TENCHAVEZ V.

ESCANO
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of
Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years
old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The
marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered
in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and
go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San
Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are
supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas
parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for
a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor
went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was
approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against
Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the
State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada
and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner
filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have
dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot
give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens
because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to
discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries.
The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough
grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine
laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos
sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the
divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of
an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

Van Dorn v. Romillo

Facts:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US
citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the
Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner
remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8,
1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal
property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the
business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce is valid
YES.
There can be no question as to the validity of the Nevada divorce in any of the States
of the US. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. Owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He
has no standing to sue as husband of the petitioner over their conjugal assets. He is estopped
by his own representation before his own country's court from asserting that right to exercise
control over their conjugal assets
-

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private
respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the
Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20,
1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony
eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in
January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January
23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child
was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to
Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the
ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife
as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and

concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be
the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared
that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so
far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and
rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner
and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Republic v. Orbecido
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24,
1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They
had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In
1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000
had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter
filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).
Held:
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence
showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and
had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET
ASIDE.
Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at
the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A.
Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.
However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be
applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of then becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction
absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal
import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.

CORPUZ V. STO. TOMAS

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized
Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently
left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to
the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with
another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada
which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A
month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love
with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig
City to register the Canadian divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas.
However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed
Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has
been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in view
of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC.
However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the
action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can
institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates
a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like
Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ,

HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati
RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820
June 20, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany,
married private respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in
Hamburg, Gemany. Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros
Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine.
Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by trial court. A motion
for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again denied by
the trial court.
In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court
of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the
children to the father.
It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order
granting the petitioners motion to dismiss, but was partially set aside on

September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues regarding property

relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children.
Petitioner assailed for the trial courts lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal
effects of a decree of divorce from a foreign country.
Held:
Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce
obtained from a foreign country such as those concerning with support and
custody of the children.
In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending
spouse was. The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to
determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education of the
best interests of the children. After all, the childs welfare is always the
paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court
has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental
custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely
Carolyne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be
remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate
proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000

FACTS: Brenda and Wilson first met sometime in 1980 when both of them
were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos
and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. They later on
became sweethearts and got married and had 5 children. After the EDSA
revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. He
engaged to different business ventures but failed. She always urged him to
look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the
head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would
hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight
mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several
times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they
were already living separately. She did not want him to stay in their house
anymore so when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and
even on her mother who came to her aid. She sought for nullity of their
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Brenda submitted
herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological
evaluation. The court a quo found Wilson to be psychologically incapacitated

to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work
to support his family and his violent attitude towards Brenda and their
children. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: W/N there is a need for personal medical examination of

respondent to prove psychological incapacity? Whether the totality of
evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity

HELD: Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a

requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the
totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Although SC is convinced that respondent failed to provide material support
to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of these acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable