ALUNAN vs. VELOSO GR No. 29158.

December 29, 1928

It is incorrect to say that there can be no usufruct of money, because it is a
fungible thing.
FACTS
Petitioner RAFAEL ALUNAN was the judicial administrator of the estate of
the deceased Rosendo Alunan. The settlement of deceaseds estate was
approved by the court below. Jose Hernaez, one of the heirs interested in this
proceeding, assigned the whole of his portion to respondent ELEUTERIA CH.
VELOSO and the latter objects to some of the items of the account filed.
VELOSO alleged that the lower court erred in admitting the partition
proposed by the administrator in his account. According to this account, the
total amount to be partitioned among the heirs is P88,979.08, which the
administrator distributed equally among all the heirs, including the widow,
each one receiving P11,122.38. This partitionwas objected to with respect to
the widow. It was alleged that the distributable amount is in money, and since
the widow's right is only a usufruct, and as there can be no usufruct of money,
since it is a fungible thing, the adjudication made to the widow was erroneous.
ISSUE
Whether or not there could be a usufruct of money.
RULING
YES, there could be. It is incorrect to say that there can be no usufruct of
money, because it is a fungible thing. The widow, according to the law, only
has a right to a portion of the estate equal to that of the legitime of each of the
children without betterment. In the instant case none of the children received a
betterment. Consequently, the widow should receive a portion equal to the
share of each in the two-thirds of the distributable amount making up the
legitime, to be taken from the one-third forming the betterment. Then, the
other free third, which the decedent failed to dispose of, must be partitioned
among the heirs to the exclusion of the widow, as an addition to their legitime.

Working out the computations on this basis, the widow should receive only
P8,474.19.

VDA DE ALBAR v. CARANDANG, 106 PHIL 855

FACTS:
Doa Rosario Fabie y Grey was the owner of the lot in the City of Manila
with a building and improvements, and by a will left by her upon her death
which was duly probated she devised the naked ownership of the whole
property to Rosario Grey Vda. de Albar, et al. but its usufruct to Josefa Fabie
for life.

During liberation, as a consequence of the fire that gutted the building in

many portions of Manila, the building on the Ongpin lot was burned, leaving
only the walls and other improvements that were not destroyed by the fire.

transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the naked owners but subject
to the right of usufruct of Josefa Fabie. The parties expressly reserved the
right to litigate their respective claims after the termination of the contract of
lease to determine which of said claims was legally correct.

By reason of the destruction of the building on the Ongpin property, the

United States War Damage Commission approved the claim that was
presented for the damage caused to the property, paid to and received by the
naked owners. In the meantime, the usufructuary paid the real estate taxes due
on the property at Ongpin for the years 1945 to 1952.

ISSUE:
One Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to lease the property for a period of five
years, at the same time agreeing to construct on the lot a new building
provided the naked owners as well as the usufructuary sign the agreement of
the lease. As the usufructuary maintains that she has the exclusive right to
cede the property by lease and to receive the full rental value by virtue of her
right to usufruct while on the other hand the naked owners maintain that the
right of usufruct was extinguished when the building was destroyed, the right
of the usufructory being limited to the legal interest on the value of the lot and
the materials, in order that the agreement of lease may be affected, the parties
agreed on a temporary compromise whereby the naked owners would receive
P100.00, or 20% of the monthly rental of P500.00 and the usufructuary the
balance of 80% or P400.00 of said monthly rental. It was likewise stipulated
in the agreement that the title to the building to be constructed would accrue to
the land upon it completion as an integral part of the lot covered by the

Whether or not the usufruct included the building and the land? W/N the
usufructuary (FABIE) or naked owner (VDA DE ALBAR) should undertake
the reconstruction? W/N the usufructuary should pay the real estate taxes?

HELD:
The usufruct for life extended to the land and the building. From the above, it
is clear that when the deceased constituted the life usufruct on the rentals
"fincas situadas" in Ongpin and Sto. Cristo streets, she meant to impose the
encumbrance both the building and the land on which it is erected for indeed
the building cannot exist without the land. And as this Court well said, "The
land, being an indispensable part of the rented premises cannot be considered

as having no rental value whatsoever." Moreover, in the Spanish language, the

term "fincas" has a broad scope; it includes not only building but land as well.
(Diccionario Ingles-Espaol, por Martines Amador) Since only the building
was destroyed and the usufruct is constituted not only on the building but on
the land as well, then the usufruct is not deemed extinguished by the
destruction of the building for under the law usufruct is extinguished only by
the total loss of the thing subject of the encumbrance (Article 603, old Civil
Code).
FABIE, the usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct the building. Of
course, this is addressed to the wisdom and discretion of the usufructuary
who, to all intents and purposes is deemed as the administrator of the property.
This has been clarified in the case of Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, 75 Phil., 536,
which was litigated between the same parties and wherein the scope of the
same provision of the will has been the subject of interpretation.

The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however, merit in the
contention that the real estate taxes paid by respondent in her capacity as
usufractuary for several years previous to the present litigation should be paid
by her, as she did, instead of by petitioners not only because she bound herself
to pay such taxes in a formal agreement approved by the court in Civil Case
No. 1569 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Fabie vs. Gutierrez David,
supra). In the case, which involved the same parties and the same properties
subject to usufruct, the parties submitted an amicable agreement which was
approved by the court wherein the usufructuary, herein respondent, bound
herself to pay all the real estate taxes, special assessment and insurance
premiums, and make all the necessary repairs on each of the properties
covered by the usufruct and in accordance with said agreement, respondent
paid all the taxes for the years 1945 to 1954.

speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in
this case, the public at large. (Merger, which presupposes ownership, is not
possible.)

FACTS:

SOLID MANILA CORP.

vs. BIO HONG TRADING
CO.- Easement and
Servitudes

Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita. The
same lies in the vicinity of another parcel registered under Bio Hong Trading
whose title came from a prior owner. In the deed of sale between Bio Hong
and the vendor, 900 sqm of the lot was reserved as an easement of way.
The construction of the private alley was annotated on Bio Hongs title stating
among other things "(6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no
obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; and (7) that the owner of the
lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use the
same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and
shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for the use thereof

Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenement of which they form part,
and even if they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, they cannot be
alienated from the tenement or mortgaged separately.

The petitioner claims that ever since, it (along with other residents of
neighboring estates) made use of the above private alley and maintained and
contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests,
the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against
the private respondent, to have the gates removed and to allow full access to
the easement.

Note: In a personal servitude, there is no "owner of a dominant tenement" to

The trial court ordered Bi Hong to open the gates but the latter argued that the

easement has been extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant
and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner.

CA reversed holding that an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and

that it does not impair the private respondent's title, and that since the private
respondent had acquired title to the property, "merger" brought about an
extinguishment of the easement.

Thus, Solid went to the SC alleging that the very deed of sale executed
between the Bio Hong and the previous owner of the property "excluded" the
alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the parties was to retain
the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding the sale.

[While the case was pending, Bio Hong asked the RTC to cancel the
annotation in question, which it granted subject to the final outcome of the
prior case.]

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easements may be alienated (sold) from the tenement
or mortgaged separately
2) Whether or not the easement had been extinguished by merger.

HELD: NO to both
1) The sale included the alley. The court rejected Solids contention that the
alley was not included in the sale. It was included but there was a limitation
on its use-the easement. As a mere right of way, it cannot be separated from
the tenement and maintain an independent existence. (Art. 617)
Even though Bio Hong acquired ownership over the property including the
disputed alley as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to
close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and thus prevent the
public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open
to the public.

2) No genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the

private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists
when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the
same person. Merger requires full ownership of both estates.
Note that The servitude in question is a personal servitude (established for the
benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered
estate does not belong). In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner
of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons
without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Thus, merger could
not have been possible

PURUGGANAN V.
PAREDES, 69 SCRA 69Easement of Drainage
In an easement of receiving rainwater, the distances prescribed in the decree
of registration should not correspond to the width and length of the roof of the
house but on the distance of the rainwater falling inside the land of the
servient estate.

FACTS:
Purugganan is the owner of a piece of residential lot adjacent to and bounded
on the north by the lot of Paredes. The lot of Purugganan is subject to an
easement of drainage in favor of Paredes annotated in the Decree of
registration, which read in part:

XXX the applicant agrees to respect an easement or servitude over a portion

of the lots No. 1 and 2 which is EIGHT and ONE HALF (8-1/2) meters in

lengthand the width is ONE (1) meter, in order that the rainwater coming
from the roofing of a house to be constructed by the oppositor over the ruins
of her brick wallshall fall into the land of the applicant.

receiving water falling from the roof which is an encumbrance imposed on the
land of Purugganan because the encumbrance is not the roof itself but the rain
water falling inside the property of Purugganan. The report submitted by the
court-appointed commissioner clearly shows that Paredes exceeded the
dimension allowed in the decree of registration.

Paredes constructed a new house, the roof was 2-1/2 meters longer than the
length allowed in the Decree of Registration, and has an outer roofing (eaves)
of 1.20 meters, protruding over the lot of Purugganan, which is .20 meters
wider than that allowed, and the rainwater from the GI roofing falls about 3
meters inside lots 1 and 2 of Purugganan.

Purugganan filed a case prohibiting Paredes from proceeding with the

construction of the roof, which exceeds the allowed dimensions. Trial court, in
a summary proceeding decided in favor of Purugganan. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of drainage refers to the measure of the roofing?

HELD: No.
Paredes have made a mistake in applying the distances prescribed in the
decree of registration to the roofing of their house. They failed to comprehend
the meaning of the phrase servidumbre de vertiente de los tejados
constituted on the land of Purugganan. Translated, it means the easement of

Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. Every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value
and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those
noted in said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be
subsisting, namely:
First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and
Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law required to appear
of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record.
Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years
immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an
innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the right of the
government to collect taxes payable before that period from the
delinquent taxpayer alone.

Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized

by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the
certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or
irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined.
Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof
by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other
law or regulations on agrarian reform.

CID vs. JAVIER- Notarial

Prohibition
Notarial prohibition is required to start the running of prescription. Also
Registration of the Immovable without the registration of the easement
extinguishes the easement.

FACTS:
The easement in dispute here is an easement of light and view, which is a
negative easement. The respondents Javier, et al are the owners of the building
standing on their lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lot. Respondents
have claimed that they had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement
of light and view arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and
light. The lower courts have ruled in their favor.

Note: easement of light and view is continuous and apparent so it is subject to

prescription.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondents Irene P. Javier, et al., owners of a building
standing on their lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lot, had acquired
by prescription an enforceable easement of light and view arising from a
verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light, alleged to have been made
upon petitioners predecessor-in-interest as owner of the adjoining lot, both of
which lots being covered by Torrens titles.

RULING: NO.
Art538s requirement is a formal act and not just any verbal or written act.
Formal act contemplated in art538 in the OLD Civil Code pertains to an

instrument acknowledged before a notary public. Prescription for a negative

easement only begins when there is a notarial prohibition by the dominant
estate. Respondents could have not acquired the easement by prescription
because they have not fulfilled this requirement. Even assuming they have
acquired it, the easement no longer exists because the properties were
registered under the Torrens system without any annotation or registration of
the said easement.

CORTES vs. YU-TIBOEasement of Light and

View

RULING: NO.

FACTS:

EXCEPTION: When the windows are not opened on the neighbor's side,
there is need of a prohibition from exercising that neighbor's right to build on
his land or cover the closed window on the party wall.
The period of prescription starts to run from such prohibition if the neighbor
consents
to
it.
Note: The law refers to all kinds of windows, even regulation windows.
According to article 528, windows with "similar projections" include sheds.

Easement disputed here is the easement of light and view. Plaintiffs wife has
certain windows on her property which open on the adjacent lot. It has been
established that the plaintiffs hasnt done any formal act prohibiting the owner
of the house of the adjacent house prohibiting them to make any
improvements. Plaintiff claims that period of prescription started when those
windows were made and acknowledge by the owner of the adjacent lot.
Defendant however claims that there should be a formal act prohibiting them
from doing a certain act to trigger the prescriptive period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs have acquired the easement through prescription?

GENERAL RULE: No part owner can, without the consent of the other,
make in a party wall a window or opening of any kind (Art. 580)
The very fact of making such opening in such a wall may be the basis for
acquisition of a prescriptive title without the necessity of any active
opposition because it always presupposes the express or implied consent of
the owner of the wall, which in time, implies a voluntary waiver of the right to
oppose.

The
exception
applies
in
this
case
because
1)
what
is
concerned
is
a
party
wall;
2) there was no prohibition on Yu-Tibo to build anything that would cover the
Cortes' window (Yu-Tibo wanted to raise his roof which would in effect cover
1/2 of the window).

The entire subject land was divided into three. However, Lot No. 954, the
narrow lot where the railroad tracks lay,
was claimed by Bomedco as its own and was declared for tax purposes in its
name.
It was not until 1989 when private respondents discovered the aforementioned
claim of Bomedco on inquiry with
the Bureau of Lands. Through their lawyer, they immediately demanded the
legal basis for Bomedco's claim over

BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO. INC. V CA

FACTS: Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein private respondents Sergio
Valdez etc. purchased from Feliciana
Santillan a parcel of unregistered land with an area of one hectare, 34 ares and
16 centares, located in Barrio
Dayhagon, Medellin, Cebu. He took possession of the property and declared it
for tax purposes in his name. Prior to
the sale, however, the entire length of the land from north to south was already
traversed in the middle by railroad
tracks owned by petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. (hereafter
Bomedco). The tracks were used for hauling
sugar cane from the fields to petitioners sugar mill. When Magdaleno Valdez,
Sr. passed away in 1948, herein

Cadastral Lot No. 954 but their letter of inquiry addressed to petitioner went
unheeded, as was their subsequent
demand for payment of compensation for the use of the land.
respondent heirs filed a Complaint for Payment of Compensation and/or
Recovery of Possession of Real Property
and Damages with Application for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction
against Bomedco before the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu. Respondent heirs alleged that, before she sold the land to
Valdez, Sr. in 1935, Santillan granted
Bomedco, in 1929, a railroad right of way for a period of 30 years. When
Valdez, Sr. acquired the land, he respected
the grant. The right of way expired sometime in 1959 but respondent heirs
allowed Bomedco to continue using the
land because one of them was then an employee of the company.

private respondents inherited the land. However, unknown to them, Bomedco

was able to have the disputed middle

On the other hand, Bomedcos principal defense was that it was the owner and
possessor of Cadastral Lot No. 954,

lot which was occupied by the railroad tracks placed in its name in the
Cadastral Survey of Medellin, Cebu in 1965.

having allegedly bought the same from Feliciana Santillan in 1929, prior to
the sale of the property by the latter to

Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. in 1935. It also contended that plaintiffs claim was
already barred by prescription and laches

gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants
no title thereto. Therefore, an

because of Bomedcos open and continuous possession of the property for

more than 50 years.

acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to

another.

ISSUE/ HELD: Whether or not petitioner acquired ownership of the easement

through prescription. NEGATIVE.

Having held the property by virtue of an easement, petitioner cannot now

assert that its occupancy since 1929 was in

30-year extraordinary prescriptive period had not yet been complied and there
was neither laches.

the concept of an owner. Neither can it declare that the 30-year period of
extraordinary acquisitive prescription

Instead of indicating ownership of the lot, these receipts showed that all
petitioner had was possession by virtue of

started from that year.

the right of way granted to it. Were it not so and petitioner really owned the
land, petitioner would not have
consistently used the phrases central railroad right of way and sugar central
railroad right of way in its tax
declarations until 1963. Certainly an owner would have found no need for
these phrases. A person cannot have an
easement on his own land, since all the uses of an easement are fully
comprehended in his general right of
ownership.
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal
immovable property of another, by virtue of
which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do,
something on his property, for the benefit
of another thing or person. It exists only when the servient and dominant
estates belong to two different owners. It

The mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert
petitioners possession into an adverse one.
Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the
owner and is insufficient to vest title,
unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an
owner.There should be a hostile use of such a
nature and exercised under such circumstances as to manifest and give notice
that the possession is under a claim of
right.
The only time petitioner assumed a legal position adverse to respondents
waswhen it filed a claim over the property
in 1965 during the cadastral survey of Medellin. Since then (1965) and until
the filing of the complaint for the
recovery of the subject land before the RTC of Cebu in 1989, only 24 years
had lapsed. Since the required 30-year
extraordinary prescriptive period had not yet been complied with in 1989,
petitioner never acquired ownership of the

subject land.
Neither can petitioner find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the
lapse of time or delay that constitutes
laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that
which, through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus
giving rise to a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or declined to assert it.
Records show that respondent heirs only learned about petitioners claim on
their property when they discovered the
inscription for the cadastral survey in the records of the Bureau of Lands in
1989. Respondents lost no time in
demanding an explanation for said claim in their letters to the petitioner dated
March 1, 1989 and April 6, 1989.
When petitioner ignored them, they instituted their complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City on June
8, 1989.
Petitioner contends that, even if it failed to acquire ownership of the subject
land, it nevertheless became legally
entitled to the easement of right of way over said land by virtue of prescription
under Article 620 of the Civil Code:
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or
by prescription of ten years.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or
discontinuous according to the manner

they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications of the existence of such
easements. Thus, an easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant
without the intervention of any act of
man, like the easement of drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at
intervals and depends on the act of man,
like the easement of right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is
exercised only if a person passes or sets foot
on somebody elses land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons,
an easement of right of way of railroad
tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train
operated by a person passes over
another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends
upon the act or intervention of man
which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not in any way
convert the nature of an easement of
right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs
or physical indications showing the
existence of an easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof, that
categorizes such easement into continuous
or discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an
easement into apparent or non-apparent.
Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a
right to light and view) are apparent

easements, while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is nonapparent.

In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioners
trains denotes the existence of an apparent
but discontinuous easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of the Civil
Code, discontinuous easements,
whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately,
petitioner Bomedco never acquired any title
over the use of the railroad right of way whether by law, donation,
testamentary succession or contract. Its use of the
right of way, however long, never resulted in its acquisition of the easement
because, under Article 622, the
discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be acquired by title
and not by prescription.
To be sure, beginning 1959 when the original 30-year grant of right of way
given to petitioner Bomedco expired, its
occupation and use of Cadastral Lot No. 954 came to be by mere tolerance of
the respondent heirs. Thus, upon
demand by said heirs in 1989 for the return of the subject land and the
removal of the railroad tracks, or, in the
alternative, payment of compensation for the use thereof, petitioner Bomedco
which had no title to the land should
have returned the possession thereof or should have begun paying
compensation for its use.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement was established

RULING:

GARGANTOS V. CAEasement
FACTS:
Sanz was the previous owner of a land which he subdivided into several lots.
One lot was sold to Tengtio, whol sold to Uy Veza. Another lot with a house
constituted thereon was sold to Tan Yanon. A third portion with a warehouse
was sold to Gargantos. The problem arose when latter asked from the
Municipality for a permit to demolish the warehouse in order to construct a
higher one. Yan Yung opposed for it would block his window and impair his
right of loght and view.

Yes. Again, Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly
owned by one person who introduced improvements on both such that the
wall of the house contructed on the first estate extends to the wall of the
warehouse on the second estate; and at the time of the sale of the first estate,
there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors, windows which
serve as passages for light and view, there being no provision in the deed of
sale that the easement of light and view will not be established, the apparent
sign of easement between the two estates is established as a title.

shut off the light and air that come in through the window of the adjacent
house owned by Jose. Hence the latter files for prohibition claiming there is a
negative easement prohibiting Amor from constructing any structure at any
height that would block the window. Amor counters that there is no easement.
Moreover, since the death of testator was before the Civil Code took effect,
the rules on easement do not apply.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing said
construction.
2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be applied

AMOR v. FLORENTINOEasement
FACTS:
Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse). By a will, she
transferred the house to Jose Florentino and the warehouse to Maria
Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to Amor. Amor then demolished the old
warehouse in order to build a new 2-storey structure. The problem is it will

RULING:
1. Yes. Easement are established by law or by will of the owners or by title.
Under Art. 624, there is title by the doctrine of apparent sign. When the estate
is subsequently owned by two different persons and the service (it cannot be
an easement before the transfer) is not revoked in the title nor removed, an
easement
is
established.
The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it involved acquisition
by prescription. Art. 624 is acquisition by title.

2. Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred before the
effectivity of the Old Civil Code. The facts show that it happened after the

effectivity of the said code so the law on easement is already applicable. In

any case, even if we assume Amors supposition, the law on easement was
already integrated into the Spanish Law and in fact, had been established by
Jurisprudence.
Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the warehouse above the
level of the window.

DISSENTING OPINION OF OZAETA.

1) The Majority opinio committed a travesty on justice when it ignored the
evidence produced by Amor that the testators death occurred before the
effectivity of the Code.

2) Hence, the law on easement will not apply. Moreover, the Spanish Law and
the Partidas provided for only three ways of acquiring easements: 1) contract
2) testament 3) prescription. There was no provision similar to the doctrine of
apparent sign.

3) There is no doctrine established by the Spanish Tribunal regarding the

doctrine.

4) In this modern age of flourescent lights and air conditioning devices, the
easement of light and view would be obsolete and deterrent to economic
progress especially when in the cities, buildings are side to side with each
other.

JAVELLANA V. IACPositive Easement

When a positive easement is constituted, the servient owner is prevented from
impairing the use of such by the dominant estate.

FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino Florete, Sr. is the present owner of the land
adjoining the Iloilo River up to the adjacent lot where the L. Borres Elem.
School is located. There existed a main canal from the Iloilo River which
passes through the Marsal property and thru a canal that traverses the school
property going towards Lot 2344. Marsal & Co. closed the dike entrance and
later on demolished the portions of the main dike connecting the main canal to
the canal running thru the school grounds. This closure caused flooding in the
premises of the school and its vicinity because the canal serves as outlet of
rain or flood water that empties into the river. This prompted the school and
barangay officials to complain to higher authorities about the closure of the
canal. When Florete was about to bury a pipe in lieu of an open canal, he was
prevented from doing so by the district supervisor, Javellana, thus he instituted
a complaint for recovery of damages for allegedly denying his access to the
use of the canal to his property.

The RTC ruled in favor of Javellana thus Florete appealed to the IAC which
reversed the decision thus the case at bar.

the dominant estate or to those who may have a right to the use of the
easement.

When Florete closed the entrance of the canal and demolished portions of the
main dike it impaired the use of the servitude by the dominant estates.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement was established in favor of the school property

RULING: YES

BENEDICTO V. CA

A positive easement of water-right-of-way was constituted on the property of

Florete as the servient estate in favor of the L. Borres Elementary School and
the nearby lands as dominant estates since it has been in continuous use for no
less than 15 years by the school fishpond as well as by the nearby adjacent
lands.

As a positive easement, Florete had no right to terminate the use of the canal
without violating Art. 629 of the CC which provides that The owner of the
servient estate cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the
servitude. Nevertheless if by reason of the place originally assigned or of the
manner established for the use of the easement, the same should become very
inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent him from
making any important works, repairs or improvements thereon, it may be
charged at his expense, provided he offers another place or manner equally
convenient and in such a way that no injury is caused thereby to the owner of

25 SCRA 145
FACTS:
Hendrick was the owner of a property which half of it was sold to Recto. An
easement of way was annotated in the certificates of title. Subsequently, the
remaining half of the property was sold to Herras who then closed and walled
the
part
of
land
serving
as
easement
of
way.

HELD:
The easement is perpetual in character and was annotated in all the certificates
of title. Absence of anything that would show mutual agreement to extinguish
the easement, the easement persists.

VILLANUEVA VS.
VELASCO- Legal
Easement

Gabriel. When he bought it, there was a small house on its southeastern
portion. It occupies one meter of two meter wide easement of right of way the
Gabriel spouses granted to Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of the private
respondents, in a contract of easement of right of way. Amongst others, the
contract provides that the easements purpose is to have an outlet to Tandang
Sora which is the nearest public road and the least burdensome (Espinolass
property being the dominant estate and Gabriel spousess as the servient
estate.) It was also provided in the contract that the easement shall be binding
to the successors, assigns without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property
that will warrant the circumstances.

A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for
private interest and becomes a continuing property right unless its removal is
provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed
before the execution of the conveyance; Essential requisites for an easement
to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the
foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.

The private respondents were able to acquire a writ of demolition on the house
obstructing the easement against the Spouses Gabriel. The petitioner filed a
third party claim with prayer to quash the writ saying that he was not made a
party to the civil case and that the writ of demolition should not prosper since
the easement which is meant to protect was not annotated in the petitioners
title.
CA ruled in favor of the private respondents saying that the easement exists
even though it was not annotated in the torrens title because servitudes are
inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. And
that Villanueva is bound by the contact of easement, not only as a voluntary
easement but as a legal easement.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Petitioner Bryan Villanueva bought a parcel of land in QC from Pacific

Banking Corporation which it acquired from the spouses Maximo and Justina

Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner?

RULING:
YES. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exists unless its
removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is
removed before the execution of the conveyance conformably with Art 647 in
accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code.

Essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant

estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not
due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way
claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate
to
a
public
highway
may
be
the
shortest.
The existence of the easement has been established by the lower courts and
the same has become conclusive to the SC. The small house occupying one
meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private
respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle (no mention of what kind.)
Accordingly, the petitioner has to demolish the house to make way for the
easement.

just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use
as an easement of a right of way.

FACTS:
A free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in the province of
Cagayan was issued in the name of Vicente Manglapus, and registered under
OCT No. P-24814. The land was granted subject to the following proviso
expressly stated in the title:

NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION VS.
CA- Easement and Just
Compensation
When a land, originally public land is awarded to a provate individual, a legal
easement may be constituted and thus no just compensation is required. It
would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case,

"... it shall not be subject to any encumbrance whatsoever in favor of any

corporation, association or partnership except with the consent of the grantee
and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
solely for educational, religious or charitable purposes or for a right of way;
and subject finally to all conditions and public easements and servitudes
recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in sections 109,
110, 111, 112, 113 and 114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended..."

Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente

Manglapus
by
absolute
sale.
Sometime in 1982, NIA was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan and
Alcala, Cagayan. NIA then entered a portion of Manglapus' land and made
diggings and fillings thereon. Manglapus filed a complaint for damages
against NIA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the
taking of a portion of his property for use as easement of a right of way.

We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11) meters in width.
This is well within the limit provided by law. Manglapus has therefore no
cause to complain.

RULING: No.

Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either
by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter
voluntary easements." In the present case, we find and declare that a legal
easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government.

The transfer certificate of title contains such a reservation. It states that title to
the
land
shall
be:
". . . subject to the provisions of said Land Registration Act and the Public
Land Act, as well as those of Mining Laws, if the land is mineral, and subject,
further to such conditions contained in the original title as may be subsisting."

Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and condition
that the land is subject to "to all conditions and public easements and
servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in
Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended." This reservation, unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant,
was not limited by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition.

Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands granted by
patent,
"shall further be subject to a right of way sot exceeding twenty meters in
width for public highways, railroads,irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs
and telephone lines, and similar works..."

The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by
free patent. The ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private
property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a
part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way.

COSTABELLA CORP. VS.

CA- Easement Right of
Way
The convenience of the dominant estate is not the gauge for the grant of
compulsory right of way but rather, it should satisfy all four requisites
(emphasis on 1st requisite- it should be merely for convenience but it must be
due to the fact that the dominant estate does not have an adequate outlet to a
public highway.

FACTS:
Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel.
Before such construction, the private respondent, in going to and from their
respective properties and the provincial road, passed through a passageway
which traversed the petitioners property. As a result of the construction, this
passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed. Private
respondent filed for injunction plus damages. In the same complaint the
private respondents also alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on
the beach fronting the latters property without the necessary permit,
obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping
debris of flotsam on the beach. The private respondent also claim that the have

acquired the right of way through prescription. They prayed for the re-opening
of the ancient road right of way (what they called the supposed easement in
this case) and the destruction of the dike. Petitioner answered by saying that
their predecessor in interests act of allowing them to pass was gratuitous and
in fact, they were just tolerating the use of the private respondents. CA ruled
in favor of the private respondents.

ISSUE:

estate. The private respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet
from their respective properties to a public highway; in fact the lower court
confirmed that there is another outlet for the private respondents to the main
road (yet they ruled in favor of the private respondents). Apparently, the CA
lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate was never a
gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity
and not mere convenience for the dominant estate to acquire such easement.
Also, the private respondents made no mention of their intention to indemnify
the petitioners. The SC also clarified that least prejudicial prevails over
shortest distance (so shortest distance isnt necessarily the best choice.)

1) Whether or not easement of right and way can be acquired through

prescription?
2) Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of
way in the form of a passageway, on the petitioners property?

RULING:
1) NO. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to
acquisitive prescription.

2) NO. one may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has
proven the: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and
has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been
paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient

VILLANUEVA VS.
VELASCO- Legal
Easement
A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for
private interest and becomes a continuing property right unless its removal is
provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed
before the execution of the conveyance; Essential requisites for an easement

to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other

immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper
indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the
foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.

the easement which is meant to protect was not annotated in the petitioners
title.
CA ruled in favor of the private respondents saying that the easement exists
even though it was not annotated in the torrens title because servitudes are
inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. And
that Villanueva is bound by the contact of easement, not only as a voluntary
easement but as a legal easement.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Petitioner Bryan Villanueva bought a parcel of land in QC from Pacific

Banking Corporation which it acquired from the spouses Maximo and Justina
Gabriel. When he bought it, there was a small house on its southeastern
portion. It occupies one meter of two meter wide easement of right of way the
Gabriel spouses granted to Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of the private
respondents, in a contract of easement of right of way. Amongst others, the
contract provides that the easements purpose is to have an outlet to Tandang
Sora which is the nearest public road and the least burdensome (Espinolass
property being the dominant estate and Gabriel spousess as the servient
estate.) It was also provided in the contract that the easement shall be binding
to the successors, assigns without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property
that will warrant the circumstances.

Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner?

The private respondents were able to acquire a writ of demolition on the house
obstructing the easement against the Spouses Gabriel. The petitioner filed a
third party claim with prayer to quash the writ saying that he was not made a
party to the civil case and that the writ of demolition should not prosper since

RULING:
YES. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exists unless its
removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is
removed before the execution of the conveyance conformably with Art 647 in
accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code.

Essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant

estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not
due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way
claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant

estate
to
a
public
highway
may
be
the
shortest.
The existence of the easement has been established by the lower courts and
the same has become conclusive to the SC. The small house occupying one
meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private
respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle (no mention of what kind.)
Accordingly, the petitioner has to demolish the house to make way for the
easement.

Locsin
vs.
Climaco
G.R.
January
No.
31,
L-27319
1969
|
FACTS
The
HawaiianCompany,
Philippine
a
sugar
central,
expiration
after
of
a
the
contract
central
granting
a
right
of
way
the
Hacienda
(voluntary)
San
thru
Vicente,
claimed
that
it had
a
legal
right
of
easement
way
and
of
could
passing
thus
continue

However,
central
was
the
not
requisites
to
satisfy
all
needed
theable
for
easement.
such
legal
ISSUE
Is
entitled
the
Central
to
claim
a
COMPULSORY
OF
WAY?
RIGHT
RULING
No.
meet
For
the
failure
to
requirements
law.
The
owner
of
of
the
an
estate
may
claim
a
compulsory
(legal)
only
after
right
he
of
has
way
established
existence
of
the
4
requisites
namely:
1.
the
estate
is
surrounded
immovables,
by
and
other
is
without
outlet
to
adequate
a
public
highway;
2.
payment
of
the
proper
indemnity;
3.
the
isolation
should
the
proprietors
not
be
due
own
to
acts;
4.
the
right
of
way
claimed
least
prejudicial
is
at
a
point
to
the
and
servient
estate
insofar
with
this
as
rule,
consistent
where
the
distance
dominant
from
estate
to
may
a
public
be
shortest.
highway
The
of
proof
onus
is
or
upon
burden
the
owner
dominant
of
the
estate
to
show
by
specific
averments
in
his
existence
complaints
of
the
enumerated.
requisites
Incidentally,
Sugar
Limitation
the
Law
as
amended,
(Act
4166)
does
not
grant
the
Central
right
to
establish
way
on
the
a
right
lands
of
of
adherent
would
planters.
It
appear
and
declaration
from
its
title
of
policy
was
enacted
that
Act
solely
4166
for
the
purpose
of
limiting
and
production
allocating
of
sugar
the
in
well
the
as
Philippines,
as
regulating
processing
the
and
marketing
thereof
Locsin
vs.
Climaco
G.R.
January
No.
31,
L-27319
1969
|
FACTS
The
HawaiianCompany,
Philippine
aand
sugar
central,
expiration
after
of
aof
the
contract
central
granting
a
right
of
way
the
Hacienda
(voluntary)
San
thru
Vicente,
claimed
that
it
had
a
legal
right
of
easement
way
could
passing
thus
continue
thru
However,
the
Hacienda.
the
central
to
satisfy
was
all
not
the
able
requisites
needed
for
such
legal
easement.
ISSUE
Is
the
Central
entitled
COMPULSORY
to
claim
RIGHT
a
OF
WAY?
RULING
No.
For
failure
to
meet
requirements
the
of
the
law.
estate
The
may
owner
of
an
claim
(legal)
a
right
compulsory
of
way
only
established
after
he
the
has
existence
of
4
requisites
namely:
surrounded
1.
the
estate
by
is
other
immovables,
without
adequate
and
is
outlet
to
a
public
highway;
2.
proper
payment
indemnity;
of
the
3.
should
the
isolation
not
be
due
to
the
acts;
proprietors
own
claimed
4.
the
right
is
at
of
a
way
point
least
the
servient
prejudicial
estate
to
and
insofar
as
consistent
with
distance
this
rule,
from
where
the
dominant
estate
to
a
public
highway
may
be
shortest.
The
onus
or
burden
of
owner
proof
of
is
the
upon
the
dominant
show
by
estate
to
specific
in
his
complaints
averments
the
existence
requisites
of
enumerated.
Incidentally,
the
Sugar
Law
(Act
Limitation
4166)
as
not
amended,
grant
the
does
Central
establish
a
right
right
of
to
way
adherent
on
the
planters.
lands
of
It
would
appear
from
its
title
and
policy
declaration
that
Act
4166
of
was
for
the
enacted
solely
purpose
and
allocating
ofClimaco
limiting
the as
production
in
the
of
sugar
well
asPhilippines,
regulating
the
processing
marketing
thereof
and
Locsin
vs.
G.R.
No.
L-27319
|
January
31,
1969
FACTS
The
Philippine
HawaiianCompany,
central,
after
a
sugar
the
expiration
of
a
contract
granting
way
central
(voluntary)
a
right
thru
of
the
Vicente,
Hacienda
San
claimed
legal
easement
that
it
had
of
a
right
could
of
thus
way
continue
and
passing
thru
the
Hacienda.
However,
central
was
the
not
able
to
requisites
satisfy
all
needed
the
for such legal
easement.

ISSUE
Is
the
Central
entitled
COMPULSORY
to claim
RIGHT
a
OF
WAY?
RULING
No.
For
failure
to
meet
requirements
the
of
the
law.
estate
The
may
owner
of
an
claim
(legal)
a
right
compulsory
of
way
only
established
after
he
the
has
existence
of
4
requisites
namely:
surrounded
1.
the
estate
by
is
other
immovables,
without
adequate
and
is
outlet
to
a
public
highway;
2.
proper
payment
indemnity;
of
the
should
3.
the
isolation
not
be
due
to
the
acts;
proprietors
own
claimed
4.
the
right
is
at
of
a
way
point
least
the
servient
prejudicial
estate
to
and
insofar
as
consistent
with
distance
this
rule,
from
where
the
dominant
estate
to
a
public
highway
may
be
shortest.
The
onus
or
burden
of
owner
proof
ofLimitation
is
the
upon
the
dominant
show
by
estate
to
specific
in
his
complaints
averments
the
existence
requisites
of
enumerated.
Incidentally,
the
Sugar
Law
(Act
4166)
as
not
amended,
grant
the
does
Central
establish
a
right
right
of
to
way
adherent
on
the
planters.
lands
of
It
would
appear
from
its
title
and
policy
declaration
that
Act
4166
of
was
for
the
enacted
solely
purpose
and
allocating
of
limiting
the
production
in
the
Philippines,
of
sugar
as
well
as
regulating
the
processing
marketing
thereof
and
Locsin
vs.
Climaco
G.R.
No.
L-27319
|
January
31,
1969
FACTS
The
Philippine
HawaiianCompany,
central,
after
a
sugar
the
expiration
of
a
contract
granting
way
central
(voluntary)
a
right
thru
of
the
Vicente,
Hacienda
San
claimed
legal
easement
that
it
had
of
a
right
could
of
thus
way
continue
and
passing
thru
the
Hacienda.
However,
central
was
the
not
able
to
requisites
satisfy
all
needed
the
for
easement
such
legal
Locsin
vs.
Climaco
G.R.
No.
L-27319
|
January
31,
1969
FACTS
The
Philippine
HawaiianCompany,
central,
after
a
sugar
the
expiration
of
a
contract
granting
way
central
(voluntary)
a
right
thru
of
the
Vicente,
Hacienda
San
claimed
legal
easement
that
it
had
of
a
right
could
of
thus
way
continue
and
passing
thru
the
Hacienda.
However,
central
was
the
not
able
to
requisites
satisfy
all
needed
the
for
easement.
such
legal
ISSUE
Is
entitled
the
Central
to
claim
a
COMPULSORY
OF
WAY?
RIGHT
RULING
No.
meet
For
the
failure
to
requirements
law.
The
owner
of
of
the
an
estate
may
claim
a
compulsory
(legal)
only
after
right
he
of
has
way
established
existence
of
the
4
requisites
namely:
1.
the
estate
is
surrounded
immovables,
by
and
other
is
without
outlet
to
adequate
a
public
highway;
2.
payment
of
the
proper
indemnity;
3.
the
isolation
should
the
proprietors
not
be
due
own
to
acts;
4.
the
right
of
way
claimed
least
prejudicial
is
at
a
point
to
the
and
servient
estate
insofar
with
this
as
rule,
consistent
where
the
distance
dominant
from
estate
to
may
a
public
be
shortest.
highway
The
of
proof
onus
is
or
upon
burden
the
owner
dominant
of
the
estate
to
show
by
specific
averments
in
his
existence
complaints
of
the
enumerated.
requisites
Incidentally,
Sugar
Limitation
the
Law
as
amended,
(Act
4166)
does
not
grant
the
Central
right
to
establish
way
on
the
a
right
lands
of
of
adherent
would
planters.
It
appear
and
declaration
from
its
title
of
policy
was
enacted
that
Act
solely
4166
for
the
purpose
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SPA. DE LA CRUZ v. RAMISCAL

G.R. No. 137882
February 4, 2005

reciprocated with an easement by the owner of another adjacent estate.

Respondent did not want to give them the easement on the eastern side of her
property but, instead, offered to them the disputed passageway, which offer
they had accepted.

Facts:
Respondent Olga Ramiscal is the registered owner of a parcel of land.
Petitioner, Spa. Elizabeth and Alfredo De La Cruz are occupants of a parcel of
land located at the back of Ramiscals property, owned by the mother of
Alfredo. The subject matter of this case is a long strip of land owned by
respondent which is being used by petitioners as their pathway to and from the
nearest public highway from their property.
Respondent leased her property, including the building thereon, to Phil. Orient
Motors. Phil. Orient Motors also owned a property adjacent to that of
respondents. Years later, Phil. Orient Motors sold its property to San Benito
Realty. It was only during the relocation survey and location plan for both
contiguous properties of respondent and San Benito Realty that respondent
discovered that the aforementioned pathway being occupied by petitioners is
part of her property.
Respondent filed a complaint, seeking the demolition of the structure
allegedly illegally constructed by petitioners on her property. Respondent
asserted in her complaint that petitioners have an existing right of way to a
public highway other than the current one they are using, which she owns.
Petitioners claimed that such use was with the knowledge of respondent. They
also alleged that respondent initiated the construction on her property of a
motor shop known as Phil. Orient Motors and they, as well as the other
occupants of the property at the back of respondents land, opposed the
construction of the perimeter wall as it would enclose and render their
property without any adequate ingress and egress. They asked respondent to
give them an easement on the eastern side of her property, which would be

Issue: W/N Petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement of right of

way
Ruling:
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal
immovable property of another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain
from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his property, for the
benefit of another thing or person.
Petitioners herein failed to show by competent evidence other than their bare
claim that they entered into an agreement with respondents. The hands of this
Court are tied from giving credence to petitioners self-serving claim that such
right of way was voluntarily given them by respondent for the following
reasons:
First, petitioners were unable to produce any shred of document evidencing
such agreement. The Civil Code is clear that any transaction involving the sale
or disposition of real property must be in writing. Thus, the dearth of
corroborative evidence opens doubts on the veracity of the naked assertion of
petitioners that indeed the subject easement of right of way was a voluntary
grant from respondent. Second, as admitted by the petitioners, it was only the
foreman, Mang Puling, who talked with them regarding said pathway on the
northern side of respondents property. Thus, petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz
testified that she did not talk to respondent regarding the arrangement
proposed to them by Mang Puling despite the fact that she often saw
respondent. It is, therefore, foolhardy for petitioners to believe that the alleged
foreman of respondent had the authority to bind the respondent relating to the

easement of right of way. Third, their explanation that said Mang Puling
submitted said agreement to the Quezon City Engineers Office, in connection
with the application for a building permit but said office could no longer
produce a copy thereof, does not inspire belief. P etitioners should have
requested a subpoena duces tecum from said court to compel the Quezon City
Engineers Office to produce said document or to prove that

SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ and JOCELYN VALDEZ v. SPOUSES

FRANCISCO TABISULA and CARIDAD TABISULA
560 SCRA 332 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

The requisites provided in conferment of a legal easement of right of way

under the Civil Law must be complied and such existence be proven.

the case at bar, no public benefit or private right requires it to be given an

imperative meaning.

FACTS: Spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez bought from Spouses Francisco
and Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land located in San Fernando, La Union. The
absolute sale indicated a right of way.

As found, however, by the trial court, which is supported by the Sketch of the
location of the lots of the parties and those adjoining them, a common
evidence of the parties, Spouses Valdez and their family are also the owners of
two properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two public
roads or highways.

Spouses Tabisula subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the
subject property. Believing that that side is the intended road right of way
mentioned in the deed, Spouses Valdez opposed such act. Conciliation was
then initiated. Spouses Tabisula failed to attend the conferences scheduled.
This prompted Spouses Valdez to file, after more than six years of execution
of the deed, a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages.
Spouses Valdez contended that they purchased the subject property on the
assurance of providing them a road right of way. On the other hand, spouses
Tabisula averred that the 2-meter easement should be taken from the western
portion of the subject property and not theirs.
The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal.
ISSUES: Whether or not Spouses Valdez are entitled to the right of way as
indicated in the absolute sale
HELD: Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving
the sale or disposition of real property must be in writing. The stipulation
harped upon by Spouses Valdez that they shall be provided a 2 meters wide
road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in
this sale is not a disposition of real property. The proviso that the intended
grant of right of way is not included in this sale could only mean that the
parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct agreement for the
purpose. The use of the word shall, which is imperative or mandatory in its
ordinary signification, should be construed as merely permissive where, as in

To be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the

following requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper
indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is not the result of the owner of the
dominant estates own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servant estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the
foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on
the owner of the dominant estate, herein the spouses Valdez.
Since Spouses Valdez then have more than adequate passage to two public
roads, they have no right to demand the grant by spouses Tabisula of an
easement on the western side of Spouses Tabisulas lot.

FLORO v. LLENADOLegal Easement

was merely provisional as the parties were still drafting a contract.

Later, Floro discovered grave damage to the lots in question from the passage
of heavy machinery. He then barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks,
wooden posts and adobe stones. He essentially implied Llenados to keep out
off property.

A legal easement cannot arise merely for the convenience of the dominant
estate. The owner must prove that the easement is absolutely necessary and
least restrictive on the servient estate.

Llenado pursued an easement claim with the RTC. The RTC denied the
request. On appeal by LLenado, and ordered that Mr. Floro remove the
barricades. Mr. Floro went to the SC

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Mr Floro owned the Floro Park Subdivision situated in Bulacan. The

subdivision has its own access roads from the MacArthur Highway through
road lot 4. Another fellow, Llenado, owned the Llenado Homes Subdivision.
He obtained the same from Mr. de Castro, when it was known as the
Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, Llenado Homes was bounded on the south by
the Palanas Creek, 5 which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision. To
the west sat the ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo. The controversy brewed
since Llenado Homes did not have any passage to the MacArthur Highway.
However, a proposed access road passing the abandoned riceland of Marcial
Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the former
Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. This plan was approved by the HLURB.
Because the access road through the Ipapo Riceland did not exist yet, the
Llenados sought, and were granted, oral permission by the Floros to use Road
Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park . At this point, remember that the agreement

Whether or not the requirements for legal easement existed to allow Llenado
to claim the same against Mr. Floro.

HELD: NO.
As in the earlier case, the court held that to be entitled to a compulsory
easement of right of way, the preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650
of the Civil Code must be established. These include:
that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid;
(3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the

servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

For this case, it is apparent that the elements have not been met. The original
subdivision development plan presented by Llenado indicates an existing and
prior agreement with Ms. Ipapo to create a right of way through the
abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed to these terms but Llenado
apparently thought it too much work and cost to develop such road. It was
easier for him to create an easement via the Floro property.

The court ruled time and again that one may not claim a legal easement
merely out of convenience. Convenience motivated Llenando to abandon the
Ipapo access road development and pursue an access road through the Floro
estate. He was stacking the cards in his favor to the unnecessary detriment of
his neighbor. The court refused to countenance his behavior.

FACTS:
Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate owned by
several co-owners.
On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and Frisca Dila)
executed a deed by which an undivided 1/3 portion of the land was donated to
a niece, Epifania Dila, and another undivided 1/3 portion to the children of a
deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the remaining portion, also an undivided
third, was declared to pertain exclusively to and would be retained by
Cornelia Dila. A partition was then executed.

FRANCISCO V. IACEasement of Way

An owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property
from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an
adjacent estate. Isolation must not be due to his own acts.

The former co-owners overlooked the fact that, by reason of the subdivision,
Epifania Dilas lot came to include the entire frontage of what used to be Lot
860 along Parada Road, and thus effectively isolated from said road the other
lots, i.e., of Cornelia Dila, and of the children of Anacleta Dila.
Despit that, Cornelia sold the lot to some buyers who subsequently sold them
to Ramos.
Ramos asked for a right of way through Franciscos land but negotiations
failed. Francisco's proposal for an exchange of land at the rate of 1 sq.m from
him to three 3 sq.m from Ramos, as was supposedly the custom in the locality,
was unacceptable to Ramos.

Later that year, Ramos succeeded was able to obtain a 3m wide passageway
through Dilas lot. Yet in August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a 10ft high
concrete wall on his lot, thereby closing the very right of way granted to him
across Lot 860-B. [It seems that what he wished was to have a right of passage
precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to be more convenient to
him, and he did not bother to keep quiet about his determination to bring suit,

if necessary, to get what he wanted.]

Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the barbedwire fence on his lot along Parada Road with a stone wall. Shortly thereafter,
Francisco filed a case against him asserting his right to a legal easement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramos was entitled to an easement of right of way through the
land belonging to Francisco

HELD: NO
The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done,
by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an
easement of way through an adjacent estate. The third of the cited requisites:
that the claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the isolation of his
property had not been met indeed the respondent had actually brought about
the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It
will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was
dffficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was
wide enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been
held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way
does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an alternative location.

MUNICIPALITY (NOW CITY) OF

PASIG, METRO MANILA, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011

GR # 152230 August 9, 2005 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain,

Expropriation, Valid and Definite Offer)
FACTS: Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision of declaring
respondent municipality (now city) as having the right to expropriate
petitioners property for the construction of an access road. Petitioner argues
that there was no valid and definite offer made before a complaint for eminent
domain was filed as the law requires (Art. 35, Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code). Respondent contends that a letter
to purchase was offered to the previous owners and the same was not
accepted.
ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite
and valid offer to expropriate.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN

SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. VS.

HELD: No. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement of a

valid and definite offer will result in the dismissal of the complaint. The
purpose of the mandatory requirement to be first made to the owner is to
encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public
purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court of action.