MACALINTAL vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013
July 10, 2003
FACTS

Romulo Macalintal is a lawyer seeking a

declaration to annul certain provisions of RA
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act).
Claiming that he has actual and material legal
interest in the subject matter in seeing to it
that public funds are properly and lawfully used
and appropriated, petitioner filed the petition
as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
Arguments of Petitioner on the Violation of
COMELECs constitutional independence:

COMELEC is not under the control of

either the Executive or Legislative; the rules
and regulations of COMELEC can only be
modified by the majority of its members
ISSUE
WON Sec. 5(d) of RA 9189 which allows the
registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries by their
mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines
violates the residency requirement of Sec. 1
Article 5 of Constitution
WON Sec. 18.5 (RA 9189) which empowers the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates
for
national
offices
and
party
list
representatives including the President & Vice
President violate the constitutional mandate
that winning candidates for President and Vice
President shall be proclaimed as winners by
Congress

WON Congress, through the Joint Congressional

Oversight Committee (Sec. 25, RA 9189) can
exercise the power to review, revise, amend &
approve the IRR that COMELEC promulgates
without
violating
the
constitutional
independence of COMELEC (MAIN ISSUE)
RULING
MAIN
ISSUE:
WON
Joint
Congressional
Committee can review, revise, amend &
approve the IRR promulgated by COMELEC
NO, such provision violates the independence
of COMELEC
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional
body. It should be allowed considerable latitude
in devising means and methods that will insure
the accomplishment of the great objective for
which it was created free, orderly and honest
elections.
The Court has no general powers of supervision
over COMELEC which is an independent body
except those specifically granted by the
Constitution, that is, to review its decisions,
orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not
correct to hold that because of its recognized
extensive legislative power to enact election
laws, Congress may intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making
authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189,
Congress has empowered the COMELEC to
issue the necessary rules and regulations to
effectively implement the provisions of this Act
within sixty days from the effectivity of this
Act. Once a law is enacted and approved, the

legislative function is deemed accomplished

and complete. The legislative function may
spring back to Congress relative to the same
law only if that body deems it proper to review,
amend and revise the law, but certainly not to
approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of
the COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve,
review, amend, and revise the IRR for The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003,
Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled
upon
the
constitutional
mandate
of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a
situation, the Court is left with no option but to
withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a
provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 19 stating that [t]he Implementing
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created by virtue of this Act for prior approval,
and the second sentence of the second
paragraph of Section 25 stating that [i]t shall
review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing
Rules
and
Regulations
promulgated by the Commission, whereby
Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto
itself a function not specifically vested by the
Constitution, should be stricken out of the
subject statute for constitutional infirmity.
Similarly, the phrase, subject to the approval
of the Congressional Oversight Committee in
the first sentence of Section 17.1 which
empowers the Commission to authorize voting
by mail in not more than three countries for the
May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, only
upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee found in

the second paragraph of the same section are

unconstitutional as they require review and
approval of voting by mail in any country after
the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer
upon itself the authority to approve or
disapprove the countries wherein voting by
mail shall be allowed, as determined by the
COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided
for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189
----------OTHER ISSUES:
1. WON Sec. 5 (d) of RA 9189 which allows the
registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries by their
mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines
violates the residency requirement of Sec. 1
Article 5 of Constitution - NO
There is no violation of the residency
requirement under Sec. 1, Article 5 of the
Constitution. As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is
to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it
behooves the Court to take a holistic view of
the
pertinent
provisions
of
both
the
Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic
rule in constitutional construction that the
Constitution should be construed as a whole.
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the
mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall
provide a system for voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that
Section 2 does not provide for the parameters
of the exercise of legislative authority in
enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of
restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly
exercised its function as defined in Article VI

(The
Legislative
Constitution.

Department)

of

the

qualifications and none of the disqualifications

to vote.

The method of absentee voting has been said

to be completely separable and distinct from
the regular system of voting, and to be a new
and different manner of voting from that
previously known, and an exception to the
customary and usual manner of voting. The
right of absentee and disabled voters to cast
their ballots at an election is purely statutory;
absentee voting was unknown to, and not
recognized at, the common law.

Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the

execution of the affidavit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit
required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the
intention of the immigrant or permanent
resident to go back and resume residency in
the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves
as an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. The affidavit
is required of immigrants and permanent
residents abroad because by their status in
their host countries, they are presumed to
have relinquished their intent to return to this
country; thus, without the affidavit, the
presumption of abandonment of Philippine
domicile shall remain. It wanted the affiant to
exercise the option to return or to express his
intention to return to his domicile of origin and
not to preempt that choice by legislation.

Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and

vice versa; a person cannot be at the same
time, both a resident and an absentee.[30]
However, under our election laws and the
countless pronouncements of the Court
pertaining to elections, an absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines as
residence is considered synonymous with
domicile. Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that
links an overseas Filipino to his residence in
this country, the framers of the Constitution
considered the circumstances that impelled
them to require Congress to establish a system
for overseas absentee voting.
The intent of the Constitutional Commission is
to entrust to Congress the responsibility of
devising a system of absentee voting. The
qualifications of voters as stated in Section 1
shall remain except for the residency
requirement. This is in fact the reason why the
Constitutional Commission opted for the term
qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to the
system of absentee voting that Congress
should draw up. As stressed by Commissioner
Monsod, by the use of the adjective qualified
with
respect
to
Filipinos
abroad,
the
assumption
is
that
they
have
the

It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does

not only require an affidavit or a promise to
resume actual physical permanent residence
in the Philippines not later than three years
from approval of his/her registration, the
Filipinos abroad must also declare that they
have not applied for citizenship in another
country.
Thus, they must return to the
Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return
shall be cause for the removal of their names
from the National Registry of Absentee Voters
and his/her permanent disqualification to vote
in absentia.
2. WON Sec. 18.5 (RA 9189) which empowers
the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list
representatives including the President & Vice

President violate the constitutional mandate

that winning candidates for President and Vice
President shall be proclaimed as winners by
Congress - YES
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning
candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
far too sweeping that it necessarily includes
the proclamation of the winning candidates for
the presidency and the vice-presidency. Section
18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant
to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only
insofar as said Section totally disregarded the
authority given to Congress by the Constitution
to proclaim the winning candidates for the
positions of president and vice-president.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC
to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs
to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to
encroach on the power of Congress to canvass
the votes for president and vice-president and
the power to proclaim the winners for the said
positions. The provisions of the Constitution
as the fundamental law of the land should be
read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the
votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidates for president and vice-president for
the entire nation must remain in the hands of
Congress.

Macquiling
v.
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013

COMELEC

FACTS:
Respondent Arnado is a natural-born
Filipino citizen who lost his Filipino
citizenship as a consequence of his

subsequent naturalization as a citizen of

United States of America.
On July 10, 2008, Arnado applied for
repatriation under RA 9225 before the
Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, USA and took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. On the same day, an Order
of Approval of his Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition was issued in his
favor.
On April 3, 2009, he again took his Oath
of Allegiance to RP and executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his American
Citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
On April 28, 2010, his rival, respondent
Linog Balua, filed a petition to disqualify
him or cancel his COC in connection with
the May 10, 2010 local and national
elections.
o Balua contended that Arnado is
NOT a resident of Kauswagan and
that he is a FOREIGNER, attaching
thereto a certification issued by
Bureau of Immigration dated April
23, 2010, indicating Arnados
nationality as USA-American.
o Balua also presented computergenerated travel record indicating
that Arnado has been using his US
PASSPORT
in
entering
and
departing the Philippines on the
following dates:
April 14, 2009
June 25, 2009
July 29, 2009
November 24, 2009
January 1, 2010

March 23, 2010

Arnado failed to file his answer so Balua
filed a motion to declare him in default.
Neither of the petition nor the motion
was acted upon having been overtaken
by the 2010 elections.
Arnado won and was subsequently
proclaimed as winning candidate.
Only then did Arnado filed his Verified
Answer.
The
First
Division
of
COMELEC
DISAGREED with Arnados claim that he
is a Filipino citizen, holding that:
o Arnados act of CONSISTENTLY
USING his US Passport AFTER
RENOUNCING his US citizenship
NEGATED
his
Affidavit
of
Renunciation;
o Such continued use is a STRONG
INDICATION that he had NO REAL
INTENTION of renouncing his US
citizenship
o As noted by the Supreme Court in
the Yu case, a passport is an
OFFICIAL document of IDENTITY
and NATIONALITY issued to a
person intending to travel or
sojourn in foreign countries
o The order of succession under
Sec. 44 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) be put into effect.
Arnado
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc, contending that:
o The finding that he is not a Filipino
citizen is NOT SUPPORTED by the
evidence consisting of his Oath of
Allegiance
and
Affidavit
of
Renunciation, which show that he
substantially complied with the
requirements under RA 9225;

