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G.R. No. 149132. May 9, 2002] JOSEPHINE B. NG and JESSE NG, vs.

SPOUSES
MARCELO and MARIA FE SOCO, and MARVIN J. SOCO,
Pet. filed complaint for accounting, injunction and damages with writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order filed by petitioners against respondents with the
RTC of Negros Oriental.
Pet. alleged that they are the owners of Jos Chicken Barbecue (Chicken Inato) secret recipe
used by petitioners chain of restaurants in some cities in the Visayas and Mindanao.
Petitioners further alleged that they entered into a partnership agreement with respondents
to operate a restaurant, the Socos Manokan Nook Restaurant. The agreement provided that
in the event of the dissolution of the partnership, respondents shall lose the right to use the
secret recipe and ownership thereof shall revert back to petitioners.
Partnership was dissolved on account of disagreement among the parties. Believing that
respondents continued to operate the same business, petitioners filed the complaint for
accounting with the court a quo. During the hearing on the petition for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, petitioners learned that Magno Garcia, respondents nephew, is
operating the restaurant under the name Manokan sa Sugbu.
Upon the belief that Garcia was merely used as dummy by respondents, petitioners filed
with the trial court a motion to admit amended complaint to implead Garcia as one of the
defendants.
In its Order, Jan. 28, 1997, the trial court denied said motion. The amendment cannot be
allowed because, according to the trial court, the amendment now, not only requires or
compels the defendants to change their defense but also subjects them to all the acts,
knowledge, admission and even the omissions of Magno Garcia.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the trial court as the same is
substantial and has the effect of changing the theory of the case. The CA likewise held that
Garcia is not an indispensable party, contrary to petitioners allegation.
HELD: Formal and substantial amendments to a pleading may be made at anytime before a
responsive pleading has been filed. Such amendment is a matter of right. Thereafter, and
during trial, amendments may only be done with the permission of the court.
The Court has invariably held that amendments are not proper and should be denied when
delay would arise, or when amendments would result in a change of cause of action or
theory of the case, or would be inconsistent with the allegations in the original complaint.
In this case, the court a quo denied petitioners amended complaint upon finding that it will
substantially alter the cause of action or defense or theory of the case. The trial court found
that respondents defense will be altered by the amendment because they will be made
liable not only for their individual acts but also for the acts of their alleged co-conspirator
Garcia.
The Court agrees with the appellate court that the trial court did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners amended complaint. The admission thereof was
clearly not a matter of right on the part of petitioners as they sought the same only after a
responsive pleading (in this case, an answer) had already been filed by respondents. The
matter was thus within the discretion of the trial court. And, as consistently held by this
Court, the granting of leave to file amended pleadings is a matter peculiarly within the
sound discretion of the trial court and such discretion would not normally be disturbed on
appeal except when evident abuse thereof is apparent. None has been shown in this case.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
[G.R. No. 129313. October 10, 2001] SPS MA. CRISTINA D. TIRONA and OSCAR
TIRONA, et al. vs. HON. FLORO P. ALEJO JUANITO IGNACIO and LUIS
NUEZ, respondents.

