Alexander Zheng 10092648

Philosophy 247
Phil Smolenski
How Just War Theory can be Sustainable with the Adoption of Asymmetric Tactics

The ethics of war are usually studied in terms of just war theory. Just war theory
deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought; it consists of deciding whether
there is a just cause to go to war, and if there is, it must decide if the means of going to war
are also just. Just war theory uses theoretical and historical examples to limit certain kinds of
warfare and agree on what forms warfare may or may not take. Conventional views of just
war theory take a utilitarian or consequentialist perspective which several modern
philosophers believe become too vague to be applicable in war in modern times. Since the
end of the cold war, the nature of war and military conflict have experienced large changes
that have led to a most modern wars being unequal or asymmetric (Rodin). Wars are
unequal or asymmetric when one military force is overwhelmingly superior to the other.
Asymmetric war, refers to when the inferior military force resorts to non-conventional tactics
to counter conventional military superiority, whereas unequal wars are wars fought with
conventional tactics, which have resulted in the large inequality of the distribution of
casualties. Through a consequential and utilitarian lens of just war theory, asymmetric and
unequal wars are considered to be morally equivalent to symmetric wars fought on equal
grounds. Most people, on the other hand, will agree that asymmetric and unequal wars
should not be morally equivalent because they often result in heavy casualties to one side,
to the point where many innocents and non-combatants are harmed or killed. If the wars
were fought on more equal grounds, losses would likely be distributed more evenly between
both military forces, which would result in less civilian and non-combatant casualties and the
loss of innocent lives. Therefore philosophers are developing philosophical views that
attempt to give special considerations to asymmetric and unequal wars, which conventional
wars do not possess, in order to evenly distribute the losses and gains. In order to possess

these special considerations, the consequentialist/utilitarian views of just war theory must be
replaced by a deontological view. Because a deontological view is the ethical position that
judges morality through adherence to moral duties and obligations, moral judgements
become defined through definitive rules rather than overall utility or consequences. David
Rodin is a philosopher whom agrees with a deontological just war theory because of how it
treats asymmetric war morally different than symmetric war and how, because asymmetric
wars are different, the moral duties of a deontological theory can be changed to make just
war more fair for both sides. In the following paragraphs, I will present Rodins argument for
a deontological just war theory over the conventional consequential and utilitarian views,
then I will discuss how his view fails to bring enough fairness to the inequality of military
powers. Theoretically, while, it has many positive benefits, his alternative idea is
unsustainable in practice because it does not undermine the powers of strong military forces
enough to provide a fair chance of victory to weaker powers. I will then attempt to strengthen
Rodins argument by adding a premise to his just war theory that allows weaker powers to
use asymmetric tactics with certain restrictions.
Traditional just war theory consists of two basic elements: an account of just
cause (jus ad bellum) and an account of just means (jus in bello) (Sterba). A just cause is
always responsive towards substantial aggression, where nonbelligerent actions to bring
peace are too hopeless or costly, and belligerent actions to bring peace are neither hopeless
nor too costly. Substantial aggression is generally regarded as the type of aggression that
violates fundamental human rights. When a just cause exists, just war theory states that it is
morally acceptable to go to war as long as it is conducted with just means. The two
conditions of just means are that harm to innocents should not be directly intended as an
end or a means, and the harm resulting from the belligerent means should not be
disproportionate to the particular defensive objective to be attained. Just war theory believes
that if the requirements for a just cause and just means are satisfied, it is just for a military
force to go to war. The problem is that just war theory is meant to deal with wars that are

fought on fair grounds. Most wars are fought on unequal grounds and are asymmetric wars.
In asymmetric wars have six categories of asymmetric tactics: 1) chemical weapons; 2)
biological weapons; 3) weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 4) information war tactic; 5)
terrorism (the use of force against non-combatants and their property); and 6) alternative
operational concepts such as guerrilla tactics, using civilians as human shields, or shifting
the battle zone to complex urban environments (Rodin). Asymmetry is a strategic term, and
asymmetric actions simply seek to obtain a strategic advantage from a position of
conventional military weakness. These tactics are often adopted to fight against the
developed Western countries and often utilise the open nature of Western societies and the
moral consequences of harming innocent civilians and non-combatants as well as the
reluctance of Western powers to incur significant casualties among their own soldiers. The
reason asymmetric wars are becoming much more important is because they offer a
symmetrical concept to war in which the disparity between the capabilities and tactics of the
two military forces is constituted by the means and capabilities of conventional power as well
as by the power of the use of non-conventional tactics. Asymmetric tactics are almost never
tactics of choice, but tactics resorted to in positions of weakness; they allow weak military
forces to engage their enemy on roughly equal terms in a conventional war. These tactics
have become much more popular due to the fact that the USA has grown to become the
worlds most powerful military force with no power close to equal terms in conventional war.
Because the USA is such a large power, going to war with the USA usually require countries
to resort to asymmetric tactics because a conventional war will likely be highly unequal.
David Rodin attempts to assess asymmetric war from a moral point of view to see if we can
accept asymmetric tactics. He answer his question in three parts: first, he assesses the
moral acceptability of asymmetric tactics, second, he attempts to identify a morally
appropriate response to asymmetric war and limit the superpower to lessen the inequality of
war, and lastly, he assesses the adequacy of the norms embodied in the just war theory
themselves to the phenomena of asymmetric and unequal war.

Asymmetric tactics often invoke reactions of disgust from the general public,
however from a consequentialist perspective, tactics of asymmetry often result in
consequences of a lower intensity than conventional wars and therefore does not see
anything intrinsically wrong with them. Rodin believes consequentialism is a poor way to
view just war theory for this reason: it is extremely difficult to answer, in a meaningful way,
whether asymmetrical tactics were beneficial and efficient. War is too unpredictable and
although sometimes asymmetric tactics have proven successful, sometimes using these
tactics will fail or stimulate the will of the opponent to escalate the violence. Because
consequentialism is most appropriate in retrospect, Rodin presents a deontological approach
to just war theory as a healthy alternative. Just war theory can be made to possess a
deontological set of guidelines to assess whether war was engaged with a just cause and
conducted with just means. The guidelines begin with the conception that people deserve
moral respect and enjoy certain personal moral protections and immunities based on their
lack of participation in war and harm they inflict upon others. These protections consist of
many rights such as the right to life, the right not to be attacked and the right not to be
exposed to excessive risk. Every human possesses these protections to start with, but they
will lose them when they engage in harming another. A deontological approach does not
look at overall utility or consequences to decide whether an action was morally acceptable,
and looks instead at whether either party is not following the basic moral requirements set by
the deontological guidelines. A deontological approach therefore determines whether a war
is just based off of whether a military forces actions are consistent with these rules and is
favored to a consequentialist or utilitarian view which simply looks at the overall quantity of
the utility or consequences.
Asymmetric tactics in general do not respect the principle of non-combatant
immunity. Most tactics attempt to gain a moral victory by either forcing combatants to
directly harming non-combatants and innocents or placing non-combatants and innocents
them in situations of excessive risk. Because these asymmetric tactics do not respect the

immunity that non-combatants and civilians possess, they fail to satisfy just war theory from
a deontological perspective. But if asymmetric tactics are morally unacceptable in just war
theory, how does the weaker military force conduct themselves in just wars without nonconventional tactics? When the weaker party is forced on equal grounds as the stronger
party, the result would be a radically unequal conflict where the weaker party is required by
the rules of war to give up the use of asymmetric tactics. This problem comes from the
tension between jus ad bellum (just cause) and jus in bello (just means) in where just cause
tells us when fighting is morally appropriate and just means places constraints on the means
of fighting. Tensions between the two often arise in many just war theories, and in Rodins
specific theory, the tension lies between the rights of non-combatants protected by jus in
bello, which prevents the use of asymmetric tactics, and the claim of the jus ad bellum to be
an account of justice, which should allow the use of asymmetric tactics to present a fair fight
against stronger powers.
Rodin presents three responses of just war theory, each with different values of jus
ad bellum and jus in bello, to provide a solution to the posed dilemma that asymmetric
tactics are morally wrong but conventional war tactics would result in unequal wars. Rodins
first response takes the standard approach of just war theory, which places greater
importance on jus in bello which outweighs the complaints of jus ad bellum. This view
claims that if a war cant be fought justly, then it shouldnt be fought at all. The problem with
this view is that it values equality over fairness. When a smaller power truly has a just reason
to go to war against a larger force, this response denies them any opportunity to seek justice
on equal grounds by placing them on even grounds. The second response is to support the
legitimacy of asymmetric tactics. They propose to relax the rules of jus in bello for the
weaker side to allow them to pursue asymmetric tactics to fight on more even terms with the
stronger power. This response trades off the protections given through limiting and using just
methods to conduct war to pursue claims of seeking justice for a just cause. The problem is
that just war theory exists to protect the immunities given to all peoples, and therefore a form

of just war theory that is willing to take away these rights defeats the purpose of just war
theory. Rodins first two responses fail to offer a morally acceptable method to conduct just
war between vastly unequal military forces. Standard just war theory simply disadvantages
the weaker force by placing restrictions on the tactics they can use results in the
disadvantaged weaker forces becoming more disadvantaged, whereas removing those
restrictions on the weaker force and keeping the restrictions on the larger force is
unacceptable because it undermines fundamental protections and immunities that just war
theory is supposed to protect. Rodin offers a third response as his method to allow a just war
theory that can allow just war to exist between strong and weak powers. Rodins third
response to easing the tensions between jus in bello and jus ad bellum in modern wars is to
keep the restrictions on the weaker power to be unable to resort to asymmetric tactics, but
require the stronger power to practice jus in bello much more critically. This response places
the protections of jus in bello as a strict and non-moving baseline, but place higher standards
on the strong. Rodin believes that there are three main ways to strengthen the norms and
standards placed upon the strong by raising the criteria of the strong in their conduct of
conventional war by: raising the requirements of making distinctions between military and
civilian objectives, raising the restrictions of strong powers to only be able to take military
force when they are certain or near-certainty enough as to the status of potential target
through clear direct and reliable evidence, and lastly to place a higher restriction of
proportionality so that the level of collateral harm to civilians is acceptable in achieving a
specific military objective and is strong powers must do all they can to keep civilian
casualties at an absolute minimum. These premises make up Rodins response to a just war
theory that is sustainable in modern times where wars are being fought between parties with
growing disparities of power. Rodin recognizes that although his exact theory may provoke
objections, the underlying attempt to raise the criteria of the strong in their conduct of just
war is a necessary turn just war theory must take to remain a relevant and applicable moral
view to study the ethics of war.

Rodins third response to easing the tensions between jus in bello and jus ad
bellum in modern wars is to keep the restrictions on the weaker power to be unable to resort
to asymmetric tactics, but require the stronger power to practice jus in bello much more
critically. This response places the protections of jus in bello as a strict and non-moving
baseline, but place higher standards on the strong. Rodins belief for a deontological just war
theory has a baseline of unmoving principles and protections given to all humans which
military forces must respect. The stronger the military force, Rodin believes, the more
restricted they should be to follow and protect these principles while conducting conventional
war upon other parties. The problem with such a view is that when it is applied in real world
scenarios, this just war theory has no means to restrict the strong powers as well as no way
to punish the strong for failing to adhere to the restrictions placed upon them. In theory, such
a practice would have significantly large positive impacts on international relationships and
human relationships. But just as there is no way to enforce strong powers to adhere to their
restrictions, there is no way to enforce weaker powers to resort to asymmetric tactics. Rodin
assumes that if a weak military force truly believed that they needed to go to war against a
strong power for a just cause they would happily oblige to following jus in bello and stop
asymmetric tactics. However Rodins adaptation of just war theory fails present a method
where the weak power have a fair chance of victory over the strong. The restrictions placed
upon the stronger power do not weaken or strengthen either power, they simply require that
the strong limit civilian casualties to the utmost. This restriction is only useful to the weaker
power in the sense that it buys them time. The strong force must be certain that they are
only attacking the weaker power and not including civilians and limit the extent of their force
to reduce collateral damage. Therefore Rodins argument seems to fall into a fallacy in which
the more the weaker power is integrated into the civilian population, the more restricted the
larger power is. If wars were still fought with conventional tactics used by both sides, the
larger power is almost always likely to win regardless of limiting their destructive power
because they simply have more technology and resources at their disposal. This encourages
the weaker power to resort to asymmetric tactics to prevent utter elimination. Rodins theory

