Between National State and Local Society

Between National State and Local Society:
Infrastructures of Local Governance in Developed Democracies
Jefferey M. Sellers
Department of Political Science
University of Southern California
Von KelinSmid Center 327, Mailcode 0044
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0044
U.S.A.
E-mail: sellers@usc.edu
The author would like to thank Jeffrey Whitten and Rebecca Jenkins for research assistance, and
Jeb Barnes, Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot, Apichai Shipper, and Melanie Walter for comments.
Support for this research was provided by the French Ministry of Research ACI-Ville Program,
the French National Center for Scientific Research, the German Academic Exchange Service,
and the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California.
Abstract
Despite growing attention in comparative politics to subnational institutions, the local

government systems that comprise the most common element of decentralization around the
world have received little systematic attention. This article employs the first systematic,
indicator-based index of local government systems in twenty-one OECD countries to analyze the
role of these systems in state-society relations at the micro-level. Cross-national variations in
these institutions correspond more to different types of welfare states than to federalism and
decentralization as measured at higher echelons of states. The results point to the crucial but
largely unexamined roles that local government plays in the operation, performance and even the
development of these national systems of state-society relations.
Across the developed world and beyond, the reordering of territorial authority among and
within nation-states has brought new attention among comparativists to sub-national levels of
government. One of the most prominent consequences of this trend has been growing or
renewed scrutiny of governance and politics at the local, regional and metropolitan levels. A
host of studies show the importance of efforts based in localities and regions to govern common
pool resources (Ostrom, 1990), to foster economic development (Sabel, 1989), to carry out
environmental policies (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1999), to mobilize political forces and
undertake governance within urban regions (John and Cole, 2000; Sellers, 2002), and ultimately
to make democracy work (Putnam, 1993). Such work refocuses the attention of
comparativists on dimensions of governance, politics and state-society relations that have long
been recognized as critical (cf. Dahl, 1961; Dahl and Tufte, 1973). Yet local government itself,
praised by Tocqueville as a bulwark of American democracy (1968; cf. Gannett, 2003), and now
one the most consistent institutional features of democracies around the world, has received
remarkably little systematic, cross-national comparative attention. Cross-national local
comparisons that focus on the effects from differences in local governmental institutions usually
find clear variations in local politics and governance (Hoffmann-Martinot and Savitch, 2000;
Kantor, Savitch and Vicari, 2002; Sellers, 2002a, 2002b). But despite a number of theoretical or
inductive typologies (Page and Goldsmith, 1987; Hesse and Sharpe, 1991; Pierre, 1999; Vetter,
2000), the field still lacks the sort of deductive, encompassing international classifications that
now dominate comparative accounts of party systems, interest intermediation, executivelegislative relations and federalism.
Accounts of decentralization have also failed to address this need. So far, these accounts
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have either assimilated characteristics of local government into differences in federal or other
institutions above the local level (e.g., Elazar, 1999; Treisman, 2000), or ignored local
institutions altogether (Lijphart, 1999). Yet local government not only has received
constitutional protections in many more countries than provide for federalism, but varies in ways
that correspond little to the differences between federal and unitary institutions at higher levels.
Especially in recent decades, as complex, inter-related forms of multilevel policymaking and
governance have become the norm throughout developed countries, local government may have
grown even more crucial than other forms of decentralization to the policy implementation and
local participation that have grown to dominate the everyday business of the state.
This article, employing the first systematic classification of local government systems,
applies an analytically derived scale made up of quantitative and qualitative indicators to
compare institutions of local-supralocal relations and institutions of local government in twentyone developed democracies. The resulting patterns cast light not only on the precise nature of
decentralization and its relation to state-society relations, but on the underpinnings of variations
among welfare states that have so far escaped the attention of comparativists.
Taking Local Government Seriously

Despite a recent shift of attention to subnational government among some students of
comparative politics, local government itself remains only rarely an object of explicit analysis.
The tendency to regard local government as only a subset of a more general federalism or
decentralization, however, runs counter to other theoretical considerations that suggest a
distinctive role for local government in political and civic participation and in policymaking.
Especially in a domain of policy aimed at addressing widespread needs in the everyday lives of
2
citizens--such as the welfare state--implementation and decisionmaking within and among

localities can be crucial.
If local government differs from forms of decentralized authority at higher levels of the
state, then the assimilation of local government systems into such aggregated classifications as
federalism (Elazar, 1999), decentralization (Lijphart, 1999) or state and local government
(Peterson, 1995) amounts to what Sartori (1970) criticized as concept stretching. For the
economic literature on fiscal federalism, focused on the consequences from divisions of
authority for interlocal markets (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972), the distinction between local and
federal institutions may make less difference. When the analysis of different tiers focuses on the
character of governmental institutions themselves, however, the potentially distinctive
dimensions of local government must be taken into account.
More than any units of government at higher levels, local government stands closer to the
micro or individual level of relations between state and society as well as relations within the
state. At higher levels individual voters may vote and individual members of elites may initiate
policies. Within localities, individual interactions are most likely to be characteristic. In at least
two ways, this micro-level aspect makes local government and state-society relations distinctive.
As Tocqueville himself consistently argued (Gannett, 2003), local government can offer
the most extensive opportunities for local individual participation. More than higher units,
localities enable citizens to participate where they live, work, and play. The smaller scale makes
possible more face-to-face relations with fellow citizens as well as more individual relations with
leaders and officials. In localities, participation can more regularly take forms that go beyond
voting, as citizens attend community meetings, discuss matters in streets and homes, or stop by
local governmental offices for meetings.
3
Beyond this, the local level carries special significance for policymaking. In localities,
much of policy implementation becomes reality for individual firms and persons. Environmental
rules apply, subsidies are given, housing is provided, incentives induce firms to relocate. As
backward mapping from outcomes to their causes in a range of environmental, social and
economic policies demonstrates, institutions and agency within communities often overwhelm
higher level governments and policies as influences (Sellers, 2002a, 2002b).
Critical to both of these sources for the importance of local government is its relative
proximity to the communities where citizens live. In a host of domains for policymaking and
participation, the actions and forms of local government can play a critical role in the realization
of objectives pursued at higher levels. Consider the array of policies that make up the welfare
state, and the aim of social equality that, in many instances, these policies have pursued. To
create public housing that serves the needs of its occupants, for instance, necessitates local
decisions within and alongside national programs. Placement of the housing, the modes of
construction, the arrangement of neighborhoods, the provision of transportation and the
distribution of amenties all help to assure that housing of this sort will work in favor of its
occupants. Neglect of these elements, as the history of public housing in many U.S. and French
cities exemplifies, can turn even a generously funded housing project into a ghetto (BodyGendrot, 2000, pp. 180-223; Sellers, 2002a, pp. 214-267). Parallel logics make local decisions
crucial to securing effective social equality in such domains as education, training and even
social assistance. In this need for consistent elements within communities themselves, an
egalitarian welfare state resembles an entire array of environmental, economic and social policies
(Sellers, 2002a, pp. 91-109).
Measuring Infrastructures of Local Government