A. Civil Case No. 5093-V-97:

On March 25, 1996, Pet. sued private respondent Luis Nuez before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Valenzuela, for ejectment. Petitioners claimed to be owners of various fishpond lots
located at Coloong, Valenzuela. Nuez admitted in his answer that petitioners owned the
fishponds, but denied the other allegations. He raised the following affirmative defenses: (1)
the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case, for petitioners failure to allege prior physical
possession in their complaint; (2) petitioners action was premature in view of the pendency
of a complaint he filed with the (DARAB), , where the issue of possession in the concept of
tenancy is the same as that raised by petitioners in Civil Case No. 6633; and (3) petitioners
are guilty of forum-shopping since they were fully aware of the said DARAB case. He moved
that the ejectment suit be dismissed.
MeTC rendered jugdment in favor of the plaintiffs. Nuez appealed said decision to the
RTC.
B. Civil Case No. 5169-V-97
On March 25, 1996, petitioners also instituted Civil Case No. 6632 for ejectment against
private respondent Juanito Ignacio with the MeTC of Valenzuela.. The allegations were
essentially the same as those against private respondent Nuez, except it is alleged that
Ignacio also illegally occupied the house constructed on the lot of, and belonging to the
plaintiff Spouses Ma. Paz D. Bautista and Cesar Bautista. Petitioners sought the same relief
prayed for in Civil Case No. 6633.
Ignacio raised similar defenses as those offered by Nuez. Like Nuez, he also moved for
dismissal of the ejectment suit against him.
MeTC of Valenzuela, Branch 82 issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 6632 against
Ignacio.
MEtc GRANTED Motion to Dismiss
It is now clear to the mind of the Court that the issue of recovery of possession pursued by
plaintiffs in this case is pending also for adjudication among other issues in DARAB Case No.
IV-MM-0099-95. There is no dispute that both this case and the DARAB case involve the
same real property or at least, adjoining lots covered by titles in the names of some of the
plaintiffs, which lots are also involved in this case.
Clearly, said DARAB case is a prejudicial question to the case at bar, and or vice
versa (stress in the original). The possibility that this Court and the DARAB may come up
with two contradicting decisions on issue of possession shall always be there, and since the
DARAB case was filed first, there appears compelling necessity to halt proceedings in this
case.
petitioners appealed the foregoing Order to the RTC of Valenzuela.
Since Civil Cases Nos. 5093-V-97 and 5169-V-97 involved essentially the same parties,
the same subject matter, and the same issues, the cases were jointly heard before Branch
172 of the RTC of Valenzuela.
(1) As correctly pointed out by the counsel for the defendants in his memorandum on
appeal, it is now settled that a complaint for forcible entry to fall within the jurisdiction of the
inferior court must allege plaintiffs prior physical possession of the property by any of the
means provided in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. Bare allegation in the
complaint that the plaintiff was deprived of the possession of the property is insufficient to
make the action one for forcible entry (citation omitted)
there is no allegation that the plaintiffs had prior physical possession of the property in
dispute. The complaint(s) in the above-entitled cases therefore did not fall within the
jurisdiction of the trial courts.
(2) The DARAB case (Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R) between the herein parties and covering the
same subject matter was filed way ahead of the instant cases. DARAB, is vested with
exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters or agrarian disputes.

(3) The plaintiffs were less than honest in certifying under oath that they have no knowledge
of any case pending before any tribunal or agency involving the same issues raised in the
instant cases. At the time of their certification, there was pending before the DARAB of a
case between the same parties with the same subject matter and where the issue of
possession as raised in the instant cases is necessarily included in the larger issue of
agricultural tenancy.
On May 6, 1997, petitioners filed with the RTC a joint Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 and a Motion for Reconsideration, together with
the proposed Amended Complaints. On May 20, 1997, the RTC denied the aforementioned
motions.
The main issue for our resolution involves the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial
courts: was petitioners failure to allege prior physical possession in a case for forcible entry
fatal to the jurisdiction of the inferior courts? Ancillary thereto, we also must inquire (a)
whether the pendency of the Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R before the DARAB barred the filing of
Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 for forcible entry; and (b) whether petitioners violated
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 proscribing forum shopping.
On the main issue, petitioners contend that the averment of the identities of the
persons in possession of the disputed properties at the time of the forcible entry thereunto is
not jurisdictional in character. Petitioners argue that the deficiency, if any, could have been
remedied by amended or supplemental pleadings or by the submission of admissible
evidence. They point out that the MeTC, had received evidence of petitioners actual
possession, resulting in a finding of fact of actual possession in its Decision of October 1,
1996
Private respondents argue that a closer scrutiny of the allegations in the complaints in
Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 filed with the court of origin will clearly show that there is no
allegation whatsoever of prior physical possession on petitioners part. They submit that this
glaring defect is fatal enough to deprive the inferior court of jurisdiction over the forcible
entry cases. With respect to the denial of admission of petitioners Amended Complaints,
private respondents point out that amendments for the purpose of making the complaint
confer jurisdiction upon the court are not allowed.
The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and the rule
is no different in actions for ejectment. Thus, in ascertaining whether or not the action is one
for forcible entry falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the averments
of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined
Petitioners submit that the phrase thereby depriving said owners of the possession of
the same in paragraph 4 is tantamount to an averment of prior physical possession since
private respondents could not have deprived them of possession unless the latter had been
previously in possession of the subject properties.
We are not persuaded. It cannot be inferred from the aforecited phrase that the
possession that petitioners were supposedly deprived of is a prior physical possession. The
question arises, what sort of prior physical possession is to be averred? The word possession
as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer, means nothing more than physical
possession, (stress supplied) not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. The
allegation must likewise show priority in time. Both requisites are wanting in the phrase
relied upon by petitioners.
A reading of the allegations in the complaints leads us to conclude that petitioners
action was one for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. The distinctions between the two
actions are: (1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he was
in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived thereof, while in illegal detainer,
the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the
possession by the defendant is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally
lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his
contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts
giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the complaint
is demurrable. Hence, in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the

municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical
possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his
possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth. Recall that the complaints in Civil
Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 failed to allege prior physical possession of the property on the
part of petitioners. All that is alleged is unlawful deprivation of their possession by private
respondents. Such bare allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction. No
reversible error was, therefore, committed by the RTC when it held that the Metropolitan Trial
Court acquired no jurisdiction.
But was the deficiency remedied, however, when petitioners submitted their Amended
Complaints?
An amendment is not allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original
complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court, or
where the action originally pleaded in the complaint was outside the jurisdiction of the court.
We have carefully perused petitioners proposed amendments and found them to include the
allegation that petitioners were in prior physical possession of the disputed fishponds before
said possession was allegedly disturbed. Clearly, the purpose is to sidestep the RTC ruling
that MeTC had no jurisdiction over their complaints and allow the inferior court to acquire
jurisdiction. This we cannot allow. Where the court of origin had no jurisdiction over the
original complaint in the first place, amendments may not be had. It is axiomatic that before
an amendment can be permitted, the trial court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
case in the first instance
At the outset, we must point out that petitioners reliance upon Republic Act No. 7881 is
off tangent. It is not disputed that at the time of the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633,
an agrarian relations dispute was pending before the DARAB.
Under Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, litis pendentia or pendency of another
action is a ground for the dismissal of the second action. Recall that in the motions to
dismiss filed by private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633, the pendency of the
DARAB case was one of the grounds relied upon in seeking the dismissal of both
actions. For litis pendentia to lie, the following requisites must be satisfied:
1. Identity of parties or representation in both cases;
2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for;
3. The relief must be founded on the same facts and the same basis; and
4. Identity of the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment, which
may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata on the action under consideration.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the test applied
is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or whether a final judgment in one
case will amount tores judicata in another. Recall that as earlier discussed, the requisites
of litis pendentia barred the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 given the pendency of
DARAB Case No. IV-MM-0099-95R. Based thereon, the RTC correctly dismissed the forcible
entry cases on the additional ground of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the Decision of the RTC of Valenzuela
is AFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. 107824. July 5, 1996] SUPERCLEAN SERVICES CORPORATION, petitioner,


vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, respondents.

On November 8, 1989, petitioner filed with RTC of Manila a complaint


for Mandamus/Certiorari With Preliminary Injunction And/Or Restraining Order against

private respondent Home Development and Mutual Fund. Petitioner alleged that at the
public bidding for janitorial services for the year 1990 it was the lowest or best bidder, but
private respondent refused without just cause to award the contract to it and instead caused
the publication on October 23, 1989 of a Notice of Rebidding to be held on November 9,
1989.
In its answer private respondent defended its action on the ground that not a single bid
submitted complied with the terms and conditions agreed upon in the pre-bidding
conference.
The trial court thereafter set petitioners application for preliminary injunction for hearing
and in the meantime ordered private respondent to desist from conducting a rebidding. At
the same time, the court granted leave to private respondent on January 4, 1990 to hire
janitorial services on a month-to-month basis to insure the maintenance of its offices.
On July 24, 1991, petitioner moved for the admission of a Supplemental
Complaint. Petitioner alleged that because the contract of services was for the furnishing of
janitorial service for the previous year 1990, the delay in the decision of the case had
rendered the case moot and academic without petitioner obtaining complete relief to redress
the wrong committed against it by respondent, which relief consists in unrealized profits,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Accordingly, instead of pursuing its prayer for a writ
ofmandamus, petitioner sought the payment of damages to it.
On August 23, 1991, the trial court denied petitioners motion.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied. In its
order dated November 25, 1991, the trial court said that admission of the Supplemental
Complaint would not only radically but substantially [change] the issues by materially
var[ying] the grounds of relief, and would operate unjustly to the prejudice of the rights of
[private respondent].
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, rendered a
decision, finding no grave abuse of discretion to have been committed by the trial court in
not admitting petitioners Supplemental Complaint and denying the motion for
reconsideration of its order. Its ruling was based on the fact that the relief sought in the
Supplemental Complaint was different from that contained in the original complaint which
sought to compel private respondent to recognize petitioner as the lowest qualifying
bidder. In addition, the appellate court held that the original complaint had been rendered
moot and academic by supervening events and that a supplemental complaint was
inappropriate since supplemental pleadings are meant to supply the deficiency in aid of the
original pleading, not to entirely substitute the latter.
HELD: The transaction, occurrence or event happening since the filing of the pleading,
which is sought to be supplemented, must be pleaded in aid of a partys right or defense as
the case may be. But in the case at bar, the supervening event is not invoked for that
purpose but to justify the new relief sought.
To begin with, what was alleged as a supervening event causing damage to petitioner
was the fact that the year for which the contract should have been made had passed
without the resolution of the case. Only incidentally was it claimed that because of the
award of a contract for janitorial services, on a month-to-month basis to a third party,
petitioner failed to realize profits.
The supervening event was therefore cited not to reinforce or aid the original
demand, which was for the execution of a contract in petitioners favor, but to say
that, precisely because of it, petitioners demand could no longer be enforced,
thus justifying petitioner in changing the relief sought to one for recovery of
damages. This being the case, petitioners remedy was not to supplement, but
rather to amend its complaint.
Indeed the new relief sought (payment of damages in lieu of an award of the contract
for janitorial services) is actually an alternative remedy to which petitioner was entitled even
before at the time of the filing of its original complaint. If petitioner was entitled to the award
of the contract, as it claimed it was, it could have asked either for an award of the contract

