http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/index.

htm

The Kissinger Telcons

gwu.edu

Washington, D.C., May 26, 2004 - Five years after the National Security Archive initiated legal
action to compel the State Department and the National Archives to recover the transcripts of
Henry Kissinger's telephone calls from his "private" collection at the Library of Congress, the
National Archives today released approximately 20,000 declassified pages (10 cubic feet) of
these historic records, spanning Kissinger's tenure under President Nixon from 1969 to August
1974 as national security adviser and also as secretary of state beginning in September 1973.
To celebrate the public recovery of this previously sequestered history, the National Security
Archive today posted "The Kissinger Telcons," the 123rd Electronic Briefing Book in the
Archive's award-winning series. Highlights of the posting include ten of the telcons released
today.
The defense secretary wishes he could sweep under the rug the atrocity
photographs. The national security adviser agrees, but the newspapers already
have the photos. So they decide to blame the low-level officer, who must have
been insane.
Iraqi prisons? No, it's Melvin Laird and Henry Kissinger, trying to spin the My Lai massacre in
Vietnam. This 21 November 1969 telephone call transcript is one of the highlights of the
newly-released Kissinger telcons posted today by the National Security Archive. Others include
President Nixon ordering the massive bombing of Cambodia one night in December 1970,
followed by Kissinger laughing with aide Alexander Haig about Nixon's bluster and
agreeing to send a few B-52s instead. The posting also includes the Associated Press lead item,
in which Kissinger puts off the British prime minister's phone call to President Nixon because
Nixon was "loaded." Today's posting also includes a special section including a key
Kissinger telcon on Chile with more to come tomorrow.
The posting also includes ten Kissinger telcons previously obtained by Archive senior analyst
Dr. William Burr. The latter were among the thousands of pages officially released today, but we
found copies in other, previously released, Nixon administration files and are providing them
here as a sampler of things to come in the new release. These records feature conversations
New
with President Nixon, Motion Picture Association president Jack Valenti, and Chase Manhattan
Kissinger
Bank chairman David Rockefeller, among others.
Telcons
Released Today's posting also includes the full text of the finding aid to the Kissinger telcons
26 May collection, created by the Nixon Presidential Materials Staff of the National Archives and
2004
Records Administration. The finding aid describes the checkered history of the telcons as
The
Dobrynin
File:
"Happy
Birthday"
Henry
Kissinger
Kissinger
Telcons
Page
1 of 11

follows:
In the late 1970s, a reporter [William Safire] and two organizations [the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press and the Military Audit Project] sued to gain
access to the telcons under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The federal
district court and the US court of appeals both ruled that the documents were
government records becuase they were prepared on government time by
government employees. These lower courts stated that the State Department
telcons should be returned to the State Department and reviewed for release under
FOIA. In 1980, the Supreme Court, in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee
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telcons should be returned
Kissinger

Telcons
on Chile

to the State Department and reviewed for release under

FOIA. In 1980, the Supreme Court, in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980), reversed the decision, ruling that the
FOIA did not apply to the telcons because they were outside of the Executive
branch. The Court noted, however, that the Federal Records Act (FRA) provided
authority for the Archivist of the United States, the agency head, and the Attorney
General to recover improperly removed records. Accordingly, at the National
Archive's behest, then Secretary of State Edmund Muskie agreed in 1980 to
re-review the telcons at the LC for possible return to State, However, that review
never took place. In 2001, Dr. Kissinger, upon request from NARA and the State
Department following inquiries from researchers [that is, the legal complaint about
to be filed in court by the National Security Archive], gave both agencies copies of
the transcripts held at LC. NARA photocopied the collection held at LC and began
processing it for public release. The State Department is reviewing its collection
and will release it at a later time.

Also included in today's posting are:

The legal complaint written by pro bono counsel Lee Rubin and Craig Isenberg (of
the Mayer Brown law firm) for the National Security Archive, that persuaded the State
Department and NARA finally to recover the Kissinger telcons.
Henry Kissinger's Deed of Gift agreements with the United States Library of
Congress from 1976.
The correspondence between the National Security Archive and the
government, starting in 1999, about the legal necessity for the government to recover the
telcons.
The 8 August 2001 statement by State Department spokesman Richard
Boucher crediting the National Security Archive for having prompted the telcon recovery.
A side-by-side comparison of a Kissinger telcon and a Nixon tape of the same
conversation (see also Tom Blanton, "Kissinger's Revenge: While Nixon was
bugging Kissinger, guess who was bugging Nixon," Slate, posted Monday, Feb. 18,
2002).