The use of his US Passport is NOT

TANTAMOUNT to a repudiation of
his Filipino citizenship as he DID
NOT perform any act of swearing
allegiance to another country;
o He used his US Passport only
because he was NOT INFORMED of
the issuance of his Philippine
Passport and that he used his
Philippine
Passport
after
he
obtained it; and,
o He is UNDOUBTEDLY the PEOPLES
CHOICE.
Petitioner
Casan
Maquiling,
who
garnered the second highest number of
votes, filed a Motion for Intervention,
claiming that the order of succession
under Sec. 44 of the LGC is NOT
APPLICABLE in this case; therefore, he
should be proclaimed as the winner.
The COMELEC En Banc REVERSED the
ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnados MR, holding that:
o By renouncing his US citizenship
as imposed by RA 9225, Arnado
embraced
his
Philippine
citizenship is if he never became a
citizen of another country. He then
became a pure Filipino citizen
again;
o The use of a US passport DOES
NOT operate to REVERT BACK his
status as a dual citizen as there is
NO LAW saying such;
o The First Divisions reliance in the
case of Yu v. Defensor-Santiago is
MISPLACED. The petitioner therein
is a NATURALIZED citizen who,
after taking his oath as a
naturalized Filipino, APPLIED for
the renewal of his PORTUGESE
o

passport. The Philippines expects

STRICT CONDUCT of allegiance to
those NATURALIZED citizens. In
the present case, on the other
hand, Arnado is a NATURAL-BORN
Filipino citizen and DID NOT apply
for a US passport after his
renunciation of his American
citizenship;
o Arnado presented a plausible
explanation
backed-up
with
evidence on the use of his US
passport: it was only in June 2009
that his Philippine passport was
issued BUT he WAS NOT NOTIFIED
thereof. He was only able to get it
about THREE MONTHS later.
Nonetheless, in his SUBSEQUENT
TRAVELS in 2010, he has already
been using his Philippine passport.
COMELEC Chair Sixto Brillantes in his
Separate Concurring Opinion
o Use of foreign passports is NOT
one of the GROUNDS provided for
under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth
Act
No.
63
through
which
Philippine citizenship is LOST;
o What is more applicable in this
case
is
the
ASSIMILATIVE
PRINCIPLE of CONTINUITY of
CITIZENSHIP: once a person
becomes a citizen, either by birth
or naturalization, it is ASSUMED
that he DESIRES to CONTINUE to
be as such, and this assumption
stands UNTIL he VOLUNTARILY
DENATIONALIZES or EXPATRIATES
himself;
o In this case, after reacquiring his
Philippine
citizenship,
Arnado
should be PRESUMED to have

REMAINED a Filipino DESPITE use

of American passport IN THE
ABSENCE
of
CLEAR,
UNEQUIVOCAL and COMPETENT
PROOF of EXPATRIATION;
o All DOUBTS should be RESOLVED
in FAVOR of CITIZENSHIP.
Commissioner
Rene
Sarmientos
DISSENT:
o Arnado FAILED to PROVE that he
TRULY
and
WHOLEHEARTEDLY
ABANDON his allegiance to US.
His CONTINUED USE of his US
passport and ENJOYMENT of all
PRIVILEGES as a US citizen,
despite previous renunciation of
such, RUNS CONTRARY to his
DECLARATION that he CHOSE to
RETAIN his Filipino citizenship;
o Qualifications for elective office,
such
as
citizenship,
are
CONTINUING
REQUIREMENTS;
ONCE any of them is LOST during
incumbency, title to office itself is
DEEMED FORFEITED. More so if he
is NOT a CITIZEN at the time he
ran for OFFICE in which he is
DISQUALIFIED to RUN as such;
o NEITHER does the fact that he
obtained the PLURALITY of VOTES
for the mayoralty post CURE his
FAILURE to comply with the
citizenship requirement since a
DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATE is NOT
a CANDIDATE at all in the eyes of
the law.
Thus, Macquiling filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the use of foreign

passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects ones qualifications to run for public
office?
RULING:
YES, it AFFECTS.
The use of foreign passport after
renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a
POSITIVE
and
VOLUNTARY
ACT
of
REPRESENTATION
as
to
ONEs
NATIONALITY and CITIZENSHIP. Although it
DOES NOT divest Filipino citizenship regained,
it RECANTS the Oath of Renunciation
REQUIRED to qualify one to run for an
elective position.
Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 or The Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003
provides that those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship who are seeking elective
public office shall, at the time of the filing of
Certificate of Candidacy, make a PERSONAL
and SWORN RENUNCIATION of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
Here, there is no question that after
performing the TWIN REQUIREMENTS OF
TAKING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE
REPUBLIC AND RENOUNCING HIS FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP under RA 9225, he became
eligible to run for public office. By executing an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a
Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign
country.
However, this legal presumption
DOES NOT OPERATE PERMANENTLY and is
OPEN to ATTACK when, after renouncing
foreign citizenship, the citizen PERFORMS
POSITIVE
ACTS
showing
CONTINUED
POSSESSION of a FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP.

This happened in this case when Arnado,

after renouncing, CONTINUED to USE his
US passport to TRAVEL IN and OUT of the
country BEFORE FILING his Certificate of
Candidacy on November 3, 2009. Between
the date he renounced his foreign citizenship
(April 3, 2009) and the date of his filing of COC,
he used his US passport FOUR TIMES.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is NOT a
HOLLOW OATH; it REQUIRES an ABSOLUTE and
PERPETUAL
RENUNCIATION
of
foreign
citizenship and FULL DIVESTMENT of all CIVIL
and POLITICAL RIGHTS granted by the foreign
country which granted such citizenship.
The Supreme Court agrees with the
COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a
foreign passport DOES NOT DIVEST Arnado of
his re-acquired Filipino citizenship. However, by
REPRESENTING himself as an AMERICAN,
Arnado VOLUNTARILY and EFFECTIVELY
REVERTED to his EARLIER STATUS as DUAL
CITIZEN. This act is FATAL to Arnados bid for
public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
DISQUALIFICATION to run for an elective local
position.
The act of using a foreign passport
is an act which REPUDIATES the very Oath
of Renunciation required for a former
Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a
local elective position. Thus, by the time he
filed his COC, Arnado was a DUAL CITIZEN
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino
and American citizenship. He was solely and
exclusively Filipino ONLY for ELEVEN DAYS
from April 3, 2009 until April 14, 2009 on which
date he first used his US passport after his
renunciation.
Arnados category of dual citizenship is
that by which foreign citizenship is acquired
through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those

considered dual citizens by virtue of birth who

are NOT REQUIRED by law to take the Oath of
Renunciation as the MERE FILING of COC
carries with it an IMPLIED RENUNCIATION of
foreign citizenship.
Qualifications for public office are
CONTINUING REQUIRMENTS and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election or assumption of office bud DURING
the officers ENTIRE TENURE. Once any of
them is lost, his title may be seasonally
challenged. Holding public office DEMANDS
FULL and UNDIVIDED ALLEGIANCE to the
Republic and to no other.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado,
found that he used his Phil passport THREE
MONTHS after June 18, 2009 the date on
which his Philippine passport was issued. But,
three months from June is SEPTEMBER. If,
indeed, he used his Philippine passport as
SOON as he was in possession of it, he
WOULD HAVE NOT used his US Passport
on November 24, 2009.
Justice Carpios Concurring Opinion
Philippine courts have no power
to declare whether a person
possesses citizenship other than
that of the Philippines. In Mercado
v.
Manzano,
Constitutional
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas was
quoted as saying, [D]ual citizenship
is just a reality imposed on us
because we have no control of the
laws on citizenship of other countries.
Whether or not one is considered a
citizen
of
another
country
is
something completely beyond our
control. In the present case, we have
no authority to declare that Arnado is
an American citizen. Only the courts
of the USA, using American law, have

the conclusive authority to make an

assertion
regarding
Arnados
American citizenship.
Arnado, as a naturalized American
citizen and a repatriated Filipino, is
required by RA9225 to: (1) swear
to an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and
(2) execute a Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship before he may
seek elective Philippine public office.
Arnados use of his American
passport after his execution of an
Affidavit of Renunciation of his
American
Citizenship
IS
A
RETRACTION
OF
HIS
RENUNCIATION.
When
Arnado
filed his Certificate of Candidacy
on 30 November 2009, there was
NO
LONGER
AN
EFFECTIVE
RENUNCIATION of his American
citizenship. It is as if he never
renounced his American citizenship
at all. Arnado, therefore, failed to
comply
with
the
twin
requirements of swearing to an
Oath of Allegiance and executing
a
Renunciation
of
Foreign
Citizenship as found in Republic
Act No. 9225.
Hence, Arnados failure to comply
with the twin requirements of R.A. No.
9225 is clearly a failure to qualify
as a candidate for Philippine
elective public office. He is STILL
DEEMED,
UNDER
PHILIPPINE
LAW, HOLDING ALLEGIANCE TO A
FOREIGN
COUNTRY,
which
disqualifies him from running for an
elective public office. Such failure to
comply
with
the
twin

requirements of R.A. No. 9225 is

included AMONG THE GROUNDS
FOR
DISQUALIFICATION
in
Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code:
Disqualifications. x x x. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for
any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in election laws.
Arnado used his USA passport after
his
Renunciation
of
American
Citizenship and before he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy. This positive
act of retraction of his renunciation
before the filing of the Certificate of
Candidacy
renders
Arnados
Certificate of Candidacy void ab
initio.
Therefore,
Arnado
was
NEVER A CANDIDATE at any time,
and all the votes for him are
stray votes.
Justice Abads Separate and Concurring
Opinion
The majority opinion amply states
that by his acts, Amado showed that
he did not etlectively renounce his
U.S. citizenship. To this I add that
he also FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE U.S. REQUIREMENTS for
citizens wishing to renounce
their citizenships.
Section
349
(a)(5)
of
the
Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) sets the procedure that
those
who
have
moved
their
residence to other countries must
observe when renouncing their U.S.