is then only applicable and useful to weaker powers if they are allowed to use asymmetric
tactics, however the whole purpose of the response was to eliminate the asymmetric tactics
for an alternative.
It is possible for Rodin now to adapt his theory due to this objection and present a
new argument to his theory that allows weaker powers to use of an adapted form of certain
asymmetric tactics that still value and respect the baseline fundamental principles of just war
theory. In other words, this argument accepts that weaker powers must resort to nonconventional tactics to have a fair chance at victory. However just as stronger powers must
prevent as much collateral damage and civilian casualties, weaker powers also must place
certain restrictions on their use of certain asymmetric tactics to prevent as much casualties
and collateral damage as possible. For example, weaker powers may be morally permitted
to engage in guerilla warfare to the extent that they are allowed to be made up of an informal
military force that does not have a military base and lives within communities comprised of
combatants and non-combatants alike. The restrictions that are forced upon the use of such
tactics is that the weaker force is never allowed to initiate combat or violence within these
communities because of the risk it brings to all the innocents. Therefore weaker powers are
given the ability to initiate conflict and be selective about when and where they want to
engage in conventional tactics of warfare. The asymmetric tactics are used simply to create
a way for the weaker powers to hide and plan their next step so they are not exterminated by
larger powers. By adopting asymmetric tactics as a defensive mechanism, and solely use it
with defensive means, stronger powers are even more heavily obligated to obey the
restrictions of jus in bello when trying to uncover their military objectives. Rodins adaptive
theory still places greater restrictions of jus in bello to strong powers and raises the criteria
for weaker powers which is consistent with just war theory because it puts the values of the
principles and protections of all peoples at the center of concern for whether the war is
morally just. The additional premise that accepts some levels of asymmetric tactics is crucial
for Rodins theory. Without it, his theory fails to provide a proper level of fairness to reconcile

the disparity between strong and weak powers. Even with this additional premise, Rodins
theory is only sustainable on a theoretical level. It only provides a set of rules that need to be
followed for a war to be just. Because there is no way to enforce these rules, both powers
are not required to follow them in any way except that it is the morally just way to conduct
war. But because both powers are not tied to these restrictions, both powers are likely to not
obey these restrictions because of a lack of trust between enemies and the insatiable greed
that humans possess to acquire victory for a cause that they believe to be just. If Rodins
adapted theory were to be put in practice, the chances that both parties would act according
to it is highly unlikely.
Rodin presents just war theory from a deontological perspective. A deontological just war
theory have many benefits over consequentialist and utilitarian views, and Rodin believes
that must be used to adapt just war theory to modern wars which are often between two
parties that vastly differ in military force. These modern wars are often extremely unequal
and weaker powers resort to asymmetric tactics in an attempt to create a fair chance of
victory. Asymmetric tactics however are unacceptable in just war theory because they
undermine human rights that just war theory was created in order to protect. Rodin
attempted to find an alternative to asymmetric tactics to create wars that were fair and just
despite occurring between weak and strong powers. His original idea was to create a
baseline of principles and require closer following of these principles to stronger powers. The
problem with this original idea is that the restriction placed upon larger powers does not
provide enough fairness in the conduction of war. Weaker powers still do not possess a fair
chance through conventional tactics and will still be annihilated from direct conflict. In order
to provide an acceptable level of fairness, I have suggested that Rodin adapt his theory to
accept asymmetric tactics to the extent that by adopting them, the weaker power also
becomes required to adhere to the principles of jus in bello to a higher extent. Asymmetric
tactics do not allow the weaker power to use them to harm innocents, but can be used as
defensive and evasive tactics which rely on the principles that protect innocents of

unreasonable risk or harm. Therefore the weaker powers can use these tactics to gain the
advantage of choosing when and where to engage in conventional warfare. Large powers
are also not restricting to waiting to participate in conventional warfare and can still attempt
to uncover guerilla soldiers in hiding and can engage them as long as they adhere to the
restrictions placed upon them: they are certain of their military targets and their actions will
minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties. If both parties place the immunity and
protection of civilians at their highest priority, wars can exist be be fair despite having large
disparities of power because the weaker power can rely and utilise certain protections that
the strong cannot to create more fairness in the conduct of unequal war. Rodins
deontological view has advanced just war theory to be a sustainable model to judge modern
wars. Although its still just a theory and possesses many difficulties, just war theory is
becoming more applicable in real life and is heading down the path to provide a practical and
efficient way to conduct just war.

Word Count: 3638

References:
David Rodin (2006) "Ethics of Asymmetric War" (153-168)
James Sterba (1992) "Reconciling Pacifists and Just War Theorists" (284-305)