As institutional configurations that frame resources, constraints and often objectives at
the local level, systems of local government furnish infrastructures for these local elements of
decision-making. To compare these configurations systematically between countries requires
scales made up of indicators designed to take each of the dimensions specific to local
government into account. This article outlines a classification of local government systems
along a scale that corresponds to perhaps the most widely recognized dimension of institutional
variation. Rather than stipulate dichotomies or exclusive classifications, the approach here
measures each national configuration along the gradations of a scale between two analytically
distinct models. This approach enables an assessment both of how far countries in fact group
systematically into either of the opposed types or others, and ultimately a comparison with other
institutional scales such as those for corporatism or consensual democracy.1
Although a full account of governance at the local level would need to take account of
local social and market institutions (Ostrom, 1990; Sellers, 2002a), the scales here encompass
only variations in governmental institutions that can be captured with relative comparability.
Even if more data ultimately makes it possible to compare nongovernmental institutions, it
remains important to separate out governmental institutions analytically for purposes of studying
their relation to other patterns in politics, markets and society.
Rather than follow the lines of hierarchical authority in national states, the scale starts
from the standpoint of localities themselves. Although these governmental units can encompass
as many as three tiers of government (county, city, and neighborhood, for instance), all local
governments generally share authorities at the level of cities, towns or smaller units. For federal
5
states in particular, this approach requires that many of the institutions established by tiers of
government above this level, but below the national level, had to be considered as equivalent to
national ones. Data collection for indicators of this sort in federal countries employed a
procedure designed to aggregate institutions at all supralocal levels into a national mean rating.2
The following section outlines the conceptual logic of the scale, and the variables used to
measure each element. The analysis will then consider how these scales compared to other
dimensions of state and society.
Statism versus Localism

In their most straightforward form, variations in local government institutions revolve
around how far higher level governments have allowed local governments, and ultimately local
citizens, to exercise power. The most extreme form supralocal control might take would be to
establish no local government. Although no developed country currently follows this approach,
the powers and related capacities that supralocal governments have given to the local level vary
considerably. An index based on a variety of indicators can capture main lines of these
variations along the more general dimension of what I will call more statist or more localist
arrangements.
Since Tocquevilles nineteenth century comparisons of the centralized, state-dominated
French state to its counterpart in the decentralized, localist United States, the opposition between
statist and localist arrangements has dominated thinking about differences among local
government systems (cf. Keating, 1991, pp. 21-25). In intergovernmental relations, whether in
politics and administration or in fiscal controls, this opposition hinges on how far governments at
higher levels dictate or restrict the terms of local governmental action. Especially when
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supralocal governments exert strong controls of this sort, local government institutions that limit
influences from local society or the administrative capacities of local officials to act also foster
statism. When intergovernmental practices empower local governments, when those
governments acquire administrative capacities to act, and when local society decisively
influences those governments, a localist system prevails.
Relations With Governments at Higher Levels

One critical aspect of local government that national institutions shape are relations with
units at higher levels. The more that these institutions accord any higher level (or supralocal)
government capacities to control local governments, or give these supralocal governments
greater capacities by comparison with local governments, the more statist the system is.
Conversely, where local governments receive greater capacities either to dictate to supralocal
governments or to act autonomously, the system fits the localist model. Although the
institutions of most developed countries include both statist and localist elements, the general
patterns of variation in both politico-administrative and fiscal institutions vary along broadly
parallel lines.
Statist institutions, by contrast with localist ones, imply several specific propensities that
comparative empirical indicators can measure. In their purest form, statist arrangements furnish
no institutional guarantees of local governmental authority, nor opportunities for representation
of local interests beyond the mechanisms of higher level governments themselves. In
comparison with supralocal governments, local legal, fiscal and administrative capacities remain
minimal. Even when local governments carry out policies or raise taxes, higher level instances
subject these activities to regulatory conditions, administrative supervision or even direct control
7
over local personnel. A purely localist set of arrangements guarantees local authority, provides
for local interests to be represented in national policymaking, gives extensive capacities to local
governments, and subjects them to minimal control or supervision.
For the twenty-one OECD countries for which full data was available for the mid-1990s,
Table 1 considers seven indicators that extend to each of these elements. Each indicator ranges
the countries in the sample along a scale of 0 (Localist) to 2 (Statist). (The Appendix contains a
precise description of each of these indicators.)3 These figures can be averaged into an overall
index for the politico-administrative dimension.
[insert Table 1 about here]
As the clearest measure of formal institutional guarantees for local authority, an indicator
classifies the many constitutional textual protections on local autonomy that have increasingly
become the rule among new as well as established democracies (Stsl01). Where the constitution
admits ambiguity in these protections it received an intermediate rating.
A second indicator (Stsl02), based on estimates derived partly from empirical studies and
other data, uses the place of the national local government associations in policy as an indication
of how far localities find effective representation in national policymaking processes. Although
the indicator does not take account of informal influence by individuals, this could take place in
even the most centralized state. Rather, the indicator captures one of the most important ways
that many countries institutionally incorporate local government interests.
To fully assess local powers and ultimate local capacities necessitates indicators beyond
these formal institutional properties and positions. Although a tallying of formal powers across
all sectors of policymaking has sometimes been employed for this purpose (e.g., Council of
Europe, 1988), the shared powers among different levels of government in many areas would
8
complicate any such an assessment. Instead, as proxies for the relative allocation of powers as
well as direct indications of relative local capacities, the index employs quantitative indicators of
the local government employment as a proportion of all government employment (Stsl03), and of
expenditures of local governments as a proportion of total governmental expenditures (Stsl04).
The lower each of these different proportions, the more statist a system can be presumed to be.
A further set of indicators compares institutional means of control over local government
by national or other supralocal governments. Both indicators measure practices that established
traditions of local government have employed as means of hierarchical control over local
governments. Many countries under the influence of the Napoleonic tradition have territorial
offices of administrative supervision over local government that correspond fully or partly to the
French prefect (Stsl05). Countries like Japan and Italy, where similar offices are now elective
rather than appointive, received intermediary ratings on this scale. A separate indicator captured
the persisting practice of central government in the Benelux countries to appoint the chief
executive within local governments (Stsl06). A final indicator (Stsl07) rated how much
discretion national or other supralocal frameworks gave localities to choose their own forms of
local government.
The indicators for fiscal relations with local governments (Table 2) measure analogous
dimensions of hierarchical control and local powers. High levels of intergovernmental grants as
a proportion of local government revenues (Stfi01) ensure the supralocal governments of a
Statist system more means of control over local governments. Local governments that rely less
on such grants generally have more means to pursue their own aims. Although borrowing can
offer local governments financing beyond the limitations of supralocal financing, requirements
of hierarchical approval or other conditions for local governments (Stfi02) to borrow furnish a
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further Statist mechanism of control.

