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Case Digest, People vs. Purisima, No.

L -47757-61, January 28, 1980

FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually
and separately, before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal
possession of deadly weapon or violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973. On the motion to quash by the
accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge Macaren, both of
CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed
before them an order to quash or dismiss the informations on a common ground
Lack of essential elements to constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. The
respondent judges stated that to constitute the said offense, two elements must be
present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon outside of residence
as stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it to commit or abet subversion,
rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said PD. The People, as petitioners,
thru the Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities and the intent of the accused are irrelevant since its is a
statutory offense and punishing the possession of such deadly weapon is not only to
eradicate subversive acts but also criminality in general. The petitioners also argued
that the preamble is not an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text
of the law itself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners arguments as to the intention and scope of
PD No. 9 (3) correct?

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize
the acts which are those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen.
Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those who commit or abet lawlessness,
rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9 also clearly
concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to
determine what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fall
within the purview of a penal statute.

Case Digest - Civil Law


People us Veneracion 249 SCRA 247
GR No 119987-88 Oct. 12, 1995
FACTS:
On August 2, 1994, the lifeless body of Angel Alquiza, 7 years old, was found
floating along Del Pan St., near the corner of Lavesares st., Binondo Manila. Abundio

Lagunday a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address and Lagarto of Tondo Manila were
later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Subsequently, Cordero,
Manlangit, Baltazar and Yaon were accused of the same crime of Rape with
Homicide.
On January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto and Ernesto Cordero
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced
with reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided by law. The City
Prosecutor of Manila filed a motion for Reconsideration on February 8, 1995 praying
that the decision be modified in that the penalty of death be imposed against the
respondents Lagarto and Cordero. On February 10, 1995, the judge issued an order
denying the same for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory
penalty of death under RA # 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime
Rape with Homicide.
RULING:
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of the justice system. If judges
under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted
beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of
their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men,
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its
authority.
In the case of bench, since the law in force at the time of the commission of the
crime for which respondent judge found the accused guilty, of he was bound by its
provisions. After an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper
penalty and civil liability provided for the law on the accused. This is a case in which
a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law refuses to impose a
penalty to which he disagrees.
The instant petition is Granted. The case is hereby Remanded to the RTC for the
imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with
respondent judges findings that the private respondents had committed the crime
of Rape with Homicide under Art 335 of the RPC, as amended by section 11 of RA #
7659, subject to automatic review by this court of the decision imposing the death
penalty

CHU JAN VS LUCIO BERNAS (GR NO L-10010 AUG 1, 1916)

FACTS:

Plaintiff Chu Jan brought suit against the defendant when on their cockfight match,
defendant Lucio Bernas was declared the winner. Each had put up a wager of P160
before the cockfight. Justice of peace court decided that bout was a draw.
Defendant appealed toCourt of First Instance praying judgment and ordering
defendant to abide and comply with rules and regulations governing cockfights ,to
pay P160 and return the other amount which s in safekeeping of Cockpit owner
Tomas Almonte. Defendant denied allegations and moved to dismiss cost against
plaintiff. Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal without special findings. On
plaintiff's motion, an order ordering provincial treasurer and if possible, Municipal
Treasurer of Tabacco to release Deposit of P160 and return to plaintiff Chu Jan.
Proceedings was forwarded to Supreme Court by means of the proper bill of
exceptions
ISSUE:
Did Court of First Instance ere in dismissing the case without findings since grounds
for dismissal pronounced by lower court appealed from ere that court has always
dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules governing
cockfights and duties of referees; that he does not know where to find the law and
that he knows of no law that governs the right to plaintiff and defendants
concerning cockfights.
Held:
Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case
submitted to him for decision are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for
terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding on the issue. Such
excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing that a case may arise to which no law
would be applicable, the Civil Code in 2nd paragraph of Art 6, provides that Customs
of the place shal l be observed and in absence thereof, the general principles of law.
Therefore, the judgment and order appealed from are reversed and to record of the
proceedings shall remanded to court from when they came for due trial and
judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made with regard to cost.

GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)


People vs. Jabinal
FACTS:
Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the
revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite
license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because,
although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from
the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from

the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with
them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned
appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the
firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis
of the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs.
Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People
vs. Mapa (1967).
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the courts rulings in
Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete
reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.
RULING:
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that Judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system . The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
restatement of legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to
possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang
and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said
firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it
was done was held not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.

D.M. Consunji vs. CA and Juego


TITLE: D.M. Consunji Inc. v Court of Appeals and Maria J. Juego
CITATION: GR No. 137873, April 20, 2001 | 357 SCRA 249

FACTS:

Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M.


Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was

immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician,
Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.

Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as
carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower
Building were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform
fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the
connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Luckily,
Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and
filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Joses widow filed a complaint on
May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to
receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000.

DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from
the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

HELD:

The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code.
Maria Juergo was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for
death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for
damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the
Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioners
personnel.
Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award
decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than
that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant
to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.
GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001
Consunji vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.


Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On
May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in
favor of the widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the
RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.
Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of
selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right
under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the
Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by
virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
themselves cumulatively of both actions,
RULING:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may
be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency
which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a
reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. Petitioner
does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of
negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any
defense relating to the incident.
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment
could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all
further claims under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided
under the Workmens Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived
theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals,
however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private
respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for
death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she
wouldve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.

G.R. No. L-63915

Taada, L. M. et al vs. Hon. J.C. Tuvera et al


G.R. No. L-63915
April 24, 1985
En Banc

Facts:

Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublished Executive Issuances
such as; Presidential Decrees, Proclamations, Executive Orders, general orders,
letters of implementation, and administrative orders. In defense, respondents stated
that the petitioners have no legal personality in the case citing sec. 3 of rule 65 of
the Rules of Court which lays-out the requirement for filing for a Writ of Mandamus.
Petitioners contended that the issue touches the public and thereby does not
require any special circumstance to institute an action. On the other hand,
respondents stated that publication of the mentioned issuances is not a sine qua
non requirement as the Law provides its own affectivity date as stated in Art. 2 of
the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not publication affects the validity of the Executive Issuances.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in its decision, ordered the respondents to publish the Executive
Issuances of general application, and further stated that failure for publication
would render the Issuances no binding force and effect.

It was explained that such publication is essential as it gives basis to the legal
maxim known as ignorantia legis non excusat. Thus, failure to publish would make
create injustice as would it would punish the citizen for transgression of the law
which he had no notice.
The court declared that Presidential issuances with general application without
publication would be inoperative and null and void. However, some justices in their
concurring opinions made a qualification stating that publication is not an absolute
requirement for the publication. As Justice Fernando stated that, publication is
needed but it must not only confined in the Official Gazette because it would make
those other laws not published in the Official Gazette bereft of any binding force or
effect.
G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985

Taada vs. Tuvera

FACTS:

Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to


publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be
informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions,


general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders is necessary before its enforcement.

RULING:

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date
of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the

law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude
the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general


applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

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