Professional Documents
Culture Documents
(1) (Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681, December 02, 1991)
(4) (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, 83815, February 22, 1991)
(12) (Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, 209135, 209136, 209155, 209164, 209260, 209442,
209517, 209569, July 01, 2014)
(52) National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama Patterson 357 U.S.
449
(58) (Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 208493, 209251, L-20768, November 19, 2013)
3 | HR_Chapter7_Readings
and
employees
in
5 | HR_Chapter7_Readings
6 | HR_Chapter7_Readings
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification abovestated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive
Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void
and is accordingly set aside.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea,
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sarmiento and Grio-Aquino, JJ., took no part.
submitted
several
(Syjuco)
Certiorari, Prohibition
(Luna)
Certiorari
and
(Villegas)
Certiorari
and
(PHILCONSA)
(IBP)
(Araullo)
Certiorari and
Prohibition
Certiorari
AcEIHC
and
(Belgica) Certiorari
(COURAGE) Certiorari
and
(VACC)
and
Certiorari
Congress
concomitantly
determines
the
jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon its
creation,
becomes
by
operation
of
the
Constitution one of the repositories of judicial
power. 25 However, only the Court is a
constitutionally created court, the rest being
created by Congress in its exercise of the
legislative power.
The Constitution states that judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice not only
"to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable"
but also "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." It
has thereby expanded the concept of judicial
power, which up to then was confined to its
traditional ambit of settling actual controversies
involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable.
The background and rationale of the expansion of
judicial power under the 1987 Constitution were
laid out during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission by Commissioner
Roberto R. Concepcion (a former Chief Justice of
the Philippines) in his sponsorship of the
proposed provisions on the Judiciary, where he
said:
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one
main function: to settle actual controversies
involving
conflicts
of
rights
which
are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights
which are guaranteed by law but cannot be
enforced by a judicial party. In a decided case, a
husband complained that his wife was unwilling
to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said:
"We can tell your wife what her duties as such are
and that she is bound to comply with them, but
we cannot force her physically to discharge her
main marital duty to her husband. There are
some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so
personal that to enforce them by actual
compulsion would be highly derogatory to human
dignity." ScCIaA
This is why the first part of the second paragraph
of Section 1 provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable or enforceable. . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less
decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential
system of government, the Supreme Court has,
also, another important function. The powers of
government are generally considered divided into
three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its
own sphere and independent of the others.
Because of that supremacy power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice. AaCTcI
MR. CONCEPCION.
No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary
cases but where there is a question as to whether
the government had authority or had abused its
authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or
excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political
question. Therefore, the court has the duty to
decide. 27
administration
has
tasked
the
various
departments and agencies to partner with civil
society
organizations
and
other
citizenstakeholders in the preparation of the Agency
Budget Proposals, which proposals are then
presented before a technical panel of the DBM in
scheduled budget hearings wherein the various
departments and agencies are given the
opportunity to defend their budget proposals.
DBM bureaus thereafter review the Agency
Budget
Proposals
and
come
up
with
recommendations for the Executive Review
Board, comprised by the DBM Secretary and the
DBM's senior officials. The discussions of the
Executive Review Board cover the prioritization of
programs and their corresponding support vis-vis the priority agenda of the National
Government, and their implementation. TDcHCa
The DBM next consolidates the recommended
agency budgets into the National Expenditure
Program (NEP) and a Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing (BESF). The NEP provides
the details of spending for each department and
agency by program, activity or project (PAP), and
is submitted in the form of a proposed GAA. The
Details of Selected Programs and Projects is the
more detailed disaggregation of key PAPs in the
NEP, especially those in line with the National
Government's development plan. The Staffing
Summary provides the staffing complement of
each department and agency, including the
number of positions and amounts allocated.
The NEP and BESF are thereafter presented by
the DBM and the DBCC to the President and the
Cabinet
for
further
refinements
or
reprioritization. Once the NEP and the BESF are
approved by the President and the Cabinet, the
DBM prepares the budget documents for
submission to Congress. The budget documents
consist of (1) the President's Budget Message,
through which the President explains the policy
framework and budget priorities; (2) the BESF,
mandated by Section 22, Article VII of the
Constitution,
68
which
contains
the
macroeconomic assumptions, public sector
context, breakdown of the expenditures and
funding sources for the fiscal year and the two
previous years; and (3) the NEP.
Public or government expenditures are generally
classified into two categories, specifically: (1)
capital expenditures or outlays; and (2) current
operating expenditures. Capital expenditures are
the expenses whose usefulness lasts for more
than one year, and which add to the assets of the
Government, including investments in the capital
of government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries. 69 Current operating
expenditures are the purchases of goods and
services in current consumption the benefit of
which does not extend beyond the fiscal year. 70
The two components of current expenditures are
those for personal services (PS), and those for
maintenance and other operating expenses
(MOOE).
13.
Properties
Foreign Exchange (FOREX)
Gains
Miscellaneous Operating and
14.
Service Income
Fines and Penalties-Government
12.
Allotments
are
lesser
in
scope
than
appropriations, in that the latter embrace the
general legislative authority to spend. Allotments
may be released in two forms through a
comprehensive Agency Budget Matrix (ABM), 94
or, individually, by SARO. 95 aIcHSC
Armed with either the ABM or the SARO, agencies
become authorized to incur obligations 96 on
behalf of the Government in order to implement
their PAPs. Obligations may be incurred in various
ways, like hiring of personnel, entering into
contracts for the supply of goods and services,
and using utilities.