I. New Kissinger Telcons Released 26 May 2004

Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to
view.
Document 1: Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird,
21 November 1969, 3:50 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 3, File 3,
083-084

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A week after Seymour Hersh had broken the story of the My Lai
massacre in the New York Times, Kissinger wanted to make sure that
Laird had a "game plane" so that the Pentagon was on "top" of the story.
Laird had known about My Lai since the spring but a witness had
gruesome photographs that were appearing in the press. Plainly May 15, 2016 10:48:50PM MDT

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Laird had known about My

Lai since the spring but a witness had

gruesome photographs that were appearing in the press. Plainly
appalled by the massacre but anxious to avoid having the Pentagon
tarred by an atrocity, Laird did not know what to do. While he was
inclined to sweep it "under the rug", Laird did not dissent when Kissinger
warned him that could not be done.
Document 2: Kissinger and President Richard M. Nixon, 9
December 1970, 8:45 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations Transcripts, Home File, Box 29, File 2
Anxious about the Cambodian situation, Nixon ordered Kissinger to
direct bombing attacks on North Vietnamese forces there "tomorrow."
He wanted to "hit everything there", using the "big planes" and the "small
planes." "I don't want any screwing around." The discussion raised an
interesting issue--the Cold War U.S. Air Force was geared to waging
nuclear war against the Soviet Union but not for "this war"--conventional
bombing operations in Southeast Asia. As Kissinger noted the U.S. Air
Force is not "designed for any war that we are likely to have to fight."
Nixon agreed: "There isn't going to be any air battle against the Soviet
Union"--that would mean a catastrophic nuclear war.
Document 3: Kissinger and General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 9
December 1970, 8:50 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations Transcripts, Home File, Box 29, File 2,
106-10
A few minutes later after receiving Nixon's call on Cambodia, Kissinger
telephoned his military assistant Alexander Haig about the orders from
"our friend." After he described Nixon's instructions for a "massive
bombing campaign" involving "anything that flys [or] anything that
moves", the notetaker apparently heard Haig "laughing." Both Haig and
Kissinger knew that what Nixon had ordered was logistically and
politically impossible so they translated it into a plan for massive
bombing in a particular district (not identifiable because the text is
incomplete). These two phone calls illustrate an important feature of the
Nixon-Kissinger relationship: while Nixon would, from time to time, make
preposterous suggestions (no doubt depending on his mood), Kissinger
would later decide whether there was a rational kernel in what Nixon
had said and whether or how to follow up on it. (Note 1)
Document 4: Kissinger and President Richard M. Nixon, 15 April
1972, 10:25 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations Transcripts, Home File, Box 29, File 8
Two weeks after the North Vietnamese launch their spring offensive on
31 March 1972, Nixon ordered bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong,
including mining operations at the latter's harbor. When Nixon ordered

