AFF

China Bad
The alternative is Chinese imperialism
Horner and Leiken 6

(Charles, graduate of University of Pennsylvania and former Adjunct Professor in

Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Robert, Ph.D. in Politics from Oxford University, Senior Fellow
at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution, "Is the Chinese Model
Gaining Economic and Political Influence in Latin America?", 8/10/06,
www.hudson.org/files/documents/ChineseModelNov21.pdf slim_)
And the corollary to this, I suppose, is that the only non-white people in the world who really matter, say, in running
the international economy are either Japanese or Chinese. Or maybe theyre Korean, but lets just say for the sake

the
Chinese have a certain thing going for themselves. Theyre not European, theyre
not American, theyre not white. They have another advantage in the fact that they call their
system socialism and that they call their ruling party communist. And this, as Jaime suggests, with
respect to their actual conduct, you see, allows them to say or allows them to claim, allows them
to think that what they do that their economic expansion in the world is somehow different in
kind from the Western economic expansion of the 19th and 20th century, and that
Chinas multinational banks and corporations, who are very active in Latin America is
something different, and so on, even as, analytically speaking, Hobson or Lenin would recognize
China as a kind of economic imperialist power. It imports primary products; its a creditor; it
exports finished goods; it exploits its own and other countries cheap labor, is what it does do; it invests in
and wants to control critical infrastructure like ports, airports, highways, telecommunications; and it uses its
political influence that is to say corrupts local political systems to protect its economic interests. But there
of this argument the Chinese now. It used to be the Japanese had a certain purchase in their model. So

may for all of this now, I think were already beginning to see the signs of the certain self-limiting aspect of it. As
Chair Mao himself once wrote, you see, Wherever there is oppression, there will be resistance. And we cant be

there are resentments already building in Brazil about the terms of

trade, or in Mexico about the fact that China is a competitor for the American market.
And countries which export primary products are not happy to see the Chinese
drifting vaguely into the group of importers, trying to use their own strong position in the market I think
the technical term for this is monopsonist position to somehow bargain with exporters for price
constraints. And therefore it does seem that the countries are on the receiving end of this sort of thing,
surprised therefore that

wherever they are, tend to seek balance. In this case the so-called stronger parties are China and the United States,
and presumably it is in the space between them that one finds ones own opportunities as countries in this situation
always have ever since 1945.

That kills democracy and leads to protectionism and arms

races
Horner and Leiken 6

(Charles, graduate of University of Pennsylvania and former Adjunct Professor in

Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Robert, Ph.D. in Politics from Oxford University, Senior Fellow
at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution, "Is the Chinese Model
Gaining Economic and Political Influence in Latin America?", 8/10/06,
www.hudson.org/files/documents/ChineseModelNov21.pdf slim_)
But in any case, so Latin America welcomes the chance to kind of reduce its dependence on us. But

there are

several rather negative impacts or even potential impacts of Chinas involvement in Latin America
for Latin America. First of all, right now, although Latin America has benefited tremendously by Chinas huge
imports from the region, 2006 may turn out to be the first year where the terms of trade switch because
Chinas exports, manufactured exports, to Latin America have been increasing very, very
rapidly. I thought I had the numbers here but I dont. But anyway, this year may be the year where Latin America

more to Latin America than it imports. This clearly is changing. Argentina is a key example
where the imports of Chinese goods into Argentina have been growing very, very rapidly
sells

compared to the exports to China. The other way in which the involvement in China will work against
Latin America, and maybe already has, is that China managed when it was promising all these great trade
benefits and agreements managed to get Argentina, Chile and Brazil to grant it a to label it a
give it market economy status , which meant that anti-dumping legislation under the WTO
rules would be the impact of them would be substantially diminished . They couldnt bring Latin
American countries couldnt bring those kinds of charges. So as a result, this gave China much more
access to their markets in terms of exports of Chinese manufactured goods . Even the
United States and Europe didnt give China the market economy status, and Brazil, Argentina and Chile did. And I

its going to tip the scales

much more in favor of China, which doesnt exactly abide by all the free trade kinds of
rules. Its highly protectionist; also, it steals a lot of intellectual property and the like. The
other problem with the relationship is that because of the commodities boom, et cetera, Latin America
the chances of Latin America enacting the kinds of economic reforms that are necessary in
order to make the Latin American economies more globally competitive are now reduced,
think Ecuador recently joined in. So this is going to hurt Latin America because

with the exception of Chile everything is always with the exception of Chile. But with the exception of Chile, which
is setting aside some of the revenues from the commodities boom for times when the commodities boom is not with
us, most of Latin America is just spending the money, taking it in but not thinking ahead, not planning, not using it
to make Latin America more economically competitive globally. So these are chickens hat are going to come home

Chinese relationships with

countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, et cetera, works to undermine democracy in the
region and strengthens countries that are not exactly pro-democratic or anti-military or whatever.
to roost. The other negative for Latin America is that obviously

And, of course, Im someone who grew up went to graduate school during the days of dependency theory, where

scholars were claiming that coming from the left that the relationship with
U.S. and multinational corporations, et cetera, was bad for Latin America. The terms of trade were bad;
the Latin American

that Latin America was being reinforced as a producer of commodities, whereas the United States was selling
manufacturers to Latin America. Well, guess what? I mean, thats China and Latin America now . I
mean, you could make the argument that the economic relationship with China is reinforcing Latin Americas
traditional role as a commodities producer, and is favoring Chinese efforts to sell manufacturers, which supposedly
have, in general, better terms of trade. Finally the issue of, is it good or bad for the United States, Chinas
relationship with Latin America? I mean, some of this is already obvious, that it helps the United States interests in
the region to the extent that China helps Latin America grow and stabilize. China is not interested in having a
chaotic, unstable Latin America for reasons of its own, and that of course is good for the United States, too. But on
the other hand, if you look at the pillars I mean, a lot of people say that the United States has no policy toward
Latin America so there is no way we can even identify what the pillars of the policy are, but I do think we do have a
policy toward Latin America. Whether or not its the right one or whether or not were doing enough is another

democracy and human rights, the Chinese involvement is

not supportive of that. Support for market economies China is in a sense kind of neutral. Some of
them are being supported; some of them are not. Arms race its helping in terms of supporting
countries like Venezuela, et cetera. In terms of support for the Latin American left we dont care about
the Latin American left in general as long as theyre democratic. Well, the Chinese behavior is also
consolidating the or helping to consolidate the not-good Latin American left.
issue. But support for

Chinese imperialism kills the economy

Horner and Leiken 6

(Charles, graduate of University of Pennsylvania and former Adjunct Professor in

Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and Robert, Ph.D. in Politics from Oxford University, Senior Fellow
at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings Institution, "Is the Chinese Model
Gaining Economic and Political Influence in Latin America?", 8/10/06,
www.hudson.org/files/documents/ChineseModelNov21.pdf slim_)
It reminds me of that famous was it Al Capone quote? which Im sure Ill mangle, but someone asked him why he

China interested in Latin

America primarily starting out? Thats where the commodities are . But anyway, in terms of the
robbed banks and he said, well, thats where the money is. In a sense, why is

actual context, I mean, China has been growing about 9.5 percent for the last decade or two, actually two decades,

to sustain this rate of growth for a population the size of China they need
commodities and food. And if you look at the situation today it was interesting when Charles mentioned
and so obviously

that at a certain point China accounted for what was it? 30 percent of the GNP, you said. Today I think its only
about 4 or 5 percent of the world GNP. But today well, I have it here: China, 4.4 percent of the worlds GNP, but it

consumes, as of today, 7.4 percent of the worlds oil, 31 percent of the worlds coal, 30 percent of the worlds iron,
27 percent of world steel and 40 percent of cement. So clearly China is on a tear economically and needs these
kinds of inputs into its economy to continue growth and its economic development effort. But of course its economic
development effort isnt only about economic development; its also about political stability. There is an argument
to be made that I dont know what percentage of economic growth China needs to sustain annually, but if it has
been growing at 9.5 percent, obviously to suddenly go down to 2 percent or 3 percent will not keep China stable.
Its hard to predict in that kind of political system what the consequences of a drastic or even a gradual slowing of
economic growth would be, but I think that we could all speculate, and its not going to be very great, very good. So
there is that issue too, the political stability issue. And so both of these things the desire to modernize the
economy and become a great economic power, and also to maintain political stability are really behind Chinas
growth Chinas search for commodities and food. The other motivating factor is that

China does not like

living in a unipolar world, or at least in a world where there is only one superpower. And although we think
of China as a big country, basically its still developing, and it actually shouldnt be so surprising to think
that China feels itself vulnerable in this kind of situation. And we get all excited when we see
China is moving into the Western hemisphere, but were all over Asia . I mean, its not
exactly as if China has control over the whole Asia-Pacific region. It doesnt. It would like to increase its power and
control there obviously. So this sense of Chinese vulnerability and the idea that the United States wants to stay the

the United States government, in a paper or two, said that thats

our strategy should be, to maintain our superpower our only superpower
status. And also China looks around and sees that the United States is willing to intervene, both
diplomatically and even militarily, when it doesnt like certain governments because
of its politics or human rights behavior or whatever. And although we can say were never going to
only superpower it got this idea because
exactly what

invade China I mean, we have enough trouble with Iraq; were certainly not going to invade China its not clear

U.S. behavior in the world undermines or feeds Chinas

sense of vulnerability. And so as a result of these things, Chinas strategy has been to both
how can I put it? avoid its dependence on any particular area of the world or any particular
that China sees it that way I mean that

countries, both economically and politically: economically diversified sources for what it needs to feed its economy,
diplomatically work in multilateral institutions to try and create strategic alliances throughout the world, diversify

to do this and this is part

it looks for a
particular niche if it could. And one niche thats just up there for grabs are countries, which for a
variety of reasons, dont have particularly good relations with the U nited States and/or Europe.
And so either because of political instability in those areas, which make them less
desirable to foreign investors, or because foreign investors, private investors, or China has an
advantage against private investors because they can afford, through their state economic and financial
institutions, to lend money at below market rates and they themselves are subsidizing various
things that they do, and also they can operate in countries where legal restrictions
involving human rights abuses, et cetera, keep the United States and Europe out. And so it
both its strategic and its trade partners, et cetera. And one of the things that it does

of what disturbs the United States, and Ill talk about it later is that it has been you know,

should come as no surprise that these countries are particularly receptive to any kinds of Chinese overtures, and
China obviously sees that it has a comparative advantage in those kinds of countries.

