PAR 2 OF ARTICLE 3 OF RPC IS DALUS OR CULPA

C. Mistake of Fact: There was no fault or negligence on the part of the

accused

HELD: trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime
NO.
GR: acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with
criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable
EX: it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express
provisions of article 8 of the code
Article 1 RPC of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
o A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal
liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had
intended to commit.
o voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act
o "malice" signifying the intent
o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - "the act itself does not make man guilty
unless his intention were so
o Actus me incito factus non est meus actus - an act done by me against my will is
not my act
GR: courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class
of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal WITHOUT
regard to the intent of the doer
EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal
without regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not
be so construed
ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness
defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in
the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of selfdefense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been
wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said
to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into
his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from
the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and
the property under his charge.

1. People V. Ah Chong (1910)

15 Phil. 488
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
CARSON, J.

Lesson: mistake of fact, definition of felony

LAWS: ARTICLE 1 RPC, ART 3 RPC
FACTS:
August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by some
trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who
is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was
being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and
called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just
above the knee by the edge of the chair (thought to be an unlawful aggression) which
had been placed against the door. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept
under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards
turned out, was his roommate, Pascual who is a house boy or muchacho who in the
spirit of mischief was playing a trick on him
Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one of
which took place in a house where he was employed as cook so he kept a knife under
his pillow for his personal protection.
trial court held it as simple homicide
ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake
as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the
facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time
when he committed the act.

PAR 2 OF ARTICLE 3 OF RPC IS DALUS OR CULPA

C. Mistake of Fact: There was no fault or negligence on the part of the

accused

WON the offense made by the defendant which was under uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury is a crime.
HELD:
No. If an offense is acted from the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an injury, at least in
same gravity, in the belief that the deceased was a malefactor who attacked him with a
dagger in handand for the reason he was guilty of no crime and is exempt from
criminal liability.
The ignorance of fact of the defendant was not due to negligence or bad faith, and this
rebuts the presumption of malicious intent accompanying the act of killing.

2. PEOPLE v. PAMBAYA BAYAMBAO

October 31, 1928 (52 Phil 309)
PARTIES:
Plaintiff and appellee: People of the Philippines

3. US v Apigo

Defendant and appellant: Pambaya Bayambao

FACTS:
Pambaya Bayambao was charged with the crime of murder. Because of fear, he shot
the head of his brother in law whom he thought was an outlaw ready to strike him.
ISSUE:

PAR 2 OF ARTICLE 3 OF RPC IS DALUS OR CULPA

C. Mistake of Fact: There was no fault or negligence on the part of the

accused
FACTS:

In 1903 a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a

number of Filipinos in Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the
government of the United States in the Philippine Islands by force of arms and
establishing a new government. Francisco Bautista (1), a close friend of the
chief of military forces (of the conspirators) took part of several meetings.
Tomas Puzon (2) held several conferences whereat plans are made for the
coming insurrection; he was appointed Brigadier-General of the Signal Corps
of the revolutionary forces. Aniceto de Guzman (3) accepted some bonds
from one of the conspirators. The lower court convicted the three men of
conspiracy. Bautista was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment and a P3,000
fine; Puzon and De Guzman to 3 years imprisonment and P1,000.
ISSUE:

WON the accused are guilty of conspiracy.

HELD:

Judgment for Bautista and Puzon CONFIRMED. Judgment for de

Guzman REVERSED. Yes, Bautista and Puzon are guilty of conspiracy.
Bautista was fully aware of the purposes of the meetings he participated in,
and even gave an assurance to the chief of military forces that he is making
the necessary preparations. Puzon voluntarily accepted his appointment and
in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance. This may
be considered as an evidence of the criminal connection of the accused with
the conspiracy. However, de Guzman is not guilty of conspiracy. He might
have been helping the conspirators by accepting bonds in the bundles, but he
has not been aware of the contents nor does he was, in any occasion,
assumed any obligation with respect to those bonds. Note: see RPC Art. 136:
Crimes against pub
lic order: conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d etat, rebellion or
insurrection.

