9 Cases

HIPOLITO-AGUILAR, CHRISEL
Property Case Digest

2nd Year - Wesleyan Law School
DIGESTED CASES
1. Del Banco v. Intermediate Appellate Court 156 SCRA 55
2. Pardell v. Bartolome 23 Phil. 450
3. Caro v. Court of Appeals 113 SCRA 10
4. Bailon- Casilao v. Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 738
5. Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court 165 SCRA 118
6. Delima v. Court of Appeals 201 SCRA 641
7. Aguilar v. Court of Appeals 227 SCRA 472
8. Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 316 SCRA 502
9. Robles v. Court of Appeals 328 SCRA 97
Page 1 of 27
DEL BANCO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

No. L72694 December 1, 1987
FACTS:
In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael, Bulacan, on February

11, 1859, three brothers, Benedicto Pansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel
Pansacola (known as Fr. Manuel Pea) entered into an agreement which
provided, among others:
o That they will purchase the lands comprising the Island of Cagbalite;
o That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their common
property;
o That the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo,
minors at that time represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr.
Manuel Pena) who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of the
Cagbalite Island;
o That whatever benefits may be derived from the Island shall be shared
equally by the co-owners in the following proportion: Benedicto
Pansacola-1/4 share; Jose Pansacola-1/4 share; and, Domingo Arce and
Baldomera Angulo-2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of
their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena).
On April 11, 1868 they agreed to modify the terms and conditions of the
agreement which now provided for a new sharing and distribution of the lands,
and benefits derived therefrom, as follows:
o The first one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Benedicto Pansacola;
o The second one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Jose Pansacola;
o The third one-fourth(1/4) portion shall henceforth belong to the children of
their deceased brother, Don Eustaquio Pansacola, namely: Don Mariano
Pansacola,- Maria Pansacola and Don Hipolito Pansacola;
o The fourth and last one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to their nephews
and nieces (1) Domingo Arce, (2) Baldomera Angulo, (3) Marcelina Flores,
(4) Francisca Flores, (5) Candelaria dela Cruz, and (6) Gervasio
Pansacola who, being all minors, are still under the care of their brother,
Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena). The latter is the real father of said
minors.
About one hundred years later, private respondents brought a special action for
partition including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest of the coowners of the Cagbalite Island in the second contract of co-ownership. In their
answer some of the defendants, petitioners herein, interposed such defenses as
prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership, estoppel and laches.
Page 2 of 27
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the Cagbalite Island has
already been partitioned into four (4) parts among the original co-owners or their
successors-in-interest. On appeal, respondent Court reversed and set aside the
decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there have been a partition of the Cagbalite Island.
RULING:
Article 496 of the Civil Code provides:
Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are
consistent with this Code.
There was no partition of the Cagbalite Island.

ANALYSIS:
Actual possession and enjoyment of several portions of the property in question does
not provide any proof that the Island in question has already been actually partitioned
and co-ownership terminated. A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other coowners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court (Rule 71 of the Old Rules), adjudicate to himself in fee simple a
determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion
of other co-owners. It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership both under the
present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889 that no individual co- owner can claim
anydefinite portion thereof. lt is therefore of no moment that some of the co-owners
have succeeded in securing cadastral titles in their names to some portions of the
Island occupied by them (Rollo, p.10).
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a
subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive
possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them
accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of actual
partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
(Maganon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 [1986]). Neither can such actual possession and
enjoyment of some portions of the Island by some of the petitioners herein be
considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is undisputed that the Cagbalite Island
was purchased by the original co-owners as a common property and it has not been
proven that the Island had been partitioned among them or among their heirs. While
Page 3 of 27
there is co-ownership, a co-owner's possession of his share is co-possession which is

linked to the possession of the other co-owners (Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234
[1977]).
CONCLUSION:
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a
subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive
possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them
accordingly.
RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ, ET AL v. GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO

ET AL - 023 Phil 450, G.R. No. 4656 November 18, 1912
Page 4 of 27
FACTS:
Petitioner of this case is Vincenta Ortiz, sister of the defendant, Matilde Ortiz.
On 1876, Calixta Felin, executed a nuncupative will in Vigan, leaving all of her
properties to her four children: Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta and Matilde Ortiz.
Manuel died before his mother, Calixta, while Francisca died and left no heir,
leaving all the properties to Vicenta and Matilde. Vicenta lives with her husband
in Spain, while Matilde and her husband, Gaspar Bartolome live in Vigan.
On or about the first months of 1888, the defendants, without judicial
authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the
administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents,
fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs interest.
Despite demands made upon Matilde Ortiz to divide the aforementioned
properties with the plaintiff Vicenta and to deliver to the latter the one-half of the
same which rightly belonged to her, said defendant and her husband, the said
defendant and her husband continued to delaying the partition and delivery of the
said properties by means of unkempt promises and other excuses.
Vicenta then filed a petition for partition with damages before the CFI/ RTC (not
mentioned which in the full text)
Defendant, in their answer, denied the allegations and said that they never
refused to divide properties in question, and that they have, as a matter of fact,
delivered to the plaintiffs, collection, specifically from those property rentals in
Calle Escolta and Calle Washington. They further alleged that Matilde Ortiz spent
Php 5091.52 for the repair of the house in Calle Escolta, after it was destroyed by
an earthquake. Hence, defendants filed a counterclaim on the expenses
rendered by them for said repair and further averred that Bartolome is entitled by
law, renumeration for being the administrator of the undivided property.
By motion, Plaintiffs, on the other hand requested that the value of the properties
be determined by experts judicial appraisers.
On October 5, 1907, the court rendered judgment holding that the revenues and
the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant
party, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise any
other expense besides those aforementioned, and absolved the defendants from
the complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim.
An exception was taken to this judgment by counsel for the defendants who
moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant
the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was
denied, hence, this petition before the court.
ISSUE:
Page 5 of 27
Whether or not co-owner is required to pay rent for exclusively using co-owned property.
RULING:
Defendants need not pay rent for exclusively using the co-owned property.
Article 394 (a) of the (Old) Civil Code Provides: (now 486 in the New Civil Code)
Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them
in accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests
of the community nor prevent the co-owners from utilizing them according to
their rights."
ANALYSIS:
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling,
in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, Matilde
caused any detriment to the interests of the community property, nor that she prevented
her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be
noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was
duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property
and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure
the interests of his co-owners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the
respective part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the co-owners
exercises together with his other co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which
entitled the defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet, in view of the
fact that the defendant Matildes husband, Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four
years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house on Calle Escolta, using it as
an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that
province, strict justice requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one-half of the
monthly rent which the said quarters could have produced, had they been leased to
another person. This conclusion as to Bartolomes liability results from the fact that,
even as the husband of the defendant coowner of the property, he had no right to
occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the house in question,
where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive
one-half of the rent which those quarters could and should have produced, had they
been occupied by a stranger. Therefore, the defendant Bartolome must pay to the
plaintiff Vicenta, half of the rent should a third person have occupied said space.
Page 6 of 27
With respect to the payment of the sum demanded as a counterclaim, it was admitted
and proved in the present case that, as a result of a serious earthquake, defendants
rendered expenses for repairing the house in Calle Escolta, half of which may be
rightfully demanded on the plaintiffs.
With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the
defendant Matilde for his administration of the property of common ownership,
inasmuch as no stipulation whatever was made in the matter by and between him and
his sister-in-law, the said defendant, the claimant is not entitled to the payment of any
remuneration whatsoever.
CONCLUSION:
Hereditary succession gives rise to co-ownership, and that Each co-owner may use the
things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with their object and in
such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the co-owners
from utilizing them according to their rights
LUZ CARO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BASILIA

LAHORRA VDA. DE BENITO, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF BENITO, respondents.
No. L46001. March 25, 1982.
FACTS:
Page 7 of 27
Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of
two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T609 and T610 of the Registry of
Deeds of Sorsogon. Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving wife,
Basilia Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito, were subsequently appointed by
the CFI as joint administrators of Marios estate.
Benjamin Benito sold 1/3 of the undivided portion to Petitioner Luz Caro, with
consent of Saturnino and Alfredo Benito.
Private Respondent Basilia Lahorra learned about the sale and offered to
redeem said 1/3 portion, which was ignored by petitioner Luz.
Private Respondent then filed for annulment of sale and mortgage and
cancellation of the of the annotation of sake and mortgage.
The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to prosecute.
Private Respondent filed an independent case and brought to prove that as an
administratrix, she was not notified of the sale as required by Articles 1620 and
1623 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner Luz Caro, on the other hand, presented evidence of written notice of
the intended sale to possible redemptioners by Benjamin Benito, as well as the
statement of Saturninos widow that the notice was indeed received by the
former, however, the same was ignored by Saturnino and he showed no interest
to buy such share.
The trial court Dismissed the Private respondents petition on the following
grounds:
o Private repondent Lahorra does not have the power to exercise the right to
legal redemption;
o Benjamin Benito was able to comply with his obligation to notify possible
redemptioners.
Motion for reconsideration of this decision was denied, hence private respondent
Lahorra appelled before the CA with the following contention:
o The judge should have inhibited because his son is an associate in the
lawfirm of Caros lawyer;
o The court erred in ruling that Benjamin complied with he provision of
Article 1623;
o Furnishing written notice of desire to sell to his co-owners is not sufficient
compliance;
o Refusing to allow plaintiff to redeem the property under Butte Vs. Manuel
Uy and Sons.
Court of Appeals render a decision in favor of Plaintiff (herein private respondent)
with the following grounds:
o Benjamin Benito and Luz Caro should have made a Notice to Lahorra of
the sale;
Page 8 of 27
o Recital to the deed of sale is not enough notice;

o Saturninos desire not to buy the lot was a unilateral- he was only one of
the administrators;
Petitioner Luz Caro filed a petition for review before the SC with the following
grounds:
o Respondent court erred in allowing the exercise of the right of legal
redemption by the private respondent;
o It further erred in finding that there was no notice in law from which to
count the tolling of the period of redemption and that the sale was not
made known at all to private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has already been a termination of co-ownership of the land
in question.
Whether or not Private respondent can exercise the right of redemption, being an
administratrix.
RULING:
Partition and termination of co-ownership was effected as early as 1960.
Private respondent does not have the personality to exercise the right of redemption
provided for under Article 1620 and 1623.
ANALYSIS:
Private respondent sought for the right of redemption based on the assumption that land
is under co-ownership, however, there has already been a partition as early as 1960,
and co-ownership was then terminated. In Hernandez vs Andal et. Al, 78 Phil. 196, court
ruled that an agreement of partition, though oral, is valid and consequently binding
upon the parties. A petition for subdivision was filed made and by common agreement,
the co-owners took exclusive and actual possession of their respective land portions.
In Caram et. Al vs. CA, the court held: xxx once the property is subdivided and
distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and there is no reason
to sustain any right of legal redemption.
Private respondent Lahorras contention that Luz Caro acted in bad faith and fraud in
obtaining a subdivision title over the 1/3 portion was not shown and proved with clear
and convincing evidence, hence untebale.
Page 9 of 27
Subdivision tittle was issued in the name of Petitioner Luz Caro, 1 year from such date
of entry of the subdivision tittle, hence the Certificate of Tittle is now incontrovertible
(Sec, 38, Act 496).
Further, Private respondent, as administratrix, has no personality to exercise said right
of redemption, in behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that private respondent had said right, she has
already failed to comply with the conditions precedent for the valid exercise thereof.
Example of such condition is that the redemptioner should render payment of
redemption money with in 30 days from the written notice of the sale by the co-owner.
CONCLUSION:
Coownership of real property becomes terminated after the two co-owners and the
administrator of the estate of the third co-owner agreed to subdivide the property owned
in common.
Even on the assumption that there still is coownership here and that therefore, the right
of legal redemption exists, private respondent as administratrix, has no personality to
exercise said right for and in behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito. She is on the
same footing as co-administrator Saturnino Benito.
BAILON- CASILAO vs. THE HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS

and CELESTINO AFABLE, respondents.
No. L78178. April 15, 1988
FACTS:
The land in question in this case is covered by OCT under the names of the
Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and Delia all surnamed Bailons, as
co-owners, each with a 1/6 share.
Page 10 of 27
Rosalia and Gaudencio sold a portion of the land to Donato Delgado. Rosalia
alone, then sold the remainder of the land to Ponciana Aresgado de Lanuza.
On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado the land which the Delgado
had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio.
Husband John Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney given by his
wife, Ponciana, sold the two parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr.
In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not
registered under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is.
It appears that the land had been successively declared for taxation first, in the
name of Ciriaca Dellamas, mother of the co-owners, then in the name of Rosalia
Bailon, then in that of Donato Delgado, then in Ponciana de Lanuza's name, and
finally in the name of Celestino Afable, Sr.
The petitioners in this case, the Bailons, filed a case for recovery of property
against Celestino Afable.
In his answer, Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through
prescription and said that the Bailons are guilty of laches.
The lower court declared Afable co-owner, having validly bought 2/6 of the land
(the shares of Rosalia and Gaudencio). And ordered the Ordering the
segregation of the undivided interests in the property in order to terminate
coownership to be conducted by any Geodetic Engineer selected by the parties
to delineate the specific part of the co-owners. Bailons appealed said decision.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, held the Bailons guilty of laches and
dismissed their complaint. Averring that although registered property cannot be
lost by prescription, nevertheless, an action to recover it may be barred by
laches, citing the ruling in Mejia de Lucaz v, Gamponia [100 Phil. 277 (1956)].
The Bailons brought the decision before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not laches is applicable in the present case.
RULING:
Neither prescription nor laches can be invoked. The action for partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription.
Page 11 of 27
ANALYSIS:
Well stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely: (1)
conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to
the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a
remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit;
and, (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred [Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et aL,
96 Phil. 622 (1955)].
While the first and last elements are present in this case, the second and third
elements are missing.
The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainants rights. However,
the mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute. laches. It is required that (1)
complainant must have had knowledge of the conduct of defendant or of one under
whom he claims and (2) he must have been afforded an opportunity to institute suit.
This court has pointed out that laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time.
Thus:
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of
time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it. (Tijam, et al., v. Sibonghanoy)
It must be noted that while there was delay in asserting petitioners rights, such delay
was not attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any opportunity to bring
suit. In the first place, petitioners had no notice of the sale made by their eldest
sister. It was only in in It was only when Delia Bailon Casilao returned to Sorsogon in
1981 that she found out about the sales and immediately, she and her co-petitioners
filed the present action for recovery of property. The appellate court thus erred in
holding that the petitioners did nothing to show interest in the land.
In view of the lack of knowledge by the petitioners of the conduct of Rosalia in selling
the land without their consent in 1975 and the absence of any opportunity to institute
the proper action until 1981, laches may not be asserted against the petitioner.
Page 12 of 27
The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of knowledge or
notice on the part of the defendant that the complainants would assert the right on
which they base the suit. On the contrary, private respondent is guilty of bad faith in
purchasing the property as he knew that the property was co-owned by six persons
and yet, there were only two signatories to the deeds of sale and no special
authorization to sell was granted to the two sellers by the other co-owners.
Indeed, aware of the flaws impairing his title, Afable went to the herein petitioner
Delia BailonCasilao, asking the latter to sign a document obviously to cure the flaw
[TSN, July 27,1983, p. 6]. Later, he even filed a petition it the Court of First Instance
to register the title in his name which was denied as aforesaid. It may be gleaned
from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino Afable is not a buyer in
good faith.
Laches being an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to the court with
clean hands.
CONCLUSION:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the acts and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate assign or mortgage it and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership (Art 493, NCC)
CONCEPCION ROQUE, Petitioner, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,