Democracy Good
Democracy promotion and foreign aid are key to sustainability
Bitar 11 (Sergio, Director of the Inter-American Dialogue, "Latin America and the United States: Looking
Towards 2020," September 2011, www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/LAtheUS2020.pdf slim_)

Which policies and international agreements could be most fruitful in helping countries both
specialize in high-tech natural resource production while at the same time diversify into more
sophisticated sectors? Education and infrastructure are two priority areas for development
and Latin America can avail itself of foreign assistance in both. In education, some countries
need to guarantee K-12 coverage, and all of them need to improve quality. These are domestic tasks, but
foreign support can help narrow the gap in areas such as graduate studies and technological
research. President Obamas proposal to increase the number of US graduate students in Latin America to
100,000and also increase the number of Latin Americans studying in the United States by the same numbercan
play a key role in launching ambitious initiatives of cooperation. Infrastructure is the second major challenge. It is

Latin America will need US$1 trillion for infrastructure improvements in

the coming decade. In addition to fiscal resources, better infrastructure will require
growing support from the IADB, CAF, and other international financial
institutions, along with private contributions through concessions or international businesses. China could
estimated that

become an even more relevant actor in the region should it decide to complement its search for commodities and

The United States

will need to secure supplier arrangements with Latin American oil producers , while
Latin America will need markets, along with investment and innovation in biofuels and
renewable energy, especially solar. On renewal energy and environmental questions, it would be fruitful to
food with investments in infrastructure and other industries. Energy is another critical area.

pursue technology transfers and joint research initiatives. The intense relationship with Asia will increase the
importance of the South Pacific and will demand better infrastructure and services. The Trans-Pacific partnership
should provide Latin American APEC members with new opportunities for coordination with the rest of the region

shared priorities. These

include: education, science and technology, infrastructure, productivity,
specialization, social inclusion, equal opportunity, strengthening of democratic institutions ,
and citizen participation. Education and infrastructure will provide the human and physical capital. Better
services and new technologies will help increase productivity. And an emphasis on renewable energy
will increase exports in more environmentally friendly ways . The strongest performers will be
and the United States. Though each countrys path will be different, there are

those that make a big bet on changing production structures to achieve the green economy of the future and that
forge Korean-style public-private partnerships. The task ahead is complex. Neither good macroeconomic policies nor
growth alone are sufficient. Absent greater equality, protection, and social inclusion, success will remain elusive.

Sustainable growth is not possible in countries marked by inequalities in income and

power and that lack national unity and self-confidence. Greater social mobility, an emphasis on merit, and equal
opportunity are preconditions for tackling ambitious challenges and avoiding the middle-income trap. This task will
demand tax reforms that generate resources to provide public goods that will increase national well-being and
productivity, which go hand-in-hand. In the new stage of Latin Americas development, strengthening institutions
and broadening citizen participation are other prerequisites for success. Although our democracies are marked by

it is now crucial to expand citizen participation, enlarge the role of civil

society, and guarantee transparency in government . In some South American nations,
periodic elections,

democratically elected executives bent on staying in power have attempted to subordinate independent
institutions. In Central America and Mexico, organized crime undermines the governments and the democratic

Installing a democracy
and living in peace is considerably harder than implementing sound economic
policy. And without democratic institutions, economic policy is not
sustainable. Active involvement in global governance should also be a priority for Latin American countries,
especially medium-sized and smaller ones. In a multipolar world, it makes sense for Latin America to
support multilateralism and participate more actively in global governance . In the
coming years, Latin America should seek a larger presence in the G-20, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, and the United Nations. Unlike larger countries, each of the small and medium-sized countries
system. This scourge is draining national energies; defeating it is a collective task.

will not be able on their own to influence the international issues that concern them. Joint action to reform
multilateral agencies is, therefore, crucial to the defense of their national interests . Each country
will have to reinforce its strategic thinking and look at the medium term to identify the vital reforms that improve
the well-being of its citizens.

Democracy strengthening is key to environmental protection, stability, and disaster

preparedness
Bitar 11 (Sergio, Director of the Inter-American Dialogue, "Latin America and the United States: Looking
Towards 2020," September 2011, www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/LAtheUS2020.pdf slim_)

Democracy Strengthening a) In Central America, collaboration could bolster the fight

against organized crime, improve citizen security, and strengthen democratic
institutions. The United States has proposed a Central America Citizen Security Partnership.
High levels of drug consumption and arms sales to countries south of the border give the United
States a special responsibility in this regard. Mexico and Colombia can also make an important
contribution, while South America can cooperate in security, crime investigation, police training, and other

The region
should also offer support to help facilitate a transition to democracy in Cuba . Despite
initiatives. b) South American nations should get more involved in providing assistance to Haiti. c)

the steps taken by the Obama administration regarding visits and remittances, the ineffective US embargo
continues with no end in sight. For Latin Americans, it will be important to have conditions in place for a peaceful
transition when Cuban leadership changes. It is helpful to encourage some processes underway in Cuba, such as
the release of political prisoners, improved freedom of expression, and economic reforms, which could pave the way
for a democratic opening. Energy and Climate Change Although President Obama has spoken about an Energy and
Climate Partnership of the Americas, its content, priorities, goals, and resources remain unclear. a) There are

opportunities for collaboration in developing renewable energy sources , especially solar,

and assisting with nuclear plant safety and ethanol, cleaner coal, and natural gas research. b) Partnership with
the United States could also help Latin America reduce CO2 emissions, protect tropical
and temperate forests, and safeguard glaciers and water resources . Latin America
abounds in natural resources and must take measures to protect them. c) Climate change and
increasing concentration of the population will intensify the impact of natural
disasters. Emergency preparedness requires effective institutions , first responder
training, equipment acquisition, public education, and improved land use and construction standards.
Latin American countries can take the initiative in these areas.

Development Good
Development good alleviates poverty and inequality
Worstall 12

(Tim, Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute, "So What is this Neoliberal Globalisation Free Trade
Thing About Anyway?", 3/1/12, www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/03/01/so-what-is-this-neoliberalglobalisation-free-trade-thing-about-anyway/ slim_)
Its easy enough to find people with opinions, strong opinions, on what this neoliberal globalisation and free trade
thing is all about. Sadly, youll find

most of those strong opinions are that its about grinding the noses of

the poor into the dust, breaking the unions, stiffing the working classes and in general feeding as
much money as is humanly possible up to the 1%. You might find a few references to Wall St v. Main St, shipping all
the good jobs off to China and even, among the more perceptive, the idea that its all about creating a global
economy rather than a series of national ones. All would agree though that its something that started in the late
70s, was driven along by both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, has included the lowering of trade barriers, a
lifting of regulations and in general a move to a more free market stance on how the economy should be managed
and regulated. The what we agree on: the result we obviously dont. For here is the point, the purpose, the aim and

this very neoliberal revolution. Thats what it was all about. We wanted to make the
poor rich. The data released by the World Banks Development Research Group show
that 22% of the developing worlds population or 1.29 billion people lived on $1.25 or
less a day in 2008, down from 43% in 1990 and 52% in 1981 (see top chart above). Nothing
the outcome of

Machiavellian about it, nothing to do with trying to make the rich richer, nothing at all to do with shafting the

aim and intention was to reduce poverty around

the world and as you can see it has rather worked. These last 30 years of the neoliberal
globalisation thing have seen the largest reduction in human poverty ever. More
people have moved from the destitution that was mans long lasting lot to a better life of three
squares a day and a roof over their heads than in any other time period in our species history .
working class. Quite the opposite in fact. The

Its difficult to get over quite how large these figures are: were talking about more people than the entire
population of Europe, or of North America, leaving absolute poverty in fewer years than I have been alive. In fact,

This is a simply astonishing development . Think back to

the UN put forward the Millennium Development Goals. One of them was a
halving of absolute poverty by the year 2015. We were told that this could only be achieved by
not far off half the years I have been alive.
the year 2000 when

huge effort, by a substantial movement of resources from the rich world to the poor. That huge effort hasnt

the target has already been met, years early. Purely through that very
neoliberal globalisation. Nothing particularly odd or strange about the process either: allow people
happened but

economic freedom, allow them to trade with whom they will and wealth just gets created all on its ownsome. I like it
when a plan comes together, dont you? We wanted to aid the poor in getting rich. We have done, by trading with
them. A useful conclusion would be that if we want to continue the process of making the poor rich we should
expand economic freedom and trade more with them.

Empirics
Empirics first discourse focus is epistemologically flawed and paralyzes action
Rodwell 5 (Jonathan, Ph.D. student at Manchester Metropolitan University, "Trendy But Empty: A Response to
Richard Jackson," www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm slim_)

there is no attempt to explore the complexity of causation is that this would

clearly automatically undermine the concentration on discourse. Moreover it would
require the admittance of identifiable evidence about the real world to be able to say anything
about it! For if something historical changed the meaning of a word , or if something about
society gave the word a different meaning and impact, then it would be an identifiable
The reason it

something. Moreover if the word is tied to and altered by an historical event or social impact, would it not be a

without
clear causal links between materially identifiable events and factors any assessment
within the argument actually becomes nonsensical. Mirroring the early inability to criticise, if we have no
traditional causational discussion how can we know what is happening? For example, Jackson details how
the rhetoric of anti-terrorism and fear is obfuscating the real problems. It is proposed that the real world
killers are not terrorism, but disease or illegal drugs or environmental issues. The problem is how do we know
this? It seems we know this because there is evidence that illustrates as much Jackson himself quoting to Dr
David King who argued global warming is a greater that than terrorism. The only problem of course is that
discourse analysis has established (as argued by Jackson) that Kings argument would just
be self-contained discourse designed to naturalise another arguments for his own
reasons. Ultimately it would be no more valid than the argument that excessive consumption of Sugar Puffs is
case of assessing the effect of original event itself as well as the language? The larger problem is that

the real global threat. It is worth repeating that I dont personally believe global terrorism is the worlds primary
threat, nor do I believe that Sugar Puffs are a global killer. But

without the ability to identify real facts

about the world we can simply say anything, or we can say nothing. This is clearly ridiculous and
many post-structuralists can see this. Their argument is that there are empirically more persuasive
explanations.[xi] The phrase empirically

persuasive is however the final undermining of post-structural

discourse analysis. It is a seemingly fairly obvious reintroduction of traditional methodology
and causal links. It implies things that can be seen to be right regardless of perspective
or discourse. It again goes without saying that logically in this case if such an assessment is possible then
undeniable material factors about the word are real and are knowable outside of any cultural definition.

Language or culture then does not wholy constitute reality. How do we know in the end that the
world not threatened by the onslaught of an oppressive and dangerous breakfast cereal? Because
empirically persuasive evidence tells us this is the case. The question must then be asked, is
our

Imperialism Good
Imperialism prevents war interdependence, institutionbuilding, and democracy promotion
Ikenberry 4

(G. John Ikenberry, Prof. of Geopolitics, Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004)
Is the United States an empire? If so, Ferguson's liberal empire is a more persuasive portrait than is Johnson's

the notion of empire is misleading -- and misses the distinctive

aspects of the global political order that has developed around U.S. power. The United States has
pursued imperial policies, especially toward weak countries in the periphery. But U.S. relations with
military empire. But ultimately,

Europe, Japan, China, and Russia cannot be described as imperial, even when "neo" or "liberal" modifies the term.

advanced democracies operate within a "security community" in which the use or

of force is unthinkable. Their economies are deeply interwoven. Together, they form a
political order built on bargains, diffuse reciprocity, and an array of
intergovernmental institutions and ad hoc working relationships. This is not empire; it is a U.S.-led
democratic political order that has no name or historical antecedent. To be sure, the
neoconservatives in Washington have trumpeted their own imperial vision: an era of global rule
organized around the bold unilateral exercise of military power, gradual disentanglement from the
constraints of multilateralism, and an aggressive effort to spread freedom and democracy. But this vision is
founded on illusions of U.S. power. It fails to appreciate the role of cooperation and rules in the
exercise and preservation of such power. Its pursuit would strip the United States of its legitimacy as
The

threat

the preeminent global power and severely compromise the authority that flows from such legitimacy. Ultimately,
the neoconservatives are silent on the full range of global challenges and opportunities that face the United States.

the American public has no desire to run colonies or manage a

global empire. Thus, there are limits on American imperial pretensions even in a unipolar
era. Ultimately, the empire debate misses the most important international development
of recent years: the long peace among great powers, which some scholars argue marks the end of greatpower war. Capitalism, democracy, and nuclear weapons all help explain this peace. But
so too does the unique way in which the United States has gone about the business of building an
international order. The United States' success stems from the creation and extension of international
institutions that have limited and legitimated U.S. power.
And as Ferguson notes,

Liberalization Good
US-led reforms are key solves economic and social distortions
Mesa-Lago 2 (Carmelo, PhD in Labor Economics and Social Security from Cornell University, "Models of
Development, Social Policy and Reform in Latin America," unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/
(httpAuxPages)/7E4B8522A609EC67C1256C7C0039C99D/$file/mesalong.pdf slim_)

Costa Rica. One of the best representatives of the mixed model , which combined a
market economy with a considerable state role, and achieved a fair balance between
social and economic goals with good results in both (1953-1981). But the debt crisis of the 1980s and the
exhaustion of that model (excessive state intervention and fiscal imbalances) led to structural adjustment reforms
in that decade and in the 1990s, albeit so far successful in maintaining the most important social gains (see also

two models were extremes: Chile overemphasized the market

while drastically reducing state functions and social goals, while Cuba did
exactly the opposite; Costa Rica managed to fairly balance goals and means . But
Mesa-Lago 2000a). The first
and economic goals

adjustments have been occurring in the three countries: toward social goals and more state regulatory powers in
Chile since the 1990s; toward economic goals and a timid move to the market in Cuba since the 1990s (still with
overwhelming state ownership and control); and toward economic goals and the market in Costa Rica since the

the three diverse economic models have been implemented by different

political systems: a military dictatorship in Chile (followed by multiparty democracy), one-party
authoritarian socialism in Cuba, and a multiparty democracy in Costa Rica (Mesa-Lago
1980s. Finally

2000d). The three countries selected are also important examples in Latin America of a relatively early emphasis on
social policies, thus ratifying Pierson's observation that "late starters (in industrialization) tended to develop welfare
institutions earlier in their own individual development and under more comprehensive terms of coverage" (cited in
Mkandawire 2000: 11). Chile and Cuba were two of five regional "pioneers" in the development of social insurance
(respectively in the 1920s and 1930s), while Costa Rica's program started later (in 1943 but this country was less
developed that the other two) and yet it was expanded in 1960-1970s and reached the level of the other two
counterparts. By the 1980s, the three countries had basically accomplished universal coverage of their populations

a UNRISD
comparative study that analyzed the unique experience of seven countries that achieved
although with diverse schemes (Mesa-Lago 1998). The three countries were selected for

levels of social performance considerably higher than their per capita income (Ghai 2000). The socioeconomic
performance of the three models is summarized in the next section. Socioeconomic Performance of the Three

Models Twenty indicators of development were selected to measure the socioeconomic

performance of the three countries and historical statistical series elaborated for 1960-1993 (in Chile the relevant

half of the indicators dealt with economic variables, both internal and
GDP growth, GDP per capita, investment, inflation, fiscal balance , composition of
GDP by economic sector, export concentration/ diversification , import composition, trade partner
concentration/diversification, trade balance per capita, and foreign debt per capita. The other half of the
indicators dealt with social variables: real wages, composition of the labour force by
sector, open unemployment, illiteracy, educational enrolment at three levels, infant
mortality, rates of contagious diseases, life expectancy, and housing . Five important social
period started in 1973). About
external:

indicators had to be discarded in the final evaluation because of two reasons: lack of data from Cuba (income
distribution, poverty incidence) or significant differences in the way those indicators were calculated (womens

Two types
of ranking were used in each of the indicators: (1) absolute, measuring the starting and
ending years in the period, for instance, the infant mortality rate in 1960 (or 1973 for Chile) and 1993; and
(2) relative improvement, the change in one indicator through time, for instance, the reduction in
participation in the labour force, access to water and sewerage/sanitation, social security coverage).

infant mortality between 1960/73 and 1993. The indicators were merged in each of the two clusters (economic and
social), and the two clusters then combined into an index of economic and social development (using various

The results of these comparisons in the absolute rankings among the three countries were as
follows: Chile ranked best (first) in economic indicators but worse (third) on social indicators; Costa Rica
ranked best in social indicators and second in the economic indicators . Cuba ranked
weights).

second in social indicators (in the 1990s, but first in the 1980s) and worst in economic indicators.1 In the relative

Costa Rica managed to close the gap with Cuba, despite a worse
stand at the starting point, for instance, in 1960 life expectancy was 61.6 years in Costa Rica and 64.0 in
improvement indicators,

Cuba but in 1995-2000 they were 76.5 and 76.0 respectively. Finally, a comparison was done with international

the Human Development

Index (H.I.) ranked the three countries in 1993 (among 174 countries in the world and 20 in Latin
America) as follows: Costa Rica 31 and 1, Chile 33 and 3, and Cuba 79 and 10 (UNDP 1996). The
balanced approach to development in Costa Rica , therefore, led to a fair performance
in economic indicators and to the best results in social indicators . Conversely, the
extreme approaches of the other two countries resulted in good performance in one set but
sacrificing the other. In Chile there were strong economic growth, lower inflation and a reduction in the fiscal
rankings that include the three countries, with similar results. For instance,

deficit, but social consequences were adverse: poverty incidence worsened, real wages shrank, educational
enrolment at secondary and tertiary levels declined, social security coverage decreased, unemployment jumped to

Cuba was leading the region in

most social indicators (housing was a notorious exception), but the cost of social programs was very high
and adverse economic distortions occurred , for instance, open unemployment was kept low but at
a historical record, and morbidity rates rose. 2 At the end of the 1980s

the cost of significant overstaffing and very low labour productivity, and egalitarianism probably led to the least
income inequality in the region but generated perverse incentives for labour absenteeism.

Latin American globalization is key to investor confidence and

productivity
Price 11 (John, Graduate in Commerce from Queen's University in Canada, has taught international business at
Universidad de las Americas in Mexico City, Globalization Is Here to Stay: Why Latin America Must Accept Its
Globalized Destiny and Ready Itself to Compete," 8/19/11,
https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Task_Force_Papers/Price-GlobalizationTFPaper.pdf slim_)

political risk and flighty investor confidence has obliged Latin

savers to park almost $2.5 trillion outside of the region4. Though this tide of money has slowed in
Latin Americas Achilles heel of

recent years, it continues to haunt economies like those of Venezuela, Bolivia and most of those in Central America.
When local savers become antsy, as Peruvians were after the presidential victory of Ollanta Humala in 2011, there
is a small army of private bankers, located in Miami, ready to move the monies of these Latin Americans off-shore in

Latin Americas banking system is chronically undercapitalized. Governments and companies turn to international bond markets to raise
funds, ostensibly at cheaper rates than they can source at home. Only Chile, with three decades of pension-fund
a matter of hours. As a result,

growth, can begin to claim financial independence. Everyone else must convince international bond markets of their

It has become a rite of passage for newly-elected presidentsto make a

pilgrimage to Washington, New York, London and, increasingly, Chinese financial markets, to
present their country in a competitive light , making bold promises to the investment and
worthiness.

development bank communities about proven policies that they plan to preserve and/or reforms they plan to
implement. Those promises, covered widely by the press at home and abroad, become a policy straitjacket that
tends to restrain any populist instincts that these new presidents developed during their election campaigns. Even
Hugo Chvez, who was first elected president of Venezuela when crude prices per barrel barely reached double
digits, made the rounds as president-elect, wooing investors with promises of an open investment climate. His tune
changed radically as oil prices climbed and he developed an economic model that could be sustained (for a while)

Latin Americas greatest competitive weakness is its

lack of legal protections and transparency needed to support innovation . Latin
without imported capital and technology.

Americans may be creative and entrepreneurial, but the region is the worst performer in the world when it comes to
bringing innovation to market. Latin America, home to 9% of the worlds population and 8% of its gross domestic
product (GDP), produces only 0.3% of the worlds patents.5 Among Latin American universities, government and
the private sector, only 6,000 patents per year are registered. In comparison, there are at least five U.S. universities

Latin American patent production relies

too much on government-funded labs and universities to make them. As a result, they are
less commercial in nature than patent production coming out of markets like South Korea or the United
States where large companies lead research and development (R&D) investment. Latin Americas economies,
therefore, rely on imported technology and products to make them work. Import
substitution is a non-starter and only leads to a dramatic drop in productivity. Mexicos
national monopolistic oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex,) facing declining yields from its older oil
fields, has for years been desperate to develop the deep water reserves sitting off its
producing that volume each year, individually. Furthermore,

Caribbean shore before deep water American oil rigs outside the 200km limit figure out how to poach them.

Despite strong political opposition, the Caldern administration was obliged to reform its
highly nationalistic energy laws in order to invite third-party service companies into the energy sector.
Additional reforms may be required to save Pemex from financial ruin as its output
declines. Latin American governments must learn that taxing imported technology makes about as much sense as
Japanstaxing imported energy.

Perm
Perm solves Latin America is a unique site for convergence of political
and critical projects
Escobar 10 (Arturo, Ph.D. in Development Policy and Philosophy from UC Berkeley and Professor of
Anthropology at UNC Chapel Hill, "Latin America at a Crossroads," Cultural Studies, 24: 1, pp. 1-65, 12 January
2010, slim_)

specificity also has to do with the multiplicity of long-term histories and

trajectories that underlie the cultural and political projects at play. It can plausibly be argued
that the region could be moving at the very least beyond the idea of a single, universal
modernity and towards a more plural set of modernities. Whether it is also moving beyond the
dominance of one set of modernities (Euro-modernities), or not, remains to be seen. Although moving to a
post-liberal society does not seem to be the project of the progressive governments, some social
movements could be seen as pointing in this direction. A third layer to which attention
needs to be paid is, of course, the reactions by, and projects from, the right. State, social
movements, and the right appear as three inter-related but distinct spheres of culturalpolitical intervention. Said differently, this paper seeks to understand the current conjuncture, in
the sense of a description of a social formation as fractured and conflictual, along multiple
axes, planes and scales, constantly in search of temporary balances or structural stabilities through a
variety of practices and processes of struggle and negotiation(Grossberg 2006, p. 4). Latin America can be
fruitfully seen as a crossroads: a regional formation where critical theories arising from many
trajectories (from Marxist political economy and post-structuralism to decolonial thought),
a multiplicity of histories and futures, and very diverse cultural and political projects all find a
convergence space. As we shall see, the current conjuncture can be said to be defined by two processes: the
This

crisis of the neo-liberal model of the past three decades; and the crisis of the project of bringing about modernity in
the continent since the Conquest.

Perm solves (or floating pik solves) the hybrid structure of

postliberalism allows for the convergence of ideology
Escobar 10 (Arturo, Ph.D. in Development Policy and Philosophy
from UC Berkeley and Professor of Anthropology at UNC Chapel
Hill, "Latin America at a Crossroads," Cultural Studies, 24: 1,
pp. 1-65, 12 January 2010, slim_)
Second, I understand the post before capitalist, liberal, and statist in a very specific manner. For Arditti and Lineras,

post-liberalism means a state of affairs characterized by hybrid practices , as a result of a

partial displacement of the dominant forms of Western liberalism and the
acknowledgment of other social and political forms , such as those of peasant and indigenous
groups. I mean something similar but a bit more. My understanding of the post is poststructuralist. It has been said

the notion of post-development (Escobar 1995) that it pointed at a pristine future where development
intuited the possibility of
visualizing an era where development ceased to be the central organizing principle
of social life and which, even more, visualized such a displacement as already happening in the
present. The same with post-liberalism, as a space/ time when social life is no longer seen as
so thoroughly determined by the constructs of economy, individual, instrumental
rationality, private property, and so forth as characteristic of liberalism modernity. It is not a state to be
arrived at in the future but something that is always under construction. Postcapitalist similarly means
looking at the economy as made up of a diversity of capitalist, alternative capitalist,
of

would no longer exist. Nothing of the sort was intended with the notion, which

and non-capitalist practices ; it signals a state of affairs when capitalism is no longer the
hegemonic form of economy (as in the capitalocentric frameworks of most political economies), where
the domain of the economy is not fully and naturally occupied by capitalism but by an array of economies
solidarity, cooperative, social, communal, even criminal economies that cannot be reduced to capitalism (Gibson-

the post signals the notions that the economy is not essentially
or naturally capitalist, societies are not naturally liberal , and the state is not the only
way of instituting social power as we have imagined it to be . The post, succinctly, means a
decentering of capitalism in the definition of the economy , of liberalism in the definition of
society and the polity, and of state forms of power as the defining matrix of social
organization. This does not mean that capitalism, liberalism, and state forms cease to
exist; it means that their discursive and social centrality have been displaced somewhat, so
that the range of existing social experiences that are considered valid and credible
alternatives to what exist is significantly enlarged (Santos 2007a). Taken together,
postliberalism, post-capitalism, and post-statist forms point at alternatives to the dominant
forms of Euro-centered modernity what might be called alternatives to modernity , or transmodernity
Graham 2006). In other words,

(Dussel 2000). Operating in the cracks of modernity/coloniality, this expression gives content to the World Social

this notion is not solely a conceit

of researchers but that it can be gleaned at least from the discourses and practices of
some social movements and intellectuals close to those movements will be shown in the rest of this paper.
Forum slogan,another world(s) is (are) possible(Escobar 2004). That

Sustainable/Inevitable
Globalization is inevitable and sustainable key to economic
stability
Price 11 (John, Graduate in Commerce from Queen's University in Canada, has taught international business at
Universidad de las Americas in Mexico City, Globalization Is Here to Stay: Why Latin America Must Accept Its
Globalized Destiny and Ready Itself to Compete," 8/19/11,
https://umshare.miami.edu/web/wda/hemisphericpolicy/Task_Force_Papers/Price-GlobalizationTFPaper.pdf slim_)

a sizeable industry of academics , pundits, policy makers and journalists that debates
the virtues and risks of globalization in Latin America, as if the region has a choice in the
matter. It does not. Latin America is the most globalized region in the world and it became
that way out of economic survival . And as globalized as Latin Americas trade and investment flows are
today, the region would stand to gain from an even deeper embrace of open borders .
Only competitive pressure will rekindle the spirit of reform that has sadly gone dormant in Latin
There exists

America in todays benign economic conditions of high commodity prices and cheap capital. Little Choice but to

Latin Americas competitive strengths and weaknesses oblige it to open

itself to trade and investment with other countries, particularly the industrialized world,
including China. South Americas greatest strength is its abundant natural resources . As
Globalize Both

the head of agricultural promotion at PromPeru (Perus export promotion agency) once remarked, when asked why
the countrys yields were so impressive, God is almighty and benevolent, and also happens to be Peruvian. The

home to 20% of the worlds

proven oil reserves1 (including the newly discovered Tup and Jupiter oil fields off the Atlantic coast of Brazil),
26%2 of global mining investment and 25%3 of the worlds arable land. The obvious
markets for Latin Americas natural abundance , however, are far away: northern China,
Japan, South Korea, Eastern USA and Western Europe. To explore, extract and ship the
regions commodities to distant markets, Latin America needs access to cheap capital
and the latest technology, that is, open capital markets and international strategic investors .
same retort could be repeated across the continent. South America is

To attract strategic investors to the mining and energy sectors, where it can take over 10 years to recapture initial
investments, nations must build and maintain a sound business climate. When they
to do so (e.g., Venezuelan and Mexican oil industries currently; Colombian mining industry during the 1990s),

productivity and wealth creation drop .

fail

Imperialism Good
Imperialism does more good than bad
Boot 03 (Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies,
U.S. Imperialism: A Force for Good May 13, 2003, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/usimperialism-force-good/p5959)

While the formal empire mostly disappeared after the Second World War, the United States set out on another bout
of imperialism in Germany and Japan. Oh, sorry -- that wasn't imperialism; it was "occupation." But when Americans
are running foreign governments, it's a distinction without a difference. Likewise, recent "nation-building"
experiments in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan are imperialism under another name. Mind you, this
is not meant as a condemnation. The history of American imperialism is hardly one of unadorned good doing; there

But, on the whole,

U.S. imperialism has been the greatest force for good in the world during
the past century. It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and
Nazism and lesser evils such as the Taliban and Serbian ethnic cleansing.
Along the way, it has helped spread liberal institutions to countries as
diverse as South Korea and Panama. Yet, while generally successful as imperialists, Americans
have been plenty of shameful episodes, such as the mistreatment of the Indians.

have been loath to confirm that's what they were doing. That's OK. Given the historical baggage that "imperialism"

But it should definitely

embrace the practice. That doesn't mean looting Iraq of its natural
resources; nothing could be more destructive of the goal of building a
stable government in Baghdad. It means imposing the rule of law,
property rights, free speech and other guarantees, at gunpoint if need be.
This will require selecting a new ruler who is committed to pluralism and
then backing him or her to the hilt. Iran and other neighbouring states won't hesitate to impose
carries, there's no need for the U.S. government to embrace the term.

their despotic views on Iraq; we shouldn't hesitate to impose our democratic views.

Imperialism is needed to maintain order

FERGUSON 04 (NIALL, Professor of History at Harvard University, A World

Without Power JULY 1, 2004,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/07/01/a_world_without_power?page=full)
If the United States
retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not China, not
the Muslim world -- and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a
single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare
of a new Dark Age. We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the history of world
Critics of U.S. global dominance should pause and consider the alternative.

politics, it seems, someone is always the hegemon, or bidding to become it. Today, it is the United States; a century
ago, it was the United Kingdom. Before that, it was France, Spain, and so on. The famed 19th-century German
historian Leopold von Ranke, doyen of the study of statecraft, portrayed modern European history as an incessant
struggle for mastery, in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent conflict. The influence of
economics on the study of diplomacy only seems to confirm the notion that history is a competition between rival

In his bestselling 1987 work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:
Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Yale University
historian Paul Kennedy concluded that, like all past empires, the U.S. and
Russian superpowers would inevitably succumb to overstretch. But their
place would soon be usurped, Kennedy argued, by the rising powers of
China and Japan, both still unencumbered by the dead weight of imperial
military commitments. In his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, University of Chicago
powers.

political scientist John J. Mearsheimer updates Kennedy's account. Having failed to succumb to overstretch, and
after surviving the German and Japanese challenges, he argues, the United States must now brace for the ascent of

new rivals. "[A] rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty-first
century," contends Mearsheimer. "[T]he United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth
slow considerably in the years ahead." China is not the only threat Mearsheimer foresees. The European Union (EU)
too has the potential to become "a formidable rival." Power, in other words, is not a natural monopoly; the

The "unipolarity" identified by some

commentators following the Soviet collapse cannot last much longer, for
the simple reason that history hates a hyperpower. Sooner or later,
challengers will emerge, and back we must go to a multipolar, multipower
world. But what if these esteemed theorists are all wrong? What if the world is actually heading for a period
struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal.

when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of power, there is an absence of power? Such a situation
is not unknown in history. Although the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with the achievements
of great powers -- whether civilizations, empires, or nation-states -- they have not wholly overlooked eras when
power receded. Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of "apolarity," if you will) is hardly

Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that,

rather than a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no
hegemon at all may be the real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could
turn out to mean an anarchic new Dark Age: an era of waning empires and
religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's
forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a
few fortified enclaves.
encouraging.

American imperialism is awesome

Miller 11 (Harrison, head writer and research for The Miller Monitor, Justifying
Imperialism December 21, 2011, https://sites.google.com/a/ncpsk12.org/amhnews-h-miller-2011/intellectual/justifying-imperialism)

United States imperialism began in the late 1800s and since its inception Americans have been debating the moral
validity behind the idea. Through the tenacious leadership of American presidents, the United States has been

The effects of United States

imperialism have been positive and justify the concept because the ideals
of democracy have been spread to the nations of Panama and the
Philippines, and Puerto Rico continue to be positively influenced by
American politics, economy, and culture. Since interaction began between
America and Panama in the early twentieth century we have been able to
see how both parties benefit from the United States intervention. America
influencing other countries in political, economic, and cultural ways.

originally went into Panama because they wanted to build the Panama Canal. The Panama Canal would benefit the
United States in trade because it was a good passageway between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans - it could save
Americans time and money. However, Columbia owned Panama at the time, and would not let the United States
build and use a canal in Panama; Panama, displeased with Columbias rule in their country, turned to the United

Once independent, Panama granted America the canal and both

nations walked away from the situation very pleased. America stayed in
Panama to build and use the canal until 1977, when the Panamanians
wanted to be fully independent. In 1989, however, the United States
helped Panama overthrow the dictator Noriega and restored democracy to
the Central American nation. The United States has stayed in Panama ever
since, and the Panamanians are happy with their involvement because
America has helped them maintain both liberty and democracy. Panama is just
States for help.

one example; America has also maintained freedom and democracy in Puerto Rico. The United States originally

They gained Puerto Rico

from the war, and helped Puerto Rico by guiding them and controlling the
island's politics and economics for the first few years of independence.
Times have changed, and, Puerto Rico has become a commonwealth; they
have their own their own government, we support them economically.
became involved in Puerto Rico as a result of the Spanish American War.

Politically, Puerto Ricos government is democratic due to the exposure

the island received in prior years from the United States. The democratic
government ensures that all Puerto Ricans are free and equal and entitled to suffrage. Without Americas
involvement, Puerto Rico might not have become the democracy that it is today; America spread democracy to
them, and perhaps there is one less dictatorship because of that. Although America is no longer taking over other
countries as much as they used to in the twentieth century, but a different kind of imperialism still exists cultural
imperialism. Cultural imperialism is the promotion of American beliefs in morals through the growth of our industry

While some say that cultural imperialism does not affect other
countries positively, it is clear that there many benefits linked to cultural
imperialism. Those who don't support imperialism believe that America needs to listen to Gandhi, who said
in other nations.

that I want the culture of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off
my feet by any. While the quote has its truths, this is indeed and opinion that can easily be argued. Gandhi is
saying that he is open to learning about other cultures, but doesnt want to be forced to take part in one.

However, America is not forcing anyone to take part in their culture and
has not in the past; countries like France and China have limited American
cultural programming through satellites and the Internet. With six billion
people in the world, one culture taking over would be impossible. And
even if it were possible, what constitutes American culture? It is my belief
that our culture is just a homogenized cluster of all the cultures in the
world, so in part, nations are scared to accepted a "tainted" version of
their original culture? Cultural imperialism is spreading though American culture to those who want it,
just as the most successful imperialism in the twentieth century resulted when countries were happy overall with

The majorities of both Panama and Puerto Rico (based on a

vote) are happy with the current involvement of the United States. The
United States helped them economically and politically. They are both
democratic, and cultural imperialism is just spreading other American
beliefs through American movies goods, and brand names, to those who
want them. After analyzing historical growth of the American empire, it is
safe to say that there has been an overall positive affect of United States
imperialism. Panama has been helped economically with the building of the canal, and the ideal of
American influence.

democracy made their government democratic. Puerto Rico also has a democratic government, and the United
States economically supports them. Americans spread the ideal of democracy, and as a result these two countries
are democratic. American cultural imperialism exists today for those countries who want to learn about American
culture. Thus, the United States has positively affected other countries with the ideal of democracy, and continues
to spread their culture to other countries today, justifying the validity of imperialism.

