Professional Documents
Culture Documents
MARIANO
L.
DEL
MUNDO, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE U. FRANCISCO and GENOVEVA
V. ROSALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 104576 January 20, 1995
VITUG, J.:
TRIAL COURT:
FACTS:
The Franciscos are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of
38,010 square meters, situated in Barrio Anilao, Municipality of
Mabini, Province of Batangas, covered by and described in Original
Certificate of title ("OCT") No. 0-3267 of the Registry of deeds of
Batangas. Del Mundo, on the other hand, is the operator of a dive
camp resort adjacent to the property.
Sometime in June of 1980, Del Mundo proposed a corporate joint
venture with the Franciscos for the development of the latter's
property. The corporation (to be named the "Anilao Development
Corporation") would have a capital stock of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos to be subscribed equally between Del Mundo
and the Franciscos. To cover the proposed subscription of the
Franciscos, Del Mundo assured the couple that he could get from
them a P125,000.00 loan secured by the realty.
The Franciscos executed a special power of attorney ("SPA"), in favor
of Del Mundo authorizing him to obtain a bank loan. The SPA, in part,
provided:
1. To negotiate for a loan with any bank or financial institution, in
such amount or amounts as our said attorney-in-fact may deem
proper and expedient and under such terms and conditions as he
may also deem proper and convenient;
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Franciscos
thusly:
(1) Declaring the real estate mortgage executed by defendant
Mariano Del Mundo in favor of defendant Republic Planters Bank
(RPB) on January 10, 1981, null and void ab initio;
(2) Declaring the unauthorized payments made by defendant
Republic Planters Bank (RPB) to the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) for the account of plaintiffs as null and void;
(3) Ordering defendant Mariano L. del Mundo to pay to plaintiffs
the sum of P42,000.00 as reasonable rental payment for the use
and occupancy of plaintiffs' property, plus P15,000.00
representing the value of equipment taken by said defendant
from plaintiffs;
(4) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs
the sum of P200,000.00 as actual and moral damages, plus
P6,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, plus costs;
(5) Ordering plaintiffs to reimburse defendant Republic Planters
Bank the sum of P67,000.00;
(6) Dismissing defendants' counterclaims for lack of merit.
CA RULING:
While the appeal was pending, Jose Francisco died; he was
substituted by his heirs. The court of Appeals rendered its now
assailed decision which decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all
respects subject to the modification that plaintiff-appellants be
absolved of any liability to appellant bank.
When Del Mundo learned, for the first time, that a writ of execution
pursuant to the appellate court's decision was sought to be
implemented against his property, he filed on the very next day, an
urgent manifestation with motion to lift the entry of judgment against
him alleging non-service of the assailed decision. The appellate court
acted favorably on Del Mundo's motion and, "in the interest of
justice," he was also allowed to file his own for reconsideration. He
did in due time.
After Del Mundo's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
present petition (petition for review on certiorari).
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent CA erred in affirming the trial court's
decision ordering petitioner and co-defendant Republic Planters Bank
("RPB") to pay private respondents, jointly and severally, the sum of P
200,000.00 as actual and moral damages plus attorney's fees, and
costs/expenses of litigation.
HELD:
YES.
In its 29th June 1984 decision, the trial court, after summarizing the
conflicting asseverations of the parties, went on to discuss, and
forthwith to conclude on, the kernel issue of the case in just two
paragraphs, to wit:
1 of 12
RTC:
After that brief disquisition, the trial court disposed of the case by
ordering Del Mundo and RPB, inter alia, jointly and severally to pay
the Franciscos the sum of P200,000.00 as actual and moral damages,
P6,000.00 as attorney's fees, and litigation expenses plus costs.
Nevertheless, concisely written such as they may be, decisions must
still distinctly and clearly express, at least in minimum essence, its
factual and legal bases.
The two awards one for actual damages and the other for moral
damages cannot be dealt with in the aggregate; neither being
kindred terms nor governed by a coincident set of rules, each must be
separately identified and independently justified. A requirement
common to both, of course, is that an injury must have been
sustained by the claimant. The nature of that injury, nonetheless,
differs for while it is pecuniary in actual or compensatory damages, it
is, upon the other hand, non-pecuniary in the case of moral damages.
A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary
loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such damages,
to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We have
emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed, and courts, in
making an award must point out specific facts which could afford a
basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are
borne.
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to
compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood
to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature,
calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered.
Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount
of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative,
nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant,
and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases
expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the civil Code. A causal
relation, in fine, must exist between the act or omission referred to in
the Code which underlies, or gives rise to, the case or proceeding, on
the one hand, and the resulting injury, on the other hand; i.e., the
first must be the proximate cause and the latter the direct
consequence thereof.
A judicious review of the records in the case at bench, indeed, fails to
show that substantial legal basis was shown to support the herein
questioned collective award for the questioned damages. We are,
therefore, constrained to disregard them.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
MODIFIED by deleting the award of P200,000.00 for actual and moral
damages. In all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
PP v. HATE
G.R. No. 145712. September 24, 2002
MORAL DAMAGES-an unlawful killing of a person, either
homicide/murder, entitles the heirs of the deceased victim to moral
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The conference was doomed from the start. It was bound to fail.
The personalities who count in the field of transpiration refused to
attend the affair or withdrew their support after finding out the
background of the organizer of the conference. How could a
conference on transportation succeed without the participation of
the big names in the industry and government policy-makers?
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The first information says that the "organizer" tried to mulct half a
million pesos from a garment producer and exporter who was
being investigated for violation of the rules of the Garments,
Textile, Embroidery and Apparel Board. The "organizer" told the
garment exporter that the case could be fixed for a sum of
P500,000.00. The organizer got the shock of his life when the
exporter told him: "If I have that amount. I will hire the best
lawyers, not you." The organizer left in a huff, his thick face very
pale.
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21 June 1989
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Ruling:
Actions; Libel; In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named;
It is not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the
person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a
third person could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication.In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named.
It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as
the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a
third person could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication. Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied
with in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Identification is grossly inadequate when even the
alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the object of the
verbal attack.Identification is grossly inadequate when even the
alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the object of the
verbal attack. It is well to note that the revelation of the identity of
the person alluded to came not from petitioner Borjal but from private
respondent himself when he supplied the information through his 4
June 1989 letter to the editor. Had private respondent not revealed
that he was the organizer of the FNCLT referred to in the Borjal
articles, the public would have remained in blissful ignorance of his
identity. It is therefore clear that on the element of identifiability
alone the case falls.
Same; Same; Privileged Communications; Words and Phrases;
Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith while qualifiedly
privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are
not actionable unless found to have been made without good
intention or justifiable motive.A privileged communication may be
either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely
privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if
the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.
VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress
from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged
communications containing defamatory imputations are not
actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or
justifiable motive. To this genre belong private communications and
fair and true report without any comments or remarks.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression;
Criminal Law; The enumeration under Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications
since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise
privileged; The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not
in the nations penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution
guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press, and this
constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the
legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing
libels.Indisputably, petitioner Borjals questioned writings are not
within the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as
correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private
communications nor fair and true report without any comments or
remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not
privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an
exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged.
