Commentary Rome Statute - Part 2, Articles 5-10 - Case Matrix Network

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Part1
Article5(1)
[28]CrimeswithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt
ThejurisdictionoftheCourtshallbelimitedtothemostseriouscrimesofconcerntothe
international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this
Statutewithrespecttothefollowingcrimes:
Thecrimesmentionedinthepresentprovisionareconsideredtobethecorecrimesofinternational
criminallaw.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article5(1)(a)
[29](a)Thecrimeofgenocide
SeecommentsunderArticle6.
Artiicle5(1)(b)
[30](b)Crimesagainsthumanity
Article5(1)(c)
[31](c)Warcrimes
Article5(1)(d)
[32](d)Thecrimeofaggression.
AttheRomeConference,theinformalconsultationsdidnotbringthedelegationstoanagreementon
thedefinitionofthecrimeandunderwhichconditionstheCourtshallexercisejurisdictionwithrespect
tothecrime.Thus,theCourtmaynotexercisejurisdictionwithrespecttothecrimeofaggression.
TheCourtsjurisdictionoverthecrimewasmadedependentontheAssemblyofStateParties(ASP)
agreeingonadefinitioninaccordancewiththenowdeletedArticle5(2).In2002theASPdecidedto
establish a Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA), which was to submit
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proposed provisions to a future Review Conference [Resolution on Continuity of Work in Respect of

the Crime of Aggression, 2002]. The SWGCA draft amendments were the starting point for the
discussionsattheKampalaReviewConferencein2010,whereArticles8bis,15bis,15terand25(3)
biswereadopted.ItfollowsfromArticles5bis(3)and15ter(3)thattheCourtwillfirstby2017have
the power to exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provide that 30 States Parties have ratified or
acceptedtheamendments.
Doctrine:
1.GerhardWerle,Principles of International Criminal Law, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2005, pp.
400401,MN11841185.
2. Herman von Hebel/Darryl Robinson, "Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court", in Roy S.
Lee(Ed.),The International Criminal Court: The Making off the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations,
Results,KluwerLawInternational,TheHague,1999,pp.8185.
3. Andreas Zimmerman, in Otto Triffterer (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court Observers Notes, Article by Article, Second Edition, C.H.
Beck/Hart/Nomos,Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,2008,pp.129142,MN141.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article6
[33]Genocide
GeneralRemarks
i.Thelegalandtheordinaryconceptofgenocide
A principal difficulty relating to the interpretation of the concept of genocide arises from the
widespread use of the term. The 'ordinary' concept, which exists outside its legal parameters, has
been stretched to fit a wide variety of scenarios. The word is commonly employed in particular in
reference to campaigns involving the killing of a large number of victims. The legal concept, as it
appears in identical phrasing in the texts of Article6 ICC Statute, Article 4(2) ICTYStatute, Article
2(2)ICTRStatuteandArticleIIoftheGenocideConvention,differsfromthat(seebelowatC.),but
there is evidence that the ordinary concept has influenced the views of tribunals and individual
judges.InKayishemaandRuzindanaforinstance,theICTRTrialChamberquotedwithapprovalthe
opinion that it was 'virtually impossible' for genocide to be committed without State involvement,
'giventhemagnitudeofthiscrime'(ProsecutorvClmentKayishemaandObedRuzindana,(CaseNo.
ICTR951T),ICTRT.Ch.,Judgment,21May1999,para94.)Thelegalconcept,atleastpursuantto
theliteralinterpretationoftheRomeStatute,requiresneithermagnitude(ontheobjectivesideofthe
crime)norStateinvolvementnoreventheinvolvementofmorethanoneperpetrator.(Butseebelow
atA.ii.forthecontextualelement).
ii.Contextualelement
An attempt to introduce a contextual element into the legal concept of genocide was made through
the 'Elements of Crime' in 2000 (see last element of each of the alternatives of genocide in the
ElementsofCrime).
A literal reading of the crime as it appears in the ICC Statute does not suggest that organisational
structure,pattern,magnitudeorothercontextualelementshavebecomeoftheconceptofgenocide.
It is for that reason that the establishment of contextual elements in the Elements of Crime is a
problematic feature. Triffterer for one has voiced the view that the requirement of a context is not
consistent with the wording of the statute and thus conflicts with Article 9 of the Rome Statute
(Triffterer 2001a, 407). In AlBashir, however, the majority of the PreTrial Chamber found that the
application of the Elements of Crime could only be refused if this would lead to an 'irreconcilable
contradiction'withtheStatuteofthecourt,ProsecutorvOmarAlBashir,ICCPT.Ch.,Decisiononthe
Prosecution'sApplicationforaWarrantofArrestagainstOmarHassanAhmadAlBashir,ICC02/05
01/093,4March2009,para128),butconcludedthat,'[i]nthecaseathand',suchacontradictiondid
notexist(ibid.,para132).
Ontherequirementofa'manifestpatternofsimilarconduct',thePreTrialChambernotedthatthe
'crime of genocide is only completed when the relevant conduct presents a concrete threat to the
existenceofthetargetedgroup,orapartthereof.'(ibid.,para124).Thatthreathadtobe'concrete
and real, as opposed to just being latent or hypothetical'(ibid.). In her dissenting opinion, Judge
Uackatookexceptiontothe'resultbased'readingtowhichthemajorityviewwouldlead,andstated
that the requirement of a threat 'would then duplicate the purpose of the second part' of the
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contextual element (AlBashir, ICC PT. Ch., Arrest Warrant Decision, ICC02/0501/093, 4
March 2009, Dissenting Opinion Judge Uacka, para 26), ie, 'conduct that could itself effect such
destruction'.
Withregardtothatelement,themajorityfoundthatitreferredtoconductof'suchanatureasto
itself effect [] the total or partial destruction of the targeted group' (AlBashir, PreTrial
Chamber,ArrestWarrantDecision,ICC02/0501/093,4March2009,para123).
iii.Evidentiaryissues
Questions of evidence cause particular problems in relation to the existence of specific genocidal
intent(Seebelow,sectionsCii.tov.).TheICTRAppealsChamberhasacceptedthatthiselementcan
beproventhroughcircumstantialevidence,butitalsoemphasisedthatafindingofintentmuststillbe
'theonlyreasonableinferencefromthetotalityoftheevidence',(ProsecutorvFerdinandNahimana,
JeanBosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze, (Case No. ICTR9952T), ICTR T. Ch., Judgment, 3
December 2003, para 524). That requirement allows for a critical approach towards strands of
evidencewhichwereacceptedbytheTrialChambersassuitableindicationsforgenocidalintent.
With regard to incriminating evidence, the ad hoc tribunals have accepted for a long time that
genocidalintentcanbeinferredfromtheactionsoftheperpetratoratthetimeofthecommissionof
the crime (Prosecutor v JeanPaul Akayesu, (Case No. ICTR964T), ICTR T. Ch., Judgment, 2
September1998,para523).
Butevenactionsofthiskindmayallowforarangeofinferences(Behrens2007,136).The'scaleof
the atrocities' (see Prosecutor v Andr Ntagerura, Emmanuel Bagambiki, Samuel Imanishimwe,
(Case No. ICTR9946T), ICTR T. Ch., Judgment, 25 February 2004, para 690) and the 'manner of
thekilling'(seeProsecutorvNtageruraetal,ICTRT.Ch.,22Dec.2008,para.689)causeparticular
problems in that regard, as crimes against humanity can be committed in an equally cruel fashion
andare,becauseoftheircontextualelement,likelytoresultinlargescaleatrocities.
The adhoc tribunals have also given weight to statements which the accused had made at the
relevanttime(ProsecutorvKayishema,ICTRT.Ch.,21May1999,para93).Inthisregard,thefact
must be taken into account that a defendant's statements will require interpretation in light of their
context(seeProsecutorvKayishema, ICTR T. Ch., 21 May 1999, , para 539, on the phrases 'go to
work'or'getdowntowork').
Preparatorywork
The introduction of the concept of this crime into international law can be traced to the work of the
Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, who in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington 1944), used the
termgenocidetorefertothedestructionofanationorofanethnicgroup(ibid.,chapter9).Before
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, genocide was mentioned in the text of the
indictment,butitdidnotformanindependentchargeagainstthedefendantsitwasratherseenas
conductwhichfulfilledtheparametersofwarcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity.
In1946,GeneralAssemblyResolution96(I)recognisedgenocideasacrimeunderinternational
lawandunderstoodittomeanthedenialoftherightofexistenceofentirehumangroups(GARes
96(I)). In that Resolution, the General Assembly also requested the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC)toundertakethenecessarystudies,withaviewtodrawingupadraftconventiononthe
crimeofgenocide(ibid.).
The UN Secretariat subsequently issued a first draft of a genocide convention, which was then
reviewed by an AdHoc Committee convened by ECOSOC, resulting in a second draft. A third draft
was issued by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in 1948 and submitted to the General
Assemblyforadoption.TheresultingconventiontheConventiononthePreventionandPunishment
oftheCrimeofGenocidewasadoptedon8December1948andenteredintoforceon12January
1951.Oneofthemostimportantchangeswhichmaterialisedduringthecodificationprocess,wasthe
shifting emphasis of the crime: where the 1946 General Assembly Resolution still put an objective
aspectofgenocideatthecentreoftheconcept,thecrimeasenshrinedintheGenocideConvention
receivesitsparticularcharacteristicthroughitssubjectiveside('intenttodestroy,inwholeorinpart,
anational,ethnical,racialorreligiousgroup,assuch').
FurtherinsightintotheinterpretationofthecrimeisprovidedthroughtheILCcommentaryonArticle
17 of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (YILC 1996, vol 2,
part2,at44).ButthedefinitionofgenocideasitappearsinArticleIIoftheGenocideConventionhas
remainedtextuallyunchangedintheICCStatute.
Author:
PaulBehrens
Article6withintent
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Article6withintent
[34]C.AnalysisofProvisionsandSubProvisions
withintent
Nexttothegroupelement,itistheexistenceofdestructiveintentwhichgivesthecrimeitsparticular
character (cf Prosecutor v Radoslav Branin, (Case No. IT9936T), ICTY T. Ch., Judgment, 1
September2004,para699).
Theintentelementisnotmerelyacounterparttoanalreadyexistingfactoronthesideoftheactus
reus, but has an existence outside and above the latter. The ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v
MilomirStaki, (Case No. IT9724T), ICTY T. Ch., Judgment, 31 July 2003, thus spoke of a crime
distinguished'bya"surplus"ofintent'(para520).
The precise threshold for genocidal intent has been subject of controversy. A majority of the
Chambersoftheadhoctribunalsresortstotermswhichimplyavolitionalstandard:theperpetrator
'seeks to achieve' the destruction (eg, Prosecutor v Goran Jelisi, (Case No. IT9510A), ICTY
A.Ch.,Judgment,5July2001,paras4546),orhemusthavehadthe'goal'ofdestroyingthegroup
(Prosecutor v Radislav Krsti, (Case No. IT9833T), ICTY T. Ch., Judgment, 2 August 2001, paras
571,572).TheILCexpressedasimilarviewwhenitfoundthat'ageneralawarenessoftheprobable
consequences'ofagenocidalactwasnotsufficient(YILC1996,vol2,part2,44,Article17,para.5).
Supporters of the cognitive opinion focus on the knowledge of the perpetrator: in Jelisi for
instance, the Prosecution stated that it was sufficient for the mental element that the perpetrator
'knewthathisactsweredestroying,inwholeorinpart,thegroup,assuch',andmadeclearthatsuch
knowledge must refer to actual (as opposed to probable) destruction (Prosecutor v Jelisi, ICTY A.
Ch.,7December2010,para42).Forfurtherreferencesintheliterature,seeBehrens2012a,77,78).
However,thelowercognitivestandardhasthatfarnotfoundfavourwiththeinternationalcriminal
tribunals with some Trial Chambers stating expressly that knowledge of inevitable or likely
destructiveconsequenceswasnotsufficientfortheconvictionofthedefendant(ProsecutorvVidoje
BlagojevicandDraganJokic, (Case No. IT0260T), ICTY T. Ch., Judgment, 17 January 2005, para
656).
Author:
PaulBehrens
Article6todestroy
[35]todestroy
In the eyes of the ILC, 'destruction' referred only to the 'material destruction of a group either by
physicalorbybiologicalmeans'otherformsofdestructionwereexpresslydismissed(YILC1996II/
2, 46, para 12). A more inclusive view has been supported by the Constitutional Court of Germany,
which in 2000 found that destructive intent extended 'beyond physical and biological extermination'
(BVerfG, para. (III)(4)(a) (aa)). In his partially dissenting opinion in Krsti, Judge Shahabuddeen
found that the destruction of the group as a 'social 'unit' was embraced by the intention of the
perpretrator(Prosecutor v Radislav Krsti, (Case No. IT9833A), ICTY A. Ch., Judgment, 19 April
2004,PartialDissentingOpinionofJudgeShahabuddeen,para51).
Inthecaselawoftheadhoctribunals,thereishoweverastrongtendencytofollowthenarrower
view: in Prosecutor v Seromba, (Case No. ICTR200166I), ICTR T. Ch., Judgment, 13 December
2006, for instance, the Trial Chamber found that the concept of 'destruction of the group' (in the
context of genocidal intent) referred to the 'material destruction of a group either by physical or by
biological means []' (para 319. See also Tournaye, 454). It is certainly true that the group can be
destroyed in more ways than through the killing of its members or the prevention of births
(Prosecutor v Blagojevic, ICTY T. Ch.,17 January 2005, para 666), but the inclusion of all kinds of
destruction is also likely to lead to such an extensive understanding of the crime that its threshold
disappears. The existence of national groups for example, could effectively be terminated through
merechangesinthelegalpersonailtyoftheState,includingitsvoluntarymergerwithanotherState.
Apartfromthat,thefactcannotbedismissedthattheoptionofincludingotherformsofdestruction
hadexistedatdraftingstagebutwasultimatelyrejected(seeProsecutorvRadislavKrsti,(CaseNo.
IT9833T),ICTYT.Ch.,Judgment,2August2001,para576,fn1284)acomprehensiveviewofthe
codificationhistorythereforedoesnotyieldaresultwhichsupportsthewiderview.
Author:
PaulBehrens
Article6inwholeorinpart
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Article6inwholeorinpart
[36]inwholeorinpart
Thephrase'inwholeorinpart'wasintroducedatthedraftingstagethroughasuggestionbyNorway,
whichtheSixthCommitteeaccepted(UNGAOR,3rdsession,6thCommittee,73rdmeeting,92,97)
but its interpretation has ever since been subject of much debate in the literature and the
internationalcriminaltribunals.
Itdoesseemwellacceptedtodaythattheintendeddestructionmustreferatleasttoa'substantial
part'oftherelevantgroup(seee.g.ProsecutorvRadoslavBranin,(CaseNo.IT9936T),ICTYT.
Ch.,Judgment,1September2004,para701,YILC1996II/2,45,para8andProsecutorvRadislav
Krsti, (Case No. IT9833A), ICTY A. Ch., Judgment, 19 April 2004, para 11). However, the
determinationof'substantiality'hascausedinterpretiveproblemstothetribunalsandcommentators.
Ininternationalcaselaw,threegeneralmethodshavebeenestablishedtoevaluatesubstantiality:the
numerical,thefunctional,andthegeographicalapproach.
TheTrialChamberinProsecutorvKayishema,(CaseNo.ICTR951T),ICTRT.Ch.,Judgment,21
May 1999, for instance promoted the numerical approach, when it found that 'in part' required the
'intention to destroy a considerable number of individuals who are part of the group' (para 97 see
also Preparatory Committee, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
InternationalCriminalCourt,14April1998,A/CONF.183/2/Add.1p.11,Article5,footnote1).Later
case law was more cautious: The Krsti Appeals Chamber for instance, saw it as a 'necessary'
starting point, but 'not in all cases the ending point of the inquiry' (para 12). In any event, the
assessment of the numerical significance of the part is not exhausted by an examination of actual
numbers, but also needs to involve an evaluation of the part of the group in relation to the overall
groupsize(ibid.).
Underthe'functionalapproach',theperpetratorisnotnecessarilyseenasselectinganumerically
significant part, but instead a section which has significance for the group because of particular
functionsassociatedwithit.Whitakerreferredinthatregardto'asignificantsectionofagroupsuch
asitsleadership'(WhitakerReport,para29).Theprecisemethodsofassessingsubstantialityunder
the functional approach vary from situation to situation. In Branin, reference was made to the
'prominence'whichthetargetedpartenjoyedwithinthegroup(ProsecutorvRadoslavBranin,(Case
No.IT9936T),ICTYT.Ch.,Judgment,1September2004,para702)andtheAppealsChamberin
ProsecutorvRadislavKrsti,(CaseNo.IT9833A),ICTYA.Ch.,Judgment,19April2004,expressed
theviewthatthetargetedBosnianMuslimsofSrebrenicawere'emblematicoftheBosnianMuslimsin
general'(atpara37andseepara16).
Asectionwhichfeaturesoftenintheconsiderationsofthetribunalsistheleadershipofthegroup
(e.g.Branin,ICTYT.Ch.,1September2004,para703).Othersectionswhichhavebeenmentioned
by tribunals and commentators include men of military age a consideration which played a
particular role in Krsti, where the killing of the Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica was concerned
(Krsti, ICTY T. Ch., 2 August 2001, para 579) and law enforcement or security personnel
(CommissionofExperts,para94).Likethenumericalapproach,theassessmentofsubstantialityhere
also involves an evaluation of the effect that the targeting of this part has on the group as a whole
(ProsecutorvGoranJelisi,(CaseNo.IT9510T),ICTYT.Ch.,Judgment,14December1999,para
82).
Aparticularconcernwhichattachestothefunctionalapproachisthefactthatitsapplicationmight
defeat the very purpose of establishing a threshold through substantiality. The problem gained
prominenceintheKrsticase.AccordingtotheDefence,theTrialChamberhadconcludedthatKrsti
hadtargetedtheBosnianMuslimmenofmilitaryageofSrebrenica.TheseformedpartoftheBosnian
Muslims of Srebrenica, which in turn were part of the actual protected group the Bosnian Muslims
(Krsti, ICTY A. Ch., 19 April 2004, para 18). In the words of the Defence, the Trial Chamber had
therefore identified 'part of a part' of a group (Prosecutor v Radislav Krsti, (Case No. IT9833
A), ICTY A. Ch., Judgment, 19 April 2004, Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para
43). If the Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica were just seen as part of the protected group as a
whole (the Bosnian Muslims), it would not have been acceptable to consider them as fulfilling the
sustantialityrequirement(Krsti,ICTYA.Ch.,19April2004,para18).
The Appeals Chamber did not follow this line of reasoning and concluded that the militaryaged
men had been considered not as 'part of a part' of a group, but that their killing had been used as
evidenceforthefactthattheperpetratorhadintenttodestroythe(substantial)partofthegroup,ie,
the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica (ibid.). At the same time, the Chamber also clarified that the
functionalapproachwas'onlyoneofseveral'methodstoassessthesubstantialityofthegroup(ibid.,
para22).
The 'geographical approach' is based on the understanding of genocide as a crime which is by
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necessitylimitedbygeographicalconditions.In1982forinstance,theGeneralAssemblyreferredto
localisedmassacresthekillingofPalestinianciviliansintheSabraandShatilarefugeecampsas
'genocide'(UNGA Res 37/123D (1982)) and the ILC pointed out that the intended destruction of a
protectedgroup'fromeverycorneroftheglobe'wasnotanecessaryrequirementofthecrime(YILC
1996II/2,45,Article17,para8).
The geographical approach has, on the whole, been embraced by the ad hoc tribunals (cf
ProsecutorvBranin,ICTYT.Ch.,1September2004,para703).SomeTrialChamberswentsofar
astofindthatthe'part'ofthegroupmightbelimitedtoasingleregionorcommunity(Prosecutorv
Duko Sikirica, Damir Doen, Dragan Kolundija, (Case No. IT958T), ICTY T. Ch., Judgement on
DefenceMotiontoAcquit,3September2001,para68).InProsecutorvKrsti,ICTYA.Ch.,19April
2004, the Trial Chamber outlined the possibility that genocide might be committed even in a
municipality, and made express reference to the General Assembly resolution on Sabra and Shatila
(para589).
Opposition to the geographical method tends not to concern the basic principle that genocidal
intent can be limited to a particular area, but rather seeks to introduce certain limitations on the
approach.InProsecutorvBranin,ICTYT.Ch.,1September2004,theTrialChamberexpressedthe
viewthatalimitationofthe'part'ofthegrouptocertainmunicipalitiesoftheAutonomousRegionof
theKrajinacouldhavea'distortingeffect'(para966).SimilarconcernswerevoicedbytheICTYTrial
ChamberinProsecutorvMilomirStaki,(CaseNo.IT9724T),ICTYT.Ch.,Judgment,31July2003,
whichhoweverfollowedthegeographicalapproach'withsomehesitancy'(para523).
Additional problems arise from the fact that the perpetrator will in some cases specifically have
limitedhisintenttoaparticularregionandthereforenothavetargetedthegroup'assuch'.Situations
ofthiskindarisewhenamunicipalityorothergeographicareaisselectedasthetargetofapunitive
expedition acts which will usually be covered by crimes against humanity, but might, because of
theirverylimitednature,notfulfiltherequirementsofgenocidalintent.
Author:
PaulBehrens
Article6anational,ethnical,racialorreligiousgroup
[37]anational,ethnical,racialorreligiousgroup
TheElementsofCrimeclarifythatthegroupelementcarriessignificancebothfortheobjectiveand
thesubjectivepartofthecrime.Ontheobjectiveside,thevictimoftheperpetratorsconductmust
belong to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group (Elements of Crime, Article 6,
element 2 of each alternative) on the subjective side, the perpetrator must have had the intent to
destroy,inwholeorinpart'agroupofthiskind(ibid.,element3ofeachalternative).
TheICTRTrialChamberinProsecutorvAkayesu,(CaseNo.ICTR964T),Judgment,2September
1998definedanationalgroupasagroupwhosemembersareseenassharingalegalbond,based
oncommoncitizenship,coupledwithreciprocityofrightsandduties(para512),anethnicgroupasa
group whose members share a common language or culture (para 513). The characteristics of
members of a racial group were seen as their hereditary physical traits often identified with a
geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors (ibid., para 514)
andmembersofareligiousgroupsharethesamereligion,denominationormodeofworship(ibid.,
para515).
Apartfromthecontroversialnatureinherentintheselectionofonlycertaingroupfortheprotection
of international criminal law (see Behrens 2012b, at 240, 241), the group element has also lead to
difficultieswhereitsapplicationinpracticeisconcerned.
The attempt to reach a precise distinction between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda for instance
groups which shared the same culture and language and which showed a high rate of mixed
marriages(Cassese,101)posedchallengeswheretheparametersofthefourenumeratedgroups
wereconcerned.
Butthelatercaselawoftheadhoctribunalshasnotfollowedanentirelyobjectiveapproach.In
KayishemaandRuzinadana,theICTRwouldalsohaveincludedatleastunderthecategoryof'ethnic
groups'agroupwhichdistinguishesitself,assuch(selfidentification)or,agroupidentifiedassuch
by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others) (Prosecutor v Clment
KayishemaandObedRuzindana,(CaseNo.ICTR951T),ICTRT.Ch.,Judgment,21May1999,para
98).
The approach which was eventually adopted by the Trial Chambers is best understood as a
'contextualapproach'referredtointheSemanzajudgmentasamethodbywhichtheidentification
ofagroupoughttobeassessedonacasebycasebasisbyreferencetotheobjectiveparticularsof
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agivensocialandhistoricalcontext,andbythesubjectiveperceptionsoftheperpetrator(Prosecutor
vLaurentSemanza,(CaseNo.ICTR9720T),ICTRT.Ch.,Judgment,15May2003,para317).The
Chamber found that group identification was to be made on a casebycase basis, consulting both
objectiveandsubjectivecriteria(ibid.).
A similar difficulty exists where the identification of members of a group is concerned. In this
regard,theexistingaselawappearstofavourasubjectiveapproach:membershipofthegroupwas
tobeconsidered'fromasubjectivestandpoint,holdingthatthevictimisperceivedbytheperpetrator
ofthecrimeasbelongingtothegrouptargetedfordestruction.'(ProsecutorvSeromba,ICTRT.Ch.,
13December2006,para318).
Author:
PaulBehrens
Article6assuch
[38]assuch
The inclusion of the words 'as such' indicates that the boundaries between genocidal intent and
motive,iftheydoexist,aredifficulttoidentify(seeBehrens2012c).Duringthedraftingprocess,the
AdHocCommitteehadsuggestedalistofmotivesthatwouldformthebasisforthegenocidalacts.
This suggestion triggered considerable debate in the Sixth Committee. In the end, an express
referencetomotiveswasnotincluded,buttheCommitteeagreedtoaproposalbyVenezuelawhich
introducedthewords'assuch'intothecrime.TheVenezuelandelegate,speakingtohisamendment,
stated that he 'felt that his amendment should meet the views of those who wished to retain a
statement of motives indeed, the motives were implicitly included in the words "as such"' (Prez
Perozo(Venezuela),UNDoc.A/C.6/SR.76,124).Subsequently,someTrialChambershavemadeuse
ofthelanguageofmotiveswhenreferringtospecificintent:theAkayesuTrialChamberwentsofar
as to refer to an 'ulterior motive, which is to destroy, in whole or in part, the group' (Prosecutor v
JeanPaulAkayesu,(CaseNo.ICTR964T),ICTRT.Ch.,Judgment,2September1998,para522).
Thephrase'assuch'alsoemphasisesthefactthatthe(principal)victimofgenocideisthegroup
itself(Prosecutor v Radoslav Branin, (Case No. IT9936T), ICTY T. Ch., Judgment, 1 September
2004, para 698) a notion which is apparent from the codification history of the crime (Ad Hoc
CommitteeonGenocide,NotebytheSecretariat,UNDocE/AC.25/3/Rev.1,12April1948,6andYILC
1996,vol2,part2, 45, Article 17, para 6). The group must have been targeted as a 'separate and
distinct entity' (Prosecutor v Popovi, ICTY T. Ch., 10 June 2010, paras 821 and 1177 with further
references).Theindividualsaffectedbytheunderlyingactsare,bycomparison,victimsonlybecause
of their membership of that particular group (Prosecutor v Radislav Krsti, (Case No. IT9833T),
ICTYT.Ch.,Judgment,2August2001,para561).
This prominent role of the group element on the subjective side of the crime raises the question
whether genocide is possible if perpetrators attack members of their own group. The issue gained
particularprominenceinthecontextofthelargescalecrimeswhichtheKhmerRougecommittedon
the Khmer people in Cambodia. The UN Commission on Human Rights, reflecting on these events,
coinedtheterm'autogenocide'(CommissiononHumanRights,35thsession,SummaryRecordofthe
First Part (Public) of the 1510th Meeting, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.1510 (1979), paras 22, 24). The term
lackslegalcurrency,buthasbeenatthecentreofsomedebateamongcommentatorsofthecrime.
Initsdiscussionofgenocide,theGroupofExpertsforCambodiadeclinedtotakeapositiononthe
question whether the Khmer Rouge possessed destructive intent with regard to the Khmer people
(ReportoftheGroupofExpertsforCambodiaestablishedpursuanttoGeneralAssemblyResolution
52 / 135, (1999), Annex, para 65). Before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
IengSaryandotherKhmerRougeleaderswerein2010indictedforgenocidecommittedagainstthe
ChamandtheVietnamese,butnotagainsttheKhmerpeople(ExtraordinaryChambersintheCourts
ofCambodia,OfficeoftheCoInvestigatingJudges, ClosingOrder, (Case No 002/I9092007ECCC
OCIJ),15December2010,paras13351349and1613.).
In the literature, some authors have supported the opinion that autogenocide still qualifies as
genocide, as it involves the intended destruction of part of a protected group (Khan / Dixon, 1088,
paras 13 25, Hannum, 103 et seq, 112). The Trial Chambers on the other hand have emphasised
that the individual victims must have been targeted 'specifically because they belonged' to the
protected group (Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR T. Ch., 2 September 1998, para 521). In the
Cambodiancase,thislendssupporttotheopposingview,sincetheKhmervictimswereselectedfor
political and other reasons, but not on the basis of their membership of a group protected by the
Convention(Vest1999,356).
ThereisinfactnoreasonwhyautogenocideshouldnotbecoveredbyArticle6.Butautogenocide,
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iftheconceptistobeappliedcorrectly,requiresthattheperpetratordeliberatelymadehisowngroup
the victim of his actions. There is perhaps a tendency to dismiss too quickly the possibility of self
destructive genocidaires. In the majority of cases however, the perpetrator will probably have an
inflated rather than a dismissive perception of his own people, leaving only a slim realm for the
realityof'genuine'autogenocide.
Crossreferences:
1.ICCCaseMatrixElementsDigest
2.ICCCaseMatrixMeansofProofDigest
Author:
PaulBehrens
Article6(a)
[39](a)Killingmembersofthegroup
The Elements of Crime provide that '[t]he term killed is interchangeable with the term caused
death'(Article6(a),note10).Thatindicatesthatthedeathofthevictimisanecessaryconsequence
oftheperpetrator'sconductandthatacausallinkneedstoexistbetweenconductandconsequence.
Tothatdegree,theelementsof'killing'asoneofthealternativesofgenocidedonotappeartoshow
any significant deviation from the elements identified under 'murder' as a crime against humanity
(seeProsecutorvMitarVasiljevi,(CaseNo.IT9832T),ICTYT.Ch.,Judgment,29November2002,
para205,notes1and2.).
However, the conclusion (suggested by some Trial Chambers) that all elements of that crime
against humanity are equivalent to the elements of 'killing' here (see on this Prosecutor v Vujadin
Popovi, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikoli, Ljubomir Borovanin, Radivoje Mileti, Milan Gvero, Vinko
Pandurevi,(CaseNo.IT0588T),ICTYT.Ch.,Judgment,10June2010,para810,referringtoparas
787789),remainsageneralisation.Onthesideofthemensrea,atleast,certaindifferencesarise.
Withregardtomurderasacrimeagainsthumanity,theintentiontocauseseriousbodilyharmwhich
'theaccusedshouldreasonablyhaveknownmightleadtodeath',hasinthepastbeenacceptedasa
sufficient subjective element (Popovi, ICTY T. Ch., 10 June 2010, para 788). If that were the case
wheregenocideisconcerned,actualknowledgewouldnolongerberequiredevennegligencewould
fulfilthemensreaofalternative(a).
MostTrialChambershoweverappeartocallforintentwithregardtotheconsequenceofthekilling.
In this regard, the findings in Akayesu are instructive. When considering both the English and the
FrenchversionoftheGenocideConvention,theChamberfoundthattheFrenchterm(meurtre)was
tobepreferredtotheEnglishterm'killing',asthelattercouldrefereventounintentionalhomicides
(Prosecutor v JeanPaul Akayesu, (Case No. ICTR964T), ICTR T. Ch., Judgment, 2 September
1998,para500).ItconsequentlyinterpretedArticle2(2)(a)oftheICTRStatuteasmeaninghomicide
'committed with the intent to cause death' (ibid., para 501). The Chamber had based its opinion on
the principle that the interpretation which is more favourable to the accused, had to be preferred
(ibid.).
Crossreferences:
1.ElementsofCrime
Author:
PaulBehrens
Article6(b)
[40](b)Causingseriousbodilyormentalharmtomembersofthegroup
The 'harm' to which this alternative of genocide refers, need not be 'permanent and irremediable'
(Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR T. Ch., 2 September 1998, para 502), but the Seromba Appeals
Chamber found that it must be so serious as to cause a threat of the 'destruction [of a protected
group] in whole or in part' (Prosecutor v Athanase Seromba, (Case No. ICTR200166
I),ICTRA.Ch.,para46).
In Krsti, the Trial Chamber noted that the relevant harm must go 'beyond temporary
unhappiness,embarrassmentorhumiliation'(para513)andthatitmustresult'inagraveandlong
termdisadvantagetoapersonsabilitytoleadanormalandconstructivelife'(ibid.).TheElementsof
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Crime and the case law of the tribunals provide examples which qualify in this category, including
torture(ElementsofCrime,fn3toArticle6(b)),1stelement,ProsecutorvRadislavKrsti,(CaseNo.
IT9833T), ICTY T. Ch., Judgment, 2 August 2001, para 513), inhuman and degrading treatment
(ibid.), rape (ibid. and Prosecutor v Rutaganda, (Case No ICTR963), ICTR T. Ch., Judgment, 6
December1999,para51)andsexualviolence(ibid.,andProsecutorvAkayesu,(CaseNo.ICTR96
4T),ICTRT.Ch.,Judgment,2September1998,para688)butpersecution(Akayesu,ICTRT.Ch.,2
September 1998, para 504) and deportations (Krsti, ICTY T. Ch., 2 August 2001 , para 513) have
alsobeenmentionedinthiscontext.
PursuanttoArticle30, intent is required both for conduct and consequence of this alternative of
genocide.Withregardtotheformer,thismeansthattheperpetratormusthavemeanttoengagein
the relevant act with regard to the latter the resulting serious bodily or mental harm Article
30 provides that the perpetrator must have meant to cause the consequence or must have been
'aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events'. The case law of the ad hoc tribunals
confirmsthattheharmmusthavebeeninflictedintentionally(ProsecutorvPopovietal.,(CaseNo.
IT0588T),ICTYT.Ch.,Judgment,10June2010,para811).
Crossreferences:
1.ElementsofCrime
Author:
PaulBehrens
Article6(c)
[41](c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destructioninwholeorinpart
The infliction of conditions of this kind does not need to be an imposition of methods which would
immediately lead to the deaths of group members (Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, (Case
No. ICTR951T), ICTR T. Ch., Judgment, 21 May 1999, para 116). The ad hoc tribunals have
accepted that socalled 'slow death' measures would fulfil the required element of this alternative
(ibid., para 115). Subjecting members of the group to a subsistence diet, the denial of necessary
medical services, but also 'systematic expulsion from homes' fall in this category (Prosecutor
vAkayesu,(CaseNo.ICTR964T),ICTRT.Ch.,Judgment,2September1998,para506Prosecutor
v Branin, (Case No. IT9936T), ICTY T. Ch., Judgment, 1 September 2004, para 691). Other
examples which have been mentioned include the failure to provide proper housing, clothing or
hygiene or imposition of 'excessive work or physical exertion' (Branin, ICTY T. Ch., 1 September
2004,para691Kayishema,ICTRT.Ch.,21May1999,para115).
There is, as the Branin Trial Chamber confirmed, no need to prove that the group has been
physicallydestroyedinwholeorinpart(para691).Ontheotherhand,itwouldgotoofartoconclude
fromthatthat'proofofaresult'isnotrequired(butonthis,seeProsecutorvStaki,(CaseNo.IT
9724T), ICTY T. Ch., Judgment, 31 July 2003, para 517). Alternative (c) does envisage a
consequence, but the consequence lies not in the destruction of the group, but in the fact that the
relevant conditions have come into existence (see on this Article 6 (c) of the Elements of Crime,
whichinitsfirstparagraphclarifiesthattheconditionsmusthavebeeninflicted).
As such, this consequence requires a corresponding element on the side of the mensrea of the
crime. The term 'deliberately' is an express reference to that element (Genocide Application Case,
69, para 186) which therefore cannot involve a standard lower than intent. However, that does not
meanthatarequirementofpriorplanningneedstobereadintotheadjective(cfJessberger,101).
Theterm'calculated'ontheotherhandisnotareferencetothemensreaoftheperpetratorthe
conditionsmaywellhavebeencalculatedbyathirdpartytohavethiseffect(forinstance,incasesin
which a military commander orders the perpetrator to impose an insufficient diet on inmates of a
detentioncamp).Thisaspect,relatingtothenatureoftheconditions,isacircumstantialelementthe
perpetratormusthavehadknowledgeofitasdefinedinArticle30(3)oftheRomeStatute.
Crossreferences:
1.StarvationinArticles7(1)(b),(j)and(k)7(2)(b)8(2)(a)(iii)8(2)(b)(ii),(v),(xiii)and(xxv)
2.ElementsofCrime
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Author:
PaulBehrens
Article6(d)
[42](d)Imposingmeasuresintendedtopreventbirthswithinthegroup
In the Akayesu case, the ICTR Trial Chamber clarified that it is sufficient for this alternative if the
relevant measures have mental effects on the victims. It referred in this regard to the example of
rape in cases in which 'the person raped refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way that
membersofagroupcanbeled,throughthreatsortrauma,nottoprocreate'(ProsecutorvAkayesu,
(CaseNo.ICTR964T),ICTRT.Ch.,Judgment,2September1998,para508).
Incasesofrape,theperpetratormayalsoachievethepreventionofbirthsinthegroupthrougha
differentchainofcausation:inthatregard,theICTRreferredtoasituationinwhichfemalemembers
ofagroupinasocietyinwhichmembershipofthegroupwasdependentontheidentityofthefather,
wererapedbymenofanothergroup(ibid.,para507).Incircumstancesofthiskind,thecriminalact
mightwellhavebeencarriedoutwiththeintenttoimpregnatethewomanandto'havehergivebirth
to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's group.' (ibid.). Other examples include
sexual mutilation, sterilisation, sexual segregation, prohibition of marriage and forced birth control
(ibid.).
The ILC made clear that the term 'imposing' implied an element of coercion: and therefore, this
rule could, for instance, not be seen as encompassing 'voluntary birth control programmes
sponsoredbyaStateasamatterofsocialpolicy.'(YILC1996II/2,p46,Article17,Commentary,
para16).
Intent is required where the commission of the act (the implementation of the measures) is
concerned(ProsecutorvPopovietal.,(CaseNo.IT0588T),ICTYT.Ch.,Judgment,10June2010,
para808),andArticle30(2)(a)appearstocallforastrongvolitionalelementinthatregard('means
to engage'). The measure itself, on the other hand, is a circumstantial element, and the required
mental element which attaches to it, is therefore cognitive in nature: the perpetrator must have
knownaboutthenatureofthemeasures(Article30(3)).Adifferentreadingcannotbederivedfrom
the word 'intended', which this alternative of genocide employs (but see also Case Concerning the
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
andHerzegovinavSerbiaandMontenegro),ICJ,Judgment,26February2007,para186):theintent
towhichthewordingofArticle6(d) refers, may well have been that of a third party. Intent, on the
other hand, is required for the consequence of the act (Article30(2)(b)), ie, for the fact that such
measureshavenowcomeintoexistenceintheprotectedgroup.
Crossreferences:
1.ElementsofCrime
Author:
PaulBehrens
Article6(e)
[43](e)Forciblytransferringchildrenofthegrouptoanothergroup
The Elements of Crime specify that the act under this alternative consists in the transfer of one or
more persons from a protected group to another group, when these persons belonged to the
protectedgroupandwerebelowtheageof18years(ElementsofCrime,Article6,elements1,2,4
and 5.). The potential age range of the victims is therefore more extensive than that envisaged in
otherinternationalcrimes(seee.g.Article8(2)(b)(xxvi)ICCStandArticle8(2)(e)(vii)).
Thetransfermusthavebeencarriedoutina'forcible'manner.Inthatregard,however,theadhoc
tribunals had already emphasised that it was the aim of the provision not only to protect against
'forcible physical transfer', but also against 'acts of threats or trauma' which would accomplish the
coercivetransfer(ProsecutorvJeanPaulAkayesu,(CaseNo.ICTR964T),ICTRT.Ch.,Judgment,2
September 1998, para 509). Today, the Elements of Crime provide that the word 'forcibly' is 'not
restrictedtophysicalforce,butmayincludethreatofforceorcoercion,suchasthatcausedbyfear
of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or
personsoranotherperson,orbytakingadvantageofacoerciveenvironment.'(ElementsofCrime,
Article6,element1,note5).
http://www.casematrixnetwork.org/cmnknowledgehub/icccommentaryclicc/commentaryromestatute/commentaryromestatutepart2articles510/#
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The perpetrator must have had intent with regard to the consequence of the crime, ie, the
completedtransferfromonegrouptoanothergroup.However,thefactthatthevictimofthetransfer
was a child, is a circumstantial element. In this regard, the Elements of Crime make clear that a
standard lower than knowledge is sufficient for the subjective element: it is enough that the
perpetrator'shouldhaveknown'thatthevictimhadnotyetreachedtheageof18years(Elementsof
Crime,Article6(e), 6th element) It is one of the rare cases in which the mens rea for one of the
underlyingactsofgenocidedeviatesfromthestandardestablishedbyArticle30oftheRomeStatute.
Crossreferences:
1.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine
1.PaulBehrens,"AMomentofKindness?ConsistencyandGenocidalIntent",inRalphHenham/Paul
Behrens,TheCriminalLawofGenocide,Ashgate,Aldershot,2007,125140.
2. Paul Behrens, "Assessment of International Criminal Evidence: The Case of the Unpredictable
Gnocidaire",ZeitschriftfrAuslndischesffentlichesRechtundVlkerrecht,vol.71,2011,pp.662
89.
3.PaulBehrens/RalphHenham,ElementsofGenocide,Routledge,NewYork,2012.
4. Paul Behrens, "The Mens Rea of Genocide", in Paul Behrens/Ralph Henhamhttp://www.legal
tools.org/doc/e48e9a/,ElementsofGenocide,Routledge,NewYork,2012,7096[Behrens2012(a)].
5. Behrens, Paul, "The Need for a Genocide Law"in Paul Behrens/Ralph Henhamhttp://www.legal
tools.org/doc/e48e9a/, Elements of Genocide, Routledge, New York, 2012, 237253 [Behrens
2012(b)].
6.PaulBehrens, "Genocide and the Question of Motives", Journal of International Criminal Justice,
vol.10(2012):50123.
7.PaulBeherens,"BetweenAbstractEventandIndividualizedCrime:GenocidalIntentintheCaseof
Croatia"(2015)LeidenJournalofInternationalLaw28:92335.
8.AntonioCassese,InternationalCriminalLaw,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2003.
9. Pieter Drost, The Crime of State: Penal Protection for Fundamental Freedoms of Persons and
Peoples,BookIIGenocide,A.W.Sythoff,Leiden,1959,p.124.
10. Paola Gaeta, The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary, Oxford University Press,
Oxford,2009.
11. Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, "Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a KnowledgeBased
Interpretation",ColumbiaLawReview,vol.99,1999,p.2259.
12. Hurst Hannum, "International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds of Silence", Human
RightsQuarterly,v.11(1989)82.
13. Kevin Jon Heller, "Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse, & Nzirorera, Case No. ICTR9844
AR73(C). Decision on Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice. International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Appeals Chamber, June 16, 2006", American Journal of International
Law,vol.101,2007,157.
14.RalphHenham/PaulBehrens,TheCriminalLawofGenocide,Ashgate,Aldershot,2007.
15.HansHeinrichJescheck,"DieinternationaleGenocidiumKonventionvom9.Dezember1948und
die Lehre vom Vlkerstrafrecht", Zeitschrift fr die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, vol. 66, 1956,
p.193.
16.FlorianJessberger,"TheDefinitionandtheElementsoftheCrimeofGenocide",inPaolaGaeta
(Ed.),TheUNGenocideConventionACommentary,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2009.
17.NinaH.B.Jrgensen,"TheDefinitionofGenocide:JoiningtheDotsintheLightofRecentPractice",
InternationalCriminalLawReview,vol.1,2001,p.285.
18. Karim Khan/Rodney Dixon: International Criminal Courts. Practice, Procedure and Evidence,
Archibold,SweetandMaxwell,London,2009,p.1088.
19.ClausKre, "The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent", Journal of International Criminal Justice,
vol.3,2005,p.562.
20.LawrenceJ.LeBlanc, "The Intent to Destroy Groups in the Genocide Convention: The Proposed
U.S.Understanding",AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw,vol.78,1984,p.380.
21. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington1944.
22.MatthewLippman, "The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide: Fifty Years
Later",ArizonaJournalofInternationalandComparativeLaw,1998,p.415.
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23. David L. Nersessian, "The Razor's Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups under the
GenocideConvention",CornellInternationalLawJournal,2003,p.293.
24.JohnQuigley,TheGenocideConvention:AnInternationalLawAnalysis,Ashgate,Aldershot,2006.
25.NehemiahRobinson,TheGenocideConvention:ACommentary,InstituteofJewishAffairs,World
JewishCongress,NewYork,1960.
26. William Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, Cambridge University
Press,Cambridge,2009.
27. Ccile Tournaye, "Genocidal Intent before the ICTY", International and Comparative Law
Quarterly,vol.52,2003,p.447.
28. Otto Triffterer, "Genocide, Its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as
Such",LeidenJournalofInternationalLaw,vol.14,2001,p.339[Triffterer2001(a)].
29. Otto Triffterer, "Kriminalpolitische und dogmatische berlegungen zum Entwurf gleichlautender
"ElementsofCrimes"fralleTatbestndedesVlkermordes",inBerndSchnemann(Ed.),Festschrift
fr Claus Roxin zum 70. Geburtstag am 15. Mai 2001, Walter de Gruyter 2001, Walter de Gruyter,
Berlin,2001,p.1415[Triffterer2001(b)].
30. Harmen Van der Wilt, "Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. Domestic
Jurisdiction",JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice,vol.4,2006,p.239.
31.BethVanSchaack, "The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention's Blind
Spot",YaleLawJournal,1997,p.2259.
32.HansVest, "Die bundesrtliche Botschaft zum Beitritt der Schweiz zur Vlkermordkonvention
kritische berlegungen zum Entwurf eines Tatbestandes fr den Vlkermord", Schweizerische
ZeitschriftfrStrafrecht,vol.117,1999,pp.351,356.
33.HansVest,GenoziddurchorganisatorischeMachtapparate,Nomos,BadenBaden,2002.
34. Hans Vest, "A StructureBased Concept of Genocidal Intent", Journal of International Criminal
Justice,2007,p.781.
35. Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge,2009.
OtherMaterials
1.Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind YILC 1996 II / 2, p 46, Art 17,
Commentary.
2.Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,14
April1998,A/CONF.183/2/Add.1p.11,Art.5,footnote1.
3. Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution52/135,(1999),Annex,para63.
4. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary
General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, 25 January 2005
['DarfurReport'].
5.UnitedNations,AdHocCommitteeonGenocide,NotebytheSecretariat,UNDocE/AC.25/3/Rev.1,
12April1948,p.6.
6. United Nations, Commission of Experts, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established
PursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution780(1992),UNDoc.S/1994/674['CommissionofExperts'].
7. United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, 35th session, Summary Record of the First Part
(Public)ofthe1510thMeeting,UNDoc.E/CN.4/SR.1510(1979),paras22,24.
8. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, 38th session, Item 4 of the provisional agenda, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6.
Revised and updated report on the question of the prevention and punishment of the crime of
genocide,preparedbyMrBWhitaker(2July1985)['WhitakerReport'],para31.
9.UnitedNations,GeneralAssembly,Resolution96(I),11Dec1946,UNDocA/Res/96(I).
10.UnitedNations,GeneralAssembly,Resolution37/123D,16Dec1982,UNDocA/Res/37/123D.
11.UnitedStatesCongress,ExecutiveSessionoftheSenateForeignRelationsCommittee,(Historical
Series),vol.2(USGovernmentPrintingOffice1976),370.
Author:
PaulBehrens
Article7(1)
[44] 1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
againstanycivilianpopulation,withknowledgeoftheattack:
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GeneralRemarks
ThegeneralelementsinthechapeauofArticle7elevateanordinarycrimeoraninhumaneconduct
toacrimeagainsthumanity.Thegeneralelementswereextensivelydealtwithduringthedraftingof
the ICC Statute and are set out in Article7(1)and(2) of the Statute, as well as in the Elements of
Crimes[vonHebelandRobinson,1999,pp.9197McCormack,2004,pp.179182,186189].Inthe
ICCcaselaw,theywereanalyzedbythePreTrialChamberin Prosecutorv.Bembain2008,andits
analysis has been largely followed by other PreTrial Chambers and the Trial Chamber in the
Prosecutorv.Katanga.
Analysis
i.Definition
Crimes against humanity pursuant to the ICC Statute are any of the enumerated acts in Article 7
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population,withknowledgeoftheattack(ICCStatute,Article7(1)).AccordingtoArticle7(2)(a),an
attack directed against any civilian population means a course of conduct involving the multiple
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack. These words are repeated in
theElementsofCrimes.
Foreachoftheunderlyingacts,theElementsofCrimessetoutthattheconductmusthavebeen
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
Further,theystatethattheperpetratormusthaveknownthattheconductwaspartoforintendedthe
conducttobepartofawidespreadorsystematicattackagainstacivilianpopulation.
Basedontheabove,thePreTrialChambershaveidentifiedfivegeneralelements:
(i)anattackdirectedagainstanycivilianpopulation,(ii)aStateororganizationalpolicy,(iii)the
widespread or systematic nature of the attack, (iv) a nexus between the individual act and the
attack,and(v)knowledgeoftheattack[SituationintheRepublicofKenya,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC
01/0919, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010, para. 79 Situationin
the Republic of Cte dIvoire, ICC PT. Ch. III, ICC02/1114, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of
the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of
CtedIvoire,3October2011,para.29].
Notably,thegeneralelementsdonotcontainanyrequirementofanexustoanarmedconflictorany
discriminatory element [von Hebel and Robinson, 1999, pp. 9294 McCormack, 2004, pp. 184186
Robinson,1999,pp.4547Schabas,2010,pp.144147,157].
ii.Requirements
a.Materialelements
With regard to the requirement of attack, the Elements of Crimes clarify that [t]he acts need not
constituteamilitaryattack.AlthoughtheICCStatuteitselfdefinesattackascourseofconduct,the
PreTrial Chamber in the Prosecutorv.Bemba considered that the term referred to a campaign or
operation, although adding that the appropriate terminology used in [the ICC Statute] being a
courseofconduct[ProsecutorvBemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,DecisionPursuantto
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre
BembaGombo,15June2009,para.75].ThePreTrialChambersetoutthatitisthecommissionof
theactsreferredtoinArticle7(1)thatconstitutetheattackandbesidethecommissionoftheacts,
no additional requirement for the existence of an attack should be proven [Ibid.]. This does not
necessarily mean that the element of attack is proven, as soon as the underlying acts allegedly
committedbytheperpetratorareproven[seeProsecutorvBemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08
424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, para. 151]. Presumably the PreTrial
ChambermerelyintendedtosaythatanattackmustbecomposedofactsenumeratedinArticle7(1)
(as opposed to other acts). In this respect, the PreTrial Chamber could have found support in the
text of Article7 itself, although it did cite the Akayesu Trial Judgment, which does not support this
[seeAkayesu,ICTR964,ICTRT.Ch.,2September1998,para.581(Theconceptofattackmaybe
(sic)definedasa(sic)unlawfulactofthekindenumeratedinArticle3(a)to(i)oftheStatute[]An
attack may also be non violent in nature, like imposing a system of apartheid [] or exerting
pressureonthepopulationtoactinaparticularmanner].
The same PreTrial Chamber stated that the requirement of directed against means that the
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civilian population must be the primary object of the attack and not just an incidental victim of the
attack[ProsecutorvBemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)
(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba
Gombo,15June2009,para.76,citingICTYcaselaw,inparticularProsecutorvKunaracetal.,IT96
23&23/2,ICTYA.Ch.,12June2002,paras9192].
Withregardtotheelementofpopulation,thePreTrialChamberimpliedalowthresholdbystating
that the Prosecutor must demonstrate that the attack was such that it cannot be characterised as
havingbeendirectedagainstonlyalimitedandrandomlyselectedgroupofindividuals.Itaddedthat
the entire population of the geographical area where the attack is taking place need not have been
targeted [Prosecutor v Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0501/08424, Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba
Gombo, 15 June 2009, para. 77]. In this respect, the PreTrial Chamber cited ICTY and ICTR case
law,inparticulartheKunaracAppealJudgement[ProsecutorvKunaracetal.,IT9623&23/2,ICTY
A.Ch.,12June2002,para.90].
ThePreTrialChambernotedthatthetermcivilianisnotdefinedintheStatutebutthataccording
to the wellestablished principle of international humanitarian law, [t]he civilian population ()
comprisesallpersonswhoareciviliansasopposedtomembersofarmedforcesandotherlegitimate
combatants[ProsecutorvBemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,DecisionPursuanttoArticle
Gombo,15June2009,para.78alsocitedbyProsecutorvKatanga,ICCT.Ch.II,ICC01/0401/07
3436,Jugement rendu en application de lArticle 74 du Statut, 7 March 2014, para. 1102]. In this
respect,thePreTrialChambercitedtheTrialJudgementinthe Kunaraccase[ProsecutorvKunarac
etal.,IT9623&23/2,ICTYTrialCh.,22February2001,para.425],althoughanyreferencetothe
ICTY Appeals Chambers later extensive analysis of this issue is notably absent [see Prosecutor v
Marti, IT9511, ICTY A. Ch., 8 October 2008, paras 291314 and Prosecutor v Mrki and
ljivananin,IT9513/1,ICTYA.Ch.,5May2009,paras2334].
The requirement of widespread or systematic is disjunctive [see Situation in the Republic of
Kenya, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0919, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome
StatuteontheAuthorizationofanInvestigationintotheSituationintheRepublicofKenya,31March
2010, para. 94]. The issue of whether this should be a disjunctive or a conjunctive test was
extensively debated by the drafters of the ICC Statute [see, inter alia, von Hebel and Robinson,
1999Robinson,1999,p.47].
With regard to widespread, the PreTrial Chambers in the cases Prosecutor v. Katanga and
NgudjoloandProsecutorv.Gbagbo stated that it connotes the largescale nature of the attack and
the number of targeted persons [Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/04
01/07717,Decision on the confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008, para. 394 Prosecutor v
Gbagbo,ICCPT.Ch.I,DecisionontheConfirmationofChargesagainstLaurentGbagbo,ICC02/11
01/11656Red, 12 June 2014, para. 222]. The PreTrial Chamber in the Prosecutor v. Bemba
restricteditfurtherbystatingthatthatitconnotesthelargescalenatureoftheattack,whichshould
be massive, frequent, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a
multiplicityofvictims[ProsecutorvBemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,DecisionPursuant
toArticle61(7)(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatuteontheChargesoftheProsecutorAgainstJeanPierre
Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, para. 83, citing Prosecutor v Akayesu, ICTR964, ICTR T. Ch., 2
September1998,para.580].
However, the Bemba and Katanga and Ngudjolo PreTrial Chambers also concluded that a
widespread attack entailed an attack carried out over a large geographical area or an attack in a
small geographical area directed against a large number of civilians. [ProsecutorvBemba,ICCPT.
Ch. II, ICC01/0501/08424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, para. 83
Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 395]. Therefore, it appears that the main
considerationsarethegeographicalscopeoftheattackandthenumberofvictims.Accordingtothe
Katanga PreTrial Chamber, even in the context of a systematic attack the requirement of multiple
acts would ensure that the attack involves a multiplicity of victims [Prosecutor v Katanga and
Ngudjolo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 30
Asforsystematic,theKatangaandNgudjoloandtheGbagboPreTrialChambersstatedthatthis
elementreferstotheorganisednatureoftheactsofviolenceandtheimprobabilityoftheirrandom
occurrence[Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, Decision on
theconfirmationofcharges,30September2008,para.394,citingKordianderkez,ICTYA.Ch.,17
December2004,para.94,whichiscitingProsecutorvKunaracetal.,IT9623&23/2,ICTYA.Ch.,
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12June2002,para.94ProsecutorvGbagbo,ICCPT.Ch.I,DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges
againstLaurentGbagbo,ICC02/1101/11656Red,12June2014,para.223].
Regardingtheelementofpolicytocommitsuchattack,theElementsofCrimessetoutthatthe
Stateororganizationactivelypromoteorencouragesuchanattackagainstacivilianpopulation.Ina
footnote, the drafters added that a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a
deliberatefailuretotakeaction,whichisconsciouslyaimedatencouragingsuchattackbutthat[t]he
existence of such a policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or
organizationalaction.
ThePreTrialChamberinthe Prosecutorv.KatangaandNgudjolocorrectlylinkedthiselementto
theelementsofwidespreadorsystematic:
in the context of a widespread attack, the requirement of an organizational policy [] ensures
thattheattack,[]muststillbethoroughlyorganisedandfollowaregularpattern[Katangaand
ThePreTrialChamberintheProsecutorv.Gbagboadded:
the concept of policy and that of the systematic nature of the attack [] both refer to a
certain level of planning of the attack. In this sense, evidence of planning, organisation or
directionbyaStateororganisationmayberelevanttoproveboththepolicyandthesystematic
nature of the attack, although the two concepts should not be conflated as they serve different
purposes and imply different thresholds under Article 7(1) and (2)(a) of the Statute [Gbagbo,
ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges against Laurent Gbagbo, ICC02/11
01/11656Red,12June2014,para.216].
Regardless of this statement by the Gbagbo PreTrial Chamber, the definition of attack directed
againstanycivilianpopulationinArticle7(2)reducesthesignificanceofthedisjunctive,asopposed
toaconjunctivetest,forthecharacterizationoftheattack(widespreadorsystematic)[seeSchabas,
2010,p.143].
ThePreTrialChamberinthe Prosecutorv.Bembadiscussedtheelementofpolicy,statingthatit
impliedthattheattackfollowsaregularpatternbutthatthepolicydoesnothavetobeformalised
[ProsecutorvBemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, 15
June2009,para.81seealsoProsecutorvKatangaandNgudjolo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07
717,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,30September2008,para.396].AnumberofPreTrial
Chambersalsopointedtotwoextremes,whichdoeslittletoclarifythelimitsofthetermpolicy:an
attack which is planned, directed or organized as opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of
violence will satisfy this criterion [Prosecutor v Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0501/08
424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, para. 81 Prosecutor v Katanga and
Ngudjolo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30
September2008,para.396Gbagbo,ICCPT.Ch.I,DecisionontheConfirmationofChargesagainst
LaurentGbagbo,ICC02/1101/11656Red,12June2014,para.215].
Article7(2)(a)clarifiesthatitneedstobeaStateororganizationalpolicy.OnePreTrialChamber
declared that the term State was selfexplanatory but added that the policy did not have to be
conceived at the highest level of the State machinery [Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC PT.
Ch. II, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0919, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
AuthorizationofanInvestigationintotheSituationintheRepublicofKenya,31March2010,para.89,
citingProsecutorvBlaki,ICTYT.Ch.,Judgment,3March2000,para.205].Therefore,alsoapolicy
adoptedbyregionalorlocalorgansoftheStatecouldsatisfythisrequirement[Ibid.].
With regard to organizational, the PreTrial Chambers in the Prosecutor v. Bemba and the
Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo stated that te organization may be groups of persons who
govern a specific territory or [] any organization with the capability to commit a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population [Prosecutor v Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/05
01/08424,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatuteontheChargesofthe
Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, para. 81 Prosecutor v Katanga and
September 2008, para. 396]. It is therefore not limited to Statelike organizations [Situation in the
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RepublicofKenya,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0919,DecisionPursuanttoArticle15ofthe
RomeStatuteontheAuthorizationofanInvestigationintotheSituationintheRepublicofKenya,31
March2010,paras9092ProsecutorvMuthauraetal.,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionontheConfirmation
of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012, para. 112
Rutoetal.,DecisionontheConfirmationofChargesPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)oftheRome
Statute,23January2012,para.33.SeealsoJudgeKaulsdissentstothesedecisions:Prosecutorv
Rutoet.al.,DissentingOpinionbyJudgeHansPeterKaultoPreTrialChamberII's"Decisiononthe
Prosecutor'sApplicationforSummonstoAppearforWilliamSamoeiRuto,HenryKipronoKosgeyand
JoshuaArapSang",15March2011,andProsecutorvMuthauraet.al.,Dissenting Opinion by Judge
HansPeterKaultoPreTrialChamberII's"DecisionontheProsecutor'sApplicationforSummonsesto
Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali", 15 March
2011].TheTrialChamberintheProsecutorv.Katangafollowedthisapproach[ProsecutorvKatanga,
ICCT.Ch.II,ICC01/0401/073436,JugementrenduenapplicationdelArticle74duStatut,7March
2014,paras11171122].
TheBembaPreTrialChamberstatedthatwhendeterminingwhetherthepartofrequirementwas
met it would consider the characteristics, the aims, the nature or consequences of the act
[ProsecutorvBemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, 15
June2009,para.84].Italsostatedtheunderlyingoffencesmust[]notbeisolated[Prosecutorv
Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0501/08424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009,
para.83],althoughthatoughttofollowalreadyfromthefacttheyhavetobepartofawidespreador
systematicattackagainstacivilianpopulation.
Author:
JonasNilsson
The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
UnitedNationsortheICTY.
Article7(1)mentalelement
[45]withknowledgeoftheattack:
Article7(1)setsoutthementalelementasknowledgeoftheattack.TheElementsofCrimesclarify
thatthisrequirement:
should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all
characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or
organization.
As stated above, the Elements of Crimes state that the perpetrator must have known that the
conductwaspartoforintendedtheconducttobepartofawidespreadorsystematicattackagainsta
civilianpopulation.Theintentclauseismeanttoaddressthesituationofanemergingwidespreador
systematic attack, that is a situation when the attack has not yet happened and knowledge of it
thereforeisimpossible[ElementsofCrimes,p.5seealsoRobinson,2001,p.73].
Crossreferences
ElementsofCrime
Doctrine
1.RodneyDixon/ChristopherK.Hall,"Chapeau",inOttoTriffterer(Ed.),CommentaryontheRome
StatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourtObserversNotes,ArticlebyArticle,SecondEdition,C.H.
Beck/Hart/Nomos,Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,2008,pp.168183.
2. Herman Von Hebel/Darryl Robinson, "Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court", in Roy S. Lee
(Ed.), The International Criminal Court The Making of the Rome Statute Issues, Negotiations,
Results,KluwerLawInternational,TheHague,1999,pp.90103.
3. Timothy L.H. McCormack, "Crimes Against Humanity", in Dominic McGoldrick et al. (Eds), The
PermanentInternationalCriminalCourtLegalandPolicyIssues,HartPublishing,Oxford,2004,pp.
179189.
4.JonasNilsson,"CrimesAgainstHumanity",inAntonioCasseseetal.(Eds.),TheOxfordCompanion
toInternationalCriminalJustice,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2009,pp.284288.
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5.DarrylRobinson,"TheContextofCrimesAgainstHumanity",inRoyS.Lee(Ed.),TheInternational
CriminalCourtElementsofCrimesandRulesofProcedureandEvidence,TransnationalPublishers,
Ardsley,2001,pp.6180.
6.DarrylRobinson,"DefiningCrimesAgainstHumanityattheRomeConference",AmericanJournal
ofInternationalLaw,vol.43,93,1999.
7. William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court A Commentary on the Rome Statute,
OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2010,pp.139157.
Author:JonasNilsson (The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily
reflecttheviewsoftheUnitedNationsortheICTY.)
Article7(1)(a)
[46](a)Murder
Generalremarks
Murder has been included as the first crime against humanity in every instrument defining crimes
against humanity [Hall, 2008, p. 183]. It was included in Article7 of the Rome Statute without real
controversy[vonHebelandRobinson,p.98Hall,2008,p.184].Itwasalsodeemednottorequirea
clarification of the intended meaning in Article7(2) [McCormack, 2004, p. 189]. Murder as a crime
againsthumanityhasbeendealtwithinoneofthejudgementsbeforetheICC[Katanga,ICCT.Ch.
II, ICC01/0401/073436, Jugement rendu en application de lArticle 74 du Statut, 7 March 2014,
paras765782].
Analysis
i.Definition
MurderasacrimeagainsthumanitywithinthemeaningofArticle7(1)(a)isnotdefinedintheStatute.
AccordingtotheElementsofCrimes,oneelementofmurderisthattheperpetratorkilled,orcaused
thedeathof,oneormorepersons.NeitherArticle7northeElementsofCrimesgiveanyclueasto
howthemensreashouldbeunderstood.ThereforeArticle30appliesandthematerialelementsmust
be committed with intent and knowledge. [Prosecutor v Katanga, ICC T. Ch. II, ICC01/0401/07
3436,JugementrenduenapplicationdelArticle74duStatut,7March2014,para.780].
ii.Requirements
a.Materialelements
AccordingtothePreTrialChamberinthecaseProsecutorv.Bembathematerialelementsofmurder
arethatthevictimisdeadandthatthedeathresultfromtheactofmurder[ProsecutorvBemba,
ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatuteontheChargesof
theProsecutorAgainstJeanPierreBembaGombo,15June2009,para.132].Thefirstelementofthe
crimeofmurderisthusthatthevictimisdead.Asforthesecondelement,thePreTrialChamberwas
unhelpfulbysimplystatingthatthecrimeofmurderrequirestheactofmurder.Itcitedanumberof
ICTRandICTYtrialjudgements[ProsecutorvAkayesu,ICTRT.Ch.,2September1998,para.589
ProsecutorRutaganda,ICTRT.Ch.,6December1999,para.80Blaki,ICTYT.Ch.,3March2000,
paras216217ProsecutorvDelalietal.,ICTYT.Ch.,16November1998,para.424],whichallsets
out that the second element is that the death must have been caused by an act of the perpetrator,
withtheICTRjudgementsaddingthatthedeathcouldalsobecausedbyanomission.
The reliance of the PreTrial Chamber on ICTY and ICTR trial judgments in this respect is odd
considering that the ICTY Appeals Chamber has set out the elements of murder as a crime against
humanity.InthecaseProsecutorv.MirolsavKvokaetal.,theAppealsChambersetoutthatthefirst
twoelementsarethatthevictimisdeadandthatthedeathwastheresultofanactoromissionofthe
perpetrator[ProsecutorKvokaetal.,ICTYA.Ch.,28February2005,para.261].
The Bemba PreTrial Chamber went on to clarify that the act may be committed by action or
omission[ProsecutorvBemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009,
para. 132]. In this respect, the PreTrial Chamber did not refer to ICTY or ICTR case law but to a
decision by the PreTrial Chamber in the case Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, discussing the
crimeofwilfulkillingaswarcrime[ProsecutorvBemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle
Gombo, 15 June 2009, para. 132, citing Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07
717,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,30September2008,para.287].
b.Mentalelements
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According to the PreTrial Chamber in the case Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, the mental
elementofthecrimesagainsthumanityofmurderisthattheperpetratorintendedtokilloneormore
persons[Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, Decision on the
confirmationofcharges,30September2008,para.423].Itspecifiedthatthisencompassesfirstand
foremost, cases of dolusdirectus of the first and second degree [Ibid.]. The PreTrial Chamber in
Prosecutor v. Bemba, in its discussion of the mental element, do not use the words first and
foremost and therefore limits the element to dolus directus in the first and second degree
[Prosecutor v Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, para.
135]. The PreTrial Chamber elaborated further on these concepts. It set out that Article30(2) and
(3) embraces two degrees of dolus, namely dolusdirectus in the first degree, or direct intent, and
dolusdirectusintheseconddegree,alsoknownasobliqueintention.However,theprovisiondoesnot
coverdoluseventualis, also referred to as subjective or advertent recklessness [Ibid., paras 352
369].TheauthorreferstothecommentaryofArticle30forfurtherdiscussiononthis.
Crossreferences:
Article8(2)(a)(i)and8(2)(c)(i)
ElementsofCrime
ICCCaseMatrixMeansofProofDigest
Doctrine:
1.ChristopherK.Hall,"Article7Crimesagainsthumanity",inOttoTriffterer(Ed.),Commentaryon
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Observers Notes, Article by Article, Second
Edition,C.H.Beck/Hart/Nomos,Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,2008,pp.183190.
2. TimothyL.H.McCormack, "Crimes Against Humanity", in Dominic McGoldrick et tal. (Eds.), The
PermanentInternationalCriminalCourtLegalandPolicyIssues,HartPublishing,Oxford,2004,pp.
189190.
3. Darryl Robinson, "Article 7(a)Crime Against Humanity of Murder", in Roy S. Lee, (Ed.), The
International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
TransnationalPublishers,Ardsley,2001,pp.8081.
5. Gunal Mettraux, "Murder", in Antonio Cassese et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Companion to
InternationalCriminalJustice,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2009,pp.426427.
6.GerhardWerle,PrinciplesofInternationalCriminalLaw, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2005, pp.
232233,MN674677.
Author:Jonas Nilsson (The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily
Article7(1)(b)
[47](b)Extermination
GeneralRemarks
Thecrimeagainsthumanityofexterminationessentiallyconsistsofthelargescalekillingofmembers
ofacivilianpopulation.Ithasbeenlistedinallinstrumentsconcerningcrimesagainsthumanitysince
theSecondWorldWar[Hall,2008,p.190].
Analysis
i.Definition
The crime against humanity of extermination is listed in Article7(1)(b) of the Rome Statute. While
Article7(1)(b) does not elaborate on the definition of extermination, Article7(2)(b) clarifies that it
includes the inteal infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and
medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population. The Elements of Crimes
providefurther:
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1.Theperpetratorkilledoneormorepersons,includingbyinflictingconditionsoflifecalculated
tobringaboutthedestructionofpartofapopulation.
2. The conduct constituted, or took place as part of,10 a mass killing of members of a civilian
population.
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilianpopulation.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a
widespreadorsystematicattackdirectedagainstacivilianpopulation.
5.Theconductcouldbecommittedbydifferentmethodsofkilling,eitherdirectlyorindirectly.
6.Theinflictionofsuchconditionscouldincludethedeprivationofaccesstofoodandmedicine.
7.Thetermaspartofwouldincludetheinitialconductinamasskilling.
ii. Distinction between extermination and murder (both as crimes against humanity) and
genocide
The only element that distinguishes murder as a crime against humanity from extermination as a
crime against humanity is the requirement for extermination that the killings occur on a mass scale
[ProsecutorvNtakirutimanaandNtakirutimana,ICTRA.Ch.,13December2004,para.542].Murder
as a crime against humanity does not contain a materially distinct element from extermination as a
crimeagainsthumanityeachinvolveskillingwithinthecontextofawidespreadorsystematicattack
against the civilian population. Consequently, a conviction for murder as a crime against humanity
andaconvictionforexterminationasacrimeagainsthumanity,basedonthesamesetoffacts,are
impermissiblycumulative[ProsecutorvNtakirutimanaandNtakirutimana,ICTRA.Ch.,13December
2004, para. 542 Prosecutor v Luki and Luki, ICTY T. Ch. III, 20 June 2009, para. 1045]. While
extermination differs from murder because extermination concerns a large number of victims,
extermination differs from genocide because extermination covers situations in which a group of
individuals who do not share any common characteristics are killed (whereas genocide requires a
demonstrationofthespecificintenttodestroyadefinedgroupsharingcommoncharacteristics)[Hall,
2008,p.190].
iii.Requirements
Inadditiontothecontextualelementsrequiredforallcrimesagainsthumanitysetoutinelements3
and4oftheabovelistedElementsofCrimes,thefollowingneedstobeproven:
a.Materialelements
Elements 1 and 2 of the abovelisted Elements of Crimes constitute the material elements of
extermination.
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life
calculatedtobringaboutthedestructionofpartofapopulation.
TheElementsofCrimesindicatethatthekillingmaybecarriedouteitherdirectlyorindirectly,which
would include the infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a
populationassetoutabove.TheonlyICCdecisiontodatetoaddressthecrimeofexterminationin
anydetailisthefirstarrestwarrantdecisionintheAlBashircase[ProsecutorvAlBashir,ICCPT.Ch.
I,Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, ICC02/0501/093, 4 March 2009]. PreTrial Chamber I found that there were reasonable
groundstobelievethatthecrimeofexterminationwascommittedthroughactssuchasthekillingof
overathousandciviliansinconnectionwithanattackonatown[ProsecutorvAlBashir,ICCPT.Ch.
I,Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir,ICC02/0501/093,4March2009,para.97].TheProsecutionalsoallegedthatthesystematic
destruction of the means of survival of civilian populations in Darfur constituted a form of
extermination. However, PreTrial Chamber I did not explicitly refer to this means of carrying out
extermination when finding reasonable grounds to believe that the crime of extermination was
committed [Prosecutor v Al Bashir, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC02/0501/093, 4 March 2009, para.
91,9597].
InthesecondarrestwarrantdecisionintheAlBashircase,PreTrialChamberInotedinpassing
that extermination can be committed through the infliction of certain conditions of life upon one or
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morepersonswherethoseconditionsarecalculatedtobringaboutthephysicaldestructionofthat
group, in whole or in part [Prosecutor v Al Bashir, ICC PT. Ch. I, Second Decision on the
Prosecutions Application for a Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC02/05
01/0994,12July2010,para.33].PreTrialChamberIconcluded(inrelationtothegenocidecharge)
that that one of the reasonable conclusions that can be drawn is that the acts of contamination of
water pumps and forcible transfer coupled by resettlement by member of other tribes, were
committed in furtherance of the genocidal policy, and that the conditions of life inflicted on the Fur,
MasalitandZaghawagroupswerecalculatedtobringaboutthephysicaldestructionofapartofthose
ethnic groups. [Prosecutor v Al Bashir, ICC PT. Ch. I, Second Decision on the Prosecutions
Application for a Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC02/0501/0994, 12 July
2010, para. 38]. It has been recognised at the ICTY and ICTR that the material elements of
extermination includes subjecting a widespread number of people or systematically subjecting a
number of people to conditions of living that would inevitably lead to death [Prosecutor v Staki,
ICTYA.Ch.,22March2006,para.259]ProsecutorvNtakirutimanaandNtakirutimana,ICTRA.Ch.,
13December2004,para.522].
2.Theconductconstituted,ortookplaceaspartof,amasskillingofmembersofacivilian
population.
InthefirstarrestwarrantdecisionintheAlBashircase,PreTrialChamberIrepeatedthatthekillings
had to occur as part of a mass killing of a civilian population and noted that this mirrors the
jurisprudenceoftheICTYandICTRonextermination[ProsecutorvAlBashir,ICCPT.Ch.I,Decision
ontheProsecution'sApplicationforaWarrantofArrestagainstOmarHassanAhmadAlBashir,ICC
02/0501/093,ICC02/0501/093,4March2009],para.96).TheElementsofCrimesclarifythatthe
termaspartofwouldincludetheinitialconductinamasskilling.Thusalreadythefirstkillingsina
mass killing meet this requirement even though the requirement of a massive killing may not be
satisfieduntilsubsequentkillingsareperpetrated[Schabas,2010,p.159].
At the ICTY and ICTR, the jurisprudence concerning the material elements of extermination has
focused on the massiveness requirement, which distinguishes the crime of extermination from the
crime of murder. [Prosecutor v Luki and Luki, ICTY A. Ch., 4 December 2012, para 536
ProsecutorvNtakirutimanaandNtakirutimana,ICTRA.Ch.,13December2004,para.542].Itiswell
established that the massiveness requirement does not suggest a strict numerical approach with a
minimum number of victims [Prosecutor v Luki and Luki, ICTY A. Ch., 4 December 2012, para.
537]. While extermination as a crime against humanity has been found in relation to the killing of
thousandsofvictims,ithasalsobeenfoundinrelationtofewerkillings,includingincidentsofaround
60 victims and less at the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL [see Prosecutor v Luki and Luki, ICTY A. Ch., 4
December2012,para.537].Theassessmentofthemassivenessrequirementismadeonacaseby
case basis, taking into account the circumstances in which the killings occurred. Relevant factors
include, inter alia: the time and place of the killings the selection of the victims and the manner in
which they were targeted and whether the killings were aimed at the collective group rather than
victims in their individual capacity [Prosecutor v Luki and Luki, ICTY A. Ch., 4 December 2012,
para. 538]. Where mass killings are committed on an extremely large scale, far surpassing the
threshold for extermination, this can be taken into account as an aggravating factor in sentencing
[ProsecutorvNdindabahizi,ICTRA.Ch.,16January2007.para.135].
It has been recognised that several killing incidents can be accumulated together to constitute
extermination[ProsecutorvPopovietal.,ICTYT.Ch.II,10June2010,para.805(holdingthatin
lightofthetemporalandgeographicalproximityofthekillings,thesimilaritiesbetweenthemandthe
organized and coordinated manner in which the Bosnian Serb Forces conducted them, [] they
formed part of a single operation.) Prosecutor v Tolimir, ICTY A. Ch., 8 April 2015, para. 147)].
Killings that are not part of the same attack on a civilian population, and instead are isolated acts,
shouldnotbeaccumulatedtogether[ProsecutorvTolimir,ICTYA.Ch.,8April2015,para.150].
a.Mentalelements
Intheabsenceofaspecificprovisiondefiningthementalrequirementsforextermination,Article30
of the Rome Statute applies. Accordingly, the material elements must be committed with intent and
knowledge,asdefinedinArticle30.
At the ICTY and ICTR it has been held that the mental elements of extermination require the
intentiontokillonalargescaleortosystematicallysubjectalargenumberofpeopletoconditionsof
livingthatwouldleadtotheirdeathsandthatthisintentreflectsthematerialelementsofthecrime.
The Appeals Chambers of the ICTY and the ICTR have noted that there is no support in customary
international law for the requirement of intent to kill a certain threshold number of victims. This is
consistent with the fact that there is no numerical threshold established with respect to the material
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elementsofextermination.[ProsecutorvStaki,ICTYA.Ch.,22March2006,para.260Prosecutorv
NtakirutimanaandNtakirutimana,ICTRA.Ch.,13December2004,paras.516,522].Asnotedabove,
in the AlBashir case, PreTrial Chamber I noted in passing that where extermination is committed
throughtheinflictionofcertainconditionsoflifeupononeormorepersons,itisnecessarytoshow
thatthoseconditionswerecalculatedtobringaboutthephysicaldestructionofthatgroup,inwhole
orinpart.[ProsecutorvAlBashir, ICC PT. Ch. I, Second Decision on the Prosecutions Application
foraWarrantofArrestforOmarHassanAhmadAlBashir,ICC02/0501/0994,12July2010,para.
33].
Crossreferences
1.Articles67(1)(a)7(2)8(2)(a)(i)8(2)(b)(xxv)8(2)(c)(i)RomeStatute30
2.ElementsofCrimes
Doctrine
1.ChristopherK.Hall,Article7Crimesagainsthumanity,inOttoTrifterer(Ed.),Commentaryonthe
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Observers Notes, Article by Article, C.H.
Beck/Hart/Nomos,Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,2008,pp.190191,237243.
2.WilliamSchabas,The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, Oxford
UniversityPress,Oxford2010,pp.158160.
Author: Matthew Gillett (The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily
reflecttheviewsoftheUnitedNations,theICTYortheOTPoftheICTY.)
Article7(1)(c)
[48](c)Enslavement
GeneralRemarks
Enslavement has been included as a crime against humanity in every instrument defining crimes
against humanity [Hall, 2008, p. 192]. There was a general agreement throughout the drafting
process that enslavement should be included in Article7 of the Rome Statute, although there was
discussionabouttotheexactmeaningoftheterm[Hall,2008,p.192].Noneofthejudgmentsbefore
theICChaveaddressedtheelementsofthiscrime.
Analysis
i.Definition
According to one author, the crime of enslavement encompasses three components: slavery,
servitude, and forced or compulsory labour [Hall, 2008, p. 193]. However, Article7(2)(b) specifies
that Enslavement means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership over a person. This reflects the definition of slavery, as set out in the Slavery
Convention of 1926 [SlaveryConvention, Article 1(1)]. This would imply that enslavement for the
purposeoftheRomeStatuteislimitedtoslaveryinthetraditionalsense.
That said, the Elements of Crimes provides further specification by the words: such as by
purchasing, selling, lending or bartering [] a person or persons or by imposing on them a similar
deprivation of liberty. It adds that [i]t is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some
circumstances, include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as
defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
InstitutionsandPracticesSimilartoSlaveryof1956.Article7(2)(b)addsthatthedefinitionincludes
the exercise of [any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person] in the
course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children, which is also repeated in the
Elements of Crimes [Elements of Crimes, p. 6, footnote 11]. The texts in Article 7(2)(b) and the
ElementsofCrimesappeartobroadenthedefinitionofenslavementbeyondthetraditionalnotionof
slavery.
NeitherArticle7northeElementsofCrimesgiveanyguidanceastohowthemensreashouldbe
understood. Therefore Article30 applies and the material elements must be committed with intent
andknowledge.
ii.Requirements
a.Materialelements
As explained above, the main area of contention is whether enslavement includes something
additional to the concept of slavery in the traditional sense. One author comments on the relevant
provisionsintheRomeStatuteandtheElementsofCrimes:Theenslavementprovisionissomewhat
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convolutedandinelegant,involvingabroadgeneraltest,arestrictivesoundinglist,andanexpansive
footnote. This reflects the contradictory pressures of the intense negotiations on these issues
[Robinson,2001,p.86].Asofnow,thereisnoICCcaselawaddressingthismatter.
InthecaseProsecutorv.DragoljubKunaracetal.,theTrialChamberdefinedenslavementasthe
exerciseofanyorallofthepowersattachingtotherightofownershipoverapersonandthatthe
actusreusofthecrimethereforewastheexerciseofanyorallofthepowersattachingtotheright
ofownershipoveraperson[ProsecutorvKunaracetal.,ICTYT.Ch.,22February2001,paras539
540]. Having reviewed international instruments and case law, the Trial Chamber added that the
definitionmaybebroaderthatthetraditionalandsometimesapparentlydistinctdefinitionsofeither
slavery, the slave trade and servitude or forced or compulsory labour found in the areas of
international law [Ibid., paras 518538, 541]. The Appeals Chamber accepted the Trial Chambers
chief thesis [] that the traditional concept of slavery, as defined in the 1926 Slavery Convention
and often referred to as chattel slavery [footnote omitted], has evolved to encompass various
contemporary forms of slavery which are also based on the exercise of any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership [Prosecutor v Kunarac et al., ICTY A. Ch., 12 June 2002, para.
117]. It added that [i]n the case of these various contemporary forms of slavery, the victim is not
subjecttotheexerciseofthemoreextremerightsofownershipassociatedwithchattelslavery,but
inallcases,asaresultoftheexerciseofanyorallofthepowersattachingtotherightofownership,
thereissomedestructionofthejuridicalpersonality[footnoteomitted]thedestructionisgreaterin
the case of chattel slavery but the difference is one of degree [Ibid.]. Thus, the ICTY Appeals
Chamberfoundthatnotonlyenslavementbutalsoslavery,asdefinedintheSlaveryConventionof
1926,hadabroadermeaningthanthetraditionalnotionofslavery.
The PreTrial Chamber in the case Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo hinted at a similar broad
understanding of enslavement. When discussing sexual slavery (Article7(1)(g)), it concluded that
thiscrimemayberegardedasaparticularformofenslavementandthereforewhatisencompassed
withsexualslaverymustalsobeencompassedwithenslavement[KatangaandNgudjolo,ICCPT.
Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008, para.
430]. The PreTrial Chamber then lists a number of institutions and practices referred to the 1956
Supplementary Convention: debt bondage, serfdom, forced marriage practices and forms of child
labour[Ibid.].Itaddsthat,initsview,sexualslavery(andtherefore,presumablyenslavement)also
encompasses situations where women and girls are forced into marriage, domestic servitude or
other forced labour involving sexual activity, including rape, by their captors. [Footnote omitted]
Forms of sexual slavery can, for example, be practices such as the detention of women in rape
camps[footnoteomitted]orcomfortstations,forcedtemporarymarriagestosoldiersandother
practices involving the treatment of women as chattel [Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC
01/0401/07717,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,30September2008,para.431].
b.Mentalelements
SeethecommentaryofArticle30fordiscussiononthemensreaforenslavementasacrimeagainst
humanity.
Crossreferences:
1.Articles8(2)(b)(xxi)and8(2)(c)(ii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine
1.CherifM.Bassiouni,CrimesAgainstHumanityHistoricalEvolutionandContemporaryApplication,
CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge2011,pp.374381.
2. Christopher K. Hall, "Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity, (c) 'Enslavement', in Otto Triffterer
(Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Observers Notes,
Article by Article, Second Edition, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden, 2008, pp.
191194,244247.
3. Timothy L.H. McCormack, "Crimes Against Humanity", in http://www.legal
tools.org/doc/ba5c37/DominicMcGoldricketal.(Eds.),ThePermanentInternationalCriminalCourt
LegalandPolicyIssues,HartPublishing,Oxford,2004,p.191.
4. Darryl Robinson, "Article 7(a)Crime Against Humanity of Murder", in Roy S. Lee (Ed.), The
TransnationalPublishers,Ardsley,NewYork,2001,pp.8486.
6.GerhardWerle,Principles of International Criminal Law, TMC Asser Press,The Hague, 2005, pp.
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236238,MN683689.
7. Alexander Zahar, "Slavery", in Antonio Cassese et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Companion to
E.Author:JonasNilsson(Theviewsexpressedarethoseoftheauthoraloneanddonotnecessarily
Article7(1)(d)
[49](d)Deportationorforcibletransferofpopulation
Generalremarks
Article7(1)(d)concernsforceddisplacementofpersonsfromwheretheyarelawfullypresent,without
groundspermittedunderinternationallaw.
Deportation, which is commonly understood as forced displacement from one country to another,
wasalreadyrecognizedasacrimeagainsthumanityintheNurembergCharter[Hall,2008,pp.194
195]. In addition to deportation, forcible transfer of population was included in the Rome Statute to
make clear that transfers within a States borders can also constitute a crime against humanity
[Robinson, 2001, p. 86]. In contrast, the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR only explicitly list
deportation as a crime against humanity. However, the jurisprudence has recognized that forcible
transfer can constitute the crime against humanity of other inhumane acts or an underlying act of
persecution[Prosecutor v Staki,(Case No. IT9724A), ICTY A. Ch., Judgement, 22 March 2006,
para. 317 Prosecutor v Krnojelac, (Case No. IT9725A), ICTY A. Ch., Judgement, 17 September
2003, para. 218 Prosecutor v Naletili and Martinovi, (Case No. IT9834A), ICTY A.
Ch., Judgement, 3 May 2006, paras. 153154]. The protected interests underlying the prohibition
ofdeportationandforcibletransferincludetherightstostayinoneshomeandcommunityandnotto
bedeprivedofonespropertybyforcibledisplacementtoanotherlocation[ProsecutorvStaki,ICTY
A.Ch.,22March2006,para.277Hall,2008,p.195seealsoProsecutorvKrnojelac,ICTYA.Ch.,
17September2003,para.218Schabas,2010,p.163].
Analysis
i.Definition
According to Article 7(2)(d), [d]eportation or forcible transfer of population means forced
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which
theyarelawfullypresent,withoutgroundspermittedunderinternationallaw.TheElementsofCrimes
providefurther:
1. The perpetrator deported or forcibly 12 transferred,13 without grounds permitted under
international law, one or more persons to another State or location, by expulsion or other
coerciveacts.
2.Suchpersonorpersonswerelawfullypresentintheareafromwhichtheyweresodeported
ortransferred.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the lawfulness of
suchpresence.
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilianpopulation.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a
widespreadorsystematicattackdirectedagainstacivilianpopulation.
12 The term forcibly is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression
orabuseofpoweragainstsuchpersonorpersonsoranotherperson,orbytakingadvantageof
acoerciveenvironment.
13Deportedorforciblytransferredisinterchangeablewithforciblydisplaced.
ii.Distinctionbetweendeportationandforcibletransfer
Article7(2)(d) provides a single definition for [d]eportation or forcible transfer of population. This
raises the question whether there is a need to distinguish between the two alternatives [see
Acquaviva, 2011, p. 18]. ICC case law supports the need for such a distinction [see also
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Werle/Jessberger,2014,p.359andHall,2008,p.247whorefertodistinctcrimes].InRutoetal.and
Muthauraetal.theProsecutionchargedandPreTrialChamberIIconfirmedchargesfordeportation
or forcible transfer of population [Prosecutor v Ruto et al., ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision on the
ConfirmationofChargesPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatute,ICC01/0901/11
373,23January2012,paras.22,268,299,349,350,367ProsecutorvMuthauraetal.,ICCPT.Ch.
II,DecisionontheConfirmationofChargesPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatute,
ICC01/0902/11382Red, 23 January 2012, paras. 21, 241, 298, 428]. The Defence in Ruto et al.
challenged this alternative formulation of the charges. PreTrial Chamber II saw no apparent
prejudicecausedbythisformulationatthisparticularstageoftheproceedingsandinrelationtothis
unique crime. The PreTrial Chamber pointed out, however, that the Trial Chamber will ultimately
havetodrawadistinctionbetweendeportationandforcibletransfer[ProsecutorvRutoetal.,ICCPT.
Ch.II,23January2012,para.268].Inothercasesthelegalcharacterizationwasalreadylimitedto
forcible transfer at the pretrial stage. In Al Bashir, Harun and Kushayb, and Hussein, PreTrial
ChamberIissuedwarrantsofarrestforallegedresponsibilityforforcibletransferasacrimeagainst
humanity [Prosecutor v Al Bashir, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Prosecutions Application for a
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC02/0501/093, 4 March 2009, p. 92
Prosecutor v Al Bashir, ICC PT. Ch. I, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC
02/0501/091,4March2009,pp.78ProsecutorvHarunandKushayb,ICCPT.Ch.I,Decisionon
theProsecutionApplicationunderArticle58(7)oftheStatute,ICC02/0501/071,27April2007,pp.
45,48,56ProsecutorvHarunandKushayb,ICCPT.Ch.I,WarrantofArrestforAhmadHarun,ICC
02/0501/072, 27 April 2007, pp. 7, 10, 1516 Prosecutor v Harun and Kushayb, ICC PT. Ch. I,
Warrant of Arrest for Ali Kushayb, ICC02/05 01/073Corr, 27 April 2007, pp. 8, 10, 1617
Prosecutor v Hussein, ICC PT. Ch. I, Public redacted version of Decision on the Prosecutors
applicationunderArticle58relatingtoAbdelRaheemMuhammadHussein,ICC02/0501/121Red,
1March2012,pp.2930ProsecutorvHussein, ICC PT. Ch. I, Warrant of Arrest for Abdel Raheem
MuhammadHussein, ICC02/0501/122, 1 March 2012, pp. 8, 11 see also ProsecutorvAl Bashir,
ICCPT.Ch.I,SecondWarrantofArrestforOmarHassanAhmadAlBashir,ICC02/0501/0995,12
July2010,p.6].Similarly,PreTrialChamberIIinNtagandaconfirmedchargesforforcibletransferof
populationasacrimeagainsthumanity[Prosecutorv.Ntaganda,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuantto
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco
Ntaganda,ICC01/0402/06309,9June2014,paras.36,6468,p.63].
The next question is then how to distinguish between deportation and forcible transfer. The
distinction between deportation and forcible transfer is commonly seen in whether the victims are
forced across a State border, which is considered as deportation, whereas forcible transfer typically
refers to displacements within a State [see Hall, 2008, p. 194]. As noted above, the definition
containedinArticle7(2)(d)doesnotexplicitlymakethisdistinction.Whileelement1oftheElements
of Crimes provides that the victims must be displaced to another State or location, it does not
explicitly limit deportation to displacement to another State, nor does it limit forcible transfer to
displacementwithinaState[seeHall,2008,footnote178].Nevertheless,PreTrialChamberIIinRuto
et al. distinguished between forcible transfer and deportation based on where [the victims] have
finally relocated as a result of these acts (i.e. within the State or outside the State). [Prosecutor v
Rutoetal.,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0901/11373,23January2012,para.268.Forthisdistinctionalso
Werle/Jessberger,2014,pp.358359Hall,2008,pp.198199withreferencetothedraftinghistory
Schabas, 2010, pp. 163164]. The distinction made by PreTrial Chamber II in Ruto et al. might
suggest that it viewed deportation and forcible transfer as mutually exclusive. At the ICTY, the
AppealsChamberconfirmedinorevithatforforcibletransferthedisplacementmay take place
withinnationalboundariesbutisnotsorestricted[Prosecutorvorevi,(CaseNo.IT0587/1A),
ICTY A. Ch., Judgement, 27 January 2014, footnote 2159, emphasis in original, referring to
ProsecutorvStaki,ICTYA.Ch.,22March2006,para.317].Accordingtothisdefinition,theultimate
location does not form part of the elements of forcible transfer deportation thus has an additional
element:thetransferacrossaborder[seeProsecutorvPopovietal.,(CaseNo.IT0588T),ICTY
T. Ch. II, Judgement, 10 June 2010, paras. 892, 904]. Deportation at the ICTY does not require
displacementacrossadejureStateborder.Rather,undercertaincircumstances,displacementacross
a de facto border suffices. This is to be examined on a case by case basis in light of customary
internationallaw,which,forexample,recognizesdisplacementfromoccupiedterritoryasdeportation
[seefortheICCArticle8(2)(b)(viii)],whiledisplacementacrossconstantlychangingfrontlinesisnot
sufficient[ProsecutorvStaki,ICTYA.Ch.,22March2006,paras.278,300303].
iii.Requirements
Inadditiontothecontextualelementsrequiredforallcrimesagainsthumanitysetoutinelements4
and5oftheabovelistedElementsofCrimes,thefollowingneedstobeproven:
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a.Materialelements
Elements 1 and 2 of the abovelisted Elements of Crimes constitute the material elements of
deportationandforcibletransfer.
1. The perpetrator deported or forcibly transferred, without grounds permitted under
internationallaw,oneormorepersonstoanotherStateorlocation,byexpulsionorother
coerciveacts.
According to the Elements of Crimes, the term forcibly is to be interpreted broadly and is not
restrictedtophysicalforce,butmayincludethreatofforceorcoercion,suchasthatcausedbyfear
of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or
personsoranotherperson,orbytakingadvantageofacoerciveenvironment.[ElementsofCrimes,
footnote12].Similarly,attheICTYforceddisplacementisnotlimitedtophysicalforcebutincludes
the threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention,
psychologicaloppressionorabuseofpoweragainstsuchpersonorpersonsoranotherperson,orby
takingadvantageofacoerciveenvironment.[Prosecutorvorevi,ICTYA.Ch.,27January2014,
para. 727 quoting Prosecutor v Staki, ICTY A. Ch., 22 March 2006, para. 281]. The question is
whether the victims had no genuine choice [Prosecutorvorevi, ICTY A. Ch., 27 January 2014,
para. 727 Prosecutor v Staki, ICTY A. Ch., 22 March 2006, para. 279]. According to PreTrial
ChamberIIinRutoetal.,variousconductcanamounttoexpulsionorothercoerciveacts,forcing
thevictimtoleave[ProsecutorvRutoetal.,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0901/11373,23January2012,
para.244].ThePreTrialChamberconsideredkilling,looting,burninganddestructionofpropertyas
thecoerciveactsthroughwhichthedisplacementoccurred[ProsecutorvRutoetal.,ICCPT.Ch.II,
ICC01/0901/11373Red, 23 January 2012, paras. 251, 255, 260261, 265266, 277]. In Muthaura
et al. PreTrial Chamber II held that the destruction of homes, killings, injuries, rapes and public
announcements that people of a certain ethnicity must leave amounted to coercion causing the
residents to leave their homes [ProsecutorvMuthauraetal., ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0902/11382
Red,23January2012,paras.244,279].
PreTrialChamberIIin Rutoetal.emphasizedthattoprovedeportationorforcibletransferalink
needs to be established between the perpetrators conduct and the resulting effect of forcing the
victim to leave the area to another State or location [ProsecutorvRutoetal., ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC
01/0901/11373,23January2012,para.245seealsoProsecutorvPopovietal.,ICTYT.Ch.II,10
June2010,para.893].
Although Article7(1)(d) refers to deportation or forcible transfer of population, the Elements of
Crimesclarifythatthetransferofonepersoncansuffice[WerleandJessberger,2014,p.358].
Thedisplacementhastooccurwithoutgroundspermittedunderinternationallaw.TheICTYAppeals
Chamber in orevi pointed out that as with all other elements of the crime this is for the
Prosecution to prove [see Prosecutor v orevi, ICTY A. Ch., 27 January 2014, para. 705].
International humanitarian law, for example, permits displacement for certain reasons, such as for
thesecurityofthepopulation/civiliansinvolvedorincaseofimperativemilitaryreasons,andunder
certain conditions (e.g. Article 49 Geneva Convention IV, Article 17 AdditionalProtocolII). PreTrial
ChamberIIinNtagandaconsideredthattheactsofdisplacementwerenotjustifiedbythesecurity
of the civilians involved or by military necessity, as there [was] no indication of any precautionary
measures having been taken before these acts of displacement were carried out or any reasons
linked to the conduct of military operations. [Prosecutor v Ntaganda, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC0104
02/06309, 9 June 2014, para. 68]. Although displacement for humanitarian reasons is allowed in
certain situations, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that this does not apply where the
humanitarian crisis that caused the displacement is itself the result of the accuseds own unlawful
activity.[Prosecutor v Staki, ICTY A. Ch., 22 March 2006, para. 287]. Human rights instruments
provide for other grounds permitting displacement in certain circumstances [see e.g. Article 12(3)
ICCPRHall,2008,p.251WerleandJessberger,2014,p.359].
2. Such person or persons were lawfully present in the area from which they were so
deportedortransferred.
Thequestionofwhetherthelawfulnessofthevictimspresenceistobedeterminedundernationalor
internationallawwasdebatedduringthenegotiationsoftheRomeStatute,butwasultimatelyleftfor
theCourttodecide[Robinson,2001,p.87settingoutthedifferentpositionsduringthenegotiations
for a determination under international law, Werle and Jessberger, 2014 p. 360 considering lawful
presenceundernationalorinternationallawsufficient,Hall,2008,p.248seealsoCryeretal.,2014,
footnote 147]. For the purpose of confirming charges against Bosco Ntaganda, PreTrial Chamber II
considered that absent any indication to the contrary in the evidence, the civilians displaced were
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lawfully present in the relevant locations [ProsecutorvNtaganda, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC010402/06
309,9June2014,para.68seealsoProsecutorvRutoetal.ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0901/11373,23
January 2012, paras. 251, 255, 261]. ICTY Trial Chamber II in Popovi et al. opined that lawfully
present should not be equated to the legal concept of lawful residence, but understood in its
commonmeaning[ProsecutorvPopovietal.,(CaseNo.IT0588T),ICTYT.Ch.II,10June2010,
para.900].
b.Mentalelements
Withrespecttothefirstmaterialelement,Article30applies[Robinson,2001,p.88].AttheICTY,the
intent to displace the victim permanently is not required for deportation or forcible transfer
[Prosecutor v Staki, (Case No. IT9724), ICTY a. Ch., 22 March 2006, paras. 278, 307, 317 see
however,WerleandJessberger,2014,p.361].
With respect to the second material element, element 3 of the Elements of Crimes clarifies that
awarenessofthefactualcircumstancesestablishingthelawfulnessofthevictimspresencesuffices.
It is not required that the perpetrator make any legal evaluation of the lawfulness of the victims
presence[Robinson,2001,p.88].
Crossreferences:
1.Articles7(2)(d),8(2)(a)(vii),8(2)(b)(viii),8(2)(e)(viii),30
2.ElementsofCrimes
Doctrine:
1. GuidoAcquaviva,"Forced Displacement and International Crimes", UNHCR Legal and Protection
PolicyResearchSeries,DivisionofInternationalProtection,June2011.
2.RobertCryeretal.(Eds.),http://www.legaltools.org/doc/f691a2/AnIntroductiontoInternational
Criminal Law and Procedure, Third Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 247
248.
3. Christopher K. Hall, "Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity", B.I.2 (d) "Deportation or forcible
transfer of population", and B.II.(d) Prohibited movements of population, in http://www.legal
tools.org/doc/a9e9f7/Otto Triffterer (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court Observers Notes, Article by Article, Second Edition, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos,
Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,2008,pp.194200,247251.
4.DarrylRobinson,"Article7(1)(d)CrimeAgainstHumanityofDeportationOrForcibleTransferof
Population",inRoyS.Lee(Ed.),The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of
ProcedureandEvidence,TransnationalPublishers,Ardsley,NewYork,2001,pp.8688.
5.WilliamA.Schabas,TheInternationalCriminalCourt:ACommentaryontheRomeStatute,Oxford
UniversityPress,Oxford,2010,pp.163165.
6.GerhardWerle/FlorianJessberger,Principles of International Criminal Law, Third Edition, Oxford
UniversityPress,Oxford,2014,pp.357361.
Author: Barbara Goy (The views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily
reflecttheviewsoftheMechanismforInternationalCriminalTribunals,theICTYortheUnitedNations
ingeneral.)
Article7(1)(e)
[50] (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamentalrulesofinternationallaw
GeneralRemarks
AlthoughimprisonmentwasnotincludedintheNurembergandTokyoCharters,ithasbeenincluded
as a crime against humanity in subsequent instruments, including the ICTY and ICTR statutes [Hall,
2008,p.200].NoneofthejudgmentsbeforetheICChaveaddressedtheelementsofthiscrime.
Analysis
i.Definition
ThefulltextofArticle7(1)(e)readsImprisonmentorotherseveredeprivationofphysicallibertyin
violation of fundamental rules of international law. There is no provision in Article 7(2) further
addressingthiscrime.
ii.Requirements
a.Materialelements
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Thetwoalternativesofimprisonmentandseverdeprivationofphysicallibertyseemtosuggestthat
thetermimprisonmentshouldbeunderstoodinanarrowsense,asimprisonmentafterconvictionby
a court [Hall, 2008, p. 201]. However, according to the definition, this imprisonment has to be in
violationoffundamentalrulesofinternationallaw.Togetherthetwoconceptscoverabroadrangeof
arbitrarydeprivationsofliberty[Hall,2008,p.202].
The Statute does not contain any clear guidance as to what constitute a severe deprivation of
liberty. The use of the word other indicates that imprisonment already meets the threshold for
severeandthismightbeofsomeassistanceininterpretingtheterm.Furthermore,accordingtothe
ElementsofCrimes,oneoftheelementsarethat[t]hegravityoftheconductwassuchthatitwasin
violation of fundamental rules of international law. Presumably the drafters did not intend to
introduce a new gravityelement that was not foreseen in the Statute [see Hall, 2008, p. 204].
Therefore, this element must be a reference to severe in the Statute. The meaning of the term
severe is then merely that the severe deprivation of liberty (including imprisonment) must be in
violationoffundamentalrulesofinternationallaw.
NeithertheStatutenortheElementsofCrimesspecifywhichthefundamentalrulesofinternational
laware.
b.Mentalelements
Article7doesnotgiveanyguidanceastohowthemensreashouldbeunderstood.Inthisrespect,
Article 30 applies and the material elements must be committed with intent and knowledge. The
authorreferstothecommentaryofArticle30fordiscussiononthemensreaforimprisonmentasa
crimeagainsthumanity.
In addition, the Elements of Crimes specifies that the perpetrator must have been aware of the
factual circumstances that established the gravity of the conduct. In this respect, one author
commented that there was general agreement among the drafters that the prosecutor need not
prove that the perpetrator made any legal evaluation that the imprisonment was in violation of
fundamentalrulesofinternationallaw[Robinson,2001,p.89].
Crossreferences:
1.Article8(2)(a)(vii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine
1. Cherif M. Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity Historical Evolution and Contemporary
Application",CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2011,pp.443445.
2. Christopher K. Hall, "Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity, (e) 'Imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty', in Otto Triffterer (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court Observers Notes, Article by Article, Second Edition, C.H.
Beck/Hart/Nomos,Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,2008,pp.200205.
PermanentInternationalCriminalCourtLegalandPolicyIssues,HartPublishing,2004,p.193.
4. Darryl Robinson, "Article 7(1)(e)Crime Against Humanity of Imprisonment or Other Severe
DeprivationofPhysicalLiberty",inRoyS.Lee(Ed.),TheInternationalCriminalCourtElementsof
CrimesandRulesofProcedureandEvidence,TransnationalPublishers,Ardsley,NewYork,2001,pp.
8889.
Article7(1)(f)
[51](f)Torture
GeneralRemarks
Accordingtooneauthor,therewasageneralsupportthroughoutthedraftingprocessfortheinclusion
of torture as a crime against humanity [Hall, 2008, p. 205]. There was, however, a considerable
debateaboutthedefinitionofthiscrime[Hall,2008,p.205].
Analysis
i.Definition
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AccordingtoArticle7(2)(e)andElementsofCrimes,torturemeanstheintentionalinflictionofsevere
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of
the accused except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidentalto,lawfulsanctions.
Notably, the definition in the Statute does not include a requirement that the infliction of pain or
sufferingwasdoneforaspecificpurpose[ElementsofCrimes, footnote 14]. Such a requirement is
includedinthetorturedefinitionintheTortureConvention,aswellasinthedefinitionoftortureasa
warcrimeintheStatute.Further,thedefinitiondoesnotincludearequirementofaconnectiontoa
publicofficial[seevonHebelandRobinson,1999,p.99].
ii.Requirements
a.Materialelements
Thetwomaterialelementsare1)theinflictionofseverephysicalormentalpainorsuffering,and2)
thatthisinflictionisonapersonincustodyorunderthecontroloftheperpetrator.Withregardtothe
severity requirement, the PreTrial Chamber in the case Prosecutor v. Bemba considered that it is
constantly accepted in applicable treaties and jurisprudence that an important degree of pain and
sufferinghastobereached[ProsecutorvBemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)
(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatuteontheChargesoftheProsecutorAgainstJeanPierreBembaGombo,
ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 193]. Arguably, this adds very little or nothing to the
understandingofthewordsevereinthedefinition.
Torture in the sense of the Statute does not include infliction of pain or suffering that arises only
from, are inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions. According to one author, lawful refers to
internationallawornationallaw,whichisconsistentwithinternationallawandstandards[Hall,2008,
p.253].However,theStatuteitself,aswellastheElementsofCrimes,aresilentonthisissue.
b.Mentalelements
Article7(2)(e)includesthewordintentional,whichmeansthatArticle30,stating[u]nlessotherwise
provided, is not applicable with regard to the crime of torture. The PreTrial Chamber in the case
Prosecutor v. Bemba concluded that the use of the term intentional excluded the separate
requirement of knowledge set out in Article 30(2) of the Statute and that it was therefore not
necessarytodemonstratethattheperpetratorknewthattheharminflictedwassevere[Prosecutorv
Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the
ChargesoftheProsecutorAgainstJeanPierreBembaGombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009,
para.194].
Crossreferences
1.Articles8(2)(a)(ii)and8(2)(c)(i)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine
1. Cherif M. Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity Historical Evolution and Contemporary
Application",CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2011,pp.411419.
2. Christopher K. Hall, "Article 7 Crimes Against Humanity, (f) 'Torture' and (e) 'Torture', in Otto
Triffterer(Ed.),Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Observers
Notes, Article by Article, Second Edition, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,
2008,pp.205206,251255.
Permanent International Criminal Court Legal and Policy Issues, Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland,
2004,pp.194195.
4. Darryl Robinson, "Article 7(1)(f)Crime Against Humanity of Torture", in Roy S. Lee (Ed.), The
TransnationalPublishers,Ardsley,NewYork,2001,pp.9092.
6. Alexander Zahar, "Torture", in Antonio Cassese et al. (Eds.), The Oxford Companion to
Article7(1)(g)1
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Article7(1)(g)1
[52](g)Rape,
Rape is considered the most severe form of sexual violence. Sexual violence is a broad term that
covers all forms of acts of a sexual nature under coercive circumstances, including rape. The key
element that separates rape from other acts is penetration. The ElementsofCrime provide a more
specificdefinitionofthecriminalconduct.Rapefallsunderthechapeausofgenocide,crimesagainst
humanityorwarcrimesunderspecificcircumstances,confirmedboththroughtheRomeStatuteand
through the case law of the ICTR and the ICTY. In order for rape to rise to the level of a crime
against humanity, it must be perpetrated within the context of a widespread or systematic attack
aimed at a civilian population. Combatants cannot thus be victims of rape as a crime against
humanity.Theattackmustalsoaimatasignificantnumberofvictims.Thisdoesnotprecludeasingle
rapefromconstitutingacrimeagainsthumanity,ifperpetratedwithinthecontextofawidespreador
systematicattack.Theunderlyingact,suchasrape,doesnothavetobethesameastheotheracts
committedduringtheattack.
Forthementalelementofrapearticle30applies.Theperpetratorhastohaveknowledgeoftheact
beingpartofasystematicattackorthefactualcircumstancesofawidespreadattack.Itissufficientif
he or she intended to further such an attack. He or she must also have intended to penetrate the
victimsbodyandbeawarethatthepenetrationwasbyforceorthreatofforce.
The definition of rape is the same regarding rape as genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes,albeitthecontextualelementsofthechapeausdiffer.Theactusreusoftheviolationisfound
intheElementsofCrimes.Thedefinitionfocusesonpenetrationwith1)asexualorganofanybody
part,or2)withtheuseofanobjectoranyotherpartofthebodyoftheanalorgenitalopeningofthe
victim,committedbyforceorthreatorforceorcoercion.Anypartofthebodyunderpoint1refers
to vaginal, anal and oral penetration with the penis and may also be interpreted as ears, nose and
eyesofthevictim.Point2referstoobjectsortheuseoffingers,handsortongueoftheperpetrator.
Coercionmayarisethroughfearofviolence,duress,detention,psychologicaloppressionorabuseof
power. These situations are provided as examples, apparent through the use of the term such as.
Consent is automatically vitiated in such situations. The definition is intentionally genderneutral,
indicating that both men and women can be perpetrators or victims. The definition of rape found in
the Elements of Crimes is heavily influenced by the legal reasoning in cases regarding rape of the
ICTY and the ICTR. Such cases can thus further elucidate the interpretation of the elements of the
crime, meanwhile also highlighting different approaches to the main elements of rape, including
forceandnonconsent.Seee.g.Furundzija,inwhichtheTrialChamberoftheICTYheldthatforce
orthreatofforceconstitutesthemainelementofrape.SeeProsecutorv.Furundzija,10December
1998, ICTY, Case No. IT9517/1T. To the contrary, the latter case of Kunarac emphasized the
element of nonconsent as the most essential in establishing rape, in that it corresponds to the
protectionofsexualautonomy.Prosecutorv.Kunarac,KovacandVukovic,22February2001,ICTY,
CaseNo.IT9623and23/1.AstothetermcoerciontheICTRTrialChamberinAkayesuheldthata
coerciveenvironmentdoesnotrequirephysicalforce.Italsoadoptedabroadapproachtotheactus
reus,includingalsotheuseofobjects,anapproachthathasbeenembracedalsobytheICTYandthe
ICC(Prosecutorv.JeanPaulAkayesu,2September1998,ICTR,CaseNo.ICTR964T,para.598).
Rule63 is of importance which holds that the Courts Chambers cannot require corroboration to
prove any crime within its jurisdiction, particularly crimes of sexual violence. Rule 70 further
delineates the possibility of introducing evidence of consent as a defense. This is highly limited,
emphasizing that consent cannot be inferred in coercive circumstances. Rule71 forbids evidence of
priorsexualconduct.
SeveralcasesastheICCincludechargesofrapeasacrimeagainsthumanity.ThisincludesPre
TrialChamberIIIinBemba,forcrimescommittedintheCentralAfricanRepublic,20022003.Bemba
ischargedwithrapeasacrimeagainsthumanityandwarcrime.Inthe2009confirmationofcharges
decisionintheBembacase,PreTrialChamberIIdismissedchargesofrapeastortureandoutrages
upon personal dignity, solely confirming charges of rape. The Chamber held that including the
distinctive charges would constitute cumulative charging and be detrimental to the rights of the
Defence.SeeICC01/0501/08424,para.202.
In Prosecutor v Katanga, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC01/0401/0771730
September2008,theChamberreferredtotheAkayesujudgmentontheinterpretationofacoercive
environment. It held that threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on
fearordesperationmayconstitutecoercion,andcoercionmaybeinherentincertaincircumstances,
such as armed conflict or military presence. Para. 440 in Katanga and para. 688 of Akayesu,Case
No IT964T, Trial Judgment, 2 September 1998, ICTR. The Chamber found sufficient evidence to
confirmchargesthatmembersoftheFNIandFRPIbyforceorthreatinvadedthebodyofwomenand
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girlsabductedinthevillageofBogoro.Seepara.442.
InProsecutorvKenyatta,Decisionontheconfirmationofchargespursuanttoarticle61(7)(a)and
(b) of the Rome Statute against Kenyatta, ICC01/0902/11, 23 January 2012, para. 257, the
Chamber confirmed that there were substantial grounds to believe widespread rapes had been
perpetratedsufficienttorisetothelevelofcrimesagainsthumanity.
Several arrest warrants confirm reasonable grounds to believe that rape as crimes against
humanity have been committed. See e.g. Prosecutor v Gbagbo, Warrant of arrest ICC02/11, 23
November2011,para8reasonablegroundstobelievethatcrimesagainsthumanityintheformof
rape and sexual violence were committed in Cote dIvoire Prosecutor v Ntaganda, Second arrest
warrant, para. 38 reasonable grounds to believe, that crimes of rape and sexual slavery were
committed as part of the attacks in different locations in Ituri Prosecutor v Ahmad Harun and Ali
Kushayb, PreTrial Chamber I, Warrant of Arresthttp://www.legaltools.org/doc/cfa830/, ICC02/05
01/07, 27 April 2007 found reasonable grounds to believe that Harun and Kushayb, through the
direction of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Janjaweed committed rapes of women and girls of
certainethnicgroups.InProsecutorvAlBashir,SecondWarrantofArrest,ICC02/0501/09,12July
2010, the PreTrial Chamber found reasonable grounds to establish rape as a crimes against
humanity. In Prosecutor v Kony, Warrant of Arrest, ICC02/0401/05, 27 September 2005 PreTrial
Chamber II also found reasonable grounds to establish rape and sexual slavery as crimes against
humanity.
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(b)(xxii)and8(2)(e)(vi)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1.AntonioCasseseatpp.374375inAntonioCassese/PaolaGaeta/JohnR.W.D.Jones.
2.GerhardWerleatpp.248250,MN723727.
3.MacheldBootatpp.141142,MN4546inOttoTriffterer.
4.AnneMarieL.M.deBrouwer,SupranationalCriminalProsecutionofSexualViolence,Intersentia,
2005,pp.103135.
5.M.CherifBassiouni,CrimesagainstHumanity,HistoricalEvolutionandContemporaryApplication,
Cambridge,2011,pp.440442.
Author:
MariaSjholm
Article7(1)(g)2
[53]sexualslavery,
Sexual slavery is a particular form of enslavement which includes limitations on one's autonomy,
freedom of movement and power to decide matters relating to one's sexual activity. Although it is
listedasaseparateoffenceintheRomeStatute,itisregardedasaparticularformofenslavement.
However, whereas enslavement is solely considered a crime against humanity, sexual slavery may
constitute either a war crime or a crime against humanity. It is partly based on the definition of
enslavement identified as customary international law by the ICTY in the Kunarac case. See
Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, 22 February 2001, ICTY, Case No. IT9623 and 23/1,
para. 543. Sexual slavery is thus considered a form of enslavement with a sexual component. Its
definition is found in the Elements of Crimes and includes the exercise of any or all of the powers
attachedtotherightofownershipoveroneormorepersons,suchasbypurchasing,selling,lending
orbarteringsuchapersonorpersons,orbyimposingonthemasimilardeprivationofliberty.The
personshouldhavebeenmadetoengageinactsofasexualnature.Thecrimealsoincludesforced
marriages, domestic servitude or other forced labour that ultimately involves forced sexual activity.
Incontrasttothecrimeofrape,whichisacompletedoffence,sexualslaveryconstitutesacontinuing
offence.
In Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC01/0401/07717, Decision on the confirmation of
charges,30September2008,para.431,PTCIheldthat"sexualslaveryalsoencompassessituations
wherewomenandgirlsareforcedinto'marriage',domesticservitudeorotherforcedlabourinvolving
compulsory sexual activity, including rape, by their captors. Forms of sexual slavery can, for
example, be practices such as the detention of women in 'rape camps' or 'comfort stations', forced
temporary 'marriages' to soldiers and other practices involving the treatment of women as chattel,
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and as such, violations of the peremptory norm prohibiting slavery." The Chamber found sufficient
evidencetoaffirmchargesofsexualslaveryascrimesagainsthumanityintheformofwomenbeing
abducted for the purpose of using them as wives, being forced or threatened to engage in sexual
intercourse with combatants, to serve as sexual slaves and to work in military camps servicing
soldiers.Seepara.434.
TheSCSLAppealsChamberintheBrimacasehasfoundtheabductionandconfinementofwomen
to constitute forced marriage and consequently a crime against humanity. The Chamber concluded
that forced marriage was distinct from sexual slavery. Accordingly, While forced marriage shares
certainelementswithsexualslaverysuchasnonconsensualsexanddeprivationofliberty,thereare
alsodistinguishingfactors.First,forcedmarriageinvolvesaperpetratorcompellingapersonbyforce
orthreatofforce,throughthewordsorconductoftheperpetratororthoseassociatedwithhim,into
aforcedconjugalassociationwithanotherpersonresultingingreatsuffering,orseriousphysicalor
mental injury on the part of the victim. Second, unlike sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a
relationship of exclusivity between the husband and wife, which could lead to disciplinary
consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement. See Prosecutor v Brima, Case No. SCSL
200416A,AppealsJudgment,22February2008,para.195.In2012theCourtinadecisiononthe
CharlesTaylorcasedeclareditspreferenceforthetermforcedconjugalslavery.TheTrialChamber
didnotfindthetermmarriagetobehelpfulindescribingtheeventsthathadoccurred,inthatitdid
not constitute marriage in the universally understood sense, ProsecutorvTaylor, SCSL0301T, 18
May2012,para.427.
SeveralarrestwarrantsattheICCconfirmreasonablegroundstobelievethatsexualslaveryhas
been committed as part of attacks on civilian population and thus constituting crimes against
humanity.SeeSecondArrestWarrantv.BoscoNtaganda,ICC01/0402/06,13July2012,Warrantof
Arrest against Joseph Kony, ICC02/0401/05, PreTrial Chamber II, 27 September 2005, para. 38
andWarrantofArrestagainstVincentOtti,ICC02/04,8July2005,PreTrialChamberII,para.17.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1.MacheldBootatp.143144,MN47and50inOttoTriffterer.
3.Cryer,Robertetal., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 2nd ed., 2010,
Cambridge,p.256.
4.AnneMarie L.M. de Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence, Intersentia,
2005,pp.137141.
Author:
MariaSjholm
Article7(1)(g)3
[54]enforcedprostitution,
TheElementsofCrimesrequiresthe1)causingorapersontoengageinactsofasexualnature2)
byforceorthreatofforceorundercoercivecircumstancesand3)theperpetratororanotherperson
obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary or other advantage in exchange for or in connection with
theacts.Primarilythelatterpointdistinguishesitfromsexualslavery.Itcanalsobedistinguishedin
that sexual slavery requires the exercise or any or all of the powers attaching to the rights of
ownership. Enforced prostitution could, however, rise to the level of sexual slavery, should the
elementsofbothcrimesexist.Incomparisonwithrapeandsexualslavery,enforcedprostitutioncan
either be a continuing offence or constitute a separate act. Enforced prostitution is prohibited in the
Geneva Convention IV 1949 as an example of an attack on a womans honour and in Additional
ProtocolIasanoutrageuponpersonaldignity.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
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Doctrine:
1.MacheldBootatp.143144,MN4850inOttoTriffterer.
2.GerhardWerleatp.251,MN729730.
Cambridge,,pp.256257.
2005,pp.141142.
Author:
MariaSjholm
Article7(1)(g)4
[55]forcedpregnancy,
According to article7(2)(f) forced pregnancy means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly
made pregnant. Unlawful confinement should be interpreted as any form of deprivation of physical
liberty contrary to international law. The deprivation of liberty does not have to be severe and no
specific time frame is required. The use of force is not required, but some form of coercion. To
complete the crime, it is sufficient if the perpetrator holds a woman imprisoned who has been
impregnatedbysomeoneelse.Theforcibleimpregnationmayinvolverapeorotherformsofsexual
violenceofcomparablegravity.Inadditiontothementalrequirementsinarticle30,theperpetrator
mustactwiththepurposeofaffectingtheethniccompositionofanypopulationorcarryingoutother
grave violations of international law. National laws prohibiting abortion do not amount to forced
pregnancy.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1.MacheldBootatpp.144and164165,MN51and108111inOttoTriffterer.
Cambridge,p.257.
2005,pp.143146.
Author:
MariaSjholm
Article7(1)(g)5
[56]enforcedsterilization,
Enforcedsterilizationisaformof"[i]mposingmeasuresintendedtopreventbirthswithinthegroup"
withinthemeaningofarticle6(e).Itiscarriedoutwithouttheconsentofaperson.Genuineconsent
isnotgivenwhenthevictimhasbeendeceived.Enforcedsterilizationincludesdeprivingapersonof
theirbiologicalreproductivecapacity,whichisnotjustifiedbythemedicaltreatmentoftheperson.It
doesnotincludenonpermanentbirthcontrolmethods.Itisnotrestrictedtomedicaloperationsbut
can also include the intentional use of chemicals for this effect. It arguably includes vicious rapes
wherethereproductivesystemhasbeendestroyed.TheElementsofCrimeprovideamorespecific
definitionofthecriminalconduct.Forthementalelementarticle30applies.Enforcedsterilizationmay
alsofallunderthechapeauofgenocideifsuchintentispresent.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1.MacheldBootatp.144,MN52inOttoTriffterer.
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Cambridge,p.257258.
2005,p.146.
Author:
MariaSjholm
Article7(1)(g)6
[57]oranyotherformofsexualviolenceofcomparablegravity
Theprovisionhasacatchallcharacterandrequiresthattheconductiscomparableingravitytothe
otheractslistedinarticle7(1)(g). It concerns acts of a sexual nature against a person through the
use of force or threat of force or coercion. The importance of distinguishing the different forms of
sexualviolenceprimarilyliesinthelevelofharmtowhichthevictimissubjectedandthedegreeof
severity,andthereforebecomesamatterofsentencing.
Itisgenerallyheldtoincludeforcednudity,forcedmasturbationorforcedtouchingofthebody.The
ICTRinAkayesuheldthatsexualviolenceisnotlimitedtophysicalinvasionofthehumanbodyand
may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact. See Prosecutor v
Akayesu, ICTR964T, 2 September 1998, para. 688. The Trial Chamber in the case confirmed that
forced public nudity was an example of sexual violence within its jurisdiction. See para. 10 A.
Similarly,theTrialChamberoftheICTYinitsKvockadecisiondeclared:sexualviolenceisbroader
thanrapeandincludessuchcrimesassexualslaveryormolestation,andalsocoverssexualactsthat
donotinvolvephysicalcontact,suchasforcedpublicnudity.SeeProsecutorvKvocka,2November
2001, ICTY, Case No. IT9830/1T, para. 180. To the contrary, in the decision on the Prosecutors
application for a warrant of arrest in the Bemba case, the PreTrial Chamber of the ICC did not
include a charge of sexual violence as a crime against humanity in the arrest warrant, which had
beenbasedonallegationsthatthetroopsinquestionhadforcedwomentoundressinpublicinorder
tohumiliatethem,statingthatthefactssubmittedbytheProsecutordonotconstituteotherformsof
sexual violence of comparable gravity to the other forms of sexual violence set forth inArticle7(1)
(g),Prosecutor v Bemba,Decision on the Prosecutors Application for a Warrant of Arrest against
JeanPierreBembaGombo,ICC01/0501/08,10June2008,para.40.
In the Lubanga case of the ICC, evidence of sexual violence was presented during the trial,
includingvariousformsofsexualabuseofgirlsoldierswhowereforcefullyconscripted.However,no
charges of sexual violence were brought. The Prosecution rather encouraged the Trial Chamber to
consider evidence of sexual violence as an integral element of the recruitment and use of child
soldiers, see Prosecutor v Lubanga, Prosecution's closing brief, ICC01/0401/062748Red, 1 June
2011, paras. 139, 142 and 205. In the confirmation of charges in the MuthauraandKenyatta case,
PreTrialChamberIIchosenottochargeforcedmalecircumcisionandpenileamputationassexual
violence,butratherasinhumaneacts.TheChamberheldthattheevidenceplacedbeforeitdoesnot
establish the sexual nature of the acts of forcible circumcision and penile amputation. Instead, it
appearsfromtheevidencethattheactsweremotivatedbyethnicprejudice,ProsecutorvMuthaura
and Kenyatta, Decision on the Confinnation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the
RomeStatute,ICC01/0902/11382Red,23January2012,para.266.Itarguedthatnoteveryact
ofviolencewhichtargetspartsofthebodycommonlyassociatedwithsexualityshouldbeconsidered
anactofsexualviolence.Seepara.265.
Crossreference:
Articles8(2)(b)(xxii)and8(2)(e)(vi)
Doctrine:
1.MacheldBootatpp.144145,MN53inOttoTriffterer.
2.GerhardWerleatpp.252253,MN734
3. R. Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 2nd ed., 2010,
Cambridge,p.258259
2005,pp.147152.
Author:
MariaSjholm
Article7(1)(h)
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Article7(1)(h)
[58] (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national,ethnic,cultural,religious,genderasdefinedinparagraph3,orothergroundsthat
areuniversallyrecognizedasimpermissibleunderinternationallaw,inconnectionwithany
actreferredtointhisparagraphoranycrimewithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt
A.Generalremarks
Persecution has been included in every instrument defining crimes against humanity. Arguably, it is
central to the concept of crimes against humanity, as being an act not criminalized also as a war
crimeorasanordinarycrime.Itseekstocriminalizemassiveviolationsofhumanrights,committed
on discriminatory grounds. There was controversy among the drafters with regard to including
persecutionasacrimeagainsthumanityintheICCStatute,aswellastothecrimesexactdefinition
[vonHebelandRobinson,1999,p.101].Thecrimeofpersecutionhasbeenextensivelydealtwithin
thecaselawoftheICTY[seeNilsson,2011].NoneofthejudgmentsbeforetheICChaveaddressed
theelementsofthiscrime.
B.Analysis
i.Definition
The full text of the definition of persecution in Article 7(1)(h) reads: Persecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as
defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdictionoftheCourt.Article7(2)(g) sets out that persecution means the intentional and severe
deprivationoffundamentalrightscontrarytointernationallawbyreasonoftheidentityofthegroup
orcollectivity.
In this respect, the ICC Statute differs significantly from other legal instruments, which include a
considerably more succinct provision. For example, the equivalent provision in the Nuremberg
Charter (reproduced in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes), reads: persecution on political, racial or
religious grounds. The reason for the more elaborate definition was a concern among many
delegations at the Rome Conference that persecution might be interpreted to include any kind of
discriminatorypractices[WitschelandRckert,2001,pp.9495].
The Elements of Crimes clarifies that the perpetrator must have targeted one or more persons
[Elements of Crimes, Article 7(1)(h), nos 12]. Besides that, the Elements of Crimes do not add
anythingtothetextintheStatuteitself.
ii.Requirements
a.Materialelements
The material elements of persecution are: 1) severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to
international law 2) on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international
lawand3)inconnectionwithanyactreferredtoinArticle7(1)oranycrimewithinthejurisdictionof
theCourt.Accordingtoonecommentator,therequirementofconnectionwithothercrimesmeansin
practice war crimes, as [p]rosecuting persecution in the presence of genocide would also be totally
redundant [Schabas, 2010, p. 177]. Another commentator argues that [i]n practical terms, the
requirement should not prove unduly restrictive, as a quick review of historical acts of persecution
showsthatpersecutionisinevitablyaccompaniedbysuchinhumaneacts[Robinson,1999,p.55].
With regard to the element of severe deprivation of fundamental rights, the charges confirmed
beforetheICCuntilnowhavebeenlimitedtosuchcrimeswhichhavealsobeenchargedseparately
asothercrimesagainsthumanity[ProsecutorvGbagbo,ICCPT.Ch.I,DecisionontheConfirmation
ofChargesagainstLaurentGbagbo, ICC02/1101/11656Red, 12 June 2014, para. 204, compared
withparas193199ProsecutorvMuthauraetal.,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0902/11382Red,Decision
ontheConfirmationofChargesPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatute,23January
2012, para. 283, compared with paras 233, 243, 257, 270271, 275277 Prosecutor v Ruto et al.,
ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0901/11373, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, 23 January 2012, paras 271272, compared with paras 225
226,228239,241242,248251,253266].
b.Mentalelements
The definition in Article 7 sets out that the severe deprivation of fundamental rights must be
committed intentionally. In addition, it expresses that the deprivation must be committed on
discriminatory grounds. Finally, with regard to the third material element mentioned above (in
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connection with any act referred to in Article 7(1) or any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court),theElementsofCrimesclarifiesthatnoadditionalmentalelementisnecessary[Elementsof
Crimes,p.10,footnote22].
C.Crossreferences
ElementsofCrime
D.Doctrine
1. Dermot Groome, Persecution, Antonio Cassese (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to International
CriminalJustice,OxfordUniversityPress,2009,pp.453454
2. Christopher K. Hall, Article 7 Crimes against humanity, (h) Persecution, Otto Triffterer (Ed.),
CommentaryontheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourtObserversNotes,Articleby
Article,SecondEdition,C.H.Beck/Hart/Nomos,Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,2008,pp.216221
3. Herman Von Hebel/Darryl Robinson, RoyS.Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court The
MakingoftheRomeStatuteIssues,Negotiations,Results,KluwerLawInternational,1999,pp.90
103
4.TimothyL.H.McCormack,CrimesAgainstHumanity,DominicMcGoldrick/PeterRowe/EricDonnelly
(Eds),ThepermanentInternationalCriminalCourtLegalandPolicyIssues,HartPublishing,Oxford
andPortlandOregon,2004,pp.196197
5.JonasNilsson,TheCrimeofPersecutionintheICTYCaseLaw,BertSwart/AlexanderZahar/Gran
Sluiter,TheLegacyoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslavia,OxfordUniversity
Press,2011,pp.219246.
OxfordUniversityPress,2010,pp.175180
7. Georg Witschel/Wiebke Rckert, Article 7(1)(h)Crime Against Humanity of Persecution, Roy S.
Lee (Ed.), The International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and
Evidence,TransnationalPublishers,Inc.,2001,pp.9497
Author:
JonasNilsson
Article7(1)(i)
[59](i)Enforceddisappearanceofpersons
A.Generalremarks
The systematic practice of enforced disappearance was considered the nature of crimes against
humanity by the UN General Assembly through a resolution in 1992 [UN GA res. 47/133, 18
December 1992, preamble]. Similarly, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
fromEnforcedDisappearancestatesthatenforceddisappearanceincertaincircumstancesdefinedin
internationallawconstitutesacrimeagainsthumanity.NoneofthejudgmentsbeforetheICChave
addressedtheelementsofthiscrime.
ThecomplexnatureofthecrimeisacknowledgedintheElementsofCrimes:itisrecognizedthat
its commission will normally involve more than one perpetrator as a part of a common criminal
purpose[ElementsofCrimes,footnote23].
B.Analysis
i.Definition
According to Article 7(2)(i), enforced disappearance of persons means the arrest, detention or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or political
organization,followedbyarefusaltoacknowledgethatdeprivationoffreedomortogiveinformation
onthefateorwhereaboutsofthosepersons,withtheintentionofremovingthemfromtheprotection
ofthelawforaprolongedperiodoftime.TheElementsofCrimesclarifiesthatboththedeprivation
of liberty and the refusal to acknowledge this deprivation or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of such person or persons must have been carried out by, or with the authorization,
supportoracquiescenceof,aStateorpoliticalorganization.
ii.Requirements
a.Materialelements
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The two central material elements are 1) an arrest, detention or abduction of a person or persons,
and 2) a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons. According to the Elements of Crimes, there must be an objective
nexusbetweenthesematerialelements[ElementsofCrimes,Article7(1)(i),item2].
Furthermore,thedeprivationoflibertyneedstohavebeencarriedoutby,orwiththeauthorization,
supportoracquiescenceof,aStateorpoliticalorganization.Inthisrespect,thereisanoverlapwith
oneofthegeneralelementsofcrimesagainsthumanity:partofawidespreadorsystematicattack
directed against any civilian population, with attack being defined as a course of conduct []
pursuanttoorinfurtheranceofaStateororganizationalpolicytocommitsuchattack[Article7(1),
and(2)(a)].
b.Mentalelements
According to the Elements of Crimes, the perpetrator must be aware that the deprivation of liberty
would be followed in the ordinary course of events by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedomortogiveinformationonthefateorwhereaboutsofsuchpersonorpersonsorthat[s]uch
refusalwasprecededoraccompaniedbythatdeprivationoffreedom.
In addition, the definition adds a specific intent for this crime: the intention of removing [the
personorpersonsdeprivedoftheirliberty]fromtheprotectionofthelawforaprolongedperiodof
time.
C.Crossreferences
1.ElementsofCrime
D.Doctrine
CambridgeUniversitypress,2011,pp.448452
2. Hall, Christopher K., Article 7 Crimes against humanity, (i) Enforced disappearance of persons,
Otto Triffterer (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
ObserversNotes,ArticlebyArticle,SecondEdition,C.H.Beck/Hart/Nomos,Mnchen/Oxford/Baden
Baden,2008,pp.221226,266273
3. Timothy L.H. McCormack, Crimes Against Humanity, Dominic McGoldrick/Peter Rowe,/Eric
Donnelly (Eds), The permanent International Criminal Court Legal and Policy Issues, Hart
Publishing,OxfordandPortlandOregon,2004,pp.197198
5.
Marieke
Wierda/Thomas
Unger,
Enforced
Disappearances,
http://www.legal
tools.org/doc/7be65f/AntonioCassese(Ed.),TheOxfordCompaniontoInternationalCriminalJustice,
6. Georg Witschel/Wiebke Rckert, Article 7(1)(i)Crime Against Humanity of Enforced
DisappearanceofPersons,RoyS.Lee(Ed.), The International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes
andRulesofProcedureandEvidence,TransnationalPublishers,Inc.,2001,pp.98103
E.Author:
JonasNilsson
Article7(1)(j)
[60](j)Thecrimeofapartheid
A.Generalremarks
The crime of apartheid was condemned as a crime against humanity by the UN General Assembly
through a resolution in 1966 [UN GA res. 2202 (XXI), 16 December 1966, para. 1] and in the
InternationalConventionontheSuppressionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofApartheid.Noneofthe
judgmentsbeforetheICChaveaddressedtheelementsofthiscrime.
A number of authors have criticized the inclusion of the crime of apartheid in the list of crimes
against humanity in the ICC Statute as legally unsound [Zahar, 2009, pp. 245246 and McCormack,
2004, pp. 198200]. Essentially, the critique is that the crime is fully covered by the crime of
persecutionasacrimeagainsthumanityandthatthereisthereforenoneedforit.
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B.Analysis
i.Definition
According to article 7(2)(h), the crime of apartheid encompasses inhumane acts of a character
similar to those referred to in paragraph 1 [of Article 7], committed in the context of an
institutionalizedregimeofsystematicoppressionanddominationbyoneracialgroupoveranyother
racialgrouporgroupsandcommittedwiththeintentionofmaintainingthatregime.TheElementsof
Crimes clarifies that the crime may be committed by an act against one or more persons, that
characterreferstothenatureandgravityoftheact,andthattheperpetratorneedtobeawareof
thefactualcircumstancesthatestablishedthecharacteroftheact.
ii.Requirements
a.Materialelements
Thematerialelementsofthecrimeofapartheidbearsimilaritieswiththecrimesofpersecutionand
otherinhumaneacts,inthatitoverlapssubstantiallywithothercrimesagainsthumanity.Withregard
towhichactsitencompasses,thedefinitionitselfpointstotheothercrimesagainsthumanity.Theact
oractsofthecrimeofapartheidmustbeofacharactersimilartothosereferredtoinparagraph1
[ofArticle7],meaningofthesamenatureandgravityasthoseacts.Therefore,theactsofthecrime
ofapartheidcouldalsobeoneofthoselistedacts,forexamplemurderandtorture.
Accordingtothedefinitiontheactoractsmustbecommittedinthecontextofaninstitutionalized
regimeofsystematicoppressionanddominationbyoneracialgroupoveranyotherracialgroupor
groups. With regard to this element there is a clear overlap with one of the general elements of
crimes against humanity: part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population,withattackbeingdefinedasacourseofconduct[]pursuanttoorinfurtheranceofa
Stateororganizationalpolicytocommitsuchattack[Article7(1)and(2)(a)].Itisdifficulttoimagine
any scenario in which the general elements have been proven (which they have to for the act to
qualify as a crime against humanity), but the specific element of the crime of apartheid has not.
Therefore, at least in practice, this element of the crime of apartheid does not amount to a distinct
elementofthecrime.
b.Mentalelements
Besidesthementalelementsofthecrime,assetoutinarticle30oftheRomeStatute,thedefinition
adds a specific intent for this crime: the intention of maintaining [the institutionalized regime of
systematicoppressionanddominationbyoneracialgroupoveranyotherracialgrouporgroups].
C.Crossreferences
ElementsofCrime
D.Doctrine
CambridgeUniversitypress,2011,pp.448452
2.ChristopherK.Hall,Article7Crimesagainsthumanity,(j)Thecrimeofapartheid,OttoTriffterer
227229,263266
5.GerhardWerle,PrinciplesofInternationalCriminalLaw,TheHague:TMCAsserPress,2005,
pp.262264,MN758765.
6.GeorgWitschel/WiebkeRckert,Article7(1)(j)CrimeAgainstHumanityofApartheid,RoyS.Lee
(Ed.), The International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
TransnationalPublishers,Inc.,2001,pp.103106
7. Alexander Zahar, Apartheid as an International Crime, Antonio Cassese (Ed.), The Oxford
CompaniontoInternationalCriminalJustice,OxfordUniversityPress,2009,pp.245246
E.Author:
JonasNilsson
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Article7(1)(k)
[61](k)Otherinhumaneactsofasimilarcharacterintentionallycausinggreatsuffering,or
seriousinjurytobodyortomentalorphysicalhealth.
A.Generalremarks
ThedefinitionsofcrimesagainsthumanityintheNurembergCharter,ControlCouncilLawNo.10,and
theICTYandICTRStatutes,haveallincludedaresidualprovisionofthiskind,indicatingthatthelist
of expressly named acts is not exhaustive. It reflects the sentiment that it is not possible to create
such an exhaustive list. According to one author: The capacity of human beings to concoct novel
formsofatrocityisaconstantsourceofdiscomfortandshameanditiscriticalthatprovisionsexistto
facilitateprosecutionofsuchactionsnotcurrentlyknownorexperienced[McCormack,2004,p.201].
TheriskofcreatinganopenendeddefinitionwascounteredinthedraftingoftheICCStatuteby
clarifyingthetermswiththeejusdemgenerisrule[vonHebelandRobinson,1999,p.102].Bylinking
itwiththeothercrimesagainsthumanity,thedrafterssoughttoachieveamoreprecisedefinitionand
thusconsistencywiththeprincipleofnullumcrimensinelege[WitschelandRckert,2001,p.107].
B.Analysis
i.Definition
The definition in Article 7(1)(k) reads: [o]ther inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. Article7(2) does
notcontainanyfurtherclarificationoftheprovision.TheElementsofCrimesclarifiesthatcharacter
referstothenatureandgravityoftheact[ElementsofCrimes,footnote30].Further,theperpetrator
mustbeawareofthefactualcircumstancesthatestablishedthecharacteroftheact[Elementsofthe
Crimes,p.12].
ii.Requirements
a.Materialelements
Therearetwomaterialelementsforthiscrime:1)anactcausinggreatsuffering,orseriousinjuryto
bodyortomentalorphysicalhealthand2)anactofsimilarcharacter(natureandgravity)toany
otheractinArticle7(1).
ThePreTrialChamberinthecase Prosecutorv.KatangaandNgudjolocontrastedtheprovisionin
the ICC Statute with the equivalent provision in the Nuremberg Charter and the ICTY and ICTR
Statutes:
the[ICC]Statutehasgiventootherinhumaneactsadifferentscopethanitsantecedentslike
the Nuremberg Charter and the ICTR and ICTY Statutes. The latter conceived other inhumane
acts as a catch all provision, leaving a broad margin for the jurisprudence to determine its
limits. In contrast, the Rome Statute contains certain limitations, as regards to the action
constitutinganinhumaneactandtheconsequencesrequiredasaresultofthataction[Katanga
andNgudjolo,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/07717,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,30
Inthisrespect,itfirstclarifiedthatnoneoftheactsconstitutingcrimesagainsthumanityaccordingto
Article7(1)(a)to(j)couldsimultaneouslybeconsideredasanotherinhumaneact[Ibid.,para.452].
Referring to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, it added that inhumane acts are to be
considered as serious violations of international customary law and the basic rights pertaining to
humanbeings,drawnfromthenormsofinternationalhumanrightslaw[Ibid.,para.448].Whethera
particular act meets these requirements has to be determined with considerations given to all the
factual circumstances [Ibid., para. 449]. In this respect, the PreTrial Chamber referred primarily to
ICTY case law [Prosecutor v Kupreki et al.(IT9516), ICTY T. Ch., 14 January 2000, para. 566
ProsecutorvStaki(IT9724),ICTYT.Ch.,31July2003,para.721ProsecutorvVasiljevi(IT98
32),ICTYApp.Ch.,25February2004,para.165],whichmightappearoddconsideringthatthePre
Trial Chamber expressly attempted to distinguish the ICTY provision from that in the ICC Statute.
With regard to consequences, the PreTrial Chamber merely reiterated the words from the Statute:
greatsuffering,orseriousinjurytobodyortomentalorphysicalhealth[Ibid.,para.453].
ThePreTrialChamberinthecaseProsecutorv.Muthauraetal.didnotcontrasttheprovisionon
other inhumane acts with the equivalent provisions in other legal instruments. It did, however,
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consider that the provision must be interpreted conservatively and must not be used to expand
uncritically the scope of crimes against humanity [Prosecutor v Mathaura et al., ICC PT. Ch. II,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute,
ICC01/0902/11382Red,23January2012,para.269].Italsoconsideredthatifaconductcouldbe
charged as another crime against humanity, its charging as other inhumane acts would be
impermissible [Ibid.]. The PreTrial Chamber confirmed charges of acts causing physical injury
(includingforciblecircumcision,penileamputation,andmutilations)andactscausingmentalsuffering
onthepartofvictimswhosefamilymemberswerekilledinfrontoftheireyes[Ibid.,paras267268,
270277].However,withregardtothedestructionorvandalizingofpropertyandbusinessesthePre
Trial Chamber did not consider that this conduct caused serious injury to mental health within the
definitionofotherinhumaneacts.
b.Mentalelements
The definition in the Statute and the Elements of Crimes sets out that the perpetrator must have
inflictedgreatsuffering,orseriousinjurytobodyortomentalorphysicalhealthintentionally.Further,
the perpetrator must have been aware of the factual circumstances that established the character
similartoanyotheractreferredtoinArticle7(1)oftheStatute.
ThePreTrialChamberinthecaseProsecutorv.KatangaandNgudjolodeclinedtoconfirmcharges
ofattemptedmurderundertheprovisionofotherinhumaneacts,forreasonsoflackofmensrea:
the clear intent to kill persons cannot be transformed into intent to severely injure persons by
meansofinhumaneactssolelyonthebasisthattheresultoftheconductwasdifferentfromthat
whichwasintendedandpursuedbytheperpetrators[KatangaandNgudjolo,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC
01/0401/07717,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,30September2008,para.463].
C.Crossreferences
1.StarvationinArticles6(c)7(1)(b)and(j)7(2)(b)8(2)(a)(iii)8(2)(b)(ii),(v),(xiii)and(xxv)and
8(2)(c)(i)
2.ElementsofCrime
D.Doctrine
1. Christopher K. Hall, Article 7 Crimes against humanity, (k) Other inhumane acts, OttoTrifterer
230234
2.HermanVonHebel/DarrylRobinson,inLee,RoyS.(ed.),TheInternationalCriminalCourtThe
MakingoftheRomeStatuteIssues,Negotiations,Results,KluwerLawInternational,1999,pp.90
103
5.GeorgWitschel/WiebkeRckert,Article7(1)(k)CrimeAgainstHumanityofOtherInhumaneActs,
RoyS.Lee(Ed.),TheInternationalCriminalCourtElementsofCrimesandRulesofProcedureand
Evidence,TransnationalPublishers,Inc.,2001,pp.106108
6. Alexander Zahar, Other Inhumane Acts, Antonio Cassese (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to
InternationalCriminalJustice,OxfordUniversityPress,2009,p.448
Author:
JonasNilsson
Article7(2)(a)
[62]2.Forthepurposeofparagraph1:
(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct involving
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themultiplecommissionofactsreferredtoinparagraph1againstanycivilianpopulation,
pursuanttoorinfurtheranceofaStateororganizationalpolicytocommitsuchattack
Article7(2)(a) clarifies that it needs to be a State or organizational policy. One PreTrial Chamber
declared that the term State was selfexplanatory but added that the policy did not have to be
conceived at the highest level of the State machinery [Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC PT.
Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle15oftheRomeStatuteontheAuthorizationofanInvestigation
intotheSituationintheRepublicofKenya,31March2010,para.89,citingProsecutorvBlaki,ICTY
T. Ch., Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 205]. Therefore, also a policy adopted by regional or local
organsoftheStatecouldsatisfythisrequirement[Ibid.].
With regard to organizational, the PreTrial Chambers in the Prosecutor v. Bemba and the
Prosecutorv.KatangaandNgudjolo stated that it may be groups of persons who govern a specific
territory or [] any organization with the capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack
againstacivilianpopulation[ProsecutorvBemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)
(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatuteontheChargesoftheProsecutorAgainstJeanPierreBembaGombo,
15June2009,para.81KatangaandNgudjolo,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/07717,Decisiononthe
confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008, para. 396]. It is therefore not limited to Statelike
organizations[Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of
theRomeStatuteontheAuthorizationofanInvestigationintotheSituationintheRepublicofKenya,
31 March 2010, paras 9092 Prosecutor v Muthaura et al., ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision on the
ConfirmationofChargesPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatute,23January2012,
para.112ProsecutorvRutoetal.,DecisionontheConfirmationofChargesPursuanttoArticle61(7)
(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatute,23January2012,para.33.SeealsoJudgeKaulsdissentstothese
decisions: Prosecutor v Ruto et. al. , Dissenting Opinion by Judge HansPeter Kaul to PreTrial
Chamber II's "Decision on the Prosecutor's Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei
Ruto,HenryKipronoKosgeyandJoshuaArapSang",15March2011,andProsecutorvMuthauraet.
al., Dissenting Opinion by Judge HansPeter Kaul to PreTrial Chamber II's "Decision on the
Prosecutor'sApplicationforSummonsestoAppearforFrancisKirimiMuthaura,UhuruMuigaiKenyatta
and Mohammed Hussein Ali", 15 March 2011]. The Trial Chamber in the Prosecutor v. Katanga
followedthisapproach[ProsecutorvKatanga,ICCT.Ch.II,ICC01/0401/073436,Jugementrendu
enapplicationdelarticle74duStatut,7March2014,paras11171122].
TheBembaPreTrialChamberstatedthatwhendeterminingwhetherthepartofrequirementwas
met it would consider the characteristics, the aims, the nature or consequences of the act
[Prosecutor v Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009, para.
84]. It also stated the underlying offences must [] not be isolated [ProsecutorvBemba, ICC PT.
Ch. II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
ProsecutorAgainstJeanPierreBembaGombo,15June2009,para.83],althoughthatoughttofollow
already from the fact they have to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population.
Author:
JonasNilsson
Article7(3)
[63]3.ForthepurposeofthisStatute,itisunderstoodthattheterm"gender"referstothe
two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term "gender" does not
indicateanymeaningdifferentfromtheabove.
Theterm"gender"referstosociallyconstructedrolesplayedbywomenandmen.
Doctrine:
MacheldBootatpp.171172,MN127128inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(1)
[64]Article8Warcrimes
1.TheCourtshallhavejurisdictioninrespectofwarcrimesinparticularwhencommitted
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aspartofaplanorpolicyoraspartofalargescalecommissionofsuchcrimes.
Incontrasttocrimesagainsthumanity,plan,policy,andscalearenotelementsofwarcrimes.One
singleactmayconstituteawarcrime.However,itisunlikelythatasingleactwouldmeetthegravity
thresholdinarticle17(1)(d).
Crossreference:
ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1.MichaelBotheatpp.380381inAntonioCassese/PaolaGaeta/JohnR.W.D.Jones.
2.WilliamJ.Fenrickatp.181,MN4inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(a)
[65]2.ForthepurposeofthisStatute,"warcrimes"means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant
GenevaConvention:
A.GeneralRemarks
War crimes are crimes committed in time of armed conflict. As there is no general definition of an
armed conflict in the ICC Statute or the Elements of Crimes the Court has relied on ICTY
jurisprudence to define armed conflict: an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to
armedforcebetweenStatesorprotractedviolencebetweengovernmentalauthoritiesandorganized
armed groups or between such groups within a State (Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC T. Ch.
I,Judgment,ICC01/0401/06,14March2012,para.533).
The crimes listed in Article 8(2) can be perpetrated in both international and noninternational
armed conflicts (Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0501/08424, Decision Pursuant to
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre
Bemba Gombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 216). Whilst Articles 8(2)(a) and (b)
cover acts committed in an international armed conflict, Articles 8(2)(c) and (e) refer to acts
committedinanoninternationalarmedconflict.
FollowingtheTadijurisprudence of the ICTY that refers to mixed conflicts, i.e. conflicts that are
both international and international (Prosecutor v. Tadi, (Case No. IT941I), ICTY App.
Ch.,Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para.
77),theICChasstatedthat(1)thenatureofaconflictcanchangeovertime(Prosecutorv.Katanga,
Jugement, ICC T. Ch. II, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014, para. 1181) and (2) conflicts of
differentnaturecantakeplaceonthesameterritory(Lubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,Judgment,ICC01/04
01/06,14March2012,para.540Katanga,ICCT.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March
2014,paras.1174and1182Prosecutorv.Ntaganda,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionontheConfirmationof
Charges, ICC01/0402/06309, 9 June 2014, para. 33). As a result any determination of the
qualificationofanarmedconflictmustbebasedonanevaluationofthefactsattherelevanttime.
B.Analysis
Article8(2)(a)statesthatForthepurposeofthisStatute,warcrimesmeans:(a)Gravebreachesof
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or
propertyprotectedundertheprovisionsoftherelevantGenevaConvention.
i)ScopeofApplication
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 apply in international armed conflict. Neither the Statute nor
theElementsofCrimesdefinetheconceptsofarmedconflictandinternationalarmedconflictand
thus recourse must be had to the principles of rules of international law, and more specifically,
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions which state that international armed conflicts involve
twoormoreStatepartiestotheconventionsanddonotnecessitateathresholdofviolencetoapply
(Lubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,Judgment,ICC01/0401/06,14March2012,para.541Katanga,ICCT.Ch.
II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1177).
Theconceptofaninternationalarmedconflictalsoincludesmilitaryoccupation(footnote34ofthe
ElementsofCrimesKatanga,ICCT.Ch.II,Jugement, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014, para.
1179):aterritoryisconsideredtobeoccupiedwhenitisactuallyplacedundertheauthorityofthe
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hostile army, and the occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been
established and can be exercised (Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ICC01/0401/06803, 29 January 2007, para. 212 Lubanga, ICC T. Ch.
I,Judgment, ICC01/0401/06, 14 March 2012, para. 542 Katanga, ICC T. Ch. II, Jugement, ICC
01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1179).InKatangatheICCdevelopedalistofelementstobe
takenintoconsiderationwhenapplyingthisdefinition(Katanga,ICCT.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/04
01/073436,7March2014,para.1180).
FollowingtheTadicjurisprudenceoftheICTY(Prosecutorv.Tadi,(CaseNo.IT941A),ICTYApp.
Ch., Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 84) the ICC has interpreted the definition of an international
armed conflict to include conflicts opposing a State against an armed opposition group when (i)
another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops (direct intervention), or (ii) some of the
participants in the internal armed conflict on behalf of that other State (indirect intervention).
(Lubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,Judgment,ICC01/0401/06,14March2012,para.541Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.
II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 220
Katanga,ICCT.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1177)inthisinstance
the conflict is internationalised. However, assistance provided by foreign States to the State fighting
an armed opposition group does not lead to the internationalisation of the conflict (Bemba, ICC
PT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,15June2009,para.246Prosecutorv.Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.
I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011, para.
101). To determine whether a situation falls within situation (ii) the ICC follows the overall control
testthatwasdevisedbytheICTYinTadi(Tadi,ICTYApp.Ch.,Judgment,15July1999,para.137)
(Lubanga, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, 29 January 2007, para. 211
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC T. Ch. I, Judgment, ICC01/0401/06, 14 March 2012, para. 541). It
specifiesthatwhenaStateplaysaroleinorganising,coordinatingorplanningthemilitaryactionsof
themilitarygroup,inadditiontofinancing,trainingandequippingorprovidingoperationalsupportto
that group then the conflict becomes international (Lubanga, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, ICC01/0401/06803, 29 January 2007, para. 211 Lubanga, ICC T. Ch.
I,Judgment, ICC01/0401/06, 14 March 2012, para. 541 Katanga, ICC T. Ch. II, Jugement, ICC
01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1178).
To sum up an international armed conflict exists in case of armed hostilities between States
throughtheirrespectivearmedforcesorotheractorsactingonbehalfoftheState(Bemba,ICCPT.
Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,15June2009,para.223Katanga,ICCT.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/04
01/073436,7March2014,para.1177).
ii)ConceptofGraveBreaches
EachGenevaConventionhasitsownlistofgravebreaches(Article50GCI,Article51GCII,Article
130GCIIIandArticle147GCIV). The ICC Statute is an accurate reflection of the grave breaches
provisionsofthefourGenevaConventions.
iii)ActsagainstPersonsorPropertyProtectedunderGCs
For the grave breaches regime under the Geneva Conventions to apply the acts must have been
committed against protected persons (e.g. wounded, injured, sick and/or shipwrecked combatants,
prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territory) and property (e.g. movable and nonmovable
property in occupied territory (see e.g. Prosecutor v. Blaki, (Case No. IT9514), ICTY T.
Ch.,Judgment,3March2000,para.157).Thisisrepeatedinfootnote35oftheElementsofCrimes:
allvictimsmustbeprotectedpersonsunderoneormoreoftheGenevaConventionsof1949.
WhilsttheGCI,IIandIIIdonotrefertothenationalityofthememberofthearmedforces,Article
4GCIVexplicitlyconsidersprotectedpersonsasthosewhofindthemselves,incaseofaconflictor
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict of Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals. Footnote 33 of the Elements of Crimes explains that [w]ith respect to nationality, it is
understoodthattheperpetratorneedsonlytoknowthatthevictimbelongedtoanadversepartyto
the conflict thereby seemingly adopting the broad definitional approach of the ICTY whereby
allegiance, rather than nationality, is key to determining whether the individual is to be granted
protectionundertheGCIV(Tadi, ICTY App. Ch., Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 76 Tadi, ICTY App. Ch., Judgment, 15 July 1999,
paras 164166). In Katanga and Chui the ICC endorsed this approach, specifying that individual
civilians[]automaticallybecomeprotectedpersonswithinthemeaningofarticle4GCIV,provided
theydonotclaimallegiancetothepartyinquestion.(ProsecutorvKatangaandChui,ICCPT.Ch.I,
DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges,ICC01/0401/07717,30September2008,para.293)
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So far no such cases have been decided by the ICC. Generally, it is rather rare for international
criminaltribunalstodealwithviolationsofthefirstthreeGenevaConventions.
iv)Awareness
UnlikeforcrimesprosecutedbeforetheICTYwhichrequiresthattheperpetratorwasawarethatthat
his/heractswerelinkedtoaconflictofaninternationalnature(Prosecutorv.NaletiliandMartinovi,
(CaseNo.IT9834A),ICTYApp.Ch., Judgment, 3 May 2006, paras 110120) the ICC Statute only
requires the awareness of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed
conflictthatisimplicitinthetermstookplaceinthecontextofandwasassociatedwith(Elements
ofCrimes,Article8,Introduction).Theremusthoweverbeanexusbetweentheactandtheconflict.
However both courts require that the individual was aware that the individuals/property were
protected under one or more of the Geneva Conventions (Elements of Crimes, Article 8(2)(a)(i),
footnote32).Itissufficienttoshowthattheperpetratorwasawareofthefactualcircumstancesthat
established[the]status[oftheindividuals].
C.Crossreferences:
1.ElementsofCrimes
D.Doctrine
1.DapoAkande,ClassificationofArmedConflicts:RelevantLegalConcepts,ElizabethWilmhurst(Ed),
InternationalLawandtheClassificationofConflicts,3279,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2012.
2. Michael Bothe, War Crimes, AntonioCassese/PaolaGaeta/John R.W.D. Jones, (Eds), The Rome
StatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt,379426,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2002.
3.WilliamJ.Fenrick,Article8,WarCrimes,OttoTriffterer(Ed.),CommentaryontheRomeStatuteof
the International Criminal Court, 181182, MN 58, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, Mnchen/Oxford/Baden
Baden,2008.
4.AntonioCasseseandPaolaGaeta,CassesesInternationalCriminalLaw,6383,3rdedition,Oxford
UniversityPress,Oxford,2013.
5.RobertCryer/HkanFriman/RobertRobinson/ElizabethWilmshurst,AnIntroductiontoInternational
CriminalLawandProcedure,264284,3rdedition,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2014.
6. Anthony Cullen, War Crimes, William Schabas/Nadia Bernaz (Eds), Routledge Handbook of
InternationalCriminalLaw,139154,Routledge,London,2011.
7 Knut Drmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court,1737,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2002.
8. William Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 131133, 4th edition,
CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2011.
9.WilliamSchabas,TheInternationalCriminalCourt:ACommentaryontheRomeStatute,188257,
OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2010.
Author:
NolleQunivet
Article8(2)(a)(i)
[66](i)Wilfulkilling
Theterm"killing"isinterchangeablewiththeterm"causingdeath".Killinginactualfightingbetween
combatants (which is not a prisoner of war, wounded or sick) is not covered by the provision. The
presentprovisionismoreclearthanarticle7(1)(a) regarding the mental element by the use of the
notion"wilful".Thus,theperpetratormusteitheractintentionallyorrecklessly.
In Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo, ICC01/0401/07717, Decision on the confirmation of
charges, 30 September 2008, para. 294, PTC I stated that "article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Statute also
applies to the wilful killing of the protected persons by an attacking force, when such killings occur
after the overall attack has ended, and defeat or full control of the targeted village has been
secured."
Crossreference:
1.Article7(1)(a)and8(2)(c)(i)
2.ElementsofCrime
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Doctrine:
1.MichaelBotheatp.392inAntonioCassese/PaolaGaeta/JohnR.W.D.Jones.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(a)(ii)1
[67](ii)Torture
Tortureistheinflictionofseverephysicalormentalpainorsufferingupononeormorepersons.The
standardfortortureissetintheTortureConvention.Incontrasttotheaforementionedconvention,it
isnotnecessarythatperpetratoractedinanofficialcapacity.TheElementsofCrimeprovidesanon
exclusive listing of which purposes the torture serve, which distinguishes it from torture as a crime
againsthumanitywhichdoesnotrequireapurpose.
Crossreference:
1.Articles7(1)(f)and8(2)(c)(i)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(a)(ii)2
[68]orinhumantreatment,
Inhuman treatment means the infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or
morepersons.Theprotectedinterestisthehumandignity.Forthementalelementarticle30applies.
In Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui, ICC01/0401/07717, Decision on the confirmation of
charges, 30 September 2008, para. 364, PTC I was of the "that there is sufficient evidence to
establishsubstantialgroundstobelievethatthewarcrimeofinhumantreatment,asdefinedinarticle
8(2)(a)(ii)oftheStatute."
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(c)(i)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(a)(ii)3
[69]includingbiologicalexperiments
Theprohibitionofbiologicalexperimentscovertheuseoftherapeuticmethodswhicharenotjustified
on medical grounds and not carried out in the interest of the affected person. The consent of the
victimisnotrelevant.
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Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(x)and8(2)(e)(xi)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(a)(iii)
[70](iii)Wilfullycausinggreatsuffering,orseriousinjurytobodyorhealth
Thisprovisioncoversactssuchasrape,mutilationofthewoundedortheirexposuretouselessand
unnecessarysuffering.Itdiffersfromthewarcrimeoftorturemainlyinthattheactdoesnotneedto
serveaspecificpurpose.Thementalelementrequiresatleastrecklessness.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(c)(i)
2.StarvationinArticles6(c)7(1)(b),(j)and(k)7(2)(b)8(2)(b)(ii),(v),(xiii)and(xxv)and8(2)
(c)(i)
3.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(a)(iv)
[71] (iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessityandcarriedoutunlawfullyandwantonly
Thedestructionofpropertyisalsocriminalizedthroughoffencesthatcovermethodsofwarfare.The
term appropriation is interchangeable with confiscation. The seizure of property in armed conflict is
not prohibited under all circumstances. Nevertheless, pillaging is expressly forbidden and cannot be
justified on the basis of military necessity, see articles 8(2)(b)(xvi) and 8(2)(e)(v). The mental
elementrequiresatleastrecklessness.
Crossreference:
1.Articles(8)(b)(xiii),8(2)(b)(xvi),8(2)(e)(v)and8(2)(e)(xii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(a)(v)
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[72](v)Compellingaprisonerofwarorotherprotectedpersontoserveintheforcesofa
hostilePower
Theexpression"forces"shouldbegivenabroadinterpretation.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(xv)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(a)(vi)
[73](vi)Wilfullydeprivingaprisonerofwarorotherprotectedpersonoftherightsoffair
andregulartrial
TheElementsofCrimereferstotheguaranteeslaiddowninGenevaConventionsIII(GCIII)andIV
(GCIV), stating that the right to fair trial include: the right to an independent and impartial court
(article 84(2) of GC III ), the right to timely notification by the detaining power about any planned
trial of a prisoner of war (article 104 of GC III), the right to immediate information on the charges
(article 104 of GC III and article 71(2) of GC IV), the prohibition of collective punishment (article
87(3)ofGCIIIandarticle33ofGCIV),theprincipleoflegality(article99(1)ofGCIIIandarticle67
ofGCIV),thenebisinidemprinciple(article86ofGCIIIandarticle117(3)ofGCIV),therightto
appealorpetitionandinformationonthepossibilitythereof(article106ofGCIIIandarticle73ofGC
IV),thepossibilityofpresentingadefenceandhavingassistanceofqualifiedcounsel(article99(3)of
GC III), the right to receive the charges and other trial documents in good time an din
understandable language (article 105(4) of GC III), the right of an accused prisoner of war to
assistance by one of his prisoner comrades (article 105(1) of GC III), the defendant's right to
representationbyanadvocateofhisownchoice(article105(1)ofGCIIIandarticle72(1)ofGCIV),
therightofthedefendanttopresentnecessaryevidenceandespeciallytocallandquestionwitnesses
(article 105(1) of GC III and article 72(1) of GC IV), and the right to the services of an interpreter
(article105(1)ofGCIIIandarticle72(3)ofGCIV).Thedeathpenaltymayonlybeimposedunder
specificcircumstances(article100ofGCIIIandarticle68ofGCIV),andprisonersofwarmustbe
triedinthesamecourtsandaccordingtothesameprocedureasmembersofthearmedforcesofthe
detaining power (article 102 of GC III). These rules should be supplemented by the rules on a fair
trialcontainedinarticle75(3)and(4)ofAdditionalProtocolI.Thementalelementrequiresatleast
recklessness.
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(b)(xiv)and8(2)(c)(iv)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(a)(vii)1
[74](vii)Unlawfuldeportationortransfer
The material element requires the transfer of persons from one territory to another. The difference
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between deportation and forcible transfer lies only in whether a border is crossed. Deportation
requires that a border is crossed, while as forcible transfer means the transfer of one or more
personswithinthesamestate'sterritory.Forthementalelementarticle30applies.
Crossreference:
1.Articles7(1)(d),8(2)(b)(viii)and8(2)(e)(viii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.WilliamJ.Fenrickatpp.184185,MN17inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(a)(vii)2
[75]orunlawfulconfinement
In certain circumstances confinement of protected persons may be legitimate, for example if a
civilianthreatensoneofthepartiesinaconflict.
Crossreference:
1.Article7(1)(e)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(a)(viii)
[76](viii)Takingofhostages
Hostagetakinginvolvestheseizureanddetainmentofoneormoreprotectedpersonsandathreatto
kill, injure or continue to detain such person or persons. In addition to the general mental
requirement in article 30 the purpose of the hostage taking is to compel a State, an international
organization, a natural or legal person or a group of persons to act or refrain from acting as an
explicitorimplicitconditionforthesafetyorthereleaseofsuchpersonorpersons.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(c)(iii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)
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[77](b)Otherseriousviolationsofthelawsandcustomsapplicableininternationalarmed
conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the
followingacts:
A.GeneralRemarks
Along with Article 8(2)(a), Article 8(2)(b) lists war crimes that take place in the context of an
internationalarmedconflict.
B.Analysis
Article 8(2)(b) reads: Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international
armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following
acts.
The scope of subparagraph (b) is the same as subparagraph (a): it is applicable in times of an
international armed conflict. This is supported by the Elements of Crimes that repeat that [t]he
conducttookplaceinthecontextofandwasassociatedwithaninternationalarmedconflict(Article
8(2)(b)) and by the caselaw (Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the
ConfirmationofCharges,ICC01/0401/07717,30September2008,para.244).InfactinKatanga
and Chui the ICC, after stating that the conflict was international, proceeds to examine offences
charged under Article 8(2)(a) and (b) (Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07
717,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,30September2008,para.243).
ii)ActsProhibited
The use of the word other indicates that this list of prohibited acts is additional to the grave
breaches(whicharealsoseriousviolationsofthelawsandcustomsapplicableininternationalarmed
conflict) list included in subparagraph (a). Yet, whilst some of the grave breaches of the Protocol
AdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andrelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsof
International Armed Conflicts (AP I) are referred to in Article 8(2)(b) (e.g. Article 85(3)(b) AP I
launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the
knowledgethatsuchattackwillcauseexcessivelossoflife,injurytocivilians,ordamagetocivilian
objects,asdefinedinArticle57paragraph2(a)(iii)isreflectedinArticle8(2)(b)(iv))othersarenot
(e.g.Article85(4)(b)APIunjustifiabledelayintherepatriationofprisonersofwarorcivilians).This
lackoffullincorporationintheICCStatuteofthegravebreachesmentionedinAPImaybedueto
thefactthatAPIenjoysfarlessunanimitywithStatesthantheGenevaConventionsdo.
In fact, the acts enumerated under Article 8(2)(b) are a patchwork of 26 serious violations of
internationallaw.Suchactsareprohibitedbyeitherorbothtreatyandcustomaryinternationallaw.
For example, some subprovisions expressly mention the Geneva Conventions (e.g. Articles (2)(b)
(xxii) and (xxv)) others are drawn from AP I. For example Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) that refers to the
crime of recruiting and using children under the age of 15 years is based on Article 77(2) AP I
(Prosecutorv.Lubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,Judgment,ICC01/0401/06,14March2012,para.542).Mostof
the subprovisions relate to means and methods of warfare and are drawn from the Convention
Relating to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV). Yet there are also a number of new
crimesunderArticle8(2)(b)suchastheprohibitionofattacksagainsthumanitarianorpeacekeeping
missions(Article8(2)(b)(iii))andagainsttheenvironment(Article8(2)(b)(iv)).
Unlike for Article 8(2)(a) there is no requirement for the victims or objects to have protected
status.
iii)Awareness
SimilartoArticle8(2)(a)theElementsofCrimeonlyrequiretheperpetratortohavebeenawareof
factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict. The ICC specifically
explains that this element of the crime is common to all war crimes provided for in article 8(2)(a)
and(b)oftheElementsofCrimes(KatangaandChui,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,ICC
PT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/07717,30September2008,para.244).
C.Crossreferences
1.ElementsofCrimes
D.Doctrine
1. Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, https://www.legal
tools.org/doc/415188/ElizabethWilmhurst(Ed), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts,
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3279,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2012.
2. Michael Bothe, War Crimes, Antonio Cassese/Paola Gaeta/John R.W.D. Joneshttp://www.legal
tools.org/doc/01addc/(eds),TheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt,395397,Oxford
3.Antonio Cassese/Paola Gaeta , Casseses International Criminal Law, 6283, 3rd edition, Oxford
4.RobertCryer/HkanFriman/DarrylRobinson/ElizabethWilmshurst,AnIntroductiontoInternational
5.AnthonyCullen,WarCrimes,WilliamSchabas/NadiaBernaz,RoutledgeHandbookofInternational
CriminalLaw,139154,Routledge,London,2011.
6. Knut Drmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
7.WilliamJ.Fenrick,Article8,WarCrimes,OttoTriffterer(Ed.),CommentaryontheRomeStatuteof
the International Criminal Court, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden, 2008, 185
MN20.
8.LeenaGrover, Interpreting Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 279
285,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2014.
Author:
NolleQunivet
Article8(2)(b)(i)
[78] (i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against
individualciviliansnottakingdirectpartinhostilities
A.GeneralRemarks
Thewarcrimeofattackingthecivilianpopulationandciviliansnottakingdirectpartinhostilitiesis
the first in the series of war crimes for which one essential element is that the crime must be
committed during the conduct of hostilities (commonly known as conduct of hostilities crimes).
(Prosecutorv.KatangaandChui,ICCPT.Ch.I,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,ICC01/04
01/07717,30September2008,para.267).Underinternationalhumanitarianlawtheactofmaking
the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack when committed wilfully and
causing death or serious injury to body or health is a grave breach (Article 85(3)(a) of Protocol
InternationalArmedConflicts(API)).
Article8(2)(b)(i) is a reflection of the principle of distinction in attack in an international armed
conflict.WhilsttheprincipleisenshrinedinArticles48and51APIitisalsoofcustomarynature(Rule
1oftheICRCStudyonCustomaryInternationalHumanitarianLawProsecutorv.Gali,(CaseNo.IT
9829A),ICTYApp.Ch.,Judgement,30November2006,para.87).TheInternationalCourtofJustice
has stressed that deliberate attacks on civilians are absolutely prohibited by international
humanitarian law (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Advisory Opinion, 8 July
1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, at 257 (para. 78). Further, as the ICTY highlighted the principles
underlyingtheprohibitionofattacksoncivilians,namelytheprinciplesofdistinctionandprotection
incontrovertibly form the basic foundation of international humanitarian law and constitute
intransgressible principles of international customary (Gali, ICTY App. Ch., Judgement, 30
November2006,para.87).
B.Analysis
Article8(2)(b)(i) states that the ICC has jurisdiction overs acts of [i]ntentionally directing attacks
against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities.
i)MaterialElements
a.DefinitionofanAttack
The first element of the Elements of Crimes requires that the perpetrator directed an attack
(ElementsofCrimes,page18).Yet,neithertheStatutenortheElementsofCrimesdefinetheterm
attack. The Court has used Article 49(1) API to define an attack as acts of violence against the
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adversary, whether in offence or in defence (Katanga and Chui, Decision on the confirmation of
charges,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/07717,30September2008,para.266).
As the ICC Statute does not provide for a specific offence of acts whose primary purpose is to
spread terror among the civilian population, it is likely that such acts fall within the broad scope of
Article8(2)(b)(i).AsArticle8(2)(b)(i)isareflectionoftheprincipleofdistinctionenshrinedinArticles
48and51API and Article 8(2)(b) must be read within the established framework of international
lawitislikelythatitwillalsocoverthesecondsentenceoftheArticle51(2)API:Actsorthreatsof
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are
prohibited.ThisapproachwasespousedbytheICTYinasmuchasitexplainedthattheprohibitionof
terror amounts to a specific prohibition within the general (customary) prohibition of attack on
civilians (Prosecutor v. Gali, (Case No. IT9829T), ICTY T. Ch. I, Judgment and Opinion, 5
December2003,para.98,upheldinGali,ICTYApp.Ch.,Judgement,30November2006,para.87).
Toestablishthelinkbetweentheattackandtheconductofthehostilities,theCourthasstipulated
thattheseciviliansmustbethosewho[have]notfallenyetintothehandsoftheadverseorhostile
party to the conflict to which the perpetrator belongs (Katanga and Chui, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, 30 September 2008, para. 267).
Following the ICTY case law, the Court has stated that the litmus test is whether the individual is
underthecontrolofthemembersofthehostilepartytotheconflict(KatangaandChui,ICCPT.Ch.I,
ICC01/0401/07717, 30 September 2008, para. 268). Acts committed against civilians who have
fallen into the hands of the enemy cannot be classified as attacks as they are not methods of
warfare. They can however be prosecuted under other appropriate legal provisions (Katanga and
Chui,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/07717,30September2008,para.269).
Theremustbeacausallinkbetweentheperpetratorsconductandtheconsequenceoftheattack
(byanalogyinrelationtoArticle8(2)(e)(i),Prosecutorv.AbuGarda,ICCPT.Ch.I,PublicRedacted
Version,DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges,ICC02/0502/09243Red,8February2010,para.
66). That being said, the attack does not need to lead to civilian casualties it is sufficient to prove
thattheauthorlaunchedtheattacktowardsthecivilianpopulationorindividualcivilians.AstheCourt
explaineditdoesnotrequireanymaterialresultoraharmfulimpactonthecivilianpopulationoron
the individual civilians targeted by the attack (KatangaandChui,Decision on the confirmation of
charges,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/07717,30September2008,para.270).Itistheintentionthat
counts as the third element of the Elements of Crimes requires that the perpetrator intended the
civilianpopulationassuchorindividualciviliansnottakingdirectpartinhostilitiestobetheobjectof
the attack. ). As noted by the Court in Katanga and Chui(Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC
01/0401/07717,30September2008,para.270)thisstandsincontrasttoArticle85(3)APIthat
requires death or serious injury to body or health and the jurisprudence of the ICTY (e.g.
Prosecutor v. Kordi and erkez, (Case IT9514/2T), ICTY T. Ch., Judgment, 26 February 2001,
para. 328 as reiterated in Prosecutor v. Kordi and erkez, (Case IT9514/2A), ICTY App. Ch.,
Judgment,17December2004,para.40).
b.ObjectoftheAttackisaCivilianPopulationandCiviliansnotTakingDirectPartintheHostilities
ThesecondelementoftheElementsofCrimesspecifiesthattheobjectoftheattackwasacivilian
population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities (Elements of Crimes,
page 18). This is an absolute prohibition that cannot be counterbalanced by military necessity
(Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute,ICC01/04
01/073436tENG,7March2014,para.800).Thispositionisreinforcedbythefactthatinthecontext
ofanoninternationalarmedconflict(andthuslikelytoapplyinaninternationalarmedconflicttoo)
theICChasindicatedthatreprisalsareprohibitedinallcircumstances(Prosecutorv.Mbarushimana,
ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December
2011,para.143).
CiviliansaredefinedbyreferencetoArticle50(1)APIandthecivilianpopulationbyreferenceto
Articles50(2)and(3)API(KatangaandChui,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,ICCPT.Ch.I,
ICC01/0401/07717,30September2008,footnotes366and368respectivelyMbarushimana,ICC
PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011,
para.148inrelationtothecivilianpopulation).Incaseofdoubtanindividualmustbeconsidereda
civilian(Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, 30 September 2008,
footnotes366and375Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/10465Red,16December2011,
para. 148). The presence amongst the civilian population of individuals who do not fit within the
definition of a civilian, however, does not deprive the entire population of its civilian character
(Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, 30 September 2008, footnote 375
Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/10465Red,16December2011,para.148).
Article8(2)(b)(i) refers to individual civilians not taking direct part in direct hostilities, thereby
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introducing the concept of direct participation in hostilities in the context of an international armed
conflict. Although the adjective active, rather than direct, appears in international humanitarian
law in relation to participation in hostilities the Court treats them as synonyms (Katanga and Chui,
ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/07717,30September2008,footnote367).TheCourtexplainsthatsuch
participationleadstoatemporarylossofprotectionofcivilianstatusforsuchtime[suchindividuals]
take direct part in the hostilities (Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, 30
September 2008, footnote 375 Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges,16December2011,para.148).Examplesofsuchactsarewhenacivilianusesweaponsor
othermeanstocommitviolenceagainsthumanormaterialenemyforcesbutnotwhenthecivilians
aresupplyingfoodandshelterorsympathisingwithabelligerentparty(Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,
16 December 2011, para. 148). Moreover, the status is not lost when a civilian is defending
him/herself (Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011, para.
148).
The ICC has explained that in cases where the attack is directed towards a legitimate military
objective within the meaning of Articles 5152 AP I and simultaneously the civilian population or
civilians not taking direct part in the hostilities, the perpetrator can still be prosecuted under Article
8(2)(b)(i) (Katanga and Chui, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/04
01/07717, 30 September 2008, para. 273). This situation must nonetheless be distinguished from
attacks against military objectives with the awareness that they will or may result in the incidental
loss of life or injury to civilians (Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, 30
September2008,para.274).TheCourthasthusdistinguishedbetweenaviolationoftheprincipleof
discrimination and a violation of the principle of proportionality, the latter being prosecuted under
Article8(2)(b)(iv)oftheStatute.
ii)SubjectiveElements
a.[I]ntentionallyDirectinganAttack
The crime must be committed with intention and knowledge, as indicated in Article30 ICC Statute.
Additionally,thethirdelementoftheElementsofCrimes(ElementsofCrimes,page18)requiresthe
perpetrator to have intended the attack. The Court has specified that this intention to attack the
civilian population is in addition to the standard mens rea requirement provided in Article 30 ICC
Statute,i.e.theremustbeadolusdirectusoffirstdegree,i.e.aconcreteintent(AbuGarda,ICCPT.
Ch. I, Redacted Version, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC02/0502/09243Red, 8
February2010,para.93KatangaandChui,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,ICCPT.Ch.I,
ICC01/0401/07717, 30 September 2008, para. 271). In more recent caselaw, albeit relating to
noninternational armed conflict, the Court has argued that the third element in the Elements of
Crimes (Elements of Crimes, page 34) does not constitute a specific dolus(Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II,
Judgmentpursuanttoarticle74oftheStatute,ICC01/0401/073436tENG,7March2014,para806
seeCommentarytoArticle8(2)(e)(i)).AccordingtotheElementsofCrimesandthecaselawsofar
recklessnessdoesnotappeartosufficetofulfilthetest.Thatbeingsaid,theOfficeoftheProsecutor
hasindicatedthat[a]nargumentcouldbemadethatapatternofindifferenceandrecklessnesswith
respect to civilian life and property should eventually satisfy the intent requirements of Articles 30
and8(2)(b)(i)and(ii).(OfficeoftheProsecutor,SituationintheRepublicofKorea.Article5Report,
June2014,para.65).
TheCourtnonethelessdistinguishestwosituations:
The civilian population is the sole target of the attack. In this case the moment the attack is
launched the crime is committed (Katanga and Chui, Decision on the confirmation of
charges,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/07717,30September2008,para.272)
Theattackislaunchedsimultaneouslyagainsttwodistinctaims:amilitaryobjective(according
toArticles5152API)andacivilianpopulation.Inthiscaseanumberofrequirementsmustbe
fulfilled for the crime to be committed. First, the village must have a significant military value
and second it must contain two distinct targets: the defending forces of the adverse or hostile
partyincontrolofthevillageandthecivilianpopulationofthevillagewhichshowsallegianceto
the adverse or hostile party. (Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, 30
September2008,para.273).
b.IntentionthattheObjectoftheAttackIstheCivilianPopulationorCivilians
Thisrequirement,whichisthesecondelementintheElementsofCrimes(ElementsofCrimes,page
18), must be analysed as a behaviour (Prosecutor v Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, Sous scells Dcision
concernant les lments de preuve et les renseignements fournis par lAccusation aux fins de
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dlivrance dun mandat darrt lencontre de Germain Katanga, ICC01/0401/074tFRA, 6 July

2007,para.41).[T]hecrimedescribedinarticle8(2)(c)(i)oftheStatuteisacrimeofmereaction
(KatangaandChui,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/07717,30
September2008,footnote374).
Elements assisting in ascertaining the intention of attacking the civilian population or civilians are
themeansandmethodsusedduringtheattack(e.g.blockingroadstoandfromthevillageandorder
to kill civilians attempting to flee (Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, 30
September 2008, para. 281)), the number and status of victims (killing of women and children
(Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, 30 September 2008, para. 282)), the
discriminatory character of the attack (e.g. chanting songs with lyrics indicating that specific groups
shouldbekilledwhilstothersshownmercy(KatangaandChui,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/07717,
30September2008,para.280))andthenatureoftheact(e.g.killingciviliansanddestroyingtheir
property(KatangaandChui,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/07717,30September2008,paras277and
282)).
c.AwarenessoftheCivilianStatusofthePopulationorIndividuals
By analogy with the requirements for the crime of attacking the civilian population or individual
civiliansnottakingdirectpartinthehostilitiesinanoninternationalarmedconflictunderArticle8(2)
(e)(i) it can be argued that the Court further requires that the perpetrator must be aware of the
civilianstatusofthevictims(Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges,
ICC01/0401/10465Red,16December2011,paras151and219Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,Judgment
pursuanttoarticle74oftheStatute,ICC01/0401/073436tENG,7March2014,para.808).Inthe
reportoftheOfficeoftheProsecutor(OTP)ontheSituationintheRepublicofKorea,theOTPnoted
that the ICTY had explained that [The] attack must have been conducted intentionally in the
knowledge, or when it was impossible not to know, that civilians or civilian property were being
targetednotthroughmilitarynecessity.(OfficeoftheProsecutor,SituationintheRepublicofKorea.
Article5Report,June2014,para.62).
d.AwarenessoftheCircumstancesthatEstablishedtheExistenceoftheArmedConflict
According to element 5 of the Elements of Crimes for the war crime of attacking civilians, the
perpetrator must be aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed
conflict (Elements of Crimes, page 18). This has been reiterated by the Court (Katanga and Chui,
Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, 30 September 2008,
para.265).
C.Crossreferences
1.Article8(2)(b)(ii),8(2)(b)(ix)and8(2)(e)(i)
2.ElementsofCrimes
D.Doctrine:
1.MichaelBothe,WarCrimes,397,AntonioCassese/PaolaGaeta/JohnR.W.D.Jones(eds),TheRome
StatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2002.
2. William Fenrick, 186187, MN 2126, Otto Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminalCourt,C.H.Beck/Hart/Nomos,Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,2008.
3. Gerhard Werle/Florian Jessberger, Principles of International Criminal Law, 475485, MN 1278
1304,3rdedition,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2014.
5. Daniel Frank, The Elements of War Crimes Article 8(2)(b)(i), 140, Roy S. Lee (ed), The
InternationalCriminalCourt,ElementsofCrimesandRulesofProcedureandEvidence,Transnational
Publishers,NewYork,2001.
Author:
NolleQunivet
Article8(2)(b)(ii)
[79](ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are
notmilitaryobjectives
A.GeneralRemarks
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The war crime of attacking civilian objects is a crime committed during the conduct of hostilities.
Unlike attacks on the civilian population and individual civilians taking a direct part in the hostilities
(seeArticle8(2)(b)(i)) the crime of attacking civilian objects is not a grave breach of the Protocol
InternationalArmedConflicts(API).FurtherthereisnoequivalentprovisionintheStatutethatdeals
with noninternational armed conflict (Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, ICC PT. Ch. I, Public Redacted
Version,DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges,ICC02/0502/09243red,8February2010,para.
85).
Article8(2)(b)(ii) is a reflection of the principle of distinction in attack in an international armed
conflict.WhilsttheprincipleisenshrinedinArticles48and52APIitisalsoofcustomarynature(Rule
7oftheICRCStudyonCustomaryInternationalHumanitarianLaw).TheInternationalCourtofJustice
has stressed that deliberate attacks on civilian objects are absolutely prohibited by international
humanitarian law (Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ICJ Advisory Opinion, 8 July
1996,[1996]ICJRep.226,at257(para.78).
B.Analysis
Article8(2)(b)(ii) states that the ICC has jurisdiction overs acts of [i]ntentionally directing attacks
againstcivilianobjects,thatis,objectswhicharenotmilitaryobjectives.
i)MaterialElements
attack.AlthoughtheCourthasnotdefinedtheconceptofattackinthecontextofArticle8(2)(b)(ii)
itislikelythat,alikeforArticle8(2)(b)(i),itwillrefertoArticle49(1)APIwhichassertsthatanattack
areactsofviolenceagainsttheadversary,whetherinoffenceorindefense(Prosecutorv.Katanga
andChui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges, ICC01/04
01/07717, 30 September 2008, para. 266). In its report on the Situation on Registered Vessels of
Comoros,GreeceandCambodia,theOfficeoftheProsecutorfoundthat"anattackincludesallactsof
violence against an adversary." (Office of the Prosecutor, Situation on Registered Vessels of
Comoros,GreeceandCambodia.Article53(1)Report,6November2014,para.93)
Theremustbeacausallinkbetweentheperpetratorsconductandtheconsequenceoftheattack.
Asinthecasewiththewarcrimeofattackingthecivilianpopulationandcivilianstakingadirectpart
inhostilities(seecommentarytoArticle8(2)(b)(i))theredoesnotseemtobearequirementthatthe
attack results in some damage or destruction (see discussion in Prosecutor v. Kordi and erkez,
(CaseIT9514/2A),ICTYApp.Ch., Judgment,17December2004,paras5962).Itistheintention
that counts as the third element of the Elements of Crimes requires that the perpetrator intended
suchcivilianobjectstobetheobjectoftheattack(ElementsofCrimes,page18).IncontrastArticle
8(2)(b)(xiii) which covers both military and civilian objects requires the destruction, by action or
omission, of the property (Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717, 30 September
2008,para.310).
b.ObjectoftheAttackisCivilianObjects
The second element of the Elements of Crimes specifies that the object of the attack was civilian
objects,thatis,objectswhicharenotmilitaryobjectives(ElementsofCrimes,page18).InGotovina
the ICTY had explained that the targeting of civilian objects may never be justified by military
necessity (Prosecutor v. Gotovina, ermak and Marka, (Case No. IT0690T), ICTY T. Ch.,
Judgment, 15 April 2011, para. 1766.). Given that the ICC has also dismissed the justification of
militarynecessity,thoughinthecontextofattacksoncivilians,itislikelythatitwillespousethesame
approachwithregardtoobjectsandfollowtheGotovinajurisprudence.
CivilianobjectsaredefinedinArticle8(2)(b)(ii)inthenegative,asobjectswhicharenotmilitary
objectives, thereby espousing the international humanitarian law approach (see Article 52(1) AP I
andRule8oftheICRCStudyonCustomaryInternationalHumanitarianLaw).Militaryobjectivesare
thus limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contributiontomilitaryactionandwhosetotalorpartialdestruction,captureorneutralization,inthe
circumstancesrulingatthetime,offersadefinitemilitaryadvantage.(Article52(2)API).Itmustbe
noted that the Court has found that this definition also applies in the context of a noninternational
armed conflict in relation to attacks on installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a
peacekeeping mission (Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC
02/0502/09243red,8February2010,para.89).
Therearethreeelementsinassessingwhetheranobjectisamilitaryobjective:
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The objects nature, location, purpose or use makes a contribution to military action. Usually
weapons, military equipment, military transport, military communication centres and army
headquartersfulfilhisrequirements.Otherobjectsthatareoftencalleddualuseobjects(e.g.
bridges, airports, power plants, manufacturing plants, and integrated power grids) must be
examinedonacasebycasebasis.Asforobjectsthatnormallyservecivilianpurposessuchas
schools and hospitals they must also be assessed on a casebycase basis. That being said,
referring to Gali (Prosecutor v. Gali, (Case No. IT9829T), ICTY T. Ch. I, Judgment and
Opinion, 5 December 2003, para. 51) the Court has explained that in case of doubt an object
thatisnormallydedicatedtocivilianpurposesmustbeconsideredcivilian(AbuGarda,ICCPT.
Ch.I,PublicRedactedVersion,DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges,ICC02/0502/09243
red, 8 February 2010, footnote 131). This again reflects the approach taken by international
humanitarianlawinArticle52(3)API.
Theobjectmustmakeaneffectivecontributiontomilitaryaction.Thismeansthattheremust
beaproximatenexusbetweentheobjectandthemilitaryaction.
Theattackonthemilitaryobjectivemustofferadefinitemilitaryadvantageinthesensethatit
is not potential or indeterminate. It is however unclear whether the definition of military
advantagerelatestoonespecificmilitaryoperationorcanbeviewedinlightofawideroperation
or military action more generally. Military advantage usually includes gaining ground or
weakeningthemilitaryforcesoftheadversary.
Examples of civilian objects falling within the purview of Article 8(2)(b)(ii) are houses and parts
thereof,personalitemsandfurniture(seeSituationintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo,ICCPT.Ch.
I, Public Document, Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in Connection with the
InvestigationintheDemocraticRepublicofCongobyApplicantsa/0047/06toa/0052/06,a/0163/06
to a/0187/06, a/0221/06, a/0225/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 to a/0233/06, a/0237/06 to a/0239/06,
anda/0241/06toa/0250/06,ICC01/04504,3July2008).
Article8(2)(b)(ii)mustbedistinguishedfromattacksagainstmilitaryobjectiveswiththeawareness
that they will or may result in the incidental destruction of civilian property as this is covered by
Article8(2)(b)(iv)whichreflectstheprincipleofproportionality.
The crime must be committed with intention and knowledge, as indicated in Article 30 ICC Statute.
Additionally,thethirdelementoftheElementsofCrimes(ElementsofCrimes,page18)requiresthe
perpetratortohaveintendedtheattack.InrelationtoArticle8(2)(b)(i)(seeCommentaryonArticle
8(2)(b)(i)) the Court has specified that this intention is in addition to the standard mens rea
requirementprovidedinArticle30ICCStatute,i.e.theremustbeadolusdirectusoffirstdegree,i.e.
a concrete intent (AbuGarda,Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC02/05
02/09243red, 8 February 2010, para. 93 KatangaandChui, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/07717,
30September2008,para.271).AsthesameterminologyisusedandArticle8(2)(b)(ii) also deals
with civilian status (of objects rather than persons) it is likely that the Court will adopt the same
approach.However,inmorerecentcaselaw,albeitrelatingtoattackonciviliansinthecontextofa
noninternational armed conflict, the Court has argued that the third element in the Elements of
Crimes(ElementsofCrimes,page34)doesnotconstituteaspecificdolus(ProsecutorvKatanga,ICC
Tr.Ch.II,Jugment,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.806seeCommentarytoArticle8(2)
(e)(i)).
According to the Elements of Crimes and the caselaw so far recklessness does not appear to
sufficetofulfilthetest.Thatbeingsaid,theOfficeoftheProsecutorhasindicatedthat[a]nargument
couldbemadethatapatternofindifferenceandrecklessnesswithrespecttocivilianlifeandproperty
shouldeventuallysatisfytheintentrequirementsofArticles30and8(2)(b)(i)and(ii).(Officeofthe
Prosecutor,SituationintheRepublicofKorea.Article5Report,June2014,para.65).
b.IntentionthattheObjectoftheAttackIsCivilianObjects
ThesecondelementintheElementsofCrimes(ElementsofCrime,page18),thatisthattheobjectof
the attack was civilian objects, must be analysed as a behaviour (ProsecutorvChui, ICC PT. Ch. I,
Sous scells Dcision concernant les lments de preuve et les renseignements fournis par
lAccusation aux fins de dlivrance dun mandat darrt lencontre de Germain Katanga, ICC
01/0401/074tFRA,6July2007,para.41).
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c.AwarenessoftheCivilianStatusoftheObject
InthereportoftheOfficeoftheProsecutor(OTP)ontheSituationintheRepublicofKorea,theOTP
notedthattheICTYhadexplainedthat[the]attackmusthavebeenconductedintentionallyinthe
knowledge, or when it was impossible not to know, that civilians or civilian property were being
targetednotthroughmilitarynecessity.(OfficeoftheProsecutor,SituationintheRepublicofKorea.
Article5Report,June2014,para.62).
conflict(ElementsofCrimes,page18).
C.Crossreferences:
1.Article8(2)(b)(i),8(2)(b)(ix)and8(2)(e)(i)
2.StarvationinArticles6(c)7(1)(b),(j)and(k)7(2)(b)8(2)(a)(iii)8(2)(b)(v),(xiii)and(xxv)
3.ElementsofCrimes
D.Doctrine:
1.MichaelBothe,WarCrimes,397398,AntonioCassese/PaolaGaeta/JohnR.W.D.Jones(eds),The
RomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2002.
2. William Fenrick, 187, MN 27, Otto Triffterer (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminalCourt,C.H.Beck/Hart/Nomos,Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,2008.
3.GerhardWerleandFlorianJessberger,PrinciplesofInternationalCriminalLaw,486488,MN1305
5. Daniel Frank, The Elements of War Crimes Article 8(2)(b)(ii), 143144, Roy S. Lee (ed), The
InternationalCriminalCourt,ElementsofCrimesandRulesofProcedureandEvidence,Transnational
Publishers,NewYork,2001.
Author:
NolleQunivet
Article8(2)(b)(iii)
[80](iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or
vehiclesinvolvedinahumanitarianassistanceorpeacekeepingmissioninaccordancewith
the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to
civiliansorcivilianobjectsundertheinternationallawofarmedconflict
A.Generalremarks
Attackingpersonnelorobjectsinvolvedinhumanitarianassistanceorpeacekeepingmissions,entitled
to the protection of civilians or civilian objects, is not a new crime under international humanitarian
law. It is rather evidence of the need to specify a group of civilians that because of its missions
deserves a specific protection (Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the establishment of a Special
Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc., S/2000/915, 4 October 2000, para.16). During the negotiations of
the ICC Statute, the Convention of the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel was
included in the Draft Statute as one out of three treaty crimes. When decided that no treaty crime
would be included in the Statute the delegations began to concentrate on treating and including
attacksagainstUNpersonnelasawarcrime.Thecrimeofattackingpeacekeeperswastheonlyone
of the three treaty crimes that "survived" this change, which is evidence of its strong symbolic
character.AcrimewiththesamedefinitionasintheICCStatutewasinincludedintheStatuteofthe
SpecialCourtforSierraLeone.
B.Analysis
a)ObjectiveElements
i.Theperpetratordirectedanattack
The Elements of Crimes do not include a definition of the term attack. The ICC PreTrial Chamber
has,byreferenceinteraliatotheapplicabletreatiesandtheprinciplesandrulesofinternationallaw,
includingtheestablishedprinciplesoftheinternationallawofarmedconflictinarticle21(1)(b)ofthe
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Statutefoundguidanceinarticle49ofAPI,applicableininternationalarmedconflicts(IACs)where
the term attack is defined as acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in
defence. The term has been given the same definition in article 13(2) of APII applicable in non
international armed conflicts (NIACs). There is no requirement of any harmful impact on the
personnel or material. There is a need to establish a causal link between the conduct of the
perpetratorandtheconsequencesothattheconcreteconsequence,theattackinthiscase,canbe
seen as having been caused by the perpetrator.(Prosecutor v Abu Garda. Decision on the
ConfirmationofCharges,PublicRedactedVersion.Doc.,ICC02/0502/09,PT.Ch.,8February2010,
para.6466).
ii. The object of the attack was personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.
There is no generally accepted definition on the notion "humanitarian assistance", but it includes
measurestakenwiththepurposeofpreventingoralleviatinghumansufferingofvictimsofanarmed
conflict. In practice the object of attacks has so far been personnel and objects involved in a
peacekeeping mission. The term peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter but has
developed in practice. The reference to in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations does
notmeanthatthemissionneedstobeestablishedbytheUNbutincludesalsomissionsestablished
byregionalorganisations.(AbuGarda,para124).Whilethetermlackasimpledefinitionthreebasic
principles are accepted as constituting a peacekeeping mission consent of the parties impartiality
and use of force only in selfdefence, (AbuGarda, para. 71) although there is now a change in UN
doctrineregardingdefinitionofsuchmissions(ProsecutorvSesay,KallonandGbao(RUF),CaseNo.
SCSL0415T,Judgement,2March2009(RUF,paras.224225).Consentofthehoststateisalegal
requirementbutinpracticetheconsentofthemainpartiestotheconflictisalsosoughttoensurethe
effectiveness of the operation. Regarding impartiality, the Report of the Panel of the United Nations
Peace Operations (UN Doc., A/55/305S/2000/809 (the Brahimi Report)) states inter alia that
"impartialityforsuchoperationsmustthereforemeanadherencetotheprinciplesoftheCharterand
totheobjectivesofamandatethatisrootedinthoseCharterprinciples.Suchimpartialityisnotthe
same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a
policyofappeasement."(BrahimiReportpara.50andAbuGarda,para73not106).TheMajorityin
theICCPreTrialChambernotedthatpeacekeepingmissionswereonlyentitledtouseforceinself
defencecomparedtopeaceenforcementmissionsdecidedunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharterwhich
may use force beyond the concept of selfdefence in order to achieve their mandates. (AbuGarda,
para. 74). In UN doctrine the right of selfdefence includes a right to resist attempts by forceful
means to prevent the peacekeeping operation from discharging its duties under the mandate of the
Security Council although it is doubtful if it has developed to become settled law (international or
national)(RUF,para.228).
ThedevelopmentinpracticewhereoperationsareoftenauthorizedbytheSecurityCouncilunder
Chapter VII to use all necessary measures for certain purposes is reflected in the UN doctrine by
references to robust peacekeeping. Recent UN doctrine considers that the tendency to refer to
peacekeepingoperationsasChapterVIoperationsandpeaceenforcementoperationsasChapterVII
operationsissomewhatmisleading.Itisnowtheusualpractice,bothinpeacekeepingandinpeace
enforcement, "for a Chapter VII mandate to be given" and a distinction is instead made between
"operations in which the robust use of force is integral to the mission from the outset [...] and
operations in which there is a reasonable expectation that force may not be needed at all" (A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc., A/59/565 (2004) para. 211). The Capstone
Doctrine, as it is known, draws a distinction between peace enforcement and robust peacekeeping.
Peacekeepingoperationswitharobustmandatehavebeenauthorizedto"useallnecessarymeansto
deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, and/or assist the national authorities in
maintaining law and order. The concept of robust peacekeeping is defined as involving "the use of
forceatthetacticallevelwiththeauthorizationoftheSecurityCouncilandconsentofthehostnation
and/orthemainpartiestotheconflict".Apeaceenforcementoperationontheotherhand"doesnot
require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic
level, which is generally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless
authorized by the Security Council" (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and
Guidelines(2008)p.34).
The difference between these types of operation is thus not whether they have been established
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but whether they are dependent on the existence of consent
andtheuseofforceatastrategiclevel.Theconceptofrobustpeacekeepingthereforechallengesthe
traditional borders between the concepts of peacekeeping and peace enforcement (traditionally
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regardedasChapterVIoperationsandChapterVIIoperations).Thismayultimatelyhaveaneffect
on the interpretation of the term peacekeeping mission in the ICC statute. It is telling that the Trial
ChamberintheRUF case found that the mandate of the UNAMSIL even after it has been expanded
throughtheresolution1279whichclearlywasdecidedunderChapterVIIandincludedtheexpression
useofallnecessarymeasureswasregardedapeacekeepingmissionforthepurposeofthecrime
ofattackingpersonnelinsuchmissions(RUF,para.1888).
iii. Such personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles were entitled to the protection given to
Personnelinhumanitarianassistanceandpeacekeepingmissionsarepresumedtobeentitledtothe
protection of civilians. This is particularly so regarding humanitarian assistance personnel. The
authority to use force by peacekeepers, in selfdefence or based on a resolution adopted under
ChapterVIIoftheUNCharter(dependingonthedefinitionofapeacekeepingmission)naturallyraise
questions if the use of force by peacekeepers could affect their protection as civilians under
internationalhumanitarianlaw.Personnelinhumanitarianassistanceandpeacekeepingmissionsare
entitled to the protection of civilians as long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities. Their
protection would not be affected by exercising their individual right of selfdefence nor the use of
forceinselfdefenceinthedischargeoftheirmandate,providedthatitislimitedtosuchuse.(RUF,
para. 233) It should in this respect be noted that the use of force in defence of the mandate is
inherently difficult to define. Determining whether peacekeeping personnel or objects of such a
mission were entitled to the protection of civilians or civilian objects, the Trial Chamber in the RUF
casefoundthatitneededtoconsiderthetotalityofcircumstancesexistingatthetimeofthealleged
offence including inter alia, the relevant Security Council resolutions for the operation, the specific
operational mandates, the role and practices actually adopted by the peacekeeping mission during
theparticularconflict,theirrulesofengagementandoperationalorders,thenatureofthearmsand
equipmentusedbythepeacekeepingforce,theinteractionbetweenthepeacekeepingforceandthe
parties involved in the conflict, any use of force between the peacekeeping force and the parties in
theconflict,thenatureandfrequencyofsuchforceandtheconductoftheallegedvictim(s)andtheir
fellowpersonnel.(RUF,para.234)Itcanbequestionedifindeedalltheseaspectsarevalidforthe
determination whether personnel or objects are entitled to the protection of civilians since this a
questiondecidedunderinternationalhumanitarianlaw.
