NOTE: Only File With The MTC If The Place Has No Prosecutor

RULE 110
Filing of the case for purposes of Preliminary

Investigation DOES NOT interrupt the running
of the prescriptive period.
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal actions.
How Criminal Cases are Instituted
1
For offenses where a preliminary

investigation is required:
By filing the complaint with the proper
officer for the purpose of conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation
For all other offenses:
1 In Manila and other chartered cities
1 General Rule By filing the
complaint with the office of the
prosecutor.
2 Exception If their charters provide
otherwise, by filing the complaint
with the office provided therein
2 In all other places
1 By
filing
the
complaint
or
information directly with the MTC, or
*NOTE: only file with the MTC if the

place has no Prosecutor
By filing the complaint with the
office of the prosecutor.
Whether or not the filing of the Complaint

Interrupts the Running of the Prescriptive
Period of the Crime
1 General Rule
Yes
2 Exception
If provided otherwise in special laws
General Rule:
Preliminary Investigation is required Penalty
> 4 years and 2 months
Preliminary Investigation NOT required
Penalty < 4 years and 2 months
Proper Officers for purposes of conducting PI

[Rule 112 Sec. 2]:
a.
b.
c.
Provincial or City Prosecutors and their

assistants;
National
and
Regional
State
Prosecutors;
Other officers as may be authorized by
law.
BEFORE:
People v. del Rosario (1964); People v.

Coquia (____)
NOW:
Filing of the case for Preliminary Investigation
INTERRUPTS the running of the prescriptive
period
People v. Olarte (___); Francisco v. CA (___);
WHEN OFFENDED PARTY DOES NOT
INITIATE; ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE
ACQUITTED; EVEN IF THE OFFENDED
PARTY
WAS
NOT
THE
ONE
WHO
INSTITUTED THE ACTION BEFORE THE
PROSECUTION; The complaint referred to in
Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court
to commence a criminal action in those cases
where a complaint of the offended party is
required by law, NOT the information which is
generally filed by a fiscal. It is not necessary
that the proper offended party file a complaint
for purposes of preliminary investigation by the
fiscal. The rule is that unless the offense
subject of the complaint is one that cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, any competent person
may
file
a
complaint
for
preliminary
investigation.
If a complaint is filed directly in court, the same
must be filed by the offended party and in case
of an information, the same must be filed by
the fiscal. However, a complaint filed with the
fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by
any person. Salazar v. People, September
10, 2002.
EFFECT OF PRESCRIPTION; FILING OF
COMPLAINT WITH THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN
FOR
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION STOPS THE RUNNING OF
THE
PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD;
The
Ombudsman has the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation against a public
officer for grave oral defamation. This authority
extends to complaints filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman against public officers and
employees for purposes of preliminary
investigation. Accordingly, the filing of the
complaint for grave oral defamation with the
Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of
prescription of the said offense. Llenes v.
Dicdican, July 31, 1996.
EFFECT OF PRESCRIPTION; OFFENSES
UNDER
THE
SUMMARY
PROCEDURE;
FILING OF COMPLAINT WITH THE OFFICE
OF THE PROSECUTOR FOR PURPOSES OF
PI DOES NOT INTERRUPT THE RUNNING
OF PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD; The prescriptive
period is not interrupted by the filing of the
NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016
complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor, as

this is not a JUDICIAL PROCEEDING. The judicial
proceeding (as required in the Summary Rule)
that could have interrupted the period is the
filing of the information with the MTC. Under
Sec. 9 of the Summary Rule, the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court
without the need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation.
This interpretation is in consonance with Act
336 which says that the period of prescription
shall be suspended when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty party. The
proceedings referred to in Sec. 2 therof are
judicial proceedings. Zaldivia v. Reyes, July
3, 1992
NOTE: Do not confuse this rule
with rule 110.
EFFECT OF PRESCRIPTION; WHERE COURT
HAS NO JURISDICTION; PRESCRIPTION DID
NOT CONTINUE TO RUN WHEN AFTER
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
THE
INFORMATION WAS FILED WITH THE MTC
INSTEAD OF RTC; When the City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of libel charges against
accused, the proceedings against her were not
terminated, precisely because a prima facie
case for libel was found against her. The
resolution of the city prosecutor actually
directed the continuation of the proceedings
against the petitioner by the filing of the
appropriate information against her and by the
holding of trial on the merits. As such, when
the information for libel was filed with the MTC,
the period of prescription for the crime was still
suspended.
It is unjust to deprive the injured party of the
right to obtain vindication on account of delays
that are not under his control. This is
because in criminal prosecutions, the only
thing that the victim of the offense may do on
his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the
requisite complaint. In this case, complainants
were not remiss in their right to seek grievance
against respondent as they filed their
complaint before the city prosecutor forty-two
days after the alleged crime of libel occurred. It
was the Office of the City Prosecutor that
committed an error when it filed the complaint
with the MTC. Arambulo v. Laqui, October
12, 2000.
SEC. 2. The complaint or information
Requirements of Complaint or Information
1 In writing
2 In the name of the People of the Philippines
and
3 Against all persons who appear to be

responsible for the offense involved.
DETERMINATION OF WHO TO CHARGE;
DISCRETION OF THE PROSECUTOR; NONINCLUSION OF CO-PRINCIPALS IN THE
INFORMATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A
VIOLATION OF ACCUSEDS RIGHT; Noninclusion of accuseds co-principals in the
information DOES NOT constitute a violation of
accuseds right to due process and equal
protection of the law. The prosecuting officer
has the DUTY to file charges against
whomsoever the evidence may show to be
responsible for an offense. They shall have
discretion which lies in determining whether
the evidence submitted justify a reasonable
belief that a person has committed an offense.
What the rule demands is that all persons
who appear responsible shall be charged in the
information, which conversely implies that
those against whom no sufficient evidence of
guilt exists are not required to be included.
Socrates v. SB, February 20, 1996.
DETERMINATION OF WHO TO CHARGE;
COURT
ORDER
TO
INCLUDE
OTHER
PERSONS; Courts cannot interfere with the
prosecutor's discretion and control of the
criminal prosecution. The reason for placing the
criminal prosecution under the direction and
control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons.
Judges should not unduly interfere with the
exercise of the power to prosecute on the part
of fiscals.
The remedy where a prosecutor errs in not
charging a person in an Information is to
appeal to the Secretary of Justice. Alonzo v.
Concepcion, January 27, 2005.
SEC. 3. Complaint defined

Elements of a Complaint
1 It is a sworn written statement,
2 It must charge a person with an offense,
and
3 It must be subscribed by
1 the offended party;
2 any peace officer, or
3 other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated
COMPLAINT FILED IN COURT; GENERAL
RULE; EXCEPTION;
General Rule: For purposes of preliminary
investigation, a complaint may be filed by any
competent person. It need not be filed by the
"offended party."
Exception: If the offense subject thereof is

one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
Ebarle v. Sucaldito, December 29, 1987.
office. Estudillo
2004.
COMPLAINT FILED IN COURT; COMPLAINT

FOR PI MAY BE FILED BY ANY COMPETENT
PERSON; The "complaint" referred to in
the Rule 110 contemplates one filed in
court, not with the fiscal, In that case, the
proceeding must be started by the aggrieved
party himself. A criminal action is commenced
by complaint or information, both of which are
filed in court. In case of a complaint, it must be
filed by the offended party; with respect to an
information, it is the fiscal who files it. But a
"complaint" filed with the fiscal prior to a
judicial action may be filed by any person.
Ebarle v. Sucaldito, December 29, 1987.
SEC. 5. Who Must Prosecute Criminal

Actions
VALUE
OF
ALLEGATION
IN
THE
COMPLAINT; EXCEPTION IS ACCUSED
COULD ALREADY ASCERTAIN THAT HE WAS
BEING ACCUSED OF THE CRIME THROUGH
ALLEGATIONS;
General Rule: The information or complaint
for
rape
should
expressly
allege
the
commission of the rape in the manner
prescribed in Article 335.
Failure of the information to state that the
accused raped the victim "through force or
intimidation" is not a fatal omission because
the complaint (denuncia; filed for preliminary
investigation) alleged the ultimate fact that the
accused raped the victim "by means of force".
Therefore, the accused could have readily
ascertained that he was being accused of rape
committed through force, a charge that
sufficiently complies with Article 335. People
v. Mendez, July 5, 2000.
SEC. 4. Information defined.
Elements of an Information
1 It is an accusation in writing,
2 It must charge a person with an offense,
3 It must be subscribed by the prosecutor,
and
4 It must be filed with the court.
INFORMATION NOT REQUIRED TO BE
UNDER OATH;
Sec. 4, Rule 110 of the Rules merely requires
that the information be in writing and
subscribed by the prosecutor. There is no
requirement that the information be sworn to.
Otherwise, the rules would have so provided.
The information need not be under oath. The
REASON therefore being principally that the
prosecuting officer filing it is charged with the
spcial duty in regard thereto and is acting
under the special responsibility of his oath of
v.
Baloma,
March
23,
Who Must Prosecute Criminal Actions

1 General Rule:
All criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and
control of the prosecutor
2 Exception The Private Prosecutor
may prosecute the case provided the
following requisites are present:
1 The public prosecutor has a heavy
workload or there is lack of public
prosecutors,
2 He must be authorized in writing by the
Chief of the Prosecution Office or the
Regional State Prosecutor, and
3 There must be approval by the court.
3 The Private Prosecutor may prosecute
the case up to the end of the trial:
1 When so authorized to prosecute the
criminal action,
2 Even in the absence of the public
prosecutor,
3 Provided such authority is not revoked
or withdrawn
4 In the MTC or MCTC, when the
prosecutor assigned thereto or to the
case is not available, the following
may prosecute:
1 The offended party,
2 Any peace officer, or
3 The public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated
Rules on Adultery and Concubinage
1 Party who must file the complaint:
Only the offended spouse
2 Effect if it is not the offended spouse
who files the complaint:
The case shall be dismissed [Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera, 174 S 653]
3 Instances where the offended party
cannot institute criminal prosecution:
1 If he/she does not included the guilty
parties, if both are alive, or
2 If she/he has:
1 Consented to the offense, or
2 Pardoned the offenders
Rules on Seduction, Abduction and Acts of
Lasciviousness
1 Party who must file the complaint:
1 If the offended party is NOT a minor:
1 The offended party, or
2 The State if the offended party dies
or becomes incapacitated before she
can file a complaint
2 If the offended party is a MINOR:
The offended party - has the right to

initiate
the
prosecution
independently even if she is a minor,
2 If the offended party fails to file the
complaint,
the
following,
in
successive order, and exclusive of all
other persons:
1 her parents,
2 her grandparents,
3 her guardian,
3 The State if:
1 the offended party dies or
becomes incapacitated before
she can file a complaint, and
2 she has no known parents,
grandparents or guardian
Instances where the above offenses
shall not be prosecuted:
1 If the offended party is alive and not
incapacitated and the complaint is not
filed by:
1 The offended party who is NOT a
minor, or
2 The offended party who is a minor,
or, in the proper case, her parents,
grandparents or guardian
2 If the offender has been expressly
pardoned by any of the above.
Under R.A. 7610, Sec. 27 The following

may File Compaints in cases of Unlawful
Acts committed against Children:
1 Offended party;
2 Parents or guardians;
3 Ascendant or collateral relative within the
third degree of consanguinity;1awphi1@ITC
4 Officer, social worker or representative of a
licensed child-caring institution;
5 Officer or social worker of the Department
of Social Welfare and Development;
6 Barangay chairman; or
7 At least three (3) concerned responsible
citizens where the violation occurred.
Rules on Defamation [Libel and Slander]
1 General Rule:
The complaint or information can be
filed by the public prosecutor even
without the instance or signature of the
offended party
2 Exception Only the offended party can
file the complaint if the defamation consists
of any of the following offenses:
1 Adultery,
2 Concubinage,
3 Seduction,
4 Abduction, or
5 Acts of Lasciviousness
PRESENCE
OF
PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR;
REASON FOR AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE
IS PLACED UNDER THE CONTROL OF
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR; The reason for placing
the criminal prosecution under the direction

and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious
or unfounded prosecutions by private persons.
Prosecuting officers under the power vested in
them by law have the duty of prosecuting
persons who, according to the evidence
received from the complainant, are shown to
be guilty of a crime committed within the
jurisdiction of their office. They have equally
the duty not to prosecute when the evidence
adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima
facie case.
The public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial
authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. People v.
CA and Cerbo, Jan. 21, 1999
OBJECTIVES
OF
A
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
The PRIMARY objective of a preliminary
investigation is to free respondent from the
inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress
of defending himself/herself in the course of a
formal trial, until the reasonable probability of
his or her guilt in a more or less summary
proceeding by a competent office designated
by law for that purpose.
SECONDARILY, such summary proceeding also
protects the state from the burden of the
unnecessary expense an effort in prosecuting
alleged offenses and in holding trials arising
from false, frivolous or groundless charges.
People v. CA and Cerbo, Jan. 21, 1999
TRIAL COURTS CANNOT DETERMINE THE
CORRECTNESS OF FINDINGS IN PI. It is an
executive function, the correctness of the
exercise of which is a matter that the trial court
itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon. People v. CA and Cerbo, Jan. 21,
1999
ABSENCE
OF
PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR
DURING ARRAIGNMENT; JUDGE CANNOT
ARRAIGN THE ACCUSED IN THE ABSENCE
OF PROSECUTOR; The judge CANNOT
proceed with the arraignment of the accused
without the participation of a government
prosecutor. As the officer in charge of
prosecuting criminal cases for the government,
rudiments of due process require that the
public prosecutor must be afforded an
opportunity to intervene in all stages of the
proceedings. Villanueva v. Almazan, Mar.
16, 2000
ABSENCE
OF
PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR
DURING TRIAL allowed as an exception
only.
The judge may NOT be held
administratively liable if he allowed the
prosecution of a crime under Summary
Procedure to be done by a private prosecutor.
Absent any showing to the contrary, it will be

presumed that official duty was regularly
performed. This presumption is reinforced in
this case by the fact that complainant, as
counsel for the accused, failed to object to the
absence of the public prosecutor, giving rise to
the presumption that the intervention of a
private prosecutor was due to the unavailability
of the public prosecutor. By failing to make a
timely objection, complainant must be deemed
to have waived his objection to the
proceedings
before
respondent
judge.
Enriquez v. Vallarta, February 7, 2002
RULE ON APPEAL; PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
REPRESENTATIVE
ON
APPEAL IS SOLGEN; The authority of the
Provincial Prosecutor to appear for and
represent the People of the Philippines is
confined only to the proceedings before the
trial court. [This authority shall cease upon
actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon
elevation of the case to the Regional Trial
Court. Sec. 5]
General Rule: IN APPEALS before the CA and
the SC either (a) by writ of error; (b) via
petition for review; (c) on automatic appeal; or,
(d) in special civil actions where the People of
the Philippines is a party, the Office of the
Solicitor General is the sole representative of
the People of the Philippines. Thus, service of a
copy of appellants petition on the respondent
People of the Philippines may be effected
through the SolGen. Salazar v. Romaquin
May 21, 2004
WHERE
PROSECUTOR
FINDS
NO
PROBABLE CAUSE; AFTER A CASE HAS
BEEN FILED IN COURT, THE FISCAL CAN BE
COMPELLED TO PROSECUTE THE SAME,
EVEN IF HE FINDS NO PROBABLE CAUSE
(in his PI). If the fiscal is not at all convinced
that a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot
move for the dismissal of the case and, when
denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He is
obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the
criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. At least what he can do is to
continue appearing for the prosecution and
then turn over the presentation of evidence to
another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to
his direction and control. Where there is no
other prosecutor available, he should proceed
to discharge his duty and present the evidence
to the best of his ability and let the court
decide the merits of the case on the basis of
the evidence adduced by both parties. Sta.
Rosa Mining v. Zabala, August 31, 1987.
ONCE INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT
ANY DISPOSITION OF THE CASE AS TO ITS
DISMISSAL OR THE CONVICTION OR
ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED RESTS IN
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT;
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that

once a complaint or information is filed in Court
any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution of criminal cases even while
the case is already in Court he cannot impose
his opinion on the trial court. The court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is
within
its
exclusive
jurisdiction
and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same.
It does not matter if this is done before or after
the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
Crespo v. Mogul, June 30, 1987
PRIVATE OFFENSE; RAPE PRIOR TO RA
8353; A COMPLAINT, CHARGING THE
ACCUSED WITH RAPE OF A RETARDATE
(20y/o with a mental age of an 8-year old
child), SIGNED BY THE VICTIM AND
ASSISTED BY HER AUNT IS VALID. Even if
the aunt is not one of those mentioned in the
Rules of Court, the complaint is valid. The
complaint has complied with the requirement
under the RPC (Art. 344) and Rules, which vest
on the victim, as the offended party, the right
to institute a criminal action. As signed by the
victim, the complaint started the prosecutory
proceeding. The assistance of her aunt, or any
of her relative who is one of those mentioned
in the Rules, was a superfluity. The victims
signature alone suffices to validate the
complaint. A minor ALONE can file a complaint
for rape independently of her parents. People
v. Dela Cruz, July 11, 2002.
PRIVATE OFFENSE; A COMPLAINT FOR
RAPE (prior to RA 8353) FILED BY THE
DAUGHTER OF THE VICTIM WHO IS AN
OLD PARALIZED WOMAN IS VALID. Rule
was relaxed. The rule is that when the
offended party has executed and subscribed to
a complaint, the prosecution before the court
may be initiated by means of an information
signed by the prosecutor alone. The rule is not
vitiated by the fact that the complaint was
signed by the daughter of the disabled and
mentally ill victim. Otherwise the rule would be
requiring the impossible, which is absurd.
People v. Nicolas, August 22, 2002.
PRIVATE OFFENSE; A COMPLAINT FOR
RAPE (prior to RA 8353) FILED ONLY BY
THE FATHER OF THE 18-year old VICTIM IS
VALID. The 18-year old victim is still a minor,
not having reached twenty-one (21) when the
crime was committed on her (raped 1981,
under the Civil Code). The records also fail to
disclose that she filed a complaint on the

outrage done to her. Consequently, when she
failed to file her complaint, the filing by her
father was justified under the Rules. People v.
Tamayo, September 17, 1993.
PRIVATE OFFENSES; IT IS NOT NECESSARY
THAT THE OFFENDED PARTY MUST ALSO
SIGN THE INFORMATION TO BE VALID, IF
THE OFFENDED PARTY OR HER PARENT
HAVE SIGNED THE COMPLAINT. The criminal
complaint, signed not only by the complainant,
but also by her mother in accordance with Rule
115, Section 5, was the basis for the
preliminary investigation conducted by the
fiscal and the subsequent filing of the
information in court. Nowhere in the law is it
required that the complainant likewise sign and
verify the information for rape filed by the
fiscal. People v. Goles, December 21, 1990.
a adulteress. Hece, Sec. 5 Rule 110 is not

applicable in this case since the alleged
slanderous utterances subject of the assailed
information do not impute any crime which
cannot be prosecuted de oficio. Gonzales v.
Arcilla, November 18, 1991.
OTHER OFFENSES; IN A PUBLIC CRIME, A
PERSON WHO IS NOT AN OFFENDED
PARTY MAY VALIDLY FILE THE COMPLAINT.
Except where the law specifically provides the
contrary, a complaint that a public crime has
been committed may be laid by any competent
person. The Omnibus Election Code does not
specifically provide that a particular person
must file the complaint and hence, the
complaint filed by any competent person is
valid. Agujetas v. CA, August 23, 1996.
SEC. 6. Sufficiency
information.
PURPOSE
OF
REQUIREMENT;
THE
REQUIREMENT THAT IT IS THE OFFENDED
PARTY OR HER PARENT WHO SHOULD
SIGN
THE
COMPLAINT
IS
NOT
JURISDICTIONAL. The complaint required in
the Rules is merely a condition precedent to
the exercise by the proper authorities of the
power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such
condition
has
been
imposed
out
of
consideration for the offended woman and her
family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through with the scandal
of a public trial.
When it is said that the requirement that there
should be a complaint of the offended party or
her relatives is jurisdictional, what is MEANT is
that it is the complaint that starts the
prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint
which confers jurisdiction on the Court to try
the case. The court's jurisdiction is vested in it
by the Judiciary Law." People v. Goles,
December 21, 1990.
NOT DEFAMATION IMPUTING A PRIVATE
OFFENSE; REQUIREMENT IN RULE 110
DOES NOT APPLY. Mang-aagaw ng asawa ng
may asawa," (one who grabs another's
husband) does not necessarily mean an
adulteress. At most, it may imply that the
person whom it is addressed is a "flirt, a
temptress, or one who is in enticing other
husbands;" hence, it is more of an imputation
of a vice, condition or act not constituting a
crime; an imputation of some kind of moral
depravity, immoral conduct or a vice, but
certainly NOT OF A CRIME.
If indeed it were the intention of the appellee
to impute upon the offended party the crime of
adultery, she should have used more dialect,
pointed and descriptive terms to convey
the accusation that the offended party is
of
complaint
or
What Must be stated in a Complaint or