citizenship. It provides that "(a) A

person who is a national of the
United States whether by birth or
naturalization, shall LOSE HIS
NATIONALITY by VOLUNTARILY
PERFORMING
ANY
OF
THE
FOLLOWING
ACTS
with
the
intention of relinquishing United
States nationality-x x x (5) making
a FORMAL RENUNCIATION OF
NATIONALITY
BEFORE
A
DIPLOMATIC
OR
CONSULAR
OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES
IN A FOREIGN STATE, in such form
as may be prescribed by the
Secretary of State." He does not
effectively renounce his citizenship
who does not comply with what his
country requires of him.
Here, there is NO SHOWING that
Amado, a U.S. citizen, fulfilled
the above requirement. To the
eyes of the U.S. government,
Amado remains its citizen, owing
obligations of loyalty to it and subject
to its laws wherever he may be.
Indeed, the U.S. government had
not
cancelled
his
passport,
permitting him to use the same a
number of times after he reacquired
his Philippine citizenship. lf the U.S.
continues to regard Amado as its
citizen, THEN HE HAS TWO
CITIZENSHIPS, A GROUND FOR
CANCELLING HIS CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY
FOR
A
PUBLIC
OFFICE IN THE PHILIPPINES.
Justice Brions Dissenting Opinion
Arnado
PERFORMED
ALL
ACTS
REQUIRED by Section 5(2) of RA
9225 TO REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE

CITIZENSHIP AND RUN FOR PUBLIC

OFFICE; in fact, he actively followed up
his re-affirmed citizenship by running for
public office
o RA 9225 requires the twin
requirements of taking an
Oath of Allegiance and the
execution of a similarly sworn
Renunciation
of
Foreign
Citizenship
o Under the given facts, Arnado
indisputably
re-acquired
Philippine citizenship AFTER
TAKING
THE
OATH
OF
ALLEGIANCE not only once but
twice on July 10, 2008 and April
3, 2009
o On April 3, 2009, he personally
executed an AFFIDAVIT OF
RENUNCIATION before notary
public Thomas Dean M. Quijano.
o Therefore, when he filed his
CoC for the position of Mayor of
the Municipality of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte on November
30, 2009, he had already
effectively
renounced
his
American citizenship, solely
retaining
his
Philippine
citizenship
as
the
law
requires. In this way, Arnado
qualified for the position of
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and filed a valid CoC.
The evidence on record shows that
ARNADOS USE OF HIS US PASSPORT
AFTER HIS COMPLIANCE WITH THE
TERMS OF RA 9225, WAS AN
ISOLATED ACT that was sufficiently
explained and justified.

Arnados Philippine passport was

issued on June 18, 2009, but HE
WAS
NOT
IMMEDIATELY
NOTIFIED of the issuance so
that he only received his
passport three months after
or sometime in September
2009.
o Clearly, when Arnado travelled on
April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and
July 29, 2009, HE HAD NO
PHILIPPINE PASSPORT that he
could have used to travel to
the United States to attend to
the winding up of his business
and other affairs in America.
o Although Arnado received his
Philippine passport by the time he
returned to the Philippines on
November 24, 2009, HE COULD
NOT USE THIS WITHOUT RISK
OF COMPLICATIONS with the
US immigration authorities for
using
a
travel
document
different from what he used in
his entry into the US on July
29, 2009. Plain practicality then
demanded
that
the
travel
document that he used to enter
the US on July 29, 2009 be the
same travel document he should
use in leaving the country on
November 24, 2009.
Arnados use of his US passport
WAS
NOT
AN
EXPRESS
RENUNCIATION
of
his
Philippine
citizenship under Section 1 of CA 63.
o Under RA 9225, natural-born
citizens who were deemed to
have lost their Philippine
citizenship because of their
o

naturalization as citizens of a
foreign
country
and
who
SUBSEQUENTLY
COMPLIED
with the requirements of RA
9225 ARE DEEMED NOT TO
HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP. RA 9225 CURED
AND
NEGATED
the
presumption made under CA
63.
Hence,
as
in
Japzon
v.
Commission
on
Elections,4 Arnado
assumed
"pure" Philippine citizenship
again after taking the Oath of
Allegiance and executing an
Oath of Renunciation of his
American citizenship under RA
9225.
In this light, the proper framing of
the main issue in this case should
be whether Arnados use of his
U.S. passport affected his
status as a "pure" Philippine
citizen. In question form did
Arnados
use
of
a
U.S.
passport amount to a ground
under the law for the loss of
his Filipino citizenship under
CA 63 or his rights thereunder
or, alternatively, the retention
of his dual citizenship status?
The
law
requires
EXPRESS RENUNCIATION
in
order
to
lose
Philippine
citizenship.
The
term
means
a
renunciation that is made
distinctly and explicitly and
is
NOT
LEFT
TO
INFERENCE
OR
IMPLICATION; it is a

renunciation
manifested
by
direct
and
appropriate language, as
distinguished from that
which is inferred from
conduct.5 The appreciation
of Arnados use of his U.S.
passport should not depart
from this norm, particularly
in a situation of doubt.
The Aznar case presents a
clear and vivid example, taken
from jurisprudence, of what
"express renunciation" is not.
The Court ruled that the mere fact
that Osmea was a holder of a
certificate that he is an American
did not mean that he is no longer
a Filipino, and that an application
for
an
alien
certificate
of
registration did not amount to a
renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
In the present case, other
than the use of his U.S.
passport in two trips to and
from the U.S., THE RECORD
DOES NOT BEAR OUT ANY
INDICATION, SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE,
OF
ARNADOS
INTENTION TO RE-ACQUIRE
U.S. CITIZENSHIP.
In the absence of clear and
affirmative
acts
of
reacquisition of u.s. Citizenship
either by naturalization or by
express acts (such as the reestablishment
of
permanent
residency in the U.S.), Arnados
use of his U.S. passport is JUST
AN ISOLATED ACT that did not
undo his renunciation of his U.S.

citizenship. What he might in fact

have
done
was
to
violate
American law on the use of
passports, but this is a matter
irrelevant to the present case.
Thus, Arnado remains to be a
"pure" Filipino citizen and the
loss
of
his
Philippine
citizenship or of citizenship
rights CANNOT BE PRESUMED
OR
INFERRED
FROM
HIS
ISOLATED ACT of using his
U.S.
passport
for
travel
purposes.
Arnado DID NOT VIOLATE his Oath
of Renunciation; at any rate, ALL
DOUBTS should be RESOLVED IN
FAVOR OF ARNADOS ELIGIBILITY
considering that he received the popular
mandate of the people of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte as their duly elected
mayor.
o Arnado
SUFFICIENTLY
JUSTIFIED THE USE OF HIS U.S.
PASSPORT
despite
his
renunciation
of
his
U.S.
citizenship: when he travelled on
April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and
July 29, 2009, he had no Philippine
passport that he could have used
to travel to the U.S. to attend to
the business and other affairs that
he was leaving. If at all, he could
be faulted for using his U.S.
passport by the time he returned
to the Philippines on November
24, 2009 because at that time, he
had presumably received his
Philippine passport. However,
given the circumstances of
Arnado's use and that he
consistently
used
his

Philippine passport for travel

AFTER November 24, 2009,
the true character of his use
of his U.S. passport stands out
as
AN
ISOLATED
AND
CONVENIENT ACT that DID NOT
NEGATE
HIS
OATH
OF
RENUNCIATION.
In a situation of doubt,
DOUBTS
SHOULD
BE
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF FULL
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP since
the thrust of RA 9225 is TO
ENCOURAGE THE RETURN TO
FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP
of
natural-born Filipinos who lost
their
Philippine
citizenship
through their acquisition of
another citizenship.
From the perspective of our
election
laws,
DOUBTS
SHOULD ALSO BE RESOLVED
IN FAVOR OF Arnado since HIS
ELECTION TO THE OFFICE of
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte WAS NEVER IN
DOUBT. The present voters of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte have
eloquently spoken and approved
Arnados offer of service not only
once but twice in 2010 and now
in 2013. Note that the present
case was very much alive in the
minds of the Kauswagan voters in
the immediately past May 13,
2013 elections, yet they again
voted Arnado into office.
The people of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte, therefore,
made their own ruling when
they elected Arnado as their

mayor despite the foreigner

label sought to be pinned on him.
__________

G.R. No. L-61586 May 30, 1983

Milllare v. Hon. Gironella
Petitioner Isidro Millare ran for the position of
Barangay Captain of Barangay Budac, Tayum
Abra, against Alfredo Elvea. Elvena filed an
action (Election Case No. 48) for exclusion and
disqualification of Millare. The said petition
sought to strike out Millare's name from the
voters' list, and to disqualify him as a
candidate for the position of barangay captain
of barangay Budac on the ground that he was
not an actual resident of the said barangay for
at least six months prior to the elections, as
required by Section 7 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
222.
At the hearing of the said petition, Millare failed
to appear and, after receiving the evidence of
Elvea the judge issued an order striking out
Millare's name from the voters' list and
declaring him disqualified to run as barangay
captain of barangay Budac.
Millare filed a motion for a reconsideration of
the said order. The motion was set for hearing,
and in an order dated May 16, 1982, Judge
Bernardino denied the, same, with the
modification that Millare's name was allowed to
remain in the voters' list. Millare received a
copy of the order denying his motion for
reconsideration at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of May 16, 1982, which was a Sunday, the eve
of election day.
Despite
the
declaration
as
to
his
disqualification, Millare ran just the same in the
election held on May 17, 1982. It appears
undisputed that he garnered more votes than
Elvea His votes, however, were not
considered by the barangay board of tellers,
they having been declared as stray. The

