ADOPTION

former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

151. G.R. No. 100835, October 26, 1993

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to

REPUBLIC vs. CA and HUGHES

adopt jointly with his or her Filipino spouse a relative by

consanguinity of the latter. While James Anthony unquestionably is

FACTS:
James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of
America, married Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who
herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. On 29 June
1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC of Angeles City

not permitted to adopt, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to

paragraph (3)(a). The problem in her case lies, instead, with Article
185 of the Code, expressing as follows:
Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:

to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor
niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their
parents, gave consent to the adoption. On 29 November 1990, the
RTC rendered a decision granting the petition. A petition for Review
onCertiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial court's
decision. This Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals which,
on 09 July 1991, affirmed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE: W/N the spouses Anthony and Lenita Hughes are qualified to
adopt the minor niece and nephews of Lenita under Philippine law
HELD:

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint
adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be
read along together with Article 184.
Executive Order No. 91, dated 17 December 1986, of President
Corazon C. Aquino amended Article 29 of PD 603 and is expressed as
follows
Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such

No, it is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt

case, parental authority shall be exercised as if the child

under Article 184 of the Family Code because he does not fall under

were their own by nature.

any of the following exceptions enumerated in paragraph (3): (a) A

If one of the spouses is an alien, both husband and

as well as support and successional rights. These are matters that

wife shall jointly adopt. Otherwise, the adoption

obviously cannot be considered inconsequential to the parties.

shall not be allowed.

We are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had

instance, that an adoption can bring not so much for the prospective

thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one

adopting parents as for the adopted children themselves. We also

of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of

realize that in proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration is

the same nationality.

given to the physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of the

adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place been

The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185

designed.

thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses
except in only two instances
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate
child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of the other.
The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the lower
court, has theorized that James Anthony should merely be considered a
"nominal or formal party" in the proceedings. This view of the
appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status that is
closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with
corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from
adoption, such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of
parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the adopted,

152. Republic v. Toledano

June 8, 1994
Puno
The spouses in this case are aliens and want to adopt a Filipino. The
SC says that they cant because one of them is not qualified under FC
184 and according to FC 185, the spouses must adopt the child jointly
The Sps. Alvin and Evelyn Clouse are aliens. In 1990, they filed a
petition in the RTC to adopt the minor, 12 yr. old, Solomon Alcala who
is the younger brother of Evelyn.
Alvin is a US natural born citizen and married Evelyn, a Filipino but
became a naturalized US citizen in 1988, in 1981. They are physically,
mentally, morally and financially capable of adopting him. The social
worker, Nila Pronda, assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study,
favourably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.
Since 1981 1989, Solomon has been under the care of the spouses
and gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery, a widow,
consented to the adoption too due to poverty.

RTC granted the petition. Republic, through the OSG, appealed via
petition for review on certiorari.
WON the RTC should have granted the petition? No
FC 184 enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt:
3. An alien, except:
a. A former Filipino who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity
b. One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her
Filipino spouse
c. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to jointly
with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter
Aliens not included in the foregoing exception may adopt Filipino
children in accordance with the rules on inter country adoption as
may be provided by law.
Alvin is not qualified to adopt Solomon.
a. He is not a Filipino citizen
b. Solomon is not his relative by consanguinity nor the
legitimate child of his spouse
c. When they filed the petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn was
no longer a Filipino citizen
FC 185 states:
Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
1. When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child
2. When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate childe of the
other
Evelyn appears to have been qualified since she was a former Filipino
and seeks to adopt her younger brother but the petition cannot be
granted to her alone without violating FC 185 which requires a joint
adoption by the husband and wife, a condition which must be read
along with FC 184.
SC went into the FCs history, saying that it the cited provisions are
meant to protect the child. Under the new law, joint adoption by a

husband and wife is mandatory which is in consonance with the

concept of joint parental authority over the child. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouse to adopt jointly and insures harmony between the
spouses. It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the
child that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases.

153. Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on March 17, 2012
(Special Proceedings Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage
filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of
Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged
in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to
their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, remarried there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no
longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the
adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors
were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and
gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for
the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was
consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness
and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to
prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written
consent of the adoptees biological mother.

Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of
the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the
adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the
written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard
the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the
validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent
to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his
parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the
filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the
child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
154. REPUBLIC V VERGARA
REPUBLIC vs. ALARCON VERGARA
GR. No. 95551
March 20, 1997
Facts:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina
Due Dye filed a petition before the RegionalTrialCourtofAngelesCity
to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old,
respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a
member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who
resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a
former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two

children. Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave
their consent to the adoption.
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question
of law, contending that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law
to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt
Filipino citizens.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an
alien is disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due
because he does not fall under any of the three afore quoted exceptions
in the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's
legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives
by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina
was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed,
thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here
does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino
citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not
adopt.
On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister
for the law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to
exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth
Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife
may jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping
the optional character of joint adoption and making it now mandatory.
Issue:
Whether or not the adoption is valid.
Ruling:
Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife
must adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other."

None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina

Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother
and sister. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a
manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must
also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in
view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and
education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a
position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the
case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without
violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time
however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the
respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.

child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle

and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and
already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their
consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:
155. In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3
instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses

FACTS:

jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use
of the word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with

authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a

Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them

legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly.

by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of

The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are

DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if

certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He

they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then

must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The

married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000.

requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification

Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty

to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental

given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a

authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes

caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency
and development of their moral mental and physical character and
well-being.
156. Cervantes v FajardoFacts:
This is a petition for a writ of
Habeas Corpus over the person of the minor Angelie Anne
Cervantes.Angelie Ann Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to
Conrado Fajardo andGina Carreon, who are common-law
husband and wife. They offered the child foradoption to Gina
Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, Zenaida CarreonCervantesand Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and
custody of the child when shewas barely two weeks old. An
Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child
wase x e c u t e d b y r e s p o n d e n t G i n a C a r r e o n .
T h e p e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n w a s f i l e d b y petitioners before
the RTC of Rizal, which
granted the petition.Sometime in 1987, the adoptive
parents, Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes,r e c e i v e d a l e t t e r f r
om the
r e s p o n d e n t s d e m a n d i n g t o b e p a i d t h e a m o u n t o f P150,0
00.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused.
As aresult, while petitioners were out at work, the Gina Carreon took
the child from her"yaya" at the petitioners' residence, on the pretext
that she was instructed to do soby her mother. Gina Carreon brought
the child to her house. Petitioners demandedthe return of the child, but
Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire togive up her child
for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption shehad
executed was not fully explained to her.
Issue:
Whether or not the natural parents or the adoptive parents
have custodyover Angelie Ann Cervantes.
Held:

The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes

are granted topetitioners, Zenaida and Nelson Cervantes, to whom
they properly belong.
Ratio:
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of
children,the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother
shall be separatedf r o m a c h i l d u n d e r f i v e ( 5 ) y e a r s o f
a g e , w i l l n o t a p p l y w h e r e t h e C o u r t f i n d s compelling
reasons to rule otherwise.
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost
consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of thec h i l d
concerned, taking into account the resources and
m o r a l a s w e l l a s s o c i a l standing of the contending
parents.C o n r a d o F a j a r d o ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e G i n a C a
r r e o n i s a c o m m o n - l a w husband and wife relationship. His open
cohabitation with Gina will not accord theminor that desirable
atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an uprightand moralminded person. Gina Carreon had also previously given birth to
anotherchild by another married man with whom she lived for
almost three (3) years butwho eventually left her and
vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister whose "father"
is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values
of saidm i n o r. U p o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , p e t i t i o n e r s w h o a r e l
e g a l l y m a r r i e d a p p e a r t o b e morally, physically,
financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor
andgiving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not
only jobless butalso maintains an illicit relation with a married man,
can most likely give her.Minor has been legally adopted by
petitioners with the full knowledge
andc o n s e n t o f r e s p o n d e n t s . A d e c r e e o f a d o p t i o n h a s t
h e e f f e c t o f d i s s o l v i n g t h e authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child.
The adopting parentshave the right to the care and custody
of the adopted child
and exercise parentalauthority and responsibility over him.

157. REPUBLIC vs. HERNANDEZ

GR No. 117209

with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being

conformably satisfied.

February 9, 1996
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the
Facts:

petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl

Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action

Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for

in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of

the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to

discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there

complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired

is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and

consequent to his adoption. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the

change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of

relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to

action in a single petition.

the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change
of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be
conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer for
the change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for

adoption.

change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and

purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being

Ruling:

respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner

No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the

further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname

legal effect of adoption: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be

of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter

deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire

and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is

the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of

sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since

parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname

this would involve a substantial change of ones legal name, a petition

of the adopters;

for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted,

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation,

and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be

to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of

granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere

adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the

incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to

adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of

denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available

adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court,

under our remedial law system.

in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner. However, the given or

proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee
must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The
creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a
license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus
granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a
mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a
prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this
case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the
civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in ones name
is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with
the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding
for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and
accordingly determined. A petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor
is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in

158. Sayson vs Court of Appeals

E l e n o a n d R a f a e l a S a y s o n b e g o t f i v e c h i l d r e n , na
mely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro.Eleno died
on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May
15,1 9 7 6 . Teo d o r o , w h o h a d m a r r i e d I s a b e l B a u t i s t a , d i
e d o n March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later. Their
propertieswere left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel,
allsurnamed Sayson, who claim to be their
children.Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together
with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint
for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro
andIsabel Sayson. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their
ownc o m p l a i n t , t h i s t i m e f o r t h e a c c o u n t i n g a n d p a r t i t i
o n o f t h e intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson,
against thecouple's four surviving children.Both cases were
decided in favor Delia, et al on thebasis of practically the same
evidence. The Judge declared inhis decision that Delia and Edmundo
were the legally adoptedchildren of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by
virtue of the decreeof adoption. Doribel was their legitimate daughter
as evidencedby her birth certificate. Consequently, the three children
weree n t i t l e d t o i n h e r i t f r o m E l e n o a n d R a f a e l
a b y r i g h t o f representation.
Held
:
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel,
as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and IsabelSayson, and Delia
and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs
to the intestate estate of the deceasedcouple, conformably to the
following Article 979 of the CivilCode: Art. 979. Legitimate

children and their descendantssucceed the parents and other

ascendants, without distinctionas to sex or age, and even if they
should come from differentmarriages. An adopted child
succeeds to the property of theadopting parents in the same
manner as a legitimate child.There is no question that as the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and
Rafaela,Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father
in thedistribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.
Under A r t i c l e 9 8 1 , q u o t e d a b o v e , s h e i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e
s h a r e h e r father would have directly inherited had he
survived,
whichs h a l l b e e q u a l t o t h e s h a r e s o f h e r g r a n d p a r
e n t s ' o t h e r children

That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this

city with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the
care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained
indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year. for the
last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila
became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the
times when petitioner would need most the care and support from a
love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly
indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.

159. LAHOM vs. SIBULO

That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a

strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner,
the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all
respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his
alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late
husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463
for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and
affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption,
considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal
purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for
its existence, hence this petition for revocation,"

G.R. No. 143989

July 14, 2003
Facts:
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in
December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22,
of Naga City. In her petition, she averred. That despite the proddings
and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his
surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner
particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death
he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but
was prevented by petitioner's supplication, however with his further
request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or
interest may pertain to respondent in the future. Respondent continued
using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein
petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation
Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally
issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in
connection with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M.
Sibulo.

That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's

nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her,
respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for
some material benefits from petitioner.

Issue:
Can the adoption be rescinded?
Ruling:
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an
adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in
cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it
remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the
law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught
in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an
adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits

otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the

grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child
his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.