Double sale who has better right

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first
in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.
PRINCIPLE OF PRIOR EST TEMPORAE, PRIOR EST IN JURA OR HE WHO IS FIRST IN TIME
IS PREFERRED IN RIGHT SHOULD APPLY.

Jurisprudence teaches us that (t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time,
stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first
buyers right except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the
first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing
of her rights under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as against the second buyer.
But in converso, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his right even if he is
first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with bad faith. This
is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to displace the
first buyer, that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted
in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers right) from the
time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery
of possession.

In a situation where not all the requisites are present which would warrant the
application of Art. 1544, the principle of prior tempore, potior jure or simply he
who is first in time is preferred in right, should apply. The only essential
requisite of this rule is priority in time; in other words, the only one who can
invoke this is the first vendee. Undisputedly, he is a purchaser in good faith
because at the time he bought the real property, there was still no sale to a
second vendee. In the instant case, the sale to the Heirs by Gamiao and

Dayag, who first bought it from Rizal Madrid, was anterior to the sale by the
Madrid brothers to Marquez. The Heirs also had possessed the subject
property first in time. Thus, applying the principle, the Heirs, without a scintilla
of doubt, have a superior right to the subject property.
Moreover, it is an established principle that no one can give what one does
not have nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one
owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what
the seller can transfer legally. In this case, since the Madrid brothers were no
longer the owners of the subject property at the time of the sale to Marquez,
the latter did not acquire any right to it.
In any event, assuming arguendo that Article 1544 applies to the present
case, the claim of Marquez still cannot prevail over the right of the Heirs since
according to the evidence he was not a purchaser and registrant in good faith.
Prior registration of the subject property does not by itself confer ownership or
a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that before the second
buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good
faith throughout (i.e., in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers
rights) from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by
registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession.
In the instant case, the actions of Marquez have not satisfied the requirement
of good faith from the time of the purchase of the subject property to the time
of registration. Found by the Court of Appeals, Marquez knew at the time of
the sale that the subject property was being claimed or taken by the Heirs.
This was a detail which could indicate a defect in the vendors title which he
failed to inquire into. Marquez also admitted that he did not take possession of

the property and at the time he testified he did not even know who was in
possession.
One who purchases real property which is in actual possession of others
should, at least, make some inquiry concerning the rights of those in
possession. The actual possession by people other than the vendor should, at
least, put the purchaser upon inquiry. He can scarcely, in the absence of such
inquiry, be regarded as a bona fide purchaser as against such possessions.
The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed
title of the vendor and one who buys without checking the vendors title takes
all the risks and losses consequent to such failure.
It is further perplexing that Marquez did not fight for the possession of the
property if it were true that he had a better right to it. In our opinion, there were
circumstances at the time of the sale, and even at the time of registration,
which would reasonably require a purchaser of real property to investigate to
determine whether defects existed in his vendors title. Instead, Marquez
willfully closed his eyes to the possibility of the existence of these flaws. For
failure to exercise the measure of precaution which may be required of a
prudent man in a like situation, he cannot be called a purchaser in good faith.
As this Court explained in the case of Spouses Mathay v. Court of Appeals:
Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land
need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that
where there are circumstances which would put a party on guard and prompt
him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him, such as the
presence of occupants/tenants thereon, it is, of course, expected from the
purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of

possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the occupants possess the
land en concepto de dueo, in concept of owner. As is the common practice in
the real estate industry, an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a
safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should he find out
that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the
seller who, as in this case, is not in actual possession, it would then be
incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the extent of the occupants
possessory rights. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such
precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby
preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a purchaser in good faith.
This rule equally applies to mortgagees of real property.
In a situation where a party has actual knowledge of the claimants actual,
open and notorious possession of the disputed property at the time of
registration, as in this case, the actual notice and knowledge are equivalent to
registration, because to hold otherwise would be to tolerate fraud and the
Torrens system cannot be used to shield fraud (Lavides v. Pre, 419 Phil. 665,
671-672 [2001]).
While certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the
whole world, they merely confirm or record title already existing and vested.
They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be
used for the perpetration of fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich himself
at the expense of others (Bayoca v. Nogales, G.R. No. 138201, 12 September
2000, 340 SCRA 154, 169).
Moreover, as the Supreme Court declared in the case of Heirs of Simplicio
Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, tax declarations are good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be

paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession
(Larena v. Mapili, G.R. No. 146341, 7 August 2003, 408 SCRA 484, 491).

Better right of possession over the property

-The only issue is who between the contending parties has the better right to
possess the contested property independent of any claim of ownership. If a party
has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain in
the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. (German Management & Services Inc., vs CA,
177 SCRA 495 (1989).
*COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTMTC has no jurisdiction over the present case for failure of the plaintiff to comply
with the 15 day period demand to vacate as mandated by law.
No proof whatsoever was established that the defendant received the
aforementioned demand from the plaintiff.
The demand to vacate attached to the complaint has only allotted a 5-day period to
vacate the subject property.
SEC. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand.-Unless otherwise stipulated, such
action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions
of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand
upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no person
be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of
land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.