Information to make it Sufficient in Form
and Substance:
1 The name of the accused;
When an offense is committed by more
than one person, all of their names shall
be stated
2 the designation of the offense given by the
statute;
3 the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense;
4 the name of the offended party;
5 the approximate date of the commission of
the offense; and
6 the place where the offense was committed
ELEMENT MAY BE INFERRED; INTENT TO
GAIN; ACCUSED MAY BE CONVICTED OF
THEFT WHERE THE INFORMATION FAILED
TO ALLEGE THAT HE TOOK THE PROPERTY
WITH INTENT TO GAIN; Although intent to
gain is not explicitly alleged in the information,
it may be presumed from the allegation that
the said mail matter was unlawfully taken.
Avecilla v. People, June 2, 1992.
DESCRIPTION OF THE OFFENSE IN THE
INFORMATION IS CONTROLLING; NOT THE
DESIGNATION;
The
averments
in
the
complaint or information characterize the
crime to be prosecuted and determine the
court before which the case must be tried.
What controls is not the designation of the
offense but the description thereof as alleged
in the information. Avecilla v. People, June
2, 1992.
ELEMENT
MAY
NOT
BE
INFERRED;
CONSPIRACY; Conspiracy arises when two or
more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Verily, the information
must
state
that
the
accused
have
confederated to commit the crime or that
there has been a community of design, a
unity of purpose or an agreement to
commit the felony among the accused.
Such an allegation, in the absence of the
usual usage of the words conspired or
confederated or the phrase acting in
conspiracy, must aptly appear in the
information in the form of definitive acts
constituting conspiracy. Conspiracy must
be alleged, not just inferred, in the
information on which basis an accused can
aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be
confused with or likened to the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it. In
establishing conspiracy when properly
alleged, the evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof but may
be inferred from shown acts and conduct
of the accused. People v. Quitlong, July
10, 1998.
STATEMENT OF DETAILS OF THE CRIME;
DETAILS OF THE CRIME WERE NOT
AVERRED, THE INFORMATION IS STILL
SUFFICIENT. The rule is that matters of
evidence, as distinguished from the facts
essential to the description of the offense,
need not be averred. All that is required is that
the charge be set forth with particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which
the accused is alleged to have committed and
will enable him to intelligently prepare his
defense. Hence, the court may allow the
introduction of evidence showing the gory
details of the killing which were not alleged in
the information. People v. Arbios, August 5,
1985.
STATEMENT OF DETAILS OF THE CRIME;
WEAPON USED WAS NOT DESCRIBED, THE
INFORMATION IS STILL SUFFICIENT. That
the Information does not describe the weapon
used, either an "itak" or "kutsilyo" is
inconsequential. The kind or nature of the
weapon used in the commission of the crime
need not be alleged in the complaint or
Information. What must be alleged in the
Information or complaint are those enumerated
in Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal
Procedure.
People
v.
Perez,
December 10, 2003.
SUFFICIENCY OF ALLEGATION IN LIBEL;
INFORMATION
MUST
SET
OUT
THE
PARTICULAR
DEFAMATORY
WORDS
VERBATIM; DEFECT IN SUCH REGARD MAY
BE CURED; The general rule is that the
information must set out the particular
defamatory words verbatim and as published
and that a statement of their substance is
insufficient. HOWEVER, a defect in this regard
may be cured by evidence. In this case, the
article was presented in evidence, but
petitioner failed to object to its introduction.

Instead, he engaged in the trial of the entire
article, not only of the portions quoted in the
information, and sought to prove it to be true.
In doing so, he waived objection based on the
defect in the information. Consequently, he
cannot raise this issue on appeal. Vasquez v.
CA, September 15, 1999.
SEC. 7. Name of the accused.
Name of the Accused:
1 What
must
be
stated
in
the
information:
1 The name and surname of the accused,
or
2 Any appellation or nickname by which
he has been or is known
2 If the name of the accused cannot be
ascertained:
1 He must be described under a fictitious
name
2 There must be an accompanying
statement that his true name is
unknown.
3 Effect if the true name of the accused
is thereafter disclosed by him or
appears in some other manner to the
court:
Such true name shall be inserted in the
complaint or information and record
ERRONEOUS DESIGNATION OF NAME IN
THE INFORMATION WILL NOT VITIATE IT;
FAILURE
TO
QUESTION
DURING
ARRAIGNMENT IS A WAIVER; It was clearly
proven (as he was positively identified by
witness) that the accused, Roberto Cultura (in
the information was Jose Cultura) was part of
the group that arrested, hogtied and killed the
victim. Besides, he did not raise this
question of his identity during the
arraignment. His acquiescence to be tried
under the name "Jose" at that stage of the case
is deemed to be a waiver on his part to raise
the question of his identity as one of the
accused for the first time on appeal. People v.
Cagadas, January 23, 1991.
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.

Designation of the Offense
1
The complaint or information shall:

1 state the designation of the offense
given by the statute,
2 aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and
3 specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances
If there is no designation of the

offense:
reference shall be made to the section
or subsection of the statute punishing it
DESCRIPTION OF THE OFFENSE IN THE

INFORMATION IS CONTROLLING; NOT THE
DESIGNATION; The introductory paragraph of
the information states that accused is being
charged with simple theft, BUT THE BODY
containing the accusatory portion mentions
that what he took is a registered mail. [Art. 310
of RPC states that qualified theft is committed
if the property stolen is mail matter]. The
averments in the complaint or information
characterize the crime to be prosecuted and
determine the court before which the case
must be tried. What controls is not the
designation of the offense but the description
thereof as alleged in the information. Thus,
accused may be convicted of qualified theft of
mail matter. Avecilla v. People, June 2,
1992.
SECTION NEEDS TO BE SPECIFIED ONLY
WHEN THERE IS NO SPECIFIC NAME GIVEN
TO THE OFFENSE; The designation of the
offense is rape, which is clearly indicated in the
caption and preamble of each Information. It is
only when there is no specific name given to
the offense that reference to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it may be
made. This usually applies to offenses under
special laws, in which case the offense is
described as a violation of the statute which
defines and penalizes it. Moreover, the real
nature
of
the
criminal
charge
is
determined not from the caption or preamble
of the Information, nor from the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, as these are mere conclusions of law.
Rather, the nature of the accusation is
determined by the actual recital of facts in
the complaint or information. It is not even
necessary for the protection of the substantial
rights of the accused or the effective
preparation of his defense that the accused be
informed of the technical name of the crime of
which he stands charged. People v.
Gutierrez, May 9, 2003.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.

How the Allegations in the Information
Shall be Stated
1
2
3
It is not necessary that they be stated in

the language used in the statute;
They just have to be stated in ordinary and
concise language;
The terms must be sufficient:
1 to enable a person of common
understanding to know:
1 what offense is being charged,
2 its
qualifying
and
aggravating
circumstances, and
2 for the court to pronounce judgment.
RETROACTIVITY
OF
RULE;
RULE
REQUIRING
AN
AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE TO BE ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION
IN
ORDER
TO
BE
CONSIDERED IS BENEFICIAL TO AN
ACCUSED. The aggravating circumstances of
craft and price or reward, even if proved, can
neither be considered because they were not
specifically alleged in the information. Section
8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal
Procedure
requires
that
the
information
specify
the
aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the
crime for it to be considered in the imposition
of penalty. This requirement is beneficial to an
accused and may, therefore, be given
retroactive effect.
NOT NECESSESARY THAT QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE APPRECIATED,
MUST BE PRECEDED WITH WORDS SUCH
AS QUALIFYING OR QUALIFIED; BUT
MUST BE PROVED. The information is
sufficient even if it failed to specifically state
that treachery and evident premeditation were
qualifying circumstances. Even after the recent
amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not
be preceded by descriptive words such as
qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an
offense. Nevertheless, in this case, neither
evident premeditation nor treachery has been
sufficiently proved to qualify the crime to
murder. People v. Sayaboc, January 15,
2004.
ALLEGATION OF RECIDIVISM; REQUISITES
IN ORDER TO APPRECIATE RECIDIVISM AS
AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; It is
necessary to allege it in the information and to
attach certified true copies of the sentences
previously meted out to the accused. This is in
accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. People v.
Dacillo, April 14, 2004.
ALLEGATION IN PREAMBLE; FILIATION OF
THE APPELLANT TO THE VICTIM WAS NOT
PROPERLY ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION;
undersigned accuses MELENCIO BALIBALITA, common law husband of the
complainants mother, of the crime of
Rape; Such relationship is not stated in the
cause of the accusation or in the narration of
the act or omissions constituting the offense.
The information upon which the appellant was
arraigned does not state in the specification of
the acts constitutive of the offense that he is
charged as the live-in partner of the mother of

the alleged victim. This insufficiency prevents a
judgment of conviction for qualified rape.
People v. Bali-balita, September 15, 2000.
ALLEGATION IN PREAMBLE; MINORITY
MUST ALLEGED IN THE ACCUSATORY
PORTION (body) OF THE COMPLAINT TO
BE CONSIDERED; MONALIZA MENDOZA,
Filipino, thirteen (13) years old, single
and a resident of Barangay Olympia; The
age of the victim age at the time of the filing of
the complaint merely appears in the caption or
preamble thereof as a description of her as the
private complainant, HOWEVER not specified in
the accusatory portion of the complaint. Such
omission is prejudicial to the right of appellant
to be informed of the nature of the accusations
against him. It is not sufficient to simply allege
the qualifying circumstances in the caption or
the preamble but, more importantly, these
must be alleged in the body or the accusatory
portion of the information. People v.
Mendoza, July 13, 2003
ALLEGATION IN PREAMBLE; INFORMATION
FOR
INCESTUOUS
RAPE;
THE
CIRCUMSTANCE
OF
RELATIONSHIP
SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED TO QUALIFY THE
OFFENSE;
Reseilleta
C.
Villanueva,
accuses Rogelio Villanueva, her father, of
the
crime
of
Rape;
IMMATERIAL
WHETHER
THE
QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE IS MENTIONED IN THE
OPENING
PARAGRAPH
OF
THE
INFORMATION
OR
IN
THE
SECOND
PARAGRAPH; Nothing in Secs. 6 and 8 of Rule
110 mandates the material allegations should
be stated in the body and not in the preamble
or caption of the Information. It is irrelevant
and
immaterial
whether
the
qualifying
circumstance of relationship is mentioned in
the opening paragraph of the Information or in
the second paragraph which alleges the acts
constituting the crime charged since either
paragraph is an integral part of the
Information.
The
preamble
or
opening
paragraph should not be treated as a mere
grouping of descriptive words and phrases. It is
as much an essential part of the Information as
the accusatory paragraph itself. People v.
Villanueva, October 15, 2003.
FAILURE
TO
SPECIFY
NATURE
OF
CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY AS ALLEGED
IN
THE
INFORMATION
WITHOUT
SPECIFICALLY STATING THAT IT IS A
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE MAY BE
CONSIDERED. Rule 110 merely require that
the Information allege, specify or enumerate
the attendant circumstances mentioned in the
law to qualify the offense. The words
aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, qualified by,
aggravating, or aggravated by need not be
expressly stated as long as the particular
attendant circumstances are specified in the

Information. People v. Tigle, January 21,
2004.
EFFECT ON CIVIL LIABILITY OF FAILURE TO
ALLEGE;
PROOF
OF
PRESENCE
OF
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES ENTITLES
THE HEIRS TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. The
presence of the aggravating circumstances of
band and uninhabited place was proven in the
present case as earlier discussed. While these
circumstances could not aggravate the crime
because they were not specifically alleged in
the Information, insofar as the civil aspect of
the case is concerned, the presence of these
aggravating circumstances entitles the heirs of
to exemplary damages. People v. Agudez,
May 20, 2004.
SEC. 10. Place of commission of the

offense.
How the Place of Commission Must be
Stated in the Information
1
General Rule:
It may be stated generally in a sense
that it can be understood from its
allegations that the offense was
committed or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at some place
within the jurisdiction of the court
Exception It must specific when the
particular
place
where
it
was
committed:
1 constitutes an essential element of the
offense charged, or
2 is necessary for its identification.
ERRONEOUS DESIGNATION OF TIME OR

PLACE IS IMMATERIAL IF NOT ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS; Where time or place or any other
fact alleged is not an essential element of the
crime charged, conviction may be had on proof
of the commission of the crime, even if it
appear that the crime was not committed at
the precise time or placed alleged, or if the
proof fails to sustain the existence of some
immaterial fact set out in the complaint,
providing it appears that the specific crime
charged was in fact committed prior to the
date of the filing of the complaint or
information within the period of the statute of
limitations, and at a place within the
jurisdiction of the court. People v. Lucas,
May 25, 1994.
SEC. 11. Date

offense.
of
commission
of
the
Date of Commission of the Offense

1
General Rule:
It is NOT necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise date
the offense was committed as the
offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible
to the actual date of its commission.
Exception
It is necessary to state the precise date
the offense was committed when it is a
material ingredient of the offense.
specification of the date when the alleged

crime was committed or for the quashal of the
Information on the ground that it does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form
deprives him of the right to object to evidence
which could lawfully be introduced and
admitted under an information of more or less
general terms but which sufficiently charges
the accused with a definite crime. People v.
Desuyo, April 17, 2002.
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party.

1
INDEFINITE DATE OF COMMISSION; SCOPE

OF ON OR ABOUT IS SUFFICIENT; The
words on or about envisage a period, months
or even two or four years before September 15,
1998 or October 22, 1998. The prosecution
may prove that the crime charged was
committed on or about September 15, 1998
and on or about October 22, 1998. People v.
Lizada, January 24, 2003.
ON OR ABOUT THE MONTH OF AUGUST
1996; FAILURE TO SPECIFY THE EXACT
DATES OR TIME OF COMMISSION OF
OFFENSE DOES NOT IPSO FACTO MAKE
THE INFORMATION DEFECTIVE. The precise
date or time when the victim was raped is not
an element of the offense. The gravamen of
the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under
any of the circumstances enumerated under
Article 335 of the RPC. As long as it is alleged
that the offense was committed at any time as
near to the actual date when the offense was
committed an information is sufficient.
EXAMPLES OF SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE;
Allegations that rapes were committed before
and until October 15, 1994, sometime in the
year 1991 and the days thereafter, sometime
in November 1995 and some occasions prior
and/or subsequent thereto and on or about and
sometime in the year 1988. People v.
Desuyo, April 17, 2002.
SERIOUSLY
DEFECTIVE
INFORMATION;
from 1977 to December 28, 1983; It places
on accused the unfair and unreasonable
burden of having to recall their activities over a
span of more than 2, 500 days. The prosecutor
must make more definite and particular the
time of the commission of the crime attributed
to accused. If he cannot, the case must be
dismissed. Rocaberte v. People, January
23, 1991.
MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS IS THE
REMEDY OF THE ACCUSED IF THE
INFORMATION FAILS TO STATE THE DATE
OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE;
The failure of the accused to move for the
What the complaint or information

must state:
1 the name and surname of the offended
party, or
2 appellation or nickname by which such
person has been or is known.
If there is no better way of identifying
him:
He must be described under a fictitious
name
If the true name of the offended party
is thereafter disclosed or ascertained:
The court must cause such true name to
be inserted in the complaint or
information and the record
In offenses against property, if the
name of the offended party is
unknown:
The property must be described with
such particularity as to properly identify
the offense charged.
If the offended party is a juridical
person:
1 It is sufficient to state:
1 its name, or
2 any name or designation by which it
is known or by which it may be
identified
2 There is no need of averring that it is a
juridical person or that it is organized in
accordance with law.
ACCUSED CAN BE VALIDLY CONVICTED

WHEN THE OFFENDED PARTY IS NOT
NAMED IN THE INFORMATION; In offenses
against property, the designation of the name
of the offended party is not absolutely
indispensable as long as the original act
charged in the complaint or information can be
properly Identified. The erroneous allegation as
to the person injured is deemed immaterial as
the same is a mere formal defect which does
not tend to prejudice any substantial right of
the defendant. People v. CFI of Quezon,
June 10, 1992.
OFFENDED PARTY IN BIGAMY MAY BE THE

FIRST OR SECOND WIFE; OFFENDED
PARTY IS THE PARTY TO WHOM OFFENDER
IS CIVILLY LIABLE. Section 12, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court as "the person against whom
or against whose property, the offense was
committed." More specifically, the offended
party in the commission of a crime, public or
private, is the party to whom the offender is
civilly liable, in light of Article 100 of the RPC,
which expressly provides that "every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable." Invariably then, the private individual to
whom the offender is civilly liable is the
offended party. Garcia v. CA, January 27,
1997.
SEC. 13. Duplicity of the offense.

Duplicity of the offense
1 General Rule:
A complaint or information must charge
ONLY ONE offense
2 Exception:
A complaint or information MAY charge
MORE THAN ONE offense when the law
prescribes a single punishment for
various offenses
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Complex Crimes
Compound Crimes (Article 49, RPC)
Single Larceny Doctrine
Look at the INTENT through the acts
committed. Even if series of acts
were committed, as long as the
intent is only one. The crime is only
one. Continuous crime.
Example: 5 chickens owned by 5
persons
inside
a
cage
were
unlawfully taken by A. 5 different
information for theft is not necessary.
Absorption Doctrine
Example: Rebellion
Special Complex Crimes
Example: Rape with homicide
HOW ABOUT continuous crime" is a single

crime consisting of a series ofacts arising from
a single criminal resolution or intent not
susceptible of division. NOT INCLUDED?
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES; INFORMATION
FOR RAPE WITH HOMICIDE IS NOT
DUPLICITOUS;
THE
PRESENCE
OF
HOMICIDE QUALIFIES THE CRIME OF RAPE.
Homicide committed on the occasion or by
reason of rape, loses its character as an
independent offense, but assumes a new
character, and functions like a qualifying
circumstance. However, by fiction of law, it
merged with rape to constitute a constituent
element of a special complex crime of rape

with homicide with a specific penalty which is
in
the
highest
degree.
Sanchez
v.
Demetriou, November 9, 1993.
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT AN
INFORMATION MUST CHARGE ONLY ONE
OFFENSE. In cases in which existing laws
prescribe a simple punishment for various
offenses, for example, Rape with homicide.
Sanchez v. Demetriou, November 9, 1993.
NOT A COMPLEX CRIME OF MULTIPLE
MURDER
AND
DOUBLE
FRUSTRATED
MURDER;
DEFINED
AND
PENALIZED
UNDER ARTICLE 248 IN RELATION TO
ARTICLE 48 OF THE RPC. A complex crime
exists when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing
the other. Where the killing was not shown to
have been committed by a single discharge of
firearms, the crime cannot be complex.
In this case, the killing of the four victims and
wounding of two others resulted from several
discharges of firearms. When various victims
expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes. Thus,
accused should be held liable for the separate
crimes of four murders and two attempted
murders. People v. Nardo, April 4, 1997.
DUPLICITOUS INFORMATION; ACCUSED
WAS CHARGED IN ONE INFORMATION
WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME BUT PROVEN
THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS NOT A
COMPLEX CRIME; FAILURE TO OBJECT,
COURT MAY VALIDLY RENDER JUDGMENT
FOR AS MANY CRIMES AS WERE ALLEGED
AND PROVEN. As a rule, an accused, as
established by evidence, may be convicted
only of the crime charged in the information, or
of an offense which necessarily includes that
which was charged or included therein.
However, in this case, the information as
stated, in effect imputed to the accused the
commission of several felonies. Yet there was
no move to quash the information on the
ground of multiplicity of charges. Neither was
there objection thereto at any other time.
Consequently, such defect is deemed waived,
and the Court may validly render judgment
against them for as many crimes as were
alleged and proven. People v. Nardo, April
4, 1997.
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution.

Rules on Amendment of the Information
1
Before arraignment:
1 General Rule -
complaint
or
information may be amended, in FORM

or in SUBSTANCE even without leave of
court
2 Exception:
1 If the amendment:
1 Downgrades the nature of the
offense charged in, or
2 Excludes any accused from the
complaint or information
2 It can be made only:
1 Upon motion by the prosecutor,
2 with notice to the offended party,
and
3 with leave of court
3 What the court must do in resolving
the motion:
1 It shall state its reasons, and
2 It shall furnish copies of its order to
all parties, especially the offended
party
After arraignment and during trial:
1 Amendment as to FORM may only be
made if:
1 it is done with leave of court, and
2 it does not prejudice the accused
2 Amendment as to SUBSTANCE Not
allowed
Rules on Substitution
1
Ground for substitution:

It appears at any time before judgment
that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense
Effects when the above ground exists:
1 A new information charging the proper
offense may be filed provided the
accused shall not be placed in double
jeopardy.
2 The court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information, and
3 The court may require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial
DISTINCTION
BETWEEN
AND SUBSTITUTION:
1
AMENDMENT
may involve either
formal
or
substantial changes
before plea has
been entered can
be effected without
leave of court
AMENDEMENT
SUBSTITUTION
necessarily involves a
substantial
change
from
the
original
charge
substitution
of
information must be
with leave of court as
the
original
information has to be
dismissed
if only as to form,
there is no need for
another preliminary
investigation
and
the retaking of the
plea of the accused
amended
information refers
to the same offense
charged
in
the
original information
or to an offense
which
necessarily
includes
or
is
necessarily
included
in
the
original
charge,
hence
substantial
amendments to the
information
after
the plea has been
taken cannot be
made
over
the
objection of the
accused, for if the
original information
would
be
withdrawn,
the
accused
could
invoke
double
jeopardy
another
preliminary
investigation
is
entailed
and
the
accused has to plead
anew to the new
information
substitution requires
or presupposes that
the new information
involves a different
offense which does
not include or is not
necessarily included
in the original charge,
hence the accused
cannot claim double
jeopardy
RULE IN DETERMINING WHETHER THERE

SHOULD BE AN AMENDMENT UNDER THE
FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 14, RULE
110,
OR
A
SUBSTITUTION
OF
INFORMATION
UNDER
THE
SECOND
PARAGRAPH THEREOF; Where the second
information involves the same offense, or an
offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information, an
amendment of the information is sufficient;
otherwise, where the new information charges
an offense which is distinct and different from
that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
Galvez v. CA, October 24, 1994.
AMENDMENT IN FORM OR SUBSTANCE;
TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN
ACCUSED
IS
PREJUDICED
BY
THE
AMENDMENT
OF
AN
INFORMATION;
Whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be
equally applicable to the information in the
new form as in the other. An amendment to an
information introduced after the accused has
pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein,
does not expose the accused to a charge which

could call for a higher penalty, does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
the new averment had each been held to be
one of form and not of substance not
prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not
prohibited by Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
An amendment is only in form when it merely
adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in
the information and not to introduce new and
material facts[38], and merely states with
additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information and
which, therefore, adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged. People v.
Sandoval, March 25, 2004.
EXAMPLE OF FORMAL AMENDMENTS;
ALLEGATION OF INSANITY OF VICTIM;
VALID AMENDMENT. After arraignment but
before commencement of trial, the court
allowed the amendment of the information to
include the allegation that by reason of the
rape, the victim became insane. NOT one of
substance but of form. The insertion of the
phrase that the victim has become insane by
reason or on occasion of the rape in the
Information merely raised the penalty (to
mandatory death) that may be imposed in case
of conviction and does not charge another
offense different from that charged in the
original Information.
Whatever defense accused may have raised
under the original information for rape
committed with a deadly weapon equally
applies to rape committed with a deadly
weapon where the victim has become insane
by reason or on occasion of the rape. The
amendment did not adversely affect any
substantial right of accused. People v.
Degamo, April 30, 2003.
CHANGE IN DESCRIPTION OF INJURY DOES
NOT
INVOLVE
A
MISTAKE
IN
THE
CHARGING OF THE PROPER OFFENSE.; NO
NEED FOR RE-ARRAIGNMENT. The court
order, after arraignment, to change in the
description of some of the victim's wounds
from "lacerated" to "stab" in the information, is
mere formal amendment. A re-arraignment is
necessary only where the change or
amendment of the information involves a
mistake in the charging of the proper offense.
Here, the change in the information, was not
effected to correct a mistake in charging the
proper offense. It did not have the effect of
changing the offense charged in the
information, which was, and correctly remained
as, murder. People v. Jaralba, September
20, 1993.

CHANGE IN DATE OF COMMISSION; The
deleted phrase on or about August 15, 1993
in the Information refers to the date of the
construction of dwelling units which were later
found to be defective, thereby causing damage
and
prejudice
to
the
complainants.
Consequently, accused, who constructed the
housing units, was charged for violating
Section 9, in relation to Section 39, of P.D. 957.
Obviously, it is impossible to finish the
construction of all units in one day or on or
about August 15, 1993. It was but proper to
amend the date in the original Information to
in the vicinity of 1981, since that the units
were shown to be completed in 1981.
The amended date in the Information is not
material to the offenses charged because the
basis thereof is not the date of the construction
but the defective construction of the units.
Such amendment does not prejudice the rights
of petitioner since it would not alter the nature
of the offense charged. Pangilinan v. CA,
January 30, 2002.
INSERTION OF THE WORD PRINTED; The
original information [which is published in
English in the City of Makati] clearly stated
that the newspaper is published in Makati City,
which allegation accordingly vests jurisdiction
over the offense charged in the RTC of Makati
City. An amendment is only in form when it
merely adds specifications to eliminate
vagueness in the information and not to
introduce new and material facts, and merely
states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original
information and which, therefore, adds nothing
essential for conviction for the crime charged.
The original information is sufficient in form.
Allowing the amendment does not alter the
defense of the accused. Indeed, it only states
with precision that which is already contained
in the original information.
Even if the court earlier ruled that it had no
jurisdiction over the offense which caused it to
grant the insertion of the word printed in
Makati so as to confer upon itself jurisdiction, is
now immaterial. Banal III v. Panganiban,
November 15, 2005.
ALLEGATION
OF
CONSPIRACY;
An
amendment after plea resulting in the inclusion
of an allegation of conspiracy and in the
indictment of some other persons in addition to
the original accused, constitutes a mere formal
amendment
permissible
even
after
arraignment. Accused is charged as a principal
in the killing of victim whom accused is alleged
to have stabbed while two unknown persons
held the victim's arms. The addition of the
phrase, "conspiring, confederating and helping
one another" does not change the nature of

petitioner's participation as principal in the
killing. Whether under the original or the
amended information, accused would have to
defend himself. Buhat v. CA, December 17,
1996.
OTHER
FORMAL
AMENDMENTS;
The
following were held to be merely formal
amendments: (1) new allegations which relate
only to the range of the penalty that the court
might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another
offense different or distinct from that charged
in the original one; (3) additional allegations
which do not alter the prosecutions theory of
the case so as to cause surprise to the accused
and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; and (4) amendment, which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the
accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription. Matalam v. Sandiganbayan,
April 12, 2005; People v. Degamo, April
30, 2003; Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag
EXAMPLE OF SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS;
INFORMATION
WHICH
UPGRADES
HOMICIDE TO MURDER AFTER A PLEA OF
NOT GUILTY IS PROHIBITED; To amend the
information so as to change the crime charged
for homicide to the more serious offense of
murder after the petitioner had pleaded not
guilty to the former is indubitably proscribed by
Sec. 14[1], Rule 110. For certainly a change
from homicide to murder is not a matter of
form; it is one of substance with very serious
consequences. Buhat v. CA, December 17,
1996.
TECHNICAL NAME OF CRIME CHARGED IN
THE CAPTION IS IMMATERIAL; RIGHT TO
BE INFORMED IS NOT VIOLATED IF THE
BODY OF THE INFORMATION ALLEGES
FACTS WHICH CONSTITUTE THE ACTUAL
CRIME COMMITTED; MAY BE CONVICTED
OF
THE
ACTUAL
CRIME
PROVEN
DIFFERENT FROM THE THAT WHICH WAS
DESIGNATED; The real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of the law alleged
to have been violated, they being conclusions
of law which in no way affect the legal aspects
of the information; BUT from the actual recital
of facts as alleged in the body of the
information. The real question which the
accused should focus on is NOT whether he
committed the crime given in the law some
technical and specific name, but WHETHER he
did perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information. For his full and complete defense
he need not know the name of the crime at all.
It is of no consequence whatever for the
protection of his substantial rights. Buhat v.
CA, December 17, 1996.

ROBBERY
TO
ROBBERY
IN
AN
UNINHABITED
PLACE;
The
proposed
amendments are substantial and have the
effect of changing the crime charged from
"Robbery" punishable under Article 209 to
"Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable
under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code,
thereby exposing the accused to a higher
penalty as compared to the penalty imposable
for the offense charged in the original
information. People v. Montenegro, March
25, 1988.
ALLEGATION
OF
CONSPIRACY;
The
allegation of conspiracy among all the accused,
which was not previously included in the
original information, is likewise a substantial
amendment saddling the accused with the
need of a new defense in order to meet a
different situation in the court. The allegation
of conspiracy enables the prosecution to
attribute and to the accused all the acts,
knowledge, admissions and even omissions of
his co-conspirator in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The amendment thereby widens
the battlefront to allow the use by the
prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to
the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp.
Also, to allow the proposed amendment
alleging conspiracy among all the accused, will
make all of the them liable not only for their
own individual transgressions or acts but also
for the acts of their co-conspirators. People v.
Montenegro, March 25, 1988.
ALLEGATION
OF
RELATIONSHIP;
The
amendment of the information sought in order
to allege the relationship of accused to the
victim, were clearly substantial in character as
they had the effect of changing the crime
charged, thereby exposing accused-appellant
to a higher penalty. Such amendment can no
longer be done after accused-appellant has
pleaded to the Information for simple rape.
People v. Sandoval, December 18, 2000.
SUBSTANTIAL
AND
FORMAL
AMENDMENTS;
Substantial
amendment
consists of recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are
merely of form. People v. Degamo, April 30,
2003.
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be

instituted.
1
Rule - The criminal action shall be

instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory:
where the offense was committed [for

local offenses], or
2 where any of its essential ingredients
occurred [for transitory or continuing
offenses]
Other
alternative
venues
for
institution of an action:
1 Where an offense is committed in a
train, aircraft, or other public or
private vehicle in the course of its
trip, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of:
1 the place of its departure,
2 any municipality or territory where
such train, aircraft, or other vehicle
passed during its trip, or
3 the place of its arrival
2 Where an offense is committed on
board a vessel in the course of its
voyage,
1 The
criminal
action
shall
be
instituted and tried in the court of:
1 the first port of entry, or
2 of any municipality or territory
where the vessel passed during
such voyage
2 Subject to the generally accepted
principles of international law
3 When the crime is committed
outside
the
Philippines
but
punishable under Article 2 of the
Revised Penal Code:
It shall be cognizable by the court
where the criminal action is first filed
JURISDICTION DEFINITION; ORIGIN OF THE

TERM; Jurisdiction has been defined as the
power conferred by law upon a judge or court
to try a case the cognizance of which belongs
to them exclusively and it constitutes the basic
foundation of judicial proceedings. The term
derives its origin from two Latin words jus
meaning law and the other, dicere meaning to
declare. The term has also been variably
explained to be the power of a court to hear
and determine a cause of action presented to
it, the power of a court to adjudicate the kind
of case before it, the power of a court to
adjudicate a case when the proper parties are
before it, and the power of a court to make the
particular decision it is asked to render.
Macasaet v. People, February 11, 2005.
PLACE OF INSTITUTION; TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION EXPLAINED; BASIS FOR
ACQUISITION OF JURISDICTION - WHERE
COMMITTED OR ANY OF ITS ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS TOOKS PLACE; For jurisdiction to
be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients took place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. Macasaet v. People,
February 11, 2005.
JURISDICTION
DETERMINED
BY
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION; The jurisdiction of a court
over the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. Macasaet v. People,
February 11, 2005.
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION; DISMISS IF
EVIDENCE SHOW THAT OFFENSE WAS
COMMITTED SOMEWHERE ELSE; However, if
the evidence adduced during the trial show
that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction. Macasaet v. People,
February 11, 2005.
PLACE OF INSTITUTION; TRANSITORY
CRIMES; MAY BE TRIED WHERE THE
OFFENSE WAS PARTLY COMMITTED; A
person charged with a transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or province
where the offense was in part committed. In
transitory or continuing offenses in which some
acts material and essential to the crime and
requisite to its consummation occur in one
province and some in another, the Court of
either province has jurisdiction to try the case,
it being understood that the first Court taking
cognizance of the Case will exclude the others.
HOWEVER, if the acts material and essential to
the crime and requisite of its consummation
occurred in one municipality or territory, the
Court of that municipality or territory has the
sole jurisdiction to try the case. People v.
Grospe, January 20, 1988.
PLACE
OF
INSTITUTION;
SPECIFIC
OFFENSE; VIOLATION OF BP BLG 22;
WHERE
ISSUED,
WHERE
THE
DRAWER/MAKER
IS
OR
WHERE
DISHONORED; In a Bouncing Checks case, the
offense also appears to be continuing in
nature. It is true that the offense is committed
by the very fact of its performance; and that
the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only
the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act
of making or drawing and issuance of a
bouncing check. The determining venue is the
place of the issuance of the check. However,
it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of
the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential
ingredient of the offense is by itself a
continuing eventuality, whether the accused
be within one territory or another.

Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the offense also lies in the place where the
check was dishonored. People v. Grospe,
January 20, 1988.
PLACE
OF
INSTITUTION;
SPECIFIC
OFFENSE; VIOLATION OF ANTI-FENCING
DECREE; FENCING IS NOT A CONTINUING
OFFENSE THAT COULD ALLOW THE FILING
OF AN INFORMATION IN THE PLACE
WHERE
THE
ROBBERY/THEFT
IS
COMMITTED
AND
NOT
NECESSARILY
WHERE THE PROPERTY IS LATER FOUND;
Unlike robbery is the taking of personal
property belonging to another, with intent to
gain, by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything, "fencing", is the act of any person
who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy
and sell, or in any other manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which
he knows, or should be known to him, to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft. The law on fencing does not
require the accused to have participated in the
crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime
of robbery or theft made to depend on an act
of fencing in order that it can be
consummated.
True, the object property in fencing must have
been previously taken by means of either
robbery or theft but the place where the
robbery
or
theft
occurs
is
inconsequential. People v. De Guzman,
October 5, 1993.
PLACE
OF
INSTITUTION;
SPECIFIC
OFFENSE; BIGAMY; PLACE WHERE THE
SECOND MARRIAGE WAS CONTRACTED; It
may not be suggested, in the crime of bigamy
which presupposes a prior subsisting marriage
of an accused, the case should thereby be
triable likewise at the place where the prior
marriage has been contracted. People v. De
Guzman, October 5, 1993.
PLACE
OF
INSTITUTION;
SPECIFIC
OFFENSE;
ESTAFA
THROUGH
MISAPPROPRIATION;
WHERE
AN
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OCCURRED; Elements
of the said crime are: (1) that money is
received by the offender in trust; (2) that there
be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a
demand made by the offended party on the
offender.
In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory wherein the offense

was committed or where any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place. In this
case, the demand to deliver the money was
made by the mother of the private complainant
at NAIA, which is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasay City.
Barrameda v. CA, September 2, 1999.
PLACE
OF
INSTITUTION;
SPECIFIC
OFFENSE; ESTAFA THROUGH ISSUANCE OF
CHECK; In the crime of Estafa by postdating or
issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are
essential elements of the offense. Under the
Rule 110, a person charged with a transitory
crime may be validly tried in any municipality
or province where the offense was in part
committed. In transitory or continuing offenses
in which some acts material and essential to
the crime and requisite to its consummation
occur in one province and some in another, the
Court of either province has jurisdiction to try
the case. Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad
check, may be a transitory or continuing
offense. Its basic elements of deceit and
damage may arise independently in separate
places.
In this case, deceit took place in, Pampanga,
while the damage was inflicted in Bulacan
where the check was dishonored by the drawee
bank in that place. Jurisdiction may, therefore,
be entertained by either the Bulacan Court or
the Pampanga Court.
While the subject check was issued in Bulacan,
it was not completely drawn there, but in
Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivered.
What is important is the delivery, it being the
final act essential to its consummation as an
obligation. People v. Grospe, January 20,
1988.
PLACE
OF
INSTITUTION;
OFFENSES
ABOARD
PUBLIC
VEHICLES;
WHERE
VEHICLE PASSED DURING SUCH TRIP;
PRECISE PLACE WHERE THE HIGHWAY
ROBBERY WAS SUPPOSEDLY COMMITTED
WAS NOT ESTABLISHED. P.D. 532 defines the
crime of highway robbery as the seizure of any
person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful
purposes, or the taking away of the property of
another by means of violence against or
intimidation of person or force upon things or
other unlawful means, committed by any
person on any Philippine Highway.
In Sec. 15(b) Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
which provides that where an offense is
committed xxx in any other public or private
vehicle while in the course of its trip, the
criminal action may be instituted and tried in
the court of any municipality or territory
where such train, aircraft or other vehicle
passed during such trip, including the place of
departure and arrival.
In this case, the RTC of Valenzuela had no

jurisdiction because complainant could not tell
whether Valenzuela was the place of their
departure or where the jeep passed during the
trip. People v. Panlilio, March 29, 1996.
PLACE OF INSTITUTION; ABOARD A
VESSEL ON VOYAGE; IF THE CRIME
OCCURRED IN A VESSEL WHICH WAS IN
TRANSIT, IT IS IMMATERIAL WHERE THE
CRIME WAS ACTUALLY COMMITTED. In
transit means on the way or passage; while
passing from one person or place to another; in
the course of transportation. Hence, the
applicable provision is Sec. 15(c), Rule 110
which provides that where an offense is
committed on board a vessel in the course of
its voyage, the criminal action may be
instituted and tried in the proper court of the
first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory through which the vessel passed
during such voyage subject to the generally
accepted principles of international law.
Calme v. CA, August 30, 1996.
PLACE OF INSTITUTION; LIBEL; ARTICLE
360 OF RPC;
1. Whether the offended party is a public
official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual,
the criminal action may also be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province where he
actually resided at the time of the commission
of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose
office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer
holding office outside of Manila, the action may
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense.
Agustin v. Pamintuan, August 22, 2005.
PLACE OF INSTITUTION; LIBEL; Article 360
of the RPC provides that, where one of the
offended parties is a public officer, the action
shall be filed in the RTC of the province or city
where (1)he holds office at the time of the
commission of the offense or of the province or
city (2) where the libelous article was
printed and first published. Hence, the
proper court to hear the libel case, in this
instance, was either the court in Quezon City
where former MP Orlando C. Dulay held Office,
or the court in Manila where the allegedly
libelous matter was printed and final published.
Uy v. Mercado, September 30, 1987.
PLACE OF INSTITUTION; LIBEL; PURPOSE

OF LIMITING THE CHOICE OF VENUE; The
limitation of choice of venue is intended to
minimize or limit the filing of out-of-town libel
suits to protect the alleged offender from
hardship, inconvenience, and harassment and
to protect the interest of the public service
where one of the offended parties is a public
officer. Uy v. Mercado, September 30,
1987.
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended

party in criminal action.
1
When offended party may intervene in

the prosecution of the offense:
When the civil action for recovery of civil
liability is instituted in the criminal action
How
may
the
offended
party
intervene:
by counsel
INTERVENTION PROHIBITED; 3 INSTANCES

IN RULE 111; There are three instances when
the offended party in a criminal case cannot
take part in the criminal prosecution, to wit: (1)
if the civil action has been waived; (2) if the
right to institute a separate civil action has
been reserved; and (3) if the civil action was
filed prior to the criminal action. Dichaves v.
Apalit, June 8, 2000.
OFFENSE WITH NO OFFENDED PARTY; FOR
VIOLATIONS OF ANTI-GRAFT LAW SEC.
3(e), THE OFFENDED PARTY IS THE
GOVERNMENT; Under Section 16, Rule 110,
the offended party may be a private individual
who is damaged or injured by the delictual acts
complained of. Such party must be one who
has a legal right; a substantial interest in the
subject matter of the action. Such interest
must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or
inconsequential. The interest of the party must
be personal; and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third
and unrelated party.
Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may also
be beneficiaries, AGFOI does NOT have a legal
right to intervene in the criminal cases merely
and solely to enforce and/or protect the
constitutional right of such members to have
access to the records of AFP-RSBS. NEITHER
are such members entitled to intervene therein
simply because the funds of the AFP-RSBS are
PUBLIC OR GOVERNMENT FUNDS. It must be
stressed that any interest of the members of
the AFP-RSBS over its funds or property is
MERELY INCHOATE AND INCIDENTAL. Such
funds belong to the AFP-RSBS which has a
juridical personality separate and independent
of its members/beneficiaries. Ramiscal

Sandiganbayan, December 13, 2004.
v.
WHERE OFFENDED PARTY DID NOT

INITIATE; AN OFFENDED PARTY NOT
MENTIONED IN THE INFORMATION MAY
CLAIM THE CIVIL LIABILITY IF HE HAS NOT
WAIVED IT. If the injured party has not
expressly waived the civil liability of the
accused nor reserved his right to file a
separate civil action, it is error for the court to
refuse a request of the injured party during the
course of the criminal prosecution to submit
evidence of his damages. Agujetas v. CA,
August 23, 1996.
WHERE
OFFENDED
PARTY
DESISTED
CONSTITUES A WAIVER TO CLAIM CIVIL
LIABILITY;
Desistance
of
the
victims
complaining mother does not bar the People
from prosecuting the criminal action, but it
does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue
civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving
her right to institute an action to enforce the
civil liability of accused, she also waived her
right to be awarded any civil indemnity arising
from the criminal prosecution. People v.
Amaca, August 12, 1997.
HOWEVER, in reality such desistance may
affect prosecution for lack of material
witness.
RULE 111
evidence,
2 Under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation
Docket Fees for Damages Being Claimed
by the Offended Party in the Civil Action
1
Actual Damages:
1 General
Rule
Payment
of
docket/filing fees is NOT required
2 Exception Payment of docket/filing
fees is required when the Rules provides
therefor, i.e.:
1 B.P. 22 cases (Rule 111 Sec. 1[b])
filing fees shall be based on the
amount of the check involved
2 Estafa cases (A.M. No. 04-2-04)
filing fees shall be based on the
amount involved
Moral,
Nominal,
Temperate,
or
Exemplary Damages
1 If the amount is specified in the
complaint or information:
the corresponding filing fees shall be
paid by the offended party upon the
filing thereof in court
2 If the amount is NOT specified in the
the
filing
fees
therefor
shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages
PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS

SEC. 1. Institution of Criminal an Civil
Actions
1
General Rule:
The civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action.
Exception - The civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed NOT
instituted with the criminal action when the
offended party:
1 waives the civil action,
2 reserves the right to institute it
separately, or
3 institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action
When Reservation of the Right to

Institute a Separate Civil Action Must be
Made:
1 Before the prosecution starts presenting its
Rules on Counterclaims, Cross-Claims or

Third Party Complaints
1 They cannot be files by the accused in the
criminal case, but
2 Any cause of action which could have been
the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action
CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO IS THE ONLY
CIVIL LIABILITY DEEMED INSTITUTED IN A
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION; NOT THOSE IN
ART 31 OF THE CIVIL CODE (other than
arising from delict); Only the civil liability of
the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action
(unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal
action).
What is deemed instituted in every criminal
prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities
arising from quasi-delicts (see Yakult),
contracts
or
quasi-contracts.
Philippine
Rabbit v. People, April 14, 2004.
EVEN IF CIVIL ACTION BASED ON ART 31
OF CC (other than arising from delict) IS
FILED SEPARATELY, OFFENDED PARTY MAY
STILL INTERVENE IN THE CRIMINAL
ACTION; In fact, even if a civil action is filed
separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended
party may -- subject to the control of the
prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal
action, in order to protect the remaining civil
interest therein. Philippine Rabbit v. People,
April 14, 2004.
WHEN CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO IS NOT
DEEMED INSTITUTED IN A CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION; The civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is not deemed
impliedly instituted when: (1) such action
arising from the same act or omission, which is
the subject of the criminal action, is waived;
(2) the right to bring it separately is reserved
or (3) such action has been instituted prior
to the criminal action. Maniago v. CA,
February 20, 1996.
CIVIL ACTION FOR THE RECOVERY OF
CIVIL LIABILITY IS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED
WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION; Such civil
action includes recovery of indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code (ex delicto), and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the
accused. Yakult v. CA, October 5, 1990.
EXCEPTION
TO
REQUIREMENT
OF
RESERVATION; INSTITUTION OF SEPARATE
CIVIL ACTION BEFORE THE PROSECUTION
PRESENTED EVIDENCE; Under Sec. 1 of Rule
111, (general rule) the reservation of the
right to institute the separate civil action shall
be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
Although the separate civil action filed in this
case was without previous reservation in the
criminal case, nevertheless since it was
(exception)
instituted
before
the
prosecution presented evidence in the
criminal action, and the judge handling the
criminal case was informed thereof, then the
actual filing of the civil action is even far better
than a compliance with the requirement of an
express reservation that should be made by
the offended party before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Yakult v. CA, October
5, 1990.
Requirements for exception to apply:
1. Institution of civil action must be

done BEFORE the prosecution has
commenced presenting evidence;
and
2. That the judge handling the
criminal case was informed of the
filing.
MANCHESTER DOCTRINE (1987); The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fees.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil
liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages,
the filing fees for such civil action as provided
in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual
damages. In cases wherein the amount of
damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information, the corresponding
filing fees shall be paid by the offended party
upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
Manantan v. CA, January 29, 2001.
NON-PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEE IS NOT A
BAR TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE CIVIL
ACTION;
MANCHESTER
DOCTRINE
APPLICABLE
ONLY
TO
IMPLIEDLY
INSTITUTED CIVIL ACTIONS; The intent of
the amendment of Sec. 1of Rule 111 is to make
the Manchester doctrine, requiring payment of
filing fees at the time of the commencement of
an action, applicable to impliedly instituted
civil actions under only when "the amount of
damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information.
When a civil action is deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, the
rule is as follows:
1) when "the amount of
actual, is alleged in
information" filed in
corresponding filing fees
offended party upon the
for trial;"
damages, other than

the complaint or
court, then "the
shall be paid by the
filing thereof in court
2) in any other case, howeveri.e., when the

amount of damages is not so alleged in the
complaint or information filed in court, the
corresponding filing fees need not be paid and
shall simply "constitute a first lien on the
judgment, except in an award for actual
damages. General v. Claravall, March 22,
1991.
REMEDY OF THE OFFENDED PARTY;
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
UNDER
RULE
65;
THE
PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE
HAS THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO ASSAIL
THE DISMISSAL BY THE TRIAL COURT
JUDGE OF THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST
AN ACCUSED UPON THE MOTION FILED BY

THE PROSECUTOR. In a special civil action for
certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the
trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state
that the petition may be filed by the person
aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved
parties are the State and the private
offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect
of the case so he may file such special civil
action questioning the decision or action of the
trial court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
the complainant should not bring the action in
the name of the People of the Philippines. The
action may be prosecuted in the name of the
said complainant. Perez v. Hagonoy, March
9, 2000.
EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE; (GR)
While it is only the Solicitor General that may
bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the
People or State in criminal proceedings
pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, (EXC) the private offended party
retains the right to bring a special civil action
for certiorari in his own name in criminal
proceedings before the courts of law. Perez v.
Hagonoy, March 9, 2000.
CORRECT PROCEDURE IS APPEAL WITH
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; BUT RULE
65 IF THERE IS NO OTHER REMEDY;
Although the correct procedure would have
been to appeal the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice to the Office of the
President, the said remedy was unavailable to
the private offended party as the penalty
involved was neither reclusion perpetua nor
death. Hence, as no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law was available to the private
offended party, filing of the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
was proper. Perez v. Hagonoy, March 9,
2000.
GENERAL RULE, A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION
WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED; If the
private complainant in this case may file a
special civil action for certiorari, then with
more reason does it have legal personality to
move for a reconsideration of the order of the
trial court dismissing the criminal charges
against the petitioner. In fact, as a general rule,
a special civil action will not lie unless a motion
for reconsideration is first filed before the trial
court, to allow it an opportunity to correct its
assigned errors. Perez v. Hagonoy, March 9,
2000.
APPEARANCE
OF
THE
PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR;
WHEN
A
PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR ENTERS HIS APPEARNCE IN
A CRIMINAL CASE BUT LATER ON
WITHDRAWS, THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
MAY BE ALLOWED TO FILE A SEPARATE
CIVIL ACTION IF THE ACCUSED IS
ACQUITTED; The appearance of the offended
party in the criminal case through a private
prosecutor MAY NOT PER SE be considered
either as an implied election to have his claim
for damages determined in said proceedings or
a waiver of his right to have it determined
separately. He must actually or actively
intervene in the criminal proceedings as to
leave no doubt with respect to his intention to
press a claim for damages in the same action.
In the present case, it can be said with
reasonable certainty that BY WITHDRAWAL OF
APPEARANCE OF ITS COUNSEL IN THE EARLY
STAGE of the criminal proceedings, the private
respondent, indeed, had NO INTENTION OF
SUBMITTING its claim for civil liability in the
criminal action. Sarmiento v. CA, December
27, 2002.
COUNTERCLAIM
BY
ACCUSED
IS
PROHIBITED IN CRIMINAL CASES; A court
trying a criminal case cannot award damages
in favor of the accused. The task of the trial
court is limited to determining the guilt of the
accused and if proper, to determine his civil
liability. A criminal case is not the proper
proceedings
to
determine
the
private
So complainants civil liability, if any. Maccay v.
March 31, 2005.
whatNobela,
is
really
ESSENCE OF FORUM-SHOPPING; The filing
the
of multiple suits involving the same parties for
correct
the
same
cause
of
action,
either
remedy
simultaneously or successively, to secure a
?
favorable
judgment.
(present)
ForumAppeal
shopping is present when in the two or more
with
cases pending, there is identity of parties,
the OP?
rights of action and reliefs sought. (not
or MR
present) However, there is no forum-shopping
with
in case where one party files a criminal case of
the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
trialproperty and the other party files a civil case
court.
for quasi-delict because the law and the rules
expressly allow the filing of a separate civil

action which can proceed independently of the
criminal action. Casupanan v. Laroya,
August 26, 2002.
SEPARATE
CIVIL
ACTION
FILED
BY
ACCUSED; OLD 1985 RULES OF COURT;
The filing of a separate civil action
independently of the criminal action is allowed,
provided the offended party reserved the right
to file such civil action. Unless the offended
party reserved the civil action before the
presentation
of
the
evidence
for
the
prosecution, ALL CIVIL ACTIONS arising from
the same act or omission were deemed
impliedly instituted in the criminal case. These

civil actions referred to the recovery of civil
liability (1) ex-delicto, the recovery of damages
for (2) quasi-delict, and the recovery of
damages for violation of Articles (3) 32, (4) 33
and (5) 34 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations. Casupanan v. Laroya, August
26, 2002.
SEPARATE
CIVIL
ACTION
FILED
BY
ACCUSED; NEW 2000 RULES OF COURT;
The independent civil action in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed
instituted with the criminal action but may be
filed separately by the offended party even
without reservation. The accused can file a civil
action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case.
This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6,
Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which
states that the counterclaim of the
accused may be litigated in a separate
civil action. Casupanan v. Laroya, August
26, 2002.
TWO
REASONS
FOR
ALLOWING
A
COUNTERCLAIM TO BE FILED IN A
SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION; FIRST, the accused
is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim
in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in
the criminal case. The accused is therefore
forced to litigate separately his counterclaim
against the offended party. If the accused does
not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
the prescriptive period may set in since the
period continues to run until the civil action for
quasi-delict is filed. SECOND, the accused, who
is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way
that the offended party can avail of this
remedy which is independent of the criminal
action. To disallow the accused from filing a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, while
refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the
criminal case, is to deny him due process of
law, access to the courts, and equal protection
of the law. Casupanan v. Laroya, August
26, 2002.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22

1
Rules in relation to the Civil Aspect:

1 The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action,
and
2 Reservation to file such civil action
separately is NOT allowed
Rules in relation to Docket Fees:
1 Actual Damages
the offended party shall pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved

Moral,
Nominal,
Temperate
or
Exemplary Damages
1 If the amount is specified in the
the offended party shall pay
additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein
2 If the amounts are not so alleged but
any
of
these
damages
are
subsequently awarded by the court
the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment
Consolidation of Civil and Criminal Actions

1 Requisites for proper consolidation:
1 The civil action has been filed
separately,
2 The trial of the civil action has not yet
commenced, and
3 There must be an application for
consolidation with the court trying the
criminal case
2 Effect is application for consolidation
is granted:
The trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions.
RULE WITH RESPECT TO VIOLATION OF BP
BLG. 22; VIOLATION OF BP BLG. 22 AND
CIVIL CASE; CIVIL CASE FOR SUM OF
MONEY
EX-CONTRACTU
MUST
BE
DISMISSED; Upon filing of the criminal cases
for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the
recovery of the amount of the checks was also
impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of
Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules. The reservation to
file a separate civil action is no longer needed.
The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal
case is expected to significantly lower the
number of cases filed before the courts for
collection based on dishonored checks. It is
also expected to expedite the disposition of
these cases. Instead of instituting two separate
cases, one for criminal and another for civil,
only a single suit shall be filed and tried. The
policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage
the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules
even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil
action, which means that one can no longer file
a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court. The only instance
when separate proceedings are allowed is
when the civil action is filed ahead of the
criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage
the consolidation of the civil and criminal
cases. In view of this special rule governing
actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the
Civil Code will not apply. Hyatt Industrial v.
Asia Dynamic, July 29, 2005.
BP 22 CASE IS EXCEPTION TO THE GR

THAT NO FILING FEE IS REQUIRED IN
CRIMINAL CASES; The rules require the
complainant to pay in full the filing fees based
on the amount of the check involved.
Generally, no filing fees are required for
criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of
the civil action in complaints for violation of
B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of
docket fees upon the filing of the complaint.
Hyatt Industrial v. Asia Dynamic, July 29,
2005.
RULE WITH RESPECT TO VIOLATION OF BP
BLG. 22; PRIVATE PROSECUTOR MAY BE
ALLOWED TO INTERVENE IN ESTAFA
CASES FOR PROSECUTION OF ATTACHED
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ISSUANCE
OF THE CHECKS INVOLVED IN A PENDING
BP 22 CASES; What Section 1(b) of the Rules
of Court prohibits is the reservation to file the
corresponding civil action in the BP 22 case.
The fact that the Rules do not allow the
reservation of civil actions in BP 22 cases
cannot deprive private complainant of the right
to protect her interests in the criminal action
for estafa. Nothing in the current law or rules
on BP 22 vests the jurisdiction of the
corresponding civil case exclusively in the court
trying the BP 22 criminal case. A recovery by
the offended party under one remedy,
however, necessarily bars that under the other.
Obviously stemming from the fundamental rule
against unjust enrichment, this is in essence
the rationale for the proscription in our law
against double recovery for the same act or
omission. Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, July 29,
2005.
PURPOSE OF NON-RESERVATION-OF-CIVILACTION RULE IN BP 22 CASE IS TO
DECLOG
COURT
DOCKETS,
NOT
TO
PRECLUDE PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION
IN ESTAFA CASES; Because the dockets of
the courts were clogged with such litigations;
creditors were using the courts as collectors.
While ordinarily no filing fees were charged for
actual damages in criminal cases, the rule on
the necessary inclusion of a civil action with
the payment of filing fees based on the face
value of the check involved was laid down to
prevent the practice of creditors of using the
threat of a criminal prosecution to collect on
their credit free of charge. BUT IT IS NOT the
intent of the special rule to preclude the
prosecution of the civil action that corresponds
to the estafa case, should the latter also be
filed. Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, July 29,
2005.
ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF BP 22 ARE
DISTINCT; The crimes of estafa and violation
of BP 22 are different and distinct from each
other. There is no identity of offenses involved,

for which legal jeopardy in one case may be
invoked in the other. The offenses charged in
the informations are perfectly distinct from
each other in point of law, however nearly they
may be connected in point of fact. Rodriguez
v. Ponferrada, July 29, 2005.
GR: AN OFFENDED PARTY MAY INTERVENE
IN THE PROSECUTION OF A CRIME;
EXCEPT: (1) when, from the nature of the
crime and the law defining and punishing
it, no civil liability arises in favor of a
private offended party; and (2) when,
from the nature of the offense, the
offended parties are entitled to civil
indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to
institute a civil action, (b) expressly
reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit
has already been instituted.
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is
suspended.
Effect of Filing a Criminal Case when Civil
Action has been Reserved
1
If the criminal action was filed AHEAD

of the civil action:
1 The separate civil action arising from
the crime CANNOT be instituted until
final judgment has been entered in the
criminal action; and
2 During the pendency of the criminal
action, the running of the prescriptive
period of the civil action is SUSPENDED
If the criminal action is filed AFTER the
said civil action has already been
instituted:
1 the civil action shall be suspended at
whatever stage it may be found before
judgment on the merits, until final
judgment is rendered in the criminal
action; but
2 The civil action, the same may, upon
motion of the offended party, be
consolidated with the criminal action in
the court trying the criminal action
Rules in Case of Consolidation

1
General Rule:
1 The evidence already adduced in the
civil action is deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action, BUT:
the prosecution [?] has the right to
cross-examine the witnesses presented
by the offended party in the criminal
case, and
The parties are allowed to present
additional evidence
2 The consolidated criminal and civil
actions shall be tried and decided
jointly.
Exception:
The civil action based on delict shall be
deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist.
Remedy of the offended party:
He/she can still file a civil case based on
OTHER sources of obligation
Effects of Extinction of the Criminal Action