ERNESTO ROQUE, FILOMENA OSMUNDO, CECILIA ROQUE, MARCELA ROQUE,
JOSE ROQUE and RUBEN ROQUE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 75886. August 30, 1988
FACTS:
On 21 September 1959, the intestate heirs of Januario Avendao executed a

document entitled "Paghahati at Pagtagabuyan ng Mana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
Through this instrument, extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 1549 was effected
Page 13 of 27
among the intestate heirs namely Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino,

Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendao, and Ernesto Roque
and Victor Roque.
On 28 September 1959, co-owners Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino,
Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendao, in consideration of
the aggregate amount of P500.00, transferred their collective and undivided
three-fourths (3/4) share in Lot No. 1549 to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor
Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and complete ownership of the property.
Subsequently, in an unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan 4 dated 27
November 1961, Ernesto and Victor Roque purportedly sold a three-fourths (3/4)
undivided portion of Lot No. 1549 to their half-sister, petitioner Concepcion
Roque, for the same amount. The property, however, remained registered in the
name of the decedent, Januario Avendao
Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however,
refused to acknowledge petitioners claim of ownership of any portion of Lot No.
1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land.
Petitioner Concepcion Roque, on 6 December 1977, filed a Complaint for
"Partition with Specific Performance with the Court of First Instance of Malolos
against respondents Ernesto Roque and the heirs of Victor Roque.
In her complaint, petitioner (plaintiff below) claimed legal ownership of an
undivided three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549 (by virtue of the 27
November 1961 Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" executed in her favor by Ernesto
Roque and the heirs of Victor Roque. Finally, petitioner alleged that, as a coowner of Lot No. 1549, she had a right to seek partition of the property, that she
could be compelled to remain in the co-ownership of the same.
In an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed on 28 December
1977(defendants below) impugned the genuineness and due execution of the
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" dated 27 November 1961 on the ground "that the
signatures appearing thereon are not the authentic signatures of the supposed
signatories . . ." It was also alleged that petitioner Concepcion Roque, far from
being a co-owner of Lot No. 1549, "occupied a portion of the lot in question by
mere tolerance of the [defendants]." Respondents also refused to honor the
unnotarized Kasulatan and, additionally, denied having had any participation in
the preparation of the Subdivision Plan.
On 27 June 1983, the trial court (now Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Malolos)
rendered a Decision:
o
Ordering the partition of the parcel of land described in par. 3 of the complaint
covered by the Original Certificate of Title No. 1442-Bulacan issued in the name
of Janurio Avendao, in the proportion of 3/4 to pertain to Concepcion Roque,
Page 14 of 27
and 1/4 to pertain to Ernesto Roque and his co-defendants, his sister-in-law,
nephews and nieces, in accordance with the approved subdivision plan;
Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00
as and for attorneys fees and the costs of suit.
The respondents appealed this decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,

which rendered a decision in favor of the respondents. It ruled:
While the action filed by the plaintiff is for partition, the defendants, after denying
plaintiffs assertion of co-ownership xxx it is obvious that the case has become
one of ownership of the disputed portion of the lot and the action filed should
have been action reivindicatoria/ action for recovery of title and possession.
This decision of the Appellate court was brought by petitioner before the Supreme Court.
o
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners action for partition has already expired.
RULING:
The action for partition of the thing owned in common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae
erciscundae) does not prescribe. Private respondents are barred by laches in asserting sole
ownership of the land.
ANALYSIS:
Article 494 provides that action for partition of the thing owned in common does not prescribe,
as long as the other owners recognize the co-ownership. However if there is an assertion of
sole ownership, action for partition of claiming co-owners may be barred by prescription.
On he issue of validity of the Bilihan at Patuluyan was predicated on fraud, no action fro
annulment of the document had been brought by respondent within 4 years prescriptive period
under Article 1391, hence, such action has already prescribed.
The fact that Petitioner has enjoyed continuous and peaceful occupation of of the land, it is
most unusual that private respondents only allowed her to do so by mere tolerance. This latter
circumstance, coupled with the passage of a very substantial length of time during which
petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and uninterrupted in her occupation and
possession, places respondents here in laches: respondents may no longer dispute the
existence of the co-ownership between petitioner and themselves.
COCLUSION:
The action for partition of the thing owned in common (actio communi dividendo or actio familiae
erciscundae) does not prescribe.
However, if the defendants show that they had previously asserted title in themselves adversely
to the plaintiff and for the requisite period of time, the plaintiffs right to require recognition of his
Page 15 of 27
status as a co-owner will have been lost by prescription and the court cannot issue an order
requiring partition.
EPITACIO DELIMA et. al, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GELILEO