In order to settle the obligations incurred by the
agencies, the DBM issues a disbursement
authority so that cash may be allocated in
payment of the obligations. A cash or
disbursement authority that is periodically issued
is referred to as a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA),
97 which issuance is based upon an agency's
submission of its Monthly Cash Program and
other required documents. The NCA specifies the
maximum amount of cash that can be withdrawn
from a government servicing bank for the period
indicated. Apart from the NCA, the DBM may
issue a Non-Cash Availment Authority (NCAA) to
authorize non-cash disbursements, or a Cash
Disbursement Ceiling (CDC) for departments with
overseas operations to allow the use of income
collected by their foreign posts for their operating
requirements.
Actual disbursement or spending of government
funds terminates the Budget Execution Phase and
is usually accomplished through the Modified
Disbursement
Scheme
under
which
disbursements chargeable against the National
Treasury are coursed through the government
servicing banks.
c.4. Accountability 98
Accountability is a significant phase of the budget
cycle because it ensures that the government
funds have been effectively and efficiently
utilized to achieve the State's socio-economic
goals. It also allows the DBM to assess the
performance of agencies during the fiscal year for
the purpose of implementing reforms and
establishing new policies.
An agency's accountability may be examined and
evaluated through (1) performance targets and
outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports; (3)
review of agency performance; and (4) audit
conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA).
2.
Nature of the DAP as a fiscal plan
a. DAP was a program designed to
promote economic growth
Policy is always a part of every budget and fiscal
decision of any Administration. 99 The national
budget the Executive prepares and presents to
Congress
represents
the
Administration's
"blueprint for public policy" and reflects the
Description
Requested
FY 2011
30,000
Unreleased
Personnel
Declare as
Unreleased
Services
(PS)
savings and
Personal
appropriations which
approve/
Services (PS)
will lapse at the end
of
authorize its use
appropriations
FY 2011 but
may be
for the 2011
pooled as savings and
Disbursement
realigned
for
priority
Acceleration
programs
that
require
Program
immediate funding
FY 2011
482
Unreleased
Unreleased
appropriations (slow
appropriations
projects and
moving
programs for
discontinuance)
FY 2010
12,336
Supported by the GFI
Approve and
Unprogrammed
authorize its use
Fund
Dividends
for the 2011
Disbursement
Acceleration
Program
Unreleased
With
FY 2010
21,544
prior
Carryover
appropriations (slow
approval from
Appropriation
moving projects and
the President in
programs for November
2010
discontinuance) and to
declare as
savings
from
Zerosavings and with
based
Budgeting
authority to use
Initiative
for
priority
projects
FY 2011 Budget
7,748
FY
2011
Agency
For information
items for
Budget items that
can
realignment
be realigned within
the
agency to fund new fast
disbursing projects
DPWH - 3.981 Billion
DA - 2.497 Billion
DOT - 1.000 Billion
DepEd - 270 Million
TOTAL 72.110
======
B. Projects in the Disbursement Acceleration
Program
(Descriptions of projects attached as Annex A)
CSHDTE
GOCCs and GFIs
Agency/Project
Allotment
(SARO and NCA Release)
(in Million Php)
1.
2.
LRTA:
NHA:
a.
residents to
27 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
6.
7.
June
TOTAL 26,945
======
9.
NGAs/LGUs
Allotment
Cash
(SARO)
Requirement
(In Million
(NCA)
Php)
DOF-BIR: NPSTAR
centralization of data
processing and others (To be
Agency/Project
13.
14.
15.
16.
144
Equipment
30
30
DA:
2,959 2,223
a.
Irrigation, FMRs and
Integrated CommunityBased Multi-Species
Hatchery and Aquasilvi
b.
Farming
1,629 1,629
Mindanao Rural
Development Project 919
183
17.
18.
19.
c.
DAR:
a.
Irrigation Project
411
1,293 1,293
Agrarian Reform
Communities Project 2
411
1,293
132
b.
Landowners Compensation
5,432
DBM: Conduct of National
Survey of Farmers/Fisherfolks/IPs
625
625
DOJ: Operating requirements
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
22.
b.
23.
24.
27.
28.
29.
for
Fund Sources
Cash
Identified for Allotments
Requirements
Approval
for Release
(In Million Php)
Release in FY
2011
Center 275
275
Enhancement of Doppler
[ / ] APPROVED
[ ] DISAPPROVED
Warning
190
150
DOF-BOC: To settle the
principal obligations with
PDIC consistent with the
agreement with the CISS and
SGS
2,800 2,800
OEO-FDCP: Establishment of
26.
C. Summary
25.
15 state attorneys
11
11
DOT: Preservation of the Cine
Corregidor Complex 25
25
OPAPP: Activities for Peace
Process (PAMANA-Project
details: budget breakdown,
implementation plan, and
conditions on fund release
attached as Annex B)1,819 1,819
DOST 425
425
a.
Establishment of National
local activities20
20
DPWH: Various infrastructure
projects
5,500 5,500
DepEd/ERDT/DOST: Thin
Client Cloud Computing
Project 270
270
DOH: Hiring of nurses and
midwives
294
294
TESDA: Training Program in
partnership with BPO industry
and other sectors
1,100 1,100
DILG: Performance Challenge
28 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
2.0 . . .
[ ] DISAPPROVED
2.1 . . .
2.2 . . .
ON THE UTILIZATION OF POOLED SAVINGS
3.0 It may be recalled that the President
approved our request for omnibus authority to
pool savings/unutilized balances in FY 2010 last
November 25, 2010.
4.0 It is understood that in the utilization of
pooled savings, the DBM shall secure
corresponding approval/confirmation of
President. Furthermore, it is assured that
proposed realignments shall be within
authorized Expenditure level.
the
the
the
the
the
1.0 Rationale
3.0 Coverage
3.1 These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of all
national government agencies (NGAs) charged
against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A.
No. 10147) and FY 2012 Current Appropriation
(R.A. No. 10155), pertaining to:
3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);
3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
(MOOE) related to the implementation of
programs and projects, as well as capitalized
MOOE; and
3.1.3
Personal
Services
corresponding
to
unutilized pension benefits declared as savings
by the agencies concerned based on their
updated/validated list of pensioners.
3.2 The withdrawal of unobligated allotments
may cover the identified programs, projects and
activities of the departments/agencies reflected
in the DBM list shown as Annex A or specific
programs and projects as may be identified by
the agencies. DCTHaS
4.0 Exemption
These guidelines shall not apply to the following:
4.1 NGAs
4.1.1 Constitutional Offices/Fiscal Autonomy
Group, granted fiscal autonomy under the
Philippine Constitution; and
4.1.2 State Universities and Colleges, adopting
the Normative Funding allocation scheme i.e.,
distribution of a predetermined budget ceiling.
4.2 Fund Sources
4.2.1 Personal
benefits;
2.0 Purpose
30 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
Services
other
than
pension
Obligations
and
Statement of Allotments,
Balances (SAOB); DcITaC
Obligation
and
for
the
Cordillera
People's
for
assistance
to
Quezon
DepEd-PPP
school
technologies
and
research
capability
P1,600,000,000
=============
the pertinent provision of the 2011 GAA (R.A. No.
10147) showed that Congress had appropriated
only P537,910,000 for MOOE, but nothing for
personnel services and capital outlays, to wit:
Personnel
Maintenance CapitalTOTAL
Services
and Other
Outlays
Operating
III.
Expenditures
Operations
a.
Funding Assistance to
177,406,000 1,887,365,000
49,090,000 2,113,861,000
and Technology Activities
1.
Central Office
1,554,238,000
1,554,238,000
a.
Generation
42 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
Science
of
new
knowledge
and
technologies
and
research
building
areas
capability
in
priority
identified
as
strategic to National
Development
537,910,000
537,910,000
Aside from this transfer under the DAP to the
DREAM project exceeding by almost 300% the
appropriation by Congress for the program
Generation of new knowledge and technologies
and research capability building in priority areas
identified as strategic to National Development,
the Executive allotted funds for personnel
services and capital outlays. The Executive
thereby substituted its will to that of Congress.
Worse, the Executive had not earlier proposed
any amount for personnel services and capital
outlays in the NEP that became the basis of the
2011 GAA. 170 CTAIHc
It is worth stressing in this connection that the
failure of the GAAs to set aside any amounts for
an expense category sufficiently indicated that
Congress purposely did not see fit to fund, much
less implement, the PAP concerned. This
indication becomes clearer when even the
President himself did not recommend in the NEP
to fund the PAP. The consequence was that any
PAP requiring expenditure that did not receive
any appropriation under the GAAs could only be a
new PAP, any funding for which would go beyond
the authority laid down by Congress in enacting
the GAAs. That happened in some instances
under the DAP.
In relation to the December 22, 2011 SARO
issued to the Philippine Council for Industry,
Energy and Emerging Technology Research and
Development
(DOST-PCIEETRD)
171
for
Establishment of the Advanced Failure Analysis
Laboratory, which reads: acEHCD
APPROPRIATION
PARTICULARS AMOUNT
CODE
AUTHORIZED
A.02.a Development, integration and
coordination of the National
Research System for Industry,
Energy and Emerging Technology
and Related Fields
Capital Outlays
P300,000,000
the appropriation code and the particulars
appearing in the SARO did not correspond to the
program specified in the GAA, whose particulars
were Research and Management Services
(inclusive of the following activities: (1)
Technological and Economic Assessment for
Industry, Energy and Utilities; (2) Dissemination
of Science and Technology Information; and (3)
Management of PCIERD Information System for
instances
because
AMOUNT
OFFICEPURPOSE
DATE (In thousand pesos)
RELEASED
Releases
Imposed
Reserve
Commission on
IT Infrastructure
and
11/11/11
143,700
Audit hiring of additional litigation
Program
experts
Congress Completion of the construction
07/23/12
207,034
250,000
House of
of the Legislative Library and
(Savings
Representatives
Archives Building/
of HOR)
Congressional e-library
The respondents further stated in their
memorandum
that
the
President
"made
available" to the "Commission on Elections the
savings of his department upon [its] request for
funds . . ." 187 This was another instance of a
cross-border augmentation.
The respondents justified all the cross-border
transfers thusly:
99. The Constitution does not prevent the
President from transferring savings of his
department to another department upon the
latter's request, provided it is the recipient
department that uses such funds to augment its
own appropriation. In such a case, the President
merely gives the other department access to
public funds but he cannot dictate how they shall
be applied by that department whose fiscal
autonomy is guaranteed by the Constitution. 188
In the oral arguments held on February 18, 2014,
Justice
Vicente
V.
Mendoza,
representing
Congress, announced a different characterization
of the cross-border transfers of funds as in the
nature of "aid" instead of "augmentation," viz.:
cHATSI
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
The cross-border transfers, if Your Honors please,
is not an application of the DAP. What were these
cross-border transfers? They are transfers of
savings as defined in the various General
Appropriations Act. So, that makes it similar to
the DAP, the use of savings. There was a crossborder which appears to be in violation of Section
25, paragraph 5 of Article VI, in the sense that the
border was crossed. But never has it been
claimed that the purpose was to augment a
deficient item in another department of the
government or agency of the government. The
cross-border transfers, if Your Honors please,
were in the nature of [aid] rather than
augmentations. Here is a government entity
separate and independent from the Executive
Department solely in need of public funds. The
President is there 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
He's in charge of the whole operation although
six or seven heads of government offices are
given the power to augment. Only the President
stationed there and in effect in-charge and has
the responsibility for the failure of any part of the
government. You have election, for one reason or
another, the money is not enough to hold
election. There would be chaos if no money is
given as an aid, not to augment, but as an aid to
a department like COA. The President is
responsible in a way that the other heads, given
the power to augment, are not. So, he cannot
very well allow this, if Your Honor please. 189
JUSTICE LEONEN:
May I move to another point, maybe just briefly. I
am curious that the position now, I think, of
government is that some transfers of savings is
now considered to be, if I'm not mistaken, aid not
augmentation. Am I correct in my hearing of your
argument?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
That's our submission, if Your Honor, please.
JUSTICE LEONEN: ITEcAD
May I know, Justice, where can we situate this in
the text of the Constitution? Where do we
actually derive the concepts that transfers of
appropriation from one branch to the other or
what happened in DAP can be considered as aid?
What particular text in the Constitution can we
situate this?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
There is no particular provision or statutory
provision for that matter, if Your Honor please. It
is drawn from the fact that the Executive is the
executive in-charge of the success of the
government.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
45 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
Taxes on Property
Taxes on Domestic Goods and Services
General Sales, Turnover or VAT
Selected Excises on Goods
Selected Taxes on Services
Taxes on the Use of Goods or Property or
Permission to Perform Activities
Other Taxes
Taxes on International Trade and Transactions
NON-TAX REVENUES
Fees and Charges
BTR Income
Government Services
Interest on NG Deposits
Advances
Guarantee Fee
TAX REVENUES
Taxes on Net Income and Profits
Interest
on
Corporations
to
Government
subscribe
to
the
5.
Equal protection, checks and balances,
and public accountability challenges
The DAP is further challenged as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause, the system of checks
and balances, and the principle of public
accountability.
With respect to the challenge against the DAP
under the Equal Protection Clause, 203 Luna
argues that the implementation of the DAP was
"unfair as it [was] selective" because the funds
released under the DAP was not made available
to all the legislators, with some of them refusing
48 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
49 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
50 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
Held:
SO ORDERED. ISDHcT
Sereno, C.J., Peralta, Villarama,
Mendoza and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Jr.,
Perez,
The
Association
both
urges
that
it
is
constitutionally entitled to resist official inquiry
into its membership lists, and that it may assert,
on behalf of its members, a right personal to
them to be protected from compelled disclosure
by the State of their affiliation with the
Association as revealed by the membership lists.
We
think
that
petitioner
argues
more
appropriately the rights of its members, and that
its nexus with them is sufficient to permit that it
act as their representative before this [p459]
Court. In so concluding, we reject respondent's
argument that the Association lacks standing to
assert here constitutional rights pertaining to the
members, who are not, of course, parties to the
litigation.
61 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
of
Policy:
the
Political
Question
powerful
countervailing
reason
against
a
wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa
ruling was actually riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies which similarly
countervail against a full resort to stare decisis.
As may be deduced from the main conclusions of
the case, Philconsa's fundamental premise in
allowing Members of Congress to propose and
identify of projects would be that the said
identification authority is but an aspect of the
power of appropriation which has been
constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this
premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If
the authority to identify projects is an aspect of
appropriation and the power of appropriation is a
form of legislative power thereby lodged in
Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress
which should exercise such authority, and not its
individual Members; (b) such authority must be
exercised within the prescribed procedure of law
passage and, hence, should not be exercised
after the GAA has already been passed; and (c)
such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the
force of law and, hence, cannot be merely
recommendatory. Justice Vitug's Concurring
Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa
quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be
objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate
funds for such specific projects as it may be
minded; to give that authority, however, to the
individual members of Congress in whatever
guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally
impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits
from hindsight and current findings on the
matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court
must partially abandon its previous ruling in
Philconsa insofar as it validated the postenactment identification authority of Members of
Congress on the guise that the same was merely
recommendatory. This postulate raises serious
constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be
simply excused on the ground that such
mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative."
Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent
case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima 155
(Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa's
allowance
of
post-enactment
legislator
participation in view of the separation of powers
principle. These constitutional inconsistencies
and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater
detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said
case was dismissed on a procedural technicality
and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the
substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare
decisis would not apply. STaCIA
II.Substantive Issues.