1 General Rule:
It does not cause the extinction of the
civil action
2 Exception:
The civil action based on delict shall be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding
in a final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist.
3 Remedy of the offended party:
He/she can still file a civil case based on
OTHER sources of obligation
SUSPENSION OF CIVIL ACTION; A CIVIL
ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM A
CRIME (EX DELICTO) MAY BE FILED
SEPARATELY FROM THE CRIMINAL CASE; A
civil action for recovery of damages arising
from a crime may filed separately from the
criminal case either before the institution of the
latter, which may be done without reservation,
after such institution, provided, however, that a
reservation that effect has been made. If in the
meantine the criminal action is instituted, the
civil action which has been reserve cannot be
commenced until final judgment has been
render in the former. However, in the cases
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, the civil action may be filed
even after the institution of the criminal case.
Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, November 18, 1991.
EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL CASE;
ACQUITTAL WITH JUDGMENT ON CIVIL
LIABILITY;
AN
ACCUSED
WHO
IS
ACQUITTED MAY BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE;
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent
a judgment against him on the civil aspect of
the case where (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) where the court
declared that the liability of the accused is only
civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused was acquitted.
Salazar v. People, September 23, 2003.
INSTANCES WHEN NO CIVIL LIABILITY
SHALL ARISE;
The civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a (1) finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise

did not exist or (2) where the accused did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
(3) That no crime existed. Salazar v.
People, September 23, 2003.
TWO
KINDS
OF
ACQUITTAL
WITH
DIFFERENT
EFFECTS
ON
THE
CIVIL
LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED;
FIRST is an acquittal on the ground that the
accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door
to civil liability, for a person who has been
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable
for such act or omission. There being no delict,
civil liability ex delicto is out of the question,
and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court.
The SECOND instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has
not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29
of the CC, where the civil action for damages is
for the same act or omission. Manantan v.
CA, January 29, 2002.
APPEAL AFTER ACQUITTAL; ACQUITTAL ON
THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT
DOES NOT BAR THE AWARD OF CIVIL
LIABILITY ON APPEAL. The acquittal by the
RTC was predicated on the conclusion that his
guilt had not been established with moral
certainty. His acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt, thus he is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. Hence,
notwithstanding his acquittal, the offended
party may elevate to the CA the civil aspect of
the terminated criminal case and CA was not
precluded from looking into the question of his
negligence or reckless imprudence [for
purposes
of
determining
civil
liability].
NO APPEAL CAN BE MADE ON A
JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL, BUT OFFENDED
PARTY MAY APPEAL JUDGMENT ON THE
CIVIL ASPECT; If the accused is acquitted on
reasonable doubt but the court renders
judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal
case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the
judgment of acquittal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, the
aggrieved party, the offended party or the
accused or both may appeal from the judgment
on the civil aspect of the case within the period

therefor. Salazar v. People, September 23,
2003.
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed

independently.
Independent Civil Action
FILING FEES ARE PAID ONLY WHEN OTHER

ITEMS OF DAMAGES SUCH AS MORAL,
NOMINAL, TEMPERATE, OR EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES
ARE
ALLEGED
IN
THE
INFORMATION; Where the civil action is
impliedly instituted together with the criminal
action, the actual damages claimed by the
offended parties, are not included in the
computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to
be paid only if other items of damages such as
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages are alleged in the complaint or
information, or if they are not so alleged, shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
FILING OF CIVIL CASE AFTER ACQUITTAL;
CIVIL ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY RES
ADJUDICATA
DESPITE
THE
ACTIVE
PARTICIPATION OF OFFENDED PARTY IN
CRIMINAL CASE, IF ACQUITTAL WAS DUE
TO REASONABLE DOUBT; When the accused
in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may still be instituted
against him, and only a preponderance of
evidence is required to hold the accused liable.
The civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt. Bonite v. Zosa,
June 20, 1988.
DISMISSAL
OF
COMPLAINT
DURING
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT
BAR A CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR
THE SAME ACT; The dismissal of the
complaint for forcible abduction with rape was
by mere resolution of the fiscal at the
preliminary investigation stage. There is no
declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil case might arise did not
exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in
any way affect the right of the private
complainant to institute a civil action arising
from the offense because such preliminary
dismissal of the penal action did not carry with
it the extinction of the civil action. The reason
most often given for this holding is that the two
proceedings involved are not between the
same parties. Furthermore, it has long been
emphasized, with continuing validity up to now,
that there are different rules as to the
competency of witnesses and the quantum of
evidence in criminal and civil proceedings.
Bunag, Jr. v. CA, July 10, 1992.
When a civil action may be brought

independently by the offended party
In cases provided in the following provisions
of the New Civil Code:
1 Art. 32 for damages for violation of
Constitutional rights
2 Art. 33 for defamation, fraud and
physical injuries
3 Art. 34 for failure of a police officer to
render assistance to a person in case of
danger to life or property
4 Art. 2176
- for quasi-delict or
obligations arising from culpa aquiliana
Rules:
1 The civil action shall:
1 Proceed
independently
of
the
criminal action, and
2 Require only a preponderance of
evidence.
2 The offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
CONSEQUENCES
OF
AMENDMENTS
INTRODUCED IN THE 2000 RULES OF
CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
REGARDING
PROSECUTION OF INDEPENDENT CIVIL
ACTIONS;
RESERVING
INDEPENDENT
ACTIONS NOT REQUIRED; The 2000 Rules
deleted
the
requirement
of
reserving
independent civil actions and allowed these to
proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus,
the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain
separate, distinct and independent of any
criminal prosecution based on the same act.
Here are some direct consequences of such
revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions
based on the Civil Code need not be
reserved in the criminal prosecution, since
they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to
file a separate civil action arising from the
crime charged does not extinguish the
right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended
party cannot recover more than once for
the same act or omission.
ACTION BASED ON QUASI DELICT; THE
INJURED PARTY IN THE CRIMINAL CASE OF
NEGLIGENCE DOES NOT NEED TO RESERVE
IN ORDER TO BE ALLOWED TO RECOVER
DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI-DELICT; In
cases of negligence, the injured party has the
choice between an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime (Article 100 of RPC)
and an action for quasi- delict (Article 2176 of
CC). The fact that he reserved his right in the
criminal case to file an independent civil action

did not preclude him from choosing to file a
civil action for quasi-delict. In fact, even
without such a reservation, the injured party in
the criminal case which resulted in the
acquittal of the accused is allowed to recover
damages based on quasi-delict. Bermudez v.
Melencio- Herrera, February 26, 1988.
CONSOLIDATION IN LIBEL; A CRIMINAL
CASE FOR LIBEL AND AN INDEPENDENT
CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING
THEREFROM FILED PURSUANT TO ART 33
OF CC, PENDING IN DIFFERENT BRANCHES
OF
THE
SAME
COURT
MAY
BE
CONSOLIDATED FOR JOINT TRIAL, EVEN IF
THE IT IS THE CIVIL ACTION WHICH IS
FILED FIRST; An independent civil action for
the recovery of civil liability, authorized under
Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code,
filed before the institution of the criminal case,
may be consolidated with the latter, subject to
the condition that no final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal case. If this is
permitted, given the existence of the condition,
then an independent civil action under any of
the said Articles, may be consolidated with the
criminal case even if filed after the institution
of the latter. Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, November
18, 1991.
SPECIFIC CRIMES; RECOVERY OF SUM OF
MONEY AND ESTAFA; THE COURT TRYING
THE CIVIL CASE FOR RECOVERY OF SUM
OF MONEY NEED NOT WAIT FOR THE
RESOLUTION IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR
ESTAFA (for the same transaction with the
civil case) BEFORE PROMULGATING ITS
DECISION SO AS TO AVOID POSSIBLE
CONFLICTS OF DECISION IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE; Article 33 of the CC which provides that
in cases involving alleged fraudulent acts, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution
and
shall
require
only
a
preponderance of evidence. This civil case may
proceed independently of the criminal case
especially because while both cases are based
on the same facts, the quantum of proof
required for holding the parties liable
therein differ. Thus, it is improvident to claim
that the decision and resolution of the CA in
the civil case would be preemptive of the
outcome of the criminal case. Their fear of
possible conflict between the disposition of this
civil case and the outcome of the pending
criminal case is illusory. Bordador v. Luz,
December 15, 1997.
SPECIFIC CRIMES; LEGAL SEPARATION
AND CONCUBINAGE; A COMPLAINT FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION, ON THE GROUND OF
CONCUBINAGE, WITH A PETITION FOR
SUPPORT AND PAYMENT OF DAMAGES

MAY PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH
THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR CONCUBINAGE;
Under Sec. 3, Rule 111, a civil action for legal
separation, based on concubinage, may
proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said
civil action is not one "to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense" even if both
the civil and criminal actions arise from or are
related to the same offense. Such civil action is
one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences
thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of offsprings,
support, and disqualification from inheriting
from the innocent spouse, among others. A
decree of legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for
legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary.
Gandionico v.
Penaranda, November 27, 1987.
SEC. 4. Effect of death on civil actions.
Effect of Death of the Accused
1 If death occurs AFTER arraignment and
DURING the pendency of the criminal
action
1 The civil liability of the accused arising
from the crime is extinguished; but
2 Independent civil actions and civil
liability arising from other sources of
obligation may be continued
2 If death occurs BEFORE arraignment:
1 The criminal case shall be dismissed,
but
2 The offended party may file the proper
civil action against the estate of the
deceased
Procedure to Follow in Continuation of the
Action in Case of Death of the Accused
1 The actions after proper substitution may
be continued against the following:
1 the estate of the accused,
2 legal representative of the accused; or
3 the heirs of the accused who may be
substituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator;
2 The court may appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor heirs.
3 The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty
(30) days from notice; and
4 A final judgment entered in favor of the
offended party shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these rules
for prosecuting claims against the estate of
the deceased
DEATH DURING PENDENCY OF APPEAL;

DEATH DURING PENDENCY OF APPEAL;
EFFECTS OF DEATH OF THE ACCUSED
WHILE APPEAL IS PENDING;
1.
Death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. The death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2.
The claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of
the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3.
Where the civil liability survives, as
explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject
to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained
above.
4.
The private offended party need not
fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action
and prior to its extinction, the private offended
party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with the provisions of Article 1155
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible privation of
right by prescription. People v. Abungan,
September 28, 2000.
SEC. 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar.
When the issue in the civil case is

classified as a prejudicial question
SEC.
6.
Suspension
prejudicial question.
Suspension
Question
1
by
Reason
by
of
reason
of
Prejudicial
Prejudicial Question:
An issue involved in a civil action which
is similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action, the
resolution of which determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed
When a criminal case may
be
suspended to give way to the
determination of a civil case:
When the issue of the civil case involves
a prejudicial question
Where petition for suspension of the
criminal action may be filed:
1 in the office of the prosecutor [during
PI], or
2 in the court conducting the PI [?]
3 in the court where the criminal case is
pending [at any time before the
prosecution rests]
REQUIREMENT
OF
A
PETITION
TO
SUSPEND THE CRIMINAL ACTION; Under
the Rules, suspension may be made only upon
petition and NOT at the instance of the judge
alone, and it also says suspension, NOT
dismissal of the criminal case. Not every
defense raised in the civil action will raise a
prejudicial question to justify suspension of the
criminal action. The defense must involve an
issue similar or intimately related to the same
issue raised in the criminal action and its
resolution should determine whether or not the
latter action may proceed.
Since no motion for suspension has been filed,
the judge could not have been informed of the
defense accused was raising in the civil action.
He could not have ascertained then if the issue
raised in the civil action would determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. Yap v. Paras, January 30,
1992.
Effect of Judgment in a Civil Action

Absolving the Defendant from Liablity
1
General Rule:
This shall not be a bar to a criminal
action against the defendant for the
same act or omission subject of the civil
action.
Exception:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.

Elements of Prejudicial Question
1 The previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and

2 The resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
INSTANCES WITH PREJUDICIAL QUESTION;
CIVIL CAS HAS TO DETERMINE THE
FALSITY IF THE TESTIMONY; CRIMINAL
CASE IS ART 182 RPC FOR GIVING FALSE
TESTIMONY IN A CIVIL CASE; The civil case
is so intimately connected with the subject
crime that it is determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal cases.
In other words, whether or not the testimonies
of accused in the civil cases are false is a
prejudicial question. Hence, under the Rules,
pending determination of the falsity of the
subject testimonies of private respondents in
the civil case, the criminal action for false
testimony must perforce be suspended. Ark
Travel v. Presiding Judge, August 29,
2003.
INSTANCES WITH PREJUDICIAL QUESTION;
CIVIL CASE FOR OWNERSHIP OF A PIECE
OF LAND; CRIMINAL CASE FOR SQUATTING
ON THE SAME PIECE OF LAND; Whatever
may be the ultimate resolution of the question
of ownership, such resolution will be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. Surely, if the
accused are co-owners of the lot in question,
they cannot be found guilty of squatting
because they are as much entitled to the use
and occupation of the land as are the private
complainants. Apa v. Fernandez, March 20,
1995.
NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE AND BIGAMY; ANNULMENT
CASE IS NOT A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
THAT WOULD JUSTIFY SUSPENSION OF
THE PROSECUTION FOR BIGAMY; The
outcome of the civil case for annulment of
petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no bearing
upon
the
determination
of
petitioners
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one
which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner
eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both
the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled. Abunado v. People, March 30,
2004.
NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; DECLARATION

OF NULLITY AND CONCUBINAGE; A
PENDING PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE FILED BY THE
ACCUSED AGAINST HIS WIFE IS NOT A PQ
TO THE CHARGE OF CONCUBINAGE FILED
BY HIS WIFE AGAINST HIM; parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a
woman not his wife before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
Beltran v. People, June 20, 2000.
NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; ESTAFA AND
CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES; PENDENCY OF
CIVIL CASE FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND
FOR DAMAGES AND ATTACHMENT IS NOT
A PQ JUSTIFYING THE SUSPENSION OF
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CRIMINAL CASE
FOR ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENT; The issue in civil case
for Injunctive Relief is whether or not accused
merely acted as an agent of his mother; while
in civil case for Damages and Attachment,
whether accused and his mother are liable to
pay damages and to return the amount paid by
complainant for the purchase of the disputed
lot.
Even if accused is declared merely an agent of
his mother in the transaction involving the sale
of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged
free from criminal liability. An agent or any
person may be held liable for conspiring to
falsify
public
documents.
Hence,
the
determination of the issue involved in the
Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or
innocence of the accused in estafa.
Likewise, ruling of the court in the civil case
that PBI should not be paid the purchase price
plus damages will not necessarily absolve
respondent of liability in the criminal case
where his guilt may still be established under
penal laws as determined by other evidence.
People v. Consing, January 16, 2003.
NO
PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION;
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE; A CIVIL
ACTION
RELATED
TO
UNFAIR
COMPETITION IS NOT A PQ TO A
PROSECUTION FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION
UNDER THE IPC; The common element in the
acts constituting unfair competition under
Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud. Pursuant
to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be

brought by the injured party. Hence, a civil case
which relates to unfair competition, is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal case. Samson v.
Daway,, July 21, 2004.
NO PQ IF CIVIL AND THE CRIMINAL
ACTION
CAN,
ACCORDING
TO
LAW,
PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY; Under Rule 111,
Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. Samson v.
Daway, July 21, 2004
NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; BP 22 AND
ANNULMENT OF SALE; A CIVIL ACTION
FOR ANNULMENT OF SALE ON THE
GROUND OF FRAUD BY THE SELLER
REGARDING THE LAND SOLD IS NOT A PQ
TO A CRIMINAL CASE FOR VIOLATION OF
BP 22 ARISING FROM THE BOUNCING OF
THE CHECK PAID BY THE BUYER OF THE
LAND; The charge for violation of BP 22 is
based on the dishonor of the check by the
buyer upon due presentment to the drawee
bank. Undeniably, at the time of said dishonor,
the buyers [accused] obligation to pay the
seller pursuant to the deed of sale, continued
to subsist. And because petitioners' checks
were dishonored for lack of funds, accused is
answerable
under
the
law
for
the
consequences of his acts. And even if the civil
case were to be finally adjudged to the effect
that the said deed of sale should be annulled,
such declaration would be of no material
importance in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of accused in the criminal case.
Umali v. IAC, June 21, 1990.
RULE 112
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
SEC. 1. Preliminary investigation defined;
when required.
Preliminary Investigation
1 Definition - An inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief
that:
1 a crime has been committed, and
2 the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial
2 When required to be conducted:
1 Before the filing of a complaint or
information in court,
2 For an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4)

years, two (2) months and one (1) day
without regard to the fine.
NATURE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;
DEFINITION; Preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A
component part of due process in criminal
justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory
and substantive right accorded to the accused
before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive them of the
full measure of their right to due process.
Villaflor v. Vivar, January 16, 2001.
PI IS NOT PART OF THE TRIAL; A full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence
is not required, but only such as may engender
a well-grounded belief than an offense has
been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. By reason of the
abbreviated
nature
of
preliminary
investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a
result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial
pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no double
jeopardy attaches. People v. CA and Cerbo,
January 21, 1999.
PI IS NOT PART OF THE TRIAL; NOT THE
VENUE FOR THE FULL EXERCISE OF THE
RIGHTS; Preliminary investigation is not the
venue for the full exercise of the rights of the
parties. This is why preliminary investigation is
not considered as a part of trial but merely
preparatory thereto and that the records
therein shall not form part of the records of the
case in court. Parties may submit affidavits but
have no right to examine witnesses though
they can propound questions through the
investigating officer. In fact, a preliminary
investigation may even be conducted ex-parte
in certain cases. People v. Narca, July 21,
1997.
DISMISSAL OF PI IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO
ACQUITTAL; NO JEOPARDY; By reason of the
abbreviated
nature
of
preliminary
investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a
result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial
pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no double
jeopardy attaches. People v. CA and Cerbo,
January 21, 1999.
A
STATUTORY
RIGHT
NOT
CONSTITUTIONAL; The right to a PI is not a
constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute. The absence of a
preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the Information or otherwise render
the
same
defective.
Serapio
Sandiganbayan, January 28, 2003.
v.

ABSENCE OF PI DOES NOT The absence
of a preliminary investigation does NOT IMPAIR
the validity of the Information or otherwise
RENDER THE SAME DEFECTIVE and NEITHER
DOES IT AFFECT THE JURISDICTION of the court
over the case or CONSTITUTE A GROUND FOR
QUASHING the Information.
If the lack of a preliminary investigation does
not render the Information invalid nor affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the case, with
more reason can it be said that the DENIAL OF
A MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION CANNOT
INVALIDATE THE INFORMATION or oust the
court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither
can it be said that petitioner had been
DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS. He was afforded
the opportunity to refute the charges against
him during the preliminary investigation.
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, January 28,
2003.
AN
EXECUTIVE
FUNCTION;
THE
DETERMINATION OF THE PERSONS TO BE
PROSECUTED RESTS PRIMARILY WITH THE
PROSECUTOR; The determination of probable
cause during a preliminary investigation or
See red
reinvestigation is recognized as an executive
function exclusively of the prosecutor. notes
An
investigating prosecutor is under no obligation
to file a criminal action where he is not
convinced that he has the quantum of
evidence at hand to support the averments.
Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not
to prosecute when after investigation or
reinvestigation they are convinced that the
evidence adduced was not sufficient to
establish a prima facie case. Thus, the
determination of the persons to be prosecuted
rests primarily with the prosecutor who is
vested with discretion in the discharge of this
function.
PURPOSE
OF
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION; The purpose of a preliminary
investigation is merely to determine whether a
crime has been committed and whether there
is probable cause to believe that the person
accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has
been committed and was committed by the
suspect. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
on
evidence
establishing
guilt
beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, January
28, 2003.
PURPOSE
OF
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION;
TO
PROTECT
THE
ACCUSED; The rationale of a preliminary
investigation is to protect the accused from the
inconvenience, expense and burden of
defending himself in a formal trial unless the
reasonable probability of his guilt shall have
been first ascertained in a fairly summary
proceeding by a competent officer. Yusop v.
Sandiganbayan, February 22, 2001.
PRIMARY
OBJECTIVE
IS
FOR
THE
ACCUSED; SECONDARY OBJECTIVE IS FOR
THE STATE; The PRIMARY objective of a
preliminary investigation is to free the accused
from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy
and stress of defending himself/herself in the
course of a formal trial, until the reasonable
probability of his or her guilt in a more or less
summary proceeding by a competent office
designated
by
law
for
that
purpose.
SECONDARILY, such summary proceeding also
protects the state from the burden of the
unnecessary expense an effort in prosecuting
alleged offenses and in holding trials arising
from false, frivolous or groundless charges.
Villaflor v. Vivar, January 16, 2001.
RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS UNDERGOING
PI; 1) the right to refuse to be made witnesses;
2) the right not to have any prejudice
whatsoever imputed to them by such refusal;
3) the right to testify on their own behalf,
subject
to
cross-examination
by
the
prosecution (DIBA SA COURT LANG ANG
CROSS EXAMINATION? IN PI, NO RIGHT TO
CROSS EXAMINE?); and 4) while testifying,
the right to refuse to answer a specific question
that tends to incriminate them for some crime
other than that for which they are being
prosecuted. Ladiana v. People, December
4, 2002.
ABSENCE OF COUNSEL DURING PI DOES
NOT RENDER IT VOID; There is nothing in the
Rules which renders invalid a preliminary
investigation held without defendants counsel.
Not being a part of the due process clause but
a right merely created by law, preliminary
investigation if held within the statutory
limitations cannot be voided. Preliminary
investigation is NOT THE VENUE FOR THE FULL
EXERCISE OF THE RIGHTS of the parties. This is
why preliminary investigation is not considered
as a part of trial but merely preparatory thereto
and that the records therein shall not form part
of the records of the case in court. Parties may
submit affidavits but have no right to
examine
witnesses
though
they
can
propound questions through the investigating
officer. In fact, a preliminary investigation may
even be conducted ex-parte in certain cases.
People v. Narca, July 21, 1997.
USE
OF
MODES
OF
DISCOVERY;
RESPONDENT IN A PI MAY AVAIL OF
DISCOVERY
PROCEEDINGS;
Rules
on
Criminal Procedure do not expressly provide for
discovery proceedings during the preliminary
investigation stage of a criminal proceeding.
This failure to provide discovery procedure
during preliminary investigation DOES NOT,
HOWEVER, NEGATE its use by a person under
investigation when indispensable to protect his
constitutional right to life, liberty and property.
Preliminary investigation is not too early a
stage to guard against any significant erosion
of the constitutional right to due process of a
potential accused. The object of a preliminary
investigation is to determine the probability
that the suspect committed a crime. The
finding of a probable cause by itself subjects
the suspect's life, liberty and property to real
risk of loss or diminution. [Discovery
proceedings for original copy of the sworn
statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report] Webb
v. De Leon, August 23, 1995.
LACK OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;
EFFECT; ABSENCE OF PI DOES NOT IMPAIR
A VALID INFORMATION; REMEDY IS ORDER
PROSECUTOR TO CONDUCT PI; Absence of a
preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render
it defective. Neither does it affect the
jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground
for quashing the information. The trial court,
instead of dismissing the information, should
hold in abeyance the proceedings and order
the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation. Villaflor v. Vivar, July 30,
2002.
LACK OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;
OBJECTION TO LACK OF PI MUST BE DONE
BEFORE ENTRY OF PLEA; REMEDY IS
REMAND NOT DISMISS INFORMATION;
CERTIORARI AND PROHOBITION LIES IF
COURT REFUSES TO REMAND; Any objection
to lack of preliminary investigation must be
made before entry of the plea and the court,
instead of dismissing the information, must
remand the case for preliminary investigation.
The refusal of the court to remand the case for
preliminary investigation can be controlled by
certiorari and prohibition to prevent trial.
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, July 30,
2002.
RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS
WAIVABLE; WAIVED WHEN THE ACCUSED
FAILS TO INVOKE IT BEFORE OR AT THE
TIME OF ENTERING A PLEA; The right to
preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time
of entering a plea at arraignment. Conversely,
if the accused does invoke it before
arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case,
the right is not waived.
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS IF COURT

REFUSES TO REMAND WHEN ACCUSED
TIMELY ASKS FOR PI; The right to preliminary
investigation is substantive, not merely formal
or technical. To deny it to petitioner would
deprive him of the full measure of his right to
due process. Hence, preliminary investigation
with regard to him must be conducted. Yusop
v. Sandiganbayan, February 22, 2001.
CASES
REQUIRING
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION; OFFENSES PUNISHABLE
BY AT LEAST 4 YEARS AND 2 MONTHS;
Preliminary Investigation is required before an
information for an offense punishable by at
least four years, two months and one day may
be filed in court. However, the right to
preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time
of entering a plea at arraignment. Conversely,
if the accused does invoke it before
arraignment, as the petitioner did in this case,
the
right
is
not
waived.
Yusop
v.
Sandiganbayan, February 22, 2001.
CASES
REQUIRING
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION;
AMENDMENT
OF
INFORMATION DOES NOT NEED A NEW PI;
New PI cannot be demanded by respondent if
the change in the information made by the
public
prosecutor
was
only
a
formal
amendment.
Filing
of
the
Amended
Information, without a new preliminary
investigation, did not violate the right of
respondent to be protected from a hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution; an open
and public accusation of a crime; or from the
trouble, the expenses and the anxiety of a
public trial. The Amended Information could not
have come as a surprise to him for the simple
and obvious reason that it charged essentially
the same offense as that under the original
Information. Moreover, if the original charge
was related to the amended one, such that an
inquiry would elicit substantially the same
facts, then a new preliminary investigation was
not necessary. Villaflor v. Vivar, January 16,
2001.
COURT DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH THE
OMBUDSMANS DISCRETION
Court does not interfere with the
Ombudsmans discretion in the conduct of
preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro
vs. Sandiganbayan[42], the Court ruled:
x x x. In the performance of his task to
determine
probable
cause,
the
Ombudsmans discretion is paramount.
Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court
said:
x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court
has adopted a policy of non-interference
in
the
conduct
of
preliminary
investigations,
and
leaves
to
the
investigating
prosecutor
sufficient
latitude of discretion in the exercise of
determination
of
what
constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish
probable cause for filing of information
against the supposed offender. Serapio v.
Sandiganbayan, January 28, 2003.
GROUNDS
FOR
WHICH
A
RECONSIDERATION OF THE OMBUDSMANS
RESOLUTION MAY BE GRANTED
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31,
2001 of petitioners omnibus motion, the
Sandiganbayan noted that a preliminary
investigation was fully conducted in
accordance with Rule II, Administrative
Order No. 7 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18, 23
and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989); and that all the
basic complaints and evidence in support
thereof were served upon all the accused.
[45] It was in light of such findings that
the Sandiganbayan held that there was
no basis for the allegation that accused
therein
(including
petitioner)
were
deprived of the right to seek a
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans
Resolution dated April 4, 2001 finding
probable cause to charge them with
plunder after the conduct of preliminary
investigation in connection therewith. In
addition, the Sandiganbayan pointed out
that petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans
resolution, but failed to show in his
motion that there were newly discovered
evidence,
or
that
the
preliminary
investigation was tainted by errors of law
or irregularities, which are the only
grounds for which a reconsideration of
the Ombudsmans resolution may be
granted.[46] Serapio v. Sandiganbayan,
January 28, 2003.
SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct
Preliminary Investigations.
Authority
to
Investigation
1
conduct
Preliminary
Who may conduct PI:

1 Provincial or City Prosecutors and their
assistants;
2 National
and
Regional
State
Prosecutors;
3 Other officers as may be authorized by
law.
Extent of their authority to conduct PI:
It shall extend to all crimes cognizable
by the proper court in their respective
territorial jurisdictions.
DOJ PROVINCIAL OR CITY PROSECUTORS;

DOJ PROSECUTORS HAVE THE AUTHORITY
TO CONDUCT PI OVER SANDIGANBAYAN

CASES; Sec. 2 and 4, Rule 112, which lists the
officers authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation states that their authority to
conduct PI shall include ALL crimes cognizable
by the proper court in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. However, under Sec. 4,
in the offenses falling within the original
jurisdiction
of
the
Sandiganbayan,
the
prosecutor shall, after their investigation,
transmit the records and their resolutions to
the Ombudsman or his deputy for appropriate
action.
Also, the prosecutor cannot dismiss the
complaint without the prior written authority of
the Ombudsman or his deputy, nor can the
prosecutor file an Information with the
Sandiganbayan without being deputized by,
and without prior written authority of the
Ombudsman or his deputy. Honasan II v.
Panel of Prosecutors, DOJ, April 13, 2004.
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF OMB AND
DOJ TO CONDUCT PI ON OFFENSES OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS/EES; The Constitution,
Ombudsman Act of 1989, OMB Administrative
Order No. 8, prevailing jurisprudence and Rules
on Criminal Procedure, all recognize and uphold
the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
and
the
DOJ
to
conduct
preliminary
investigation on charges filed against public
officers and employees. Honasan II v. Panel
of Prosecutors, DOJ, April 13, 2004.
DOJ PROSECUTORS DO NOT NEED TO BE
DEPUTIZED BY THE OMB BEFORE THEY
CAN
CONDUCT
PI
OVER
OFFENSES
COMMITTED
BY
PUBLIC
OFFICIALS
COGNIZABLE
BY
ORDINARY
COURTS;
OMB-DOJ CIRCULAR IS A SUPERFLUITY;
The power to conduct preliminary investigation
on charges against any public officers or
employees may be exercised by an investigator
or by any provincial or city prosecutor or their
assistants, either in their regular capacities
or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
The fact that all prosecutors are in effect
deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the
OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere superfluity. The DOJ
Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by
the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary
investigation for complaints filed with it
because of DOJ's authority to act as the
principal law agency of the government and
investigate the commission of crimes. Thus,
there is not even a need to delegate the
conduct of the preliminary investigation to an
agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in
the first place. Honasan II v. Panel of
Prosecutors, DOJ, April 13, 2004.

DESIGNATION OF PROSECUTOR; A JUDGE
MAY NOT DESIGNATE A PARTICULAR
PROSECUTOR
TO
CONDUCT
PI;
A
preliminary investigation is an executive, not a
judicial, function. The prosecutor is the officer
authorized to direct and control the prosecution
of all criminal actions. Therefore, a judge
cannot directly order an assistant prosecutor,
particularly over the objections of the latters
superiors,
to
conduct
a
preliminary
investigation. To allow the judge to do so is to
authorize him to meddle in the executive and
administrative functions of the provincial or
city prosecutor. People v. Navarro, March
25, 1997.
OTHERS AUTHORIZED BY LAW; AUTHORITY
OF THE OMBUDSMAN; OMB AUTHORITY
EXTENDS ALL CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING
PUBLIC OFFICERS/EES; The Ombudsman is
clothed with authority to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute all criminal
cases involving public officers and employees,
not only those within the jurisdiction of the
SANDIGANBAYAN,
but those within the
jurisdiction of the REGULAR COURTS as well.
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute offenses committed by public
officers and employees is founded in Section
15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15 vests
the Ombudsman with the power to investigate
and prosecute any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, March 20, 2001.
OTHERS AUTHORIZED BY LAW; AUTHORITY
OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LIMITED TO
CRIMINAL
CASES
WITHIN
SB
JURISDICTION;
Office
of
the
Special
Prosecutor shall be an organic component of
the Office of the Ombudsman and shall be
under the supervision and control of the
Ombudsman. It is merely a component of the
Office of the Ombudsman and may only act
under the supervision and control and upon
authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to
conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, March 20, 2001.
OTHERS AUTHORIZED BY LAW; COMELEC;
COMELEC HAS EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO
CONDUCT
PI
AND
PROSECUTE
ALL
ELECTION
OFFENSES
UNDER
THE
OMNIBUS ELEC CODE BUT QUALIFIED BY
CONTINUING
AUTHORITY
GIVEN
TO
PROSECUTORS;
1993 COMELEC RULES OF
PROCEDURE SEC. 2. Continuing Delegation of
Authority to Other Prosecution Arms of the
Government. The Chief State Prosecutor, all
Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their

respective assistants are hereby given
continuing authority, as deputies of the
Commission,
to
conduct
preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election
offenses under the election laws which may be
filed directly with them, or which may be
indorsed to them by the Commission or its
duly authorized representatives and to
prosecute the same. Such authority may be
revoked or withdrawn any time by the
Commission whenever in its judgment such
revocation or withdrawal is necessary to
protect the integrity of the Commission,
promote the common good, or when it believes
that successful prosecution of the case can be
done by the Commission. Margarejo v.
People, September 13, 2001.
Pursuant to the authority given to the
Ombudsman by the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 to lay down its
own rules and procedure, the Office of the
Ombudsman promulgated Administrative
Order No. 8, dated November 8, 1990,
entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain
Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, to
wit:
A complaint filed in or taken cognizance
of by the Office of the Ombudsman
charging any public officer or employee
including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, with an act or
omission alleged to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient is an Ombudsman
case. Such a complaint may be the
subject of criminal or administrative
proceedings, or both.
For
purposes
of
investigation
and
prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving
criminal offenses may be subdivided into
two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those
falling under the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. The difference between
the two, aside from the category of the
courts wherein they are filed, is on the
authority to investigate as distinguished
from the authority to prosecute, such
cases.
The power to investigate or conduct a
preliminary
investigation
on
any
Ombudsman case may be exercised by an
investigator or prosecutor of the Office of
the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or
City Prosecutor or their assistance, either
in their regular capacities or as deputized
Ombudsman prosecutors.
The prosecution of cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan shall be under the
direct exclusive control and supervision
of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases
cognizable by the regular Courts, the
control and supervision by the Office of
the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman

cases in the sense defined above. The law
recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction
between the Office of the Ombudsman
and other investigative agencies of the
government in the prosecution of cases
cognizable by regular courts. (Emphasis
supplied)
A reading of the foregoing provision of
the Constitution does not show that the
power
of
investigation
including
preliminary investigation vested on the
Ombudsman is exclusive.3
Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of
the Ombudsman Act, the Court held in
said case:
Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No.
6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take
over at any stage from any investigatory
agency
of
the
government,
the
investigation of such cases. The authority
of
the
Ombudsman
to
investigate
offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies
of
the
government.
Such
investigatory agencies referred to include
the PCGG and the provincial and city
prosecutors and their assistants, the
state prosecutors and the judges of the
municipal trial courts and municipal
circuit trial court.
In other words the provision of the law
has opened up the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of offenses
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all
investigatory agencies of the government
duly authorized to conduct a preliminary
investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with
the
only
qualification
that
the
Ombudsman may take over at any stage
of such investigation in the exercise of his
primary jurisdiction.4 (Emphasis supplied)
In summation, the Constitution, Section
15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and
Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as
amended, do not give to the Ombudsman
exclusive
jurisdiction
to
investigate
offenses committed by public officers or
employees.
The
authority
of
the
Ombudsman
to
investigate
offenses
involving public officers or employees is
concurrent
with
other
government
investigating agencies such as provincial,
city and state prosecutors. However, the
Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at

any stage, from any investigating agency
of the government, the investigation of
such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is
not precluded from conducting any
investigation of cases against public
officers involving violations of penal laws
but if the cases fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then
respondent Ombudsman may, in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction take
over at any stage.
SEC. 3. Procedure.
Procedure as to the Complaint
1 He/she shall file the complaint with the
office of the prosecutor,
2 The complaint shall:
1 state the address of the respondent,
2 be accompanied by:
1 affidavits [subscribed, and sworn to
and certified] of the complainant and
his witnesses, and
2 other supporting documents to
establish probable cause;
3 Number of copies for the complaint:
1 as many as there are respondents, plus
2 two [2] copies for the official file
Procedure as to the Investigation Officer
1 He/she has ten [10] days after the filing of
the complaint, either to:
1 Dismiss it if he finds no ground to
continue with the investigation, or
2 Issue a subpoena to the respondent,
attaching to the subpoena:
1 a copy of the complaint, and
2 its
supporting
affidavits
and
documents
2 He/she shall resolve the complaint based on
the evidence presented by the complainant,
if the respondent:
1 cannot be subpoenaed, or
2 is subpoenaed, but does not submit
counter-affidavits within the ten [10]
day period;
3 He/she may set a hearing if there are facts
and issues to be clarified from a party or a
witness.
1 The
parties
[complainant
and
respondent]:
1 can be present at the hearing,
2 have no right to examine or crossexamine, but
3 may submit to the investigating
officer questions which may be
asked to the party or witness
concerned.
2 The hearing shall be:
1 held within 10 days:
from submission of the counter-
affidavits and other documents,

or
from the expiration of the period
for their submission
2 terminated within 5 days.
Within 10 days after the investigation,
he/she shall determine whether or not there
is sufficient ground to hold the respondent
for trial
Procedure as to the Respondent

1 With respect to documentary evidence
submitted by the complainant, he/she shall
have the right to:
1 examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have
been furnished,
2 to copy them at his expense, and
3 to require the complainant to specify
those which he intends to present
against the respondent, if the evidence
is voluminous
2
With respect to object evidence:

1 they need not be furnished to the
respondent, but
2 They shall be made available for
examination, copying, or photographing
at his/her expense
Within 10 days from receipt of the
subpoena
with
the
complaint
and
supporting affidavits and documents,
he/she shall submit:
1 counter-affidavit [subscribed and sworn
to and certified] of himself and that of
his witnesses, and
2 other supporting documents relied upon
for his/her defense
He/she shall not be allowed to file a motion
to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit
DOCUMENTS TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE

CAUSE;
REQUIREMENT
OF
SWORN
STATEMENTS; Rule 110, Section 3 of the
Rules defines a complaint as, a sworn written
statement charging a person with an offense
subscribed by the offended party, xxx Rule
112, Section 3 (a) likewise requires that for
purposes of preliminary investigation, the
complaint and its accompanying affidavits and
supporting documents be sworn to before any
fiscal, state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public, who
must certify that he personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. The requirement is mandatory.
Oporto Jr. v. Monserate, April 16, 2001.
CAUSE; OMB CANNOT VALIDLY ORDER THE
ACCUSED
TO
SUBMIT
A
COUNTER-
AFFIDAVIT
IN
ANSWER
TO
AN
ANONYMOUS AND UNSIGNED LETTERCOMPLAINT; In preliminary investigation of
cases it is incumbent upon the complainants to
submit their evidence in affidavit form and it is
only after such submission that respondent
may be required to explain and submit his
counter-affidavit, also under oath.
While reports and even raw information
obtained from anonymous letters may justify
the initiation of an investigation, this stage of
the preliminary investigation can be held only
after
sufficient
evidence,
derived
from
submitted affidavits from the complainants and
his witnesses, shall have been duly gathered
and evaluated, and only thereafter can the
respondent be required to submit his affidavits
and other documents to explain, also under
oath. It is from such affidavits and counteraffidavits that the Ombudsman can determine
whether there is a probable cause for bringing
the
case
to
court.
Bautista
v.
Sandiganbayan, May 12, 2000.
CAUSE; COMPLAINT; IMPLIED WAIVER OF
REQUIREMENT
THUS
INFORMATION
CANNOT BE QUASHED ON THE GROUND
OF ABSENCE OF SWORN STATEMENTS;
Despite the Ombudsman's noncompliance with
the affidavit requirement, accused filed his
counter-affidavit and answered the charges
against him. Hence, having submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and
having allowed the proceedings to go on until
the preliminary investigation was terminated
and
the
Information
filed
at
the
Sandiganbayan, accused is deemed to have
waived whatever right he may otherwise have
to assail the manner in which the preliminary
investigation was conducted. Consequently,
petitioner
is
likewise
estopped
from
questioning the validity of the Information filed
before the Sandiganbayan. Bautista v.
Sandiganbayan, May 12, 2000.
CAUSE;
COMPLAINT;
AFFIDAVIT
NOTARIZED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY IS
VALID AND MAY INITIATE THE CONDUCT
OF PI; Under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is
substantially sufficient if it states the known
address of the respondent, it is accompanied
by complainants affidavit and his witnesses
and supporting documents, and the affidavits
are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor
or government official authorized to administer
oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a
notary public who must certify that he
personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits. The absence of an
oath
in
the
complaint
does
not
MERE
DEFECT
HENCE
VALID OR
REQUIRE
MENT
HENCE IF
ABSENT
IS VOID?
SEE
SASOT.
necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is

a mere defect of form, which does not affect
the substantial rights of the defendant on the
merits. Sasot v. People, June 29, 2005.
CAUSE; WITNESSES WITHOUT SWORN
STATEMENTS DURING PI MAY BE ALLOWED
TO TESTIFY DURING TRIAL; There is no law
which requires that the testimony of a
prospective witness be first reduced to writing
in order that his declaration in court at a later
time may be believed or accepted by the trial
judge. The rules do not make it a condition
precedent for a witness to execute an affidavit
before taking the witness stand. The
prosecution is allowed to call witnesses other
than those named in the complaint and
information. While the accused in a criminal
prosecution is entitled to know the nature and
cause of accusation against him, it does not
mean that he is entitled to know in advance
the names of all the witnesses for the
prosecution. The success of the prosecution
might be endangered if such right be granted
to an accused for the known witnesses might
be subjected to pressure or coerced not to
testify. The time for the accused to know all the
witnesses against him is when they take the
witness stand. People v. Pacabes, June 24,
1985.
FAILURE
OF
ACCUSED
TO
RECEIVE
SUBPOENA WILL NOT INVALIDATE PI,
THUS CANNOT BE A GROUND FOR MOTION
FOR REINVESTIGATION; Sec. 3(d), Rule 112
of the Rules provides that if the respondent
cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, the
investigating officer shall base his resolution on
the evidence presented by complainant. The
New Rules on Criminal Procedure does not
require as condition sine qua non to the validity
of the preliminary investigation the presence of
the accused for as long as efforts to reach him
were made, and an opportunity to controvert
the evidence for the complainant is accorded
him. The obvious purpose of the rule is to block
attempts of unscrupulous respondents to
thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding
themselves or by employing dilatory tactics.
People v. Arlee, January 25, 2000.
HEARING; RIGHT OF PARTY TO ASK
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS DURING PI IS
NOT ABSOLUTE; The right of party to ask
clarificatory questions is not absolute. The
fiscal has the discretion to determine whether
or not he will propound these questions to the
parties or witnesses. Under Section 3(e), Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, while the parties are
afforded the opportunity to be present, they
have no right to examine or cross-examine. If
the parties so desire, they may submit
questions to the investigating officer which the
latter may propound to the parties or witnesses
concerned. Paderanga v. Drilon, April 19,

1991.
PRESENCE
OF
COUNSEL
FOR
COMPLAINANT IS NOT REQUIRED DURING
PI; ABSENCE CANNOT BE GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT; The Rules do
not state that counsel for complainant is
authorised
to
conduct
preliminary
investigation; nor his presence mandatory.
Capulong v. Gozum, February 17, 2003.
SEC. 4. Resolution of
prosecutor and its review.
investigating
Resolution of Investigating Prosecutor

1 If the investigating prosecutor finds
cause to hold the respondent for trial:
1 He shall prepare the resolution and
information;
2 He shall certify under oath in the
information that:
1 he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his
witnesses;
2 that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof;
3 the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and
4 the
accused
was
given
an
opportunity to submit controverting
evidence; and
3 He shall forward the record of the case,
within five [5] days from his resolution,
to his superior who may either be the:
1 Provincial or city prosecutor, or
2 Chief state prosecutor, or
3 Ombudsman or his deputy in cases
of offenses cognizable by the SB in
the
exercise
of
its
original
jurisdiction.
2 If the investigating prosecutor finds
NO cause to hold the respondent for
trial:
1 He shall recommend the dismissal of
the complaint; and
2 He shall forward the record of the case,
within five [5] days from his resolution,
to his superior who may either be the:
1 Provincial or city prosecutor, or
2 Chief state prosecutor, or
3 Ombudsman or his deputy in cases
of offenses cognizable by the SB in
the
exercise
of
its
original
jurisdiction
Review
of the Resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor
1 No complaint or information may be filed
or
dismissed
by
an
investigating
prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the:
1 provincial or city prosecutor, or
2 chief state prosecutor, or
3 the Ombudsman or his deputy
Duty of the superior reviewing the
resolution:
1 He/she shall act on the resolution
within ten days from receipt thereof, by
either:
1 approving it, or
2 disapproving it; and
2 He/she shall immediately inform the
parties of such action.
Approval
or
Disapproval
of
Recommendation Made by Investigating
Prosecutor:
1 If the recommendation for DISMISSAL
is DISAPPROVED by the superior in the
ground that a probable cause exists:
1 The superior may, by himself, file the
information against the respondent, or
direct another assistant prosecutor or
state prosecutor to do so, and
2 There is no need for conducting another
Preliminary Investigation.
2 The Secretary of Justice may reverse
or modify
the resolution of the
superior
of
the
investigating
prosecutor:
1 Upon petition by a proper party under
such rules as the DOJ may prescribe, or
2 Motu Proprio
3 What the Secretary of Justice may do
when he reverses or modifies said
resolution he may direct the
prosecutor concerned either to:
1 FILE the corresponding information
without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or
2 DISMISS or move for dismissal of the
complaint or information with notice to
the parties
RESOLUTION; SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
FOR CONVICTION; IN HOLDING THAT
THERE
IS
PROBABLE
CAUSE,
THE
PROSECUTOR DOES NOT NEED TO MAKE A
FINDING THAT HE HAS SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO PROVE GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT; A prosecutor does not
decide whether there is evidence beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person
charged. He merely determines whether there
is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. A finding of probable
cause, therefore, does not require an inquiry as
to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction. It is enough that the
prosecutor believes that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.

A trial is intended precisely for the reception of
prosecution evidence in support of the charge.
It is the court that is tasked to determine guilt
beyond reasonable doubt based on the
evidence presented by the parties at a trial on
the merits. Rizon v. Desierto, October 21,
2004.
RESOLUTION; CERTIFICATION IS NOT AN
ESSENTIAL PART OF THE INFORMATION;
ITS ABSENCE IS MERELY A FORMAL
DEFECT; Notwithstanding the absence in the
information of a certification as to the holding
of a preliminary investigation, the information
is nonetheless considered valid for the reason
that such certification is not an essential part
of the information itself and its absence cannot
vitiate it as such. Alviso v. Sandiganbayan,
March 17, 1993.
CERTIFICATION; PURPOSE; NOT BINDING
ON THE COURT; If the investigating
prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of
the Information against the respondent, he
executes a certification at the bottom of the
Information that from the evidence presented,
there is a reasonable ground to believe that the
offense charged has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof. Such
certification of the investigating prosecutor is,
by itself, ineffective. It is not binding on the
trial court. Nor may the RTC rely on the said
certification as basis for a finding of the
existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused. Okabe v. Gutierrez, May 27,
2004.
AUTHORITY TO DISMISS; CASE PENDING
IN COURT; JUDGE MAY DISMISS AN
INFORMATION WITHOUT PROSECUTORS
CONSENT; Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the New Rules
on Criminal Procedure which provides that no
complaint or information may be filed or
dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the
prior written approval of the provincial or city
fiscal or chief state prosecutor applies to the
conduct of the preliminary investigation, which
is within the control of the public prosecutor. It
has no application in a case where the
information is already filed before the proper
court. In fact, the epigraph of Rule 112 is "Duty
of investigating fiscal." Manlavi v. Gacott, Jr.,
May 9, 1995.
AUTHORITY TO DISMISS; COMELEC HAS
THE AUTHORITY TO APPEAL DISMISSAL BY
THE COURT OF THE INFORMATION FOR AN
ELECTION OFFENSE; NOT DESIGNATED
PROSECUTOR; The authority to decide
whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs
to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the
Constitution expressly vests in it the power and
function to investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting

election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to
prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They
derive their authority from it and not from their
offices. Consequently, it was beyond the power
of the DOJ prosecutor to oppose the appeal of
the COMELEC. If he thought there was no
probable cause for proceeding, he should have
discussed the matter with the COMELEC and
awaited its instruction. If he disagreed with the
COMELECs findings, he should have sought
permission to withdraw from the cases.
COMELEC v. Silva, February 10, 1988.
REVIEW OF RESOLUTION; NATURE OF
PROSECUTION OFFICE; A quasi-judicial body
has been defined as "an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature
which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule-making." On
the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication
nor
rule-making
functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial,
and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except
that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof.
Office of the Prosecutor was not covered by the
appellate process under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court (ordinary appea). Filadams Pharma v.
CA, March 30, 2004.
NOTES: In a sense, quasi-judicial because
the duty of the prosecutor involves
discretion and mandamus cannot even lie.
BUT for purposes of applying civil
procedure, it is not a QJ body subject to
certiorari. Appeal is not ordinary (Rule
63). Remedy is exhaust Administrative
proceeding the Rule 65 on Grave Abuse of
Discretion.
REVIEW
OF
RESOLUTION;
SOJ
HAS
SUPERVISION
AND
CONTROL
OVER
PROSECUTORS IN THE CONDUCT OF PI;
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to
Sections 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the
Revised Administrative Code gives
the
Secretary of Justice supervision and control
over the Office of the Chief Prosecutor and the
Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The
actions of prosecutors are not unlimited; they
are subject to review by the Secretary of
Justice who may affirm, nullify, reverse or
modify their actions or opinions. Consequently
the Secretary may direct them to file either a
motion to dismiss the case or an information

against the accused.
In short, the Secretary of Justice, who has the
power of supervision and control over
prosecuting officers, is the ultimate authority
who decides which of the conflicting theories of
the complainants and the respondents should
be believed. Community Rural Bank v.
Talavera, April 6, 2005.
REVIEW OF RESOLUTION; OMBUDSMAN
RESOLUTION FINDING EXISTENCE OR
NON-EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE IS
REVIEWABLE BY SC THROUGH RULE 65;
The proper course of action is a special civil
action for certiorari before Supreme Court.
While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to
determine whether a criminal case should be
filed, the SC is not precluded from reviewing
the Ombudsmans action when there is grave
abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in which case Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court may be invoked pursuant to
present practice or, exceptionally, even Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Accordingly, where the finding of the
Ombudsman as to the existence of probable
cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we
have held that while there is no appeal, the
aggrieved party may file before us a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Maturan v.
Ombudsman, July 7, 2004.
REVIEW OF RESOLUTION; SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE RESOLUTION FINDING EXISTENCE
OR NON-EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
IS REVIEWABLE BY CA THROUGH RULE 65;
Office of the Prosecutor is not covered by the
appellate process under Rule 43. Hence the
proper remedy from the resolution of the
Assistant Prosecutor dismissing his complaint is
through an appeal to the Secretary of Justice. If
the appeal was dismissed, as well as his
subsequent motion for reconsideration, since
there was no more appeal or other remedy
available in the ordinary course of law, the
procedure is to file a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. Filadams Pharma v. CA,
March 30, 2004.
DISCRETION OF COURT TO DISMISS;
COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO DECIDE ON A
MOTION
TO
WITHDRAW
THE
INFORMATION ALREADY FILED IN COURT;
NOT DEPENDENT ON THE PROSECUTOR; A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the public
prosecutor should be addressed to the court
who has the option to grant or deny the same.
In resolving a motion, the trial court should not
rely solely and merely on the findings of the
public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice
that no crime was committed or that the
evidence in the possession of the public

prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment
of conviction of the accused. The trial court is
not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of
the case and it may either agree or disagree
with the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice.
The trial court may make an independent
assessment of the merits of the case based on
the
affidavits
and
counter-affidavits,
documents, or evidence appended to the
Information; the records of the public
prosecutor which the court may order the latter
to produce before the court;or any evidence
already adduced before the court by the
accused at the time the motion is filed by the
public prosecutor.
In this case, the trial court failed to make an
independent assessment of the merits of the
cases and the evidence on record or in the
possession of the public prosecutor. In granting
the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw
the Informations, the trial court relied solely on
the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice.
Santos v. Orda, September 1, 2004.
EXCEPTIONS TO NON-INTERFERENCE BY
COURTS; GR IS COURTS SHOULD NOT
INTERFERE
WITH
CONDUCT
OF
PI;
EXCEPTIONS; While it is this Courts general
policy not to interfere in the conduct of
preliminary
investigations,
leaving
the
investigating officers sufficient discretion to
determine
probable
cause,
we
have
nonetheless made some exceptions to the
general rule, such as:
1. when necessary to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;
2. when
necessary
for
the
orderly
administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;
3. when there is a prejudicial question which
is sub judice;
4. when the acts of the officer are without or
in excess of authority;
5. where the prosecution is under an invalid
law, ordinance or regulation;
6. when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense;
8. where it is a case of persecution rather
than prosecution;
9. where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10. when there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash
on that ground has been denied.
REMEDIES OF OFFENDED PARTY WHEN
PROSECUTOR
REFUSES
TO
FILE
INFORMATION;
Where
the
government
prosecutor unreasonably refuses to file an
information or to include a person as an
accused therein despite the fact that the
evidence clearly warrants such action, the
offended party has the following remedies:
(1) in case of grave abuse of discretion, he may
file an action for mandamus to compel the
prosecutor to file such information;
(2) he may lodge a new complaint against the
offenders before the Ombudsman and have a
new examination conducted as required by
law;
(3) he may institute administrative charges
against the erring prosecutor, or a criminal
complaint under Article 208 of the Revised
Penal Code, or a civil action for damages under
Article 27 of the Civil Code;
(4) he may secure the appointment of another
prosecutor; or
(5) he may institute another criminal action if
no double jeopardy is involved.
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, February 20,
1996.
SEC. 5. When Warrant of Arrest May

Issue.
Procedure to be followed by an RTC or
MTC Judge when Preliminary Investigation
if Required
1 He shall PERSONALLY EVALUATE the
resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence:
This must be done within 10 days from
the filing of the complaint or information
2 Step to be taken after personal
evaluation:
1 If the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause immediately
DISMISS the case.
2 If he finds probable cause, he shall
ISSUE, either a:
1 warrant of arrest, or
2 commitment
order
when
the
complaint ot information was filed
pursuant to a lawful warrantless
arrest under Sec. 6
3 What the judge may do in case of
doubt:
He may order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within 5 days from
notice.
4 Period for resolution:
The issue must be resolved by the court
within 30 days from the filing to the
complaint or information.
When the MTC Judge Need NOT Issue a
Warrant of Arrest
1 When the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to a lawful warrantless arrest;
2 When the accused is charged for an offense
punishable by fine only; or

3 When the case is covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
BY
WHOM
WHEN
PROBABLE CAUSE; DEFINITION; Probable

cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
the existence of such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a
warrant of arrest, must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted, there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been
committed and that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the
criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked
to review in detail the evidence submitted
during the preliminary investigation. It is
sufficient that he personally evaluates such
evidence in determining probable cause. The
judge merely determines the probability, not
the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in
doing so, he need not conduct a de novo
hearing. He simply personally reviews the
prosecutors
initial
determination
finding
probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence. People v. CA, January
21, 1999.
FUNCTI
ON OF
OBJECTI
VE
PROBABLE CAUSE; STANDARD TO APPLY;

Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an
opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing
accretions of case law reiterate that they are
facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested. Other
jurisdictions utilize the term man of
reasonable caution or the term ordinarily
prudent and cautious man. The terms are
legally synonymous and their reference is not
to a person with training in the law such as a
prosecutor or a judge but to the average man
on the street. It ought to be emphasized that in
determining probable cause, the average man
weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of our technical
rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil.
Rather, he relies on the calculus of common
sense of which all reasonable men have an
abundance. Webb v. De Leon, August 23,
1995.
PROBABLE
CAUSE;
MEANING
OF
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR FILING A CASE;
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY
PROSECUTOR
DISTINGUISHED
FROM
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY
JUDGE;
WHAT
Probable cause
to hold a person
for trial
Probable cause
to issue a
warrant of
arrest
CONTEN
TS OF
FINAL
OUTPUT
PROSECUTOR
preliminary
investigation
Executive
function
Whether there
is
reasonable
ground
to
believe that the
accused
is
guilty of the
offense charged
and should be
held for trial
The contents of
the prosecutors
report
will
support his own
conclusion that
there is reason
to charge the
accused of an
offense
and
hold him for
trial.
JUDGE
Judicial function
Whether
a
warrant
of
arrest should be
issued against
the
accused,
i.e.,
whether
there
is
a
necessity
for
placing
him
under
immediate
custody in order
not to frustrate
the
ends
of
justice
Judges
order
must
have
supporting
evidence, other
than
the
prosecutors
bare
report
upon which to
legally
sustain
his own findings
on the existence
or non-existence
of
probable
cause to issue
an arrest order.
PERSONAL
DETERMINATION
BY
THE
JUDGE; EVIDENCE NEEDED FOR ISSUANCE;
JUDGE MUST ISSUE A WARRANT BASED ON
PROSECUTORS RESOLUTION, AFFIDAVIT
OF COMPLAINANT, COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
OF ACCUSED AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE PARTIES; In determining the
existence or non-existence of probable cause
for the arrest of the accused, the judge
SHOULD NOT RELY SOLELY on the report of the
investigating prosecutor. The judge should
consider not only the report of the
investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit
and the documentary evidence of the parties,
the counter-affidavit of the accused and his
witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic
notes
taken
during
the
preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to
the court by the investigating prosecutor upon
the filing of the Information. Okabe v.
PERSONAL
DETERMINATION
BY
THE
JUDGE; RELIANCE ON PROSECUTORS
CERTIFICATION; The STATEMENT ("no reason
for the judge to doubt the validity of the
certification made by the Assistant Prosecutor
that a preliminary investigation was conducted
and that probable cause was found to exist as

against those charged in the information
filed.") in the issued warrant is an admission
that the judge relied solely and completely on
the certification made by the fiscal that
probable cause exists as against those charged
in the information and issued the challenged
warrant of arrest. The Constitution commands
the judge to personally determine probable
cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest.
To be sure, it cannot be determined beforehand
how cursory or exhaustive the examination of
the records should be. The extent of the judges
examination depends on the exercise of his
sound discretion as the circumstances of the
case require. But he cannot adopt the
judgment of the prosecutor regarding the
existence of probable cause as his own without
abdicating his duty under the constitution.
Abdula v. Guiani, February 18, 2000.
PERSONAL
DETERMINATION
BY
THE
JUDGE; RELIANCE BY JUDGE ON CLERK IS
NOT ALLOWED; The exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself as to the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant of arrest. To this end,
he MUST PERSONALLY EVALUATE the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable
cause. A judge fails in his bounden duty if he
relies merely on the certification of the
investigating officer as to the existence of
probable cause making him administratively
liable. Here, the judge issued the subject
warrant
of
arrest
without
even
such
certification to rely upon, and worse, merely at
the instance of the clerk who mechanically
typed the Warrant of Arrest for his signature.
Talingdan v. Eduarte, October 5, 2001.
PERSONAL
DETERMINATION
BY
THE
JUDGE; DUTY OF THE JUDGE UPON THE
FILING OF INFORMATION;
The judge may: (a) personally evaluate the
report
and
the
supporting
documents
submitted by the prosecutor regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on
the basis thereof he finds no probable cause,
disregard the prosecutors report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence. Talingdan v. Eduarte, October 5,
2001.
PERSONAL
DETERMINATION
BY
THE
JUDGE;
PERSONAL
EXAMINATION
OF
WITNESSES BY THE JUDGE IS NOT
REQUIRED; In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest, the judge is NOT REQUIRED
TO PERSONALLY EXAMINE THE COMPLAINANT
AND HIS WITNESSES. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally

evaluate the report and the documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusions as to the existence of
probable cause. Sound policy dictates this
procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly
laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases
filed before their courts. Webb v. De Leon,
August 23, 1995.
HOLDING
IN
ABEYANCE
ARREST;
PENDENCY OF REINVESTIGATION; RTC
JUDGE CAN ISSUE A WARRANT OF ARREST
BEFORE
THE
PROSECUTOR
CAN
CONCLUDE THE PI OR REINVESTIGATION
WHICH HE (JUDGE) ORDERED THE LATTER
TO CONDUCT; Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the Rules
does not require that preliminary investigation
be first completed before a warrant of arrest
may issue. What the RULE SIMPLY PROVIDES IS
THAT NO COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION FOR AN
OFFENSE COGNIZABLE BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT MAY BE FILED WITHOUT COMPLETING
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. But nowhere
is it mandated that preliminary investigation
must be completed before a warrant of arrest
may issue. So also, there is nothing in Rule 112
which suggests that once a motion for
preliminary investigation is granted, an existing
alias warrant of arrest be considered
automatically lifted or recalled. Pen v. de
Castro, July 23, 1998.
HOLDING
IN
ABEYANCE
ARREST;
PENDENCY OF MOTION TO HOLD IN
ABEYANCE; COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT
OF ARREST DESPITE A PENDING MOTION
TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE ISSUANCE OF
THE SAME; When accused filed the omnibus
motion (to defer issuance of warrant of arrest
and/or to remand case to the Office of the City
Prosecutor pending review of the motion for
reconsideration), the court has not yet acquired
jurisdiction over his person, since he was not
arrested nor did he surrender.
With the filing of Information, the trial court
could then issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused as provided for by Section 6 of Rule
112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The issuance of the warrant was not
only procedurally sound but it was even
required considering that respondent had yet
to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
complainant.
Consequently,
complainants
charge that respondent Judge failed to act on
the omnibus motion before issuing the arrest
SO
THE
COURT
HAS
TO
ACQUIRE
JURISDICTI
ON OF THE
PERSON
OF
THE
ACCUSED
BEFORE IT
CAN
DECIDE
ON
HIS
OMNIBUS
MOTION?
warrant is untenable. Talag v. Reyes, June 3,