Colonialism is key for democracy in underdeveloped nations

Ishiyama 11
[John T. Ishiyama, 6. Democratization and the Global Environment, Comparative Politics: Principles of Democracy
and Democratization, April 20 2011, Wiley interscience]
An oft- cited additional international factor affecting democratic development, particularly in the developing
world, is the legacy of colonialism. On the one hand, there is the extremely Eurocentric view that

the spread

of democracy is the political outcome of the spread of European values and traditions
via colonialism (for a discussion, see Huntington, 1984 ). This is because, theoretically, the
colonial power may have transmitted some of its culture and language to
the colony, which in turn may have led to the emergence of a cooperative
political culture, or may have left institutions that were conducive to democracy in place when the colonizing
powers exited (Weiner, 1989 ). However, some scholars (Barro, 1999 ; Quainoo, 2000 ) have found no relationship
between colonial heritage and democracy, while others (Lipset et al ., 1993; Clague et al. , 2001 ) fi nd that being a
former British colony increases the probability that a country becomes democratic. In particular, several scholars
have argued that the type of colonizer was important in explaining whether a country was able to develop into a
democracy after the end of colonial rule. Myron Weiner (1989) , for instance, noted that by 1983 every country in
the Third World that emerged from colonial rule since World War II with a population of at least one million (and
almost all the smaller countries as well) with a continuous democratic experience was a former British colony. This
would suggest that there was something about British colonial rule that made it different from the colonial
administration of other European states, such as France and Belgium. Khapoya (1998) , for instance, distinguishes
between two main types of colonial rule in Africa: indirect rule and direct rule. The British generally used a system

indirect rule, where the emphasis was not on the assimilation of Africans to become black Britishers,
empower the Africans with the ability to run
their own communities. Thus, instead of assimilating the Africans as British citizens, society was
of

but rather to share skills, values, and culture, to

segregated between the natives and the whites living in the colony. The British also employed an indirect system of
administrative rule. Generally this meant that the colonial authorities would co - opt the local power structure (the
kings, chiefs, or headman) and via invitations, coercion, or bribery, incorporate them into the colonial
administrative structure. In return, these local elites were expected to enforce laws, collect taxes, and serve as the

A positive consequence of this system

of indirect rule (a system used elsewhere in the British Empire, such as in India and Malaya) was that
it provided native elites with important experiences in self - rule. Further,
many British colonies adopted practices that mimicked British practices such as
experience with electoral, legislative, and judicial institutions (Clague et al. ,
buffer between the natives and colonial authorities.

2001 ). Given this level of preparedness, then following World War II, Britain was much more willing than other
colonial powers to grant independence, which in turn made the newly independent states more willing to retain the
institutions the British had put into place. Thus, from this perspective, Britain seems to have left its colonies in a
better situation to develop democracy later than non - British colonies.

Imperialism Ethical
Imperialism breeds democratic self rule
Kurtz 03 (Stanley, Senior Fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center, A just
empire? Democratic Imperialism: A Blueprint, April 1, 2003,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6426)
Even the mildest imperialism will
be experienced by many as a humiliation. Yet imperialism as the midwife
of democratic self-rule is an undeniable good. Liberal imperialism is thus a
moral and logical scandal, a simultaneous denial and affirmation of selfrule that is impossible either to fully accept or repudiate. The counterfactual offers
a way out. If democracy did not depend on colonialism, we could confidently forswear empire. But in
contrast to early modern colonial history, we do know the answer to the
counterfactual in the case of Iraq. After many decades of independence,
there is still no democracy in Iraq. Those who attribute this fact to
American policy are not persuasive, since autocracy is pervasive in the
Arab world, and since America has encouraged and accepted democracies
in many other regions. So the reality of Iraqi dictatorship tilts an admittedly precarious moral balance in
Our commitment to political autonomy sets up a moral paradox.

favor of liberal imperialism.

American imperialism K2 world peace

Elshtain 03 (Jean Bethke, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and
Political Ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School, Just War Against
Terrorism pg. 169)

The heavy burden being imposed on the United States does not require
that the United States remain on hair-trigger alert at every moment. But it
does oblige the United States to evaluate all claims and to make a
determination as to whether it can intervene effectively and in a way that
does more good than harmwith the primary objective of interdiction so
that democratic civil society can be built or rebuilt. This approach is better by far than
those strategies of evasion and denial of the sort visible in Rwanda, in Bosnia, or in the sort of "advice" given to

At this point in time the possibility of

international peace and stability premised on equal regard for all rests
largely, though not exclusively, on American power. Many persons and powers do not
Americans by some of our European critics.

like this fact, but it is inescapable. As Michael Ignatieff puts it, the "most carefree and confident empire in history

America's
fate is tied inextricably to the fates of states and societies around the
world. If large pockets of the globe start to go badhere, there,
everywhere (the infamous "failed state" syndrome)the drain on
American power and treasure will reach a point where it can no longer be
borne.
now grimly confronts the question of whether it can escape Rome's ultimate fate."9 Furthermore,

Intervention protects basic human rights

Nardin and Pritcharal 90 (Terry- professor and head of the Political Science
Department at the National University of Singapore, Kathleen D- director of

community impact product development for the United Way of America, ETHICS
AND INTERVENTION: THE UNITED STATES IN GRENADA, 1983 1990, pg 9)
A second major argument in favor of intervention is based on a concern
for human rights. This argument rests on the idea that a country that
values democracy and individual rights should be pre-pared to act when
those values are threatened, not only at home but abroad. According to this
view, it is simply intolerable for a free nation to stand on the sidelines while foreign
tyrants like Idi Amin and Pal Pat enslave and massacre their own unfortunate
subjects. At least in extreme cases like these. unilateral intervention should
be permitted if other means fall. A nation that is not in a position to
intervene Itself should support those governments (like Tanzania in the
case of Idi Amin) that are able to act.

Imperialism Inevitable
Imperialism cant be blamed solely on the imperialist
Said 94 (Edward W., was a professor of English and Comparative Literature at
Columbia University, a literary theorist, and a public intellectual, Culture and
Imperialism May 31, 1994, pg. 19)

Domination and inequities of power and wealth are perennial facts of human society. But in today's global setting

The nations
of contemporary Asia, Latin America, and Africa are politically
independent but in many ways are as dominated and dependent as they
were 'when ruled directly by European powers. On the one hand, this is
the consequence of self-inflicted wounds, critics like V. S. Naipaul are wont
to say: they (everyone knows that "they" means coloreds, wogs, niggers)
are to blame for what "they" are, and it's no use droning on about the
legacy of imperialism. On the other hand, blaming the Europeans
sweepingly for the misfortunes of the present is not much of an
alternative. What we need to do is to look at these Matters as a network
of interdependent histories that it would be inaccurate and senseless to
repress, useful and interesting to understand. The point here is not complicated. If while
they are also interpretable as having something to do with imperialism, its history, its new forms.

sitting in Oxford, Paris, or New York you tell Arabs or Africans that they belong to a basically sick or unregenerate

Even if you prevail over them, they are not

going to concede to you your essential superiority or your right to rule
them despite your evident wealth and power. The history of this standoff
is manifest throughout colonies where white masters were once
unchallenged but finally driven out. Conversely, the triumphant natives soon enough found that
culture, you are unlikely to convince them.

they needed the West and that the idea of fatal independence was a nationalist fiction designed mainly for what
Fanon calls the "nationalist bourgeoisie," who in turn often ran the new countries with a callous, exploitative tyranny
reminiscent of the departed masters.

Perm
Perm solves Their absolutist rejection of imperialism is too
dualistic
Angus 4 (Ian, Professor of humanities at Simon Fraser University, Empire, Borders, Place: A Critique of Hardt and Negris Concept of
Empire. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v007/7.3angus.html)
The two critical points that I have made converge on a central issue: how

can one find a limit to the expansive tendency of

empire? The inscription of a border and a politics of place both pertain to the construction of a limit to
expansion and thus to hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges (xii). While
deterritorialization cannot be exactly reversed, it is not true that this implies that emancipation must
lie in further deterritorialization and that all reterritorializations are perverse, or fundamentalist.
They are artificiala matter of human artificeto be sure. However, it can be argued that the most profound and effective
anti-neoliberal globalization politics in recent years has been inspired precisely by inventive
reterritorializations, localizations that retrieve that which has been pushed aside by empire and
preserved by borders. It is a politics of limit to empire so that a plurality of differences can occur
differences from empire, not the putative consumer differences that are equalized by exchanges . Leonard
Cohen has pointed to the problem of empire in this fashion. Things are going to slide in all directions. Wont be nothing. Nothing you can measure
anymore.24 How exactly to define limits, draw borders, to open a space where measure can be taken, will take a great deal of political debate and action in
deciding. There is a lot more to be said and done about this, but I doubt whether the perspective put forward in Empire will be of much use in this important
matter. Their

concept of abstraction is too dualistic, their concept of border too one-sided, their concept of
history too uni-linear, their concept of place too shallow, to have much long-term resonance in the antineoliberal globalization alliance. I would put my bets on the construction of borders that allow Others to flourish, a politics of place and a
defence of communities against exchange value. This is a very different politics whose difference is perhaps now obscured by the common opposition to
empire. But it is different enough that one may expect it to become generally visible before too long.