In the raising of taxes themselves, the measures of Statist or Localist arrangements also
necessarily take account of more than one dimension of hierarchical control. On the one hand,
supralocal governments that limit the share of local governments in national systems of taxation
can undermine local capacities for autonomous action (Stfi03). On the other, even when local
governments raise large proportions of overall national revenues through taxes, governments at
higher levels can still assert control over the conditions of local taxation. An index of local tax
autonomy, elaborating a set of categories developed by the OECD (OECD, 1999), rated control
of this sort for each type of local tax (Stfi04). The overall rating for each country weighted these
individual ratings by the overall proportion of each type within the total of local taxes.4
Aggregated into a mean rating, these fiscal indicators of supralocal control mostly
correlate with the overall patterns in politico-administrative indicators (r=.57, p<.01). In some
countries, the infrastructures lean more heavily on one type of control over others. Especially in
Ireland, the United Kingdom, Austria and Japan, fiscal means of control have predominated over
politico-administrative ones; in Italy, politico-administrative means have proven stronger.
Local Government and Politics

As all developed countries have allocated some degree of authority to local government,
a comprehensive set of indicators must also take account of institutions for decision-making and
politics at this level. Institutional arrangements that limit the possibilities for local political
challenges, that constrain local administrative capacity or that circumscribe possibilities for
independent local administrative action should reinforce Statist elements in the wider
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intergovernmental system. The international variations among these elements correspond only
partly to the Statist elements of intergovernmental relations (Table 3).
As infrastructures of local government generally establish elected councils and a mayor
or another official head of the local executive, the terms of these officials furnish one common
indicator of the openness of local institutions to challenges to local elites (Stlo1, Stlo2).
Comparative local case studies corroborate how shorter terms offer challengers to local elites
sooner opportunities to displace them (Sellers, 2002a, Chap. 3). Although elected councils
prevail throughout the countries analyzed here, elected mayors are less widespread. A further
indicator of mayoral election (Stlo3) classified those with direct elections as most localist, those
with direct voting for mayor as part of a council slate next, then those with selection of the
mayor by the council and appointment by external officials.
A measure of the Statist or Localist propensities in the structure of the local governmental
institutions (Stlo04) centered around the number of veto players (Tsebelis, 1995, 2001) who
could obstruct collective action between the local council and executive. This classification
drew upon and extended the categories of the most extensive recent comparative study of local
administrative practice (Mouritzen and Svara, 2000). For this indicator, a strong mayor system
stands at the most Statist end of the continuum because of the authority the executive in such a
system could exercise. Committee-leader systems organized around the leadership of an
executive committee follow. The collective leadership of an executive committee with an
externally appointed mayor adds a further veto player. A council-manager system adds the
separation of the executive from direct council supervision at the same time that legislative
decisions remain a matter of collective action by the council.
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Two final indicators capture dimensions of local administration relevant to the potential
of local governmental officials to act on their own. The size of local public employment in
relation to the total population (Stlo05) furnishes an aggregate measure of the administrative
capacities of local government. To adjust for the wide variation in this indicator, and in
particular the exceptionally low levels for Greece, the measure takes the logarithmic
transformation of this figure. Even in the presence of larger numbers of local employees, a civil
service system that integrated the local bureaucracy into a national system of recruitment,
standards, promotion and other conditions could still foster a local administration more attentive
to national policies and administrative hierarchies than to local political will. To take this
possibility into account, a further indicator captured whether either a national civil service or a
local civil service subject to national rules imposed conditions on local bureaucratic service
(Stlo06). The more conditions a national civil service imposed on employment for local
administrators, the more Statist this dimension of local institutions. National rules applied to a
distinct civil service at the local level earned a more qualified Statist rating, as systems without
such rules received the most Localist ratings.
Statism in local government institutions correlates significantly with the two hierarchical
dimensions of local government systems, but somewhat more modestly than each of these with
the other (r=.45, p<.05 for each). The United States and Switzerland rate as more Localist in
terms of both local government and the mean of the two hierarchical scales, and Belgium,
Greece, Spain, the Netherlands and Austria qualify as comparatively Statist in both senses. In
the Scandinavian countries that ranked as most Localist on the hierarchical scales, local
government institutions include mixes of Statist and Localist elements. Several other countries,
including Ireland and the United Kingdom, combine relatively high levels of hierarchical control
12
with local government institutions that enable comparatively plentiful opportunities for challenge
to local political elites.
Taking the average of the three separate indicators yields what may be considered an
overall indicator of statism and localism. This figure provides an overarching measure of how
far the infrastructure of local government concentrates authority, capacities and opportunities at
any higher levels of government, on the one hand, or within communities on the other. If the
comparative classifications here verify many of the observations from previous typologies,
systematic analysis also reveals significant departures from earlier classifications based on
parallel colonial or cultural legacies (cf. Hesse and Sharpe, 1991). Although the Anglo-Saxon
colonies largely fit together, the United Kingdom and Ireland correspond more fully to the statist
category. If the bases of Localism in the Scandinavian countries differ in important respects
from those in the United States, the overall rating turns out to be surprisingly similar.
Only with considerable qualification on the basis of size can this measure be taken as a
measure of actual opportunities for influence from above and below. Tendencies at the two ends
of the scale even suggest a limited relation to size (Figure 1). The three largest countries in
territorial terms (Canada, the United States, Australia), all of them confronting much larger land
masses than others to administer, have all adopted relatively localist systems as well as
federalism.5 Japan too, with the largest population after the United States, has tempered its more
statist fiscal elements in an overall balance with localist ones. Two of the countries with the
smallest populations and territories (Greece and Belgium), where concentration of power above
the local level might be expected to make less difference for local influence, register the most
statist averages. At the same time several mid-size countries, led by France, remain more statist
13
than many smaller countries. Although localism among the Scandinavian countries concentrates
in somewhat different dimensions of local government than in the three largest countries, it rivals
the overall level in those settings.
[insert Figure 1 about here]
Infrastructures of Local Government and Other Institutional Patterns