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the bombing campaign he realized there was some chance that it could
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the bombing campaign he realized there was some chance that it could
jeopardize the Moscow summit with Brezhnev scheduled for Moscow
later in May. As this discussion shows, a meeting that Kissinger had
with Ambassador Dobrynin earlier in the day indicated that there would
be no problem. Employing language that Nixon liked to use, Kissinger
disdainfully reported that "Dobrynin was in slobbering over me."
Kissinger observed that the Soviets were not following the "peacenik"
textbook by "yelling and screaming" about the bombing; instead, they
found it more expedient to cultivate their relationship with the other
superpower. Unless the Soviets "screw us," Kissinger's secret visit,
slated for the following week, and the summit would go ahead.
Document 5: Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Anatoli Dobrynin, 15 December 1972, 5:41 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations Transcripts, Anatoly Dobrynin File, Box 27,
File 7, 09
In late 1972, the Paris negotiations on the Vietnam War entered an
intense and frustrating stage where the North Vietnamese were
unwilling to accept conditions proposed by the U.S. on behalf of its
South Vietnamese ally. In the first two weeks of December, the talks
reached an impasse and were suspended, slated for resumption in early
January. Kissinger returned to Washington and North Vietnam's chief
negotiator Le Duc Tho headed to Moscow to convince the Soviets to put
pressure on Washington. Kissinger and Dobrynin discussed Tho's visit
to Moscow in condescending terms, with the former suggesting that Le
Duc Tho was coming to Moscow "crying on your shoulder." Once Tho
was in Moscow, Dobrynin joked, the Soviets would find out how "nice"
he was. While Dobrynin shared a laugh with his U.S.partner at the
expense of an ally, he did not realize that his American interlocutor did
not hold the Ambassador's position on Vietnam in high esteem and had
laughed with Nixon at a "slobbering" Dobrynin (See Document 4). The
Soviet ambassador might not have been quite so joking if he had known
that Nixon and Kissinger were making decisions to launch a bombing
campaign against North Vietnam. Through bombing the North, Nixon
and Kissinger hoped to persuade the recalcitrant Saigon regime that it
could rely on the Nixon administration to punish Hanoi in the event of
future violations of the peace agreement.
Document 6 : Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, 3
January 1973, 4:00 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 17, 1973
2-6
During the December 1972 Christmas bombing," the Nixon White
House sought to destroy military targets in North Vietnam. Yet, some of
the targets were in Hanoi and precision bombing by high-flying B-52s
was impossible. In a notorious incident, bombs aimed at another target
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struck Bach Mai hospital in central Hanoi killing 30 people. As is evident

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struck Bach Mai hospital in central Hanoi killing 30 people. As is evident

from this conversation with Secretary of Defense Laird, the accidental
bombing of civilian facilities in North Vietnam triggered international
protests. On his way out of the Pentagon, Laird had not supported the
bombing strategy recommending diplomatic compromise instead but
had been responsible for overseeing the bombing operations. Thus, he
was unhappy to see his agency associated with "lousy stories" about
"hospitals and schools" publicized by "leftwing Joan Baez" and other
anti-war critics. Laird hoped that Kissinger would bring the problem to
Nixon's attention so that a "positive" story about the bombing of military
targets could be spun.
Document 7 : Kissinger and World Bank President Robert
McNamara, 3 January 1973, 5:45 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 17, 1973
2-6
Long before he was ready to acknowledge that he had been "terribly
wrong" on Vietnam, Robert McNamara privately offered his support for
Kissinger's Vietnam War endgame. Apparently a fan, McNamara told
Kissinger that he was "the man who finally got us out of there." Not
questioning the Christmas bombing, McNamara observed that "not
everybody is as critical as some of those damn columnists." Both
agreed that ending the U.S. fighting role in Vietnam required a
"conscious ambiguity"; in other words, an unambiguous U.S. diplomatic
victory was impossible (for example, the U.S. would have to accept the
presence of North Vietnamese forces in the South). That McNamara
referred to the war as "the damn thing" suggested a deeper level of
discomfort that he would not discuss in public for many years.
Document 8: Kissinger and John Crewdson (New York Times),
22 September 1973, 6:15 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 22, File 5
The day after the U.S. Senate voted to confirm Kissinger Secretary of
State, a New York Times reporter reminded him of an unpleasant
subject--the wiretaps that Nixon and Kissinger had approved in 1969 to
plumb the source of press leaks on the secret bombing of Cambodia.
Crewdson had a new angle from an undisclosed source-- Kissinger's
own telephones may have been wiretapped; apparently someone else in
the White House had suspected (not unreasonably) that Kissinger had
been involved in press leaks. Crewdson had been working on the story
for some time and wanted to speak with Kissinger before reporting on it.
Kissinger responded that he had never been officially told that he had
been wiretapped, but he wanted the story to go away: "as far as I'm
concerned, I'd just as soon not have any more wiretap stories."
Nevertheless, Crewdson pursued the story and on 25 November 1973
the Times ran this headline: "Kissinger Is Said to Cite Taps on Him." Not
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long before his confirmation hearings, Crewdson reported, Kissinger