for janitorial services or for damages. The fact that it opted for the first does not preclude it
from subsequently claiming damages because through no fault of its own, the year passed
without an award in its favor, with the result that it could no longer demand the execution of
a contract in its favor after that year.
Be that as it may, the so-called Supplemental Complaint filed by petitioner should
simply be treated as embodying amendments to the original complaint or petitioner may be
required to file an amended complaint.
Second. But, it is contended, such an amendment of the complaint would change the
theory of the case. Three reasons were cited by the Court of Appeals why it thought the trial
court correctly refused to admit the so-called Supplemental Complaint of petitioner: (1)
change in the reliefs prayed for; (2) change in the issues of the case; and (3) prejudice to the
rights of private respondent.
The contention has no merit. An amendment to change the relief sought does not
change the theory of a case. What is prohibited is a change in the cause of action.
In this case, the original complaint for Mandamus/Certiorari With Preliminary Injunction
And/Or Restraining Order alleged, as cause of action, private respondents unjustifiable
refusal to award the contract to petitioner despite the fact that the latter was the lowest and
best qualifying bidder..
As already stated, the change in the relief sought was necessitated by a supervening
event which rendered the first relief sought impossible of attainment.
Because the cause of action on which the complaint for mandamus and injunction and
the so-called Supplemental Complaint are based is one and the same, the issue raised is the
same, namely, whether private respondent was justified in refusing to award the contract for
janitorial services to petitioner.
Nor would admission of the amended complaint prejudice the rights of private
respondent as defendant in the action below, as the Court of Appeals held. Indeed neither
the trial court nor the appellate court showed in what way the rights of private respondent
would be prejudiced by the allowance of the amendment in question. There will be no
unfairness or surprise to private respondent, because after all private respondent will have a
right to file an amended answer and present evidence in support thereof.
Third. The Court of Appeals also held that the action for mandamus and/or injunction
had become moot and academic and consequently there was no longer any complaint to be
supplemented. It is true that a supplemental or an amended pleading presupposes the
existence of a pleading. What was rendered moot and academic, however, was not
petitioners cause of action but only its prayer for the writ of mandamus. There was still an
alternative remedy left to petitioner of seeking damages in lieu of an award of the
contract. The situation is similar to an action for illegal dismissal in labor law. If
reinstatement is no longer possible, because the position has been abolished and there is no
way the dismissed employee can be reinstated to a comparable position, the employees
action is not thereby rendered moot and academic. He can instead ask for separation pay.
Indeed, what is important is that, as already stated, the basic allegations of fact in the
original and in the amended complaints are the same, namely, that private respondent,
without justification, refused to award the contract of services to petitioner. Through no fault
of petitioner, the year for which janitorial services were to be rendered expired without the
resolution of petitioners case. It would be to exalt technicality over substance to require that
petitioner file a new complaint. It would best serve the interests of justice if the so-called
Supplemental Complaint is simply considered as embodying amendments to the original
complaint. In fact it appears that the court ordered a continuation of the trial on September
19, 1991, despite petitioners statement in its Supplemental Complaint that the original case
had become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the case is
REMANDED to the trial court with instructions to admit the Supplemental Complaint and to
treat it as an amendment to the original complaint or to require petitioner to file an

amended complaint, merging the relevant allegations of its original complaint and
Supplemental Complaint, and thereafter to allow private respondent to file an answer.
[GRN L-39379 April 30, 1985]
BONIFACIO GOTICO, plaintiff-appellant,
COMMERCE, defendantappelle.

vs.

LEYTE

CHINESE

CHAMBER

OF

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The controversy revolves around the ownership of a portion of Lot No. 4875 of the Tacloban
Cadastre, with a total area of 1,306 sq. ms., situated at Bo. Utap, Litid District, Tacloban City.
The Disputed Portion consists of approximately 872 square meters.

On July 13, 1961, plaintiff-appellant obtained Original Certificate of Title No. P-139 covering
the entirety of Lot 4875.