Taking statism and localism systematically into account can help to clarify the nature and
ultimately the consequences of other institutional arrangements. As elements of government that
bear little correspondence to the conventional institutional distinction between federal and
unitary states, statism and localism may prove even more crucial than this conventional
distinction to relations between national institutions and local society. At the least, since critical
dimensions of national policymaking and politics often depend upon and reflect the influence of
these local government systems, these systems shape influences from higher levels. The
difference between localism and statism acquires particular importance for understanding the
operation and development of different varieties of welfare states.
If decentralization to the local level corresponded with parallel arrangements at higher
levels, then these indicators of statism would exhibit a strong negative correlation with federal
arrangements. But as Figure 1 suggests, localism as measured here corresponds remarkably little
to federalism and decentralization as measured at higher levels of the state. By the same token,
statism bears little relation to centralization at higher levels. The aggregated index to measure
Statism correlates at only -.26 with the six acknowledged federal systems among these countries,
and only -.15 with Lijpharts more nuanced indicator of federalism and decentralization (for
both, p>.10).6 Of all the individual indicators, only the measure of local choice (Stsl07)
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correlates strongly with these two measures (r=-.75 for the simple measure, r=-.69 for Lijpharts,
for both p<.01). In some instances more complex links than can be captured in these overall
correlations probably do link federalism to local government forms. Despite the lack of an
overall correlation with indicators for local government representation or national civil service
practices, federalism in such countries as the United States and Canada has most likely posed an
impediment to the development of more statist local government practices. But federal countries
like Germany or Australia have largely overcome similar obstacles, while other unitary countries
manifest similarly localist tendencies. Even taking size into account, Figure 1 shows federal
countries in all of the main groupings.
Public policies are a different matter. Here systematic correspondences mark the
relationship with localism and statism. One of the most encompassing classifications of policies
among developed countries, focused on differences in welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990;
Huber and Stephens, 2001), demonstrates an especially close relationship. Controlling for
federalism at higher levels enhances the strongest of these correspondences (Table 4).
Despite some points of disagreement with respect to specific countries, analysts such as
Goodin et al. (2000) and Huber and Stephens (2001, pp. 86-105) have generally adopted EspingAndersens broad categorization of European and North American welfare states. The Social
Democratic welfare states typical of Scandinavia emphasize universal, egalitarian provision of
social insurance and a wide range of services by the state. Liberal welfare states like those of the
United States and the United Kingdom look generally to private provision for services beyond
education, confining many public services to means-tested, minimal provision. The Christian
Democratic welfare states of central and southern Europe maintain generous systems of social
15
provision but with less universality and equality than Social Democratic counterparts, and less
direct provision by the state. Huber and Stephens also classify Australia and New Zealand as a
further set of wage-earner welfare states that have recently converged toward the liberal
model, and Japan as a distinctive type of its own. Since policies that comprise the welfare state,
such as public housing, education and welfare assistance, largely take place through
implementation or even autonomous decision-making at the local level, localism and statism can
play critical roles in the delivery of these social services. As a consequence, differences in
infrastructures of local government have proven crucial to different types of welfare states.
The strong governmental role in Social Democratic welfare states might seem to make
for the most statist territorial arrangements. Yet on the contrary, with remarkable consistency,
welfare states of this type have developed some of the most localist infrastructures of local
government. Not only the overall index, but the politico-administrative indicators and to a lesser
degree the fiscal ones manifest the expected negative correlation with this type (Table 4).
Controlling for federalism only reinforces these relations. Norway, the only exception, still
stands in the middle of the international spectrum rather than at the opposite end. In fact,
localism in these welfare states is closely bound up with the high levels of public provision in
education, health and other services that Huber and Stephens call the most distinctive feature
(92) of the Social Democratic type. Localist institutions pursue the same ends of social equity
and universal services within communities that Social Democratic parties have built into the
welfare state on a wider scale. To distribute public housing in ways that promote social and
spatial integration across a metropolitan area, to provide equal and equally accessible
opportunities for education and health care, and to assure that local markets do not reinforce
social exclusion, concerted local initiatives have long been coordinated local planning with
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welfare state services (Anton, 1975; Hall, 2000, pp. 842-887). The free-commune and other
reforms that diffused throughout Scandinavian countries in the 1980s and 1990s reinforced other
elements of decentralization with new opportunities for local officials and citizens to make this
localized governance more responsive to local preferences. (Pierre, 1999; Bogason, 2000).
Contrasting correlations mark the relation of the index with Christian Democratic welfare
state. Among this group, the countries considered by Huber and Stephens include most of the
most statist systems. The overall correlation with statism is nearly as strong and consistent as the
opposite correlation with Social Democratic welfare states, falling below .05 significance only
for fiscal relations (Table 4). Seen from above, the greater statism of these settings might seem
to enable higher levels governments to pursue equality more effectively. The actual effect often
runs in the opposite direction. Just as Localism in the Social Democratic welfare states has
enabled the pursuit of national goals within communities, Statism in Christian Democratic ones
has fostered local variations in the effective character of welfare state policies. In France, the
most statist among larger countries as of the mid-1990s as well as a unitary state, several
different institutional features enabled variations in the trajectories of local economic and social
policy. In the absence of national rules and other practices that reinforced equal services within
and among localities, the will and vision of local leaders and the policy regimes these actors
constructed yielded a wide variety among cities (Levy, 1999; Body-Gendrot 2001, pp. 180-233;
Sellers, 2002a, pp. 214-238; cf. Culpepper, 2001). Where Social Democratic or other moderate