barangay board of canvassers proclaimed

Elvea as the duly elected Barangay Captain of
barangay Budac. He took his oath of office as
such.
Millare did not appeal the orders in Election
Case No. 48 which declared him disqualified to
run as barangay captain of barangay Budac.
On May 20, 1982, Millare filed with the MTC
and election protest against Elvea praying for
the annulment of the proclamation of Elvea
and for a declaration that he (Millare) was the
duly elected Barangay Captain of barangay
Budac.
Judge Gironella dismissed the action. He
reasoned out that the election protest may not
be availed of as a means of appealing the
decision which declared Millare as disqualified
as a candidate and which had already become
final and executory, there having been no
appeal taken from the same.
The respondents are pinning down Millare on
his failure to appeal the order of Judge
Bernardino in Election Case No. 48 declaring
him disqualified to run for the position of
barangay captain of barangay Budac on the
ground of non-residence. Such failure, it was
reasoned out, resulted in the said order
becoming final and executory, and that by
virtue thereof, Millare lacked the requisite
personality to file Election Protest No. -49.
Issue:
WON Millare can file an election protest instead
of appealing the judgment in Election Case No.
48
Held:
Yes.
From a strict legal standpoint, the view that the
order disqualifying Millare had become final
and executory due to his failure to appeal the
same may be said to be technically correct.
The law governing barangay elections is
contained in Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,

otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act

of 1982.
The pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court
which have been made applicable to "all
disputes over barangay elections" require that
the decision of a municipal court be appealed
to the Court of First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Court) "within fifteen days after
notification of the judgment complained of."
(Sec. 2, Rule 40, Rules of Court.) It is a fact that
Millare did not take an appeal from the orders
issued by Judge Bernardino in Election Case No.
48.
However, We find Ourselves unable to go along
with the stoically legalistic stance taken by the
respondents which not only disregards the
equities involved, but also contravenes the
unquestioned policy in the interpretation of
election laws and the disposition of election
cases. We have repeatedly ruled that "the
purpose of election laws is to give effect to
rather than frustrate, the will of the voters."
Under the undisputed facts, Millare could not
have appealed the order disqualifying him as a
candidate before the election. The order
denying his motion for reconsideration or the
order dated May 13, 1982 in Election Case No.
48 was received by Millare only at 3:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of May 16, 1982, a Sunday, or
only a few hours before the opening of the
polling places.
However, as to whether Millare should have
appealed the said order of disqualification after
election day, more particularly when his votes,
which were more than those of his opponents,
were not credited to him, they having been
considered stray due to the aforementioned
disqualification, was not plain nor certain
enough as the proper course of action to take.
The barangay board of tellers had considered
the order of his disqualification as already final
and executory, for which reason they

considered his votes stray. If the order of

disqualification was still appealable, as
contended by the respondents, such action on
the part of the barangay board of tellers was
legally unjustified and erroneous. The quandary
in the mind of Millare as to what course of
action to take after Elvea was proclaimed the
winner despite his having received less votes
than Millare was not helped any by the state of
the law and of the applicable decisions on the
matter. As aforesaid, there is no express legal
provision or pertinent jurisprudence which
indicates whether, under such a situation,
Millare should have appealed the order of his
disqualification, or file an election protest.
The propriety of Millare's filing a separate
election contest in lieu of appealing the order
of disqualification in Election Case No. 48 could
have been induced also by the need to raise
issues in the election contest other than the
sole question of the alleged non-residence of
Millare in Barangay Budac; such as, the denial
of due process consisting in the lack of
opportunity to present evidence in his behalf,
the propriety of declaring the votes cast in his
favor as stray, and the refusal of Judge
Bernardino to allow the reopening of the ballot
boxes for a recanvassing of the votes. At any
rate, if appeal is indeed the proper remedy, the
filing of Election Protest No. 49 on May 20,
1982, or well within the period of appeal, may
be considered as in the same nature of that
remedy. Whatever procedural mis-step may
have been committed in this regard may not
override the paramount consideration of
upholding the sovereign will of the people
expressed through the democratic process of
suffrage. Millare may not be faulted for
sleeping on his rights. He had insisted on his
qualification for the position he ran for, and
took determined and seasonable steps to
assert the same.

So, the cases were consolidated and remanded

to the RTC to be tried on the merits. RTC was
also instructed to allow Millare to present his
evidence.
Ysip v. Municipality of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija
G.R. No. L-18947
April 29, 1922
Malcom
FACTS:

At the last general election in 1919, two

parties, the Partido Democrata and the
Partido Nacionalista, contested for
supremacy in the municipality of Cabiao,
Nueva Ecija. The highest number of
votes was cast for the Partido
Nacionalista, and the second highest
number for the Partido Democrata.
Partido
Nacionalista
was
however
divided into two parties, the Partido
Nacionalista,
commonly
known
as
Unipersonalista,
and
the
Partido
Nacionalista Colectivista.
The Partido Nacionalista Colectivista was
inaugurated in the municipality of
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, on February 28,
1922.
portion of section 11 of Act No. 3030 of
the Philippine Legislature, reads:

Should there be in such municipality one or

more political parties or branches or fractions
thereof, or political groups, then two of said
inspectors and two substitutes for the
same shall belong to the party which
polled the largest number of votes in said
municipality at such preceding election and
the other inspector and his substitute
shall belong to the party, branch or
fraction thereof, or political group which

polled the next largest number of votes at

said election; and the inspectors so appointed
shall be persons proposed by the legitimate
representative or representatives of such
political parties, branches or fractions thereof,
or political group.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
Partido
Nacionalista Colectivista will be entitled
to
an
election
inspector
in
the
approaching elections
RULING: YES
A strict construction of the law would
necessarily result in the Nacionalista Party
being granted two inspectors in many
municipalities, since no one can deny that this
is "the party which polled the largest number
of votes," in such municipalities at the
preceding election. Nor can it be denied that
the law contemplates bi-partisan elections and
only takes into account the successful party,
and the party which polled the next largest
number of votes.
A liberal construction of the law will, on
the other hand, permit the Nacionalista
Colectivista Party to have representation
on election boards in all municipalities in
which the old Nacionalista Party polled
the largest number of votes at the last
election. Such interpretation and application
of the law will not do violence to it, in view of
the notorious fact that the party which won the
election in many municipalities, such as
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, the Nacionalista Party has
now split its forces between the old party and a
new
party.
Such
interpretation
and
application of the law would, moreover,
be in accord with the underlying purpose
of the Election Law, which is to provide as

complete a method as possible to obtain

a clean election.
If we must choose between a strict and literal
interpretation of the law and a liberal and
reasonable interpretation of the law, if we must
choose between the letter of the law which
"killeth" and the spirit of the law which "giveth
life", can any one doubt what our decision will
be? We adopt that construction which will
produce the most beneficial results.
Where in such municipalities, in addition to the
Partido Nacionalista there has been duly
organized a new party known as the Partido
Nacionalista
Colectivista,
one
election
inspector and one substitute shall belong
each to the Partido Nacionalista, the
Partido Nacionalista Colectivista and the
Partido Democrata.

Violago, Sr. v COMELEC

GR No 194143
Oct 04, 11
CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTION LAWS: LIBERALLY
CONSTRUED
Facts:
special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: set aside
Order of the 2nd Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
dismissing the election protest filed by
herein petitioner against herein private
respondent, and the Order of the
COMELEC en banc, denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration
Petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for the mayoralty race during
the May 10, 2010 elections in the City of

Meycauayan,
Bulacan.
Private
respondent was proclaimed the winner.
petitioner filed a Petition with the
COMELEC questioning the proclamation
of private respondent on the following
grounds: (1) massive vote-buying; (2)
intimidation
and
harassment;
(3)
election fraud; (4) non-appreciation by
the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
machines of valid votes cast during the
said election; and, (5) irregularities due
to non-observance of the guidelines set
by the COMELEC.
The COMELEC 2nd Division issued an
Order setting the preliminary conference
on August 12, 2010 and directing the
parties
to
file
their
Preliminary
Conference Briefs at least one (1) day
before the scheduled conference.
On August 11, 2010, private respondent
filed her Preliminary Conference Brief
Petitioner filed his Brief on the day of the
scheduled preliminary conference.
Petitioner and his counsel failed to
appear during the actual conference on
August 12, 2010. On even date, private
respondents counsel moved for the
dismissal of the case.
The COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed
petitioners protest on the ground that
the latter belatedly filed his Brief in
violation of the COMELEC rule on the
filing of briefs.
the COMELEC en banc contending that it
was only on August 16, 2010 that he
received a copy of the Order of the
COMELEC which set the preliminary
conference on August 12, 2010.
the
COMELEC en
banc denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
on the ground that petitioner failed to

file a verified motion in violation of

Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure.
Issue:
Held:
A perusal of the records of the instant
case would show that petitioner was able to
present a copy of the Certification issued by
the Postmaster of Meycauayan City, Bulacan,
attesting to the fact that the Order sent by the
COMELEC to petitioners counsel informing the
latter of the scheduled hearing set on August
12, 2010 and directing him to file his
Preliminary Conference Brief was received only
on August 16, 2010.
Petitioner likewise submitted an advisory
issued by the Chief of the Operations Division
of the TELECOM Office in Meycauayan that the
telegraph service in the said City, through
which the COMELEC also supposedly sent
petitioner a notice through telegram, has been
terminated and the office permanently closed
and transferred to Sta. Maria, Bulacan as of
April 1, 2009. Respondent did not question the
authenticity of these documents.
The Court finds no justifiable reason why the
COMELEC 2nd Division hastily dismissed
petitioners election protest. There is no
indication that the COMELEC 2nd Division
made prior verification from the proper or
concerned COMELEC department or official of
petitioners allegation that he did not receive a
copy of the subject Order. In fact, it was only
on the day following such dismissal that the
Electoral Contests Adjudication Department,
through the 2nd Division Clerk, sent a letter to
the Postmaster of Meycauayan City, Bulacan
requesting for a certification as to the date of
receipt of the said Order stating therein that
the certification is urgently needed for the

proper
and
appropriate
disposition
of
petitioners election protest. Fairness and
prudence dictate that the COMELEC 2nd
Division should have first waited for the
requested certification before deciding whether
or not to dismiss petitioners protest on
technical grounds.
Petitioner should not be penalized for belatedly
filing his Preliminary Conference Brief. While it
may be argued that petitioner acquired actual
knowledge of the scheduled conference a day
prior to the date set through means other than
the official notice sent by the COMELEC, the
fact remains that, unlike his opponent, he was
not given sufficient time to thoroughly prepare
for the said conference. A one-day delay, as in
this case, does not justify the outright dismissal
of the protest based on technical grounds
where there is no indication of intent to violate
the rules on the part of petitioner and the
reason for the violation is justifiable. Thus, the
COMELEC 2ndDivision committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing petitioners protest.
With respect to the COMELEC en bancs denial
of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, it is
true that Section 3, Rule 20 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an
Automated Election System, as well as Section
3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
clearly
require
that
a
motion
for
reconsideration should be verified. However,
the settled rule is that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure are subject to liberal construction.
In Quintos v. Commission on Elections, this
Court held that the alleged lack of verification
of private respondents Manifestation and
Motion for Partial Reconsideration is merely a
technicality that should not defeat the will of
the electorate. The COMELEC may liberally
construe or even suspend its rules of procedure
in the interest of justice, including obtaining a

speedy disposition of all matters pending

before the COMELEC.
In the case of Panlilio v. Commission on
Elections, restated the prevailing principle that
the COMELECs rules of procedure for the
verification of protests and certifications of
non-forum shopping should be liberally
construed.
In Pacanan v. Commission on Elections:
x x x An election contest, unlike an ordinary
civil action, is clothed with a public interest.
The purpose of an election protest is to
ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by
the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of
the people. What is sought is the correction of
the canvass of votes, which was the basis of
proclamation of the winning candidate. An
election contest therefore involves not only the
adjudication of private and pecuniary interests
of rival candidates but paramount to their
claims is the deep public concern involved and
the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the
real choice of the electorate. And the court has
the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all
means within its command, who is the real
candidate elected by the people.
Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are
subject to a liberal construction. This liberality
is for the purpose of promoting the effective
and efficient implementation of the objectives
of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections and for
achieving just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action
and proceeding brought before the Comelec.
Thus, we have declared:
It has been frequently decided, and it may be
stated as a general rule recognized by all
courts, that statutes providing for election
contests are to be liberally construed to the

end that the will of the people in the choice of

public officers may not be defeated by mere
technical objections. An election contest, unlike
an ordinary action, is imbued with public
interest since it involves not only the
adjudication of the private interests of rival
candidates but also the paramount need of
dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the
real choice of the electorate with respect to
who shall discharge the prerogatives of the
office within their gift. Moreover, it is neither
fair nor just to keep in office for an uncertain
period one whos right to it is under suspicion.
It is imperative that his claim be immediately
cleared not only for the benefit of the winner
but for the sake of public interest, which can
only
be
achieved
by
brushing
aside
technicalities of procedure which protract and
delay the trial of an ordinary action.
Tolentino
v.
Commission
on
Elections,20 and De Castro v. Commission on
Elections,21 where the Court held that in
exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as
defined by its mandate to protect the integrity
of elections, the COMELEC must not be
straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving
election disputes.
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioners
motion for reconsideration was not verified, the
COMELEC en banc should have considered the
merits of the said motion in light of petitioners
meritorious claim that he was not given timely
notice of the date set for the preliminary
conference. The essence of due process is to
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence in support of
ones claim or defense.22 It is the denial of this
opportunity that constitutes violation of due
process of law.23 More particularly, procedural
due process demands prior notice and

hearing.24 As discussed above, the fact that

petitioner somehow acquired knowledge or
information of the date set for the preliminary
conference by means other than the official
notice sent by the COMELEC is not an excuse
to dismiss his protest, because it cannot be
denied that he was not afforded reasonable
notice and time to adequately prepare for and
submit his brief. This is precisely the reason
why petitioner was only able to file his
Preliminary Conference Brief on the day of the
conference itself. Petitioners counsel may not
likewise be blamed for failing to appear during
the scheduled conference because of prior
commitments and for, instead, filing an Urgent
Motion to Reset Preliminary Conference.
US vs Cueto
G.R. No. 13626
October 29, 1918
In the general election held on June 6, 1916,
Elias Cueto was an election inspector for an
election precinct in the municipality of Tiaong,
Province of Tayabas.
For the position of municipal president of this
municipality,
Mayo and Magbiray were
candidates.
Toribio Briones, a qualified elector, belonged to
the Mayo party. He was given a slip containing
the slate of candidates of the Mayo faction for
the different offices and with this in his
possession, entered the polling place. Being a
disabled person, because of failing sight and
rheumatism in his hand, although still able
when necessary to read and write, Briones
secured the assistance of Cueto to prepare his
ballot. Instead, however, of copying the name
of Mayo, the candidate for municipal president

found on the slip of paper, for whom Briones

desired to vote, Cueto inserted the name of
Magbiray. When once outside the dark booth,
Briones noticed that his ballot contained the
name of Magbiray and, on his objecting, a new
ballot with the name of Mayo was prepared for
him by the election inspector.

vote secretly for whom he pleases, free from

improper influences.
Purpose of election laws:
To secure a fair and honest count of the ballots
cast.
On Cuetos liability:
WON Cueto violated the Election law

History:
The Philippine Bill and subsequent Acts of
Congress conceded to qualified persons the
high prerogative of suffrage. To carry out this
purpose, the Election Law was carefully drafted
and enacted, and then revised by the
Philippine Legislature. Its primal feature was to
allow the citizen to vote secretly for whom he
pleased, free from improper influences.
The purity of elections is one of the most
important and fundamental requisites of a
popular government.
Main feature of election laws: topic sa syllabus
Act No. 1582 was enacted to accomplish the
objective of insuring purity of elections. This
law requires that only qualified electors shall
be admitted to the polls; that they shall vote in
absolute secrecy, and that the returns shall be
justly compiled and announced. In its essential
details, this law is a counterpart of the ballot
laws almost universally adopted within
comparatively recent times in the United
States, and is generically called by textwriters
the Australian ballot law. The central idea of
the Australian ballot law, as so often expressed
in the cases, is to shroud the marking of the
ballots in absolute secrecy. All the efforts to
secure a free and untrammeled expression of
the electors will lead up to and depart from
that point. It is intended to allow the citizen to

Held:
Yes.
The accused, as already remarked, was an
election inspector. To hold this office it was
necessary
for
him
to
have
certain
qualifications.
He had to be a qualified elector of his precinct,
of good character, not convicted of an offense
involving moral turpitude, and able to read,
write, and speak either English, Spanish, or the
local dialect understandingly. The accused took
an oath, honestly and justly to administer his
duties according to the Election Law without
prejudice or favor toward any persons
candidate, party, society, or religious sect. One
of his functions was, in conjunction with
another inspector (the accused, however,
violated this provision of the law by acting
alone), to prepare ballots for disabled persons.
The law made it his duty, and his duty only,
with another inspector, to ascertain the wishes
of the disabled voter and to prepare the ballot
of the voter in proper form according to his
wishes.
(See
sections
417-424,
453,
Administrative Code of 1917.)
The election inspector in giving assistance to a
disabled voter has but one function to perform,
namely, the mechanical act of preparing the
ballot. The exercise of any discretion as to the
selection of candidates for the voter assisted is
prohibited to the marker, and the substitution

of his own for the voters choice in such

selection is a flagrant violation of an official
trust.

(DEFINITION,
ELECTIONS)

An inspector who fails to write upon the ballot

the name or names expressly indicated by the
voter is guilty of a fraud practiced against the
voter and thus of a violation of the penal
provisions of the Election Law.