Hegemonic cultures do not subvert others; they create a

dynamic dialectic that advances culture for both nations.
Demont-Heinrich 11
[Christof Demont-Heinrich, Cultural Imperialism Versus Globalization of Culture: Riding the Structure-Agency
Dialectic in Global Communication and Media Studies, Sociology Compass, Wiley interscience]
Multiple scholars (Hall 1990; Kraidy 2002; Straubhaar 2007; Tomlinson 1999, etc.) have picked up the trope
of hybridity and hybridization and sought to develop it and refine it, and, in some cases, to claim it as the analytical
and theoretical locus around which international media and communication research ought to congeal. Hall (1990)

propose the examination of globalization and culture

through the lens of hybridization via his notion of cultures in contact. According to Hall, new
and different cultures hybrids emerge from social and cultural
overlapping. This overlapping has historically taken place in what Hall
describes as contact zones. These are places where cultures intersect,
with one typically an imperialist culture, the other(s) a subordinate one.
The dominant, imperialist culture does not, according to Hall, steamroll
the subordinate culture. Instead, a subordinate culture draws from its own
roots and mixes its culture with elements of the hegemonic culture.
was among the first to

Considerable attention has recently been paid to considering hybridization in terms of power inequities. Attention
has also been given to the challenge of marrying macro- and micro-level analysis. This, in an attempt to mold an
approach which captures the strengths of both cultural imperialist and globalization of culture perspectives while
leaving the weaknesses of each behind. In this section, I examine and analyze two comparatively recent articles in
which some of the scholars at the leading edge of theorizing globalization, culture, and media seek to forge new,
interesting and productive methodological and theoretical ground. The articles I select are certainly not the only
ones I could have chosen. However, they are thought-provoking and highly relevant to the focus of this article.
Rogers (2006) searches for a middle ground vis-a`-vis the cultural imperialism and globalization of culture
continuum and, more broadly, with respect to a structure and agency continuum in the article, From Cultural
Exchange to Transculturation: A Review and Reconceptualization of Cultural Appropriation. In it, he advances an
intriguing proposal to consider globalization, culture and media through the lens of transculturation. According to
Rogers, Neither pure determinism (vulgar Marxism) nor pure agency (neoliberalism) is capable of accounting for

the dynamics of cultural appropriation in the conditions of cultural dominance (2006, 482). Here, Rogers locates
cultural appropriation in the conditions of cultural dominance while also acknowledging inequities in global cultural
flows, most notably the tremendous televisual and film outflow as opposed to inflow with respect to the United
States. This sets Rogers analysis apart from those which stop at the dynamics of cultural appropriation and fail to
get to the question of cultural dominance or unequal flows. Rogers also tips his theoretical hat to globalization of
culture active audience theorists, underscoring the importance of the idea of polysemic media texts which, he
writes, challenge(d) simplistic models of ideological domination (483). Rogers ultimately proposes a typology of
cultural appropriation based on four categories: Exchange, dominance, exploitation, and transculturation. He
devotes the final third of his article to transculturation and to making an argument for its comparative superiority as
a theoretical and analytical instrument by which to engage the intersections among globalization, media, and
culture. Transculturation, he writes, refers not only to a more complex blending of cultures than the previous
categories but also to a set of conditions under which such acts occur: globalization, neocolonialism, and the
increasing dominance of transnational capitalism vis-a`-vis nation states (2006, 491). Rogers makes his primary
appeal to the trans. However, it is worth asking: Does the reality of a growing tendency toward the trans mean

no single national actor, or group of social actors, has more control over
the emergent trans-based system than another? It seems to me that the condition of
transculturlarity is likely to be different sometimes dramatically so for
different people and peoples around the world, all of them positioned
differently sometimes radically so vis-a`-vis this social phenomenon. As a critical scholar, I am especially
that

interested here in the question of power differentials in terms of the condition of transculturalarity how can we
most usefully and effectively understand, theorize, and address such differentials in a transcultural world while
keeping the question of inequality squarely in view? Conclusion: melding the macro and micro, the global and local,
and production and consumption Kraidy and Murphys call for a comparative, empirically grounded translocalism
and Rogers appeal to a transcultural approach represent the leading edge of global communication theory. In

the field is a highly productive one as it seeks to tap

the strengths of cultural imperialism and globalization of culture
perspectives while also aiming to avoid some of their weaknesses. This
melding of the two approaches undoubtedly has resulted in, and will
continue to result in, the development of a more sophisticated and
nuanced theoretical base from which to better understand the complex
interplay among globalization, culture, and media. Ultimately, it seems to me that the
most effective middle ground approach would situate local, creative
appropriation of cultural objects against the backdrop of those larger
regional and global macro-forces which play a significant role in the
question of which cultural objects are widely available in which particular
cultural contexts, and which ones are not. This approach which would keep an eye
both on productive and consumptive players and actors would also seek to acknowledge the
many complexities and paradoxes that characterize the intersections
among globalization, culture, and media, including, for example, the ways in which the local,
national, regional, and global constitute one another (Kraidy and Murphy 2008). Ideally, such an approach
would also pay attention to the ways in which resistance to local or
regional cultural hegemony can paradoxically fuel national or international
cultural hegemony. More concretely, it would, for example, acknowledge the ways in which, in Quebec,
general, the direction in which they seek to push

an individual business owners decision to post a store sign in English only rather than in English and French in an
attempt to resist and challenge the regional imposition of French in Quebec might also be understood as
contributing to the hegemony of English on a national, North American, and global scale. If paying attention to
cross-cutting tendencies and paradox, for example, to the ways in which the global growth of MTV or McDonalds is
heavily dependent upon localization strategies that, at a broad level of analysis, are comparatively homogenous, is
crucial and it is it is equally important to engage processes of globalization at multiple levels of analysis. In other
words, while it is crucial to pay attention to the reality of widespread localization of cultural products, in other
words, to undeniable cultural difference, it is equally important to pay close attention to similarities and
comparative homogenization. This means examining the ways in which the macro-sociological processes and forces
of globalization are realized in, and shaped by, the micro-practices of everyday life. What, for example, does it
mean in terms of larger macro-sociological forces such as the global spread of fast food culture and global popular
music when a Nigerian immigrant to Brazil sits down and helps herself to a Big Mac to the strains of a Celine Dion
song in English in Sao Paulo? Alternatively, how do we make sense of, and meaningfully situate against the
backdrop of the increasing global prevalence of English, a decision by Slovenian pop music group such as Siddharta
to re-record its top songs in English? We might read the first example as an instance of increasing cultural
hybridization, or, rather differently, as indicative of the increasing homogeneity of modern life. Alternatively, it
could be read as indicative of both of these tendencies. And we might read the second example primarily as an

instance of a musical group tapping English to realize greater global agency, or, rather differently, primarily as a
micro-act that when added together with thousands of similar micro-acts contributes to the very thing that
necessitates that Siddharta sing in English in the first place, meaning the global hegemony of English. Ultimately,

the challenge for global communication studies lies in constructing an analytical

approach that doesnt lean too far toward a macro or micro-level
perspective, but which effectively and critically takes both into account
at the same time. This is not an easy, nor necessarily unproblematic, task. Indeed, the difficulty of

perhaps the impossibility of putting aside ones assumptions about the nature of the relationship between the
human social whole and the individual is surely one of the primary reasons for the often heated debates that have
swirled around, and which will continue to swirl around, how best to approach theorizing and studying the relation
between the global and local and culture and media. As contentious as these debates have been and as passionate
as they continue to be, it seems clear that, as Fornas (2008), Jansson (2009), and others have noted, global
communication and media studies has generally moved beyond the polarization that once characterized the field.
Thus, there appears to be general agreement that one cannot adequately grasp the nexus between globalization
and culture by looking exclusively at the realm of cultural production or by zeroing in only on local, individual acts
of creative cultural appropriation. This doesnt mean that disagreement and debate have disappeared from global
communication and media studies, or that the disagreement that remains does not revolve around some of the
same issues that it has in the past, most notably, the question of where the balance of power primarily resides in
the global local equation. However, it does mean global communication and media studies is moving toward
building approaches to engaging and understanding the global local-culture media dynamic in more sophisticated
and productive fashion than it has in the past. In short, it shows that the field is not stagnant and that it is not being
held back by entrenched thinking. Indeed, it is, as Rogers (2006) and Kraidy and Murphys (2008) recent work
shows, very definitely moving forward. In the end, this is exactly what ought to be happening with theory, whether
its focused on the interplay between globalization, media and culture, or, more broadly, on the general nature of
human social being in the world.