On the strength of that title, plaintiff-appellant filed the instant case for
Ejectment against defendant-appellee, the Leyte Chinese Chamber of Commerce, on
August 8, 1962. The Complaint alleged that plaintiff-appellant was the "owner and possessor
since time immemorial tacked by purchase to his predecessors-in-interest of Lot 4875;" that
defendant-appellee, without any color of right, had occupied the Disputed Portion and
utilized the same as a private cemetery
Plaintiff-appellant then prayed for judgment ordering defendantappellee to vacate the
Disputed Portion and to declare him the lawful owner and possessor thereof and "(b)
ordering defendant to pay the amount of P200,000.00 in rentals of the premises in question,
to be computed from 1928 to the filing of the complaint x x x" (Italics ours).
Defenclant-appellee traversed the Complaint by claiming that it had been in possession of
the Disputed Portion since 1928 when it built a public cemetery thereon with the approval of
the Bureau of Health; that plaintiffappellant had obtained title to Lot 4875 by means of fraud
and false statements of fact, and that on May 2, 1962, or prior to the institution of the
Ejectment Case, it had already petitioned the Bureau of Lands for the cancellation of
plaintiff-appellant's title over Lot 4875. Defendant-appellee then prayed for the dismissal of
the Complaint and for the declaration of plaintiffappellant's title as null and void.
On January 29, 1965, the Bureau of Lands filed case entitled "Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Director of Lands vs. Bonifacio Gotico, and the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City," for the reversion of Lot 4875 to the Government and the cancellation of
plaintiff-appellant's title (Reversion Case).
Considering that both cases involved the same parties and the same subject matter, the
parties agreed that the two cases be jointly heard. A joint Pre-trial was held wherein both
parties agreed that:
"x x x stipulations and admissions in Civil Case 3618 in so far as they are material and
relevant to Case 3088 shall be taken into consideration in said Case 3088, and that
whatever stipulations and admissions made by the parties in Case 3088 in so far as they are
pertinent to said Civil Case 3618."2
In the same Pre-trial hearing, the parties stipulated on the following facts:
"1) the admission of the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the complaint;
"2) that the cemetery owned by the Leyte Chinese Chamber of Commerce is within Lot 4875
and is occupying an area of 872 square meters;
"3) that the defendant had been occupying and using the said land in question since 1928;
"4) that Lot 4875, where the cemetery in question is also included, is covered by OCT No. P139, marked Exhibit 'A' in Civil Case No. 3088 and as Exhibit '1' in Civil Case No. 3168, and
that after the issuance of OCT No. P139, there was issued Tax Declaration No. 17392, in the
name of BONIFACIO GOTICO and which is marked as Exhibit 'B' in Civil Case No. 3088 and as
Exhibit '2' in Civil Case No. 36183. (Italics supplied).
Realizing that the admission as to the date of commencement of
defendantappellee's possession made in paragraph 3 of the aforesaid Pre-trial
agreement, as well as the averments made in paragraph 4 of the Complaint and in

the Prayer thereof were fatal to his cause, plaintiff-appellant, assisted by a new
counsel, filed an "Omnibus Motion to Amend Complaint and Recall or Correct some
Pre-trial Admissions." The thrust was to amend the year "1928" to 1961 not only in
paragraph 4 and in the Prayer of the Complaint but also in the aforementioned pre-trial
Agreement. The Court denied the Motion for amendment and/or correction for being
unmeritorious. Two Motions for Reconsideration filed by plaintiff-appellant met with the same
fate.
In the meantime, the Reversion Case was decided in favor of the Government and plaintiffappellant's title was ordered cancelled.
On the basis of said judgment, defendant-appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in
the Reversion Case alleging that there is "no genuine issue between the parties x x x and
the defendant is entitled as a matter of law to the dismissal of the x x x case." Summary
judgment was rendered therein ordering reversion of Lot 4875 to the State.
Subsequently, in the Ejectment Case, the trial Court rendered judgment dismissing the suit
after opining that:
Civil Case No. 3618, especially upon a consideration of the admission of Bonifacio Gotico,
not only in his complaint but also in the pre-trial hearing, that the defendant bad been
occupying the land in question since 1928."
Hence, the appeal to the then Court of Appeals.
HELD:
1. We find that the Trial Court correctly exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff-appellant's
Motion to Amend paragraph 4 of the Complaint and paragraph (b) of the Prayer by changing
the year 192 8 " to 196
The amendment sought is a substantial one. A claim of possession by either or both parties
involving a span of 33 years is surely
"x x x the Court has, therefore, no alternative but to render in this case a Decision
which must be consistent with the Decision of this Court in a substantial element
of the cause of action. Besides, even if the amendment were allowed, there is
preponderant evidence proving possession by defendant-appellee since 1928. It
had filed the application for the conversion of the Disputed Portion into a cemetery on
February 10, 1928. Its application was approved on May 17, 1928 by the Bureau of Health.
Since then, that portion had remained part of a Chinese cemetery. Its possession since 1928
was also recognized in the Reversion Case. All of which disprove plaintiffappellant's
allegations in his application for a Free Patent that:
"4. The land described and applied for - is not claimed or occupied by any other person, but
is a public land. I entered upon and began cultivation of the same on the 28th day of
January, 1961, and since that date I have made thereon the following improvements viz:
bamboos, bananas and coconut"4
Similarly, we find no error in the denial by the Trial Court of plaintiffappellant's Motion to
recall or correct some pre-trial admissions. Pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court,
the Order entered at the pre-trial controls the subsequent course of the action.
Furthermore, under Rule 129, Section 2, it is necessary for a party who desires to
be relieved of the effects of admissions in the pleadings and any admissions made
in the course of the trial, to show that the admission had been made through
palpable mistake. In this case, that there was no such palpable mistake is shown
by the fact that the year "1928" was stated not only in paragraph 4 of the
Complaint, but repeated in the Prayer, and reiterated in the Pre-trial admissions.
Under the circumstances obtaining and in the face of the evidence, the rule on liberality of
construction of the Rules cannot be successfully invoked. To do so would be obstructive of
the interests of substantial justice.
2. The second error raised is neither meritorious. Plaintiff-appellant who had agreed with
defendant-appellee that the evidence in either of the two consolidated cases, when relevant,
would be considered in the other, is now estopped from asserting the contrary now that he
had lost both cases.
And more significantly, since plaintiff-appellant's title was cancelled in the
Reversion Case, he has lost any cause of action he may have had in the Ejectment
Case. The appeal in the Reversion Case had been resolved against
plaintiffappellant on December 13, 1972.

3. The foregoing discussions also dispose of the third issue raised, which is but a
consequence of the first two errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV, is hereby
affirmed in toto.
[G.R. No. L-7076. April 28, 1955.]
ERIBERTO P. ROSARIO and PAZ UNTALAN DE ROSARIO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
FILOMENO CARANDANG, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
On October 16, 1952, plaintiffs Eriberto P. Rosario and Paz Untalan de Rosario filed a
complaint against defendants Filomeno Carangdang, et al., CFI Pangasinan specifically
alleging therein that plaintiffs-appellants are the owners and possessors of a parcel of land
in Labrador, Pangasinan; that they have applied for the registration thereof in Registration
Case No. 658, G.L.R.O. No. 2610, wherein defendants filed an opposition; that on or about
October 3, 1952, defendants illegally entered into the premises, destroyed the nipa plants
thereon, and made dikes to convert the place into a fishpond; that in spite of warnings and
notices from plaintiffs-appellants, defendants continued to possess and occupy the
premises; and that as a result of defendants' entry into and possession of the land in
question, plaintiffs have suffered damages in the amount of P2,000.
On November 3, 1952, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint, claiming (1)
that the Court had no jurisdiction of the case because it is one of forcible entry and detainer
exclusively cognizable by the Justice of the Peace Court, and furthermore, because the
demand for damages does not exceed P2,000; and (2) that there is another action pending
between the same parties and for the same cause, wherein plaintiffs are the applicants and
defendants are the oppositors, in which the title and ownership of the parcel in question is
involved and contested. Plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss, alleging that the Court of
First Instance acting as a registration court, can not award damages resulting from
defendants' alleged illegal entry into and possession of the land in question.
The lower Court found the motion to dismiss meritorious, and on November 7, 1952
ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiffs moved for the reconsideration of the
order of dismissal, and prayed as well for the admission of an amended complaint,
wherein they make specific allegation for the first time that the defendants are
claiming ownership of the land in question in the two registration cases
previously mentioned. Defendants opposed the motion for reconsideration and the
admission of an amended complaint, upon the ground that the amended complaint would
convert plaintiffs' action from one of forcible entry and detainer to one of recovery of
ownership and possession. Again, defendants' position was sustained by the Court below;
and later, it denied a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal. Hence, this
appeal by the plaintiffs to this Court.
We see no error in the lower Court's dismissal of appellants' original complaints. It was filed
on October 16, 1952, barely two weeks from and after the alleged entry into and illegal
taking of possession of the land in question by the defendants. The case pleaded was a
clear action for forcible entry and detainer, where plaintiffs allege prior
possession of the premises in question and to have been deprived thereof within
the period of one year, by other person or persons, who excluded them therefrom
and withheld possession without right a case falling within the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts.
Appellants insist that their action is not for forcible entry and detainer but for declaration of
ownership or quieting of title, with claim for damages in the sum of P2,500 This argument is
untenable. There is no averment in the complaint that the defendants claim or dispute the
ownership of the parcel in question. The simple allegation therein that defendants have filed
an opposition in the case where plaintiffs have applied for the registration of said parcel,
does not amount to an allegation that the defendants are claiming ownership thereof, since
an opposition in a registration case may be based on claims or interest other than ownership
in the land sought to be registered. And neither does the fact that appellants pray in their
complaint that they be declared owners of the parcel in question convert their action from
one of forcible entry into one for declaration of ownership or quieting of title; for the prayer
is not a material part of the complaint, and it is the allegations of the complaint, and not the
prayer, that not only determine the jurisdiction of the court, but confer that jurisdiction
Plaintiffs also insist that their action falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance,
because their claim for damages amounts to P2,500. This argument is untenable. In the first

place, settled is the rule that justice of the peace courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
forcible entry and detainer cases, regardless of the amount claimed therein as damages.
Under their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the lower Court erred in
denying their motion for reconsideration and in refusing to admit their amended complaint.
Again we find this assignment of error to be without merit. While it is true that under the
liberal provisions of our Rules of Court, amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally
allowed in the furtherance of justice, it is obvious that when it appears from the very face of
the complaint that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, an
amendment of the complaint can not be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon the Court.
Appellants' original complaint, as we have already determined, is one for forcible
entry and detainer, over which the Court below has no jurisdiction. Not having
acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the original complaint, the
lower court has neither the power nor the jurisdiction to act on the motion for the
admission of the amended complaint, much less to allow such amendment, since
it is elementary that the court must first acquire jurisdiction over the case in
order to act validly therein. Wherefore, the Court below did not err in refusing to
admit plaintiffs-appellants' amended complaint.
The case might be different had the amendment been made before an answer or a motion
to dismiss had been filed, since the original complaint was then amendable, and the
amendment could supersede the original pleading, as of right, without leave of court being
required, and without the Court taking cognizance at all of the original complaint.
In view of the foregoing, the orders appealed from are affirmed, without prejudice to
appellants' filing another case for reivindicacion.

CONTECH CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JERRY A.


KHO, WEIJEN A. KHO and WILLEN A. KHO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
GREENBELT SQUARE, INC., respondents.
NOCON, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul and set
aside the decision dated July 24, 1987 of the Court of Appeals 1 directing the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch CLXIV in Civil Case No. 45321 to admit the amended complaint of
respondent Greenbelt Square, Inc. and to proceed with the trial of said case.
It appears on record that on August 8, 1980, petitioner Contech Construction Technology &
Development Corporation, as contractor, and private respondent Greenbelt Square, Inc., as
owner, entered into an Agreement whereby the former undertook the construction,
equipping, furnishing and supplying of materials for a theater and restaurant building for
consideration of P20,069,694.00. 2
Pursuant to said Agreement, petitioners secured from the Philippine British Assurance Co.,
Inc. (Phil-British for brevity), a bond of P2,000,000.00 under Bond No. 0746 to guarantee the
payment of the labor and materials used in connection with the construction project, 3 from
the Metropolitan Insurance Co. (Metropolitan for brevity); P4,000,000.00 under Surety No.
80/G(13)00853 to secure the full and faithful performance of the petitioners 4 and Surety
No. 80/G(10)00457 for P2,000,000.00 to guarantee the supply of cement and steel bars
needed for said project. 5
On October 21, 1981, respondent Corporation terminated the Agreement upon petitioners'
failure to comply with the terms and conditions of said Agreement. 6 Respondent
Corporation, likewise, sent Phil-British and Metropolitan notices of claim for petitioners'
failure to perform their part of the Agreement.
Petitioners, thereafter, withdrew their men and equipments from the construction site and
respondent Corporation contracted the services of R.N. Construction Co., Inc. to finish the
building project. However, upon petitioners' refusal to pay their obligation to respondent
Corporation, the latter, on March 24, 1982, simultaneously filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal who separate complaints against petitioners and their sureties for breach of
contract.
In the first complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. 45321, respondent Corporation
had petitioners and Phil-British as party defendants for the collection of a sum of money,
while the second complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. 45322, petitioners and
Metropolitan were also party defendants for the collection of a sum of money.

On June 3, 1982, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint on the ground of
the pendency of the first complaint likewise between the same parties for the same cause,
which motion was denied by the trial court. However, upon appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court, 7 the appellate court on May 4, 1984 held that there was a splitting of a
cause of action when the two complaints were filed simultaneously, hence, the orders of the
trial court dated May 17, 1983 and July 25, 1983 denying the motion to dismiss and the
motion for reconsideration were nullified. Said decision of the appellate court became final
on August 2, 1984.
On August 8, 1984, respondent Corporation filed before the lower court where the first
complaint was pending, a motion for leave to amend its complaint and to consolidate the
two cases, which motion was denied on October 3, 1984. Accordingly, respondent
Corporation filed a motion for reconsideration on October 29, 1984, which was also denied
on January 13, 1987.
Thereafter, respondent Corporation filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
appellate court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying its
motion to amend the complaint.
The appellate court, on July 24, 1987, rendered a decision giving due course to respondent
Corporation's petition and directed the trial court to admit the amended complaint of the
respondent corporation. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on
August 11, 1987 which was denied on August 27, 1987.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the appellate court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the amended complaint of the
respondent Corporation, considering that the previous dismissal of the second complaint for
violating the rule against splitting a cause of action barred its reinstitution by the
amendment of the first complaint.
Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
"A party may amend his pleading once
pleading is served or, if the pleading is
the action has not been placed upon
within ten (10) days after it is served."

as a matter of course at any time before a responsive


one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time
Cdpr

Under this rule, a party is given a right to file an amended pleading within the time and upon
the conditions specified in the rule and without the necessity of obtaining leave of court
since a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served. This rule expressly authorizes the amendment of pleadings in
order that all matters in the action in dispute between the parties may be completely
determined in a single proceeding. The amended complaint, in the instant case, was filed
not to delay nor alter the cause of action of the first complaint but rather to obviate the
splitting of the cause of action and to obtain a speedy determination of the controversy in
one proceeding without regard to technicality. The amended complaint merely impleaded
Metropolitan as a party defendant in the first complaint and included in said complaint the
cause of action alleged in the second complaint which was already dismissed. Furthermore,
petitioners had not yet filed any responsive pleading to the first complaint when respondent
corporation filed the motion to amend its complaint. As correctly held by the appellate court:
"It is a recognized rule of procedure that pleadings shall be construed liberally so as to
render substantial justice to the parties and in order that actual merits of the controversy
may speedily be determined without regard to technicalities and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner. The judicial attitude has always been favorable and liberal in allowing
amendments to a pleading. The rationale behind the rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits and
in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights are
determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. When the
situation is such that if the proposed amendment is not allowed, another action would be
instituted, thus making two actions, two trials, and two appeals possible and probable, the
said amendment should be admitted. Hence, should the trial court find the allegations in the
pleadings to be inadequate, it should allow the party concerned to file proper amendments
to pleadings in accordance with the mandate of the Rules of Court that amendments to
pleadings are favored and should be liberally allowed.
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent
Court committed a grave and serious abuse of discretion in not admitting the amended
complaint. The records of the case indicate that the motion for leave to admit the amended

complaint was filed before a responsive pleading was filed. In fact, no responsive pleading
has yet been filed by the private respondents. Their opposition filed on August 15, 1984 is
not a responsive pleading within the contemplation of the rule. Consequently, the filing by
the petitioner of an amended complaint was erroneously denied by the respondent Court,
the same being a matter of right. Indeed, in such a situation, an error of the trial court in
refusing such amendment is controllable by mandamus.
Moreover, the Court, after assiduously examining and comparing the original and amended
complaint, is of the opinion that the amendment sought to be included did not in any
manner change the cause of action nor was it intended for delay, which considerations
appear to be the only ground for denying a motion for leave to amend under section 3 of
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court." 8
Petitioners also contend that the rule of conclusiveness of judgment is applicable in this case
in view of the finality of the judgment of the appellate court dismissing the second complaint
which was being reintroduced by a mere amendment of the first complaint. In said
judgment, it was held that there was a splitting of a cause of action in the first and second
complaint, therefore the rule against splitting of a cause of action barred the second
complaint as enunciated in the cases of Jimenez vs. Camara 9 and City of Bacolod vs. San
Miguel Brewery, 10 resulting in an outright denial of the amended complaint.
We do not agree.
The rulings in the aforementioned cases are not applicable in the case at bar since both
cases refer to a situation wherein the second complaint, which cause of action should be
included in the first complaint, was filed after a final decision was rendered on the merits. In
this case, the first and second complaint were not yet set for pre-trial or trial because
petitioners had not yet filed any responsive pleading to both complaints, therefore the
amendment should be allowed since said amendment will not delay the proceeding and
there was no change in respondent Corporation's cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

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