FACTS:

Of course, an election officer is not responsible

for a mere mistake in judgment but only for a
willful disregard of duty. All that the law
requires of an election officer is the exercise of
prudence, of intelligent deliberation leading
him to judgment; and when he does that,
although he does not live up to the law there is
no crime, because there is no criminal intent.
The defendant is not only guilty of an attempt
to defeat the will of the people of his district in
their effort to choose their representatives in
the legislative branch of the government, but
also violated his oath of office in which he
asked God to help him honestly and justly to
administer his duties as an inspector of
elections without prejudice or favor toward any
person, candidate, party, society, or religious
sect, which oath must have been taken freely
or without evasion or mental reservation
whatsoever. In addition to convicting himself of
an attempt to violate the rights of the people,
together with the violation of a solemn oath, he
also convicts himself of the falsification of a
public document, and might be punished for
the latter offense in a manner very much more
severe than for the crime for which he is being
tried.

RULLADO VS COMELEC

BASIS

AND

NATURE

OF

In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo

N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido were the
contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of
Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June 22,
2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed
away at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center.
His widow, petitioner Petronila Betty Rulloda,
wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections on
June 25, 2002 seeking permission to run as
candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas in
lieu of her late husband. Petitioners request was
supported by the Appeal-Petition containing several
signatures of people purporting to be members of
the electorate of the Barangay.
On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L.
Asuncion issued a directive to the Chairman and
Members of the Barangay Board of Canvassers of
Sto. Tomas as follows:
Just in case the names BETTY or PETRONILA or
the surname RULLODA is written on the ballot,
read the same as it is written but add the words
NOT COUNTED like BETTY NOT COUNTED or
RULLODA NOT COUNTED.
Based on the tally of petitioners watchers who were
allowed to witness the canvass of votes during the
July 15, 2002 elections, petitioner garnered 516
votes while respondent Remegio Placido received
290 votes. Despite this, the Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of
Sto. Tomas.
After the elections, petitioner learned that the
COMELEC, acting on the separate requests of

Andres Perez Manalaysay and Petronila Rulloda to

be substituted as candidates for Barangay
Chairman of Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija and Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan, respectively, issued Resolution No.
5217 dated July 13, 2002 which states:
PREMISES
CONSIDERED,
the
Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to ADOPT the
recommendation of the Law Department as follows:
1. 2.
To deny due course the Certificates of Candidacy of
ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY and PETRONILA S.
RULLODA; and
To direct the Election Officer of Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija and San Jacinto, Pangasinan to delete the
name of ANDRES PEREZ MANALAYSAY, candidate
for Barangay Chairman in Barangay La Fuente, Sta.
Rosa, Nueva Ecija; and the name of PETRONILA S.
RULLODA, candidate for Barangay Captain in
Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.
The above-quoted Resolution cited as authority the
COMELECs Resolution No. 4801 dated May 23,
2002, setting forth the guidelines on the filing of
certificates of candidacy in connection with the July
15, 2002 synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan elections, more particularly Section 9
thereof which reads:
Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. There shall be
no substitution of candidates for barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials.[8]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari, seeking to annul Section 9 of Resolution
No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217, both of the
COMELEC, insofar as they prohibited petitioner from
running as substitute candidate in lieu of her
deceased husband; to nullify the proclamation of

respondent; and to proclaim her as the duly elected

Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan.
Private respondent Remegio Placido filed his
Comment, arguing that since the barangay election
is non-partisan, substitution of candidates is not
allowed. Moreover, petitioner did not file any
certificate of candidacy; hence, there was only one
candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas,
namely, respondent Placido.
Public respondent COMELEC also filed its Comment.
It contends that its Resolution No. 4801 was issued
not pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but as an
incident of
its inherent administrative functions over the
conduct of the barangay elections. Therefore, the
same may not be the subject of review in a petition
for certiorari. Further, the COMELEC alleges that it
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy
and in proclaiming respondent considering that he
was the only candidate for Barangay Chairman of
Sto. Tomas.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN COMELEC
DENIED PETITIONERS REQUEST THAT SHE BE
ALLOWED TO RUN FOR ELECTIONS

HELD:
At the outset, there is no dispute that petitioner
garnered 516 votes while respondent got only 290
votes. Respondents did not deny this in their
respective Comments.
In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or
selection of candidates to public office by popular

vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected

officials which are determined through the will of
the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the
popular will, the expression of the sovereign power
of the people. The winner is the candidate who has
obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in
the election. Sound policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those who receive the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office. For, in all republican forms of government the
basic idea is that no one can be declared elected
and no measure can be declared carried unless he
or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal
votes cast in the election.
Respondents base their argument that the
substitution of candidates is not allowed in
barangay elections on Section 77 of the Omnibus
Elections Code, which states:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after
the last day of the filing of certificates of candidacy,
an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for
any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified
by the same political party may file a certificate of
candidacy to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute
candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for
the office affected in accordance with the preceding
sections not later than mid-day of the election. If
the death, withdrawal or disqualification should
occur between the day before the election and midday of election day, said certificate may be filed
with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate or, in the case
of candidates to be voted by the entire electorate of
the country, with the Commission.
Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the

barangay election is non-partisan, there can be no

substitution because there is no political party from
which to designate the substitute. Such an
interpretation, aside from being non sequitur,
ignores the purpose of election laws which is to give
effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the
voters. It is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and
unmistakable mandate of the people. It is wellsettled that in case of doubt, political laws must be
so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Contrary to respondents claim, the absence of a
specific
provision
governing
substitution
of
candidates in barangay elections can not be
inferred as a prohibition against said substitution.
Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into
the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there
is more reason to allow the substitution of
candidates where no political parties are involved
than when political considerations or party
affiliations reign, a fact that must have been
subsumed by law.
Private respondent likewise contends that the votes
in petitioners favor can not be counted because
she did not file any certificate of candidacy. In other
words, he was the only candidate for Barangay
Chairman. His claim is refuted by the Memorandum
of the COMELEC Law Department as well as the
assailed Resolution No. 5217, wherein it indubitably
appears that petitioners letter-request to be
allowed to run as Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas
in lieu of her late husband was treated as a
certificate of candidacy.
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the
plurality of votes in the contested election.
Technicalities and procedural niceties in election
cases should not be made to stand in the way of the
true will of the electorate. Laws governing election
contests must be liberally construed to the end that

the will of the people in the choice of public officials

may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
Election contests involve public interest, and
technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if
they constitute an obstacle to the determination of
the true will of the electorate in the choice of their
elective officials. The Court frowns upon any
interpretation of the law that would hinder in any
way not only the free and intelligent casting of the
votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results.

SUBIC BAY METROPILITAN AUTHORITY VS

COMELEC and ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO A.
CALIMBAS
G.R. NO. 125416 September 26, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Note: This is an action for certiorari and prohibition,

petitioner seeks to nullify the respondent
Commission on Elections' Ruling dated April 17,
1996 and Resolution No. 2848 promulgated on June
27, 1996, denying petitioner's plea to stop the
holding of a local initiative and referendum on the
proposition to recall Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.
10, Serye 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan.

FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the
creation of the Subic Economic Zone.

Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. Subject to

the concurrence by resolution of the Sangguniang
Panlugnsod of the City of Olongapo and the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipalities of Subic.
Morong and Hermosa, there is hereby created a
Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of
the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic,
Province of Zambales.

RA 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement

the declared national policy of converting the Subic
military reservation into alternative productive
uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned
over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines
government. Immediately, petitioner commenced
the implementation of its task, particularly the
preservation of the seaports, airport, buildings,
houses and other installations left by the American
navy.
In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute
concurrence, as required by RA 7227, to join the
Subic Special Economic Zone then submitted it to
the Office of the President.
The following month, respondents filed a petition
with
the
Sangguniang
Bayan
of
Morong
to annul and invalidate Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg. 10, Serye 1993, among other conditions.
Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of
their petition, herein respondents resorted to their
power initiative under the Local Government Code
of 1991, Sec. 122 paragraph (b) of which provides
as follows:
Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative.

(b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the

sanggunian concerned, the proponents, through
their
duly
authorized
and
registered
representatives, may invoke their power of
initiative, giving notice thereof to the sangguniang
concerned.
On July 6, 1993, respondent Commission En Banc in
Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 denied the petition
for local initiative by herein private respondents on
the ground that the subject thereof was merely a
resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an
ordinance.
On August 15, 1993, private respondents instituted
a petition for certiorari and mandamus before this
Court against the Commission on Elections and the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, to set aside
Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 insofar as it
disallowed the conduct of a local initiative to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, and
Comelec Resolution No. 93-1676 insofar as it
prevented the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Bataan from proceeding with the authentication of
the required number of signatures in support of the
initiative and the gathering of signatures.
On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of RA
7227, the President of the Philippines issued
Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and
bounds of the SSEZ.
On June 18, 1996, respondent COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a "Calendar
of Activities for local referendum on certain
municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong, Bataan", and which indicated,
among others, the scheduled Referendum Day (July
27, 1996, Saturday). A week later, it promulgated
the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the
rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum
proposing
to
annul
or

repeal Kapasyahan
Blg.
10,
Serye
1993 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan".

enact legislations through an election called for the

purpose.

On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present

petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the
validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter
alia, that public respondent "is intent on proceeding
with a local initiative that proposes an amendment
of a national law.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

ISSUES:

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a

petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance.

(1) WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion in promulgating and implementing
Resolution No. 2848
(2) WON the questioned local initiative covers a
subject within the powers of the people of Morong
to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the
amendment of a national law." (Ultra Vires?)
HELD:
1) Sufficiency of Comelec Resolution No. 2848
We answer the question in the affirmative.
To begin with, the process started by private
respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent
Comelec
made
preparations
for
a
REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the
Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the
word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times,
but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. To repeat, not
once was the word "initiative" used in said body of
Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is
unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
There are statutory and conceptual demarcations
between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting
the "Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress
differentiated one term from the other, thus:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to propose and

a.1. Initiative on the Constitution, which refers to a

petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation; and

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the

people through a proposition sent to Congress or
the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to
approve or reject a legislation through an election
called for the purpose. It may be of two classes,
namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a
petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part
thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2 Referendum on local law which refers to a
petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local
legislative bodies.
Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A.
Cruz defines initiative as the "power of the people to
propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them
at the polls independent of the legislative
assembly." On the other hand, he explains that
referendum "is the right reserved to the people to
adopt or reject any act or measure which has been
passed by a legislative body and which in most
cases would without action on the part of electors
become a law."

The foregoing definitions, which are based on

Black's and other leading American authorities, are
echoed in the Local Government Code (RA 7160)
substantially as follows:
Sec. 120. Local Initiative Defined. Local initiative
is the legal process whereby the registered voters of
local government unit may directly propose, enact,
or amend any ordinance.
Sec. 126. Local Referendum Defined. Local
referendum is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of the local government units may
approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by
the sanggunian.
The local referendum shall be held under the control
and direction of the Comelec within sixty (60) days
in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days
in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case
of baranggays. The Comelec shall certify and
proclaim the results of the said referendum.
From these definitions, we gather that initiative is
resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly
either because the law-making body fails or refuses
to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that
they desire or because they want to amend or
modify one already existing.
On the other hand, in a local referendum, the lawmaking body submits to the registered voters of its
territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any
ordinance or resolution, which is duly enacted or
approved by such law-making authority. Said
referendum shall be conducted also under the
control and direction of the Commission on
Elections.
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of
the electorate, referendum is begun and consented
to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of
law-making by the people themselves without the

participation and against the wishes of their elected

representatives, while referendum consists merely
of the electorate approving or rejecting what has
been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body.
Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative
are understandably more complex than in a
referendum where expectedly the voters will simply
write either "Yes" of "No" in the ballot.

actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or

cases.

[Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer

to initiative and referendum as "powers" or "legal
processes", these can be also be "rights", as Justice
Cruz terms them, or "concepts", or "the proposal"
itself (in the case of initiative) being referred to in
this Decision.]

CLAUDIO vs. COMELEC

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises

administration and supervision of the process itself,
akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people,
hence the respondent Commission cannot control or
change the substance or the content of legislation.
In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it
should have done so already) issue relevant and
adequate guidelines and ruls for the orderly
exercise of these "people-power" features of our
Constitution.

The initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,

Serye 1993 is REMANDED to the Commission on
Elections for further proceeding consistent with the
foregoing discussion.

G.R. NO. 140560, 140714

May 4, 2000

Court said that it shall not pass upon the third issue
of ultra vires on the ground of prematurity. The
municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It
is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject
it, then there would be nothing to contest and to
adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted
for it and it has become an approved ordinance or
resolution that rights and obligations can be
enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point,
it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition
cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility.
Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only

Jovito Claudio is the duly elected mayor of

Pasay City in the May 11, 1988 elections. He
assumed office on July 1, 1988.

During the 2nd week of May 1999, several

barangays gathered to discuss the possibility
of filing a petition for recall against Mayor
Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 19,
1999, an ad hoc committee was made for
the purpose of convening the Preparatory
Recall Assembly (PRA).

On May 29, 1999, PRA members adopted a

resolution to initiate the recall of Mayor
Claudio for loss of confidence

Petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999,

accompanied by an affidavit of service of the
petition on the Office of the City Mayor.

The
signatures
affixed
to
the
resolution were actually meant to
show attendance at the PRA meeting

The convening of the PRA took

place
within
the
1-year
prohibited period

Recall resolution failed to obtain the

majority of all the members of the
PRA

COMELEC granted the petition for recall and

dismissed the opposition of Mayor Claudio.

The bone of contention in this case is Sec. 74 of the

Local Government Code which provides:

FACTS

2. WON initiative is Ultra Vires

Mayor Claudio filed an opposition on the

following grounds:

Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official

may be the subject of a recall election only once
during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year
from the date of the official's assumption to office
or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
local election. xxx
ISSUES

WON the word recall in paragraph b covers a

process which includes the convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the
recall resolution

WON the term regular local election in paragraph

b includes the election period or the date of the
Election Day

WON the Recall resolution was signed by the

majority of PRA and duly verified

RULING

WON the word recall in paragraph b covers a

process which includes the convening of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the
recall resolution NO

(1) the convening of the preparatory assembly or

gathering of the signatures of at least 25%
registered voters in the LGU;
(2) the filing of the recall resolution or petition with
the COMELEC;
(3) the verification of the resolution or petition;
(4) fixing of the date of the recall election; and

According to Mayor Claudio, the prohibited 1-year

period began from the convening of the PRA on May
29, 1999 when in it resolved to initiate the recall
process and since May 29 is less than 1 year
from the date he assumed office (July 1,
1988), the filing of the recall petition was null &
void.

Comelec contends that recall process starts from

the filing of the petition for recall until the
conduct of the recall election and since the
petition was filed on July 2, 1999, this was exactly
one year from the date Claudio assumed
office.

The word recall in Sec. 74 (b), LGC refers to the

election itself by means of which voters decided
whether they shall retain their local official or elect
his replacement. IN THIS CASE, SINCE THE
RECALL ELECTION IS SET ON APRIL 15, 2000,
IT IS MORE THAN 1 YEAR AFTER PETITIONER
ASSUMED OFFICE THEREFORE THERE IS NO
BAR AS TO HOLDING THE RECALL ELECTION
ON THAT DATE.

Recall is a process which involves the following

steps:

(5) holding of the election.

What are the limitations under Sec. 74 (b) on the

holding of recall?
a) That no recall shall take place within 1
year from the date of assumption of
office
b) That no recall shall take place within 1
year immediately preceding a regular
local election

Since the power vested on the electorate is not the

power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to
elect an official into office, the term "recall" in
paragraph (b) Section 74, LGC refers only to the
recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA
and the filing of a petition for recall with the
COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at
least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.

The holding of the PRA is NOT the recall itself. A

recall resolution merely sets the stage for the
official concerned before the tribunal of the people
so he can justify why he should be allowed to
continue in office.
If the preliminary proceeding (PRA) does not
produce a decision by the electorate as to whether

the official continues to enjoy the confidence of the

people, the prohibition in paragraph b shall not
apply.

It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings

to be initiated before the official concerned has
been in office for one-year would be to allow him to
be judged without sufficient basis. As long as the
recall election is not held before the official
concerned has completed one year in office, he will
not be judged on his performance prematurely.
That the word recall used in Sec. 74(b), LGC,
refers to the recall election itself and not to the
preliminary proceedings to initiate recall is due to
the following reasons:

1. Because Sec. 74 speaks of limitations on "recall"

which, according to Sec. 69, is a power which shall
be exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit. Since the voters do not exercise
such right except in an election, it is clear that the
initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited
within the one-year period provided in paragraph
(b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in
paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis
for judging an elective local official, and final
judging is not done until the day of the election; and
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph
(b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings
would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of
assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.
-------------WON the term regular local election in paragraph
b includes the election period or the date of the
Election Day NO

Petitioner argued that regular local elections does

not only mean day of the local election (May 14,
2001) but the election period as well. Therefore he
contended that beginning March 30, 2000, no
recall election may be held.

The term regular elections does not include the

election period.

If the regular elections mentioned in Sec. 74(b)

would
include
the
election
period,
which
commences 90 days from the date of the election
and extends to 30 days thereafter, the period
during which the power of recall may be exercised
will be reduced even more. (in this case, from 1 July
1999 to mid-February 2000)

---------WON the Recall resolution was signed by the

majority of PRA and duly verified YES

To construe the word regular elections as

including the election period would emasculate the
right of the people to exercise the power of recall.

Actually, because no recall election may be held

until one year after the assumption of office of an
elective local official, presumably on June 30
following his election, the free period is only the
period from July 1 of the following year to about the
middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a
period of only nine months and 15 days, more or
less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph
(b) as including the campaign period would reduce
this period to eight months. Such an interpretation
must be rejected, because it would devitalize the
right of recall which is designed to make local
government
units"
more
responsive
and
accountable."

Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top

of the page, it is apparent that it was written by
mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel
lines drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken
for the attendance sheet which is a separate
document. It is absurd to believe that the 74
members of the PRA who signed the recall
resolution signified their attendance at the meeting
twice. It is more probable to believe that they
signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in
the recall resolution of which the pages in question
are part.

Peralta
v.
G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978

COMELEC

SEC. 4. Election and campaign periods. The

election period shall be FIXED BY THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS in accordance with
Section 6, Article XII-C of the Constitution. The
period of campaign shall not be more than
forty- five days immediately preceding the
election, excluding the day before and the day
of the election: Provided, That for the election of
representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa,
the period of campaign shall commence on
February 17, 1978 except that no election campaign
or partisan political activity may be conducted on
March 23 and 24, 1978.
They contend that it runs counter to Section 6 of
Article XII-C of the Constitution:
SEC. 6. Unless otherwise fixed BY THE
COMMISSION in special cases, the ELECTION
PERIOD shall commence ninety days before
the day of election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.
For them, Sec. 4 of the 1978 Election Code
violates the Constitution because:
(a) it was decreed by the President and not by the
Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6
of Article XII-C; and
(b) the period should cover at least ninety (90)
days.