A.Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the
substantive issues of these cases, it must first
define the terms "Pork Barrel System,"
"Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential
69 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
Justice Bernabe:
In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza:
Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done
and then there is no identification.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Bernabe:
Now, would you know of specific instances when
a project was implemented without the
identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: CIaHDc
I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I
have no specific examples. I would doubt very
much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is
a need [for] a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO
and the NCA are triggered by an identification
from the legislator.
xxx xxx xxx
Solictor General Jardeleza:
What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we
were replying to a question, "How can a legislator
make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It
is mandatory in the sense that he must identify,
in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does
not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds
and his district would not be able to have PDAF
Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court
hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as
all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment
authority in the implementation or enforcement
of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers
principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary
thereto, informal practices, through which
legislators have effectively intruded into the
proper phases of budget execution, must be
deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and,
hence, accorded the same unconstitutional
treatment. That such informal practices do exist
and have, in fact, been constantly observed
throughout the years has not been substantially
disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno)
during the Oral Arguments of these cases: 193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of
both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if
we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I
had seen the extent of this research made by my
staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress
c.Accountability.
allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the postenactment determinations made by the individual
legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences
outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF
Article does not constitute an "appropriation
made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only
authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in
violation of the non-delegability principle as
afore-discussed.
2.Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power since the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" gives the President
"unbridled discretion to determine for what
purpose the funds will be used." 243
Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court
to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the
same section and thus, construe the phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" to refer only to other
purposes
related
"to
energy
resource
development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government." 244
The Court agrees with petitioners' submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or
determinable amount for a particular public
purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to
exist, the appropriation law must contain
adequate legislative guidelines if the same law
delegates rule-making authority to the Executive
245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the
details of the law for its enforcement, known as
supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining
facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making. 246 There
are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the
legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making
are indeed adequate. The first test is called the
"completeness test." Case law states that a law is
complete when it sets forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate. On the other hand, the second test is
called
the
"sufficient
standard
test."
Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. 247 To
be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits
of the delegate's authority, announce the
legislative policy, and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented. 248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with
petitioners that the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President's
authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads,
the said phrase gives the President wide latitude
80 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
respondent to prepare
(Emphases supplied)
the
list
requested.
Matters
in
Justice Bernabe:
Justice Bernabe:
the
to,
the
the
executory
but
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J. and Carpio, J., see concurring opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part.
85 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
that no
aTAEHc
unnecessary
inferences
are
made.
Briefly,
I
fully
pronouncements:
support
the
following
I.COEQUALITY
OF
THE
THREE
BRANCHES
NECESSITATES JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
In any dispute before this Court,
judicial restraint is the general rule.
Since the ponencia crafted a ruling on a highly
technical matter, it is only fitting that the
nuances, implications, and conclusions on our
pronouncement be elucidated. My views are
guided by the inherent restraint on the judicial
office; as unelected judges, we carmot
haphazardly set aside the acts of the Filipino
people's representatives. This is the import of the
requirement for an actual case or controversy to
exist before we may exercise judicial review, as
aptly noted by the pre-eminent constitutionalist,
former Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza:
87 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
88 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
The
questions
surrounding
lump-sum
appropriations, in the context of how they arose
during the interpellation, are not legal questions.
Unlike the first two reasons advanced by the
ponencia in finding for the unconstitutionality of
the
PDAF,
the
invalidity
of
lump-sum
appropriations finds no textual support in the
Constitution. By its very words, the Constitution
does not prohibit lump-sum appropriations. In
fact, the history of legislative appropriations
suggests otherwise.
As it stands now, the plain text of the
Constitution and the Revised
Administrative Code renders the
modality of budgeting to be a
political question.
The Constitution contains provisions that regulate
appropriation law, namely: it must originate from
the House of Representatives, 24 its items can be
vetoed by the President, 25 it is initiated by the
Executive, 26 and money can only be paid out of
the Treasury by virtue of appropriations provided
by law. 27 Congress may not increase the
appropriations recommended by the President for
the operation of the Government as specified in
the budget. 28 EHCaDS
The form, content, and manner of preparation of
the budget must be prescribed by law, and no
provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation
therein, and such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates. 29 Procedures involving
appropriations must be uniform. 30 A special
appropriations bill must be specific in purpose
and supported or supportable by funds. 31 Only
the heads of the branches of government, as well
as the constitutional commissions and fiscally
independent bodies may be authorized to
augment
items
in
appropriations.
32
Discretionary
funds
are
regulated.
33
Appropriations of the previous year are
automatically revived if Congress fails to pass a
new
law.
34
Appropriations
for
fiscally
autonomous agencies are released automatically.
35 Furthermore, in relation to all this, the
Constitution gives to the President the duty to
faithfully execute the law. 36
Beneath this framework runs a sea of options,
from which the two political branches must carve
a working, functioning fiscal system for the State.
So long as these basic tenets are maintained, the
political branches can ply the route of the way
they deem appropriate to achieve the purpose of
the government's budget. What are thus clearly
set forth are requirements for appropriations, and
not the modalities of budgeting which fall
squarely under the technical domain of the
Executive branch, namely, the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM).