leftist elements prevailed in local policy, local governments enjoyed comparative success in
effort to fight segregation and social exclusion; in other cities the Right or pro-development
coalitions sacrificed social equity in housing and local. Unitary national government, in
concentrating larger amounts of public resources from around the country that might be brought
17
to bear in support of policies pursued in any given locality, may well have even enhanced this
variety. At the same time, in the absence of access to as much of these resources, local
governments in many smaller communities and even some larger cities often lacked capacities to
pursue effective policy to provide services. Finally, especially as support from above for local
governmental efforts to provide housing or services declined, competition among places often
induced local governments to subordinate affordable housing or social services to promotion of
economic development (Sellers, 2002a, pp. 332-333).7
The two categories of welfare states besides Japan, the liberal and wage-earner types,
correlate less clearly with the localist-statist scale. The United States, clearly within the camp of
liberal welfare states, stands nearly as close to the localist end of the scale as Sweden. Rather
than serve the pursuit of social services and equal conditions within communities there, however,
localism and federalism combine with the liberal welfare state to produce limited capacities for
local governments to provide welfare state services directly. The resulting dynamics of
competition among localities induce them to privilege economic development over other
objectives even more systematically in France (Sellers, 2002a, pp. 238-267). Not only Canada
in the liberal camp, but the wage earner welfare states of Australia and New Zealand manifest
similar local and national arrangements. At the same time, however, Great Britain as well as
Ireland combine two of the more statist infrastructures of local government as well as unitary
structures at higher levels with liberal welfare states (cf. King and Wood, 1999). If Social
Democratic welfare states appear to rely on a localist infrastructure of local government, and
Christian Democratic ones largely on a statist one, liberal welfare states have maintained variants
of both types.
The production regimes and systems of interest intermediation often identified with
18
welfare states (cf. King and Wood, 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001, pp. 86-105) bear a more
limited but nonetheless intriguing relation. Overall, and in relations between higher and lower
level governments, no consistent relation exists. But within local government and society,
coordinated market economies tend markedly toward statism. Comparative case studies of the
coordinated market economies in Germany and Scandinavia with the more liberal ones in the
United States and France demonstrate the role local institutions play. Coordination relies on
strong, active governments alongside other institutions at the local level to carry out agendas for
training, labor markets and innovation (Pierre, 1999; Sellers, 2002a, pp. 307-335, 2002b).
To investigate the precise nature of these institutional correspondences would require
further examination of how both local government and these related institutional configurations
have developed over time. Lijpharts indicator of executive dominance, a measure of how long
parties maintained cabinets from 1971-1996 (1999, pp. 132, 313), already suggests a
correspondence between control of the national government and statist local government. With
the control for federalism, this is the only one among several of his indicators for consensus
democracy to maintain a significant correspondence with the scale (Table 4). Control at the
national level may have enabled parties to construct statist institutions at the local level; or
parties may have exploited statist infrastructures to secure support from below. For many of the
developed democracies, moreover, the origins of local government systems trace back at least as
far as the emergence of welfare states and industrial capitalism in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Recent historical work suggests that local government and the interests
surrounding it, rather than simply grow of these other institutions, played an integral role in their
emergence and development (Kantzow, 1980; Petit and Marec, 1996; Topalov, 1999).
19
Conclusion
Alongside widespread devolution, a steady expansion of policymaking and state activity
in such domains as environmental regulation and economic development, and the growth of
opportunities for political participation at the local level, have placed increasing responsibilities
on local governments (Manor, 1999; Sellers, 2002a). Systematic comparison of the resulting
infrastructures of local institutions shows that these arrangements vary little along the lines of
such traditional territorial distinctions as federalism and unitary states or even more general
patterns of centralization and decentralization at higher echelons of states. Rather, local
government systems differ most clearly in ways that correspond to contrasts in the public
policies that have become the stock-in-trade of twenty-first century governance. Accumulating
micro-level evidence points to the important role that systematic national contrasts in local
institutions, participation and governance play in the operation and ultimately the performance of
national policy. Types of welfare states and their close relation to localism and statism
exemplify this critical linkage.
As data becomes available, the classification here could be elaborated with additional
institutional indicators for such practices as local referenda or local business-government
relations. Further research needs to examine other patterns in local infrastructures that may
affect wider patterns of policy (see Sellers 2003), and changes in these infrastructures over time.
Because of the strong connections between national local government systems and such
conventional national institutional categories as welfare states, studies of nation-states as analytic
units provide at best a starting point for cross-national comparison. Taking the full measure of
these local influences on national differences requires comparisons grounded in subnational
cases. The theoretical imperatives that compel this turn go well beyond the methodological
20
concerns that have typically been offered to justify subnational studies (Przeworski and Teune,
1970; Lijphart, 1974; Snyder, 2000). Patterns of government and state-society relations within
regions and metropolitan areas may ultimately provide accounts of the outputs and outcomes
from policy and of patterns of political participation as crucial to our understandings as
institutions and interests at the heights of the state (Sellers, 2002a: 393-395). Qualitative
methodologies such as process tracing, or quantitative techniques like hierarchical linear
modeling or interactive variables should aid in this endeavor. Any such analysis must take
account of how the infrastructures examined here mediate between local contexts and wider
patterns.
21
Footnotes
[T]he empirical hypothesis that regimes do cluster in [a given] manner must be evaluated within a graded
approach that can assess whether a gap [between types] exists (Collier and Adcock, 1999, pp. 554).
2
The following formula was used to calculate variations among federal units and local governments:
3Ni = (F1 + F2+ . . .Fj)/j,

or (if local variations within federal units, and information on distribution within units)
3Ni = (L1 + L2+ . . .Lk)/k,

or (estimated if variations among local and/or federal units, and inadequate information on distribution)
3Ni = (V1 + V2+ . . .Vm)/m,

3Fj = (V1 + V2+ . . .Vp)/p,
where
Ni = the value for country i,

j = the number of federal units in country i,
Fj = the value or rating for federal unit j in country i.

k = the number of local governments surveyed in country i,
Lk = the value or rating for each local government k,

Vm = one of m values present in one or more local governments or federal units of country i,
Vp = one of p values present in one or more local governments in federal unit j.
22
For more detailed, country-by-country explanations of these ratings, see Jefferey M. Sellers, National Institutions
of Local Governance in Developed Democracies: An Analysis and Classification, Working Paper (January 2003)
(online at http://www.usc.edu/dept/polsci/sellers).
4
The index applied the following formula:
Oi = 3( S1/Ci) R1 + (S2/Ci) R2 + .(Sx/Ci) Rx
where
Oi = the overall local tax autonomy rating for country i,

Sx = the total amount of revenues raised by the local governments of country i
in tax category x,
Rx = the rating of local tax autonomy for tax category x in country i,

Ci = the total local tax revenues in country i.
Where Rx had to be aggregated from distinct types of taxes, and those types could not be broken down in OECD
categories, the estimation employed the following formula:
Rx = (RT1 + . . . RTy) / yx
where
yx = the number of predominant taxes in country i within OECD tax category x,
RTy =
the rating of tax autonomy for tax y.
23
When the taxes and ratings of autonomy also varied among federal units, since
RTy = (RTFy1 + RTFy2+ . . .RTFyj)/jy),
where
RTFyj =
the rating of local tax autonomy within federal unit Fj for tax of type RTy, and
jy = the number of federal units j that raise the tax at varying rules for local tax autonomy, then
Rx= ((RTF11+RTF12+. . .RTF1j)/j1) +. . .((RTFy1 + RTFy2+. . .RTFyj)/jy)) / yx
Only the predominant taxes in each OECD category were used in these sub-national calculations. In a few cases of
inadequate subnational information the calculation employed alternative formulas based on the means ratings for the
known types of taxation (see the section on federal and local unit variations).
Although territorial size correlates more strongly with federalism (.47, p<.05) than with statism in local
government (.32, p>.10), this does not preclude the less unilinear relation that Figure 1 suggests. Overall,
population and its log correlated at under .30 with both.
6
Of the three component indicators, only Statism in local government maintains a comparatively strong correlation
(-.41 with the simple measure and -.34 with Lijpharts).
As the most heterogeneous welfare states of the three types (Huber and Stephens, 2001, p. 91), Christian
democratic welfare states included some with more egalitarian elements. In Germany, under a Christian Democratic
welfare state and somewhat more moderate statism, national policies often combined with local efforts in pursuit of
more equal access to housing and social services (Sellers, 2002a, pp. 64-86, 190-214).
24
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Treff, Karin and Perry, David B. (1997). Finances of the Nation 1996. Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation.
Treisman, Daniel. (2000). Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action or Continuity?
American Political Science Review 94: 837-858.
Tsebelis, George. (1995). Decision-making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism,
Multicamerialism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science 25:289-325.
Tsebelis, George. (2001). Veto Players. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Union of Belgian Cities and Municipalities. (2002). Union of Belgian Cities and Municipalities: a brief
description. Accessed at http://www.uvcb-vbsg.be/uvcb/english.htm (October 29, 2002).
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Relations.
35
United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. (1994). Significant Features of Fiscal
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Printing Office. (Population (1997) and Area (2000) figures at pp. 829-840).
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Germann and Ernest Weibel (eds.), Handbuch: Politisches System der Schweiz, Volume 3: Federalismus (pp. 107136). Bern, Stuttgart: Haupt.
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World Bank Group. (1997). Share of Total Government Expenditure. Washington, DC: World Bank. Online at
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/percent.htm (December 21, 2002).
36
Figure 1
Localism, Statism and Federalism, by Population and Territorial Size
United States (F)
Canada (F)
Australia (F)
Japan
Germany (F)
Italy
United Kingdom
8.5
Finland
og
d
ge
0.6
Ireland
0.8
7.0
1.0
Loc
alis
m
7.5
Belgium (F)
1.2
1.4
- St
atis
1.6 6.5
m In
dex
37
tion
. (l
Switzerland (F)
Denmark
8.0
Greece
Austria (F)
p u la
km
NorwayPortugal
Netherlands
y po
.
sq
New Zealand
Size
b
by
Spain (F)
(log
g
e
Siz
Sweden
France
ed)
Table 1
Indicators of Statism in Politico-Administrative Relations with Supralocal Governments
COUNTRY
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
CANADA
DENMARK
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
IRELAND
ITALY
JAPAN
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
NORWAY
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
UK
US
Absence of Absence of
Local government
constitutional corporate
protections representation employment as
for local
on local
proportion of all
governments public employment
autonomy
Stsl01
Stsl02
%
Stsl03
2.00
0.67
3
1.86
0.00
0.00
11
1.40
1.00
2.00
5
1.75
2.00
1.33
10
1.46
0.00
0.00
31
0.10
0.00
0.00
22
0.70
1.00
1.33
11
1.41
0.00
0.67
7
1.61
0.00
1.33
1
2.00
2.00
0.67
2
1.93
2.00
1.33
5
1.74
0.00
1.33
24
0.56
0.00
0.00
3
1.91
2.00
0.67
5
1.75
2.00
0.67
20
0.85
0.00
0.00
6
1.73
0.00
1.33
13
1.24
0.00
0.00
33
0.00
1.00
0.67
15
1.14
2.00
0.67
4
1.83
2.00
1.33
13
1.26
Local government
expenditure as
proportion of all
government
expenditures
%
Stsl04
8
1.99
23
1.54
24
1.52
22
1.55
72
0.04
69
0.13
24
1.51
29
1.35
8
2.00
10
1.93
22
1.57
60
0.40
29
1.36
14
1.82
74
0.00
17
1.73
17
1.71
73
0.02
25
1.46
45
0.88
59
0.46
Supralocal
Supralocal appointment
supervisory of executive Supralocal
officials at within local control of
local level government form
Average
Stsl05
Sts06
Stsl07
StslT
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.08
2.00
0.00
2.00
0.99
1.00
2.00
2.00
1.61
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.05
1.00
0.00
2.00
0.45
2.00
0.00
2.00
0.69
2.00
0.00
2.00
1.32
1.62
0.00
2.00
1.04
2.00
0.00
2.00
1.33
0.00
0.00
2.00
1.22
2.00
0.00
2.00
1.52
1.00
0.00
2.00
0.76
1.00
2.00
2.00
1.18
0.00
0.00
2.00
1.18
2.00
0.00
2.00
1.07
2.00
0.00
2.00
1.07
2.00
0.00
2.00
1.18
2.00
0.00
2.00
0.57
1.50
0.00
1.00
0.97
0.00
0.00
2.00
1.05
0.00
0.00
0.52
0.79
Sources: Akizuki (2001); Association de la Ville et des Communes de la Region de Bruxelles-Capitale (2002); Associao
39
Nacional de Municpios Portugueses (2002); Association des Maires de France (2002); Association des Grandes Villes de
France (2002); Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (2002); Association of Flemish Cities and
Municipalities (2002); Associazione Nazionale Communi Italiani (2002); Barzel (2002); Boswell (1996); Bush (1995);
Commonwealth Local Government Forum (2002a, 2002b, 2002c); Council of Europe (1993, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c,
1998d, 1998e, 1998f, 1998g, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2000a, 2000b, 2001); Council of Local Authorities for International
Relations (2000); Deutscher Stadtetag (2002); European Commission (1997, 2001); FEMP (2002); Federation of Canadian
Municipalities (2002); Federation of Canadian Municipalities (2001); Finnish Local Government Act (1995); International
Monetary Fund (2000); Japan Association of City Mayors (2002); Judd and Swanstrom (1998); Lidstone (2001); Meylan
(1986); Model, Creifelds, Lichtenberger (1987); Mossberger (2000); Neudorfer (1998); Newton (1997); Norwegian
Association of Regional and Local Authorities (2002); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1992);
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1997); Reed (1986); Statistics Canada (2002); Switzerland
(2002); Thurer (1998); Union of Belgian Cities and Municipalities (2002); United States Bureau of the Census (1997, 1998);
Urio and Markov (1986); World Bank Group (1997).
40
Table 2
Indicators of Statism in Fiscal Relations With Supralocal Governments
COUNTRY
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
CANADA
DENMARK
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
IRELAND
ITALY
JAPAN
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
NORWAY
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
UK
US
Grants as proportion
of local government
revenue
%
Stfi01
16
0.40
12
0.30
54
1.39
43
1.09
44
1.12
33
0.84
32
0.82
33
0.83
0
0.00
78
2.00
57
1.46
33
0.84
70
1.79
9
0.24
39
0.99
48
1.22
36
0.91
19
0.48
17
0.43
72
1.85
38
0.98
41
Constraints Local tax revenues

as a percentage of
on local
borrowing all tax revenues
Stfi02
%
Stfi03
2.00
3
1.86
2.00
11
1.40
2.00
5
1.75
1.40
10
1.46
0.00
31
0.10
0.00
22
0.70
1.00
7
1.66
1.00
7
1.61
2.00
1
2.00
2.00
2
1.93
0.00
4
1.83
2.00
24
0.56
0.00
3
1.91
1.00
5
1.75
2.00
20
0.85
0.00
6
1.73
2.00
7
1.67
0.00
33
0.00
0.00
15
1.14
2.00
4
1.83
0.02
13
1.26
Local tax
autonomy
Stfi04
0.34
1.85
0.73
0.12
1.14
0.73
1.20
1.35
2.00
0.80
0.80
1.67
0.80
0.43
1.94
1.44
1.64
1.20
0.83
0.80
0.82
Average
StfiT
1.15
1.39
1.47
1.02
0.59
0.57
1.17
1.20
1.50
1.68
1.02
1.27
1.13
0.86
1.44
1.10
1.55
0.42
0.60
1.62
0.76
Average,
PoliticoAdministrative
Indicators
StslT
1.08
0.99
1.61
1.05
0.45
0.69
1.32
1.04
1.33
1.22
1.52
0.85
1.18
1.18
1.07
1.07
1.18
0.57
0.97
1.05
0.79
Sources: Almy (2000); Auld (1989); Bush (1995); Chapman and Wood (1984); Commerce Clearing House (2002);
Coughlan and Buitleir (1996); Council of Europe (1993, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1998e, 1998f, 1998g, 1999a,
1999b, 1999c, 2000a, 2000b, 2001); Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (2000); Craig (1997); Due
(1994); European Commission (2001); French Ministry of Finance (2002); Hy and Waugh (1995); International Bureau of
Fiscal Documentation (2001); International Monetary Fund (2000); Japanese Ministry of Finance (2001); Kelove, Stotsky
and Vehorn (1997); Mullins and Cox (1995); Neudorfer (1998); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(1997, 1999, 2001); Sansom (1996); Stotsky and Sunley (1997); Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997); Treff and Perry (1997);
Victorian Local Governance Associations (2002); United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(1994); World Bank Group (1997).
42
Table 3
Indicators of Statism in Local Government and State-Society Relations
COUNTRY
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
CANADA
DENMARK
FINLAND
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
IRELAND
ITALY
JAPAN
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
NORWAY
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
UK
US
Term of
mayor (if
no mayor,
Election of of
manager)
mayor
Stlo03
Stlo01
0.67
0.47
0.50
1.50
2.00
1.67
1.00
0.67
1.33
1.00
1.33
1.00
0.67
1.67
0.41
2.00
0.67
1.00
1.33
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
1.67
0.00
0.67
1.33
1.00
0.67
1.00
0.33
1.00
1.33
1.00
0.03
1.00
1.33
0.00
0.53
0.67
Term of
council
Stlo02
0.79
1.50
1.67
0.67
1.00
1.00
1.67
1.31
1.00
1.33
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.67
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.77
Executivelegislative
veto
Population per local
points
employee
Stlo04
(persons) Stlo05
0.00
133
0.96
2.00
58
0.39
0.67
52
0.34
1.33
87
0.61
1.33
11
0.02
0.00
11
0.02
2.00
47
0.30
1.82
63
0.42
2.00
268
2.00
0.00
133
0.96
2.00
65
0.44
2.00
47
0.30
0.67
64
0.43
1.33
88
0.62
0.00
11
0.02
2.00
123
0.88
2.00
110
0.78
1.33
8
0.00
1.33
53
0.35
1.33
26
0.14
0.80
25
0.13
Civil
service for
local
personnel Average
StloT
Stlo06
0.00
0.55
2.00
1.31
2.00
1.28
0.00
0.60
1.60
1.05
1.60
0.83
2.00
1.39
2.00
1.33
2.00
1.45
0.00
0.67
0.00
0.81
0.00
0.85
1.60
1.23
0.00
0.55
0.40
0.63
1.60
1.19
1.60
1.12
1.20
0.98
0.00
0.62
1.60
0.90
0.00
0.48
OVERALL
AVERAGE
StT
0.93
1.23
1.45
0.89
0.70
0.69
1.29
1.19
1.43
1.19
1.12
1.01
1.18
0.86
1.05
1.12
1.29
0.66
0.73
1.19
0.68
Sources: Alberta Municipal Government Act of 2000; Association of the European Local
Government Chief Executives (2002); Barzel (2002); British Columbia Local Government Act
of 1996; Barzel (2002); Bush (1995); Commonwealth Local Government Forum (2002a, 2002b,
2002c); Council of Europe (1993, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1998e, 1998f, 1998g,
1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2000a, 2000b, 2001); Council of Local Authorities for International
Relations (2000); Cusack (1999); De Ftima, Mendes, and Migus (2001); Finnish Local
Government Act of 1995; Government of New Zealand (2002); Gravel (1987); International
City/County Management Association (1997); Kingdom (1993); Manitoba Municipal Act of
1996; McManus (1999); Meylan (1986); Mouritzen and Svara (2002); Neudorfer (1998); New
Brunswick Municipalities Act of 1967; Newfoundland Municipal Elections Act of 2001; Nova
Scotia (2002); Ontario Municipal Act of 2001; Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (1992); Prince Edward Island Municipalities Act of 2000; Quebec Law on
Municipal Elections of 1988; Saskatchewan Northern Municipalities Act of 1983; Saskatchewan
Rural Municipality Act of 1989; Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Act of 1984; Synnersstrom,
Lalazarian, and Manning (2001); United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (2002); Urio and Markov (1986).
43
Table 4
Bivariate and Partial Correlations of Local Government Index with Other Institutional Patterns
(Each Partial Correlation controls for Federalism) (n=21)
Welfare States (Huber and Stephens

a
2001)
Social
Christian Liberal WageDemocratic Democratic
Earner
Statist-Localist Index
-.51**
(Partial correlation)
-.64***
Statist-Localist PoliticoAdministrative Relations -.63***
-.72***
Statist-Localist Fiscal
Relations
-.47*
-.55**
Statist-Localist Local
Government
.05
-.15
.57**
.61***
-.03
.00
.16
-.14
Production Regimes and

Interest Intermediation
Corporatism Coordinated or
(Siaroff 1999) Liberal Market
Economies
(Hall and
Soskice 2001)
-.28
-.01
-.13
-.04
Consensus Democracy (Lijphart 1999)
.56**
.58**
-.01
-.00
.11
.14
-.40*
-.35
-.23
-.14
-.24
-.22
.12
.18
-.04
.25
.17
.14
.18
.16
.31
.33
.29
.31
-.07
-.06
-.35
-.25
-.23
-.26
-.41*
-.37
.45**
.49**
-.38*
-.02
.40*
.37
.11
.09
.44*
.49**
-.41*
-.36
-.41*
-.41*
.11
.32
.46**
.45**
.07
.15
.36
.47**
.12
.25
-.08
-.19
-.26
-.28
Executive
Parties
Dimension
National
Number of Minimal
Seats
Executive
parliawinning one- /votes
Dominance mentary party
disproporparties
cabinets
tionality
-.26
-.21
.42*
.51**
-.15
-.10
-.22
.16
.15
-.00
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, two-tailed significance tests.
a
Dummy variables for each type (n=18, excluding Greece, Portugal and Spain).
b
Scale values: 2 = Coordinated market economy, 1 = Market economies classified as ambiguous (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 21), 0
= Liberal market economy.
44
Appendix
Indicators of Statism in Local Governance Infrastructures
Features
Consequences
Scale
Absence of constitutional
protections on local autonomy
(Stsl01)
Absence of constitutional means to

assert local government autonomy
2=no explicit or implicit

constitutional protection
1=constitutional provisions furnish
implicit means to assert local
interests
0=explicit constitution guarantee of
local authority
Absence of corporate representation