TheMajorityintheICCPreTrialexemplifieddirectparticipationinhostilitiestoinclude"bearing,
using or taking up arms, taking part in military or hostile acts, activities, conduct or operations,
armed fighting or combat, participating in attacks against enemy personnel, property or equipment,
transmitting military information for immediate use of a belligerent, and transporting weapons in
proximity to combat operations. (AbuGarda, para 81). The determination of whether a person is
directlyparticipatinginhostilitiesrequiresacasebycaseanalysis(AbuGarda,para.83).
Basedonthedefinitionofcivilianobjectsinarticle52(2)ofAPIandtheICRCcustomarylawstudy,
theMajorityintheICCPreTrialChamberfoundthatinstallations,material,unitsorvehiclesinvolved
inapeacekeepingmissionthecontextofanarmedconflictnotofaninternationalcharactershallnot
beconsideredmilitaryobjectives,andthusshallbeentitledtotheprotectiongiventocivilianobjects,
unless and for such time as their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
themilitaryactionofapartytoaconflictandinsofarastheirtotalorpartialdestruction,captureor
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. (Abu
Garda,para89).
Given the military structure and organisation of peacekeeping missions it may in fact be
questioned if such personnel should be regarded as civilians taking direct part in hostilities if they
become involved in armed conflict. Military personnel organised and commanded by a state or an
intergovernmental organisation within a traditional military structure may rather be regarded as
members of a military force under command of party to an armed conflict than civilians directly
participating in an armed conflict. The former has also the legal effect of a change in status of the
personnel in a more permanent manner than the latter where civilians directly participating in
hostilitiesonlytemporarily.
b)Subjectiveelements
i.Theperpetratorintendedsuchpersonnel,installations,material,unitsorvehiclessoinvolvedtobe
theobjectoftheattack
TheMajorityintheICCPreTrialChamberfoundthatthissubjectiveelementwasofsimilarcharacter
to that of the Elements of the Crimes for articles8(2)(b)(i)and8(2)(e)(i) dealing with attacks on
civilians in both international and noninternational armed conflicts. The offence first and foremost
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encompasses dolus directus of the first degree. The finding of the Majority was also applicable in
NIACs.(AbuGarda,para93)
ii.Theperpetratorwasawareofthefactualcircumstancesthatestablishedthe
Protection
The necessary knowledge required by the perpetrator pertains to the facts establishing that the
installations,materials,unitsorvehiclesandpersonnelwereinvolvedinapeacekeepingmissionbut
thereisnoneedoflegalknowledgeregardingtheirprotection.
iii. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed
conflict.
Thereisnorequirementonbehalfoftheperpetratortoconcludeonthebasisofalegalassessment
ofthesaidcircumstances,thattherewasanarmedconflict.(AbuGarda,para.96)(RUF,para.235)
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(e)(iii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1. Michael Bothe, War Crimes, 412, Antonio Cassese/Paola Gaeta/John R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2002.
2.MichaelCottier,AttacksonHumanitarianAssistanceorPeacekeepingMissions,330,OttoTriffterer
(Ed.),CommentaryontheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt:Observers'Notes,Article
byArticle(Munichetal.,Becketal.2nded.,2008
Court:SourcesandCommentary,453456,ICRC/CambridgeUniversityPress,2003.
4. Ola Engdahl, Prosecution of Attacks against Peacekeepers in International Courts and Tribunals,
51,MilitaryLawandLawofWarReview,249,2012.
5. Daniel Frank, Article 8(2)(b)(iii) Attacking Personnel or Objects Involved in a Humanitarian
Assistance or Peacekeeping Mission, 146, Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court:
ElementsofCrimesandRulesofProcedureandEvidence,Ardsley,TransnationalPublishers,2001.
6. Herman von Hebel/Darryl Robinson, Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, 110, Roy S. Lee
(ed.), The International Criminal Court: the Making of the Rome Statute, The Hague, Kluwer Law
International,1999.
Author:
OlaEngdahl
Article8(2)(b)(iv)
[81] (iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread,
longtermandseveredamagetothenaturalenvironmentwhichwouldbeclearlyexcessive
inrelationtotheconcreteanddirectoverallmilitaryadvantageanticipated
The provision reflects the principle of proportionality (articles 51(5)(b) and 85(3)(b) of Additional
ProtocolI)andbringsenvironmentintotheequation(articles35(3)and55ofAdditionalProtocolI).
Crossreference:
1.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(v)
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Article8(2)(b)(v)
[82] (v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or
buildingswhichareundefendedandwhicharenotmilitaryobjectives
Aplaceisconsideredundefendedwhenitisinhabited,locatedinawarzoneornearby,andopento
occupationbyanadverseparty.Thus,theprovisiondoesnotcoverobjectsbehindenemylines,even
iftherearenocombatantsorweaponslocatedinornearbytheobjects.
Crossreference:
1.StarvationinArticles6(c)7(1)(b),(j)and(k)7(2)(b)8(2)(a)(iii)8(2)(b)(ii),(xiii)and(xxv)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.WilliamJ.Fenrickatpp.197198,MN5254inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(vi)
[83] (vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no
longermeansofdefence,hassurrenderedatdiscretion
Thescopeoftheprovisionprotectingcombatantsnotinvolvedincombat,horsdecombat,coversto
alargeextentthewarcrimeofdeclaringthatnoquarterwillbegiven,article8(2)(b)(xii).Themental
elementrequiresatleastrecklessness.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(xii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.MichaelCottieratpp.198202,MN5568inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(vii)1
[84](vii)Makingimproperuseofaflagoftruce,
Envoys,identifyingthemselvesbyawhiteflag,authorizedtonegotiatewiththeenemyareprotected.
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(b)(xi)and8(2)(e)(ix)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.MichaelCottieratp.205,MN75inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
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[85]oftheflagorofthemilitaryinsigniaanduniformoftheenemy
According to the Elements of Crime the use of enemy flags, military insignias, and uniforms is
prohibitedwhileengagedinanattack,whichmakestheprohibitionlessstrictincomparisonwiththe
useofprotectiveemblems.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
[86]oroftheUnitedNations,
AccordingtothewordingonlyUNmilitaryinsigniaisincluded,whichappearstobeaneditorialerror.
ItissubmittedthattheprovisionalsoincludesnonmilitaryUNpersonnel.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
[87]aswellasofthedistinctiveemblemsoftheGenevaConventions,
ThedistinctiveemblemsoftheGenevaConventionsaretheredcross,theredcrescent,theredlion
and sun, and the red crystal. The latter emblem was added by the adoption of a third additional
ProtocoltotheGenevaConventions,8December2005.TheProtocolwaspartlyadoptedinresponse
to the Israeli argument that it should be able to use the red shield of David in national operations.
ThethirdadditionalProtocolenablestheIsraeliSocietytocontinuetouseitsredshieldofDavidas
itssoleembleminsideIsrael.WhenworkingoutsideIsraeltheSocietywouldneedtoworkaccording
totherequirementsofthehostcountry.Normallythiswouldmeanthatitcoulddisplaytheredshield
of David incorporated within the red crystal, or use the red crystal alone (article 3 of the third
additional Protocol). The emblems mark medical and spiritual personnel, medical units and
transports,equipmentorsupplies.Theemblemsmayinprincipleonlybeusedbypersonswhodonot
themselvesparticipateinhostilities.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
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Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
[88]resultingindeathorseriouspersonalinjury
Theconductisonlycriminalunderarticle8(2)(b)(vii)whenitledtoaperson'sdeathorinjury.
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(viii)
[89](viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or
partsofthepopulationoftheoccupiedterritorywithinoroutsidethisterritory
The transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies violates the principle of international law that an Occupying Power is only permitted to a
position of trust as an interim military administrator. The material element requires the transfer of
persons from one territory to another. Article 49(2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention allows the
Occupying Power to undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the
population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the
displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for
material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be
transferredbacktotheirhomesassoonashostilitiesintheareainquestionhaveceased.
Crossreference:
1.Articles7(1)(d),8(2)(a)(vii)and8(2)(e)(viii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
3.GerhardWerleatpp.327328and329331,MN964966and971976.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(ix)
[90]Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art,
science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick
andwoundedarecollected,providedtheyarenotmilitaryobjectives
A.Generalremarks
With this article the drafters of the Rome Statute included a provision criminalizing violations of the
rules protecting cultural property, which have been established by international humanitarian law as
well as several UNESCO treaties over the years. The purpose of this provision is to specifically
criminalize the destruction of cultural property as opposed to civilian property and therefore, it
constitutesalexspecialistoArticles8(2)(a)(iv),8(2)(b)(ii)and8(2)(b)(xiii).
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B.Analysis
i.Definition
Pursuant to the ICC Elements of Crime, the following criteria need to be met in order to fulfill the
article at hand: 1. The perpetrator directed an attack. 2. The object of the attack was one or more
buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitalsorplaceswherethesickandwoundedarecollected,whichwerenotmilitaryobjectives.3.
The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are
collected,whichwerenotmilitaryobjectives,tobetheobjectoftheattack.4.Theconducttookplace
in the context of and was associated with an international armed conflict. 5. The perpetrator was
awareoffactualcircumstancesthatestablishedtheexistenceofanarmedconflict.
ii.Requirements
a.Materialelements
Theobjectoftheoffencehastobespeciallyprotected.TheinstitutionsenlistedintheRomeStatute
canbeclassifiedintofourmaincategories:culturalobjects,placesforthecollectionofthoseinneed
(e.g.hospitals),institutionsdedicatedtoreligionandothersdedicatedtoeducation.TheICTYdefined
cultural objects by referring the definition of cultural property in treaty law (e.g. the 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict) (Prosecutor v.
Strugar,(CaseNo.IT0142),ICTYT.Ch.Judgmentof31January2005,para.230).Accordingtothe
case law of the ICTY, religious and educational institutions are protected as long as they meet the
special requirement of cultural heritage of people, meaning objects whose value transcends
geographical boundaries, and which are unique in character and are intimately associated with the
historyandcultureofapeople(Prosecutorv.Marti,(CaseNo.IT9511),ICTYT.Ch.Judgmentof
12 June 2007, para. 97). Additionally, these institutions must clearly be identified as dedicated to
religionoreducation(Prosecutorv.Blaki, (Case No. IT9514), ICTY T. Ch. Judgmentof3March
2000,para.185).
Furthermore, the object of the offence cannot be a military objective. Military objectives are
definedbyArticle52(3)AdditionalProtocolI as objects which by their nature, location, purpose or
usemakeaneffectivecontributiontomilitaryactionandwhosetotalorpartialdestruction,captureor
neutralization,inthecircumstancesrulingatthetime,offersadefinitemilitaryadvantage.
Concerning the nature of the offence the Rome Statute penalizes the directing of attacks against
suchinstitutions.ThetermattackisdefinedinArticle49(1)AdditionalProtocolIandmeansactsof
violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence. Hence, the scope of the article is
extremely broad and almost all acts of hostility fall under this provision. Furthermore, no actual
damage to the protected institutions is required. In order for the article at hand to be fulfilled it is
sufficientthattheattackwasdirectedagainsttherespectiveprotectedinstitution.
b.Mentalelements
Additionally to the mental elements concerning the general requirements of war crimes, the
perpetrator has to fulfill the mental elements of the underlying offence at hand. Namely, the attack
against the protected institutions has to be committed intentionally. A controversial issue while
draftingtheRomeStatutewaswhetherthetermintentionallywasrelatedsolelytothedirectingof
anattackoralsototheobjectoftheattack.Thetraxauxprparatoiresadoptedthelatterapproach.
Therefore, the ICC Elements of the Crime require that the perpetrator must have known about the
protected status of the institution. Additionally the perpetrator must have knowledge of the
institutionsfailuretoqualifyasamilitaryobjective,andneverthelesscarryouttheattack.However,
he does not have to make a legal assessment of the protected status of the institutions. He merely
needs to know the factual circumstances, which give the object a special status (see, Prosecutor v.
Blaki,(CaseNo.IT9514),ICTYT.Ch.Judgmentof3March2000,para.185).
C.Crossreferences:
1.Article8(2)(b)(i),8(2)(b)(ii),8(2)(e)(i)and8(2)(e)(iv)
2.ElementsofCrime
D.Doctrine:
1. Roberta Arnold, Article 8, Paragraph 2 (b)(ix), Otto Triffterer (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court Observers Notes, Article by Article, 375380, Second
Edition,C.H.Beck/Hart/Nomos,Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,2008
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2. Gideon Boas et al., International Criminal Law Practitioner Library, Vol. II, Elements of Crime
underInternationalCriminalLaw,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2008
3. CarolineEhlert, Prosecuting the Destruction of Cultural Property in International Criminal Law,
MartinusNijhoffPublishers,Leiden,2014,pp.121140
4.MicaelaFrulli,TheCriminalizationofOffencesagainstCulturalHeritageinTimesofArmedConflict:
TheQuestofConsistency,EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw,vol22(2011):203217
5.MireilleHector,Enhancingindividualcriminalresponsibilityforoffencesinvolvingculturalproperty
the road to the Rome Statute and the 1999 Second Protocol, Nout Van Woudenberg/ Liesbeth
Lijnzaad(Eds.),ProtectingCulturalArmedConflictAnInsightintothe1999SecondProtocoltothe
HagueConventionof1954fortheProtectionofCulturalPropertyintheEventofArmedConflict,21
42,KoninklijkeBrill,Leiden,2010
6.TheodorMeron,TheProtectionofCulturalPropertyintheEventofArmedConflictwithintheCase
law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Museum International, vol 57
(2005):4159
7. Roger OKeefe, Protection of Cultural Property under International Criminal Law, Melbourne
JournalofInternationalLaw,vol11(2010):154
8. Rdiger Wolfrum, Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, RdigerWolfrum(Ed.), The
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, online
edition[www.mpepil.com]
Author:
CarolineEhlert
Article8(2)(b)(x)1
[91](x)Subjectingpersonswhoareinthepowerofanadversepartytophysicalmutilation
The term "physical mutilation" cover acts such as amputations, injury to limbs, removal of organs,
andformsofsexualmutilations.Thevictim'sconsentisnotaexcusabledefence.
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(c)(i)and8(2)(e)(xi)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.AndreasZimmermanatp.216,MN106107inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(x)2
[92]ortomedicalorscientificexperiments
The prohibition of medical or scientific experiments cover the use of therapeutic methods which are
not justified on medical grounds and not carried out in the interest of the affected person. The
consentofthevictimisnotrelevant.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(a)(ii)and8(2)(e)(xi)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
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Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(x)3
[93]of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of
the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or
seriouslyendangerthehealthofsuchpersonorpersons
The acts in article 8(2)(b)(x) can only be justified if undertaken in the interest of the person
concerned,forexampleamputationsmaybelawfulifperformedtosavetheliveoroverallhealthof
thepatient.
Crossreference:
Article8(2)(e)(xi)
Doctrine:
2.AndreasZimmermanatpp.216217,MN109113inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xi)
[94](xi) Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or
army
Treachery, also synonymous with perfidy, involves a breach of good faith of the combatants. In
practice,itistypicallycasesinwhichtheaccusedindeceptionclaimsarighttoprotectionforhimor
herself,andusesthisforhisorheradvantageinthecombat.Itincludes:
pretendingtobeacivilian
fakeuseofaflagoftruce,theflagorofthemilitaryinsigniaanduniformoftheenemyorofthe
UnitedNations,aswellasofthedistinctiveemblemsoftheGenevaConventions
fakeuseofoftheprotectiveemblemofculturalproperty
fakeuseofotherinternationallyrecognizedprotectiveemblems,signsorsignals
pretendingtosurrender
pretendingtobeincapacitatedbywoundsorsickness
pretending to belong to a neutral state or other State not party to the conflict by the use of their
signs
pretendingtobelongtotheenemybytheuseoftheirsigns
Thewordingoftheprovisionindicatesthattheprohibitionofthreacheryprotectenemycombatants,
as well as civilians. Perfidious acts are only punishable if the perpetrator intentionally killed or
woundedanadversary.
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(b)(vii)and8(2)(e)(ix)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xii)
[95](xii)Declaringthatnoquarterwillbegiven
The offence covers "take no prisoners" warfare. The material element will typically be fulfilled by a
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declaration that any surrender by the enemy shall be refused even if it is reasonable to accept. In
addition to declarations, the provision should be include order and threats that no quarter shall be
refused.Combatantsarenotrequiredtoprovidetheenemywiththeopportunitytosurrender.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(vi)and8(2)(e)(x)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xiii)
[96](xiii)Destroyingorseizingtheenemy'spropertyunlesssuchdestructionorseizurebe
imperativelydemandedbythenecessitiesofwar
The individual elements of the prohibition should be interpreted in light of the relevant rules of
customaryinternationallaw,suchasthoseembodiedinteraliainarticles46,52,53,54,55and56of
the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Acts otherwise
prohibited may me justified if "imperatively demanded by the necessities of war". The exception
shouldbeinterpretedrestrictively,noteverysituationofmilitarynecessityiscovered.
charges, 30 September 2008, paras. 310311, PTC I held "that the property in question whether
moveable or immoveable, private or public must belong to individuals or entities aligned with or
with allegiance to a party to the conflict adverse or hostile to the perpetrator. Article8(2)(b)(xiii)of
the Statute applies not only when the attack is specifically directed at a military objective but also
whenittargetsanddestroyscivilianproperty."PTCIalsostatedthat"intheviewoftheChamber,the
provision does not apply to incidental destruction of civilian property during an attack specifically
directed at a military objective, as long as the destruction does not violate the proportionality rule
providedforinarticle51APIandinarticle8(2)(b)(iv)oftheStatute(para.313)."
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(a)(iv),8(2)(b)(xvi),8(2)(e)(v)and8(2)(e)(xii)
2.StarvationinArticles6(c)7(1)(b),(j)and(k)7(2)(b)8(2)(a)(iii)8(2)(b)(ii),(v)and(xxv)
3.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xiv)
[97](xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and
actionsofthenationalsofthehostileparty
The term "actions" is referring to the the right of access to courts of law. This provision is similar
article8(a)(vi).Thedifferencebetweentheprovisionswouldappearthatthepresentprovisioncovers
civilclaimsasopposedtocriminalscases.
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(a)(vi)and8(2)(c)(iv)
2.ElementsofCrime
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Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xv)
[98](xv)Compellingthenationalsofthehostilepartytotakepartintheoperationsofwar
directedagainsttheirowncountry,eveniftheywereinthebelligerent'sservicebeforethe
commencementofthewar
This offence can also be charged under article 8(a)(v). There is disagreement whether the
prohibitioncoversmorethancompellingnationalstoserveinthearmedforcesoftheadversary,for
examplewarrelatedwork.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(a)(v)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xvi)
[99](xvi)Pillagingatownorplace,evenwhentakenbyassault
The term "pillage" means appropriation of property for private, personal use and embraces acts of
plundering, looting and sacking. There is no substantive difference between appropriation and
confiscation.Article8(2)(e)(v)isanidenticalprovisiontothepresentprovision,butappliesinnon
international armed conflicts. In comparison with articles 8(2)(a)(iv), 8(2)(b)(xiii) and 8(2)(e)(xii),
pillage differs from appropriation and confiscation in regard to the perpetrator's intent to obtain the
propertyforprivateorpersonaluse.
charges, 30 September 2008, para. 329, PTC I stated that the "war crime of pillaging under article
8(2)(b)(xvi)oftheStatuterequiresthatthepropertysubjecttotheoffencebelongstoan'enemy'or
'hostile'partytotheconflict."
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(a)(iv),8(2)(b)(xiii),8(2)(e)(v)and8(2)(e)(xii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xvii)
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[100](xvii)Employingpoisonorpoisonedweapons
Thisoffencecouldforexampleincludethepoisoningofwatersupplies.Theproductionandstorageof
poisonisnotprohibited.Thereisnoagreementwhethertheprohibitionontheuseofpoisoncovers
poison gas. The provision does not prohibit chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.
Insteadthisiscoveredbyarticle8(2)(b)(xx),butwhichisnotyetinforce.Thismaybeexplainedthe
lack of agreement on the prohibition on of nuclear weapons and a following compromise during the
Romeconference,withtheresultthatweaponsofmassdestructionarenotsubjecttoanexplicitand
bindingprovisionintheRomeStatute.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(xviii)and8(2)(b)(xx)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xviii)
[101](xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids,
materialsordevices
ThewordingofthepresentprovisionisbasicallyidenticaltheGenevaProtocolof17June1925forthe
prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological
methods of warfare. It is generally understood that the wording "asphyxiating, poisonous or other
gases,andallanalogousliquids,materialsordevices"inthe1925GenevaProtocolincludeschemical
weapons which nullifies the compromise mentioned in the previous commentary (article 8(2)(b)
(xvii)). Even though biological weapons are covered by the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, it is
doubtful that the present provision covers these weapons. This is supported by the fact that the
relevantpassageonbiologicalweaponsintheGenevaProtocolof17June1925wasnotincludedin
article8(2)(b)(xvii).
Crossreference:
ElementsofCrime
ICCCaseMatrixElementsDigest
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xix)
[102] (xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as
bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with
incisions
The "dumdum" bullet is type of bullet covered by the present provision, as well as customary law.
Theprohibitionequallyappliestostandardbulletsconvertedonthebattlefieldbypiercingthemwith
incisions,aswellastoothertypesofbulletswhichexpandorflatteneasilyinthehumanbody.
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Crossreference:
1.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xx)
[103](xx) Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are
of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently
indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that such
weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a
comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute, by an amendment
inaccordancewiththerelevantprovisionssetforthinarticles121and123
Thisacatchallprohibitionwhichrequiresanamendmentintheformofannexinordertobebinding.
Thus, the provision is at the present time not applicable. The present provision was part of the
compromise mentioned in the commentary to article8(2)(b)(xvii). A great number of delegation at
the Rome Conference wanted to include additional weapons such as biological weapons, chemical
weapons,landminesandlaserblindingweapons.Theprovisionmaybeamendedinafuturereview
conference.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(xvii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.MichaelCottieratpp.239240and242244,MN179181and185188inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xxi)
[104] (xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degradingtreatment
Thehumiliatinganddegradingtreatmentisprohibitedevenifthevictimovercomestheconsequences
relatively quickly. In Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui, ICC01/0401/07717, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008, para. 369, PTC I quoted ICTY jurisprudence when it
stated that "there is no requirement that such suffering be lasting". There is no special intent
requirementinadditiontothegeneralrequirementofarticle30.
Crossreference:
1.Articles7(1)(c)and8(2)(c)(ii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.PatriciaViseurSellersatpp.244248,MN189199inOttoTriffterer.
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Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xxii)1
[105](xxii)Committingrape,
throughthecaselawoftheICTRandtheICTY.Rapeasawarcrimediffersfromthedefinitionofrape
asacrimeagainsthumanityonlyintermsofthecontextinwhichthecrimeiscommitted.Therape
musthavebeenperpetratedinthecontextofandinassociationwithaninternationalarmedconflict.
Forthementalelementofrapearticle30applies.Theperpetratorhastobeawareofthefactual
circumstancesthatestablishedtheexistenceofanarmedconflict.Heorshemustalsohaveintended
topenetratethevictimsbodyandbeawarethatthepenetrationwasbyforceorthreatofforce.
The definition of rape is the same regarding rape as genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes,albeitthecontextualelementsofthechapeausdiffer.Theactusreusoftheviolationisfound
intheElementsofCrimes.Thedefinitionfocusesonpenetrationwith1)asexualorganofanybody
part,or2)withtheuseofanobjectoranyotherpartofthebodyoftheanalorgenitalopeningofthe
victim,committedbyforceorthreatorforceorcoercion.Anypartofthebodyunderpoint1refers
to vaginal, anal and oral penetration with the penis and may also be interpreted as ears, nose and
eyesofthevictim.Point2referstoobjectsortheuseoffingers,handsortongueoftheperpetrator.
Case No. IT9623 and 23/1. As to the term coercion the ICTR Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v.
Akayesu held that a coercive environment does not require physical force. It also adopted a broad
approach to the actus reus, including also the use of objects, an approach that has been embraced
alsobytheICTYandtheICC(Prosecutorv.JeanPaulAkayesu,2September1998,ICTR,CaseNo.
ICTR964T,para.598).
priorsexualconduct.
charges, 30 September 2008, ICC, para. 347, the Chamber found sufficient evidence to affirm
charges of rape as a war crime. This included the invasion of the body of civilian women by the
penetration of the perpetrators sexual organ or other body parts, through force, threat or fear of
violenceordeath.See.paras.351352.
Crossreference:
1.Articles7(1)(g)and8(2)(e)(vi)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1. Antonio Cassese at pp. 374375 and Michael Bothe at pp. 415416 in Antonio Cassese/Paola
Gaeta/JohnR.W.D.Jones.
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2.MacheldBootatpp.141142,MN4546andMichaelCottieratp.253,MN209inOttoTriffterer.
4.RobertCryer/HkanFriman/DarrylRobinson/ElizabethWilmshurst,p.292,
2005,pp.199201.
Author:
MariaSjholm
[106]sexualslavery,
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, 22 February 2001, ICTY, Case No. IT9623 and 23/1,
offence.Sexualslaveryasawarcrimediffersfromthedefinitionofsexualslaveryasacrimeagainst
humanityonlyintermsofthecontextinwhichthecrimeiscommitted.
charges,30September2008,para.431,PTCIheldthat"sexualslaveryalsoencompassessituations
wherewomenandgirlsareforcedinto'marriage',domesticservitudeorotherforcedlabourinvolving
compulsory sexual activity, including rape, by their captors. Forms of sexual slavery can, for
example, be practices such as the detention of women in 'rape camps' or 'comfort stations', forced
temporary 'marriages' to soldiers and other practices involving the treatment of women as chattel,
and as such, violations of the peremptory norm prohibiting slavery." The Chamber found sufficient
evidencetoaffirmchargesofsexualslaveryasawarcrimeintheformofwomenbeingabductedfor
thepurposeofusingthemaswives,beingforcedorthreatenedtoengageinsexualintercoursewith
combatants, to serve as sexual slaves and to work in military camps servicing soldiers. See para.
347.
to constitute forced marriage and consequently a crime against humanity. The Chamber concluded
that forced marriage was distinct from sexual slavery. Accordingly, While forced marriage shares
certainelementswithsexualslaverysuchasnonconsensualsexanddeprivationofliberty,thereare
alsodistinguishingfactors.First,forcedmarriageinvolvesaperpetratorcompellingapersonbyforce
orthreatofforce,throughthewordsorconductoftheperpetratororthoseassociatedwithhim,into
aforcedconjugalassociationwithanotherpersonresultingingreatsuffering,orseriousphysicalor
mental injury on the part of the victim. Second, unlike sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a
relationship of exclusivity between the husband and wife, which could lead to disciplinary
consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL
200416A,AppealsJudgment,22February2008,para.195.In2012theCourtinadecisiononthe
CharlesTaylorcasedeclareditspreferenceforthetermforcedconjugalslavery.TheTrialChamber
didnotfindthetermmarriagetobehelpfulindescribingtheeventsthathadoccurred,inthatitdid
notconstitutemarriageintheuniversallyunderstoodsense(Prosecutorv.CharlesTaylor,SCSL03
01T,18May2012,para.427).
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
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Doctrine:
2.MacheldBootatp.143144,MN47and50andMichaelCottieratp.253,MN209inOttoTriffterer.
2005,pp.199201.
Author:
MariaSjholm
ProtocolI as an outrage upon personal dignity. Forced prostitution as a war crime differs from the
definitionofforcedprostitutionasacrimeagainsthumanityonlyintermsofthecontextinwhichthe
crimeiscommitted.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.MacheldBootatp.143144,MN4850andMichaelCottieratp.253,MN209inOttoTriffterer.
2005,pp.199201.
Author:
MariaSjholm
[108]forcedpregnancy,asdefinedinarticle7,paragraph2(f),
Forced pregnancy means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant. Unlawful
confinement should be interpreted as any form of deprivation of physical liberty contrary to
internationallaw.Thedeprivationoflibertydoesnothavetobesevereandnospecifictimeframeis
required. The use of force is not required, but some form of coercion. To complete the crime, it is
sufficientiftheperpetratorholdsawomanimprisonedwhohasbeenimpregnatedbysomeoneelse.
Theforcibleimpregnationmayinvolverapeorotherformsofsexualviolenceofcomparablegravity.
In addition to the mental requirements in article30, the perpetrator must act with the purpose of
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of
international law. National laws prohibiting abortion do not amount to forced pregnancy. Forced
pregnancyasawarcrimediffersfromthedefinitionofforcedpregnancyasacrimeagainsthumanity
onlyintermsofthecontextinwhichthecrimeiscommitted.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
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Doctrine:
2.MacheldBootatpp.144and164165andMichaelCottieratp.253,MN209inOttoTriffterer.
2005,pp.199201.
Author:
MariaSjholm
alsofallunderthechapeauofgenocideifsuchintentispresent.Enforcedsterilizationasawarcrime
differs from the definition of enforced sterilization as a crime against humanity only in terms of the
contextinwhichthecrimeiscommitted.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.MacheldBootatp.144,MN52andMichaelCottieratp.253,MN209inOttoTriffterer.
2005,pp.199201.
Author:
MariaSjholm
[110]or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions
otheractslistedinarticle8(2)(b)(xxii).Itconcernsactsofasexualnatureagainstapersonthrough
theuseofforceorthreatofforceorcoercion.Theimportanceofdistinguishingthedifferentformsof
severity,andthereforebecomesamatterofsentencing.Sexualviolenceasawarcrimediffersfrom
crimesagainsthumanityintermsofthecontextinwhichthecrimeiscommitted,inthiscaseinthe
contextofaninternationalarmedconflict.
may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact. See Prosecutor v.
JeanPaul Akayesu, ICTR964T, 2 September 1998, para. 688. The Trial Chamber in the case
confirmed that forced public nudity was an example of sexual violence within its jurisdiction. See
para.10A.Similarly,theTrialChamberoftheICTYinitsKvockadecisiondeclared:sexualviolence
is broader than rape and includes such crimes as sexual slavery or molestation, and also covers
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sexual acts that do not involve physical contact, such as forced public nudity. See Prosecutor v.
MiroslavKvocka, 2 November 2001, ICTY, Case No. IT9830/1T, para. 180. To the contrary, in the
decision on the Prosecutors application for a warrant of arrest in the Bemba case, the PreTrial
Chamber of the ICC did not include a charge of sexual violence as a crime against humanity in the
arrestwarrant,whichhadbeenbasedonallegationsthatthetroopsinquestionhadforcedwomento
undressinpublicinordertohumiliatethem,statingthatthefactssubmittedbytheProsecutordonot
constituteotherformsofsexualviolenceofcomparablegravitytotheotherformsofsexualviolence
setforthinArticle7(1)(g)(DecisionontheProsecutorsApplicationforaWarrantofArrestagainst
JeanPierreBembaGomboICC01/0501/08,10June2008,para.40).
In the Lubanga case of the ICC, evidence of sexual violence was presented during the trial,
includingvariousformsofsexualabuseofgirlsoldierswhowereforcefullyconscripted.However,no
charges of sexual violence were brought. The Prosecution rather encouraged the Trial Chamber to
consider evidence of sexual violence as an integral element of the recruitment and use of child
soldiers. ICC01/0401/062748Red. In the confirmation of charges in the Muthaura and Kenyatta
case, PreTrial Chamber II chose not to charge forced male circumcision and penile amputation as
sexualviolence,butratherasinhumaneacts.TheChamberheldthattheevidenceplacedbeforeit
does not establish the sexual nature of the acts of forcible circumcision and penile amputation.
Instead,itappearsfromtheevidencethattheactsweremotivatedbyethnicprejudice.ICC01/09
02/11382Red,para.266.Itarguedthatnoteveryactofviolencewhichtargetspartsofthebody
commonlyassociatedwithsexualityshouldbeconsideredanactofsexualviolence.Seepara.265.
charges, 30 September 2008, para. 375 PTC I, the defendants were charged with outrages upon
personaldignity,asdefinedinarticle8(2)(b)(xxi), rather than sexual violence for making a woman
walkthroughtown,dressedsolelyinablouse,withoutunderwear.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.MacheldBootatpp.144145,MN53andMichaelCottieratp.253,MN209inOttoTriffterer.
2005,pp.199201.
Author:
MariaSjholm
Article8(2)(b)(xxiii)
[111](xxiii)Utilizingthepresenceofacivilianorotherprotectedpersontorendercertain
points,areasormilitaryforcesimmunefrommilitaryoperations
In addition to civilians, it is prohibited to use the presence of prisoners of war and military medical
personnelasashield.Ifapartyviolatesthisprovision,theattackingpartymuststillupholdtherules
ofhumanitarianlaw,includingtheruleofproportionalityandconsideradditionalincidentalcasualties
which may arise due to an attack. In addition to mental requirement of article30 the perpetrator
mustacttoprotect,aidorpreventamilitaryobjectiveoroperation.
Crossreference:
1.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xxiv)
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Article8(2)(b)(xxiv)
[112] (xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in
conformitywithinternationallaw
The term "attack" corresponds to the offence of attacks on a civilian population (article 8(2)(b)(i)).
TherecognizedemblemsaretheemblemoftheRedCross,theredcrescent,theredlionandthesun
andtheredcrystal(thethirdadditionalProtocol).
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(b)(i)and8(2)(e)(ii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xxv)
[113](xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving
them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies
asprovidedforundertheGenevaConventions
Inadditiontodeprivationoffood,theterm"starvation"mayincludenonfoodobjectsindispensible
to the survival of civilians, for example medicines, blankets or clothing. Acts prohibited under this
provision may also be covered by articles6(c)7(1)(b),(j)and(k)7(2)(b)8(2)(a)(iii) 8(2)(b)(ii),
(v)and(xiii).Stravationcantakemanyforms,includingremovalordestructionofessentialsupplies,
the prevention of the production of food, impeding relief supplies, and not fulfilling a duty under
internationallawtoprovidesupplies.Inadditiontomentalrequirementofarticle30theperpetrator
mustintendtostarveciviliansasamethodofwarfare.
Crossreference:
1.Articles6(c)7(1)(b),(j)and(k)7(2)(b)8(2)(a)(iii)8(2)(b)(ii),(v)and(xiii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(b)(xxvi)
[114] (xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the
nationalarmedforcesorusingthemtoparticipateactivelyinhostilities
A.Generalremarks
Article8(2)(b)(xxvi) concerns the conscription, recruitment or use of children younger than fifteen
yearsofage,inthecontextofaninternationalconflict.ThecrimealsoappearsinArticle8(2)(b)(vii)
to cover the same crime in the context of an internal conflict. The act of conscripting or enlisting a
child under the age of fifteen years into a national or nongovernmental force is therefore a crime,
regardlessofwhetheritiscommittedinthecontextofaninternationalorinternalarmedconflict.
B.Preparatoryworks
As the practice of child soldier recruitment/conscription/use had not been previously expressly
recognised as criminalised, its inclusion was naturally a controversial point of debate during Statute
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negotiations. The United States in particular was against the inclusion of the crime, arguing that it
was not a crime under customary international law and represented an area of legislative action
outside the purview of the Conference [Committee of the Whole Meeting Records, 4th meeting
(Wednesday,17June1998),54].However,agreementoninclusionwaseventuallyreachedduetoits
position as a wellestablished treaty law provision [Additional Protocol I, Article 77(2) Additional
ProtocolII,Article4(3)(c)andConventionontheRightsoftheChild,Article38(3)].In2002thecrime
wasincludedasaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlawinArticle4(c)oftheStatuteof
the Special Court for Sierra Leone [Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc.
S/2002/246]. In a split decision in May 2004, the Special Court held that the provision was already
customaryinternationallawpriortotheadoptionoftheRomeStatutein1998thatistosaythatthe
Statutecodifiedanexistingcustomarynormratherthanforminganewone(ProsecutorvSamHinga
Norman,FourthDefencePreliminaryMotionBasedonLackofJurisdiction(ChildRecruitment),SCSL
0414AR72,31May2004).
C.Analysis
i.Definition
AccordingtoArticle8(2)(b)(xxvi)thecrimehasthreecomponents:recruitment,conscriptionoruse.
ThisisincontrasttobothAdditionalProtocolIandArticle38oftheConventionontheRightsofthe
Child,whichmakereferencetothesingularactofrecruiting.TheElementsofCrimeprovidefurther:
1. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into the national armed forces or
usedoneormorepersonstoparticipateactivelyinhostilities.
2.Suchpersonorpersonswereundertheageof15years.
3.Theperpetratorkneworshouldhaveknownthatsuchpersonorpersonswereundertheageof15
years.
4.Theconducttookplaceinthecontextofandwasassociatedwithaninternationalarmedconflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed
conflict.
The PreTrial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga determined that the term conscripting
referstoaforcibleact,enlistingencompassesavoluntarydecisiontojoinamilitaryforce,andthe
actofenlistingincludesanyconductacceptingthechildaspartofthemilitia.(ProsecutorvThomas
DyiloLubanga,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,ICC01/0401/06,29January2007).
ii.Consentofthechildasamitigatingfactor
Whileallegedvoluntarinessmaybenegatedbyforceorintimidation,theconsentofthechildcreates
thelegalcharacterisationoftheconductasenlistmentratherthanconscription.Consentistherefore
not irrelevant, but nonetheless places the admission of a child to the armed forces firmly within the
realmofArticle8regardlessofthemeansofadmission.Thespecificmodeofadmission,whetherthe
result of governmental policy, individual initiative or acquiescence in demands to enlist [Happold
(2006) The Age of Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law p. 8] is, for the most part
irrelevant. Happold suggests that this distinction between the means of committing the material
element of this crime may become pertinent during sentencing [Happold p. 12]. In its judgment in
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo the ICC Trial Chamber intimated that it would follow this path
when determining the sentence, but found no aggravating factors when delivering the sentencing
orderon10July2012,insteadfindingthatthefactorsthatarerelevantfordeterminingthegravityof
the crime cannot additionally be taken into account as aggravating circumstances. (Prosecutor v
ThomasLubanga,Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC01/0401/062842, 14 March
2012, para. 617 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga, SentencingOrder, ICC01/0401/062901, 10 July
2012,paras.78and96).
iii.Continuingcrime
There are a number of different ways in which these two concepts are interrelated or occur
concurrently in the context of the crime. Conscription and enlistment can be viewed as continuing
crimes that begin from the moment a child joins an armed group and end upon demobilisation or
attainment of 15 years of age, with all intermittent time additionally constituting use. This is
therefore a continuing crime: a state of affairs where a crime has been committed and then
maintained.Thecrimeiscommittedfromthemomentthatachildisenteredintoanarmedforceor
group, through enlistment or conscription, and continues for as long as that child remains a child
soldier,endingeitherthroughdemobilisationortheattainmentof15yearsofage.Thisplacesliability
on the person who recruited the child, whether by enlisting or conscripting, regardless of whether
they were involved in the "use" of the child in an armed conflict. The act of recruitment triggers
responsibility for all subsequent use, even if by other commanders. An alternative interpretation is
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that the crime is not a composite one, as it is capable of being committed by either the initial
conscription or enlistment step, or through the subsequent use of the given child, and not
necessarilythroughdemonstratingacombinationofthetwo.Thisexpandstheliabilityforthecrime
toincorporatenotjustthepersonwhoactuallyundertakestherecruitmentprocessofagivenchild,
butalsoincludesotherswholaterusethechildformilitarypurposes.
iii.Requirements
Inadditiontothecontextualelementsrequiredforallwarcrimesofaninternationalnaturesetoutin
elements4and5oftheabovelistedElementsofCrimes,thefollowingneedstobeproven:
a.Materialelements
The first two elements listed above set out the material elements of child soldier
conscription/enlistment/use.
ThewarcrimesestablishedbytheRomeStatutearelimitedtotheconscriptionorenlistmentanduse
ofchildrenundertheageoffifteenyears.However,theactsofconscriptionandenlistmentarenot
defined in the Statute, nor in the Elements of Crimes, leaving elaboration to judicial interpretation.
ThePreTrialChamber,(ProsecutorvLubanga,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,ICC01/04
01/06, 29 January 2007) determined that the term conscripting refers to a forcible act, whereas
enlistingencompassesavoluntarydecisiontojoinamilitaryforce(ProsecutorvLubanga,Decision
ontheconfirmationofcharges,paras.246247).Theactofenlistingincludesanyconductaccepting
thechildaspartofthemilitia(ProsecutorvLubanga,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,para.
114). While alleged voluntariness may be negated by force or intimidation, the consent of the child
creates the legal characterisation of the conduct as enlistment rather than conscription. Consent is
therefore not irrelevant, but nonetheless places the admission of a child to the armed forces firmly
withintherealmofArticle8regardlessofthemeansofadmission.
Finally, Participation by combatant and noncombatant children are covered equally by the Rome
Statuteduetoitsuseofthetermparticipateactively.However,theirparticipationmustbewithinthe
context of an armed conflict. The Elements of Crime require that the participation be conduct
associated with an armed conflict, while the travaux prparatoires noted above specifies that
participationinthearmedconfrontationsisnotnecessary,butalinktocombatisrequired[U.N.Doc.
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1,(14April1998)].
b.Mentalelements
years.
WhileArticle30(3)providesthataperpetratormusthavehadpositiveknowledgeofthechildsage,
theElementsofCrimesmerelyrequirethathekneworshouldhaveknownthatthechildwasunder
fifteen.InProsecutorvLubangaitwasdeterminedthattheElementsofCrimesprovidesforsituations
wheretheperpetratorfailstopossessknowledgeofthegivenchildsageduetoafailuretoexercise
duediligenceinthecircumstances,(ProsecutorvLubanga,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,
para. 348). Therefore, the PreTrial Chamber considered this element of negligence to be an
exceptiontotheintentandknowledgestandardprovidedinArticle30(1).
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(e)(vii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1.JulieMcBride,TheWarCrimeofChildSoldierRecruitment,Springer,2013.
2. Matthew Happold, Child Recruitment as a Crime under the Rome Statute of the International
CriminalCourt.InDoriaetal(eds)TheLegalRegimeoftheInternationalCriminalCourt:Essaysin
MemoryofIgorBlischenko.Brill,Leiden.
3.GerhardWerle, Principles of International Criminal Law, Second Edition, T.M.C. Asser Press, The
Hague,2009.
Author:
JulieMcBride
Article8(2)(c)
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Article8(2)(c)
[115] (c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious
violationsofarticle3commontothefourGenevaConventionsof12August1949,namely,
anyofthefollowingactscommittedagainstpersonstakingnoactivepartinthehostilities,
includingmembersofarmedforceswhohavelaiddowntheirarmsandthoseplacedhors
decombatbysickness,wounds,detentionoranyothercause:
A.GeneralRemarks
TwoprovisionsintheICCStatuterelatetowarcrimescommittedinnoninternationalarmedconflict,
subparagraphs (c) and (e). A literal interpretation of these subparagraphs shows that there are two
thresholdsofapplicability,i.e.twotypesofnoninternationalarmedconflicts.Howeveritseemsthat
theCourtdoesnotdistinguishbetweenthetwotypesofnoninternationalarmedconflicts(Prosecutor
v.Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the
paras 216 and 224 Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011, para. 103). This may be so because the
subparagraph (d) (which explains subparagraph (c)) threshold appears lower, not requiring the
conflicttobeprotracted.ForexampleinKatangatheICConlyreferstoArticle8(2)(f)tocharacterise
thenatureoftheconflict(Prosecutorv.Katanga,ICCT.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7
March 2014, paras 11831187) and yet probes offences under Article 8(2)(c) (Katanga, ICC T. Ch.
II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1231).
Subparagraph (c) must be read in conjunction with Article8(2)(d) as the latter removes specific
situations from its scope of application. As a result the following situations are not covered by
subparagraph(c):
international armed conflicts. This explains why the assessment of the characterisation of the
conflict under Article 8(2)(c) takes place in a wider discussion, notably in contradistinction to
international armed conflicts (see Article 8(2)(a) ICC Statute). The problem may arise in
particular in armed conflicts where there is fighting between governmental forces on one side
andorganizedarmedgroupsontheotherwhereatthesametimeathirdStateisinvolvedinthe
conflict intervening in support of the organized armed groups. The way the Court distinguishes
betweenanoninternationalandaninternationalarmedconflictisbyusingthe"overallcontrol"
testasopposedtothe"effectivecontrol"testthatwasestablishedbytheInternationalCourtof
Justice in the Nicaragua Case (Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
AgainstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStates),ICJMerits,Judgment,27June1986,para.115).
The"overallcontrol"testwasdevisedanddevelopedbytheICTY(Prosecutorv.Tadi,(CaseNo.
IT941I), ICTY App. Ch., Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction,2October1995,para.137)andreadilyadoptedbytheICC(Prosecutorv.Lubanga,
ICCPT.Ch.I,DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges,ICC01/0401/06803,29January2007,
para. 211 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC T. Ch. I, Judgment, ICC01/0401/06, 14 March 2012,
para.541Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1178)
internal disturbances and tensions. This is confirmed by Article 8(3) which clearly states to
Nothinginparagraph2(c)and(e)shallaffecttheresponsibilityofaGovernmenttomaintainor
reestablishlawandorderintheStateortodefendtheunityandterritorialintegrityoftheState,
by all legitimate means. The aim of this article is to ensure that acts committed in times of
internaldisturbancesandtensionsarenottobeprosecutedaswarcrimes.
B.Analysis
Article 8(2)(c) reads: In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious
violationsofarticle3commontothefourGenevaConventionsof12August1949,namely,anyofthe
followingactscommittedagainstpersonstakingnoactivepartinthehostilities,includingmembersof
armedforceswhohavelaiddowntheirarmsandthoseplacedhorsdecombatbysickness,wounds,
detentionoranyothercause.
i)ScopeofApplication:ExistenceofanArmedConflictnotofanInternationalCharacter
ForthissubprovisiontoapplytheICCmustdeterminethattheactswerecommittedinthecontextof
anarmedconflictnotofaninternationalcharacter,whichmeansthattheCourtwillexaminefirst(1)
whethertheconflictisinternationalorhasbeeninternationalisedandthen(2)whetheranumberof
criteriatoconsidertheeventsasanoninternationalarmedconflictarefulfilled(seeBemba,ICCPT.
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ProsecutorAgainstJeanPierreBembaGombo,ICC01/0501/08424,15June2009,paras.220237).
InBemba,theCourtafterreviewingthelimitssetbytheICCStatutetoArticle8(2)(c)and(e)by
Article8(2)(d)and(f)respectively(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo,ICC
01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, paras 224226), Common Article 3 (Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC
01/0501/08424,15June2009,para.227),APII(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,15
June 2009, para. 228), the ICTY caselaw (Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June
2009,para.229referringtoTadi,ICTYApp.Ch.,Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
AppealonJurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70) and ICTR caselaw (Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC
01/0501/08424,15June2009,para.230referringtoProsecutorv.Akayesu,(CaseNo.ICTR964
T), ICTR Ch. I, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 620) states that a noninternational armed
conflictischaracterisedbythefollowingelements(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,15
June2009,para.231):
1)Thearmedhostilitiesreachacertainlevelofintensity,exceedingthatofinternaldisturbances
andtensions,suchasriots,isolatedactsofviolenceorotheractsofasimilarnature(seealso
Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC01/0401/10465
Red,16December2011,para.103)
2) The armed hostilities take place within the confines of a State territory (see also
Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/10465Red,16December2011,para.103)
3) The armed hostilities break out either between government authorities and organised
dissidentarmedgroupsorbetweensuchgroups(seealsoMbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC
01/0401/10465Red,16December2011,para.103).Whilstsubparagraph(d)doesnotreferto
twoopposingsidestotheconflicttheICCinBembaexplainedthatthiselementalsoappliesasa
matterofcustomarylaw(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)of
the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, ICC
01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 232). The notion of organised armed group is
understoodascoveringarmedgroupsthat
a)havetheabilitytoplanandcarryoutmilitaryoperationsforaprolongedperiodoftime
and (Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/06803, Decision on the
ConfirmationofCharges,29January2007,para.234,Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/05
01/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 233). The existence of a centre that coordinates the
operationsofthedifferentactorsatteststothegroupsabilitytoplanandcarryoutmilitary
operations(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,15June2009,para.259)and
b) must be under responsible command. This notably entails the capacity to impose
discipline and the ability to plan and carry out military operations (Lubanga, ICC PT. Ch.
I,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges, ICC01/0401/06803, 29 January 2007, para.
232Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 234). The group
musthaveahierarchicalstructureandahighlevelofinternalorganisation(Mbarushimana,
ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16
December2011,para.104)whichmeansthatagroupthatisstructuredlikeaconventional
armyeasilyfulfilsthisrequirement(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,15June
2009,paras258and261).Constitutiveinstrumentsaswellastheexistenceandknowledge
bythemembersofthegroupofdisciplinaryandmilitarycodesdemonstratethatthegroup
has an internal disciplinary system (Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/10465
Red,16December2011,para.104Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,15June
2009,para.261).
It is unclear whether the requirement of protracted armed conflict that is expressly mentioned in
subparagraph(f)asalimitationtosubparagraph(e)alsoappliesasalimitationtosubparagraph(c).
A literal approach of the ICC Statute would conclude that there is no need for an Article 8(2)(c)
conflicttobeprotracted.HowevertheICCinBembaraisedtheissue,withoutansweringitproperlyit
circumventedtheissuebystatingthattheconflictitwasexaminingappearedtofulfilthehigheror
additionalthresholdofbeingprotractedunderArticle8(2)(e)combinedwithArticle8(2)(f)andthus
therewasnoneedtodiscusstheapplicabilityofthisthresholdtoArticle8(2)(c)(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.
Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 235). In
Mbarushimana the ICC simply mentioned the requirement of protracted without giving any
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justificationforitsapplication(Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges,
ICC01/0401/10465Red,16December2011,para.103).Thatbeingsaidthereisnorequirement
undertheICCStatuteforthearmedgrouptoexertcontroloverapartoftheterritory(Bemba,ICC
PT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,15June2009,para.236).
Since 2012 the Court has consistently defined a noninternational armed conflict by reference to
Article 8(2)(e) and (f) and it is unclear what has happened to the Bemba and Mbarushimana
jurisprudence.Thecommentariesofsubparagraphs(e)and(f)examineindetailthecurrentstateof
thelawregardingthedefinitionofanoninternationalarmedconflict.
ii)SeriousViolationsofArticle3commontothefourGenevaConventionsof12August1949
As specified in Article 8(2)(c) and acknowledged by the caselaw (Katanga, ICC T. Ch.
II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.785)thecrimeslistedthereunderarethe
actsspecifiedunder(a),(b),(c)and(d)ofCommonArticle3(1)oftheGenevaConventions,though
notinthesameorder.Suchcrimesarealsoprohibitedundercustomaryinternationallawallthemore
as Common Article 3 is viewed as a mandatory minimum code applicable to internal conflict
(Prosecutor v. Delalic, (Case No. IT9621A), ICTY App. Ch., Judgment, 20 February 2001, para.
140).
iii)ActsCommittedagainstPersonsTakingNoActivePartintheHostilities
TheoffenceslistedinArticle8(2)(c)mustbecommittedagainstpersonstakingnoactivepartinthe
hostilities and these include members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placedhorsdecombatbysickness,wounds,detentionoranyothercause.Asthewordincludingis
useditmeansthatthislistisonlyillustrative.IndeedtheElementsofCrimereferstopersons[who
are] either hors de combat, or [] civilians, medical personnel, or religious personnel taking no
active part in the hostilities. (ElementsofCrimes,Article8, page 33 see also Katanga, ICC T. Ch.
II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.786)
TheICCexaminesthestatusofindividualsonacasebycasebasis,asaconstituentelementofthe
offences(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatuteon
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June
2009,para.237).Somegeneralcommentscanhoweverbemade.
In Katanga, the ICC, after noting that whilst Article 8(2)(c) refers to direct participation the
Elements of Crimes use the terminology of active participation, explains that as Article 8(2)(c)
reflects offences under Common Article 3 the concept that applies under Article 8(2)(c) is that of
direct participation, an interpretation further supported by the caselaw of the ICTY and ICTR that
does not distinguish between direct and active participation (Katanga, ICC T. Ch.
II,Jugement, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014, para. 789). In other words persons protected
underArticle8(2)(c)onlylosetheirprotectioniftheytakeadirect,rather,thananactivepartinthe
hostilities and for the duration of their participation (Katanga, ICC T. Ch. II, Jugement, ICC01/04
01/073436,7March2014,para.790).Intheabsenceofatreatyorcustomarydefinitionofdirect
participationinhostilities,theICCusestheCommentarytoArticle13(3)APIIthatstatesthatthese
are acts of war that by their nature or purpose struck at the personnel and matriel of enemy
armedforces(Katanga,ICCT.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.790).
ThepersonsspecificallyincludedinthelistinArticle8(2)(c)areknownaspersonshorsdecombat,
i.e. members of the armed forces who have surrendered and/or are sick, wounded or detained.
Whilstitisclearthatthosewhohavesurrenderedoraredetainedarenothreattotheopposingparty
anymore and thus hors de combat it must be noted that under international humanitarian law
combatantswhoaresickorwoundedareonlyconsideredhorsdecombatiftheyrefrainfromhostile
conduct (Sandoz Yves et al. (Eds) Commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions,MartinusNijhoff,Geneva,1987,para.1409).SofartheICChasnothadtheopportunity
toexamineanysuchcases.
TheElementsofCrimefurtherreferto
civilianswhohavebeendefinedinKatangaaspersonswhoarenotmembersofStateandnon
State armed forces (Katanga, ICC T. Ch. II, Jugement, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014,
paras.788and801).ThecasespresentedtotheICCwereratherstraightforwardinthesense
thattherewasnodoubtthatthecivilianswerenottakingpartinthehostilitiesandthereforethe
Courtdidnothavetoapplytheaforementionedtestofdirectparticipation.Itshouldbenoted
thatunderCommonArticle3andcustomarylawtheadjectiveswoundedandsickalsoapply
tocivilians.
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medicalandreligiouspersonnel,thelatterbeingdefinedasnonconfessionalnoncombatant
militarypersonnelcarryingoutasimilarfunction.(ElementsofCrimes,Article8,footnote56)
iv)Awareness
TheICCStatuterequirestheawarenessofthefactualcircumstancesthatestablishedtheexistence
of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms took place in the context of and was associated
with, i.e. there must be a nexus between the act and the conflict (Elements of Crimes, Article 8,
page34Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatuteon
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June
2009,para.263Katanga,ICCT.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,paras791,
794, 1176 and 1231). Further the perpetrator must be aware that the acts were perpetrated in the
contextofanoninternationalarmedconflict(ElementsofCrimes,Article8,page34).
What is more the perpetrator must be aware of the factual circumstances that established the
[statusofthepersonsagainstwhomtheactswerecommitted](ElementsofCrime,Article8, page
34).Inotherwords,theperpetratorcouldeasilydrawfromthecircumstancesthattheindividualshad
e.g.civilianstatus(seee.g.Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges,
ICC01/0401/10465Red,16December2011,paras191and219).
C.Crossreferences
1.Article8(2)(e)
D.Doctrine
1. Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, Elizabeth Wilmhurst
(Ed), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts, 3279, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2012.
2.MichaelBothe,WarCrimes,417418,AntonioCassese/PaolaGaeta/JohnR.W.D.Jones,(eds),The
3.AntonioCasseseandPaolaGaeta,CassesesInternationalCriminalLaw,6283,3rdedition,Oxford
5. Anthony Cullen, War Crimes, 139154, William Schabas/Nadia Bernaz, Routledge Handbook of
InternationalCriminalLaw,Routledge,London,2011.
10. Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of NonInternational Armed Conflict, 192195 and 273280,
11. Andreas Zimmermann, Article 8, War Crimes, 262269 MN 233269, Triffterer, Otto
(Ed.),CommentaryontheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt,C.H.Beck/Hart/Nomos,
Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,2008.
Author:
NolleQunivet
Article8(2)(c)(i)1
[116](i)Violencetolifeandperson,inparticularmurderofallkinds,
Theterm"killed"intheElementsofCrimeisinterchangeablewiththeterm"causeddeath".Themens
rea for murder is neither fully clarified in the present provision nor in the Elements of Crime. The
standardofarticle30appliestomentalelement.Themainquestioniswhethertoapplythecommon
lawconceptof"wilfulblindness"and"recklessness"orcivillawconceptssuchas"doluseventualis".
DuringthenegotiationsoftheStatuteandtheElementsofCrimeitwasdecidedtoleavesuchdetails
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fortheCourttointerpretarticle30.Murderasawarcrimediffersfromthedefinitionofmurderasa
crimeagainsthumanityonlyintermsofthecontextinwhichthecrimeiscommitted.
Crossreference:
1.Article7(1)(a)and8(2)(a)(i)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2. Christopher K. Hall at pp. 129131, MN 1923 and Andreas Zimmerman pp. 272273, MN 272 in
OttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(c)(i)2
[117]mutilation,
The term "mutilation" should be understood to have synonymous meaning as "physical mutilation"
in article 8(2)(b)(x), covering acts such as amputations, injury to limbs, removal of organs, and
formsofsexualmutilations.Thevictim'sconsentisnotaexcusabledefence.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(x)and8(2)(e)(xi)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1.MichaelBotheatpp.395397and419inAntonioCassese/PaolaGaeta/JohnR.W.D.Jones.
2.AndreasZimmermanatpp.216and273,MN106107and273inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(c)(i)3
[118]crueltreatment
The offence of cruel treatment carries the same meaning as inhuman treatment (article 8(2)(a)(ii),
namely the infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons. The
protectedinterestisthehumandignity.Forthementalelementarticle30applies.
charges, 30 September 2008, para. 364, PTC I was of the "that there is sufficient evidence to
establishsubstantialgroundstobelievethatthewarcrimeofinhumantreatment,asdefinedinarticle
8(2)(a)(ii)oftheStatute."
Crossreference:
1.Articles7(1)(k)andarticle8(2)(a)(ii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.WilliamJ.Fenrickatp.183,MN11andAndreasZimmermanatp.273,MN273inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
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Article8(2)(c)(i)4
[119]torture
Tortureistheinflictionofseverephysicalormentalpainorsufferingupononeormorepersons.The
standardfortortureissetintheTortureConvention.Incontrasttotheaforementionedconvention,it
isnotnecessarythatperpetratoractedinanofficialcapacity.TheElementsofCrimeprovidesanon
exclusive listing of which purposes the torture serve, which distinguishes it from torture as a crime
againsthumanitywhichdoesnotrequireapurpose.
Crossreference:
1.Articles7(1)(f)and8(2)(a)(ii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(c)(ii)
[120] (ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degradingtreatment
Thehumiliatinganddegradingtreatmentisprohibitedevenifthevictimovercomestheconsequences
relatively quickly. In Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui, ICC01/0401/07717, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, 30 September 2008, para. 369, PTC I quoted ICTY jurisprudence when it
stated that "there is no requirement that such suffering be lasting". There is no special intent
requirement in addition to the general requirement of article 30. The wording of the provision is
identicaltoarticle8(2)(b)(xxi).
Crossreference:
1.Articles7(1)(c)and8(2)(b)(xxi)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.PatriciaViseurSellersatpp.244248,MN189199inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(c)(iii)
[121](iii)Takingofhostages
Hostagetakinginvolvestheseizureanddetainmentofoneormoreprotectedpersonsandathreatto
kill, injure or continue to detain such person or persons. In addition to the general mental
requirement in article 30 the purpose of the hostage taking is to compel a State, an international
organization, a natural or legal person or a group of persons to act or refrain from acting as an
explicit or implicit condition for the safety or the release of such person or persons. The wording of
theprovisionisidenticaltoarticle8(2)(a)(viii).
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(a)(viii)
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2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(c)(iv)
[122] (iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees
whicharegenerallyrecognizedasindispensable.
The provision guarantees certain minimum due process rights before a sentence is passed or an a
executionagainstaprotectedpersontakesplace.TheElementsofCrimedistinguishesthreeseparate
criminal acts, namely i) there was no previous judgement pronounced by a court, ii) the court was
not regularly constituted, and iii) the court that rendered judgement did not afford other generally
recognizedjudicialguarantees.Theprovisionofferssimilar,butnotidenticalprotectionasarticle8(2)
(a)(vi). State authorities retains the right to criminally prosecute fighters or civilians for crimes
committedinconnectionwithinternalarmedconflicts.
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(a)(vi)and8(2)(b)(xiv)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(d)
[123](d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and
thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolatedandsporadicactsofviolenceorotheractsofasimilarnature.
A.GeneralRemarks
Article 8(2)(d) limits the application of subparagraph (c) to certain situations (Prosecutor v.
Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the
para.225).Assubparagraph(c)whichrelatestocrimescommittedinsituationsofanoninternational
armedconflictlacksanydefinitionsubparagraph(d)appearswelcome.Furtheritmustbenotedthat
subparagraph(d)isrepeatedverbatimasthefirstsentenceofsubparagraph(f).
B.Analysis
Article8(2)(d)statesthatParagraph2(c)appliestoarmedconflictsnotofaninternationalcharacter
andthusdoesnotapplytosituationsofinternaldisturbancesandtensions,suchasriots,isolatedand
sporadicactsofviolenceorotheractsofasimilarnature.
ScopeofApplication
For a situation to fall within the purview of subparagraph (c) it must be above the lower threshold
specified in subparagraph (d). The lower threshold differentiates a noninternational armed conflict
from situations of internal disturbances and tensions. In other words it excludes specific situations
from the realm of application of subparagraph (c). The provision provides some examples: riots,
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isolatedandsporadicactsofviolenceorotheractsofasimilarnature.
Caselaw in relation to subparagraph (d) exclusively is rather sparse. In Bemba whilst the Court
explainsthatacertainlevelofintensitymustbereachedforsubparagraph(c)toapply(Bemba,ICC
PT.Ch.II,Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 225) it
considersthisalimitationonitsjurisdiction(para.225)ratherthanadescriptionofanarmedconflict
ofanoninternationalcharacter.Incontrast,inMbarushimanatheCourt,whilstalsoconsideringthat
subparagraph(d)requirestheconflicttobeofacertainlevelofintensity,examinesthesubparagraph
inabroaderdiscussiononthenatureofthearmedconflict(Prosecutorv.Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.
I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011, para.
103).Infactitseemsthatthecriterionofintensityisanelementinthedeterminationofaconflictof
noninternationalarmedconflictaswellasajurisdictionalrequirement.
Further although subparagraph (c) covers acts listed in Common Article 3 to the Geneva
Conventions, subparagraph (d) directly stems from Article 1(2) AP II which is deemed to have a
higherthresholdofapplicabilitythanCommonArticle3.Inotherwordstheredoesnotseemtobea
distinction between noninternational armed conflicts falling under the purview of subparagraph (c)
limitedbysubparagraph(d)ontheonehandandofsubparagraph(e)limitedbysubparagraph(f)on
the other. As a result and bearing in mind that the first sentences of subparagraphs (d) and (f) are
identical ICC caselaw relating to subparagraph (f) can be used. In Lubanga (Prosecutor v.
Lubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,Judgment,ICC01/0401/06,14March2012,para.538)theCourtreferstothe
ICTY jurisprudence, holding that the intensity of the conflict is used to distinguish an armed conflict
fromsituationsthatarenotsubjecttointernationalhumanitarianlaw(Prosecutorv.orevi,(Case
No.IT0587/1T),ICTYT.Ch.,PublicJudgmentwithConfidentialAnnexVolumeIofII,23February
2011, para. 1522). In the same paragraph of the judgment (which refers to Prosecutorv.Mrkiet
al., (Case No. IT9513/1T), ICTY T. Ch., Judgment, 27 September 2007, para. 407) the Court also
accepts that indicators of intensity are the seriousness of attacks and potential increase in armed
clashes, their spread over territory and over a period of time, the increase in the number of
government forces, the mobilisation and the distribution of weapons among both parties to the
conflict, as well as whether the conflict has attracted the attention of the United Nations Security
Council, and, if so, whether any resolutions on the matter have been passed. These indicators are
spelledout(para.1187)andapplied(paras12161218)inKatangatoo(Prosecutorv.Katanga,ICCT.
Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014).
In addition, the Court has read into Article 8(2)(d) the requirement that for a noninternational
armedconflicttobeestablishedtheremustbetwoopposingsidestotheconflict(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.
Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 232). In
Bemba it has however avoided examining whether the stricter requirement of the conflict being
protracted(thatappliesinthecontextofsubparagraph(e)limitedbysubparagraph(f))appliesto
subparagraph(c)limitedbysubparagraph(d)(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,15June
2009,para.235)thoughithasapplieditinothercases(Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,Decisiononthe
ConfirmationofCharges,ICC01/0401/10465Red,16December2011,para.103andKatanga,ICC
T.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1217).
C.Crossreferences
Article8(2)(f)
D.Doctrine
1. Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, Elizabeth Wilmhurst
2012.
3. Antonio Cassese/Paola Gaeta, Casseses International Criminal Law, 6283, 3rd edition, Oxford
4.RobertCryer/HkanFriman7DarrylRobinson/ElizabethWilmshurst,AnIntroductiontoInternational
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11. Andreas Zimmermann, Article 8, War Crimes, 262269 MN 233269, Otto Triffterer
Author:
NolleQunivet
Article8(2)(e)
[124](e)Otherseriousviolationsofthelawsandcustomsapplicableinarmedconflictsnot
of an international character, within the established framework of international law,
namely,anyofthefollowingacts:A.GeneralRemarks
TwoprovisionsintheICCStatuterelatetowarcrimescommittedinnoninternationalarmedconflict,
subparagraphs(c)and(e). A literal interpretation of these subparagraphs shows that there are two
thresholdsofapplicability,i.e.twotypesofnoninternationalarmedconflicts.Howeveritseemsthat
theCourtdoesnotdistinguishbetweenthetwotypesofnoninternationalarmedconflicts(Prosecutor
v.Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the
paras 216 and 224 Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges,ICC01/0401/10465Red,6December2011,para.103)specifiedinsubparagraphs(c)and
(e).
Subparagraph(e)mustbereadinconjunctionwithsubparagraphs(f)andArticle8(3).Asaresult
thefollowingsituationsarenotcoveredbysubparagraph(e):
international armed conflicts. This explains why the assessment of the characterisation of the
conflict under Article 8(2)(e) takes place in a wider discussion, notably in contradistinction to
international armed conflicts (see Article 8(2)(a) ICC Statute). The problem may arise in
particular in armed conflicts where there is fighting between governmental forces on one side
andorganizedarmedgroupsontheotherwhereatthesametimeathirdStateisinvolvedinthe
conflict intervening in support of the organized armed groups. The way the Court distinguishes
betweenanoninternationalandaninternationalarmedconflictisbyusingthe"overallcontrol"
testasopposedtothe"effectivecontrol"testthatwasestablishedbytheInternationalCourtof
Justice in the NicaraguaCase (Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
AgainstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStates),ICJMerits,Judgment,27June1986,para.115).
The"overallcontrol"testwasdevisedanddevelopedbytheICTY(Prosecutorv.Tadi,(CaseNo.
IT941I), ICTY App. Ch., Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction,2October1995,para.137)andreadilyadoptedbytheICC(Prosecutorv.Lubanga,
ICCPT.Ch.I,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,ICC01/0401/06803,29January2007,
para. 211 Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC T. Ch. I, Judgment, ICC01/0401/06, 14 March 2012,
para. 541 Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, Jugement, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March
2014,para.1178).
internal disturbances and tensions. This is confirmed by Article 8(3) which clearly states to
Nothinginparagraph2(c)and(e)shallaffecttheresponsibilityofaGovernmenttomaintainor
reestablishlawandorderintheStateortodefendtheunityandterritorialintegrityoftheState,
by all legitimate means. The aim of this article is to ensure that acts committed in times of
internaldisturbancesandtensionsarenottobeprosecutedaswarcrimes.
B.Analysis
Article 8(2)(e) states that Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law,
namely,anyofthefollowingacts.
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i)ScopeofApplication:ExistenceofanArmedConflictnotofanInternationalCharacter
ForthissubprovisiontoapplytheICCmustdeterminethattheactswerecommittedinthecontextof
anarmedconflictnotofaninternationalcharacter.
Atfirstsight,theCourtseemstohaveproducedtwosetsofcaselawinrelationtononinternational
armed conflicts, one for subparagraph (c) and one for subparagraph (e). Indeed in some instances
theCourtsapproachtosubparagraph(e)isthatexplainedintheCommentarytoArticle8(2)(c).Two
differencesarehoweverworthbeingmentioned.First,theCourtexplainedthatforsubparagraph(e)
toapplytheconflictmustbeprotracted(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)
and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba
Gombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 235 Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011, para. 103). In the
instantcasetheCourtfoundthatfivemonthswastoberegardedasprotracted(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.
II, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 255). Second, the Court specified that the organised
armedgroupmustbeunderresponsiblecommand(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,15
June2009,para.234),arequirementlaterdismissedbytheCourtinLubanga(Lubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,
Judgment,ICC01/0401/06,14March2012,para.536).
Inotherinstances,infactinallcasesfromLubanga(Lubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,Judgment,ICC01/04
01/06, 14 March 2012 Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, Jugement, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014
Prosecutorv.Ntaganda,(CaseNo.ICC01/0402/06),ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionontheConfirmationof
Charges,ICC01/0402/06309,9June2014)onwards,theCourtextensivelyreferstotheICTYcase
law(therebyusinganinterpretationwithintheestablishedframeworkofinternationallawspecified
insubparagraph(e))andfollowsArticle8(2)(f)asexplainedintheCommentarytosubparagraph(f).
Itisbelievedthatthisistheleadingapproachtodefiningaconflict(paras533538).
Therelevantcriteriaare:
(1) The hostilities must be between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State (Lubanga, ICC T. Ch. I, Judgment, ICC01/0401/06, 14
March2012,para.533).InKatangatheCourtspecifiesthatthisprovidesfortwotypesofnon
international armed conflicts: those opposing the authorities of the government of the State
wherethehostilitiesoccuragainstorganisedarmedgroupsandthoseopposingorganisedarmed
groups,theformeralsoencompassingsituationswhereaStateintervenesonaforeignterritory
in a conflict opposing the governmental authorities to armed opposition group(s), yet with the
consent of the governmental authorities (Katanga, (Case No. ICC01/0401/07), ICC Tr. Ch.
II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,paras1184and1228).
(2) The conflict must be protracted (Lubanga, ICC T. Ch. I, Judgment, ICC01/0401/06, 14
March 2012, para. 536 Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, Jugement, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March
2014,para.1185).TheCourthashoweverneverexplainedwellwhatismeantbyprotractedin
thiscontextandseemstobesubsumedinthedefinitionofanorganisedarmedgroup(Katanga,
ICCTr.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1185)andtheintensityof
the conflict (Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, Jugement, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014, para.
1217)(seeCommentaryonsubparagraph(f))
(3) The organized armed groups must have a sufficient degree of organisation, in order to
enable them to carry out protracted armed violence (Lubanga, ICC T. Ch. I, Judgment, ICC
01/0401/06,14March2012,para.536Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/07
3436,7March2014,para.1185).Thereishowevernorequirementforthegrouptobeunder
a responsible command as expounded in Bemba(Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0501/08
424, 15 June 2009, para. 234) and in Article 1(1) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational
Armed Conflicts (AP II) (Lubanga, ICC T. Ch. I, Judgment, ICC01/0401/06, 14 March 2012,
para. 536 Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, Jugement, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014, para.
1186) though in Katanga the Court mentions that the group must present a certain level or
organisation such that it is able to implement humanitarian law relating to noninternational
armedconflicts(Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.
1185). There is no requirement under the ICC Statute for the armed group to exert control
overapartoftheterritory(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/08424,15June2009,para.
236ProsecutorLubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,Judgment,ICC01/0401/06,14March2012,para.536
Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1186).Asnoted
by the Court itself (Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 236
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Lubanga, ICC T. Ch. I, Judgment, ICC01/0401/06, 14 March 2012, para. 536) this clearly
departsfromArticle1(1)APII.TheICChasdrawnanonexhaustivelistoffactorsthatassistin
determining whether the group was organised. The list includes: the force or groups internal
hierarchythecommandstructureandrulestheextenttowhichmilitaryequipment,including
firearms,areavailabletheforceorgroupsabilitytoplanmilitaryoperationsandputtheminto
effect and the extent, seriousness, and intensity of any military involvement and each
criterion is to be applied with some flexibility and each situation must be assessed on a case
bycasebasis(Lubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,Judgment,ICC01/0401/06,14March2012,para.537
Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1186)
(4)Theconflictmustreachacertainlevelofintensity(Lubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,Judgment,ICC
01/0401/06,14March2012,para.538Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/07
3436, 7 March 2014, para. 1187). Again, referring back to the ICTY jurisprudence in line with
thewithintheestablishedframeworkofinternationallawrequirementsetoutinsubparagraph
(e) the Court explains that this minimum threshold spelled out in subparagraph (f) removes
sporadic and isolated situations which are not subject to international humanitarian law
(Prosecutor v. orevi, (Case No. IT0587/1T), ICTY T. Ch., Public Judgment with
ConfidentialAnnexVolumeIofII,23February2011,para.1522)fromthejurisdictionofthe
ICCandthatanumberoffactorsmustbetakenintoaccount(Prosecutorv.Mrkietal.,(Case
No.IT9513/1T),ICTYT.Ch., Judgment,27September2007,para.407)whenassessingthe
intensityoftheconflict.Thesearetheseriousnessofattacksandpotentialincreaseinarmed
clashes, their spread over territory and over a period of time, the increase in the number of
governmentforces,themobilisationandthedistributionofweaponsamongbothpartiestothe
conflict,aswellaswhethertheconflicthasattractedtheattentionoftheUnitedNationsSecurity
Council,and,ifso,whetheranyresolutionsonthematterhavebeenpassed.(Lubanga,ICCT.
Ch. I, Judgment, ICC01/0401/06, 14 March 2012, para. 538 Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch.
II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1187)
ii)Crimes
The crimes that are mentioned in Article8(2)(e) are serious violations prohibited by either or both
customary and treaty law. The word other relates to serious violations of Common Article 3,
therebyindicatingthattherootsoftheprovisionstemfromothersources(seealsoBemba,ICCPT.
Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 224),
includingAdditionalProtocolII.HoweverwhilstthelistismainlydrawnfromAPIInotallviolations
contained in the treaty have been included in subparagraph (e) and whilst the list is exhaustive for
ICC jurisdiction purposes it does not provide an exhaustive list of war crimes in noninternational
armed conflict. This is recognised by Article 10 ICC Statute that explains that [n]othing in this Part
shallbeinterpretedaslimitingorprejudicinginanywayexistingordevelopingrulesofinternational
law for purposes other than this Statute. In fact Resolution RC/Res. 5 has expanded the list to
includes Articles 8(2)(e) (xiii), (xiv) and (xv), thereby proving that the list is exhaustive for ICC
jurisdictionpurposesonlyandthatfurthercrimescanandcouldbeaddedontothelist.
iii)Awareness
TheICCStatuterequirestheawarenessofthefactualcircumstancesthatestablishedtheexistence
of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms took place in the context of and was associated
with, i.e. there must be a nexus between the act and the conflict (see for example Elements of
Crime in relation to Article8(2)(e)(i)Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)
and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba
Gombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 263 Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, Jugement, ICC
01/0401/073436,7March2014,paras1176and1231).Furthertheperpetratormustbeawarethat
the acts were perpetrated in the context of a noninternational armed conflict (see for example
ElementsofCrimeinrelationtoArticle8(2)(e)(i)).
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(c)
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Doctrine:
1. Dapo Akande, , Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, Elizabeth Wilmhurst
2012.
3. Antonio Cassese/Paola Gaeta, Casseses International Criminal Law, 6283, 3rd edition, Oxford
4. Robert Cryer/Hkan Friman/Darryl Robinson/Elizabeth Wilmshurst, , An Introduction to
International Criminal Law and Procedure, 264284, 3rd edition, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge,2014.
11.SylvainVit,TypologyofArmedConflictsinInternationalHumanitarianLaw:LegalConceptsand
ActualSituations,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,vol91,(2009):6994.
12. Andreas Zimmermann, Preliminary Remarks on para. 2(c)(f) and para. 3: War crimes
Committed in an Armed Conflict not of an International Character 475478 in Otto Triffterer
Author:
NolleQunivet
Article8(2)(e)(i)
[125](i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against
individualciviliansnottakingdirectpartinhostilities
A.GeneralRemarks
The war crime of attacking the civilian population and civilians not taking direct part in hostilities
belongstothecategoryofoffencescommittedduringtheactualconductofhostilitiesbyresortingto
prohibitedmethodsofwarfare.(Prosecutorv.Ntaganda,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionontheConfirmation
ofCharges,ICC01/0402/06309,9June2014,para.45)
Article8(2)(e)(i)isareflectionoftheprincipleofdistinctioninattackinanoninternationalarmed
conflict. Whilst the principle is enshrined in Article 13(2) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventionsof12August1949,andrelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofNonInternationalArmed
Conflicts(APII)itisalsoofcustomarynature(Rule1oftheICRCStudyonCustomaryInternational
Humanitarian Law Prosecutor v. Gali, (Case No. IT9829A), ICTY App. Ch., Judgement, 30
November2006,para.87).TheInternationalCourtofJusticehasstressedthatdeliberateattackson
civiliansareabsolutelyprohibitedbyinternationalhumanitarianlaw(LegalityoftheThreatorUseof
NuclearWeapons,ICJAdvisoryOpinion,8July1996,[1996]ICJRep.226,at257(para.78)).Further,
as the ICTY highlighted the principles underlying the prohibition of attacks on civilians, namely the
principles of distinction and protection incontrovertibly form the basic foundation of international
humanitarian law and constitute intransgressible principles of international customary (Gali, ICTY
App.Ch.,30November2006,para.87).
Article 8(2)(e)(i) mirrors Article 8(2)(b)(i) that applies in an international armed conflict. Both
articlesgivetheCourtjurisdictionoverattacksagainstciviliansandthecivilianpopulation.Thatbeing
saidthereisnoequivalentinArticle8(2)(e)toArticle8(2)(b)(ii)thatprohibitsattacksagainstcivilian
objects. Given that Article 8(2)(e)(i) specifically refers to the civilian population and individual
civilians,i.e.individuals,itcannotbeinterpretedsoastocoveralsocivilianobjects.
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B.Analysis
Article8(2)(e)(i) states that the ICC has jurisdiction overs acts of [i]ntentionally directing attacks
against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities.
i)MaterialElements
InKatanga(Prosecutorv.Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,Jugement,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,
para.796)theCourthasexpoundedthatthematerialelementsofthecrimeare:
Theperpetratorhaslaunchedanattack
Theaimoftheattackwasthecivilianpopulationorciviliansnottakingdirectpartinhostilities.
attack. Referring to the established framework of international law mentioned in the chapeau of
Article8(2)(e)theCourthasusedArticle49oftheProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts and
applied it by analogy to Article 13(2) AP II to define an attack as acts of violence against the
adversary,whetherinoffenceorindefence(Prosecutorv.AbuGarda,ICCPT.Ch.I,PublicRedacted
Version,DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges,ICC02/0502/09243red,8February2010,para.
65Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.798Ntaganda,ICCPT.Ch.
II, ICC01/0402/06309, 9 June 2014, para. 45). To establish the link between the attack and the
conduct of the hostilities, the Court has stipulated that these civilians must be those who have not
fallenyetintothehandsoftheattackingparty(Prosecutorv.Katanga,(CaseNo.ICC01/0401/07),
ICCPT.Ch.I,DecisionontheEvidenceandInformationProvidedbytheProsecutionfortheIssuance
ofaWarrantofArrestforGermainKatanga, ICC01/0401/0755, 7 July 2007, para. 37 Ntaganda,
ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0402/06309,9June2014,paras45and47).Actscommittedagainstcivilians
whohavefallenintothehandsoftheenemyorarecommittedfarfromthecombatareacannotbe
classified as attacks as they are not methods of warfare. They can however be prosecuted under
other appropriate legal provisions (Ntaganda, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0402/06309, 9 June 2014,
para.47).
TheCourthasspelledoutthatinordertocharacteriseacertainconductasanattackitisimportant
to look at the intended and foreseeable consequences (Ntaganda, ICC PT. Ch. II, ICC01/0402/06
309, 9 June 2014, para. 46). In other words there must be a causal link between the perpetrators
conductandtheconsequenceoftheattack(AbuGarda,DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges,ICC
PT. Ch. I, ICC02/0502/09243red, 8 February 2010, para. 66). Examples of acts falling within the
purviewofanattackunderArticle8(2)(e)(i)areshelling,sniping,murder,rape,pillage,attackson
protected objects and destruction of property provided they are linked to the conduct of hostilities
(Ntaganda,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0402/06309,9June2014,para.46).
As the ICC Statute does not provide for a specific offence of acts whose primary purpose is to
spread terror among the civilian population, it is likely that such acts fall within the broad scope of
Article8(2)(e)(i).AsArticle8(2)(e)(i)isareflectionoftheprincipleofdistinctionenshrinedinArticle
13(2)APIIandArticle8(2)(e)mustbereadwithintheestablishedframeworkofinternationallawit
is likely that it will also cover the second sentence of the Article 13(2) AP II: Acts or threats of
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are
prohibited.ThisapproachwasespousedbytheICTYinasmuchasitexplainedthattheprohibitionof
terror amounts to a specific prohibition within the general (customary) prohibition of attack on
civilians (Prosecutor v. Gali, (Case No. IT9829T), ICTY T. Ch. I, Judgment and Opinion, 5
December 2003, para. 98, upheld in Prosecutor v. Gali, ICTY App. Ch., 30 November 2006, para.
87).
The attack does not need to lead to civilian casualties it is sufficient to prove that the author
directed the attack towards the civilian population or individual civilians. This is in line with Article
13(2)APII which specifies that the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall
not be the object of attack, thereby not requiring for harm to occur. As the Court explained the
crimeprovidedforunderarticle[]8(2)(e)(i)oftheStatutedoesnotrequireanyharmfulimpacton
the civilian population or on the individual civilians targeted by the attack, and is committed by the
mere launching of the attack [] (Katanga, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/0755, 6 July 2007, para.
37 see also Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014, para. 799). It is the
intention that counts as the Elements of Crimes require that the perpetrator intended the civilian
population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the
attack.ThisstandsincontrasttotheICTYjurisprudencethatrequiredtheattacktoresultindeath,
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seriousbodilyinjuryorequivalentharm(Prosecutorv.Kordianderkez,(CaseNo.IT9514/2A),
ICTYApp.Ch.,Judgment,17December2004,paras5568).
b.ObjectoftheAttackisaCivilianPopulationandCiviliansnotTakingDirectPartintheHostilities
ThesecondelementoftheElementsofCrimesspecifiesthattheobjectoftheattackwasacivilian
population as such or individuals civilians not taking direct part in hostilities (Elements of Crimes,
page 34). This is an absolute prohibition that cannot be counterbalanced by military necessity
(Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.800).Thispositionisreinforced
by the fact that the ICC has, in contrast to the ICTY Kupreskiccase(Prosecutor v Kupreki et al.,
(Case No. IT9516R), ICTY T. Ch., Judgment, 14 January 2000, paras 527535), indicated in clear
termsthatreprisalsareprohibitedinallcircumstances(Prosecutorv.Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,
DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges,ICC01/0401/10465Red,16December2011,para.143),
relying notably on the ICTY Martic decision (Prosecutor v. Martic, (Case No. IT9511R61), ICTY T.
Ch.,Decision,8March1996,paras1517).
Asthereisnodefinitionofacombatantinanoninternationalarmedconflictthereisnodefinitionof
acivilianunderthetreaties.WhilsttheICTYdefinedacivilianasanyonewhoisnotamemberofthe
armedforcesorofanorganizedmilitarygroupbelongingtoapartytotheconflict(Gali,ICTYT.Ch.
I, 5 December 2003, para. 47) the ICC considers as a civilian anyone who is not a member of the
State or nonState armed forces (Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014,
para.788)andacivilianpopulationasallciviliansasopposedtomembersofarmedforcesandany
otherlegitimatecombatants(Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/0401/10465Red,16December
2011,para.148Prosecutorv.Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)
oftheRomeStatuteontheChargesoftheProsecutorAgainstJeanPierreBembaGombo,ICC01/05
01/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 78). In case of doubt an individual must be considered a civilian
(Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011, para. 148). The
presenceamongstthecivilianpopulationofindividualswhodonotfitwithinthedefinitionofacivilian,
however,doesnotdeprivetheentirepopulationofitsciviliancharacter(Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.
I, ICC01/0401/10465Red, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011, para. 148) though the
Court will take into account factors such as the number and the behaviour of the fighters present
amongstthepopulation(Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.801).
Article8(2)(e)(i) refers to individual civilians not taking direct part in direct hostilities, thereby
introducingtheconceptofdirectparticipationinhostilitiesinanoninternationalarmedconflict(which
alsoappearsinthechapeauofArticle8(2)(c)).Thereisnocustomaryortreatylawdefinitionofthe
concept(AbuGarda,DecisionontheConfirmationofCharges,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC02/0502/09243
red,8February2010,para.80Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.
789 (though in the context of Article 8(2)(c))). Such participation leads to a temporary loss of
protection of civilian status, unless the act is in selfdefence (Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC
01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011, para. 148). It is indeed recognised that a civilian is
allowedtodefendhim/herself(Prosecutorv.Bagosoraetal.,(CaseNo.ICTR9841T),ICTRT.Ch.I,
JudgementandSentence,18December2008,paras22382239).
TheCourthasstressedthatinlinewiththeCommentaryofArticle13(3)APIIwhichexplainsthat
[h]ostilities have been defined as acts of war that by their nature or purpose struck at the
personnel and matriel of enemy armed forces there must be a sufficient causal relationship
between the act and its immediate consequences (Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC02/0502/09243red,8February2010,para.80Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,
ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014, para. 790). The assessment of whether an individual takes a
directpartinhostilitiesmustbecarriedoutonacasebycasebasis(AbuGarda,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC
02/0502/09243red,8February2010,para.83).Forexample,theCourthasspelledoutthatusing
weaponsorothermeanstocommitviolenceagainsthumanormaterialenemyforceswillqualifyas
direct participation in hostilities whilst supplying food and shelter, sympathising with one belligerent
party will not (Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011, para.
148).
The ICC has explained that in cases where the attack is directed towards a legitimate military
objectiveandsimultaneouslythecivilianpopulationorciviliansnottakingdirectpartinthehostilities,
theauthorcanstillbeprosecutedunderArticle8(2)(e)(i)(Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,ICC01/0401/07
3436, 7 March 2014, para. 802 Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16
December 2011, para. 142). It must however be proven that the principal target of the attack was
the civilian population (Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014, para. 802).
This situation must nonetheless be distinguished from attacks against military objectives with the
awareness that they will or may result in the incidental loss of life or injury to civilians
(Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011, paras 142 and 218).
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TheCourthasthusdistinguishedbetweenaviolationoftheprincipleofdiscriminationandaviolation
oftheprincipleofproportionality.Whilstinaninternationalarmedconflicttheviolationoftheprinciple
of proportionality can be prosecuted under Article 8(2)(b)(vi) this is not the case in a non
internationalarmedconflict,despitethefactthattheprincipleisrecognisedtobeofcustomarynature
inbothinternationalandnoninternationalarmedconflicts(seediscussioninMbarushimana,ICCPT.
Ch. I, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011, footnote 290). That being said the Court has
also argued that in some instances the incidental effect on the civilian population or civilians not
takingdirectpartinhostilitiesmightbesodisproportionatethatitamountstoadirectattackagainst
such a population or individuals, thereby revealing the authors intention to make the civilian
population the object of his/her attack (Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March
2014,para.802).
InKatanga(Prosecutorv.Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.808)
theCourtexplainedthatforthesubjectiveelementtobefulfilledfourrequirementsmustbepresent.
The crime must be committed with intention and knowledge, as indicated in Article30 ICC Statute.
The Court has however noted that Article 8(2)(e)(i) specifies that the crime has to be committed
intentionally.Whilstinsomecases(thoserelatingtoArticle8(2)(b)(i))theCourthasexplainedthat
this intention to attack the civilian population is in addition to the standard mens rea requirement
providedinArticle30ICCStatute,i.e.theremustbeadolusdirectusoffirstdegree,i.e.aconcrete
intent(Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC02/0502/09243
red, 8 February 2010, para. 93 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the
confirmationofcharges,ICC01/0401/07717,30September2008,para.271),inothercasesithas
argued that the word intentionally is nothing but a repetition of Article30(2)(a)(Katanga, ICC Tr.
Ch.II,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.806).TheCourthasarguedthatthethirdelement
in the Elements of Crimes (Elements of Crimes, page 34) does not constitute a specific dolusbut is
justified by the use of the word intentionally at the beginning of the sentence and by the need to
distinguish this crime from other acts violating the principles of proportionality and/or precautions
(Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,footnote1851).
b.IntentionthattheObjectoftheAttackIstheCivilianPopulationorCivilians
The Court has stated that this requirement, which is the second element in the Elements of Crimes
(ElementsofCrimes,page34),mustbeanalysedasabehaviour(ProsecutorvChui,(CaseNo.ICC
01/0401/07), ICC PT. Ch. I, Sous scells Dcision concernant les lments de preuve et les
renseignementsfournisparlAccusationauxfinsdedlivrancedunmandatdarrtlencontrede
GermainKatanga,ICC01/0401/074tFRA,6July2007,para.41).Elementsassistinginascertaining
theintentionarethemeansandmethodsusedduringtheattack,thenumberandstatusofvictims,
the discriminatory character of the attack and the nature of the act (Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, ICC
01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.807).Forexample,inMbarushimana(Mbarushimana,ICCPT.
Ch. I, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011) intention could be inferred from the fact that
thearmedgroupwantedtoexactrevengeonbothciviliansandsoldiers(dubbedoperationeyefor
eye,para.144),theordersweretokillallindividuals(e.g.everythingthatmovesshouldbekilled,
everything which has breath shouldnt be there at all) (para. 144) and the troops were
congratulatedforachievingtheobjective,i.e.killingcivilians(para.150).
c.AwarenessoftheCivilianStatusofthePopulationorIndividuals
TheCourtfurtherrequiresthattheperpetratorattackingthecivilianpopulationorindividualcivilians
not taking direct part in the hostilities must be aware of the civilian status of the victims
(Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011, paras 151 and 219
Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.808).
conflict(ElementsofCrimes,page34).
C.Crossreferences:
1.Article8(2)(b)(ii),8(2)(b)(ix),8(2)(b)(i)and8(2)(c)
2.ElementsofCrimes
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D.Doctrine:
1. Michael Bothe, War Crimes, 397, Antonio Cassese/Paola Gaeta/John R.W.D. Jones, (eds), The
2. William Fenrick William, 186187, MN 2126, Otto Triffterer (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos, Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,
2008.
3.GerhardWerleandFlorianJessberger,PrinciplesofInternationalCriminalLaw,475487,MN1278
5.SandeshSivakumaran, The Law of NonInternational Armed Conflict, 338341, Oxford University
Press,Oxford,2014.
Author:
NolleQunivet
Article8(2)(e)(ii)
[126] (ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in
conformitywithinternationallaw
The term "attack" corresponds to the offence of attacks on a civilian population (article 8(2)(e)(i)).
TherecognizedemblemsaretheemblemoftheRedCross,theredcrescent,theredlionandthesun
and the red crystal (the third additional Protocol). The provision is identical to article 8(2)(b)(xxiv)
anddiffersonlyintermsofthecontextinwhichthecrimeiscommitted.
"Attack"isdefinedas"actsofviolenceagainsttheadversary,whetherinoffenceorindefence",
Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, Public Redacted Version Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 8
February2010,para.65.
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(e)(i)and8(2)(b)(xxiv)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1.WilliamJ.Fenrickatp.254,MN212213andAndreasZimmermanatp.277,MN293294inOtto
Triffterer.
2.
GerhardWerleatpp.348349,MN10351038
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(e)(iii)
[127](iii)Intentionallydirectingattacksagainstpersonnel,installations,material,unitsor
vehiclesinvolvedinahumanitarianassistanceorpeacekeepingmissioninaccordancewith
the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to
A.Generalremarks
Attackingpersonnelorobjectsinvolvedinhumanitarianassistanceorpeacekeepingmissions,entitled
to the protection of civilians or civilian objects, is not a new crime under international humanitarian
law. It is rather evidence of the need to specify a group of civilians that because of its missions
deserves a specific protection (Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the establishment of a Special
CourtforSierraLeone,UNDoc.,S/2000/9154October2000,para.16).Duringthenegotiationsofthe
ICCStatute,theConventionoftheSafetyofUnitedNationsandAssociatedPersonnelwasincludedin
the Draft Statute as one out of three treaty crimes. When decided that no treaty crime would be
includedintheStatutethedelegationsbegantoconcentrateontreatingandincludingattacksagainst
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UN personnel as a war crime. The crime of attacking peacekeepers was the only one of the three
treatycrimesthat"survived"thischange,whichisevidenceofitsstrongsymboliccharacter.Acrime
withthesamedefinitionasintheICCStatutewasinincludedintheStatuteoftheSpecialCourtfor
SierraLeone.
B.Analysis
a)ObjectiveElements
i.Theperpetratordirectedanattack
The Elements of Crimes do not include a definition of the term attack. The ICC PreTrial Chamber
has,byreferenceinteraliatotheapplicabletreatiesandtheprinciplesandrulesofinternationallaw,
including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict in article 21 (1)(b)of
the Statute found guidance in article 49 of AP I, applicable in international armed conflicts (IACs)
wherethetermattackisdefinedasactsofviolenceagainsttheadversary,whetherinoffenceorin
defence. The term has been given the same definition in article 13(2) of APII applicable in non
international armed conflicts (NIACs). There is no requirement of any harmful impact on the
personnel or material. There is a need to establish a causal link between the conduct of the
perpetratorandtheconsequencesothattheconcreteconsequence,theattackinthiscase,canbe
seen as having been caused by the perpetrator.(Prosecutor v. Abu Garda. Decision on the
ConfirmationofCharges,PublicRedactedVersion.Doc.,ICC02/0502/09,PT.Ch.,8February2010,
para.6466).
ii. The object of the attack was personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.
There is no generally accepted definition on the notion "humanitarian assistance", but it includes
measurestakenwiththepurposeofpreventingoralleviatinghumansufferingofvictimsofanarmed
conflict. In practice the object of attacks has so far been personnel and objects involved in a
peacekeeping mission. The term peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter but has
developed in practice. The reference to in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations does
notmeanthatthemissionneedstobeestablishedbytheUNbutincludesalsomissionsestablished
byregionalorganisations.(AbuGarda,para124).Whilethetermlackasimpledefinitionthreebasic
principles are accepted as constituting a peacekeeping mission consent of the parties impartiality
and use of force only in selfdefence, (Prosecutorv.AbuGarda, para. 71) although there is now a
changeinUNdoctrineregardingdefinitionofsuchmissions(Sesay,KallonandGbao(RUF),CaseNo.
SCSL0415T,Judgement,2March2009(RUF,paras.224225).Consentofthehoststateisalegal
requirementbutinpracticetheconsentofthemainpartiestotheconflictisalsosoughttoensurethe
effectiveness of the operation. Regarding impartiality, the Report of the Panel of the United Nations
Peace Operations (UN Doc., A/55/305S/2000/809 (the Brahimi Report)) states inter alia that
"impartialityforsuchoperationsmustthereforemeanadherencetotheprinciplesoftheCharterand
totheobjectivesofamandatethatisrootedinthoseCharterprinciples.Suchimpartialityisnotthe
same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a
policy of appeasement." (Brahimi Report para. 50 and Prosecutor v. AbuGarda, para 73 not 106).
TheMajorityintheICCPreTrialChambernotedthatpeacekeepingmissionswereonlyentitledtouse
forceinselfdefencecomparedtopeaceenforcementmissionsdecidedunderChapterVIIoftheUN
Charterwhichmayuseforcebeyondtheconceptofselfdefenceinordertoachievetheirmandates.
(Prosecutorv.AbuGarda,para.74).InUNdoctrinetherightofselfdefenceincludesarighttoresist
attemptsbyforcefulmeanstopreventthepeacekeepingoperationfromdischargingitsdutiesunder
themandateoftheSecurityCouncilalthoughitisdoubtfulifithasdevelopedtobecomesettledlaw
(internationalornational)(RUF,para.228).
ThedevelopmentinpracticewhereoperationsareoftenauthorizedbytheSecurityCouncilunder
Chapter VII to use all necessary measures for certain purposes is reflected in the UN doctrine by
references to robust peacekeeping. Recent UN doctrine considers that the tendency to refer to
peacekeepingoperationsasChapterVIoperationsandpeaceenforcementoperationsasChapterVII
operationsissomewhatmisleading.Itisnowtheusualpractice,bothinpeacekeepingandinpeace
enforcement, "for a Chapter VII mandate to be given" and a distinction is instead made between
"operations in which the robust use of force is integral to the mission from the outset [...] and
operations in which there is a reasonable expectation that force may not be needed at all" (A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc., A/59/565 (2004) para. 211). The Capstone
Doctrine, as it is known, draws a distinction between peace enforcement and robust peacekeeping.
Peacekeepingoperationswitharobustmandatehavebeenauthorizedto"useallnecessarymeansto
deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, and/or assist the national authorities in
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maintaining law and order. The concept of robust peacekeeping is defined as involving "the use of
forceatthetacticallevelwiththeauthorizationoftheSecurityCouncilandconsentofthehostnation
and/orthemainpartiestotheconflict".Apeaceenforcementoperationontheotherhand"doesnot
require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic
level, which is generally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless
authorized by the Security Council" (United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and
Guidelines(2008)p.34).
The difference between these types of operation is thus not whether they have been established
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but whether they are dependent on the existence of consent
andtheuseofforceatastrategiclevel.Theconceptofrobustpeacekeepingthereforechallengesthe
traditional borders between the concepts of peacekeeping and peace enforcement (traditionally
regardedasChapterVIoperationsandChapterVIIoperations).Thismayultimatelyhaveaneffect
on the interpretation of the term peacekeeping mission in the ICC statute. It is telling that the Trial
ChamberintheRUF case found that the mandate of the UNAMSIL even after it has been expanded
throughtheresolution1279whichclearlywasdecidedunderChapterVIIandincludedtheexpression
useofallnecessarymeasureswasregardedapeacekeepingmissionforthepurposeofthecrime
ofattackingpersonnelinsuchmissions(RUF,para.1888).
iii. Such personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles were entitled to the protection given to
Personnelinhumanitarianassistanceandpeacekeepingmissionsarepresumedtobeentitledtothe
protection of civilians. This is particularly so regarding humanitarian assistance personnel. The
authority to use force by peacekeepers, in selfdefence or based on a resolution adopted under
ChapterVIIoftheUNCharter(dependingonthedefinitionofapeacekeepingmission)naturallyraise
questions if the use of force by peacekeepers could affect their protection as civilians under
internationalhumanitarianlaw.Personnelinhumanitarianassistanceandpeacekeepingmissionsare
entitled to the protection of civilians as long as they are not taking a direct part in hostilities. Their
protection would not be affected by exercising their individual right of selfdefence nor the use of
forceinselfdefenceinthedischargeoftheirmandate,providedthatitislimitedtosuchuse.(RUF,
para. 233) It should in this respect be noted that the use of force in defence of the mandate is
inherently difficult to define. Determining whether peacekeeping personnel or objects of such a
mission were entitled to the protection of civilians or civilian objects, the Trial Chamber in the RUF
casefoundthatitneededtoconsiderthetotalityofcircumstancesexistingatthetimeofthealleged
offence including inter alia, the relevant Security Council resolutions for the operation, the specific
operational mandates, the role and practices actually adopted by the peacekeeping mission during
theparticularconflict,theirrulesofengagementandoperationalorders,thenatureofthearmsand
equipmentusedbythepeacekeepingforce,theinteractionbetweenthepeacekeepingforceandthe
parties involved in the conflict, any use of force between the peacekeeping force and the parties in
theconflict,thenatureandfrequencyofsuchforceandtheconductoftheallegedvictim(s)andtheir
fellowpersonnel.(RUF,para.234)Itcanbequestionedifindeedalltheseaspectsarevalidforthe
determination whether personnel or objects are entitled to the protection of civilians since this a
questiondecidedunderinternationalhumanitarianlaw.
TheMajorityintheICCPreTrialexemplifieddirectparticipationinhostilitiestoinclude"bearing,
using or taking up arms, taking part in military or hostile acts, activities, conduct or operations,
armed fighting or combat, participating in attacks against enemy personnel, property or equipment,
transmitting military information for immediate use of a belligerent, and transporting weapons in
proximity to combat operations. (AbuGarda, para 81). The determination of whether a person is
directly participating in hostilities requires a casebycase analysis (Prosecutorv.Abu Garda, para.
83).
Basedonthedefinitionofcivilianobjectsinarticle52(2)ofAPIandtheICRCcustomarylawstudy,
theMajorityintheICCPreTrialChamberfoundthatinstallations,material,unitsorvehiclesinvolved
inapeacekeepingmissionthecontextofanarmedconflictnotofaninternationalcharactershallnot
beconsideredmilitaryobjectives,andthusshallbeentitledtotheprotectiongiventocivilianobjects,
unless and for such time as their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
themilitaryactionofapartytoaconflictandinsofarastheirtotalorpartialdestruction,captureor
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. (Abu
Garda,para89).
Given the military structure and organisation of peacekeeping missions it may in fact be
questioned if such personnel should be regarded as civilians taking direct part in hostilities if they
become involved in armed conflict. Military personnel organised and commanded by a state or an
intergovernmental organisation within a traditional military structure may rather be regarded as
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members of a military force under command of party to an armed conflict than civilians directly
participating in an armed conflict. The former has also the legal effect of a change in status of the
personnel in a more permanent manner than the latter where civilians directly participating in
hostilitiesonlytemporarily.
b)Subjectiveelements
i.Theperpetratorintendedsuchpersonnel,installations,material,unitsorvehiclessoinvolvedtobe
theobjectoftheattack
TheMajorityintheICCPreTrialChamberfoundthatthissubjectiveelementwasofsimilarcharacter
to that of the Elements of the Crimes for articles8(2)(b)(i)and8(2)(e)(i) dealing with attacks on
civilians in both international and noninternational armed conflicts. The offence first and foremost
encompasses dolus directus of the first degree. The finding of the Majority was also applicable in
NIACs.(AbuGarda,para93)
ii.Theperpetratorwasawareofthefactualcircumstancesthatestablishedthe
Protection
The necessary knowledge required by the perpetrator pertains to the facts establishing that the
installations,materials,unitsorvehiclesandpersonnelwereinvolvedinapeacekeepingmissionbut
thereisnoneedoflegalknowledgeregardingtheirprotection.
iii. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed
conflict.
Thereisnorequirementonbehalfoftheperpetratortoconcludeonthebasisofalegalassessment
of the said circumstances, that there was an armed conflict. (Prosecutorv. Abu Garda, para. 96)
(RUF,para.235)
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(iii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1. Michael Bothe, War Crimes, 412, Antonio Cassese/Paola Gaeta/John R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2002.
2.MichaelCottier,AttacksonHumanitarianAssistanceorPeacekeepingMissions,330,Triffterer(Ed.),
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by
Article(Munichetal.,Becketal.2nded.,2008
Court:SourcesandCommentary,453456,ICRC/CambridgeUniversityPress,2003.
4. Ola Engdahl, Prosecution of Attacks against Peacekeepers in International Courts and Tribunals,
51,MilitaryLawandLawofWarReview,249,2012.
5. Daniel Frank, Article 8(2)(b)(iii) Attacking Personnel or Objects Involved in a Humanitarian
Assistance or Peacekeeping Mission, 146, Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court:
ElementsofCrimesandRulesofProcedureandEvidence,Ardsley,TransnationalPublishers,2001.
6.Herman von Hebel/Darryl Robinson, Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court, 110, Roy S. Lee
(ed.), The International Criminal Court: the Making of the Rome Statute, The Hague, Kluwer Law
International,1999.
Author:
OlaEngdahl
Article8(2)(e)(iv)
[128]Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art,
science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick
andwoundedarecollected,providedtheyarenotmilitaryobjectives
A.Generalremarks
With this article the drafters of the Rome Statute included a provision criminalizing violations of the
rules protecting cultural property, which have been established by international humanitarian law as
well as several UNESCO treaties over the years. The purpose of this provision is to specifically
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criminalize the destruction of cultural property as opposed to civilian property and therefore, it
constitutesalexspecialistoArticle8(2)(e)(xii).
B.Analysis
i.Definition
Pursuant to the ICC Elements of Crime, the following criteria need to be met in order to fulfill the
article at hand: 1. The perpetrator directed an attack. 2. The object of the attack was one or more
buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitalsorplaceswherethesickandwoundedarecollected,whichwerenotmilitaryobjectives.3.
The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are
collected,whichwerenotmilitaryobjectives,tobetheobjectoftheattack.4.Theconducttookplace
inthecontextofandwasassociatedwithanarmedconflictnotofaninternationalcharacter.5.The
perpetratorwasawareoffactualcircumstancesthatestablishedtheexistenceofanarmedconflict.
ii.Requirements
a.Materialelements
Theobjectoftheoffencehastobespeciallyprotected.TheinstitutionsenlistedintheRomeStatute
canbeclassifiedintofourmaincategories:culturalobjects,placesforthecollectionofthoseinneed
(e.g.hospitals),institutionsdedicatedtoreligionandothersdedicatedtoeducation.TheICTYdefined
cultural objects by referring the definition of cultural property in treaty law (e.g. the 1954 Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict) (Prosecutor v.
Strugar,(CaseNo.IT0142),ICTYT.Ch.Judgmentof31January2005,para.230).Accordingtothe
case law of the ICTY, religious and educational institutions are protected as long as they meet the
special requirement of cultural heritage of people, meaning objects whose value transcends
geographical boundaries, and which are unique in character and are intimately associated with the
historyandcultureofapeople(Prosecutorv.Marti,(CaseNo.IT9511),ICTYT.Ch.Judgmentof
12 June 2007, para. 97). Additionally, these institutions must clearly be identified as dedicated to
religionoreducation(Prosecutorv.Blaki, (Case No. IT9514), ICTY T. Ch. Judgmentof3March
2000,para.185).
Furthermore, the object of the offence cannot be a military objective. Military objectives are
definedbyArticle52(3)AdditionalProtocolI as objects which by their nature, location, purpose or
usemakeaneffectivecontributiontomilitaryactionandwhosetotalorpartialdestruction,captureor
neutralization,inthecircumstancesrulingatthetime,offersadefinitemilitaryadvantage.
Concerning the nature of the offence the Rome Statute penalizes the directing of attacks against
suchinstitutions.ThetermattackisdefinedinArticle49(1)AdditionalProtocolIandmeansactsof
violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence. Hence, the scope of the article is
extremely broad and almost all acts of hostility fall under this provision. Furthermore, no actual
damage to the protected institutions is required. In order for the article at hand to be fulfilled it is
sufficientthattheattackwasdirectedagainsttherespectiveprotectedinstitution.
b.Mentalelements
Additionally to the mental elements concerning the general requirements of war crimes, the
perpetrator has to fulfill the mental elements of the underlying offence at hand. Namely, the attack
against the protected institutions has to be committed intentionally. A controversial issue while
draftingtheRomeStatutewaswhetherthetermintentionallywasrelatedsolelytothedirectingof
anattackoralsototheobjectoftheattack.Thetraxauxprparatoiresadoptedthelatterapproach.
Therefore, the ICC Elements of the Crime require that the perpetrator must have known about the
protected status of the institution. Additionally the perpetrator must have knowledge of the
institutionsfailuretoqualifyasamilitaryobjective,andneverthelesscarryouttheattack.However,
he does not have to make a legal assessment of the protected status of the institutions. He merely
needs to know the factual circumstances, which give the object a special status (see Prosecutor v.
Blaki,(CaseNo.IT9514),ICTYT.Ch.Judgmentof3March2000,para.185).
C.Crossreferences:
1.Article8(2)(b)(ix)
2.ElementsofCrime
D.Doctrine:
1. Roberta Arnold, Article 8, Paragraph 2 (b)(ix), Triffterer, Otto (Ed.), Commentary on the Rome
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Statute of the International Criminal Court Observers Notes, Article by Article, 375380, Second
Edition,C.H.Beck/Hart/Nomos,Mnchen/Oxford/BadenBaden,2008
2. Gideon Boas et al., International Criminal Law Practitioner Library, Vol. II, Elements of Crime
underInternationalCriminalLaw,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2008
3. Caroline Ehlert, Prosecuting the Destruction of Cultural Property in International Criminal Law,
MartinusNijhoffPublishers,Leiden,2014,pp.121140
4.MicaelaFrulli,TheCriminalizationofOffencesagainstCulturalHeritageinTimesofArmedConflict:
TheQuestofConsistency,EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw,vol22(2011):203217
5.MireilleHector,,Enhancingindividualcriminalresponsibilityforoffencesinvolvingculturalproperty
the road to the Rome Statute and the 1999 Second Protocol, Van Woudenberg, Nout, Lijnzaad,
Liesbeth(Eds.),ProtectingCulturalArmedConflictAnInsightintothe1999SecondProtocoltothe
HagueConventionof1954fortheProtectionofCulturalPropertyintheEventofArmedConflict,21
42,KoninklijkeBrill,Leiden,2010
6.TheodorMeron,TheProtectionofCulturalPropertyintheEventofArmedConflictwithintheCase
law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Museum International, vol 57
(2005):4159
7. Roger OKeefe, Protection of Cultural Property under International Criminal Law, Melbourne
JournalofInternationalLaw,vol11(2010):154
8. Rdiger Wolfrum, Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, RdigerWolfrum (Ed.), The
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, online
edition,[www.mpepil.com]
Author:
CarolineEhlert
Article8(2)(e)(v)
[129](v)Pillagingatownorplace,evenwhentakenbyassault
The term "pillage" means appropriation of property for private, personal use and embraces acts of
plundering, looting and sacking. There is no substantive difference between appropriation and
confiscation. Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) is an identical provision to the present provision, but applies in
international armed conflicts. In comparison with articles 8(2)(a)(iv), 8(2)(b)(xiii) and 8(2)(e)(xii),
pillage differs from appropriation and confiscation in regard to the perpetrator's intent to obtain the
propertyforprivateorpersonaluse.
InProsecutorv.KatangaandChui,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,30September2008,
para. 329, PTC I stated that the "war crime of pillaging under article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Statute
requires that the property subject to the offence belongs to an 'enemy' or 'hostile' party to the
conflict."
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(a)(iv),(8)(2)(b)(xiii),8(2)(b)(xvi)and8(2)(e)(xii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2. Andreas Zimmerman at pp. 237239, MN 167178 and Andreas Zimmerman at pp. 278279, MN
299300inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(e)(vi)1
[130](vi)Committingrape,
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throughthecaselawoftheICTRandtheICTY.Rapeasawarcrimediffersfromthedefinitionofrape
asacrimeagainsthumanityonlyintermsofthecontextinwhichthecrimeiscommitted.Therape
must have been perpetrated in the context of and in association with a noninternational armed
conflict. In Kunarac, a sufficient nexus to the armed conflict was considered to exist in a situation
where combatants took advantage of their positions of military authority to rape individuals, whose
displacementwasanexpressgoalofthemilitarycampaignofwhichtheywerepart.SeeProsecutor
v.DragoljubKunarac,RadomirKovacandZoranVukovic(AppealJudgment),IT9623&IT9623/1
A,12June2002,paras.5859.
Forthementalelementofrapearticle30applies.Theperpetratorhastobeawareofthefactual
circumstancesthatestablishedtheexistenceofanarmedconflict.Heorshemustalsohaveintended
topenetratethevictimsbodyandbeawarethatthepenetrationwasbyforceorthreatofforce.The
definitionofrapeisthesameregardingrapeasgenocide,crimesagainsthumanityandwarcrimes,
albeit the contextual elements of the chapeaus differ. The actus reus of the violation is found in the
ElementsofCrimes.Thedefinitionfocusesonpenetrationwith1)asexualorganofanybodypart,or
2)withtheuseofanobjectoranyotherpartofthebodyoftheanalorgenitalopeningofthevictim,
committed by force or threat or force or coercion. Any part of the body under point 1 refers to
vaginal,analandoralpenetrationwiththepenisandmayalsobeinterpretedasears,noseandeyes
of the victim. Point 2 refers to objects or the use of fingers, hands or tongue of the perpetrator.
CaseNo.IT9623and23/1.AstothetermcoerciontheICTRTrialChamberinAkayesuheldthata
coerciveenvironmentdoesnotrequirephysicalforce.Italsoadoptedabroadapproachtotheactus
reus,includingalsotheuseofobjects,anapproachthathasbeenembracedalsobytheICTYandthe
ICC(Prosecutorv.JeanPaulAkayesu,2September1998,ICTR,CaseNo.ICTR964T,para.598).
priorsexualconduct.
The ICC has in several arrest warrants found reasonable grounds to believe that rape as a war
crime within the meaning of Article 8(2)(e)(vi) has been committed. See Second Arrest Warrant
against Ntaganda, where the Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that rape and sexual
slaverywerecommittedindifferentlocationsinIturi,ICC01/0402/06,13July2012,para.57,Pre
TrialChamberI,WarrantofArrestagainstAhmadHarunandAliKushayb,ICC02/0501/07,27April
2007reasonablegroundstobelievethatHarun,throughthedirectionoftheSudaneseArmedForces
andtheJanjaweedcommittedrapesofwomenandgirls,WarrantofArrestagainstJosephKony,ICC
02/0401/05,PreTrialChamberII,27September2005, WarrantofArrestagainstVincentOtti,ICC
02/04,8July2005,PreTrialChamberII,para.17andProsecutorv.SylvestreMudacumura,Decision
ontheProsecutor'sApplicationunderArticle58,ICC01/0401/12,13July2012,para.47.
Crossreference:
1.Articles7(1)(g)and8(2)(b)(xxii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1.AntonioCasseseatpp.374375inAntonioCassese/PaolaGaeta/JohnR.W.D.Jones.
3.MacheldBootatpp.141142,MN4546inOttoTriffterer(1999).
4.MichaelCottieratp.253,MN209inOttoTriffterer(1999).
5.AndreasZimmermanatp.279MN301303inOttoTriffterer(1999).
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2005,pp.202220.
Author:
MariaSjholm
Article8(2)(e)(vi)2
[131]sexualslavery,
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, 22 February 2001, ICTY, Case No. IT9623 and 23/1,
offence. The provision is identical to article8(2)(b)(xxii) and differs only in terms of the context in
whichthecrimeiscommitted.
InProsecutorv.KatangaandChui,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,30September2008,
para. 431, PTC I held that "sexual slavery also encompasses situations where women and girls are
forcedinto'marriage',domesticservitudeorotherforcedlabourinvolvingcompulsorysexualactivity,
includingrape,bytheircaptors.Formsofsexualslaverycan,forexample,bepracticessuchasthe
detention of women in 'rape camps' or 'comfort stations', forced temporary 'marriages' to soldiers
and other practices involving the treatment of women as chattel, and as such, violations of the
peremptorynormprohibitingslavery."
toconstituteforcedmarriage.TheChamberconcludedthatforcedmarriagewasdistinctfromsexual
slavery. Accordingly, While forced marriage shares certain elements with sexual slavery such as
nonconsensual sex and deprivation of liberty, there are also distinguishing factors. First, forced
marriageinvolvesaperpetratorcompellingapersonbyforceorthreatofforce,throughthewordsor
conduct of the perpetrator or those associated with him, into a forced conjugal association with
another person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the part of the
victim. Second, unlike sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between
the husband and wife, which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this exclusive
arrangement.SeeProsecutorv.Brima, Case No. SCSL200416A, Appeals Judgment, 22 February
2008,para.195.In2012theCourtinadecisionontheCharlesTaylorcasedeclareditspreference
for the term forced conjugal slavery. The Trial Chamber did not find the term marriage to be
helpful in describing the events that had occurred, in that it did not constitute marriage in the
universallyunderstoodsense(Prosecutorv.CharlesTaylor,SCSL0301T,18May2012,para.427).
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.MachteldBootatp.143144,MN47and50inOttoTriffterer(1999).
2005,pp.202220.
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Author:
MariaSjholm
Article8(2)(e)(vi)3
ProtocolIasanoutrageuponpersonaldignity.Theprovisionisidenticaltoarticle8(2)(b)(xxii)and
differsonlyintermsofthecontextinwhichthecrimeiscommitted.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.MacheldBootatp.143144,MN4850inOttoTriffterer(1999).
2005,pp.202220.
Author:
MariaSjholm
Article8(2)(e)(vi)4
[133]forcedpregnancy,asdefinedinarticle7,paragraph2(f),
Forced pregnancy means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant. Unlawful
confinement should be interpreted as any form of deprivation of physical liberty contrary to
internationallaw.Thedeprivationoflibertydoesnothavetobesevereandnospecifictimeframeis
required. The use of force is not required, but some form of coercion. To complete the crime, it is
sufficientiftheperpetratorholdsawomanimprisonedwhohasbeenimpregnatedbysomeoneelse.
Theforcibleimpregnationmayinvolverapeorotherformsofsexualviolenceofcomparablegravity.
In addition to the mental requirements in article30, the perpetrator must act with the purpose of
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of
internationallaw.Nationallawsprohibitingabortiondonotamounttoforcedpregnancy.Theprovision
is identical to article 8(2)(b)(xxii)and differs only in terms of the context in which the crime is
committed.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.MacheldBootatpp.144and164165inOttoTriffterer(1999).
http://www.casematrixnetwork.org/cmnknowledgehub/icccommentaryclicc/commentaryromestatute/commentaryromestatutepart2articles510/
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2005,pp.202220.
Author:
MariaSjholm
Article8(2)(e)(vi)5
also fall under the chapeau of genocide if such intent is present. The provision is identical to article
8(2)(b)(xxii)anddiffersonlyintermsofthecontextinwhichthecrimeiscommitted.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.MacheldBootatp.144,MN52inOttoTriffterer(1999).
2005,pp.202220.
Author:
MariaSjholm
Article8(2)(e)(vi)6
[135]andanyotherformofsexualviolencealsoconstitutingaseriousviolationofarticle3
commontothefourGenevaConventions
other acts listed in article8(2)(e)(vi). It concerns acts of a sexual nature against a person through
theuseofforceorthreatofforceorcoercion.Theimportanceofdistinguishingthedifferentformsof
severity, and therefore becomes a matter of sentencing. Common Article 3 is considered part of
customaryinternationallaw.
may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact. See Prosecutor v.
JeanPaul Akayesu, ICTR964T, 2 September 1998, para. 688. The Trial Chamber in the case
confirmed that forced public nudity was an example of sexual violence within its jurisdiction. See
para.10A.Similarly,theTrialChamberoftheICTYinitsKvockadecisiondeclared:sexualviolence
is broader than rape and includes such crimes as sexual slavery or molestation, and also covers
sexual acts that do not involve physical contact, such as forced public nudity. See Prosecutor v.
MiroslavKvocka, 2 November 2001, ICTY, Case No. IT9830/1T, para. 180. To the contrary, in the
decision on the Prosecutors application for a warrant of arrest in the Bemba case, the PreTrial
Chamber of the ICC did not include a charge of sexual violence as a crime against humanity in the
arrestwarrant,whichhadbeenbasedonallegationsthatthetroopsinquestionhadforcedwomento
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undressinpublicinordertohumiliatethem,statingthatthefactssubmittedbytheProsecutordonot
constituteotherformsofsexualviolenceofcomparablegravitytotheotherformsofsexualviolence
setforthinArticle7(1)(g).Decision on the Prosecutors Application for a Warrant of Arrest against
JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, ICC01/0501/08, 10 June 2008, para. 40. In the Lubanga case of the
ICC, evidence of sexual violence was presented during the trial, including various forms of sexual
abuseofgirlsoldierswhowereforcefullyconscripted.However,nochargesofsexualviolencewere
brought. The Prosecution rather encouraged the Trial Chamber to consider evidence of sexual
violenceasanintegralelementoftherecruitmentanduseofchildsoldiers.ICC01/0401/062748
Red.IntheconfirmationofchargesintheMuthauraandKenyattacase,PreTrialChamberIIchose
not to charge forced male circumcision and penile amputation as sexual violence, but rather as
inhumane acts. The Chamber held that the evidence placed before it does not establish the sexual
nature of the acts of forcible circumcision and penile amputation. Instead, it appears from the
evidencethattheactsweremotivatedbyethnicprejudice.ICC01/0902/11382Red,para.266.It
argued that not every act of violence which targets parts of the body commonly associated with
sexualityshouldbeconsideredanactofsexualviolence.Seepara.265.
Crossreference:
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.MacheldBootatpp.144145,MN53inOttoTriffterer(1999).
2005,pp.202220.
Author:
MariaSjholm
Article8(2)(e)(vii)
[136] (vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed
forcesorgroupsorusingthemtoparticipateactivelyinhostilities
A.Generalremarks
Article 8(2)(e)(vii) concerns the conscription, recruitment or use of children younger than fifteen
yearsofage,inthecontextofaninternalconflict.ThecrimealsoappearsinArticle8(2)(b)(xxvi)to
coverthesamecrimeinthecontextofaninternationalconflict.
B.Preparatoryworks
As the practice of child soldier recruitment/conscription/use had not been previously expressly
recognised as criminalised, its inclusion was naturally a controversial point of debate during Statute
negotiations. The United States in particular was against the inclusion of the crime, arguing that it
was not a crime under customary international law and represented an area of legislative action
outside the purview of the Conference [Committee of the Whole Meeting Records, 4th meeting
(Wednesday,17June1998),54].However,agreementoninclusionwaseventuallyreachedduetoits
position as a wellestablished treaty law provision [Additional Protocol I, Article 77(2) Additional
ProtocolII,Article4(3)(c)andConventionontheRightsoftheChild,Article38(3).In2002thecrime
wasincludedasaseriousviolationofinternationalhumanitarianlawinArticle4(c)oftheStatuteof
the Special Court for Sierra Leone [Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc.
S/2002/246]. In a split decision in May 2004, the Special Court held that the provision was already
customaryinternationallawpriortotheadoptionoftheRomeStatutein1998thatistosaythatthe
Statutecodifiedanexistingcustomarynormratherthanforminganewone(Prosecutorv.SamHinga
Norman,FourthDefencePreliminaryMotionBasedonLackofJurisdiction(ChildRecruitment),SCSL
0414AR72,31May2004).
C.Analysis
i.Definition
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Accordingtoarticle8(2)(b)(xxvi)thecrimehasthreecomponents:recruitment,conscriptionoruse.
ThisisincontrasttobothAdditionalProtocolIandArticle38oftheConventionontheRightsofthe
Child,whichmakereferencetothesingularactofrecruiting.TheElementsofCrimeprovidefurther:
years.
4.Theconducttookplaceinthecontextofandwasassociatedwithaninternationalarmedconflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed
conflict.
The PreTrial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga determined that the term conscripting
referstoaforcibleact,enlistingencompassesavoluntarydecisiontojoinamilitaryforce,andthe
act of enlisting includes any conduct accepting the child as part of the militia.. (Prosecutor v.
ThomasDyiloLubanga,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,ICC01/0401/06,29January2007).
ii.Consentofthechildasamitigatingfactor
Whileallegedvoluntarinessmaybenegatedbyforceorintimidation,theconsentofthechildcreates
thelegalcharacterisationoftheconductasenlistmentratherthanconscription.Consentistherefore
not irrelevant, but nonetheless places the admission of a child to the armed forces firmly within the
realmofArticle8regardlessofthemeansofadmission.Thespecificmodeofadmission,whetherthe
result of governmental policy, individual initiative or acquiescence in demands to enlist [Happold
(2006) The Age of Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law p. 8] is, for the most part
irrelevant. Happold suggests that this distinction between the means of committing the material
element of this crime may become pertinent during sentencing [Happold p. 12]. In its judgment in
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo the ICC Trial Chamber intimated that it would follow this path
when determining the sentence, but found no aggravating factors when delivering the sentencing
orderon10July2012,insteadfindingthatthefactorsthatarerelevantfordeterminingthegravityof
the crime cannot additionally be taken into account as aggravating circumstances. (Prosecutor v.
ThomasLubanga,Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC01/0401/062842, 14 March
2012,para.617Prosecutorv.ThomasLubanga,SentencingOrder,DecisiononSentencePursuantto
Article76oftheStatute,ICC01/0401/062901,10July2012,paras.78and96).
iii.Continuingcrime
There are a number of different ways in which these two concepts are interrelated or occur
concurrently in the context of the crime. Conscription and enlistment can be viewed as continuing
crimes that begin from the moment a child joins an armed group and end upon demobilisation or
attainment of 15 years of age, with all intermittent time additionally constituting use. This is
therefore a continuing crime: a state of affairs where a crime has been committed and then
maintained.Thecrimeiscommittedfromthemomentthatachildisenteredintothearmedforces,
through enlistment or conscription, and continues for as long as that child remains a child soldier,
endingeitherthroughdemobilisationortheattainmentof15yearsofage.Thisplacesliabilityonthe
personwhorecruitedthechild,whetherbyenlistingorconscripting,regardlessofwhethertheywere
involvedintheuseofthechildinanarmedconflict.Theactofrecruitmenttriggersresponsibilityfor
allsubsequentuse,evenifbyothercommanders.Analternativeinterpretationisthatthecrimeisnot
a composite one, as it is capable of being committed by either the initial conscription or enlistment
step,orthroughthesubsequentuseofthegivenchild,andnotnecessarilythroughdemonstratinga
combinationofthetwo.Thisexpandstheliabilityforthecrimetoincorporatenotjustthepersonwho
actually undertakes the recruitment process of a given child, but also includes others who later use
thechildformilitarypurposes.
iii.Requirements
Inadditiontothecontextualelementsrequiredforallwarcrimesofaninternationalnaturesetoutin
elements4and5oftheabovelistedElementsofCrimes,thefollowingneedstobeproven:
a.Materialelements
The first two elements listed above set out the material elements of child soldier
conscription/enlistment/use.
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ThewarcrimesestablishedbytheRomeStatutearelimitedtotheconscriptionorenlistmentanduse
ofchildrenundertheageoffifteenyears.However,theactsofconscriptionandenlistmentarenot
defined in the Statute, nor in the Elements of Crimes, leaving elaboration to judicial interpretation.
ThePreTrialChamber,(Prosecutorv.Lubanga,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,ICC01/04
01/06, 29 January 2007) determined that the term conscripting refers to a forcible act, whereas
enlisting encompasses a voluntary decision to join a military force (Lubanga, Decision on the
confirmationofcharges, paras. 246247). The act of enlisting includes any conduct accepting the
child as part of the militia (Lubanga, Decision on the confirmation of charges, para. 114). While
alleged voluntariness may be negated by force or intimidation, the consent of the child creates the
legalcharacterisationoftheconductasenlistmentratherthanconscription.Consentisthereforenot
irrelevant,butnonethelessplacestheadmissionofachildtothearmedforcesfirmlywithintherealm
ofArticle8regardlessofthemeansofadmission.
Finally, Participation by combatant and noncombatant children are covered equally by the Rome
Statuteduetoitsuseofthetermparticipateactively.However,theirparticipationmustbewithinthe
context of an armed conflict. The Elements of Crime require that the participation be conduct
associated with an armed conflict, while the travaux prparatoires noted above specifies that
participationinthearmedconfrontationsisnotnecessary,butalinktocombatisrequired[U.N.Doc.
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1,(14April1998)].
b.Mentalelements
years.
WhileArticle30(3)providesthataperpetratormusthavehadpositiveknowledgeofthechildsage,
theElementsofCrimesmerelyrequirethathekneworshouldhaveknownthatthechildwasunder
fifteen.InLubangaitwasdeterminedthattheElementsofCrimesprovidesforsituationswherethe
perpetrator fails to possess knowledge of the given childs age due to a failure to exercise due
diligenceinthecircumstances,Prosecutorv.LubangaDecisionontheconfirmationofcharges,para.
348. Therefore, the PreTrial Chamber considered this element of negligence to be an exception to
theintentandknowledgestandardprovidedinArticle30(1).
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(xxvi)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
1.JulieMcBride,TheWarCrimeofChildSoldierRecruitment,Springer,2013.
2. Matthew Happold, Child Recruitment as a Crime under the Rome Statute of the International
CriminalCourt.InDoriaetal(eds)TheLegalRegimeoftheInternationalCriminalCourt:Essaysin
MemoryofIgorBlischenko.Brill,Leiden.
3.GerhardWerle, Principles of International Criminal Law, Second Edition, T.M.C. Asser Press, The
Hague,2009.
Author:
JulieMcBride
Article8(2)(e)(viii)
[137](viii) Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the
conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so
demand
Article8(2)(e)(viii),paralleltoArticle8(2)(b)(viii),prohibitsthedisplacementofthecivilianpopulation
in the context of a noninternational armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or
imperative military reasons so demand. This conduct is prohibited under the same terms in Article
17AdditionalProtocolIIandreflectscustomaryinternationalhumanitarianlaw[Rule129oftheICRC
Study,seealsoHenckaertsandDoswaldBeck,2005].
TheICCElementsofCrimesclarifythattoprovethewarcrimeofdisplacingacivilianpopulationit
isnecessarythat1.theperpetratororderedadisplacementofacivilianpopulation2.suchanorder
wasnotjustifiedbythesecurityoftheciviliansinvolvedorbymilitarynecessity3.theperpetrator
wasinapositiontoeffectsuchdisplacementbygivingsuchorder4.theconducttookplaceinthe
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contextandwasassociatedwithanoninternationalarmedconflictand5.theperpetratorwasaware
offactualcircumstancesthatestablishedtheexistenceofanarmedconflict.
Thetermdisplacementshallbeinterpretedinlightofinternationalhumanitarianlawastoinclude
theevacuationofthecivilianpopulationbothwithinandoutsidethenationalterritory.Article17(2)AP
IIproscribesthedisplacementofciviliansoutsidetheirnationalterritory.
Differently from the wording used in the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes refer to the
displacementofacivilianpopulationasopposedtothecivilianpopulation.Thisdiscrepancyshall
be construed as to criminalize conducts of displacement of civilians not necessarily involving the
wholecivilianpopulation[onthepoint,cf.Drmann,2003,p.473].
However,thenumberofciviliansinvolvedinthedisplacementshallexceedindividualoccurrences.
This results from the systemic reading of the Elements of Crimes where, e.g., Article 8(2)(a)(vii)
refers to one or more persons as opposed to a civilian population [cf. Drmann, 2003, p. 472].
Arguably, since the letter of Article 8(2)(e)(vii) does not resort to the same expression, only the
civilian population and not individual civilians shall be affected by the displacement in order for the
conduct to fall under the scope of the provision. This proposition finds support in the travaux
prparatoirestotheRomeStatutewheretheexpressioncivilianpopulationwasdeliberatelychosen
againsttheoneormoreciviliansasthedraftersconsideredthedisplacementofoneciviliantobe
insufficienttoconstitutethewarcrimeofdisplacementofcivilians[Drmann,2003,p.472].
AsalientissuewhichhasbeenrecentlyelucidatedbytheICCcaselawrelatestotheexistenceof
an actual order to displace a civilian population as a constitutive element of the war crime under
Article8(2)(e)(viii). In the case Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, the PreTrial Chamber has clarified
whatfollows:
theconductbywhichtheperpetrator(s)force(s)civilianstoleaveacertainareaisnotlimitedto
anorder,asreferredtoinelement1oftherelevantElementsofCrimes.TheChamberconsiders
that,shouldthisnotbethecase,theactualcircumstancesofciviliandisplacementinthecourse
of an armed conflict would be unduly restricted. This is specifically reflected in the general
introduction to the Elements of Crimes, which states that [t]he elements [] apply mutatis
mutandis to all those whose criminal responsibility may fall under articles 25 and 28 of the
Statute.[Prosecutorv.Ntaganda,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)of
theRomeStatuteontheChargesoftheProsecutorAgainstBoscoNtaganda,ICC01/0402/06
309,9June2014,para.64].
NothingintheElementsofCrimesindicatesthenatureofthepositionwhichtheallegedperpetrator
hastocoverinordertoeffectthedisplacementofciviliansunderArticle8(2)(e)(viii).Yet,thewording
toeffectthedisplacementseemstoprivilegeadefactoappraisalofsuchaposition.Therefore,both
dejureanddefactopositionscanbereasonablycontemplatedunderthetermsoftheprovision.This
findssupportinthepronouncementofthePreTrialChamberinthecaseProsecutorv.BoscoNtaganda
[Ntaganda,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatuteonthe
ChargesoftheProsecutorAgainstBoscoNtaganda,ICC01/0402/06309,9June2014,para.68]
stating()themeansused()andthemodusoperandishowthattheUPC/FPLCsoldierswereina
positiontodisplacecivilians,asfurtherdemonstratedbythelargenumberofcivilianswhowereinfact
displaced.
Article8(2)(e)(viii)admitsthedisplacementofacivilianpopulationforreasonsconnectedtothe
conflictonlyintwoexceptionalcircumstances:1.Whenthesecurityoftheciviliansinvolvedso
demands,(e.g.whentheciviliansarelocatedinareaslikelytobesubjectedtobombings2.When
imperativemilitaryreasonssodemand,wherethetermimperativeimposesarestrictive
interpretationofthisexception[Drmann,2003,pp.474475].
Crossreference:
1.Articles7(1)(d),8(2)(a)(vii)and8(2)(b)(viii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
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CourtSourcesandCommentary,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2003.
2. JeanMarie Henckaerts/Louise DoswaldBeck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, ICRC,
CambridgeUniversityPress,2005reprint2009.
Author:
LetiziaLoGiacco
Article8(2)(e)(ix)
[138](ix)Killingorwoundingtreacherouslyacombatantadversary
Treachery, also synonymous with perfidy, involves a breach of good faith of the combatant
adversaries. In practice, it is typically cases in which the accused in deception claims a right to
protectionforhimorherself,andusesthisforhisorheradvantageinthecombat.Itincludes:
pretendingtobeacivilian
fakeuseofaflagoftruce,theflagorofthemilitaryinsigniaanduniformoftheenemyorofthe
UnitedNations,aswellasofthedistinctiveemblemsoftheGenevaConventions
fakeuseofoftheprotectiveemblemofculturalproperty
fakeuseofotherinternationallyrecognizedprotectiveemblems,signsorsignals
pretendingtosurrender
pretendingtobeincapacitatedbywoundsorsickness
pretendingtobelongtotheenemybytheuseoftheirsigns
The provision is simliar, but not identical to article 8(2)(b)(xi). The prohibition on prefidy in the
present only extends to "combatant adversaries", while article 8(2)(b)(xi) also prohibits the killing
andwoundingofcivilians.Theuseofthenotion"combatantadversary"shouldbedistinguishedfrom
"enemy combatants", indicating that there is notion "combatant" is not applicable in internal armed
conflicts. Perfidious acts are only punishable if the perpetrator intentionally killed or wounded an
adversary.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(vii)and8(2)(b)(xi)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2.MichaelCottieratpp.217224,MN114130andAndreasZimmermanatpp.282283MN317319
inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(e)(x)
[139](x)Declaringthatnoquarterwillbegiven
The offence covers "take no prisoners" warfare. The material element will typically be fulfilled by a
declaration that any surrender by the enemy shall be refused even if it is reasonable to accept. In
addition to declarations, the provision should be include order and threats that no quarter shall be
refused. Combatant adversaries are not required to provide the enemy with the opportunity to
surrender.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(vi)and8(2)(b)(xii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
2. Michael Cottier at pp. 225227, MN 131137 Andreas Zimmerman at p. 283 MN 320321 in Otto
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Triffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(e)(xi)1
[140] (xi) Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the conflict to
physicalmutilation
The term "physical mutilation" cover acts such as amputations, injury to limbs, removal of organs,
andformsofsexualmutilations.Thevictim'sconsentisnotaexcusabledefence.
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(b)(x)and8(2)(e)(xi)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(e)(xi)2
[141]ortomedicalorscientificexperiments
The prohibition of medical or scientific experiments cover the use of therapeutic methods which are
not justified on medical grounds and not carried out in the interest of the affected person. The
consentofthevictimisnotrelevant.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(a)(ii)and8(2)(e)(xi)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(e)(xi)3
[142]ofanykindwhichareneitherjustifiedbythemedical,dentalorhospitaltreatmentof
the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or
seriouslyendangerthehealthofsuchpersonorpersons
The acts in article 8(2)(e)(xi) can only be justified if undertaken in the interest of the person
concerned,forexampleamputationsmaybelawfulifperformedtosavetheliveoroverallhealthof
the patient. Any physical mutilation or unwarranted medical or scientific experiments undertaken of
eithergovernmentalauthoritiesoronnonstategroupsarecoveredbyarticle8(2)(e)(xi).
Crossreference:
Articles8(2)(b)(x)
Doctrine:
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Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(e)(xii)
[143](xii) Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or
seizurebeimperativelydemandedbythenecessitiesoftheconflict
This provision is parallel, mutatis mutandis, to Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) Rome Statute and reflects
customary international humanitarian law [Rule 50 ICRC Study, see also Henckaerts and Doswald
Beck,2005].
The ICC Elements of Crimes set out the constitutive elements of the war crime of destroying or
seizing the enemys property: 1. The perpetrator destroyed or seized certain property 2. such a
propertywasofanadversary3.suchpropertywasprotectedfromthedestructionorseizureunder
theinternationallawofarmedconflict4.theperpetratorwasawareofthefactualcircumstancesthat
established the status of the property the destruction of the property was not required by military
necessity5.theconducttookplaceinthecontextandwasassociatedwithanarmedconflictnotof
aninternationalcharacter6.theperpetratorwasawareoffactualcircumstancesthatestablishedthe
existenceofanarmedconflict.
Article 8(2)(e)(xii) has been invoked as ground of charges against, inter alios, Callixte
Mbarushimana,[Prosecutorv.Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,
ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011] and Bosco Ntaganda [Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC
PT.Ch.II,Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the
ProsecutorAgainstBoscoNtaganda, ICC01/0402/06309, 9 June 2014, para. 72 ff.]. Likewise, the
crimeofdestructionofenemyspropertyhasbeenimputedtoGermanKatangaandMathieuNgudjolo
ChuiunderArticle8(2)(b)(xiii).SuchalegalbasiswassubsequentlymodifiedintoArticle8(2)(e)(xii)
aftertherequalificationoftheconflictfrominternationaltononinternational.
InthejudgmentinthecaseProsecutorv.Katanga[Prosecutorv.GermainKatanga,ICCT.Ch.II,
Jugementrenduenapplicationdelarticle74duStatut,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.
889ff.],theTrialChamberclarifiedthescopeofArticle8(2)(e)(xii)statingthatriennindiquequeles
lmentsconstitutifsducrimevislarticle82exiisontdiffrentsdeceuxducrimededestruction
desbiensdelennemicommisdanslecadredunconflitarminternationaletvislarticle82b
xiii [para. 889]. Such a statement is supported by authoritative doctrine [see Drmann, pp. 485
486].Basedonthis,theanalysisofArticle8(2)(e)(xii)mayoccurbyanalogywithArticle8(2)(b)(xiii)
RomeStatute.
The provision criminalizes the destruction or seizure of enemys property protected by the law of
armedconflicts.Thereexistsapluralityofwaysinwhichthedestructionofpropertymaybecarried
out. The Trial Chamber has exemplified some of them, namely, par des acts tels que lincendie, le
dmantlement ou toute autre forme de dgradation de biens [Prosecutor v. Katanga, T. Ch.
II,Jugement rendu en application de larticle 74 du Statut, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014,
para. 891], concluding that property heavily damaged can be assimilated to partly destroyed
property and can thus fall under the terms of Article 8(2)(e)(xii) [Prosecutor v. Katanga, T. Ch.
II, Jugement rendu en application de larticle 74 du Statut, ICC01/0401/073436, March 2014,
para.891].InthecaseProsecutorv.BoscoNtaganda,thePreTrialChamberconfirmedthechargeof
destruction of property against the defendant for having destroyed houses, buildings and other
permanent structures, set on fire houses or removed their metal roofs, destroyed fields, destroyed
andburnedvillages[Prosecutorv.Ntaganda,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and
(b)oftheRomeStatuteontheChargesoftheProsecutorAgainstBoscoNtaganda,ICC01/0402/06
309, 9 June 2014, paras 7273]. Similarly, destruction of property may occur by setting fire to,
pulling down, or otherwise damaging the adversaries property [Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, ICC
PT. Ch. I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC01/0401/10465Red, 16 December 2011,
para.171].
Astotheseizureofproperty,neithertheICCStatutenortheElementsofCrimeshelpclarifythe
meaning of the term. According to the ICRC Commentary, seizure is to be distinguished from
requisition because the former relates to public property and is a temporary sequestration followed
by restitution and indemnity the latter affects private property and consists in a passage of
ownership[Pictet,1958,p.296].However,thispointremainsdebatedinliteratureandunclarifiedby
theICCcaselaw[forarecollectionofrelevantpositions,cf.Drmann,2003,pp.256257].
Thenotionofpropertyisquietbroad.Itincludespropertyofnaturalandlegalpersons,moveable
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and immoveable, public and private, provided that they are of the adverse party [Prosecutor v.
Katanga,Jugement,para.892].TheTrialChamberhasshedlightofthemeaningofadverse,notably,
allies ou faisant allgeance une partie au conflit opposee ou hostile lauteur du crime [in
KatangaJudgment,para.892].Suchanadversecharactercanbeestablishedbyvirtueoftheethnic
originofthepersonswhosepropertyhasbeendestroyed(orpartlydestroyed)orseizedorbasedon
theirplaceofresidence[Prosecutorv.Katanga,Jugement,para.892].
Article8(2)(e)(xii)appliestoindividualactsofdestructionorseizureofenemyspropertywhichare
protectedbythelawofarmedconflictanddoesnotrequireanyelementofextensivenessasopposed
toArticle8(2)(a)(iv))[Extensivedestructionandappropriationofproperty()carriedoutunlawfully
andwantonly].
The destruction of enemy property does not constitute a crime under the terms of the Statute if
such a destruction was imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict. Such an
expression has been regarded as substantively equivalent to military necessity and interpreted in
line with the ICTY case law [Prosecutor v. Katanga, T. Ch. II, Jugement rendu en application de
larticle74duStatut,ICC01/0401/073436,March2014,para.894].Militarynecessityistherefore
meantasncessitdemeasuresindispensablespourattaindrelesbutsdeguerre,etlgalesselon
les lois et coutumes de la guerre [Lieber Code, Article 14, cited in Prosecutor v. Katanga, T. Ch.
II,Jugement rendu en application de larticle 74 du Statut, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014,
para.894].
Crossreference:
1.Articles8(2)(a)(iv),(8)(2)(b)(xiii),8(2)(b)(xvi)and8(2)(e)(v)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
CourtSourcesandCommentary,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2003.
2. JeanMarie Henckaerts/Louise DoswaldBeck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, ICRC,
CambridgeUniversityPress,2005reprint2009.
3. Jean Pictet, Commentary to I Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
theWoundedandSickinArmedForcesintheField,ICRC,Geneva,1958.
Author:
LetiziaLoGiacco
Article8(2)(e)(xiii)
[144](xiii)Employingpoisonorpoisonedweapons
Thisoffencecouldforexampleincludethepoisoningofwatersupplies.Theproductionandstorageof
poisonisnotprohibited.Thereisnoagreementwhethertheprohibitionontheuseofpoisoncovers
poison gas. Article 8(2)(b)(xvii) is an identical provision to the present provision, but applies in
internationalarmedconflicts.
Theprovisiondoesnotprohibitchemicalandbiologicalweaponsofmassdestruction.Thismaybe
explained the lack of agreement on the prohibition on of nuclear weapons and a following
compromise during the Rome conference, with the result that weapons of mass destruction are not
subjecttoanexplicitandbindingprovisionintheRomeStatute.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(xvii),8(2)(b)(xviii)and8(2)(b)(xx)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(e)(xiv)
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[145] (xiv) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids,
materialsordevices
ThewordingofthepresentprovisionisbasicallyidenticaltheGenevaProtocolof17June1925forthe
prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological
methods of warfare. Article8(2)(b)(xviii) is also an identical provision to the present provision, but
appliesininternationalarmedconflicts.
It is generally understood that the wording "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquids, materials or devices" in the 1925 Geneva Protocol includes chemical weapons
which nullifies the compromise mentioned in the previous commentary (Article 8(2)(e)(xiv)). Even
thoughbiologicalweaponsarecoveredbytheGenevaProtocolof17June1925,itisdoubtfulthatthe
present provision covers these weapons. This is supported by the fact that the relevant passage on
biologicalweaponsintheGenevaProtocolof17June1925wasnotincludedinArticle8(2)(b)(xvii).
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(xvii)and8(2)(b)(xviii)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(e)(xv)
[146] (xv) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as
bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with
incisions.
The "dumdum" bullet is type of bullet covered by the present provision, as well as customary law.
Theprohibitionequallyappliestostandardbulletsconvertedonthebattlefieldbypiercingthemwith
incisions,aswellastoothertypesofbulletswhichexpandorflatteneasilyinthehumanbody.Article
8(2)(b)(xix) is an identical provision to the present provision, but applies in international armed
conflicts.
Crossreference:
1.Article8(2)(b)(xix)
2.ElementsofCrime
Doctrine:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8(2)(f)
[147](f) Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and
thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolatedandsporadicactsofviolenceorotheractsofasimilarnature.Itappliestoarmed
conflictsthattakeplaceintheterritoryofaStatewhenthereisprotractedarmedconflict
betweengovernmentalauthoritiesandorganizedarmedgroupsorbetweensuchgroups.
A.GeneralRemarks
Subparagraph (f) is an express limitation to the scope of application of subparagraph (e) that
enumerates crimes committed in a noninternational armed conflict (Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC PT.
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ProsecutoragainstJeanPierreBembaGombo,ICC01/0501/08424,15June2009,para.225).Itis
undoubtedlythemostdiscussedarticleinacademicliteratureas:
(1)Itconveystheimpressionthattherearetwotypesofnoninternationalarmedconflictsunder
the ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(c) conflicts as limited by subparagraph (d) and Article 8(2)(e)
conflictsaslimitedbysubparagraph(f).
(2) It appears to adopt the Tadijurisprudence(Prosecutorv.Tadi, (Case No. IT941AR72),
ICTYApp.Ch.,DecisionontheDefenceMotionforInterlocutoryAppealonJurisdiction,2October
1995,para.70)thoughwithadifferenceinthewording.
B.Analysis
Article8(2)(f)statesthatParagraph2(e)appliestoarmedconflictsnotofaninternationalcharacter
andthusdoesnotapplytosituationsofinternaldisturbancesandtensions,suchasriots,isolatedand
sporadicactsofviolenceorotheractsofasimilarnature.Itappliestoarmedconflictsthattakeplace
intheterritoryofaStatewhenthereisprotractedarmedconflictbetweengovernmentalauthorities
andorganizedarmedgroupsorbetweensuchgroups.
Article8(2)(f) limits the application of subparagraph (e) by first providing a minimum threshold of
applicabilityandsecondlyspellingouttherequirementsforaconflicttobecharacterisedasanarmed
conflictofnoninternationalnature.Thefirstsentenceisidenticaltothatexpressedinsubparagraph
(d)andhasbeeninterpretedinthesameway(Prosecutorv.Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,Jugementrendu
enapplicationdelarticle74duStatut,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,paras1187and1216
Prosecutorv.Lubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,Judgment,ICC01/0401/06,14March2012,para.538).
The second sentence was initially considered by the Court as adducing an additional requirement
(Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the
Charges of the Prosecutor against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009,
para. 235), raising the threshold of a noninternational armed conflict. Yet, later caselaw suggests
that this is not the case and there is only one type of noninternational armed conflict (see
Commentariesonsubparagraph(c)and(e))andthatitsdefinitionistobefoundinsubparagraph(f).
Subparagraph(f)secondsentencerequires:
thearmedconflicttotakeplacebetweengovernmentalauthoritiesandorganisedarmedgroupsor
betweensuchgroups(seeCommentaryonsubparagraph(e))and
thearmedconflicttobeprotracted(seealsoLubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,Judgment,ICC0/0401/06,14
March 2012, para. 536). Whilst in subparagraph (f) it is the armed conflict that needs to be
protracted, in the ICTY caselaw it is the violence that must be protracted (Tadi, ICTY App.
Ch.,Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para.
70). It is unclear whether the ICC has paid much attention to this difference in terminology. Indeed
theonlytimetheICCmakesareferencetoarmedviolenceinrelationtosubparagraph(f)iswhen
itexplainstherequirementofanorganisedarmedgrouptobeorganisedenoughinordertoenable
[it] to carry out protracted armed violence (Lubanga, ICC T. Ch. I, Judgment, ICC0/0401/06, 14
March 2012, para. 536). Moreover the ICTY has used the notion of protracted as an intensity
element,havingoverlookeditstemporalconnotation(asacknowledgedbytheICTYinProsecutorv.
BokoskiandTarulovski,(CaseNoIT0482T),T.Ch.Judgment,10July2008,para.186).
Thatbeingsaid,thetemporalconnotationisimpliedintwoseparate,thoughrelatedcontexts:
(1) Linked to the requirement that the conflict be of a certain intensity. It is indeed unclear
whethertheintensityrequirementisembeddedinthefirstorsecondsentenceofsubparagraph
(f). Given that the majority of the cases (barring the example of Bemba(Bemba, ICC PT. Ch.
ProsecutoragainstJeanPierreBembaGombo,ICC01/0501/08424,15June2009)whichlinks
intensity to the first sentence (para. 225)) do not distinguish between conflicts under
subparagraph (c) and (e) the answer to this question does not seem to have any practical
implications.InpracticetheICC,whendiscussingtheintensityrequirement,examinesthelength
of the conflict as one (i.e. the spread [of attacks] [] over a period of time (Lubanga,ICCT.
Ch. I, Judgment, ICC0/0401/06, 14 March 2012, para. 538) of many other elements. It has
found that hostilities covering a period of five months (Bemba, ICC PT. Ch. II, 15 June 2009,
paras 235 and 255), seven months (Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the
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Confirmation of Charges, ICC01/0401/06803, 29 January 2007, paras 236327), 12 months

(Prosecutorv.Mbarushimana,ICCPT.Ch.I,Decisionontheconfirmationofcharges,ICC01/04
01/10465Red,16December2011,para.107),16months(Prosecutorv.Ntaganda,ICCPT.Ch.
Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ICC01/0402/06309, 9 June 2014, para. 33) and 17
months(Katanga,ICCTr.Ch.II,Jugement rendu en application de larticle 74 du Statut,ICC
01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1217)areprotractedbutthismaynotsolelybedueto
thelengthoftheconflict.Otherfactorsplayaroleindecidingwhethertheconflicthasreached
therequiredintensity(seeCommentaryonsubparagraph(e)).
(2) Linked to the requirement that the armed group be organised: Directly referring to the
adjective protracted in subparagraph (f) the ICC explains that the organised armed group
musthavetheabilitytoplanandcarryoutmilitaryoperationsforaprolongedperiodoftime
(Lubanga,ICCPT.Ch.I,ICC01/040106803,29January2007,para.234(emphasisadded)
Mbarushimana, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC01/0401/10465
Red, 16 December 2011, para. 103 see also Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, Jugement rendu en
application de larticle 74 du Statut, ICC01/0401/073436, 7 March 2014, para. 1185
Lubanga, ICC T. Ch. I, Judgment, ICC0/0401/06, 14 March 2012, para. 536). This
interpretation is based on Article 1(1) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August1949,andrelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofNonInternationalArmedConflictsthat
requires the dissident armed forces to be able to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations, albeit decoupled from the requirement of territorial control, at odds with and the
Tadidefinitionofanarmedconflict(Tadi,ICTYApp.Ch.,DecisionontheDefenceMotionfor
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70). It must be added that the
wordsprolongedandprotractedhavebothbeentranslatedintoFrenchasprolongbutdo
notseemtohavebeengivenaspecifictemporalconnotation.
The Court has specifically mentioned that there is no requirement under the ICC Statute for the
armedgrouptoexertcontroloverapartoftheterritory(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuant
toArticle61(7)(a)and(b)oftheRomeStatuteontheChargesoftheProsecutoragainstJeanPierre
BembaGombo, ICC01/0501/08424, 15 June 2009, para. 236 Lubanga, ICC T. Ch. I, Judgment,
ICC0/0401/06, 14 March 2012, para. 536 Katanga, ICC Tr. Ch. II, Jugement rendu en application
delarticle74duStatut,ICC01/0401/073436,7March2014,para.1186).AsnotedbytheCourt
itself(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,ICC01/0501/0844,15June2009,para.236Lubanga,ICCT.Ch.I,
Judgment, ICC0/0401/06, 14 March 2012, para. 536) this clearly departs from Article 1(1) AP II.
That being said, territorial control is sometimes mentioned (e.g. Ntaganda, ICC PT. Ch. II, Decision
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against
BoscoNtaganda,ICC01/0402/06309,9June2014,para.34).Likewise,theCourthasspecifiedthat
thereisnoneedfortheorganisedarmedgrouptobeunderresponsiblecommand(Lubanga,ICCT.
Ch.I,Judgment,ICC0/0401/06,14March2012,para.536)despitereferringtothatrequirementin
theearliercaseofBemba(Bemba,ICCPT.Ch.II,DecisionPursuanttoArticle61(7)(a)and(b)ofthe
RomeStatuteontheChargesoftheProsecutoragainstJeanPierreBembaGombo,ICC01/0501/08
424,15June2009,para.234).
Crossreference:
Article8(2)(d)
Doctrine:
1.DapoAkande,ClassificationofArmedConflicts:RelevantLegalConcepts,ElizabethWilmhurst(Ed),
InternationalLawandtheClassificationofConflicts,3279,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2012.
2.MichaelBothe,WarCrimes,417418,AntonioCassese/PaolaGaeta/JohnR.W.D.Jones(eds),The
3. Antonio Cassese/Gaeta Paola, Casseses International Criminal Law, 6283, 3rd edition, Oxford
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10.SandeshSivakumaran,TheLawofNonInternationalArmedConflict,192195,OxfordUniversity
Press,Oxford,2014.
11.SylvainVit,TypologyofArmedConflictsinInternationalHumanitarianLaw:LegalConceptsand
ActualSituations,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross,vol91,(2009):6994.
12. Andreas Zimmermann, Preliminary Remarks on para. 2(c)(f) and para. 3: War crimes
Committed in an Armed Conflict not of an International Character' 475478 in Otto Triffterer,
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, C.H. Beck/Hart/Nomos,
Author:
NolleQunivet
Article8(3)
[148]3. Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall affect the responsibility of a Government
tomaintainorreestablishlawandorderintheStateortodefendtheunityandterritorial
integrityoftheState,byalllegitimatemeans.
Paragraph3isasavingclausetakenfromarticle3(1)ofthesecondadditionalprotocol.Theprovision
may justify legitimate actions taken on behalf of the Government of a State in which an internal
armed conflict is taking place and its armed forces, but not actions taken by nonstate groups. The
reference to "legitimate means" should be interpretated in a way that the saving clause does not
destroytheobjectandpurposeofsubparagraphs2(c)and(e).
Doctrine:
2.AndreasZimmermanatpp.287288,MN283288and339345inOttoTriffterer.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article8bis
[149]Crimeofaggression
A.Generalremarks
Thecrimeofaggressioncriminalizestheplanning,preparation,initiationandexecutionofaggressive
useofforcefromonestateagainstanother.Thecrimeofaggressionisaleadershipcrime,requiring
theperpetratortohavebeeninapowerfulpositioninthestatethatcommittedtheactofaggression.
UnlikeothercrimesintheRomeStatute,itiswithoutapplicationtoleadersofnonstategroups.The
Court will exercise jurisdiction of the crime of aggression in accordance with Articles 15 bis and 15
ter. The Definition of aggression in this Article is based largely on the Definition of Aggression
annexedtoUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyresolution3314(XXIX)of14December1974.
B.PreparatoryWorks
ThecrimeofaggressionhasbeenlistedasacrimeunderArticle5oftheRomeStatutesince1998,
but the Courts jurisdiction over the crime was made dependent on the Assembly of State Parties
(ASP) agreeing on a definition in accordance with the now deleted Article 5(2). In 2002 the ASP
decided to establish a Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA), which was to
submit proposed provisions to a future Review Conference [Resolution on Continuity of Work in
RespectoftheCrimeofAggression,2002].TheSWGCAdraftamendmentswerethestartingpointfor
thediscussionsattheKampalaReviewConferencein2010,whereArticles8bis,15bis,15terand25
(3)biswereadopted.
The main areas of controversy for the SWGCA, and later for the Review Conference, were the
definition of an act of aggression the individual conduct within the act and the exercise of
jurisdiction. The first two sets of issues are covered by this Article, whereas the question of
jurisdictionisdealtwithunderArticles15bisand15ter.
ThechallengefortheSWGCAwhendefiningactofaggressionforthepurposeoftheICCStatute
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was to find a definition inclusive enough to be effective, but narrow enough to exclude potentially
justifiable uses of force. It was also considered as important that it should remain close to the
definitionundercustomaryinternationallaw.
Actsofaggressionhavelongbeenheldtobegraveviolationsoftheprohibitionoftheuseofforce
asregulatedinArticle2(4)oftheUNCharter.Whileithasbeenagreedthatnotallactsprohibitedby
Article 2(4) constitute aggression, it has proven difficult to draw the line between aggression and
mere uses of force. This has not been made easier by the uncertainty surrounding the scope and
definition of prohibition of the use of force and its exceptions. However, despite
significantdisagreements,therearesomeusesofforcethatlieoutsideofthissphereofuncertainty
andithasbeenpossibletoreachatleastsomeagreementonhowtodefine'actofaggression.
In 1974, the General Assembly unanimously agreed on the definition of aggression annexed to
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 (hereafter 3314Definition), which sought to define
aggression for the purposes of determinations by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.Whilemostagreedthatthe3314Definitionwasthemosteffectivestartingpointforfindinga
definition of aggression for the purpose of this Statute, it was held to be problematic since it was
written for the determination of state acts rather than for individual criminal responsibility. It as
further questioned due to its ambiguity and questionable status as customary international law.
Despite suggestions to find a generic definition in customary international law on the crime of
aggression,ortoleavefortheSecurityCounciltodeterminewhetheranactofaggressionhadbeen
committed,thesolutionwastokeepthecorearticlesofthe3314DefinitioninArticle8bis(2)andto
contextualizethedefinitionforthepurposeoftheICCStatute[Barriga,2012,1820].
ThesecondsetofissuesfortheSWGCAtoconsiderwastheindividualelementsofthecrime.Asan
actofaggressiongenerallyiscommittedbyacollective,itisessentialtohavetoolstoascertainthat
every person is treated fairly in relation to his or her individual conduct. To agree on the individual
elementsprovedtobelessdifficultthanagreeingonadefinitionofactofaggression,partlybecause
the customary crime of aggression here could provide more guidance. While the requirements or a
perpetrator have been involved in 'the planning, preparation, initiation or execution' of the act, was
basedonArticle6aoftheCharteroftheInternationalMilitaryTribunalinNurembergwithexecution
beingheldtobeamodernsynonymofwaging,therewassomediscussiononthelevelofinfluence
that the leader needed to have over the acts of the state to be in a position to commit a crime of
aggression.Thecrimeofaggressionhashistoricallybeenaleadershipcrime,andwithfewexceptions
it was also widely held in the negotiations that its application should be limited to leaders of states,
ratherthanofnonstateentitiessuchasarmedrebelgroups[KressandHoltzendorff,2010,p.1090].
While the majority promoted the now adopted control or direct test, some favored the broader
powertoshapeorinfluencetestwhichwasheldtobemoreconsistentwiththecustomarydefinition
ofthecrimeofaggression[Heller,2007,p.479].
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(1)Crimeofaggression
[150]C.Analysisofprovisionandsubprovisions
1.ForthepurposeofthisStatute,crimeofaggression
Article8bis(1)istobereadtogetherwithArticle8bis(2),whichdefinesactofaggressionforthe
purposeofthisStatute.
Thefirstparagraphaimstodefinetherolethatapersonplayedintheactofaggressionandthe
level of power he or she had within the State. The wording in Article 8 bis (1) reflects that a
perpetratordoesnothavetotakepartofthewholeprocessfrombeginningtoend,butratherheor
she needs to have planned, prepared, initiated or executed the act. The conduct verbs are taken
directlyfromtheLondonChartersArticle6(a),aswellasfromtheICLDraftCodeonCrimesagainst
thePeaceandSecurityofMankind,withtheexemptionofexecution,whichhasreplacedwagingin
order to take into account the modernization of the language. In assessing the individual conduct,
Article 8 bis(1) should be read together with Article 25(3), 25(3) bis and Article 28, although the
latterhasbeenheldtobeveryunlikelytoapplyinpractice[McDougall,2013,p.184].
There is some uncertainty regarding the scope of the different modes of participation, and it has
been considered difficult to receive much guidance from the PostWorld War II Tribunals in
NurembergandTokyo,whichtookaverybroadapproachtotheinterpretationoftheseverbs.Itwill
befortheCourttomakeamoredetaileddeterminationofthenatureandscopeoftheconductverbs,
whiletakingintoaccountArticle22(2)incasesofambiguity.
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Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(1)Planning
[151]planning,
Theplanningofanactofaggressioncanforexampleconsistofparticipationinmeetingswhereplans
to attack another state are formulated. While it does not require the person to be alone in planning
the act, it seems not to be sufficient that a person in a powerful position has verbally supported a
plan that was already under way, unless in a way their conduct would be caught by Article 25(3)
[McDougall,2013,p.187].
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(1)Preparation
[152]preparation,
Thepreparationofanactofaggressionincludesawiderangeofactivitiesleadingtoastatehaving
the capacity and possibility to commit the act. This includes military, economic, and
diplomaticconductandcanforexampleconsistoftraditionalassemblingoftroopsonabordertothe
state to be attacked, as well as acts such as acquisition of weapons, and the liquidation of state
assets in order to fund such purchases when this is done for the purpose of committing the act of
aggression. It further includes diplomatic attempts to conceal the states intentions to gain military
advantagebeforeanattack[Shukri,2010,p.528UnitedStatesetalv.Gringetal,IMT,1October
1946,pp.108109].
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(1)Initiation
[153]initiation
The initiation of an act of aggression refers to the decision taken immediately before the act to
actuallymoveaheadandcommitit.Thiscoversdecisionsonastrategiclevel,butnotnecessarilyon
an operational or tactical level. It may for example criminalize the conduct of a defence minister,
militaryleader,orapresidentgivingfinalorderstocommittheact[Shukri,2010,p.528McDougall,
p.188].
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(1)Execution
[154]orexecution,
Theexecutionofanactofaggressionincludesdecisionstakenaftercommencementoftheact,such
as annexing occupied territory or to occupy territory after an initial aggressive act. This can
notably include conduct by persons who were not at all involved in the initial stages of the act
[McDougall,p.188].
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(1)Leadershipcrime
[155]byapersoninapositioneffectivelytoexercisecontroloverortodirectthepolitical
ormilitaryactionofaState,
The leadership requirement Article 8 bis (1) states that a perpetrator was a person in a position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of the State which
committed the act of aggression. That leaders can be convicted under the Rome Statute is not
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exclusive for the crime of aggression, but it is the only crime where the perpetrator has to be in a
leadershipposition.
In a position to effectively exercise requires the perpetrator to be in a de facto position, and
includesnotonlypeopleinformalpositions,butratheranyonewithacertainlevelofinfluenceover
theactofthestate.Italsoexcludesformalholdersofofficewhoarelackingrealpower.Suggested
examplesofnongovernmentalfigureswithdefactoinfluenceareprominentfiguresinbusinessand
religion. It should be noted, however, that the requirement that they should be in a position to
exercisecontroloverortodirectthepoliticalandmilitaryactionoftheStatehasbeenheldtobea
very high threshold for nonformal office holders, making it unlikely that it will apply to such actors
[McDougall,2013,p.181Heller,2007p.490Politi,2012p.285].
Therearesomeuncertaintiesastotheapplicationofthe'controlordirect'test.Whereas,theICJ,
withregardstoastateslevelofcontroloveranarmedgroup,hasappliedaneffectivecontroltest
inCaseConcerningMilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandAgainstNicaragua,(Nicaraguav.United
States of America), ICJ, Judgment, 27 June 1986 with regards to a states level of control over an
armed group, and used it again in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ,
Judgment, 26 February 2007, the ICTY instead preferred an overall control test in Prosecutor v.
Tadi,(CaseNoIT941A),ICTY,Judgment,15July1999.Itremainstobeseentowhatextentthe
CourtwilltakeguidancefromthesejudgementswhenapplyingthecontrolortodirecttestinArticle
8bis(1).
A further requirement under this paragraph is that a perpetrator needs to have had the certain
positioninthestatewhichcommittedtheactofaggression,andincaseswhereanentitiesstatusasa
statewillneedtobedecidedupon,itwillbefortheCourttodoso.Theexclusionofnonstateactors
from the crime of aggression is an important difference from the other crimes in the Statute, and
despitebeingalargelyundisputedsolutionithasbeencriticizedfornotaccountingfortherealityof
contemporaryusesofforce[Weisbord,2009,p.7].
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(1)Character,gravityandscale
[156]ofanactofaggressionwhich,byitscharacter,gravityandscale,
According to Understanding 7, the three components of character, gravity and scale must be
sufficienttojustifyamanifestdetermination,andthepresenceofonecomponentwillnotsufficeon
its own [Resolutions RC/Res.6, Annex III, Understanding 7]. While some argue that the and in
character, gravity and scale should be read as though they all must reach the manifest violation
threshold, the majority holds as sufficient that two of the three components are present, as long as
they together are strong enough to satisfy the standard [McDougall, 2013, pp. 128130 Kress and
vonHoltzendorff,2010,p.1207].
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(1)Manifestviolationandmensrea
[157]constitutesamanifestviolationoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations.
In order for a crime of aggression to have been committed, an act of aggression as defined in
Paragraph 2 must have constituted a manifest violation of theUNCharter by its character, gravity
and scale. According to the drafted elements, this is an objective qualification, and the subjective
experienceofthevictimstateasamanifestviolationisnotsufficient.Astheelementsalsostatethat
anyoftheactsreferredtoinArticle8bis(2),qualifyasanactofaggression,therehasbeensome
debateastowhetherornotthemanifestviolationrequirementchangesthethresholdcomparedto
the3314Definition of Aggression, and compared to customary international law. Some argue that
sincethe3314Definitionalreadyhasahighthreshold,andasonlygraveviolationsoftheprohibition
of the use of force constitutes aggression under jus ad bellum, it is not inconsistent with the law
applicable on state conduct to require a violation to be manifest. Others similarly suggest that the
manifestviolationrequirementisasafeguardtomakesuretoexcludegreyareasofthelawonthe
useofforce,especiallywithregardstoHumanitarianIntervention[OConnellandNiyazmatov,2012,
pp. 203204 Cryer et al., 2014, p. 321]. The influence of discussions on Humanitarian Intervention
canalsobeseeninUnderstanding6,whichstatesthatadeterminationofanactofaggressionshall
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take into consideration the circumstances of each particular case, including the gravity of the acts
concernedandtheirconsequences,inaccordancewiththeCharteroftheUnitedNations[Resolutions
RC/Res.6,AnnexIII,Understanding6].WhileasuggestiontohaveanexplicitexclusionHumanitarian
Intervention failed to gain support of the majority, this understanding aims to exclude acts with
positivehumanitarianconsequences.Itshouldbenotedthatthelegalvalueoftheunderstandingsin
AnnexIIIiscontested,andalthoughitseemstobeclearthattheyarenotconsideredtobepartof
the text of the Rome Statute itself, there is disagreement on to what extent they bind the Court
[Heinsch,2010,p.729730Heller,2012,pp.230231McDougall,2013,pp.113119VanSchaack,
2011, p. 487]. According to some scholars the understandings are purely suggestions for
interpretation,whereasothersholdthemaspartofthecontextinwhichthecrimeofaggressionare
tobeinterpreted.ItremainstobeseenhowtheywillbetreatedbytheCourt.
Another grey area of jus ad bellum is the right to anticipatory selfdefense. Despite some still
arguingArticle51oftheUNCharterrequirestheactualoccurrenceofanarmedattack,andthatthe
adoption of the Article overrode the previous customary right to anticipatory selfdefense, there is
growingacceptanceoftherighttouseforceinanticipatoryselfdefenseaslongasitisconductedas
alastresortwherenopeacefulmeansareavailable[Wilmshurst,2005,pp.45].Thus,itispossible
thatanticipatoryselfdefenseadheringtotheprincipleofnecessityandconductedinaproportionate
mannerwillnotbeconsideredamanifestviolationoftheCharterrules.
Mensrea
ThemensrearequirementisfoundinArticle30withsomeclarifyingnotesontheinterpretationwith
regardstotheCrimeofAggressioninAnnexII.Thereisnorequirementtoprovethattheperpetrator
has made a legal evaluation as to whether or not the use of armed force was inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations [Resolution RC/Res.6, 2010, Annex II, Paragraph 2]. There is also
noneedtoprovethattheperpetratorhasmadealegalevaluationastothemanifestnatureofthe
violationofthe Charter of the United Nations. [Resolution RC/Res.6, 2010, Annex II, Paragraph 4].
Whatisrequiredisthattheperpetratorwasawareofthefactualcircumstancesthatestablishedthat
theuseofarmedforcewasnotonlyinconsistentwith,butalsoamanifestviolationof,theUNCharter
[ResolutionRC/Res.6,2010,AnnexII,Elements5and6].Amistakeoffactleadingtoalackofmens
reaisagroundforexcludingcriminalresponsibilityinaccordancewithArticle32.
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(2)
[158]2.Forthepurposeofparagraph1,actofaggressionmeanstheuseofarmedforce
byaStateagainstthesovereignty,territorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofanother
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of
the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United
Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act
ofaggression:
Article 8 bis(2) defines act of aggression for the purpose of the Rome Statute. In deciding what
constitutes an act of aggression, the Paragraph relies heavily on Article 1 and 3 of the 3314
DefinitionandshouldbereadtogetherwithArticle8bis(1),whichrequirestheacttobeamanifest
violationoftherulesoftheUNCharter.Althoughtherehasbeensomediscussiononhowtointerpret
theinsertionofinaccordancewithResolution3314, this is not held to mean that the parts of the
3314Definition that are not repeated in Article8bis(2) are directly applicable to the Court [Kress
andHoltzendorff,2010,p.1191].
The examples of acts of aggression listed in Article 3 of the 3314Definition and in the present
Paragraph, have previously been criticised for not being consistent with the definition of aggression
under customary international law. While there seem to be little debate on whether occupation
followingamilitaryintervention,bombardmentofanotherstatesterritory,aswellasthesendingof
armed groups to use substantial force on another states territory, all constitute aggression under
customary international law, other acts such as the allowance of territory to be used for act of
aggression against third state are held to be more uncertain [JudgeKooijimans and Judge Elaraby
Separate opinions, Armed Activities Case, ICJ, 19 December 2005]. This is not problematic with
regards to State Parties, though it can create a potential defense for individuals from nonState
Parties,whereasituationhasbeenreferredtotheCourtbytheSecurityCouncilinaccordancewith
Article 15 ter[Milanovic, 2012, pp. 174175]. While the adoptation of Article 8 bis strengthens the
statusofthelistedexamplesasactsofaggressionundercustomaryinternationallaw,especiallyifit
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is ratified by a high number of states, this is not necessarily sufficient to change the customary
definition.
EventhoughdeterminationsofanactofaggressionarenotbindingupontheCourt,inaccordance
with Article 15 bis (9) and Article 15 ter (4), determinations by the Security Council and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) can still serve as great guidance for the ICC when assessing
whether an act of aggression has been committed. Yet, it is important to remain careful when
interpreting judgments and decisions of acts of aggression by the Security Council and the ICJ, as
theyaremadeinthecontextofjusadbellum,ratherthanunderinternationalcriminallaw.Itisoften
notnecessaryfortheSecurityCounciltodeterminewhethertherehasbeenanactofaggression,as
itissufficientthatithasbeenathreatorbreachtothepeaceinaccordancewithArticle39oftheUN
Charter for the full spectrum of Chapter VII measures to be available for the Council. That the
Security Council or the ICJ has labelled an act as unlawful 'use of force' or 'threat or breach of the
peace' rather than act of aggression should therefore not be taken as a negative determination of
whetheranactofaggressionhasbeencommitted.
The definition of acts as 'armed attacks' for the purpose of Article 51 of the UN Charter might
providesomeguidance.TheICJhasreferredtothe3314Definitionindeterminingwhethertherehas
beenanarmedattackgivingrighttoselfdefensebothinNicaraguaandinDemocraticRepublicofthe
Congov.Uganda[Nicaragua,ICJ,27June1986ArmedActivitiesontheterritoryofCongo,ICJ,19
December2005].Itshouldbenoted,however,thatwhiletheICJhasusedthe3314Definitionwhen
assessingtheexistenceofanarmedattack,therelationshipbetweenactofaggressionandarmed
attack is contested. Many consider the difference between act of aggression and armed attack to
bepurelycontextual[OConnellandNiyazmatove,2012,p.198],whereasothersholdthatanarmed
attack triggering a right to selfdefense does not always constitute an act of aggression [Ruys,
2010,p.139].
ThoughtherewasinitiallysomediscussionofwhetherornotthelistinArticle8bis(2)shouldbe
considered exhaustive, the list is by most read as open ended, a view supported by the wording in
theArticle.However,asregardsallcrimes,careshallstillbetakeninaccordancewiththeprincipleof
Nullum Crime sine Lege, found in Article 22 of the Statute [McDougall, 2013, p. 103 Kress and
Holzendorff,2010,p.1191].
OneareaofparticularinterestswithregardstothereadingofthelistinthisParagraphisthatof
cyberattacks.Sincesuchattacksdonotfitdirectlywithanyoftheexamplesgiveninthelistbelow,it
has been suggested that they might be covered under Article 8 bis with the use of analogy, or
alternatively through the application of a broad interpretation of armed attack to include cases
whereacyberattackisamanifestviolationoftherulesoftheUNCharter[Weisbord,2009,pp.19
20].ItistobeseenwhichapproachtheCourtwilltaketocyberattacksinthefuture.
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(2)(a)
[159](a)The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or
attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part
thereof
Invasionbyarmedforces,militaryoccupation,orannexationofterritorythroughtheuseofforceare
uncontroversial types of aggression. It has, however, been suggested that the requirement for an
occupation to follow from an armed attack is limiting and would exclude occupation following from
threatsandothercoercivemeans[McDougall,2013,p.76].
The General Assembly explicitly referred to Article 3(a) of the 3314 Definition in a series of
Resolutions from 1981 to 1992, when holding that Israels occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights
constitutedanactofaggression.Italsoreferredtothe3314DefinitionofAggressionregardingSouth
AfricasoccupationofNamibiain1982[GeneralAssemblyResolution37/43,3December1982].
The Security Council, which often avoids the term aggression, has used it on a number of
occasions such as Resolution 546 (1984) 6 January 1984 regarding the military occupation and
bombings by South Africa in Angola and Resolution 424 on Sothern Rhodesias invasion of Zambia
[SecurityCouncilResolution424,17March1978].
EventhoughtheSecurityCouncildidnotdescribeIraqsinvasionofKuwaitin1990,asaggression,
but merely as an illegal use of force triggering the need for collective action, [Security Council
Resolution 660 2 August 1990], the invasion is still widely held as an act of aggression [Cassese,
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2007,p.845].ThesameistruefortheinvasionofFalklandIslandsbyArgentinain1982,whichwas
deemedabreachofpeacebytheSecurityCouncilinResolution502,3April1982.
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(2)(b)
[160](b)BombardmentbythearmedforcesofaStateagainsttheterritoryofanotherState
ortheuseofanyweaponsbyaStateagainsttheterritoryofanotherState
The use of any weapons against the territory of another state which meets the criteria of manifest
violationinArticle8bis(1),consistutesanactofaggression.Therearenumerousexamplesofacts
deemed as aggression that would fall under this section if the Court held them to be sufficiently
severe.SomeexamplesaretheIsraelibombingoftheOsiraknuclearreactorinIraq1981[General
Assembly Resolution 36/27, 13 November 1981], the attacks by Southern Rhodesia into Zambia
[Security Council Resolution 424, 17 March 1978], and the air raid by Israel over Tunisia [Security
CouncilResolution573,4October1985].
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(2)(c)
[161] (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another
State
A blockade of ports and coasts are activities that halt the maritime transport to and from another
state. A common example of this is the presence of warships controlling traffic in and out of a
harbourorofcoastal,territorialwaters,aswellastheminingofaharbourstoppingboatsandships
fromenteringorleaving.TwoexamplesofblockadearethosebytheUSofCubaduringtheMissile
Crisis1962andagainoftheDominicanRepublicin1965[Glennon,2010,p.93].
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(2)(d)
[162](d)AnattackbythearmedforcesofaStateontheland,seaorairforces,ormarine
andairfleetsofanotherState
This subparagraph regards the attack of the forces or fleets of a state, even where they are
stationedin,orintransitthrough,athirdstate.Thereisnosetrequirementforthelevelofdamage,
orforthesizeoftheforceorfleetthatissubjectforattack,inorderforthisprovisiontoapply.The
ICJ has not ruled out the possibility for the destruction of a 'single military vessel' to constitute an
'armed attack' for the purpose of Article 51 of the UN Charter [Oil platform case, ICJ, 6 November
2003, para 72]. It has, however, been suggested that the use of the term 'fleets' in this provision
aimstoexcludeattacksonasingle,orasmallgroupof,commercialvessels[Dinstein,2011,p.217].
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(2)(e)
[163](e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another
StatewiththeagreementofthereceivingState,incontraventionoftheconditionsprovided
for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the
terminationoftheagreement
Article8bis(2)(e)isapplicableinsituationswhereaStateinitiallyhasconsentedtothepresenceof
the armed forces of another state, but where the second state either overstays its welcome, or in
other ways uses its armed forces in breach of this agreement. A contravention of conditions can
includebothgeographicalscopeandactivities[ArmedActivitiesCase,ICJ,19December2005].
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Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(2)(f)
[164](f)TheactionofaStateinallowingitsterritory,whichithasplacedatthedisposalof
anotherState,tobeusedbythatotherStateforperpetratinganactofaggressionagainsta
thirdState
Thisprovisionestablishesresponsibilitywhereastatehasapprovedtheuseofitsterritorybyanother
stateforthepurposeofattackingathirdstate.Theprovisionhasbeencriticisedforconfusingtheuse
offorcewithassistanceoftheuseofforceinthemeansofstateaction[McDougall,2013,p.76].It
shouldbenotedthatactsunderthisprovisionalsoincludescaseswhereastateallowsanotherstate
toattackathirdstatesforcesorfleetsasregulatedunderArticle8bis(2)(d).
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article8bis(2)(g)
[165] The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as
toamounttotheactslistedabove,oritssubstantialinvolvementtherein.
Article 8 bis(2)(g) regulates indirect aggression, where a state instead of using its armed troops
uses armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries to conduct the act of aggression. Similar
provisionscanbefoundintheFriendlyRelationsDeclarationof1970,aswellasintheILCDraftCode
on Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind of 1954. The inclusion of both groups and
mercenaries shows that the aims of the group, whether political, ideological or economical, are
unimportantfortheapplicationofthisstatutewhatmatteristheextenttowhichthestateinquestion
hascontrolovertheiractions.
Whilemanyviolentactivitiesbynonstateactorsdonotmeettherequirementofgravityandscale,
this section asserts that when they do, a state controlling the nonstate actor should not avoid
responsibilitybecauseitsowntroopsdidnotconducttheviolentact[Weisbord,2009,p.13].Further,
whileitisuncommonfornonstateactorstocommitactsthatinthemselvesmeetthethresholdforan
act of aggression, the ICJ has held that a series of incidents breaching the prohibition of the use of
force can collectively amount to an armed attack. This might provide some guidance for the
interpretationofthissubparagraph[Dinstein.2005,p.202ArmedActivitiesCase,ICJ,19December
2005,para146].
Withregardtoattribution,theICJ,inNicaragua,inventedandappliedtheeffectivecontroltestin
examiningtherequiredlevelofcontrolforactionsbeingattributableforthestate[Nicaragua,ICJ,27
June1986].ThetestwaslaterrejectedbytheICTYinTadicwhichfavoredatestofoverallcontrol
sinceitheldtheeffectivecontroltesttolackflexibility,butwasreinforcedbytheICJintheGenocide
Casein2007,thenacknowledgingtheimportanceofflexibilityastothecircumstancesofeachcase
[Tadic, ICTY, 15 July 1999 Genocide Case, ICJ, 26 February 2007]. The alternative basis or
substantial involvement therein seems to open up for less direct involvement in the activities of an
armedgroup,andincludeactivitiessuchasfinancing,providingofarmsorothermeans,andtraining.
SuchactivitiesfailedtomeetthethresholdforanarmedattackinNicaragua,whichwascriticizedin
thedissentingopinionofJudgeSchwebelforfailingtoaccountfortherealitiesoftheuseofforcein
international relations. It remains to be seen how the ICC will interpret substantial involvement in
relationtotherequirementsinArticle8bis(1).
Crossreferences
Article5(1)(d),15bis,15terand25(3)bis
Doctrine
1. Stefan Barriga, Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression, Stefan Barriga/Claus
Kress, (ed), The Traveaux Preparatoires of the Crime of Aggression, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge,2012,pp.357
2.Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, third edition,
CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2014,p.321
3. Yorah Dinstein, War, Aggression and SelfDefence, fifth edition, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge,2011,p.217
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4.MichaelGlennon, The BlankProse Crime of Aggression, Yale Journal of International Law, vol 35
(2010):71114
5. Robert Heinsch, The Crime of Aggression After Kampala: Success or Burden for the Future?
GoettingenJournalofInternationalLaw,vol2,2(2010):713743
6. Kevin Jon Heller, The Uncertain Legal Status of the Aggression Understandings, Journal of
InternationalCriminalJustice,vol10(2012):229248
7. Kevin Jon Heller, Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership Requirement in the Crime of
Aggression,EuropeanJournalofInternationalLaw,vol18(2007):477497
8. Claus Kress/Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression,
JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice,vol8,5(2010):11791217
9.CarrieMcDougall, The Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2013,pp.76,103,113119,128130,181,184,187
188
10.MarkoMilanovic, Aggression and Legality Custom in Kampala, Journal of International Criminal
Justice,vol10(2012):165187
11.Mary Ellen OConnell/Mirakmal Niyazmatov, What is Aggression? Comparing the Jus ad Bellum
andtheICCStatute,JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice,vol10(2012):189207
12.MauroPoliti,TheICCandtheCrimeofAggression:ADreamthatCameThroughandtheReality
Ahead,JournalofInternationalCriminalJustice,vol10(2012):267288
13. Tom Ruys, Armed attack and Article 51 of the UN Charter, Evolutions in Customary Law and
Practice,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2010,p.139
14.Muhammad Aziz Shukri, Individual Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression, Bellelli,
Roberto(ed),InternationalCriminalJusticeLawandPractciefromtheRomeStatutetoItsReview,
519545,AshgatePublishing,Farnham,2010
15. Beth Van Schaack, Crime of Aggression and Humanitarian Intervention on Behalf of Women,
InternationalCriminalLawReview,vol11(2011):477494
16.NoahWeisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression , Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law,
vol20(2009):148
17.ElisabetWilmshurst,PrinciplesofInternationalLawontheUseofForcebyStatesinSelfDefence,
ChathamHouse,ILPWP05/01,2005,pp.45
Author:
MarieAronsson
Article9(1)
[166]ElementsofCrimes
1.ElementsofCrimesshallassisttheCourtintheinterpretationandapplicationofarticles
6, 7, 8 and 8 bis. They shall be adopted by a twothirds majority of the members of the
AssemblyofStatesParties
The main purpose of the Elements of Crime is to define the crimes with clarity, precision and
specificityinordertomeettheprincipleoflegality,requiredforbycriminallaw.
In both civil and common law systems a crime consists of material elements (the objective
requirements, the actus reaus) and mental elements (the subjective requirements: intent and/or
knowledge,ormensrea).
TheElementsofCrimeincludematerialelementsofthreedifferenttypes,whichrelatetoconduct,
consequenceandcircumstance(seereferenceinarticle30).
Unlessotherwiseprovided,article30providesthementalrequirement.Thus,theprincipalmental
elementsintheElementsofCrimestemfromarticle30.
Thewording"shallassisttheCourt"makesclearthenonbindingnatureoftheElementsofCrime.
TheprovisionappearstocontradictArticle21(1)(a)whichstatesthat:"TheCourtshallapply:Inthe
firstplace,thisStatute,ElementsofCrimeanditsRulesofProcedureandEvidence".However,inlight
ofthenegotiatinghistory,theElementsofCrimeshouldbeunderstoodtohaveonlypersuasivevalue
ratherthanbindingforce.
The present provision should be contrasted to article112(7)(a) which states that: "Decisions on
matters of substance must be approved by a twothirds majority of those present and voting
providedthatanabsolutemajorityofStatesPartiesconstitutesthequorumforvoting."Thewording
of Article 9(1) makes it clear that a twothirds majority of the total members of the Assembly of
StatesParties,notjusttheStatespresentandvoting,isrequiredfortheadoptionoftheElementsof
Crime.
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Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article9(2)(a)
[167]2.AmendmentstotheElementsofCrimesmaybeproposedby:(a)AnyStateParty
TherightforanyStatePartytoproposeanamendmenttoatreatystemsfromthesovereignequality
ofStates.ItshouldbenotedthattheElementsofCrimearesubjecttoadifferentprocedurethanthe
onedesigneddesignedforamendmentsoftheRomeStatute.
Itisnotspecifiedinregulation5(1)whetherproposalsfromStatePartiesshouldbesubmittedto
theAdvisoryCommitteeonLegalTexts.ItappearslikelythataStatePartywouldsubmitaproposal
foranamendmenttoanorganoftheAssemblyofStatesParties.Onealternativewouldbetoadopt
the same procedure as used for amendments of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rule 3),
wherebyStatePartiessubmittheirproposalstothePresidentoftheBureauoftheAssemblyofStates
Parties.
Crossreferences:
Regulation5(1)AmendmentstotheRulesandElementsofCrime
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article9(2)(b)
[168](b)Thejudgesactingbyanabsolutemajority
Providedthatthereare18judges,anabsolutemajorityrequiresthesupportof10judges.According
toregulation5(1)anyproposalforamendmentstotheElementsofCrimepursuanttoarticle9shall
besubmittedbyajudgetotheAdvisoryCommitteeonLegalTexts.
Crossreferences:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article9(2)(c)1
[169](c)TheProsecutor.
In contrast to proposals from the Judges, the use of the word "may" instead of "shall" in regulation
5(1)appeartoindicatethatproposalsforamendmentstotheElementsofCrimecanbesubmittedby
theProsecutorbothtotheAdvisoryCommitteeonLegalTextsandtheappropriateorganofthethe
AssemblyofStatesParties.
Crossreferences:
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article9(2)(c)2
[170]Such amendments shall be adopted by a twothirds majority of the members of the
AssemblyofStatesParties.
TheprocedureforamendingtheElementsofCrime is identical for the procedure of the adoption of
theElementsofCrimestatedinparagraph1. Thus, it is clear that a twothirds majority of the total
membersoftheAssemblyofStatesParties,notjusttheStatespresentandvoting,isrequiredforthe
amendmentoftheElementsofCrime.
Author:
MarkKlamberg
Article9(3)
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[171] 3. The Elements of Crimes and amendments thereto shall be consistent with this
Statute.
ThepresentprovisionindicatestherelationbetweentheRomeStatuteandtheElementsofCrimeis
lexsuperiorderogatlegiinferiori,ratherthanlexposteriorderogatlegiprori.Inotherwords,inthe
event of an conflict between the RomeStatute and the Elements of Crime, the Rome Statute shall
prevail.Thus,thenonbindingnatureoftheElementsofCrimeisaffirmed.
Doctrine:
1.ErkinGadirovatpp.289312inOttoTriffterer.
2.HermanvonHebelandMariaKeltatpp.714inRoyS.Lee,2001.
3.AlainPelletpp.10591062and10771078inAntonioCassese/PaolaGaeta/JohnR.W.D.Jones.
Author:MarkKlamberg
Article10
[172]NothinginthisPartshallbeinterpretedaslimitingorprejudicinginanywayexisting
ordevelopingrulesofinternationallawforpurposesotherthanthisStatute.
Article 10 has no heading that would enlighten the purpose of the provision or clarify its content.
When draft Article Y eventually adopted as Article 10 was suggested, it was namely envisaged
that the provision could be a subparagraph to Article 5 (enumerating the crimes within the
jurisdictionoftheCourt)andassuchitwouldnothaveneededaheading.[UNDoc.A/CONF.183/2,p.
20. See further Triffterer, 2008, p. 532]. The formulation for purposes other than this Statute,
however,givesforththattheprovisionwasadoptedtoaffectthestatusgiventopart2oftheRome
StatuteoutsidetheICCcontext.AccordingtoSadat,thedesirewastoensurethatthecodificationof
[...] international criminal law in the ICC Statute would not negatively impact either the existing
customary international framework or the development of new customary law [Sadat, 2000, pp.
910911].DraftArticleYhencemadetheICCnegotiationseasierbyemphasizingthatthegoalofthe
negotiations was to adopt crime definitions for the purpose of ICC proceedings only and not to
influenceinternationallawmoregenerally.Article10isthusanarticlethatpostulatestheexistence
oftwo[...]regimesorcorporaofinternationalcriminallaw[Cassese,1999,p.157],thatis,anICC
regimeandacustomaryinternationallawregime.
While there is general agreement that the pivotal function of draft Article Y was to preserve
existinginternationallawinsituationswheretheICCStatutefellshortofit(mostnotablyinrelationto
warcrimes),therearedifferentopinionsabouttheextenttowhichthegoalalsowastopreventother
typesoflegalchanges.Inthisregard,Sadathasheldthattheframersapparentlyintendedthatonly
therestrictiveportionsofthedefinitionsofthecrimeswouldremainlockedwithintheICCstructure,
not more progressive elements [Sadat, 2000, p. 918]. Bennouna, on his part, has argued that the
aimofArticle10wasnotonlytoprotectthepositionofthecountriesfavouringabroaderdefinition
of war crimes, but also to hinder unease among those adhering to a more restrictive definition of
crimesagainsthumanity[Bennouna,2002,p.1102].Bennouna'sinterpretationfindssupportinthe
fact that the provision does not only address existing rules of international law, but also applies to
developingrules.Sadat's,ontheotherhand,inthatthearticleonlyreferstolimitingorprejudicing
interpretation[Sadat,2002,p.269].Whilethedraftersintentionwiththeprovisionisopentodebate,
thepresentauthorfindsSadat'sinterpretationtobemorefunctionalfromacontextualperspectivein
thatitentailsthatinternationalcriminallawisnotunnecessarilyfragmented.Topreservetheunityof
international criminal law is namely important in that the ICC may have jurisdiction over individuals
basedonSecurityCouncilreferralsofsituations[Article13]inwhichcasesitisproblematiciftheICC
lawdepartsfromcustomaryinternationallaw[seefurtherMilanovi,2011,p.25ff.,andSadat,2002,
pp. 262 and 269271]. It should also be noted that when amendments to the ICC Statute were
adoptedin2010,includingadefinitionofthecrimeofaggression,anunderstandingwasattachedto
the amendment in which it was reaffirmed that the crime of aggression also can be prosecuted in
relation to situations referred by the Security Council. At the same time, however, Article 10 is
mentionedinrelationtodomesticjurisdictionoverthecrimeofaggression,anditisemphasizedthat
the ICC definition of the crime has been accepted "for the purpose of [..., the] Statute only."
[ResolutionRC/Res.6,AnnexIII].Assuch,theunderstandingsendsaconflictingmessageaboutthe
customarylawrelevanceofICClawanddoesnotreallyanswerhowArticle10shouldbeinterpreted.
ThefactthatthearticlesprimaryaddresseesareactorsoutsidetheCourtmakesitnecessaryto
ask to what extent such actors are bound to follow provisions in the ICC Statute. It is, for sure,
possible to have treaty provisions explaining the drafters intentions and to try to influence
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interpretations (see also Articles22(3), 25(4) and 80). This being said, the behaviour of States in
connectiontothenegotiationandratificationofinternationaltreatiesplaysacentralrolewhenState
practice and opinio juris are assessed in connection to customary international law. As such, the
participationofnumerousStatesintheICCnegotiationsandtheirsubsequentratificationoftheRome
Statuteissomethingthatcannotbecompletelyignoredwhenthecontentofcustomaryinternational
lawisconsidered[seee.g.,Bennouna,2002,p.1106].ThesamealsoappliestoStatebehaviourin
treaty amendment procedures. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the case law of many
internationalandregionalcourtscontainreferencestoPart2oftheICCStatute[forsuchreferences,
seeSchabas,2010,p.271].IntheFurundijacase,aTrialChamberoftheICTYexplicitlycommented
uponthelegalrelevanceofArticle10andfoundthat:
[The Rome Statute] was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the States attending the
Rome Diplomatic Conference and was substantially endorsed by the General Assemblys Sixth
Committeeon26November1998.InmanyareastheStatutemayberegardedasindicativeof
the legal views, i.e. opinio juris of a great number of States. Notwithstanding article10ofthe
Statute, the purpose of which is to ensure that existing or developing law is not limited or
prejudicedbytheStatutesprovisions,resortmaybehadcumgranosalistotheseprovisions
to help elucidate customary international law. Depending on the matter at issue, the Rome
Statutemaybetakentorestate,reflectorclarifycustomaryrulesorcrystallisethem,whereas
insomeareasitcreatesnewlawormodifiesexistinglaw.Atanyevent,theRomeStatuteby
andlargemaybetakenasconstitutinganauthoritativeexpressionofthelegalviewsofagreat
number of States. [Prosecutor v Furundija, ICTY T. Ch., 10 December 1998, para. 227. See
alsoCryer,2006,p.251]
The case law of the various international and regional courts has made Schabas submit that
article 10 appears to be largely ignored by the very bodies to whom it is directed, namely
specializedtribunalsengagedintheinterpretationofinternationallaw[Schabas,2010,p.271].
As Article10 of the Rome Statute primarily is directed to actors outside the Court, it is rarely
mentioned in the case law of the ICC. In the Al Bashir case, the majority of the PreTrial Chamber,
however, found that the article becomes meaningful insofar as it provides that the definition of the
crimesintheStatuteandtheElementsofCrimesshallnotbeinterpretedaslimitingorprejudicingin
any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.
[Prosecutor v Al Bashir, ICC PT. Ch., 4 March 2009, para. 127]. What the judges exactly meant by
thisreferencetoArticle10isnotevidenttothepresentcommentator.Schabas,however,interprets
thepronouncementtomeanthatthejudgesheldthatArticle10supportedtheirclaimthatitwasnot
necessarytotakeintoconsiderationcustomaryinternationallawwheninterpretingtheICCprovision
on genocide [Schabas, 2011, p. 93]. Furthermore, Article 10 has been mentioned in a dissenting
opinionbyJudgeKaul,wherehefoundthatArticle10reinforcestheassumptionthatthedraftersof
the Statute may have deliberately deviated from customary rules [Situation in the Republic of
Kenya,ICCPT.Ch.(Diss.Op.Kaul),ICC01/0919,31March2010,para.32].Asnotedabove,Article
10indeedenvisagesafragmentedinternationalcriminallaw.
Finally,itshouldbenotedthatArticle10limitsitsapplicabilitytothisPartreferringtopart2of
the Rome Statute containing provisions on jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law. The
international crimes definitions are placed in Part2, but, for example, the provisions on individual
criminal responsibility and grounds for excluding criminal responsibility are situated elsewhere (in
Part3).ThisgivesrisetothequestionoftowhatextenttheimplicationsoftheRomeStatuteonthe
existing or developing rules of international law are different in other parts of the Statute. In this
regard,TrifftererhasarguedthatthelegalprincipleenshrinedinArticle10isapplicabletothewhole
Statute.Hebaseshisargumentofthedraftingprocessoftheprovision:
by its drafting process it may be assumed that a limiting or prejudicing interpretation of all
articles outside Part 2, adopted as a compromise or those describing a status quo, should
equally not bar the interpretation of existing or developing rules of international law for
purposesotherthanthisStatute.Thisgoeswithoutsaying,forinstance,withregardtoarticle
25[onindividualcriminalresponsibility.][Triffterer,2008,p.535,seealsop.537]
While a detailed analysis of the relationship between customary international law and the Rome
Statuteliesbeyondthescopeofthiscommentary,thefollowingshouldbenoted:Firstly,Part3ofthe
RomeStatutecontainsaprovisionsimilartoArticle10,namelyArticle22(3),whichstipulatesthatthe
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nullum crimen sine lege provision shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal
under international law independently of the Statute [on the relationship between Article 10
and22(3), see Broomhall, 2008, p. 726, and Lamb, 2002, p. 754]. Secondly, when it comes to the
modesofresponsibilityandgroundsforexcludingcriminalresponsibility,itisgenerallyacceptedthat
customary international law and ICC law do not always concur. For example, in connection to
commissionresponsibility,theICChasnotadoptedthejointcriminalenterprisedoctrineoftheadhoc
tribunals[Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC PT. Ch., 29 January 2007, paras 329, 335 and 338] and the
ICTY,onitspart,hasfoundthatcoperpetratorshipresponsibilitylaICCArticle25(3)(a)doesnot
havesupportincustomaryinternationallaw[ProsecutorvStaki,ICTYA.Ch.,22March2006,paras
59and62].As,however,thetodayfunctioningadhocinternationalcriminaltribunalsprimarilyhave
addressed atrocities that have occurred before the adoption of the Rome Statute, these tribunals
havenothadanyreasontoindetailconsidertowhatextent,ifany,theStatePracticeinconnection
to the adoption and ratification of the Rome Statute, or its amendment procedures, have changed
customaryinternationallaw.
Crossreferences:
Articles21(3)and22(3)
Doctrine:
1.MohamedBennouna,TheStatutesRulesonCrimesandExistingorDevelopingInternationalLaw,
Cassese,Antonioetal.(Eds.),TheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt:ACommentary,
VolumeII,11011107,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2002
2.BruceBroomhall,Article22,NullumCrimenSineLege,OttoTriffterer(Ed.), Commentary on the
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Author:
MikaelaHeikkil
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proposed provisions to a future Review Conference [Resolution on Continuity of Work in Respect of

dlivrance dun mandat darrt lencontre de Germain Katanga, ICC01/0401/074tFRA, 6 July

7.AnneMarie L.M. de Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence, Intersentia,

Confirmation of Charges, ICC01/0401/06803, 29 January 2007, paras 236327), 12 months

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