DELIMA (deceased), substituted by his legal heirs, Respondents.
G.R. No. 46296. September 24, 1991
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla
Friar Lands Estate in Cebu. He later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three
brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and
Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in question was
issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of "The Legal Heirs of Lino Delima,
deceased, represented by Galileo Delima.
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents,
executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs.". Based on this
affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on
Page 16 of 27
February 4, 1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the
other heirs.
In 1968, Petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima,
filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu an action for reconveyance and/or
partition of property and for the annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages
against their uncles Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima (for refusing to join the
latter in their action).
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners,
ordering the partition of the land in question, and cancelling TCT no. 3009.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 19, 1977, respondent
appellate court reversed the trial courts decision and upheld the claim of Galileo
Delima that all the other brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio,
Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and waived their rights to the
property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the
remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon.
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the right of a co-heir to demand partition of
inheritance is imprescriptible. If it does, the defenses of prescription and laches
have already been waived.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners action for partition is already barred by the statutory period
provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by
acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed
property.
RULING:
Petitioners are now barred by prescription. The petition denied and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
ANALYSIS:
When a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of partition and on the
strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor
and the issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property,
thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their
shares, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted
by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their
rights thereunder (Castillo v. Court of Appeals). Since an action for reconveyance of
land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the
Page 17 of 27
date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes
of the statute of limitations is counted (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals)
The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or
co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima
from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As the certificate
of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was
binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription. Hence,
when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on
February 29, 1963, such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims the
other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at
this time.
CONCLUSION:
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. However, from the
moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the
properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer
one of partition but of ownership. In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for
partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely
possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by
prescription.
VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B.

AGUILAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 76351 October 29, 1993
FACTS:
Virgilio and Senen are brothers. Virgilio is the youngest of seven (7) children
while Senen is the fifth. On 28 October 1969, the two brothers purchased a
house and lot in Paraaque where their father could spend and enjoy his
remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that
Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was onethird. By virtue of a written memorandum dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and
Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be
equal, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original
Page 18 of 27
owners with the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession
and enjoyment of the house together with their father.
Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers
agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title registered in the
meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would take
care of their father and his needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in
Cebu.
After their father died in 1974, petitioner (Virgilio) demanded from respondent
(Senen) that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and
proceeds thereof divided among them. Senen refused.
On 12 January 1979, Virgilio filed an action to compel the sale of the house and
lot so that the they could divide the proceeds between them. He has the following
prayer:
o the proceeds of the sale, be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his
favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent.
o for monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their
father died.
Respondents counterclaims on the other hand averred:
o that he had no objection to the sale as long as the best selling price could
be obtained
o that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided
equally; and,
o being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the
property.
RTC rendered judgment by default against defendant. It ruled:
o Senen and Virgilio are co-owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on
the basis of their written agreement.
o that plaintiff Virgilio has been deprived of his participation in the property
by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and lot, free of rent,
despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants, to
delay partition.
o upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand partition.
The decision was appealed and reversed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
petition by Virgilio before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Virgilio and Senen are co-owners of the house in equal shares.
Whether or not, Virgilio is entitled to rentals demanded by him.
Page 19 of 27
RULING:
Petition granted.
Virgilio and Senen are co-owners in equal shares.
Petitioner is not entitled to rentals.
ANALYSIS:
The Court holds that petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot
in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any
time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale
shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing
owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of
the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners
cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be
sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to
partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of
the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of
the co-owners, and (2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall
be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without
paying any rent to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common long as it is
in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to
the interest of the other co-owners. Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso
exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no
other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason
being that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined
and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint ownership over the
pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the
house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been
preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice
and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale
can be effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of
P1,200.00 per month, with legal interest; from the time the trial court ordered him to
Page 20 of 27
vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property appertaining to
petitioner.
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court
granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was
deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.
Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the
interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided
equally between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should be held liable
for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.
CONCLUSION:
Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property
and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective
share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the same.
TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 124262 October 12, 1999
FACTS:
On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an action for Partition before
the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their predecessor-ininterest, Juan De Castro, died intestate in 1993. They also alleged that their
father owned a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3010 located at Barrio San
Juan, Morong, Rizal. They further claim that in 1979, without their knowledge and
consent, said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was
made possible when Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the
property.
Petitioner College filed a motion to dismiss contending lack of jurisdiction and
prescription and/or laches.
Page 21 of 27
The trial court, after hearing the motion, dismissed the complaint in an Order
dated August 18, 1984.
On motion for reconsideration, the trial court, in an Order dated October 4, 1994,
reconsidered the dismissal of the complaint and set aside its previous order.
Petitioner filed its own motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for
certiorari.
Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the lower court, hence this petition
before the Supreme Court with the following contentions.
ISSUE:
Whether of not the respondents are barred by prescription in asserting their rights to
partition.
RULING:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may
demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.
Petition is denied. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
ANALYSIS:
On the issue of prescription, the court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other coowners who did not consent to the sale.
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the sellers
share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantors share
in the partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of
the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner/seller
are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the
recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but for
division or partition of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession of
Page 22 of 27
the co-owners who possessed and administered it. Such partition should result in
segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
In the light of the foregoing, petitioners defense of prescription against an action for
partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, "no co-owner
shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime
the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned."
CONCLUSION:
No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
LUCIO ROBLES, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL

G.R. No. 123509 March 14, 2000
FACTS:
Leon Robles owns the lot in question, located in Morong Rizal. This was inherited
by his son, Silvino Robles. Upon the latter death, his widow and children
inherited said land.
Silvinos heirs agreed that plaintiff Lucio Robles will shall cultivate the land, while
Hilario Robles, shall pay the land taxes for his co-heirs.
In 1962, for unknown reasons, tax declaration under the name of Silvino was
transferred under the name of Exequiel Ballena, father-in-law of Hilario Robles.
Exequiel Ballena secured a loan in Antipolo Rural Bank using said tax
declaration. Somehow, tax declaration was transferred to Antipolo Rural Bank,
and later on, under the name of Sps Hilario and Andrea Robles.
Page 23 of 27
In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from Cordona Rural Bank. For failure to
pay the mortgage, foreclosure proceedings were had and defendant Rural Bank
emerged as the highest bidder. Tax declaration later on was transferred under its
name.
Defendant Rural Bank later on sold the lot to Sps. Vergel Santos and Ruth
Santos.
On May 1998, defendant Sps Santos took possession of the land and were able
to secure Free Patent on the same.
Sibling Lucio, Emerita, Claudia and Emilio, all surname Robles, filed a Complaint
against Sps. Santos and Rural Bank of Cardona. They contended that it was only
September 1987 that they came to know about the mortgage and that they as coowners did not agree with the same. They prayed for the following relief:
o Preliminary mandatory injuction be issued, restoring their possession over
the land;
o Declaring the Free Patent over the land, null and void.
The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the Robles, rendering the
mortgage secured by Hilario null and void (his signature was forged as admitted
by his wife) as well as the foreclosure of the land and its sale by the rural bank to
Sps. Santos
The Trial Court further stated that under the circumstances, and considering that
"open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public lands for the
period prescribed by law (30 years), creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial
or other action, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.
Consequently, the issuance of [a] free patent title to the Spouses Vergel Santos
and Ruth C. Santos is not valid because at the time the property subject of this
case was already private land, the Bureau of Lands having no jurisdiction to
dispose of the same.
Spouses Santos appealed trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals
which REVERSED the same and ruled that:
o at the time of the petitioners instituted the complaint for quieting of title,
they no longer had any title thereto, as evident by its transfer to Exequiel
Ballena, the to Sps Hilario and Andrea Robles, then to the Bank of
Cardona.
o Granting that there indeed is co-ownership, the action of Hilario Robles,
transferring under his name the tax declaration is a clear repudiation of
such co-ownership.
o In view of the plaintiff-appellees inaction for more than 20 years, from the
said transfer, the Appellant (Sps. Santos) correctly maintain that
prescription has already set in.
Page 24 of 27
Petitioners filed a petition for review of the above ruling with the following
contentions:
o CA erred in ruling that in view of the transfer of the Tax Declaration,
Petitioner lost their title thereto by prescription
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were correct in seeking for quieting of title.
RULING:
Petitioners have the requisite title essential to their suit for quieting of title.
Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Except as
modified by the last paragraph of this Decision, the trial courts Decision is
REINSTATED.
ANALYSIS:
Article 476 provides that whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which
is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet title.
It is a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the
title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.
10 Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud
on plaintiffs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity.
Petitioners allege that their title as owners and possessors of the disputed property is
clouded by the tax declaration and, subsequently, the free patent thereto granted to
Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos. The more important question to be resolved,
however, is whether the petitioners have the appropriate title that will entitle them to
avail themselves of the remedy.
They anchor their ownership through inheritance and that they have agreed that
Petitioner Lucio would cultivate the land, while Hilario would pay the land taxes.
Petitioners insist that they were not aware that from 1962 until 1987, the subject
property had been declared in the names of Exequiel Ballena, the Rural Bank of
Page 25 of 27
Antipolo, Hilario Robles, the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., and finally, Spouses Vergel
and Ruth Santos. Maintaining that, as co-owners of the subject property, they did not
agree to the real estate mortgage constituted on it.
Ostensibly, the Court of Appeals failed to consider irregularities in the transactions
involving the disputed property. First, while it was declared in the name of Exequiel in
1962, there was no instrument or deed of conveyance evidencing its transfer from the
heirs of Silvino to him. This fact is important, considering that the petitioners are alleging
continued possession of the property. Second, Exequiel was the father-in-law of Hilario,
to whom petitioners had entrusted the payment of the land taxes. Third, considering that
the subject property had been mortgaged by Exequiel to the Rural Bank of Antipolo, and
that it was foreclosed and in fact declared in the banks name in 1965, why was he able
to sell it to Spouses Hilario and Andrea in 1966? Lastly, inasmuch as it was an
unregistered parcel of land, the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., did not observe due
diligence in determining Hilarios title thereto.
The deed of conveyance purportedly evidencing the transfer of ownership and
possession from the heirs of Silvino to Exequiel should have been presented as the
best proof of that transfer. No such document was presented, however.
Contrary to the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, Hilario effected no clear and evident
repudiation of the co-ownership. It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot
acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of
the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence
thereof is clear and convincing.
In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of the subject property; neither did
he exclude the petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had
indisputably shared in its fruits. 13 Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage contract
with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-ownership.
The assertion that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to repudiation was
belied by the continued occupation and possession of the disputed property by the
petitioners as owners.
CONCLUSION:
Page 26 of 27
In an action for quieting of title, it is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of
the action.
It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of
the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the coownership. Requisites in
order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner are the following:
(1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster
of the other co-owners;
(2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners;
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing.
Page 27 of 27

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HIPOLITO-AGUILAR, CHRISEL

Property Case Digest

DEL BANCO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael, Bulacan, on February

There was no partition of the Cagbalite Island.

there is co-ownership, a co-owner's possession of his share is co-possession which is

RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ, ET AL v. GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO

LUZ CARO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BASILIA

o Recital to the deed of sale is not enough notice;

BAILON- CASILAO vs. THE HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS

CONCEPCION ROQUE, Petitioner, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,

On 21 September 1959, the intestate heirs of Januario Avendao executed a

among the intestate heirs namely Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino,

The respondents appealed this decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,

EPITACIO DELIMA et. al, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GELILEO

VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B.

TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

LUCIO ROBLES, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL

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