When the Constitution gives the political
branches a "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue[,]" 37 or the lack of
89 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
"judicially
discoverable
and
manageable
standards for resolving it[,]" 38 or even the
"impossibility
of
a
court's
undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of
government[,]" 39 then there is a political
question that this Court, in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion, cannot conclude. 40
Apart from the provisions already discussed,
there are no constitutional restrictions on how the
government should prepare and enact its budget.
In fact, these restrictions are mostly procedural
and not formal. If the Constitution does not
impose a specific mode of budgeting, be it purely
line-item budgeting, purely lump-sum budgeting,
a mixture of the two, or something else entirely,
e.g., zero balance lump-sum, loan repayment
schemes,
or
even
performance-informed
budgeting, then neither should this Court impose
the line-item budgeting formula on the Executive
and Legislative branches. AHDcCT
This confusion appears to have stemmed from
the highly limited exchanges in the oral
arguments between one of the petitioners and
the Chairperson of the Commission on Audit
(COA), on one hand, and a Member of the Court,
on the other. The argument progressed on the
basis of the Member's own suggestion that the
item-veto power of the President is negated by
lump-sum budgeting despite the fact that it was
not the very issue identified in the petitions.
While it is true that the COA Chairperson opined
that line-item is preferred, that statement is an
operational standard, not a legal standard. It
cannot be used to support a judicial edict that
requires Congress to adopt an operational
standard preferred, even if suggested by the COA
Chairperson.
The Court never asked Congress what its
response would be to a wholesale striking down
of lump-sum budgeting. It never asked the DBM
whether it could submit an expenditure proposal
that has nothing but line-item budgets. To reject
even very limited forms of lump-sum budgeting
without asking whether it can even be
operationally done within the very tight timeline
of the Constitution for preparing, submitting, and
passing into law a national budget is simply plain
wrong and most unfair. It is as if this Court is
trying to teach both political branches who
constitute the nation's top 300 elected officials
what they can and cannot do, in a manner that
will completely take them by surprise, as lumpsum budgeting was never the lis mota in this
case. At the very least, this is not the case for
that matter, if eventually this matter were also to
be decided. cCHETI
II.MODALITIES UNDER THE APPROPRIATIONS LAW
Government accounting takes place through
concurrent processes. First is the call to all
agencies, including fiscally independent ones,
such as the Supreme Court. The deadline for this
is usually in March or April. Then the proposals
are all collated in a comprehensive document,
and vetted by the DBM, and submitted to the
to
the
The
key
factor
that
makes
lump-sum
appropriations desirable for the United States
Legislature is the flexibility 68 in the use of the
appropriation. As Justice Souter stated in Lincoln
v. Vigil, a lump-sum appropriation's purpose is to
give the agency discretion, and allow it to remain
flexible in meeting whatever contingencies arise:
The allocation of funds from a lump-sum
appropriation is another administrative decision
traditionally regarded as committed to agency
discretion. After all, the very point of a lump-sum
appropriation is to give an agency the capacity to
adapt to changing circumstances and meet its
statutory responsibilities in what it sees as the
most effective or desirable way. 69 (Emphasis
supplied)
The use of lump-sum appropriations inherently
springs from the reality that the government
cannot completely predict at the beginning of a
fiscal year where funds will be needed in certain
instances. Since Congress is the source of the
appropriation law in accordance with the principle
of separation of powers, it can craft the law in
such a way as to give the Executive enough fiscal
tools to meet the exigencies of the year. Lumpsum appropriations are one such tool. After all,
the different agencies of government are in the
best position to determine where the allocated
money might best be spent for their needs:
TECcHA
[A]n agency's allocation of funds from a lumpsum appropriation requires "a complicated
balancing of a number of factors which are
peculiarly within its expertise": whether its
"resources are best spent" on one program or
another; whether it "is likely to succeed" in
fulfilling its statutory mandate; whether a
particular program "best fits the agency's overall
policies"; and, "indeed, whether the agency has
enough resources" to fund a program "at all." 70
ADcEST
Thus, the importance of allowing lump-sum
appropriations for budgetary flexibility and good
governance has been validated in other
jurisdictions. The evolution of the government's
budgeting from a small amount in past decades,
into what is now a massive undertaking that
contains
complexities,
and
involves
an
exponentially larger sum than before, suggests
that a mixture of lump-sum and line-item
budgeting within the same appropriation law
could also be a feasible form of budgeting. At the
very least, this Court owes it to Congress to ask it
the question directly, on whether an exclusively
line-item budgeting system is indeed feasible.
Simply put, there appears, even in the United
States, a necessity for the inclusion of lump-sum
appropriations in the budget:
Congress has been making appropriations since
the beginning of the Republic. In earlier times
when the federal government was much smaller
and federal programs were (or at least seemed)
much
simpler,
very
specific
line-item
93 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
own
constitutionally
allocated
sphere.
8
Lawmaking belongs to Congress, implementing
the laws to the Executive, and settling legal
disputes to the Judiciary. 9 Any encroachment on
the functions of a co-equal branch by the other
branches violates the principle of separation of
powers, and is thus unconstitutional. In Bengzon
v. Drilon, 10 this Court declared: STaCIA
It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional
government such as ours, the rule of law must
prevail. The Constitution is the basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must
conform and to which all persons including the
highest official of this land must defer. From this
cardinal postulate, it follows that the three
branches of government must discharge their
respective functions within the limits of authority
conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle
of separation of powers, neither Congress, the
President nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields
allocated to the other branches of government.
The legislature is generally limited to the
enactment of laws, the executive to the
enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their
interpretation and application to cases and
controversies.
In the present petitions, the Court is faced with
issues of paramount importance as these issues
involve the core powers of the Executive and the
Legislature. Specifically, the petitions raise
questions on the Executive's constitutional power
to implement the laws and the Legislature's
constitutional power to appropriate. The latter
necessarily involves the President's constitutional
power to veto line-items in appropriation laws. 11
Under the Constitution, the President submits
every year a proposed national expenditures
program (NEP) to Congress. The NEP serves as
basis for the annual general appropriations act
(GAA) to be enacted by Congress. This is provided
in the Constitution, as follows:
The President shall submit to the Congress within
thirty days from the opening of every regular
session,
as
the
basis
of
the
general
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and
sources of financing, including receipts from
existing and proposed revenue measures. 12
aSIDCT
While the President proposes the expenditures
program to Congress, it is Congress that
exercises the power to appropriate and enact the
GAA.
The
Constitution
states
that
"all
appropriation . . . shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments." 13 The
Constitution likewise mandates, "No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." 14
The Administrative Code of 1987 defines
"appropriation" as "an authorization made by law
or other legislative enactment directing payment
out of government funds under specified
conditions or for specified purposes." 15 Thus,
Assistance to Students
DepEd
xxx
xxx
xxx
2.
Health
xxx
xxx
xxx
Medical Mission including
provision of medicines
and immunization
LGUs
xxx
3.
Livelihood
Specialty training/employment
xxx
xxx
families
LGUs
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
5.
Peace and Order and Security
xxx
xxx
xxx
Surveillance and Communication
equipment
LGUs/PNP
xxx
xxx
xxx
6.
Arts and Culture
Preservation/Conservation,
including publication of
historical materials NHCP (formerly NHI)/
LGUs
xxx
7.
Public Infrastructure Projects
Construction/Rehabilitation/
Repair/Improvement of the following:
Local roads and bridges
LGUs
xxx
Public Markets/Multi-Purpose
Buildings/Multi-Purpose
Pavements, Pathways and
Footbridges
xxx
xxx
xxx
B.
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS CHARGEABLE
AGAINST HARD ALLOCATION
Construction/Rehabilitation/
Renovation of the following:
Roads and bridges
DPWH
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Flood Control DPWH
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
PROVIDED, That this Fund shall not be used for
the payment of Personal Services expenditures:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That all procurement shall
comply with the provisions of R.A. No. 9184 and
its Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations:
PROVIDED, FINALLY, That for infrastructure
projects, LGUs may only be identified as
implementing agencies if they have the technical
capability to implement the same. DcaCSE
2.Project Identification. Identification of projects
and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform
to the priority list, standard or design prepared by
each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That
preference shall be given to projects located in
97 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
funds
have
been
2.Submission
of
Quarterly
Reports.
The
Department of Budget and Management shall
submit within thirty (30) days after the end of
each quarter a report to the Senate Committee
on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations on the releases made from this
Fund. The report shall include the listing of the
projects, locations, implementing agencies and
the endorsing officials.
It is clear from the CDF provisions of the 1994
GAA that the authority vested in legislators was
limited to the mere identification of projects.
There was nothing in the 1994 GAA that made
identification of projects by legislators mandatory
on the President. The President could change the
projects identified by legislators without the
favorable endorsement of any congressional
committee, and even without the concurrence of
the legislators who identified the projects. The
Court ruled in PHILCONSA:
The authority given to the members of Congress
is only to propose and identify projects to be
implemented by the President. Under Article XLI
of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce
examine whether the proposals submitted by
members of Congress fall within the specific
items of expenditures for which the Fund was set
up, and if qualified, he next determines whether
they are in line with other projects planned for
the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects
qualify for funding under the Fund, it is the
President who shall implement them. In short, the
proposals and identifications made by members
of Congress are merely recommendatory. 27
(Emphasis supplied) CTHaSD
LAMP is likewise not applicable to the cases
before us. Article XLVII of the 2004 GAA, which
was the subject matter in LAMP, only states the
following on the PDAF:
Special Provision
1.Use and Release of the Fund. The amount
herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority
programs and projects or to fund the required
counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and
projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be
released directly to the implementing agency or
Local Government Unit concerned: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein
may be realigned to any expense class, if
deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE,
That a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the
authorized allocations by district may be used for
procurement of rice and other basic commodities
99 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
101 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
Scrutiny
and
view
of
that my colleagues Justices Carpio and PerlasBernabe have covered on the constitutional
status of PDAF, except only to state my
observations or disagreements. But as I also
stated at the start, I agree largely with the
conclusion
reached
that
the
PDAF
is
unconstitutional as it subverts and can fatally
strike at our constitutional processes unless
immediately stopped; it is, in my view, a villain
that "must be slain at sight." 28
A.Constitutionality of Section 12 of P.D. No. 1869,
as amended
P.D. No. 1869 whether under the 1973 or the
1987 Constitutions is an appropriation law as it
sets aside a determinable amount of money to be
disbursed and spent for a stated public purpose.
This presidential decree, prior to its amendment,
made allocations to fund the following:
"infrastructure and socio-civic projects within the
Metropolitan Manila Area: (a) Flood Control (b)
Sewerage and Sewage (c) Nutritional Control (d)
Population Control (e) Tulungang Bayan Centers
(f) Beautification (g) Kilusang Kabuhayan at
Kaunlaran (KKK) projects." Additionally, it
provided that the amount allocated "may also be
appropriated and allocated to fund and finance
infrastructure
and/or
socio-civic
projects
throughout the Philippines as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines."
As the decree then stood i.e., prior to its
amendment, the above italicized portion already
rendered the authority given to the Office of the
President of the Philippines of doubtful validity as
it gave the President authority to designate and
specify the projects to be funded without any
clear guiding standards and fixed parameters.
Only two things, to my mind, would have saved
this provision from unconstitutionality.
113 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
lump-sum
funds
to
Million) and Senators
118 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
of
the
Audit Disallowances/Charges/Suspensions. In
the course of the audit, whenever there are
differences arising from the settlement of
accounts by reason of disallowances or charges,
the
audit
shall
issue
Notices
of
Disallowance/Charge (ND/NC) which shall be
considered as audit decisions. Such ND/NC shall
be adequately established by evidence and the
conclusions, recommendations, or dispositions
shall
be
supported
by
applicable
laws,
regulations, jurisprudence and the generally
accepted accounting and auditing principles. The
Auditor may issue Notices of Suspension (NS) for
transactions of doubtful legality/validity/propriety
to obtain further explanation or documentation.
19
Notices of Disallowance that will be issued will
furthermore still be litigated.
However, prior to the filing of these Petitions, this
Court promulgated Delos Santos v. Commission
on Audit. In that case, we dealt with the patent
irregularity of the disbursement of the Priority
Development
Assistance
Fund
of
then
Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco. 20
We have basis, therefore, for making the
exception to an actual case. Taking together
Delos Santos and the prima facie findings of fact
in the COA Report, which must be initially
respected by this Court sans finding of grave
abuse of discretion, 21 there appears to be some
indication that there may be widespread and
pervasive wastage of funds by the members of
the Congress who are tasked to check the
President's spending. It appears that these
leakages are not only imminent but ongoing.
We note that our findings on the constitutionality
of this item in the General Appropriations Act is
123 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
use
of
precedents
is
never
125 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
Priority
127 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
any
any
the
law
and
Justice Leonen:
. . . First, can I ask you whether each legislative
district will be getting the same amount under
that title? Each legislator gets 70 Million, is that
not correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza:
There will be no appropriation like that, Your
Honor.
Justice Leonen:
No, I mean in terms of Title XLIV right now, at
present.
Solicitor General Jardeleza:
Oh, I'm sorry.
Justice Leonen:
Of the 24 Billion each Member of the House of
Representatives and a party list gets 70 Million, is
that not correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza:
Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Leonen:
Second, that each senator gets 200 Million, is
that not correct?
Solicitor General:
Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Leonen:
Let's go to congressional districts, are they of the
same size?
Solicitor General Jardeleza:
No, Your Honor. HCDAcE
Justice Leonen:So there can be smaller
congressional districts and very big congressional
districts, is that not correct?
Solicitor General:
Yes.
Justice Leonen:
And there are congressional districts that have
smaller populations and congressional districts
that have a very large population?
Solicitor General Jardeleza:
Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Leonen:
Justice Leonen:
Justice Leonen:
Justice Leonen:
Justice Leonen:
The allocation for the Supreme Court, is it for
anyone of the fifteen of us or is it for the entire
Supreme Court?
Solicitor General:
For the Office, Your Honor.
Justice Leonen:
So you have here an item in the budget which is
allocated for a legislator not for a congressional
district, is that not correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza:
Well, for both, Your Honor.
Justice Leonen:
Is this a valid appropriation? 99
Had it been to address the developmental needs
of the Legislative districts, then the amounts
would have varied based on the needs of such
districts. Hence, the poorest district would receive
the largest share as compared to its well-off
counterparts.
Justice Leonen:
130 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
of
the
Priority
131 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s
implementation.
What
it requires
is
an
appropriation for a discernable purpose. The
Priority Development Assistance Fund fails this
requirement.
VI
The Constitution in Article VI, Section 29 (3)
provides for another type of appropriations act,
thus:
All money collected on any tax levied for a
special purpose shall be treated as a special fund
and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose
for which a special fund was created has been
fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall
be transferred to the general funds of the
government. IAETSC
This provision provides the basis for special laws
that create special funds and to this extent
qualifies my concurrence with the ponencia's
result in so far as Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 910 is concerned. This provision states:
. . . All fees, revenues, and receipts of the Board
from any and all sources including receipts from
service contracts and agreements such as
application and processing fees, signature bonus,
discovery bonus, production bonus; all money
collected from concessionaires, representing
unspent work obligations, fines and penalties
under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the
government share representing royalties, rentals,
production share on service contracts and similar
payments on the exploration, development and
exploitation of energy resources, shall form part
of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President. (Emphasis provided)
It is true that it may be the current
administration's view that the underscored
provision should be read in relation to the specific
purposes enumerated before it. However, there is
no proscription to textually view it in any other
way. Besides, there should have been no reason
to provide this phrase had the intent of the law
been as how the current administration reads and
applies it.
VII
A member of the House of Representatives or a
Senator is not an automated teller machine or
ATM from which the public could withdraw funds
for sundry private purposes. They should be
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133 | H R _ C h a p t e r 7 _ R e a d i n g s