had told an aid that he was "virtually certain" that he had been
wiretapped. While Nixon had certainly put Kissinger on tape, White
House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman and his assistant Lawrence Higby
later denied that any wiretapping operation had been aimed at
Kissinger. (Note 2)
Document 9: Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, 11 October 1973,
5:55 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 22, File
10, 089
On Wednesday 10 October, a financial scandal forced Vice President
Spiro Agnew to resign; kickbacks that he had taken years earlier when
he was involved in Maryland politics had come to light. Nixon was
already preoccupied by the Watergate scandal and this latest political
crisis came only days into the Middle East war. Apparently such
developments led Nixon to take comfort in drinking; not a heavy drinker,
he did not hold alcohol well. When British Prime Minister Edward Heath
called to discuss the Middle East with Nixon, Kissinger told Scowcroft
that this was impossible because the president was "loaded."
Apparently, Scowcroft was not surprised; this problem had long been
the subject of banter among Kissinger and the NSC staff. In any event,
Kissinger and Scowcroft agreed that Heath's office should be told the
president is not "available" and that the conversation should take place
in the morning.
Document 10: Kissinger and Norm Kempster (Washington Star),
2 January 1974, 12:25 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, Henry A. Kissinger
Telephone Conversations Transcripts, Chronological File, Box 24, File
4, 094
Even the smallest incident would be recorded in the transcripts, such as
this brief discussion with a startled reporter who found himself speaking
with the Secretary of State.
Notes
1. See Walter Isaacson's Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon &
Shuster, 1992) for considerable discussion of this point.
2. Isaacson, Kissinger, pp. 233-233.

Telcons Previously Released in Other Nixon Presidential Files

Document 1: Nixon and Kissinger, 11 March 1969, c. 10:00 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security Council
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Files. Box 489. Dobrynin/Kissinger 1969 (Part I)

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Files. Box 489. Dobrynin/Kissinger 1969 (Part I)

Not long after the White House and Soviet ambassador Anatoly
Dobrynin had established a secret "back channel" to the Soviet Union
(excluding the State Department), Kissinger and Nixon discussed a
recent meeting with Dobrynin, as well as Vietnam war negotiations,
other developments in Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet border clash, and
anti-ballistic missile issues. At the close of thediscussion, Nixon
observed that Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird wanted to "get out" of
Vietnam and would "pay a big price" to do so. As the following months
would show, Laird would play a key role in forcing troop withdrawals
from Vietnam.
Document 2: Nixon and Kissinger, 14 January 1970, 5:40 p.m.,
Excised Copy
Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger/Scowcroft West Wing Office
File, Vietnam War, Secret Peace Talks [Mr. "S" File] (7)
1/1/70-12/31/70
Nixon and Kissinger discussed Vietnam negotiations, World War II,
French diplomacy, Middle East, the government budget, the Nigerian
crisis, and a Nixon foreign policy statement. As with most of these
conversations, much contextual information is needed to make sense of
them; moreover, sometimes the transcriber could not even get what the
participants were saying, as is evident from occasional blanks in the
text. At the close of the call, Nixon talked about his foreign policy
innovation ("the Nixon doctrine") but revealed his grudges against the
late President Kennedy: If a recent speech "was said by the Kennedys
the papers would have emoted all over the place."Document 3: Nixon
and Kissinger, 10 March 1970, 10:40 a.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project. National Security Council
Files. Box 612. Israeli Aid
Kissinger and Nixon discussed how to tell the Israelis the good news
(economic aid up to $8 million, a message the White House would
deliver) and the bad news (no new military aid except to replace losses
in fighting with Egyptians, a message left to the State Department). At
the very end of the call, Kissinger raised the issue of the investigation of
the My Lai massacre, and advises Nixon to let Secretary of Defense
Laird handle it.
Document 4: Nixon and Kissinger 17 March 1970, 8:07 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project. National Security Council
Files. Box 612. Israeli Aid
After briefly discussing the aid packages to Israel, Nixon and Kissinger
turned to the My Lai investigation. While Kissinger was a little queasy
("some of the stories are awful" with "400 people were killed there and it
[went] on for days"), Nixon was more hardnosed("these boys [US
soldiers] being killed by women carrying that stuff in their satchels").
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They go on to discuss the next bombing campaign against North

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They go on to discuss the next bombing campaign against North