ISSUE:
In Paras v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that
the limitations on Sec. 74 (a) and Sec. 74 (b) would
mean that a local elective official may be subject
only to recall during the second year of his/her term
(in this case, from 1 July 1999 to mid-May 2000)

FACTS:
Under Martial Law, President Ferdinand
Marcos decreed BP 881 in the exercise of his
legislative power.
Petitioners question the
constitutionality of Section 4 of the 1978
Election Code, which provides:

WON Sec. 4 of the 1978 Election Code is

unconstitutional as regards the period it prescribes
for the campaign?

RULING:
NO, it is NOT UNconstitutional.

It is apparent that there is a distinction between

the "election period" and "campaign period".
Thus, Section 4, Article I of the 1978 Election Code
provides that the "election period shall be fixed
by
the
Commission
on
ELECTIONS
IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 6, ARTICLE XII
(C) OF THE CONSTITUTION (90-30 rule)." The
"campaign period", however, has been fixed
so that "it SHALL NOT BE MORE THAN FORTYFIVE
DAYS
immediately
preceding
the
election: Provided, That for the election of
representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa,
the period of campaign shall commence on
February 17, 1978 except that no election campaign
or partisan political activity may be conducted on
March 23 and 24, 1978."
The distinction is further made apparent by the fact
that the "election period" under Section 5 of
Article XII-C of the Constitution EXTENDS
EVEN BEYOND THE DAY OF THE ELECTION
ITSELF, while the "campaign period", BY
REASON OF ITS NATURE AND PURPOSE, must
necessarily be BEFORE THE ELECTIONS ARE
HELD. There is, therefore, no conflict with the
constitutional provision.

Election Period
period is 90 days before election until 30
days thereafter
period extends BEYOND day of election

Banaga, Jr. v COMELEC

GR No 134696

July 31, 2000

materially alter the results of the

election for the office of Vice-Mayor in
the City of Paraaque.
o

Facts:

special civil action for certiorari

Petitioner and private respondent were the

candidates for vice-mayor of the City of
Paraaque in the May 11, 1998 election

the city board of canvassers proclaimed

private respondent, Florencio M. Bernabe, Jr.,
the winner for having garnered a total of
71,977 votes of the total votes cast for the
vice-mayoralty position

the COMELEC dismissed petitioners suit

the grounds relied upon by petitioner do not

fall under any of the instances enumerated
in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The election tribunal concluded that
based on the allegations of the petition, it is
clear that an election took place and that it
did not result in a failure to elect

petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 29,

1998, an action denominated as Petition
to Declare Failure of Elections and/or
For Annulment of Elections alleging that:

local
elections
amounts
to
a
denigration of the expression of the
true will of the people, as it was
tainted with widespread election
anomalies which constitutes election
fraud;
with
election
offenses,
specifically vote buying and flying
Campaign Period
voters being allowed to vote; during
the canvassing of votes before the
Board
of
Canvasser,
numerous
period shall NOT be MORE than 45 days
Election Returns were discovered to
contain glaring discrepancies and are
period, by reason of its nature and purpose,
replete with blatant omissions, not to
must be necessarily BEFORE the day of
mention the fact that numerous
election
election returns appeared to be
tampered with
o

several Election Returns are found to

have glaring discrepancies which may

the results thereof are statistically

improbable. A case in point is
precinct number 483 where petitioner
shockingly is supposed to have
received zero (0) votes. Petitioner is
the incumbent Vice-Mayor of the City
of Paraaque. It is, thus, impossible
that he will receive zero (0) votes in
any given precinct

Issue: whether or not public respondent acted with

grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
petition

Held:

Petitioners action is a petition to declare a

failure of elections or annul election results. It is not
an election protest.
The COMELECs authority to declare a failure of
elections is provided in our election laws. Section 4
of RA 7166 provides that the COMELEC sitting en
banc by a majority vote of its members may decide,

among others, the declaration of failure of election

and the calling of special election as provided in
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.
There are three instances where a failure of
election may be declared, namely, (a) the
election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes; (b) the election in any polling place has
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes; or (c) after the voting and during the
preparation and transmission of the election returns
or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes.
In these instances, there is a resulting failure to
elect. This is obvious in the first two scenarios,
where the election was not held and where the
election was suspended. As to the third scenario,
where the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns give rise to the consequence of
failure to elect must as aforesaid, is interpreted to
mean that nobody emerged as a winner.
Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition
seeking to declare a failure of election two
conditions must concur, namely (1) no voting took
place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed
by law, or even if there was voting, the election
resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not
cast would have affected the result of the election.
[11]
Note that the cause of such failure of election
could only be any of the following: force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes.

Petitioner did not allege at all that elections were

either not held or suspended. Neither did he aver
that although there was voting, nobody was
elected. On the contrary, he conceded that an
election took place for the office of vice-mayor of
Paraaque City, and that private respondent was, in
fact, proclaimed elected to that post.
While petitioner contends that the election was
tainted with widespread anomalies, it must be
noted that to warrant a declaration of failure of
election the commission of fraud must be such that
it prevented or suspended the holding of an
election, or marred fatally the preparation and
transmission, custody and canvass of the election
returns. These essential facts ought to have been
alleged clearly by the petitioner below, but he did
not.
Petitioner claims that public respondent gravely
abused its discretion when it dismissed his
petition motu propio. However, the fact that a
verified petition has been filed does not mean that a
hearing on the case should first be held before
COMELEC can act on it. The petition to declare a
failure of election and/or to annul election
results must show on its face that the
conditions necessary to declare a failure to
elect are present. In their absence, the petition
must be denied outright.[18] Public respondent had
no recourse but to dismiss petition. Nor may
petitioner now complain of denial of due process, on
this score, for his failure to properly file an election
protest. The COMELEC can only rule on what was
filed before it. It committed no grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing his petition to declare
failure of elections and/or for annulment of
elections for being groundless, hence without
merit.

Di ka let go: old cases on the subject: instructive

daw:
In Mitmug vs. COMELEC,[12] petitioner instituted with
the COMELEC an action to declare failure of
election in forty-nine precincts where less than a
quarter of the electorate were able to cast their
votes. He also lodged an election protest with the
Regional Trial Court disputing the result of the
election in all precincts in his municipality. The
COMELEC denied motu propio and without due
notice and hearing the petition to declare failure of
election despite petitioners argument that he has
meritorious grounds in support thereto, that is,
massive disenfranchisement of voters due to
terrorism. On review, we ruled that the COMELEC
did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the
petition. It was not proven that no actual voting
took place. Neither was it shown that even if there
was voting, the results thereon would be
tantamount to failure to elect. Considering that
there is no concurrence of the conditions seeking to
declare failure of election, there is no longer need to
receive evidence on alleged election irregularities.
In Sardea vs. COMELEC,[13] all election materials and
paraphernalia with the municipal board of
canvassers were destroyed by the sympathizers of
the losing mayoralty candidate. The board then
decided to use the copies of election returns
furnished to the municipal trial court. Petitioner
therein filed a petition to stop the proceedings of
the board of canvassers on the ground that it had
no authority to use said election returns obtained
from the municipal trial court. The petition was
denied. Next, he filed a petition assailing the
composition of the board of canvassers. Despite
that petition, the board of canvassers proclaimed
the winning candidates. Later on, petitioner filed
a petition to declare a failure of election alleging
that the attendant facts would justify declaration of

such failure. On review, we ruled that petitioners

first
two
actions
involved
pre-proclamation
controversies which can no longer be entertained
after
the
winning
candidates
have
been
proclaimed. Regarding the petition to declare a
failure of election, we held that the destruction and
loss of copies of election returns intended for the
municipal board of canvassers on account of
violence is not one of the causes that would warrant
the declaration of failure of election. The reason is
that voting actually took place as scheduled and
other valid election returns still existed. Moreover,
the destruction or loss did not affect the result of
the election. We also declared that there is failure
of elections only when the will of the electorate has
been muted and cannot be ascertained. If the will

of the people is determinable, the same must as far

as possible be respected.
In Loong vs. Comelec,[14] the petition for annulment
of election results or to declare failure of elections in
Parang, Sulu, on the ground of statistical
improbability and massive fraud was granted by the
COMELEC.[15] Even before the technical examination
of election documents was conducted, the
COMELEC already observed badges of fraud just by
looking
at
the
election
results
in
Parang. Nevertheless, the COMELEC dismissed the
petition for annulment of election results or to
declare failure of elections in the municipalities of
Tapul, Panglima Estino, Pata, Siasi and Kalinggalang
Calauag. The COMELEC dismissed the latter action

on ground of untimeliness of the petition, despite a

finding that the same badges of fraud evident from
the results of the election based on the certificates
of canvass of votes in Parang, are also evident in
the election results of the five mentioned
municipalities. We ruled that COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition
as there is no law which provides for a reglementary
period to file annulment of elections when there is
yet no proclamation. The election resulted in a
failure to elect on account of fraud. Accordingly, we
ordered the COMELEC to reinstate the aforesaid
petition. Those circumstances, however, are not
present in this case, so that reliance on Loong by
petitioner Banaga is misplaced.