As contemplated in the aforecited rule, the demand to pay rent and vacate is
necessary if the action for unlawful detainer is anchored on the non-payment of
rentals, as in the instant case. The same rule explicitly provides that the unlawful
detainer suit must be commenced only if the lessee fails to comply after the lapse
or expiration of fifteen (15) days in case of lands and five (5) days in case of
buildings, from the time the demand is made upon the lessee. The demand required
and contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 70 is a jurisdictional requirement for the
purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit for failure to pay rent. It partakes of

an extrajudicial remedy that must be pursued before resorting to judicial action

such that full compliance with the demand would render unnecessary a court
action.[6]
Hence, it is settled that for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites
must concur, namely: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or to comply with the
conditions of the lease and (2) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and
vacate within the periods specified in Section 2, particularly, 15 days in the case of
land and 5 days in the case of buildings. The first requisite refers to the existence
of the cause of action for unlawful detainer while the second refers to the
jurisdictional requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be
pursued.[7]
As the subject matter of the instant case is a parcel of land, the
expiration of the aforesaid fifteen-day period is a prerequisite to
the filing of an action for unlawful detainer. As to whether
respondent observed this fifteen-day period, an affirmative
answer can be gleaned from the evidence on record.

(LIMBAUAN vs. ACOSTA G.R. No. 148606, 30June 2008)

in Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank:[17] where it said:

As contemplated in Section 2, the demand required is the demand
to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and not merely a
demand to vacate. Consequently, both demands - either to pay rent or
adhere to the terms of the lease and vacate arenecessary to make the
lessee a deforciant in order that an ejectment suit may be filed. It is
the lessor's demand for the lessee to vacate the premises and the tenant's
refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of the

possession. Such refusal violates the lessor's right of possession giving

rise to an action for unlawful detainer. However, prior to the institution
of such action, a demand from the lessor to pay or comply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate the premises is required under
the aforequoted rule. Thus, mere failure to pay the rents due or
violation of the terms of the lease does not automatically render a
person's possession unlawful. Furthermore, the giving of such demands
must be alleged in the complaint, otherwise the MTC cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the case.

PLAINTIFF IS IN BAD FAITH

Knowledge of a prior conveyance of a property by a subsequent purchaser makes him a
purchaser in bad faith and his knowledge of such transfer vitiates his right acquired by virtue of
the latter instrument of conveyance which creates no right as against the first purchaser.

TAX DECLARATIONS; TAX RECEIPTS

Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are
not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good
indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or atleast constructive possession. They constitute at least
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to
the property and announces his adverse claim against the state and
all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute to
the needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens
ones bona fide, claim of acquisition of ownership. (Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Naguit)

Moreover, tax declarations and receipts when coupled with actual

possession constitute evidence of great weight.
When a party claiming title presents a deed executed and delivered
to him by the former owner, the receipts and declarations constitute
some proof showing the good faith on the part of the person
occupying and retaining possession of the property.( Frondarina v.
Malazarte, GR No.148423, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 223).
Tax receipts may not prevail as proof of adverse possession against
one who is in actual possession of the property, but they constitute
atleast an indicia of possession.
POSSESSION
The Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. To possess means to have, to actually and
physically occupy a thing, with or without right. Two things are
paramount in possession. First, there must be occupancy,
apprehension or taking. Second, there must be intent to possess.
The defendant is in the possession and occupation of the property
in question under a claim of title or ownership. Conversely, the
defendant possesses the property not as a lessee but with the
intention of claiming it in hostility against any person by virtue of
the instrument of conveyance executed in favor of the defendant.
His act of occupation seeks to delimit the all- encompassing effect
of constructive possession.
RULE IN CASE OF CONFLICT OF POSSESSION
Article 538 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same

time in two different personalities except in the cases of copossession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are
two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all
these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings.
It is undisputed that even prior to the death of the previous owner
of the property in question, the defendant has been in an open,
continuous, actual, public and adverse possession and occupation
of the land under claim of ownership and not as a lessee or a
person who holds the property by mere tolerance of the owner. And
if the defendant was in actual possession of the property in
question, then the plaintiff was never in actual possession of the
said lot. If the plaintiff is not in actual possession of the lot, the
alleged possessory information alone, without showing of actual,
public, and adverse possession of the land under clam of ownership
is weak as a ground for claiming ownership over such property.

OVERT ACTS OF POSSESSION

Overt acts of possession may consist in introducing valuable
improvements on the property like constructing a residential house
thereon and declaring the same for taxation purposes.

As held in the case of Heirs of Juan Oclarit vs. C.A., 233 SCRA 239,
Any person who claims ownership by virtue of Tax
Declarations must also prove he is in actual possession of the
property. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes become strong evidence of ownership
acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession.