1. ANASTACIA QUIMEN, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 112331. May 29, 1996]
DOCTRINE:
LEAST DAMAGE > SHORTEST DISTANCE
When the easement may be established on any of several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the
way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen.
However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do
not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least
damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
FACTS:
- Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister,
inherited a piece of property in Bulacan. They agreed to
subdivide the property equally among themselves. The
shares of Anastacia and 3 other siblings were next to the
municipal road. Anastacias was at the extreme left of the
road while the lots on the right were sold by her brothers to
Catalina Santos. A portion of the lots behind Anastacias
were sold by her (as her brothers adminstratix) brother to
Yolanda.
- Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first
because it d no access to the public road. Anastacia
prevailed upon her by assuring her that she would give her
a right of way on her adjoining property (which was in front)
for p200 per square meter.
- Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as
her passageway to the public highway a portion of
anastacias property. But when yolanda finally offered to
pay for the use of the pathway anastacia refused to accept
the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia
from passing through her property.
- After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from the
Quimens (a brother), located directly behind the property of
her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore
between their house, extending about 19m from the lot of
Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of one brother, and
Anastacias perimeter fence.
- In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court
praying for a right of way through Anastacias property. The
proposed right of way was at the extreme right of
Anastacias property facing the public highway, starting
from the back of the sari-sari store and extending inward by
1m to her property and turning left for about 5m to avoid

the store in order to reach the municipal road. The way was
unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the
middle.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action, explaining that the right of way through the
brothers property was a straight path and to allow a detour
by cutting through Anastacias property would no longer
make the path straight. They held that it was more practical
to extend the existing pathway to the public road by
removing that portion of the store blocking the path as that
was the shortest route to the public road and the least
prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing through
Anastacias property.
CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right of
way on Anastacias property. The court, however, did not
award damages to her and held that Anastacia was not in
bad faith when she resisted the claim.
Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be
considered as a servient estate despite the fact that it does
not abut or adjoin the property of private respondent. She
denies ever promising Yolonda a right of way.
Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the
second lot, the easement of right of way she provided was
ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of
ownership of the dominant and the servient estates in one
person so that there was no longer any compelling reason
to provide private respondent with a right of way as there
are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose.
She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of way
is not the shortest access to the public road because of the
detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most
damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year
from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and
considering that an avocado has an average life span of
seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from
it.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was a valid grant of an easement
2) Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolonda is the least
onerous/least prejudicial to the parties
HELD: YES to both
1) A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by
covenant or granted by law to a person or class of persons to pass

over anothers property when his tenement is surrounded by

realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the
public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a
right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies
the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property.
The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are:
(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
without an adequate outlet to a public highway;
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate;
and,
(d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate.
These elements were clearly present. The evidence clearly shows
that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the
estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she
offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as
agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the
isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least
prejudicial to the servient estate. These facts are confirmed in the
ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial
court itself declared that [t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen
which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were
totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an
imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public
highway.
2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that the easement of
right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail
over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of
judicial appreciation. When the easement may be established on
any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the
one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage
should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which
will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be
the shortest.
TCs findings:

> Yolandas property was situated at the back of her fathers

property and held that there existed an available space of about
19m long which could conveniently serve as a right of way
between the boundary line and the house of Yolanda s father
> The vacant space ended at the left back of the store which was
made of strong materials
> Which explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of
Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5)
meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway.
CAs finding:
> The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is 1m wide and 5m
long at the extreme right of Anastacias property will cause the
least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested
passage through the property of Yolanda s father which would
mean destroying the sari-sari store made of strong materials.
Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid
of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, the
SC accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would
demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public
highway, and another right of way which although longer will only
require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative
should be preferred.