Vietnam if a "provocation" occurred.
Document 5: Nixon and Kissinger, 24 September 1970, 11:30 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project. National Security Council
Files. HAK Office Files. Box 128. Chronology of Cuban Submarine Base
Episode 1970-1971
Soviet plans to develop a nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos, Cuba
caused a mini-U.S-Soviet crisis in the fall of 1970. A developing crisis in
Jordan also threatened East-West tensions. Here Nixon discussed with
Kissinger tactics for talking about Cienfuegos with Soviet Ambassador
Dobrynin, as well as Nixon's presentation to wealthy Republicans, and
the Jordanian crisis. As was customary, Kissinger laid it on thick in
complimenting Nixon ("you certainly laid it on them", "if not you or this
Administration, who?").Document 6: Nixon and Kissinger 24
September 1970, 6:40 p.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project. National Security Council
Files. HAK Office Files. Box 128. Chronology of Cuban Submarine Base
Episode 1970-1971
This call featured more discussion of tactics in dealing with Dobrynin
over Cienfuegos. While Dobrynin wanted to deliver a Kremlin message
on a summit to Nixon, the latter is reluctant to take it unless the
message was positive: "I don't think we want to appear that everytime
he comes back [from Moscow], I'm going to slobber over him." During
the brief discussion of the Jordanian crisis, Kissinger stated that Iraqi
soldiers were providing aid and "changing into Fedayeen uniforms."
Document 7: Kissinger and Christian Science Monitor
Washington Bureau Chief Saville Davis, 17 December 1970, 3:04
p.m.
Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State. Summaries of
the Undersecretary's Meetings with the National Security Advisor. Box
1. Irwin/KissingerLunches 1970-71
This call demonstrated a classic Kissinger interaction with the press.
After the Monitor published a story critical of Kissinger's NSC staff and
NSC-State relations, Davis called up to apologize stating that the writer
was out of his "depth." Whether the story was accurate or not,
undoubtedly doubt Davis believed that Kissinger had to be
accommodated if the Monitor was going to preserve its access to him.
Document 8: Conversation with Madame Jean Sainteny, 13 May
1971, 8:15 a.m.
Source: Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger/Scowcroft West
Wing Office File, Vietnam War, Secret Peace Talks [Mr. "S" File] (8)
1/1/71-6/30/71
Jean Sainteny, who had served in the French colonial administration in
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Vietnam in the 1940s had close contacts with the North Vietnamese
and, as "Mr. S", cooperated with Kissinger as a secret intermediary.
Kissinger wanted Sainteny to meet with him in Washington later in the
month but found that this would involve taking on duties as a "tourist
agency" to make sure that the visit couldtake place.
Document 9: Kissinger and Motion Picture Association
President Jack Valenti, 15 October 1971 9:05 a.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project. National Security Council
Files. HAK Office Files. Box 87. PRC Personal Requests 1971-73
Kissinger's key role in pulling off the U.S.-China rapprochement meant
that he would receive requests for favors and advice from friends in high
plaes. Not long before his second trip to Beijing, Kissinger received a
phone call from Jack Valenti. Wanting to develop exports of movies to
China, Valenti hoped that he could bring some movie stars to Beijing to
promote film, "a common link between people."
Document 10: Kissinger and Chase Manhattan Bank chairman
David Rockefeller, 13 March 1972, 11:12 a.m.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project. National Security Council
Files. HAK Office Files. Box 87. PRC Personal Requests 1971-73
After congratulating Kissinger on some undisclosed triumph and
offering him a plane ride to the next Bilderberg meeting,
Rockefellerasked how he could get a visa to visit China. Kissinger was
not too surprised (the president of American Express was also trying to
get one) and said he would try to find out through "various channels." He
assured Rockefeller that the Chinese were "less hung up on the name
Rockefeller than the Russians. They don't think they're running the
country."