The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the
nations penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution
guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918,
in United States v. Caete, this Court ruled that publications which
are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court takes this opportunity to
remind media practitioners of the high ethical standards attached to
and demanded by their noble professionwithout a lively sense of
responsibility, a free press may readily become a powerful instrument
of injustice.We must however take this opportunity to likewise
remind media practitioners of the high ethical standards attached to
and demanded by their noble profession. The danger of an unbridled
irrational exercise of the right of free speech and press, that is, in
utter contempt of the rights of others and in willful disregard of the
cumbrous responsibilities inherent in it, is the eventual selfdestruction of the right and the regression of human society into a
veritable Hobbesian state of nature where life is short, nasty and
brutish. Therefore, to recognize that there can be no absolute
unrestraint in speech is to truly comprehend the quintessence of
freedom in the marketplace of social thought and action, genuine
freedom being that which is limned by the freedom of others. If there
is freedom of the press, ought there not also be freedom from the
press? It is in this sense that self-regulation as distinguished from selfcensorship becomes the ideal mean for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has
warned, [W]ithout x x x a lively sense of responsibility, a free press
may readily become a powerful instrument of injustice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is also worth keeping in mind
that the press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its
freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey
on the ordinary citizen.Lest we be misconstrued, this is not to
diminish nor constrict that space in which expression freely flourishes
and operates. For we have always strongly maintained, as we do now,
that freedom of expression is mans birthrightconstitutionally
protected and guaranteed, and that it has become the singular role of
the press to act as its defensor fidei in a democratic society such as
ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the press is the servant,
not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does not carry with it
an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Damages; Proof and motive that
the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex
and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly
established to entitle the victim to damages.On petitioners
counterclaim for damages, we find the evidence too meager to
sustain any award. Indeed, private respondent cannot be said to have
instituted the present suit in abuse of the legal processes and with
hostility to the press; or that he acted maliciously, wantonly,
oppressively, fraudulently and for the sole purpose of harassing
petitioners, thereby entitling the latter to damages. On the contrary,
private respondent acted within his rights to protect his honor from
what he perceived to be malicious imputations against him. Proof and
motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and
preponderantly established to entitle the victim to damages. The law
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, nor
should counsels fees be awarded every time a party wins a suit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the brightest jewel in the
crown of the law to speak and maintain the golden mean between
defamation, on one hand, and a healthy and robust right of free
public discussion, on the other.For, concluding with the wisdom in
Warren v. Pulitzer Publishing Co.Every man has a right to discuss
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Applying these principles in the instant case, the SC finds that the
award of Php700k as moral damages in favor of PR Navarette is
unconscionable and excessive. SC further rejects Navarettes claim
for Php1M for the loss of her boyfriend. The SC notes that she asked
for the amount of Php500k as moral damages for her physical injuries
and therefore, the award for moral damages should not exceed such
amount. The SC rules that under the circumstances of the instant
case, the amount of Php200k as moral damages in favor of PR
Navarette is reasonable, just and fair.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly
GRANTED. The questioned decision of the CA is MODIFIED in that the
amount of Php700k as moral damages granted to complainant
Navarette is reduced to Php200k.
Rima and Alegre went beyond the scope of their work at that time.
There was likewise no showing the FBNI did not authorize and ratify
the defamatory broadcasts. There is also insufficient evidence on
record that FBNI exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees (for not introducing evidences to prove
that it observed the same diligence in the supervision of the
broadcasters). There was also no clear and convincing evidence
show that Alegre and Rima underwent the regimented process of
application (selection). Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay
damages together with Rima and Alegre.
Dispositive Portion: SC denies the petition and affirm the CA decision
with modification in the award of moral damages by reducing it from
300K to 150K.
NOMINAL DAMAGES
EMERENCIANA M. VDA. DE MEDINA, ET AL., PlaintiffsAppellees, vs. GUILLERMO CRESENCIA, ET AL., Defendants.
GUILLERMO CRESENCIA, Appellant.
[G.R. No. L-8194. July 11, 1956.]
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Facts:
On May 31, 1953, passenger jeepney bearing plate No. TPU-2232
(Manila), driven by Brigido Avorque, smashed into a Meralco post on
Azcarraga Street, resulting in the death of Vicente Medina, one of its
passengers. A criminal case for homicide through reckless
imprudence was filed against Avorque (criminal case No. 22775 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila), to which he pleaded guilty on
September 9, 1953. The heirs of the deceased, however, reserved
their right to file a separate action for damages, and on June 16,
1953, brought suit against the driver Brigido Avorque and Appellant
Guillermo Cresencia, the registered owner and operator of the
jeepney in question. Defendant Brigido Avorque did not file any
answer; while Defendant Cresencia answered, disclaiming liability on
the ground that he had sold the jeepney in question on October 14,
1950 to one Maria A. Cudiamat; that the jeepney had been repeatedly
sold by one buyer after another, until the vehicle was purchased on
January 29, 1953 by Rosario Avorque, the absolute owner thereof at
the time of the accident. In view of Cresencias answer, Plaintiffs filed
leave, and was allowed, to amend their complaint making Rosario
Avorque a co-Defendant; and the latter, by way of answer, admitted
having purchased the aforesaid jeepney on May 31, 1953, but alleged
in defense that she was never the public utility operator thereof. The
case then proceeded to trial, during which, after the Plaintiffs had
presented their evidence, Defendants Guillermo Cresencia and
Rosario Avorque made manifestations admitting that the former was
still the registered operator of the jeepney in question in the records
of the Motor Vehicles Office and the Public Service Commission, while
the latter was the owner thereof at the time of the accident and
submitted the case for the decision on the question of who, as
between the two, should be held liable to Plaintiffs for damages.
The lower court, by Judge Jose Zulueta, held that as far as the public
is concerned, Defendant Cresencia, in the eyes of the law, continued
to be the legal owner of the jeepney in question rendered judgment
against him, jointly and severally with the driver Brigido Avorque, for
P6,000 compensatory damages, P30,000 moral damages, P10,000
exemplary damages, P10,000 nominal damages, P5,000 attorneys
fees, and costs, while Defendant Rosario Avorque was absolved from
liability. From this judgment, Defendant Cresencia appealed. This
Petition.
(These points were discussed thats why I included it in case
it
will
be
asked)
Sale of the jeepney here in question was admittedly without the
approval of the Public Service Commission, Appellant herein,
Guillermo Cresencia, who is the registered owner and operator
thereof, continued to be liable to the Commission and the public for
the consequences incident to its operation. Wherefore, the lower
court did not err in holding him, and not the buyer Rosario Avorque,
responsible for the damages sustained by Plaintiff by reason of the
death of Vicente Medina resulting from the reckless negligence of the
jeepneys driver, Brigido Avorque.
Appellant also argues that the basis of Plaintiffs action being the
employers subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code for
damages arising from his employees criminal acts, it is Defendant
Rosario Avorque who should answer subsidiarily for the damages
sustained by Plaintiffs, since she admits that she, and not Appellant,
is the employer of the negligent driver Brigido Avorque. The argument
is untenable, because Plaintiffs action for damages is independent of
the criminal case filed against Brigido Avorque, and based, not on the
employers subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code, but on a
breach of the carriers contractual obligation to carry his passengers
safely to their destination (culpa contractual). And it is also for this
reason that there is no need of first proving the insolvency of the
driver Brigido Avorque before damages can be recovered from the
carrier, for in culpa contractual, the liability of the carrier is not
merely subsidiary or secondary, but direct and immediate (Articles
1755, 1756, and 1759, New Civil Code).
ISSUE: Whether or not the court is correct in imposing Nominal
Damages
together
with
Compensatory
Damages?
RATIO: The propriety of the damages awarded has not been
questioned, Nevertheless, it is patent upon the record that the award
of P10,000 by way of nominal damages is untenable as a matter of
law. Since nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages. The purpose of nominal damages is to vindicate or
recognize a right that has been violated, in order to preclude further
contest thereon; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand not for the purpose
of indemnifying the Plaintiff for any loss suffered by him (Articles
2221, 2223, new Civil Code.) Since the court below has already
awarded compensatory and exemplary damages that are in
themselves a judicial recognition that Plaintiffs right was violated, the
award of nominal damages is unnecessary and improper. Anyway, ten
thousand pesos cannot, in common sense, be deemed nominal.
RULING: With the modification that the award of P10,000 nominal
damages be eliminated, the decision appealed from is affirmed.
Costs against Appellant. SO ORDERED.
TEMPERATE DAMAGES
G.R. No. 111263. May 21, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARIO PADLAN y MARCOS,
ROMEO MOTMOT MAGLEO, and ALFREDO BOY MAGLEO
Mendoza, J.:
TEMPERATE DAMAGES
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision, dated June 30, 1993, rendered by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56 of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, in
Criminal Case No. SCC-1960, finding accused-appellants Mario Marcos
Padlan, Romeo Motmot Magleo, and Alfredo Boy Magleo guilty of
two counts of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer an
imprisonment of:
1. Reclusion perpetua, for the death of Rodolfo Manzon.
2. Reclusion perpetua, for the death of Mateo Manzon.
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased as follows:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
rifle were recovered from the crime scene. Rodolfo Manzon had a
short bolo which the police found to be in its scabbard, while Mateo
Manzon had a slingshot with darts. Near the feet of Rodolfo Manzon
the police found a knife. Jordan was interviewed and he told the
police that Mario Padlan fired at them and that with Padlan were
Romeo and Alfredo Magleo. The police were unable to locate the
other accused-appellants Romeo and Alfredo Magleo in their
residences.
Alfredo Magleo admitted that he was at the pre-wedding party in
Barangay Libas in the evening of November 14, 1992, Mario Padlan
and Romeo Magleo also interposed the same alibi. Alfredo Magleo
claimed that he and Mario Padlan and others did not leave the place
until 4 a.m. of the following day. Mario Padlan and Romeo Magleo, on
the other hand claimed that after the party, Romeo Magleo stayed
behind, as he had been asked by the host to help prepare the food for
the guests on the day of the wedding. Mario Padlan claimed that from
the party, he went to the house of his father-in-law because his wife
was there. The police found him and invited him to go with them to
the police station for questioning. He denied involvement in the killing
and even asked to be given a paraffin test by the National Bureau of
Investigation, but he could not be tested due to lack of equipment.
Padlan also testified that he had no misunderstanding with the
Pagsolingan family. Romeo Magleo testified that before he left the
place at 8:30 a.m. of November 15, 1992, Flora Pagsolingan arrived
with some policemen and asked if any untoward incident had
happened during the celebration, Romeo Magleo answered in the
negative.
The trial court found accused-appellants guilty as charged in its
decision, the dispositive portion of which was quoted earlier herein.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred when it decided that the accused-appellants are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
No, the RTCs decision is without merit. Accused-appellants were
positively identified by prosecution witnesses. They were at the time
of the killing is in the same barangay where the crime also took place.
It was not at all physically impossible for them to have committed the
crime. The claim of the accused-appellants that they had no quarrel
with the deceased or the prosecutions main witnesses is irrelevant
because motive assumes significance only where there is no showing
of who the perpetrators of the crimes were. Romeo and Alfredo
Magleo contend that entry in the police blotter does not name them
as among those involved in the crime. Flora Pagsolingan explained
that at the time she made the report, she was in a state of shock,
confused, and did not know what she was doing. But she maintains
that she never said the assailant was Marcos Pagsolingan. Entries in
police blotters are not conclusive proof of the truth stated in such
entries and should not be given undue significance or probative value
because they are usually incomplete and inaccurate. What indicates
the guilt of the Magleos is the fact that shortly after the killing they
went into hiding. They could not be found in their respective
residences after the crime. Flight has been held to be evidence of
guilt.
However, the SC found errors in awarding damages for the
death of Rodolfo Manzon and his son Mateo. The indemnity for
death as currently fixed is P50,000.00 so the trial courts award of
P60,000.00 for the death of Rodolfo Manzon should be reduced
accordingly.
The award of P100,000.00 for actual and temperate damages cannot
be allowed. Damages cannot be both actual and temperate.
Temperate or moderate damages are allowed because, while some
pecuniary loss has been suffered, from the nature of the case its
amount cannot be proved with certainty. This is not the case here.
The trial court awarded the P100,000.00 as temperate damages
apparently because the prosecution failed to adduce proof of
expenses in connection with the death, wake, or burial of Rodolfo and
Mateo Manzon but not because from the nature of the case it was not
possible to show with certainty the amount of the damage done. For
the same reason, no award of actual damages can be made.
The award of P200,000.00 for moral damages is excessive. As moral
damages are not intended to enrich the prevailing party, an award of
P50,000.00 would be in keeping with this purpose of the law.
The award of exemplary damages is warranted under Art. 2230 of the
Civil Code in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. Imposition of exemplary damages is also
justified under Art. 2229 of the Civil Code in order to set an example
for the public good. For this purpose, we believe that the amount of
P20,000.00 can be appropriately awarded. In reviewing the records of
this case, we noticed a variance between the allegation in the
information and the evidence presented regarding the manner in
which Mateo Manzon was killed. The information alleged that he and
his father Rodolfo Manzon were killed with the use of high-powered
long firearm, but the medical certificate indicates that while Rodolfo
Manzon suffered both incised and lacerated wounds as well as a
gunshot wound, his son Mateo suffered only a gaping incised wound
21/2 inches long and 11/2 inches wide and 51/2 inches deep
horizontally across the anterior chest wall just below the medial end
of the right clavicle lacerating the right first rib and right portion of
the sternum, directed posteriorly to the left lacerating the lungs and
the heart. The variance, however, is not an obstacle to finding the
accused-appellants liable for double homicide. The variance does not
affect or change the nature of the crime charged, namely, murder,
which in view of our finding is actually homicide. The variance
concerns merely the manner of execution of the crime. The defense
could have objected to the presentation of the evidence, in which
event the court could have ordered the amendment of the
information so as to make the allegation conform to the evidence
presented and the accused-appellants would be none the worse for it.
Accordingly, we hold that accused-appellants are liable for two counts
of homicide.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants are found guilty
of two counts of homicide and each one is sentenced to two prison
terms of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay to the heirs of the
victims P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Rodolfo Manzon,
P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Mateo Manzon, P50,000.00
as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
CENON MEDELO, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. NATHANAEL M. GOROSPE, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, City of Iligan,
PEDRO ERMAC, and his children ELENA, CARLOS, ANTONIO,
LUCIANO, HILARIO, INADALECIO and FRANCISCA, all surnamed
ERMAC, respondents.
G.R. No. L-41970 March 25, 1988
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus with damages seeking the issuance
of an order directing the respondent judge to immediately order the
execution of the lower court's order dated June 25, 1970.
FACTS:
The deceased spouses Potenciano Ermac and Anastacia Mariquit left
as the only property to be inherited by their heirs a parcel of land, Lot
No. 1827, Iligan Cadastre No. 292, covered by OCT No. RP-355 (262)
of the Register of Deeds of Iligan, with an assessed value of P590.00.
Herein petitioner Cenon Medelo, one of the grandchildren of the said
spouses (being one of the children of their pre-deceased daughter
Digna Ermac) filed a petition for summary settlement of the said
estate. Since no opposition thereto was flied and all requirements
were complied with, the Honorable Judge Hernando Pineda, then the
presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte,
Branch II, City of Iligan, issued an order summarily settling the estate
of the deceased spouses, enumerating all the heirs entitled to
participate in the inheritance and ordering petitioner to present the
project of partition of said lot.
Consequently, Medelo submitted on February 5, 1970 a project of
partition. After the filing of the said project of partition, private
respondent Pedro Ermac one of the children of the deceased spouses
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of settlement, asking
that an order be issued eliminating Lot 1327 from the estate on the
ground that it belonged to him and his wife. The lower court denied
the motion and ruled that the proper remedy was a separate suit.
Thus, Pedro Ermac together with his children, filed Civil Case No. 1564
for Quieting of Title with the Court of First instance (CFI) of Lanao del
Norte involving the same Lot 1327, Cad. 292.
TRIAL COURT:
On June 25, 1970, the above-mentioned project of partition was
approved. The private respondents Ermac family members (the other
private respondents), filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
approving the project of partition. The said motion was, however,
denied on July 15, 1970.
SC: (Petition for Review, ruling was annotation of lis pendens)
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On July 20, 1970, the private respondents filed before this Court a
Petition for Review alleging excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the lower court in approving the project of
partition notwithstanding the fact that it was being claimed by the
respondents in a separate civil action.
X x x Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed
without prejudice to petitioner having the proper
annotation of lis pendens regarding Civil Case No.
1564 made on the title covering Lot 1327.
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Cenon Medelo filed a motion for
execution of the lower court's order approving the project of partition
dated June 25, 1970 based upon this Court's decision of June 19,
1975. The private respondents filed their opposition to said motion on
August 28, 1975.
HELD:
A
Severino and Rudy Lines, Plenago and Bedano were the only accused
who appealed with the cases Murder and Attempted Murder. Manero
brothers and Espia sis not appeal, the decision against them become
final.
Lines, Plenago and Bedanos defense was alibi, they claim that they
were harvesting palay at such time and only went to the scene of the
crime when they heard gun shots.
SC:
RTC:
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