Amado Picart vs Frank Smith

SYLLABUS
1. NEGLIGENCE; CRITERION FOR DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF NEGLIGENCE. The test for
determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results
to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man, in the position of the
person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure
to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of
the admonition born of this prevision, is the constitutive fact in negligence.
2. ID.; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; SUCCESSIVE NEGLIGENT ACTS. Where both parties
are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an
appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference
to the prior negligence of the other party.
3. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobile
ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of the
automobile, however, guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he
was only a few feet away. He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that
the latter being frightened, jumped around and was killed by the passing car. Held: That
although the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the
defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages resulting from the collision,
as he had a fair opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized the situation created by
the negligence of the plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while the
plaintiff could by no means then place himself in a position of greater safety.
Facts:
Amado Picart was riding on his pony over the Carlatan Bidge in La Union when he saw Frank
Smiths automobile heading towards the bridge. Picart claimed that due to the cars rapid
speed, he pulled on the right side of the bridge instead of going on the left. Smith, on the
other hand, on the assumption that Picart would move to the right side, guided his car on
the left side of the bridge. Smith blew his cars horn to give warning signals but Picart did
not go to the right side of the bridge. By the time Smith change his side to avoid hitting the
horse; he was so near the horse that it became frightened. The horse turned its body across
the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, its leg was struck by the car and
broke. The horse fell and Picart was thrown off with some violence. Picart suffered
contusions and the horse died. Picart then filed a complaint against Smith seeking to recover
P31,100.00 as damages caused by the accident.
The trial court absolved Smith from liability. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Smith was guilty of negligence.
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that although Picart was guilty of negligence in being on the
wrong side of the bridge, Smith was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages
resulting from the collision, as he had a fair opportunity to avoid the accident after he
realized the situation created by the negligence of Picart and failed to avail himself of that
opportunity; while Picart could by no means then place himself in a position of greater
safety.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
In the case at bar, Smith had the right to assume that Picart and his horse would pass over
to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to
his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was
too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. The control of the
situation had then passed entirely to Smith; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an
immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other
side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of
doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was deceived into
doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known
nature of horses, there was an appreciable risks that, if the animal in question was
unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and jump under the conditions which
here confronted him. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he
was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.