3. ENCARNACION vs. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondents are the owners of two adjacent
estates situated in Buco, Talisay Batangas. Petitioner owns the
dominant estate bounded on the north by the servient estate
owned by respondents and an estate owned by a Magsino. The
servient estate of the respondents was in turn bound on north by
the National Highway. In other words, the servient and the estate
of Magsino stood between the National Highway and the
petitioners estate. To provide access to the highway, a 1-meter
wide roadpath was constituted, taking half a meter each from the
estate of the respondents and that of Magsino. At the time,
petitioner started his plant nursery business on his land, using
pushcarts to haul the plants and garden soil to and from the

nursery and the highway via the 1-meter road path. As his
business grew, it became increasingly difficult to use the pushcarts
and he bought an owner-type jeep which could not pass through
the road path. He requested the respondents to sell him 1
meters of their property so that he may add the same to the
existing pathway but the respondents refised. Hence, the
petitioner instituted an action for easement of a right of way over
an additional width over the respondents estate. Both the RTC and
CA ruled against petitioner holding that the necessity interposed
by petitioner was not compelling to justify interference with the
property rights of respondents considering the presence of a dried
river bed only 80 meters away from the dominant estate through
which petitioner may drive his jeep in order to get to the highway.

modern means of conveyance or transport. Petitioner should not

be denied a passageway wide enough to accomodate his jeepney
since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant
nursery business.
Since the easement to be established in favor of petitioner is of a
continuous and permanent nature, the indemnity shall consist of
the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage
caused to the servient estate pursuant to Artcile 649 of the CC.

4. G.R. No. 175510

VALDEZ V. TABISULA

ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner is entitled to an additional easement of right of
way.
HELD:
Yes. While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the
dominant tenement, that access is grossly inadequate. Generally,
the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely
no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one,
it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the
present case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete
bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the
jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four
(4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the
river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used
at certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the
river bed which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if
there were no outlet at all.
Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the
right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of
law.
Under Art. 651 of the CC, it is the needs of the dominant property
which ultimately determine the width of the easement of right of
way. As petitioners business grew, so did the need for the use of

July 28, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased via a
January 11, 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale from respondent-spouses
Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a 200 square meter (sq.m.)
portion (the subject property) of a 380 sq. m. parcel of land
located in San Fernando, La Union. The deed stated that the
petitioners shall be provided a 2 1/2 meters wide road rightof-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included
in this sale.

Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the western

side of the subject property. Believing that that side is the
intended road right of way mentioned in the deed, petitioners,
through
their
representative,
reported
the
matter
to
the barangay for mediation and conciliation. Respondents failed to
attend the conferences scheduled by the barangay, however,
drawing petitioners to file in April 1999 or more than six years
after the execution of the deed a Complaint for Specific
Performance with Damages against respondents before the RTC
of San Fernando City, La Union. In their complaint, petitioners
alleged that they purchased the subject property on the strength
of respondents assurance of providing them a road right of
way. They thus prayed that respondents be ordered to provide the

subject property with a 2-meter wide easement and to remove

the concrete wall blocking the same.
Respondents, in their
Answer averred that the 2 -meter easement should be taken
from the western portion of the subject property and not from
theirs; and petitioners and their family are also the owners of two
properties adjoining the subject property, which adjoining
properties have access to two public roads or highways. RTC
dismissed petitioners complaint. CA affirmed. The CA held that
the deed only conveyed ownership of the subject property to
petitioners, and that the reference therein to an easement in favor
of petitioners is not a definite grant-basis of a voluntary easement
of right of way.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners are entitled to a right of way considering
that the right of way is included in the deed of absolute sale
executed by the parties
HELD: No.
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction
involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in
writing. The stipulation harped upon by petitioners that they
shall be provided a 2 meters wide road right-of-way on the
western side of their lotbut which is not included in this sale is not
a disposition of real property. The proviso that the intended grant
of right of way is not included in this sale could only mean that
the parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct
agreement for the purpose. The use of the word shall,
which is imperative or mandatory in its ordinary
signification, should be construed as merely permissive
where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or private right
requires it to be given an imperative meaning. Besides, a
document stipulating a voluntary easement must be
recorded in the Registry of Property in order not to
prejudice third parties under Articles 708 and 709 of the Civil
Code.

An easement or servitude is a real right constituted on

anothers property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which

the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow

somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of
another thing or person. The statutory basis of this right is Article
613 of the Civil Code. There are two kinds of easements
according to source by law or by the will of the owners as
provided in Article 619 of the Civil Code. Petitioners are neither
entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right of
way. For to be entitled to such kind of easement, the
preconditions under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be
established.
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way
under Article 649, the following requisites must be
complied
with: (1)
the
property
is
surrounded
by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is
not the result of the owner of the dominant estates own
acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial
to theservient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the
foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence
of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant
estate, herein petitioners. As found, however, by the trial court,
which is supported by the Sketch of the location of the lots of the
parties and those adjoining them, a common evidence of the
parties, petitioners and their family are also the owners of two
properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two
public roads or highways. Since petitioners then have more
than adequate passage to two public roads, they have no
right to demand the grant by respondents of an easement
on the western side of [respondents] lot.

VALDEZ vs TABISULA Case Digest

SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ and JOCELYN VALDEZ v. SPOUSES
FRANCISCO TABISULA and CARIDAD TABISULA
560 SCRA 332 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales,
J.)

The requisites provided in conferment of a legal easement

of right of way under the Civil Law must be complied and
such existence be proven.
FACTS: Spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez bought from Spouses
Francisco and Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land located in San
Fernando, La Union. The absolute sale indicated a right of way.
Spouses Tabisula subsequently built a concrete wall on the western
side of the subject property. Believing that that side is the intended
road right of way mentioned in the deed, Spouses Valdez opposed
such act. Conciliation was then initiated. Spouses Tabisula failed to
attend the conferences scheduled. This prompted Spouses Valdez
to file, after more than six years of execution of the deed, a
complaint for Specific Performance with Damages.
Spouses Valdez contended that they purchased the subject
property on the assurance of providing them a road right of way.
On the other hand, spouses Tabisula averred that the 2-meter
easement should be taken from the western portion of the subject
property and not theirs.
The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal.
ISSUES: Whether or not Spouses Valdez are entitled to the right of
way as indicated in the absolute sale
HELD: Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction
involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in writing.
The stipulation harped upon by Spouses Valdez that they shall be
provided a 2 meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of
their lot but which is not included in this sale is not a disposition of
real property. The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is
not included in this sale could only mean that the parties would
have to enter into a separate and distinct agreement for the
purpose. The use of the word shall, which is imperative or
mandatory in its ordinary signification, should be construed as
merely permissive where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit
or private right requires it to be given an imperative meaning.

As found, however, by the trial court, which is supported by the

Sketch of the location of the lots of the parties and those adjoining
them, a common evidence of the parties, Spouses Valdez and their
family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject
property which have access to two public roads or highways.
To be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649,
the following requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the
isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estates own
acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to
the servant estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the
foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence of
these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate,
herein the spouses Valdez.
Since Spouses Valdez then have more than adequate passage to
two public roads, they have no right to demand the grant by
spouses Tabisula of an easement on the western side of Spouses
Tabisulas lot.

5. VDA. DE BALTAZAR V. COURT OF APPEALS- Easement of

Right of Way

For someone to be entitled of an easement of right of way,

4 requisites must be present: (1) the estate must be
surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway (2) after payment of the proper
indemnity (3) the isolation is not due to the propietors
own acts and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
FACTS:

Daniel Panganiban is the owner of Lot No. 1027. It is bounded on

the north by Sta. Ana River, on the south by the land of vda. de
Baltazar and on the west by lot 1028 and on the east by Lot 1025.
Directly in front of 1026, 1028, and 1025 is the Braulio St.
Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars for the
establishment of a permanent and perpetual easement of right of
way for him to have access to the provincial road. The RTC
dismissed the complaint for it found 2 other passageways. The CA
reversed the decision for it found that there was a strip of land
used by Panganiban and his grandfather as a right of way for 30
years until it was closed and that the 2 other passageways were
only temporary and was granted to Panganiban when the right of
way was closed. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Panganiban is entitled to an easement of right of
way
RULING: YES
It has been held that for someone to be entitled of an easement of
right of way, 4 requisites must be present. (1) the estate must be
surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to
a public highway (2) after payment of the proper indemnity (3) the
isolation is not due to the propietors own acts and (4) the right of
way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate
and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

Panganiban has all 4 requisites. With regard to the 1st requisite,

his land is bounded on all sides by immovables, the lands of
Baltazar, Legaspi and Calimon and by the river. The 2nd requisite
is settled by a remand to the lower court for the determination of
the proper indemnity. As regards the 3rd requisite, it was found
that Panganiban bought the land from the Baltazars therefore its
isolation was not due to his own acts. And with regard to the 4th
requisite, the passage claimed is the shortest distance from his lot
to Braulio Street. Panganiban was established all 4 requisites
therefore is entitled to the easement.

6. Apolinardito and Perfecta Quintanilla, petitioners

-versusPedro Abangan and DARYLS Collections Intl. Inc., respondents
Key Facts:
Sometime in the 1960s Perfecta donated a lot to his son,
Apolinardito, who is now registered as the owner thereof.
Petitioners also own a domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of rattan-made furniture. In the conduct of
their business, they use vans to haul and transport materials and
products. As they wanted to expand their business and construct a
warehouse on their property, they asked for a right of way from
Pedro sometime in April 1994.
However, Pedro who was the owner of the servient estate
near the dominant estate of the petitioners, sold the same to
DARYLS on March 1994, and thereafter, constructed a concrete
warehouse enclosed by a concrete fence.
Petitoners sought the imposition of an easement of Right of
Way over the servient estate.
RTC dismiss the case for lack of merit saying that there was
already a concrete fence around the area of the servient estate
plus inside was a concrete warehouse. Thus to impose ROW (Right
of Way) will create substantial damage to the servient estate. The
RTC observed also that the imposition of ROW passing to the
servient estate would make for convenient access to the main
passage of the vans. Otherwise, if the ROW were to be constituted
on any other surrounding properties, then the vans of the
petitioners would have to make a turn. On this premise, the RTC
opined that MERE CONVENIENCE TO THE DOMINANT ESTATE
SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE THE BASIS FOR THE COMPULSORY
EASEMENT OF ROW.
Aggrieved petitioners went on to the CA to appeal. CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC saying again that the least

prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the shortest

distance.

CA when it noted that the criterion of least prejudice to the

servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance.

Petitioners went to the SC, contending that the criterion of

least prejudice should be applied at the time of the filing of the
original complaint; otherwise, it will be easy for the servient estate
to evade the burden by subsequently constructing structures
thereon in order to increase the damage or prejudice.

According to the SC, as between a ROW that would

demolish a fence of strong materials to provide ingress and egress
to a public highway and another ROW which although longer will
only require a van or vehicle to make a turn, the second
alternative should be preferred.

On the other hand, respondents contend that ROW would

cause substantial damage considering that a concrete fence has
already erected thereon. In fact, they also submit that petitioners
can have adequate ingress to or egress from the dominant estate
by passing through surrounding vacant lots.

Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is

required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory
easement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not in compliance with the requirements set
forth in Art. 649 and 650 of the NCC, the Right of Way may be
imposed?
HELD:
Petition was DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT. CA decision was
AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
Easement for Right of Way Requisites:
1. Dominant estate must be surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. Proper indemnity has been paid;
3. The isolation was not due to acts of the owner of the
dominant estate; and
4. ROW claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the estate.
As far as the SC is concerned, in the present case, the
fourth requisite is absent. SC concurs aptly to the wisdom of the