4. U.S. V. BAUTISTA [6 Phil. 581 (1906)]

Nature: Appeal from the judgment of the Manila CFI

PAR 2 OF ARTICLE 3 OF RPC IS DALUS OR CULPA

C. Mistake of Fact: There was no fault or negligence on the part of the

accused

registry of baptism read July as June, and as a matter of fact the man in question did
not complete his twenty-one years until the 1st day of July, fifteen days after his
marriage. Can such a one be convicted of a violation of article 475? It would seem that
this case is included within those of the article. He was in fact a minor when he
married, and he married without the consent of his parents. It is true that so far as the
parent is concerned the offense has been committed, but can the same be said with
reference to the State in the absence of a voluntary violation of the law? Article 1 of the
Code does not contain the word "with malice" that are to be found in the Code of 1822;
nevertheless Pacheco, the eminent commentator, has said that those words are
included in the word "voluntary" (El Codigo Penal Concordado y Comentado, Vol. I,
folio 74, third edition); and he states positively that crime can not exist without intent.
Other commentators, without being in entire conformity with Pacheco, nevertheless are
agreed up to a certain point. Groizard says: "Such is the general rule; so it is
ordinarily." (Codigo Penal de 1870, Vol. I, folio 37.) Viada says that "in the majority of
cases, in the absence of intent there has been no crime; but that there can exist in
some cases the latter without the former." (Vol. I, Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870,
folio 16.) Silvela says: "In effect if suffices to remember the first article, which states
that where there is no intent there is no crime, ... in order to assert without fear or
mistake that in our Code the substance of a crime does not exist if there is not a deed,
an act which falls within the sphere of ethics, if there is not a moral wrong." (Vol. 2,
Derecho Penal, folio 169.)

5. THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
MARCOSA PEALOSA and ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ, defendantsappellants.
Francisco Rodriguez, for appellants.
Alfredo Chicote, for private prosecutor.
MISTAKE OF FACT AS TO THE AGE OF MINOR (MARRIAGE)
WILLARD, J.:
Article 475 of the prevailing Penal Code provides as follows:
Any minor who shall contract marriage without the consent of his or her parents or of
the persons who for such purpose stand in their stead shall be punished with prision
correccional in its minimum and medium degrees.

The theory that the absence of the words "with malice" in the prevailing Code has this
effect is supported by the provisions of article 568 which says: "He who by reckless
negligence commits an act which would constitute a grave crime if malice were present
shall be punished," etc.

The accused were convicted in the lower court for the violation of this article, it
appearing from the evidence adduced that the accused, Marcosa Pealosa, was not
21 years of age on the 3rd day of May, 1901, when she married the codefendant, and
that she contracted the marriage without the consent of her father.

The Supreme Court in several successive sentences has followed the same doctrine:
"It is indispensable that this (action) in order to constitute a crime should carry with it all
the malice which the volition and intention to cause the evil which may be the object of
the said crime suppose. (Judgment of May 31, 1882.)

Should the judgment appealed from be affirmed if the woman was in fact less than 21
years of age, without taking into consideration what was her belief concerning her age?
Many instances can be called to mind in which there may exist an error in good faith
concerning this point. A man who is about to marry and is ignorant of his exact age
seeks and obtains a certified copy of the registry of his baptism. From this it appears
that he was born twenty-one years before the 1st day of June, let us say. He marries
on the 15th day of June. It develops later that the person who took the copy of the

In a cause for falsity the facts involved were that the defendant had married "before the
municipal judge of the pueblo of Rubete without other ceremony than the simple

PAR 2 OF ARTICLE 3 OF RPC IS DALUS OR CULPA

C. Mistake of Fact: There was no fault or negligence on the part of the

accused

the trade-mark of this factory on the packages, which were to be used to hold
cigarettes. (Judgment of December 30, 1896.)
The judgment of October 4, 1893, is of the same tenor. It is not necessary to hold in
this action that no crime mentioned in the Code can exist without intent. It suffices for
the present to decide, as we do decide, that one can not be convicted under article 475
when by reason of a mistake of fact there does not exist the intention to commit the
crime.
It remains for us to apply this principle to the facts of the present case. The defendant
has stated that she believed that she was born in 1879; that so her parents had given
her to understand ever since her tenderest age; that she had not asked them
concerning her age because her father had given her to so understand since her
childhood. Her father was present in the court room as the complaining witness. If his
daughter was deviating from the truth it would have been an easy matter for him to
have testified denying the truth of what she had stated. It is evident that he was
interested in the conviction of his daughter, and the fact that the complaining witness
did not contradict her obliges us to accept as true the statements of the witness. Being
true, they disclose that she acted under a mistake of fact; that there was no intention
on her part to commit the crime provided for and punished the article 475.
As for the husband, it has been proved that two days before the marriage was
celebrated he received a letter from the woman in which she said that she was 21
years of age. This letter the defendant showed to the clergyman who married them.
The woman when the marriage ceremony was performed took an oath before the
clergyman, in the presence of her husband, that she was 21 years of age. The
defendant testifies that he had no suspicion that the woman was a minor. This
statement has not been contradicted and we consider that it suffices to demonstrate
that the defendant acted under a mistake of fact, and in conformity with the principle
laid down in this opinion he has not been guilty of a violation of article 475 in
connection with article 13, No. 3, nor in any other manner.
The conviction of the defendants in accordance with article 568, together with article
29 of General Orders, No. 58, has not been prayed for, and even if it had been we do
not consider the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction in accordance with this

manifestation and expression of his wishes and those of the woman Leonor with whom
he married before said municipal judge; that relying upon that, on account of his
ignorance and lack of instruction, on the 27th of June, 1882, and the 5th of April, 1884,
in the municipal court of the pueblo of Polopos he registered as legitimate children his
sons, Jose and Emilio the offspring of the illicit union of the defendant and Leonor
Gonzalez." For the crime of falsity committed by reckless negligence the Criminal
Audiencia of Albunol condemned the said defendant to the penalty of four months and
one day of arresto mayor. The Supreme Court annulled said sentence "considering
that whatever might be the civil effects of the registration of his three sons entered by
the accused in the Civil and Parochial Registers, it can not partake of the nature of a
crime for lack of the necessary element of volition or intent to offend, essential to every
punishable act or omission; neither did he act with negligence." (Judgment of March
16, 1892.)
In a cause prosecuted against the Chinese Sy-Ticco and against Don Guillermo
Partier, in the court of Quiapo, for falsification of trade-marks, the Criminal Chamber of
the Audiencia of Manila condemned the Chinaman to two years and some months of
presidio correccional, and Partier to one year and some months of similar
imprisonment. A writ of error was sued out in the name of Partier. The Supreme Court
annulled this sentence, "considering that the moral element of the crime, or, in other
words, existence or nonexistence of intent and malice in the commission of an act
designated and punished by the law as criminal is essentially a question of fact for the
exclusive judgment and determination of the trial court."
Considering that the act charged against the accused, Guillermo Partier, of having
printed in his lithographic establishment the trade-mark of the cigarette packages of the
Insular factory by virtue of a supposed order of the owner of said factory, to whose
injury the Chinaman Abelardo Zacarias Sy-Ticco ordered him to do the said fraudulent
printing, can not be considered (from the facts declared proved in the final sentence of
acquittal of the Court of First Instance, accepted in its entirety and without any addition
by the Appellate Court) as constituting intentional participation or cooperation in deed
of falsification and defraudation committed by the former, since it does not appear in
any part of the sentence that Partier was in connivance with Sy-Ticco nor that he had
any reason to suspect the true character of him who, styling himself the representative
of Seor Santa Marina, the owner of the La Insular factory, gave him the order to print

PAR 2 OF ARTICLE 3 OF RPC IS DALUS OR CULPA

C. Mistake of Fact: There was no fault or negligence on the part of the

accused

6. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintif

and appellee, vs.
GONA (Mansaca), defendant and appellant.
MISTAKE IN THE IDENTITY OF THE VICTIM IS NEITHER
EXEMPTING OR MITIGATING
Jose Ma. Capili for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
The defendant was charged before the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao
with the crime of homicide, the information reading as follows:
That on or about October 26, 1928, in the municipal district of Pantukan, Province of
Davao, Philippine Islands, as within the jurisdiction of the court, the said accused
voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with a bolo which he then carried, assaulted the
Mansaca Mapudul, causing him a mortal wound on the left side of the neck and that as
a consequence of said wound, the said Mapudul died.
Upon trial the court below found the defendant guilty as charged in the information and
taking into consideration the extenuating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication,
sentenced him to suffer twelve years and one of reclusion temporal with the accessory
penalties prosecuted by law to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000, and to the costs. From this sentenced the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that on the evening of October 26, 1928, a number of
Mansacas celebrated a reunion in the house of the Mansaca Gabriel. There seems to
have been liberal supply of alcoholic drinks and some of the men present became
intoxicated, with the result that a quarrel took the place between the Mansaca Dunca
and the defendant. Dunca and his son Aguipo eventually left the house and were
followed by Mapudul and one Award. The defendant left the house about the same

article. Her husband has the right to accept the sworn statement of the woman. The
only person whom she could ask for information was her father, and he had told her
age repeatedly.
For the reasons above set forth the sentence of the lower court is reversed with
reference to both defendants, acquitting them freely with costs of suit de oficio.
It is so ordered.

PAR 2 OF ARTICLE 3 OF RPC IS DALUS OR CULPA

C. Mistake of Fact: There was no fault or negligence on the part of the

accused

time with intention of assaulting Dunca, but in the darkness of the evening and in the
intoxicated condition of the defendant, the mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicated on
him a mortal wound with a bolo.
There can no doubt that the defendant killed Mapudul and that he is guilty of the crime
charged, but his attorney argues that in view of the fact that said defendant had no
intention to kill the deceased and committed the crime by mistake, he should have
been found guilty of homicide through negligence under paragraph 1 of article 568 of
the Penal Code and not of the graver crime of intentional homicide.
This contention is contrary to earlier decisions of this court. In these case of United
State vs. Mendieta(34 Phil., 242), the court said:

7.PEOPLE V GUEVARRA
ABERRATI ICTUS: TREACHERY MAYBE APPRECIATED EVEN IF
THERE IS A MISTAKE IN THE BLOW
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02367,
dated 16 October 2007,[1] affirming with modification the Decision, dated 4 July 2006,
of the Batangas City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch IV, in Criminal Case No.
12486,[2] finding accused-appellant Agripino Guevarra y Mulingtapang, alias Boy
Dunggol, guilty of murder, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The facts gathered from the records of the case are as follows:
On 30 August 2002, an Information[3] was filed with the RTC charging appellant with
murder. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about August 24, 2002 at around 9:15 oclock in the evening at Ebora Road,
Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this

Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure Hilario Lauigan instead of Pedro
Acierto, even that, in view of the mortal wound which inflicted upon the latter, in no way
could be considered as a relief from his criminal act. That he made a mistake in killing
one man instead of another, when it is proved that he acted maliciously and willfully,
cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility. Neither do we believe that the fact that
he made a mistake in killing the wrong man should be considered as a mitigating
circumstances.
The appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the defendant. So ordered.

PAR 2 OF ARTICLE 3 OF RPC IS DALUS OR CULPA

C. Mistake of Fact: There was no fault or negligence on the part of the

accused

Appellant testified that at the time of the incident (9:15 p.m., 24 August 2002), he was
at Barangay Malad, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro vacationing at the house of a
certain Hector Africa (Africa). He arrived therein on the afternoon of 23 August 2002
and left on the morning of 26 August 2002. He was not acquainted with Inspector Barte
and came to know that he was accused of killing Inspector Barte when he arrived at
Batangas City from Oriental Mindoro on the afternoon of 26 August 2002. He was
informed that he would be salvaged for killing Inspector Barte. Hence, he became
afraid and hid in his house for two weeks. Thereafter, he surrendered to the mayor of
Batangas City who turned him over to the Batangas City police. He alleged that
Anacleto and Antonette testified against him because he did not support the candidacy
of Antonette during the previous election for barangay captain where Antonette lost. He
supported then the candidacy of the incumbent barangay captain.[34]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 4 July 2006 convicting appellant of murder.
[36] Appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay the
heirs of Inspector Barte the amounts of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages,
P109,250.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
P4,212,312.72 for loss of earning capacity, and cost of suit.