2004.
ARREST
WARRANTS
AGAINST
JOHN
DOES IS A GENERAL WARRANT WHICH IS
VOID; A JUDGE MAY NOT ISSUE WARRANT
OF
ARRESTS
AGAINST
PERSONS
DESIGNATED MERELY AS JOHN DOES; An
arrest warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John
Does" not one of whom the witnesses to the
complaint could or would Identify, is of the
nature of a general warrant, one of a class of
writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and
once anathematized as "totally subversive of
the liberty of the subject." Clearly violative of
the constitutional injunction that warrants of
arrest should particularly describe the person
or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as
regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.
Pangandaman v. Casar, April 14, 1988.
ARREST WARRANT IN EXTRADITION; IN
EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS, WARRANT
OF
ARREST
AGAINST
A
POTENTIAL
EXTRADITEE MAY BE ISSUED WITHOUT
PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING; Section 6 of
PD 1069, the Extradition Law, uses the word
IMMEDIATE to qualify the arrest of the accused.
Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer
be considered immediate. Hearing entails
sending notices to the opposing parties,
receiving facts and arguments from them, and
giving them time to prepare and present such
facts and arguments. Immediately upon receipt
of the petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge shall make a prima facie
finding whether the petition is sufficient in form
and substance, whether it complies with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the
person sought is extraditable. If convinced that
a prima facie case exists, the judge
immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of
the potential extraditee and summons him or
her to answer and to appear at scheduled
hearings.
Even Sec. 2 of Art. III of the Constitution does
not require a notice or a hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. What it requires
is for the judge to determine probable cause by
examination of the complainants and the
witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused
before the issuance of warrant of arrest.
Extradition proceedings are not criminal in
nature.
In
criminal
proceedings,
the
constitutional rights of the accused are at fore;
in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class
by itself -- they are not. Government v.
Purganan, September 24, 2002
SEC. 6. When accused lawfully arrested

without warrant.
When Accused Lawfully Arrested Without

a Warrant
1 When Sec. 6 is applicable:
1 When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant, and
2 The arrest involves an offense which
requires PI
2 When a complaint and information
may be filed without need of the
required preliminary investigation:
When an INQUEST has been conducted
in accordance with existing rules
3 Inquest investigation:
An investigation based only on the

affidavit of the offended party, the
police, and some witnesses.
Who shall file the complaint or
information
against
said
person
lawfully arrested without a warrant:
1 General
Rule
The
[inquest]
prosecutor
2 Exceptions - In the absence or
unavailability of an inquest prosecutor,
following may file the complaint directly
with the proper court on the basis of the
affidavit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person:
1 the offended party, or
2 a peace officer
Effect when a person Lawfully Arrested

without a Warrant asks for Preliminary
Investigation
1 BEFORE the complaint or information
is filed
1 he must sign a waiver of the provision of
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, in
the presence of his counsel, but
2 Despite the waiver, he may apply for
bail, and
3 The preliminary investigation must be
terminated within 15 days from its
inception.
2 AFTER the complaint or information is
filed:
1 he may ask for a PI within 5 days [nonextendible] after learning that the
complaint has been filed, otherwise, his
right to PI is deemed waived, and
2 he has the right to adduce evidence in
his defense during the PI, but
3 This has to be done before he is
arraigned as the entering of a plea is
deemed a waiver of ones right to a PI
INQUEST DURING HOLIDAYS; WHEN A
PERSON
IS
ARRESTED
WITHOUT
A
WARRANT ON A SUNDAY/HOLIDAY, THE
PROSECUTOR IS NOT REQUIRED TO HOLD
AN INQUEST AND CHARGE ACCUSED
WITHIN
12/18/36HRS;
ARRESTING
OFFICER WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR DELAY
IN DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS
UNDER 125 OF RPC; The fact is that

November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was
declared an official holiday; and November 9
(election day) was also an official holiday. In
these three no-office days, it was NOT AN EASY
MATTER FOR A FISCAL to look for his clerk and
stenographer, draft the information and search
for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get
the clerk of court to open the courthouse,
docket the case and have the order of
commitment prepared. And then, where to
locate and the uncertainty of locating those
officers and employees could very well
compound the fiscals difficulties. These are
considerations sufficient enough to deter the
court from declaring that the accused is
arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to
court on the very first office day following
arrest. Soria v. Desierto, January 31, 2005.
POSTING OF BAIL BEFORE CASE IS FILED;
A DETAINED PERSON MAY BE GRANTED
BAIL EVEN IF A FORMAL INFORMATION
WAS NOT YET FILED IN COURT; A person
lawfully arrested without a warrant and
detained but who has not yet been formally
charged in court, CAN SEEK his provisional
release through the filing of an application for
bail. He need not wait for a formal complaint or
information to be filed since bail is available to
all persons where the offense is bailable.
Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that a judge could
grant bail to a person lawfully arrested but
without a warrant, upon waiver of his right
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruiz v. Beldia, February 16, 2005.
POSTING OF BAIL BY A PERSON LAWFULLY
ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT, IS NOT
TANTAMOUNT TO WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT
TO
A
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION;
Accused did not waive his right to a preliminary
investigation upon his posting of bail. While
that right is statutory rather than constitutional
in its fundament, since it has in fact been
established by statute, it is a component part
of due process in criminal justice. The right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound over to trial for a criminal
offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a
mere formal or technical right; it is a
substantive right. Go v. CA, February 11,
1992.
NATURE OF THE FIVE-DAY PERIOD; A
MOTION
FOR
REINVESTIGATION
CANNOT BE FILED BEYOND THE 5-DAY
PERIOD FROM THE TIME THE ACCUSED
LEARNS OF THE FILING OF INFORMATION
AGAINST HIM; The period for filing a motion
for
preliminary
investigation
after
an
information has been filed against an accused
who was arrested without a warrant has been
characterized as mandatory by the Court.

Section 7 of Rule 112 of the present Rules
gives the accused the right to ask for a
preliminary investigation; but it does not give
him the right to do so after the lapse of the
five-day period. This is in accord with the intent
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to make
preliminary investigation simple and speedy.
People v. CA, March 23, 1995.
WHERE ACCUSED IS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED;
DUTY OF THE PROSECUTOR IS TO
CONDUCT PI, WHEN A PERSON IS
UNLAWFULLY ARRESTED AND THE POLICE
FILES A COMPLAINT AGAINST HIM FOR
INQUEST; An arrest which took place 6 days
after the shooting is unlawful, hence not proper
for inquest. When the police files a complaint
which is not proper for inquest, the prosecutor
should immediately schedule a preliminary
investigation to determine whether there is a
probable cause for charging the person in
court. In such a situation, the person is entitled
to a preliminary investigation and that right
should be accorder him without any condition.
He is also entitled to be released forthwith
subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation. Go v. CA, February 11, 1992.
WHERE ACCUSED IS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED;
DUTY OF THE JUDGE IS TO SUSPEND
COURT PROCEEDINGS AND ORDER A PI,
WHEN
A
PERSON
IS
UNLAWFULLY
ARRESTED
AND
THE
PROSECUTOR
CONDUCTED AN INQUEST, INSTEAD OF A
REGULAR PI; Absence of a preliminary
investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of
the trial court but merely the regularity of the
proceedings. It does not impair the validity of
the Information or otherwise render it
defective.[16] Neither is it a ground to quash
the Information or nullify the order of arrest
issued against him or justify the release of the
accused from detention.However, the trial
court should suspend proceedings and
order a preliminary investigation considering
that the inquest investigation conducted by the
State Prosecutor is null and void. The RTC
commits grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
ordering the City Prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation which is merely a review by the
Prosecutor of his records and evidence instead
of a preliminary investigation as provided for in
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. San Agustin v. People,
August 31, 2004.
EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT ISSUANCE OF
WARRANT;
A
PERSON
UNLAWFULLY
ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT OR BY
VIRTUE
OF
AN
INVALID
WARRANT,
CANNOT QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF HIS
CONTINUED
DETENTION,
IF
SUBSEQUENTLY A VALID WARRANT IS
ISSUED; The issue of his invalid arrest

becomes moot and academic if the new
warrant
of
arrest
complies
with
the
requirements of the Constitution and the Rules
of Court. While the first warrant was
unquestionably void, being a general warrant,
release of the petitioner for that reason will be
a futile act as it will be followed by her
immediate re-arrest pursuant to the new and
valid warrant, returning her to the same prison
she will just have left. This Court will not
participate in such a meaningless charade.
People v. Sanchez, November 8, 1993
SEC. 7. Records.
RECORDS
1 Records supporting the information or
complaint filed in court shall be
supported by:
1 the affidavits and counter-affidavits of
the parties and their witnesses,
2 supporting evidence, and
3 the resolution on the case
2 Record of the PI conducted by a
prosecutor or other officers as may be
authorized by law:
1 shall not form part of the record of the
case [in court]
2 however, the court, on its own initiative
or on motion of any party, may order
the production of the record or any of its
part when:
1 necessary in the resolution of the
case or any incident therein, or
2 it is to be introduced as an evidence
in the case by the requesting party
PURPOSE OF REQUIREMENT THAT AN
INFORMATION
FILED
IN
COURT
BE
SUPPORTED BY AFFIDAVITS ETC.; TO
ALLOW
JUDGE
TO
PERSONALLY
DETERMINE
PROBABLE
CAUSE
FOR
ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST; It is
intended to allow the judge to personally
determine the existence or non-existence of
the probable cause for issuing a warrant of
arrest against the accused. However, if the
judge finds the records and/or evidence
submitted by the investigating prosecutor to be
insufficient, he may order the dismissal of the
case, or direct the investigating prosecutor
either to submit more evidence or to submit
the entire records of the preliminary
investigation, to enable him to discharge his
duty. The judge may even call the complainant
and his witness to themselves answer the
courts probing questions to determine the
existence of probable cause. Okabe v.
RECORD OF PI DOES NOT FORM PART OF
COURT RECORDS; CANNOT BE USED AS
EVIDENCE ABSENT INTRODUCTION; The
record of the preliminary investigation does not
form part of the regional trial court records

unless introduced as evidence during the trial.
Absent such introduction, the records of
preliminary investigation cannot be treated as
evidence in court; neither may the trial court
be compelled to take judicial notice of the
same. Santos v. People, January 20, 2003.
NOT
REQUIREED
THAT
THE
ENTIRE
RECORDS OF THE CASE DURING PI BE
SUBMITTED EXAMINED BY THE JUDGE; It is
not required that the complete or entire
records of the case during the preliminary
investigation be submitted to and examined by
the judge. It is not intended to unduly burden
trial courts by obliging them to examine the
complete records of every case all the time
simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of
an accused. What is required, rather, is that
the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
counter-affidavits,
sworn
statements
of
witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes,
if any) upon which to make his independent
judgment or, at the very least, upon which to
verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause. Okabe v.
RECORD AS EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL;
WHERE AN OFFENSE CAN ONLY BE
PROSECUTED UPON COMPLAINT OF THE
OFFENDED PARTY, IT IS NOT NECESSARY
TO MARK AND INTRODUCE DURING THE
TRIAL THE WRITTEN COMPLAINT IN
EVIDENCE
AS
THE
BASIS
OF
THE
INFORMATION
FILED
BY
THE
PROSECUTOR; Under the rule prevailing at
the time this case was commenced and tried in
1977, the complaint was considered part of the
record of the preliminary investigation and had
to be transmitted to the trial court upon the
filing of the corresponding charge. Such
complaint was in fact transmitted as required
and could therefore be judicially noticed by the
trial judge without the necessity of its formal
introduction as evidence of the prosecution.
People v. Rondina, April 8, 1987.
RECORDS
OF
PREVIOUS
DISMISSAL;
PREVIOUS DISMISSAL OF THE CASE DOES
NOT
ENTITLE
THE
ACCUSED
TO
ACQUITTAL; Under the Rules, the record of
the preliminary investigation does not form
part of the regional trial court records unless
introduced as evidence during the trial. Absent
such introduction, the records of preliminary
investigation cannot be treated as evidence in
court; neither may the trial court be compelled
to take judicial notice of the same.
A careful review of the records of this case,
however, will show that the accused presented,
and formally offered as evidence, the records
of the preliminary investigation. Nonetheless,
we remain unconvinced that these records will

exculpate the accused. The dismissal of the
case by the investigating prosecutor was based
on the report in the barangay blotter which we
earlier
held
as
highly
unreliable
and
undeserving of any probative value. For good
reasons, the dismissal of the case was reversed
by the Secretary of Justice. Santos v. People,
January 20, 2003.
2
SEC. 8. Cases not requiring a preliminary
investigation nor covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
Cases
not
requiring
a
preliminary
investigation nor covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
1 Cases covered by this section cases
where the imposable penalty is a:
1 maximum of 4 years and 2 months, and
2 minimum of 6 months and 1 day
2 Two [2] ways of instituting a criminal
case under Sec. 8:
1 File the complaint with the prosecutor
while observing the procedure outlined
in Sec. 3
2 File the complaint or information with
the MTC
If
1
Within ten (10) days after the filing

of the complaint or information,
2 After personally
1 evaluating the evidence, or
2 examining in writing and under
oath the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of
searching
questions
and
answers.
He may REQUIRE THE SUBMISSION of
additional evidence:
Within ten (10) days from notice, to
determine further the existence of
probable cause
If the judge still finds no probable cause
despite the additional evidence
1 He shall dismiss the case,
2 Within ten (10) days:
1 from its submission of additional
evidence, or
2 expiration of the period to submit
additional evidence
the judge FINDS probable cause
He shall:
1 issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused
had already been arrested, and
2 hold the accused for trial
He may issue summons instead of a
warrant of arrest:
if the judge is satisfied that there is
no necessity for placing the accused
under custody
Procedure when Complaint is filed directly

with Prosecutor
1 The complaint must:
and
and certified] of the complainant
and his witnesses, and
2 The prosecutor shall act on the complaint
based on the affidavits and other
supporting documents submitted by the
complainant within 10 days from its filing.
3 The respondent is not allowed to file
counter-affidavits [only those provided in
Sec. 3(a)]
PROCEDURE WHEN PENALTY OF OFFENSE

IS PRISION CORRECCIONAL MEDIUM OR
LESS OR FROM 6MOS AND 1D TO 4YRS
AND 2MOS; The procedure laid down in Sec.
3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules shall be observed. If
the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the
complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused had already been arrested,
and hold the latter for trial. However, the judge
is given the discretion to merely issue
summons instead of a warrant of arrest if he
does not find it necessary to place the accused
under custody. Sesbreno v. Aglugub,
February 28, 2005.
Procedure when Complaint or Information

is filed with the MTC
1 The complaint must:
and
and certified] of the complainant
and his witnesses, and
2 If the judge finds NO probable cause
1 He shall DISMISS the complaint:
DISCRETIONARY UPON JUDGE TO ISSUE A

WARRANT FOR THE ARREST; It is thus not
obligatory but merely discretionary upon the
investigating judge to issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused even after having
personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions
for the determination of whether probable
cause exists. Whether it is necessary to place
the accused in custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice is left to the judges sound
judgment. Sesbreno v. Aglugub, February
28, 2005.
DOWNGRADING OF COMPLAINT; MTC

JUDGE CONDUCTING PI IN A COMPLAINT
FOR GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION CANNOT
DOWNGRADE IT TO SIMPLE SLANDER; The
original charge for grave oral defamation is
punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, while simple slander is punishable by
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos. Thus, the original charges were
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and did
not require a preliminary investigation.
Villanueva v. Almazan, March 16, 2000.
PROPER ACTION OF JUDGE IF FOUND TO
BE WITHOUT BASIS IS DISMISS; The proper
action the judge could have taken under the
premises was to dismiss the complaint if found
to be without any basis for further proceedings
or if warranted, to issue a warrant of arrest for
the respondent, and after arrest, to hold him
for trial. Consequently, the respondent judge
was devoid of jurisdiction or authority to
reduce the charge to simple slander.
Villanueva v. Almazan, March 16, 2000.

NOTE: Only File With The MTC If The Place Has No Prosecutor

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RULE 110

Filing of the case for purposes of Preliminary

For offenses where a preliminary

*NOTE: only file with the MTC if the

Whether or not the filing of the Complaint

Proper Officers for purposes of conducting PI

Provincial or City Prosecutors and their

People v. del Rosario (1964); People v.

NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016

complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor, as

3 Against all persons who appear to be

SEC. 3. Complaint defined

NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016

Exception: If the offense subject thereof is

COMPLAINT FILED IN COURT; COMPLAINT

SEC. 5. Who Must Prosecute Criminal

Who Must Prosecute Criminal Actions

NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016

The offended party - has the right to

Under R.A. 7610, Sec. 27 The following

the criminal prosecution under the direction

NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016

Absent any showing to the contrary, it will be

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that

NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016

disclose that she filed a complaint on the

a adulteress. Hece, Sec. 5 Rule 110 is not

What Must be stated in a Complaint or

NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016

petitioner failed to object to its introduction.

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.

The complaint or information shall:

NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016

If there is no designation of the

DESCRIPTION OF THE OFFENSE IN THE

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.

It is not necessary that they be stated in

NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016

charged as the live-in partner of the mother of

attendant circumstances are specified in the

SEC. 10. Place of commission of the

ERRONEOUS DESIGNATION OF TIME OR

SEC. 11. Date

NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016

Date of Commission of the Offense

specification of the date when the alleged

SEC. 12. Name of the offended party.

INDEFINITE DATE OF COMMISSION; SCOPE

What the complaint or information

ACCUSED CAN BE VALIDLY CONVICTED

NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016

OFFENDED PARTY IN BIGAMY MAY BE THE

SEC. 13. Duplicity of the offense.

HOW ABOUT continuous crime" is a single

element of a special complex crime of rape

SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution.

NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016

information may be amended, in FORM

Ground for substitution:

RULE IN DETERMINING WHETHER THERE

NANKURUNAISA. CEBF. 2016

does not expose the accused to a charge which