A side-by-side comparison of a Kissinger telcon and a Nixon

tape of the same conversation
When Kissinger was in office he would sometimes circulate "telcons" to
staffers when they needed them for their work and occasionally the
documents, such as the one below, would remain in the files. One of the
more fascinating aspects of this transcript of a telephone conversation
between President Richard Nixon and Kissinger is that while Kissinger's
secretary was listening in and transcribing the conversation, Nixon had
a tape recorder that simultaneously taped the call. Neither realized that
the other was making a record of the conversation.
The "telcon" is very close to the tape in content although not in all of the
wording (no doubt it was difficult for the transcriber to keep up with
every word). The tape (number 2-52 in the Nixon tapes), however, is not
available in its entirety; several portions were excised when the tape
was released in 1999. Nevertheless, the "telcon" in the Nixon
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presidential materials was released in full last spring, and it immediately

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presidential materials was released in full last spring, and it immediately

becomes evident that two of the deletions, withdrawn on privacy
grounds, are Kissinger's critical comments on U.S. representative to the
United Nations George H.W. Bush. The other excision made on
"national security" grounds was Kissinger's reference to the secret
Pakistani channel that Nixon and Zhou Enlai used to exchange
messages. That the secrecy censors deleted the reference to Pakistan
is astonishing given that information on the Pakistani channel has been
available for years, not least in Henry Kissinger's memoirs, White House
Years (1979), and has been declassified in numerous documents in the
Nixon Presidential Materials Project at the National Archives.
The substance of the Kissinger-Nixon phone conversation concerned a
message that Kissinger had received at 6:15 p.m. that day from Chinese
premier Zhou Enlai. Zhou's message set the stage for Kissinger's secret
visit to Beijing on 9 July, the subsequent Nixon trip to China, and the
beginning of normalization of relations with China. Zhou's message was
delivered through the secret Pakistani channel between Beijing and
Washington that had been established during 1969. Confirming earlier
messages, Zhou wrote that the People's Republic of China was willing
to receive a "special envoy of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) ... or
even the President of the U.S. himself for direct meeting and
discussions." Kissinger immediately walked the message over to the
Oval Office and an hour or so later, Nixon discussed it on the telephone
with Kissinger. Zhou had suggested Kissinger as a "special envoy," but
in his phone call to Kissinger, Nixon discussed anybody else as
envoy--New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Vietnam negotiator
Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, U.S. representative to the United
Nation ambassador George H.W. Bush, Secretary of Health Education
and Welfare Elliot Richardson, and even the recently deceased GOP
presidential candidate Thomas Dewey. Nixon was toying with Kissinger,
who wanted to go to Beijing. The next day, Nixon settled the suspense
and told Kissinger that he would be going to Beijing.
[See also Tom Blanton, "Kissinger's Revenge: While Nixon was
bugging Kissinger, guess who was bugging Nixon," Slate, posted
Monday, Feb. 18, 2002)]
TELCON, "The President/Mr. Kissinger," 8:18 p.m., April 27, 1971
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and
Records Administration, National Security Files, Box 1031, Exchanges
Leading Up to HAK Trip to China, December 1969-July 1971 (1)
Audio clip: Conversation 2-52, President Richard Nixon and
Henry Kissinger, 8:18 p.m., April 27, 1971. (Full clip is 9.38 MB MP3 format)
Above clip divided into four parts: (Part 1) (Part 2) (Part 3) (Part 4
)
Source: White House Tapes, Nixon Presidential Materials Project,
National Archives and Records Administration
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National Archives and Records

Administration

Legal Documents
Henry Kissinger, Deed of Gift and Agreement with United States Library
of Congress, November 12, 1976, 6 pp.
Henry Kissinger, Second Deed of Gift and Agreement with United
States Library of Congress, December 24, 1976, 1 p.
National Security Archive to Archivist of the United States John W.
Carlin, January 15, 1999, 1 p.
Archivist of the United States John W. Carlin to National Security
Archive, January 21, 1999, 1 p.
Attorneys for National Security Archive to National Archives and
Records Administration and Department of State, January 25, 2001, 2
pp. [Encloses letter from State Department Spokesman James P. Rubin
to Archivist of the United States John W. Carlin, 2 pp.]
Complaint by National Security Archive presented to the Archivist of the
United States and the Secretary of State, January 25, 2001, 10 pp.
[Attachment to previous letter]
Attorneys for National Security Archive to Department of State, National
Archives and Records Administration, and Department of Justice, April
25, 2001, 3 pp.
United States Department of State Press Release, "Former Secretary of
State Kissinger Provides Department with Documents," August 8, 2001
Terms and conditions for use of materials found on this website.
Contents of this website Copyright 1995-2016 National Security Archive. All rights reserved.

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