The accused maybe credited with his preventive imprisonment if he is entitled to any
and directed to be immediately committed to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa
City.[37]
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 16 October 2007, the appellate court
promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision.[38] It held that
an additional amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages should also imposed on
appellant because the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing of
Inspector Barte. Thus:

Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a caliber .45 pistol, a
deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and repeatedly shot
with said firearm suddenly and without warning one P/Chief Inspector Marcos Barte y
Paz while the latter was unarmed and completely defenseless, thereby hitting him on
different parts of his body which directly caused the victims death.
That the special aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm is
attendant in the commission of the offense.

ctor Barte in a stretcher. She also saw therein Godoy being treated for wounds.[7]
Dr. Castillo, a surgeon assigned at the Batangas Regional Hospital, recounted that he
attended to Inspector Barte when the latter was brought to the hospital on the night of
24 August 2002. During the initial examination, he observed that Inspector Barte
sustained gunshot wounds and had no blood pressure, cardiac and respiratory rate.
He and some medical staff tried to resuscitate Inspector Barte but to no avail. The
gunshot wounds were located on the left temporal area, left anterior chest, right nipple,
and left arm of Inspector Barte. He considered the gunshot wounds in the left temporal
area and left anterior chest of Inspector Barte fatal. He issued a medico-legal
certificate pertaining to Inspector Barte and an anatomical chart showing the location
of gunshot wounds sustained by Inspector Barte.[10] His findings, as stated in the
medico-legal certificate of Inspector Barte, are as follows:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Marcos P. Barte, 46 years of age, male, Filipino of Sorosoro 2, Batangas City, at about 9:30 p.m., August 24, 2002 with the following injuries
sustained by him:

NOTE: DEAD ON ARRIVAL.[11]

CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUNDS, HEAD AND CHEST.[13]

PAR 2 OF ARTICLE 3 OF RPC IS DALUS OR CULPA

C. Mistake of Fact: There was no fault or negligence on the part of the

accused

It is settled that aggravating/qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the

information and proven during the trial before they can be appreciated.[51]
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defensive or
retaliatory act which the victim might make.[52] The essence of treachery is a
deliberate and sudden attack that renders the victim unable and unprepared to defend
himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. Two essential
elements are required in order that treachery can be appreciated: (1) The employment
of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offenders safety from
any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party who has, thus, no opportunity for
self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods
or manner of execution.[53]
In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the information and all its elements were
duly established by the prosecution.
Inspector Barte was sitting inside the jeep when appellant suddenly appeared and
approached him. Appellant asked Inspector Barte if he was Major Barte. However,
before Inspector Barte could respond or utter a word, appellant quickly shot him
several times in the head and chest with a caliber .45 pistol. The suddenness and
unexpectedness of the appellants attack rendered Inspector Barte defenseless and
without means of escape. There is no doubt that appellants use of a caliber .45 pistol,
as well as his act of waiting for Inspector Barte to be seated first in the jeep before
approaching him and of shooting Inspector Barte several times on the head and chest,
was adopted by him to prevent Inspector Barte from retaliating or escaping.
Considering that Inspector Barte was tipsy or drunk and he was seated inside the jeep
where the space is narrow, there was absolutely no way for him to defend himself or
escape.
Appellants assertion that he was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender is meritorious. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the offender had not been

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 4, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Batangas City, Branch IV, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should also be awarded.[39]

Appellant elevated the instant case before us assigning a single error, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[40]

Appellant maintains in his lone assigned error that his testimony and that of his
corroborating witness, Ravino, were more credible than the testimonies of Anacleto
and Antonette; that his denial and alibi were meritorious; and that the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor.

Denial is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving. Corollarily, alibi is

the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove.[46] Denial
and alibi must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence otherwise
they cannot prevail over the positive testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.[47] For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove
that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[48]

We agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm
attended the killing of Inspector Barte.

PAR 2 OF ARTICLE 3 OF RPC IS DALUS OR CULPA

C. Mistake of Fact: There was no fault or negligence on the part of the

accused

WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR H.C. No. 02367, dated 16 October 2007, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the civil indemnity of appellant is increased from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00; (2) the indemnity for Inspector Bartes loss of earning capacity is increased
from P4,212,312.72 to P4,213,551.00; and (3) an interest on all the damages awarded
at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid is imposed.
SO ORDERED.

actually arrested; (2) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and
(3) that the surrender was voluntary.[56]
All of the foregoing requisites are present in the case at bar. Appellant had not been
actually arrested by the police or other law enforcers. He surrendered unconditionally
to the mayor of Batangas City, a person in authority, thereby saving the police trouble
and expenses which it would otherwise incur in his search and capture. The fact that
appellant surrendered two weeks after the incident is immaterial. We have held that for
voluntary surrender to mitigate an offense, it is not required that the accused surrender
at the first opportunity.[57] As long as the aforementioned requisites are met, voluntary
surrender can be appreciated.[58]