Alt Fails
The ideology of imperialism is to deeply entrenched in society
that the State has been corrupted and prevents any
alternative
Van Elteren 3 (Mel, Associate Professor of Social Sciences at Tilburg University, US
Cultural Imperialism Today
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v023/23.2elteren.html)
To the extent that advertising constitutes a pervasive public "art form," however, it has

become the dominant mode in which

thoughts and experiences are expressed. This trend is most evident in U.S. society. While alternative
values and ideologies do exist in this culture, it is harder to find representations for them. Advertising
distorts and flattens people's ability to interpret complex experiences, and it reflects the culture only
partially, and in ways that are biased toward a capitalist idealization of American culture. 47 At this level, goods are
framed and displayed to entice the customer, and shopping has become an event in which individuals purchase and consume the meanings attached to
goods. The

ongoing interpenetration and crossover between consumption and the aesthetic sphere
led to a [End Page 182] greater
"aestheticization of reality": appearance and image have become of prime importance. Not only have
(traditionally separated off as an artistic counter-world to the everyday aspect of the former) has

commodities become more stylized but style itself has turned into a valuable commodity. The refashioning and reworking of commoditieswhich are
themselves carefully selected according to one's individual tastesachieve a stylistic effect that expresses the individuality of their owner. 48 This

provides the framework for a more nuanced and sometimes contradictory second order of meaning.
The dynamics of cultural change therefore entail both processes of "traveling culture," in which the received culture (in this case
globalizing capitalist culture) is appropriated and assigned new meaning locally, and at the same time a "first order" meaning that
dominates and delimits the space for second order meaningsthus retaining something of the
traditional meaning of cultural imperialism. The latter is, ultimately, a negative phenomenon from the
perspective of self-determination by local people under the influence of the imperial culture. Traditional
critiques of cultural globalization have missed the point. The core of the problem lies not in the homogenization of cultures as such, or in the creation of a
"false consciousness" among consumers and the adoption of a version of the dominant ideology thesis. Rather, the

problem lies in the global

spread of the institutions of capitalist modernity tied in with the culturally impoverished social
imagery discussed above, which crowd out the cultural space for alternatives (as suggested by critical analysts like Benjamin
Barber and Leslie Sklair). The negative effects of cultural imperialismthe disempowerment of people
subjected to the dominant forms of globalizationmust be located on this plane. It is necessary, of course, to
explore in more detail how the very broad institutional forces of capitalist modernity actually operate in specific settings of cultural contact. The practices of

A state-centered
approach blurs the main issue here, which is not whether nationals or foreigners own the carriers of globalization, but whether
their interests are driven by capitalist globalization.
transnational corporations are crucial to any understanding of the concrete activities and local effects of globalization.

Imperialism doesnt allow for the space of alternatives to exist

Ali 6 (Tariq, novelist, historian, and commentator on the
current situation in the Middle East, The new imperialists Ideologies of Empire,
Ch 3 Pg 51)
Did the
triumph of capitalism and the defeat of an enemy ideology mean we were in a world without conflict or
enemies? Both Fukuyama and Huntington produced important books as a response to the new situation. Fukuyama, obsessed with
Then came the total collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of a peculiar form of gangster capitalism in the world.

Hegel, saw liberal democracy/capitalism as the only embodiment of the world-spirit that now marked the end of history, a phrase
that became the title of his book.3 The long war was over and the restless world-spirit could now relax and buy a condo in Miami.
Fukuyama insisted that there were no longer any available alternatives to the American way of life. The philosophy, politics,
and economics of the Other each and every variety of socialism/Marxism had disappeared under the ocean, a
submerged continent of ideas that could never rise again. The victory of capital was irreversible. It was a
universal triumph. Huntington was unconvinced, and warned against complacency. From his Harvard base, he
challenged Fukuyama with a set of theses first published in Foreign Affairs (The Clash of Civilizations? a phrase originally coined
by Bernard Lewis, another favourite of the current administration). Subsequently these papers became a book, The Clash of Civilizations

and the Remaking of the World Order. The question mark had now disappeared. Huntington

agreed that no ideological

alternatives to capitalism existed, but this did not mean the end of history. Other antagonisms remained.
The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. . . . The
clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. 4 In particular, Huntington emphasized the continued importance of
religion in the modern world, and it was this that propelled the book onto the bestseller lists after 9/11. What did he mean by the
word civilization? Early in the last century, Oswald Spengler, the German grandson of a miner, had abandoned his vocation as a
teacher, turned to philosophy and to history, and produced a master-text. In The Decline of the West, Spengler counterposed culture (a
word philologically tied to nature, the countryside, and peasant life) with civilization, which is urban and would become the site of
industrial anarchy, dooming both capitalist and worker to a life of slavery to the machine-master. For Spengler, civilization

reeked of death and destruction and imperialism. Democracy was the dictatorship of money and
money is overthrown and abolished only by blood.5 The advent of Caesarism would drown it in blood and
become the final episode in the history of theWest.Had the Third Reich not been defeated in Europe, principally by the Red Army (the
spinal cord of the Wehrmacht was broken in Stalingrad and Kursk, and the majority of the unfortunate German soldiers who perished are
buried on the Russian steppes, not on the beaches of Normandy or in the Ardennes), Spenglers prediction might have come close to
realization. He was among the first and fiercest critics of Eurocentrism, and his vivid worldview, postmodern in its intensity though not
its language, can be sighted in this lyrical passage: I see, in place of that empty figment of one linear history, the drama of a number of
mighty cultures, each springing with primitive strength from the soil of a mother-region to which it remains firmly bound throughout its
whole life-cycle; each stamping its material, its mankind, in its own image; each having its own idea, its own passions, its own life, will
and feeling, its own death. Here indeed are colours, lights, movements, that no intellectual eye has yet discovered. Here the Cultures,
peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom and age as the oaks and stonepines, the blossoms, twigs and leaves. Each Culture has
its own new possibilities of self-expression, which arise, ripen, decay and never return.6 In contrast to this, he argued, lay the destructive
cycle of civilization:Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed
humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone-built
petrifying world city following motherearth . . . they are an end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again. . . .

Imperialism is civilization unadulterated. In this phenomenal form the destiny of the West is now
irrevocably set. . . . Expansionism is a doom, something daemonic and intense, which grips forces into
service and uses up the late humanity of the world-city stage.7

No Links
They confuse the distinction between hegemony and
imperialism, by simply cooperating we are maintaining peace
and avoiding imperialism
Yilmaz 10
[Sait Yilmaz, State, Power, and Hegemony, December 2010]
According to Cox, theories like Realism and Neo-realism were coined to preserve the status quo serving the
interests of rich dominant Western countries and their elite (Cox, 1981: 16-155). Those theories aimed to make the
international order seem natural and unchangeable. Hegemony enabled the dominant state to spread its moral,
political, and cultural values around the society and sub-communities. This was done through civilian society
institutions. Civilian society consists of the net of institutions and practices that are partly autonomous from the

Hegemony is to produce social and political systems that are to be

applied on the nations targeted. There are many ideas about the relationship between hegemony
and imperialism. Imperialism is defined as enlarging the dominance of one
nation over the other by way of open political and economical instruments
(Heywood, 2007: 392). To explain the basic difference between the imperialism
and hegemony Keohane says that as hegemony manipulates the relations with no
superior body, imperial powers set their superiority with a senior political
body (Keahone, 1991: 435-439). However imperialists have an approach for expansion
by conquering new territory. Another scholar, Duncan Snidal separates hegemony into three;
state.

hegemony implied by conviction, kind but forceful hegemony, and colonialist hegemony based on force (Snidal,
1986: 579-614). Discrimination between hegemony and dominance is another study subject argued by many
scholars including Machiavelli, Gramsci, and Nye. According to those three intellectuals, a major power should not
just rely on dominance, force, and hard power. Machiavelli advocates respect as a source of obedience to a major
power (Wright, 2004). Gramsci says that a major power itself evokes willingness and cooperation instinctively (Cox,

a superior power becomes a hegemonic power by

persuading others to cooperate. Persuasion would be ensured by the utilization of soft power that
makes other countries believe in common interests (Nye, 2002). However, according to hegemonic
stability theory, major powers achieve their position unilaterally with the
deployment of hard power but retaining consent and convinction (Keahone,
1993: 49-66). Nye believes that

1984: 11). In another definiton, hegemony is the position of having the capability and power to change the rules
and norms of international systems based on ones own motivation and desire (Volgy, 2005: 1-2). If you dont have
enough power to affect global events in line with your own road map, that would be a dangerous illusion. Susan
Strange envisages that hegemony requires two kinds of strength; relational and structural based (Strange, 1989:
165). Relation based power is the strength to persuade and force the other actors one by one or in groups.
Structural power is the essential capacity to realize the desired rules, norms, and operations in the international

A hegemon creates or maintains critical regimes to cooperate in the

future, and reduces uncertainty while other states are in pursuit of their
own interests.
system.

FW Evd
In the context of Latin America policy debates that focus on
how to best utilize liberalized trading lead to the best forms of
stability and decrease oppressive regimes - decades of reforms
prove
Korzeniewicz 00
[Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz and William C. Smith, Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in Latin America: Searching
for the High Road to Globalization, Latin American Research Review, 2000, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2692041]

A major concern addressed by the intellectual architects of the original

consensus involved the social conflicts and political instability of the 1970s, both
linked to the crisis of civilian rule and the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in the region. Rising
instability, associated with "macroeconomic populism, was linked to the crisis of state-centric
development models in closed protectionist economies (see, for example, Dornbusch and
Edwards 1991). In this regard, the collapse of heterodox shock policies (such as the Austral, Cruzado, and Inti plans
in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru) contributed to the growing hegemony of more orthodox neoclassical policies. In

cross-regional comparisons with the then thriving East Asian economies called
attention to the advantages of an alternative model of development based
on a "market-friendly" strategy built on trade liberalization and export orientation
addition,

as engines of growth (Kahler 1990, 1992; World Bank 1993c). According to this new World Bank perspective,
although poverty rates may have recently declined somewhat in some countries, this outcome is due not to trade
and financial reforms but to lower inflation and a return to modest growth. This admission brings the views of the
bank into alignment with the broad consensus previously discussed. Moreover, the authors of these studies agree
that formal and informal unemployment has risen in many countries and that wage differentials between skilled and

This rather pessimistic assessment of a decade of Washington

reforms is the basis for their advocacy of "a dialogue among
policy-makers, civil society, and the academic community in [Latin America
and the Caribbean] on how best to design and reform institutions-that is, on how to
'supply' institutional reforms to meet new societal demands " (World Bank 1998, 2).
unskilled workers have worsened.16
Consensus-style