for local governments (Stsl02)
No corporate representation of local

governments in higher level
decision-making
2=insignificant influence
1.33=limited influence
0.67=strong role, not formally
institutionalized
0=institutionalized representative
role (in constitution, laws)
Local government expenditure as

proportion of all government
expenditures (Stsl03)
Monopoly of higher level

governments on government
expenditures
2=lowest
0=highest
Local government employment as

proportion of all public employment
(Stsl04)
Monopoly of higher level

governments on government
employment
2=lowest
0=highest
Supralocal supervisory officials at

local level (Stsl05)
Carries out supralocal policies

locally/mediates clientelist relations
with higher levels
2=local administrative/supervisory
official
1=local administrative official,
elected locally or possessing limited
powers
0=no local supralocal representative
Supralocal appointment of
executive within local government
(Stsl06)
Carries out supralocal

mediates/mediates clientelist
relations with higher levels
2=supralocal appointment of
executive
0=local appointment
Supralocal-local relations
45
Supralocal determination of local

governmental forms (Stsl07)
Implements state policies about

governmental form, or leaves to
local self-determination
2=supralocal determination of local

structures
1=significant but limited elements
of local self-determination
0=widespread local choices of
government forms
Intergovernmental fiscal relations

Grants as proportion of local
government revenue (Stfi01)
Reliance on funds from higher

levels rather than locally raised
revenues
2=highest
0=lowest
Constraints on local borrowing

(Stfi02)
Local fiscal capacities to raise

revenues independently
2=Approval required
1=Almost free
0=Free, or requirement of local
majority vote
(from Council of Europe ratings)
Local tax revenues as a percentage

of all tax revenues, 1995 (Stfi03)
Local fiscal capacities to raise

revenues independently
2=Lowest
0=Highest
Local tax autonomy (Stfi04)
Limits influence of local decisionmaking on local taxation: legislated

constraints on rates, assessments,
sharing of taxes (subject partly to
local rate determinations), informal
rate constraints, procedural
constraints
2=Central or intermediate
government sets rates, base
1.60=standardized or strictly limited
rates with some discretion, but no
discretion as to base
1.20=No discretion as to base, and
range set for rates; or no discretion
as to base, and diversion of
revenues to other governments: or
informal constraints on rates
.8=No discretion as to
base/assessment, or informal
constraints on rates, or sharing
0.4=Autonomy to set
base/assessment, and procedural or
insignificant constraints on rates
(e.g., requirement of local majority
vote)
0=Full autonomy to assess and set
rates
Local government and local

society
46
Term of mayor (if no mayor, of

manager) (Stlo01)
Protection of local elites from local

political challenge
2=more than 6 years

1.67=6 years
1.33=5 years
1=4 years
.67=3 years
.33=2 years
0=1 year
Term of council (if no council,

executive committee) (Stlo02)

political challenge
2=more than 6 years

1.67=6 years
1.33=5 years
1=4 years
.67=3 years
.33=2 years
0=1 year
Election of mayor (Stlo03)

political challenge
2=not elected, appointed from

outside
1.33=indirect election by council
0.67=Election as head of electoral
list
0=Direct election
(For Australia, where no numerical
basis for estimation of variation,
average set at midpoint between
main practices)
Executive-legislative veto points

(Stlo04)
Opportunities for veto by

management body besides
mayor/manager/executive
2= strong mayor as executive

1.33= committee-leader
committee executive without
manager/mayor
.67= collective leadership of
committee, externally appointed
mayor
0= council-manager separation of
roles between council, manager
Population per local employee,

logged (Stlo05)
Low local administrative capacity
2=highest
0=lowest
47
Civil service for local personnel

(Stlo06)
System of expertise, standards for

local administrative personnel
48
2= national civil service for local

personnel with full coverage (job
duties, tenure, discipline, rewards,
closed recruitment)
1.6= national civil service for local
personnel with 4 of 5 items (job
closed recruitment)
closed recruitment)
closed recruitment); or separate,
national local civil service with job
closed recruitment
closed recruitment); or separate,
national local service with limited
conditions
0= separate local or other
subnational civil service, without
national rules

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Between National State and Local Society:

Infrastructures of Local Governance in Developed Democracies

Despite growing attention in comparative politics to subnational institutions, the local

Taking Local Government Seriously

citizens--such as the welfare state--implementation and decisionmaking within and among

Measuring Infrastructures of Local Government

Statism versus Localism

Relations With Governments at Higher Levels

further Statist mechanism of control.

Local Government and Politics

Infrastructures of Local Government and Other Institutional Patterns

3Ni = (F1 + F2+ . . .Fj)/j,

3Ni = (L1 + L2+ . . .Lk)/k,

3Ni = (V1 + V2+ . . .Vm)/m,

Ni = the value for country i,

Fj = the value or rating for federal unit j in country i.

Lk = the value or rating for each local government k,

The index applied the following formula:

Oi = 3( S1/Ci) R1 + (S2/Ci) R2 + .(Sx/Ci) Rx

Oi = the overall local tax autonomy rating for country i,

Rx = the rating of local tax autonomy for tax category x in country i,

yx = the number of predominant taxes in country i within OECD tax category x,

the rating of tax autonomy for tax y.

RTy = (RTFy1 + RTFy2+ . . .RTFyj)/jy),

Rx= ((RTF11+RTF12+. . .RTF1j)/j1) +. . .((RTFy1 + RTFy2+. . .RTFyj)/jy)) / yx

(-.41 with the simple measure and -.34 with Lijpharts).

http://www.qp.gov.ab.ca/documents/acts/L21.cfm (December 22, 2002).

http://www.kuntaliitto.fi/english/administ.htm (December 26, 2002).

http://www.clgf.demon.co.uk/research (October 21, 2002).

DC: Urban Institute Press.

Elazar, Daniel. (1999). The Globalization of Federalism. Publius.

at http://www.elections.org.nz/elections/esyst/la_index.html (October 22, 2002).

OECD. Online at http://www1.oecd.org/puma/malg/malg97/toc.htm (December 21, 2002).

http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/161_1/a35.html (December 9, 2002).

United States (F)

Constraints Local tax revenues

Welfare States (Huber and Stephens

Production Regimes and

Consensus Democracy (Lijphart 1999)

Absence of constitutional means to

2=no explicit or implicit

Absence of corporate representation

No corporate representation of local

Local government expenditure as

Monopoly of higher level

Local government employment as

Monopoly of higher level

Supralocal supervisory officials at

Carries out supralocal policies

Carries out supralocal

Supralocal determination of local

Implements state policies about

2=supralocal determination of local

Intergovernmental fiscal relations

Reliance on funds from higher

Constraints on local borrowing

Local fiscal capacities to raise

Local tax revenues as a percentage

Local fiscal capacities to raise

Local tax autonomy (Stfi04)

Limits influence of local decisionmaking on local taxation: legislated

Local government and local

Term of mayor (if no mayor, of

Protection of local elites from local