Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14355

October 31, 1919

THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
City Fiscal Diaz for appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien, Williams, Ferrier and Sycip, Delgado and Delgado, Filemon Sotto, and Ramon Salinas for
appellees.

acquire the parcels of land in question; that a portion of the lands in question was used as a cemetery in which were
the graves of his ancestors; that monuments and tombstones of great value were found thereon; that the land had
become quasi-public property of a benevolent association, dedicated and used for the burial of the dead and that
many dead were buried there; that if the plaintiff deemed it necessary to extend Rizal Avenue, he had offered and
still offers to grant a right of way for the said extension over other land, without cost to the plaintiff, in order that the
sepulchers, chapels and graves of his ancestors may not be disturbed; that the land so offered,free of charge,
would answer every public necessity on the part of the plaintiff.
The defendant Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose Maria Delgado, and each of the other
defendants, answering separately, presented substantially the same defense as that presented by the Comunidad
de Chinos de Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting above referred to.
The foregoing parts of the defense presented by the defendants have been inserted in order to show the general
character of the defenses presented by each of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was
necessary. The defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in
question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and
monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes.

JOHNSON, J.:
The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings by the city of Manila, may the
courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation?
That question arose in the following manner:
On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city,
praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public
improvement. The petitioner, in the second paragraph of the petition, alleged:
That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue,
Manila,it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated
in the district of Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said district, and within the jurisdiction of this court.
The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila], answering the petition of the
plaintiff, alleged that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine
Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that
it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; that itdenied that it
was either necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and
roads furnished ample means of communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed
expropriation; that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes
were available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the
resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been
used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if
said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the
expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the
purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new
monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all those persons
owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was
without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the
expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement.

Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge,
in a very elucidated opinion, with very clear and explicit reasons, supported by ambulance of authorities, decided
that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all
of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs.
From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and presented the above question as its principal ground of appeal.
The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate
land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain
the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisible
purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that
the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is
fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes, is not denied. Section 2429 of
Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private property
for public use."
The Charter of the city of Manila contains no procedure by which the said authority may be carried into effect. We
are driven, therefore, to the procedure marked out by Act No. 190 to ascertain how the said authority may be
exercised. From an examination of Act No. 190, in its section 241, we find how the right of eminent domain may be
exercised. Said section 241 provides that, "The Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or
department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law, the
right to condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner hereinafter prescribed."
Section 242 provides that a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented; that the complaint shall state
with certainty the right of condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be condemned together with
the interest of each defendant separately.
Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it
shall then appoint commissioners.

The defendant Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition, denied each and every allegation of the complaint,
and alleged that said expropriation was not a public improvement; that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to

Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of the commissioners. Section 248 provides
for an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said section 248 gives the
Supreme Court authority to inquire into the right of expropriation on the part of the plaintiff. If the Supreme Court on
appeal shall determine that no right of expropriation existed, it shall remand the cause to the Court of First Instance
with a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the possession of the property and that he recover whatever
damages he may have sustained by reason of the possession of the plaintiff.

this jurisdiction is compelled to stand mute while his land is being expropriated for a use not public, with the right
simply to beg the city of Manila to pay him the value of his land? Does the law in this jurisdiction permit
municipalities to expropriate lands, without question, simply for the purpose of satisfying the aesthetic sense of
those who happen for the time being to be in authority? Expropriation of lands usually calls for public expense. The
taxpayers are called upon to pay the costs. Cannot the owners of land question the public use or the public
necessity?

It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section, "and if the court shall find the right to
expropriate exists," means simply that, if the court finds that there is some law authorizing the plaintiff to
expropriate, then the courts have no other function than to authorize the expropriation and to proceed to ascertain
the value of the land involved; that the necessity for the expropriation is a legislative and not a judicial question.

As was said above, there is a wide divergence of opinion upon the authority of the court to question the necessity or
advisability of the exercise of the right of eminent domain. The divergence is usually found to depend upon
particular statutory or constitutional provisions.

Upon the question whether expropriation is a legislative function exclusively, and that the courts cannot intervene
except for the purpose of determining the value of the land in question, there is much legal legislature. Much has
been written upon both sides of that question. A careful examination of the discussions pro and con will disclose the
fact that the decisions depend largely upon particular constitutional or statutory provisions. It cannot be denied, if
the legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some
specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation.
If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant general authority to a municipal corporation to
expropriate private land for public purposes, we think the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the
provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning whether
or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. In other words, have no the courts in this
jurisdiction the right, inasmuch as the questions relating to expropriation must be referred to them (sec. 241, Act No.
190) for final decision, to ask whether or not the law has been complied with? Suppose in a particular case, it
should be denied that the property is not private property but public, may not the courts hear proof upon that
question? Or, suppose the defense is, that the purpose of the expropriation is not public butprivate, or that there
exists no public purpose at all, may not the courts make inquiry and hear proof upon that question?
The city of Manila is given authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes. Can it be possible that said
authority confers the right to determine for itself that the land is private and that the purpose is public, and that the
people of the city of Manila who pay the taxes for its support, especially those who are directly affected, may not
question one or the other, or both, of these questions? Can it be successfully contended that the phrase used in Act
No. 190, "and if the court upon trial shall find that such right exists," means simply that the court shall examine
the statutes simply for the purpose of ascertaining whether a law exists authorizing the petitioner to exercise the
right of eminent domain? Or, when the case arrives in the Supreme Court, can it be possible that the phrase, "if the
Supreme Court shall determine that no right of expropriation exists," that that simply means that the Supreme Court
shall also examine the enactments of the legislature for the purpose of determining whether or not a law exists
permitting the plaintiff to expropriate?
We are of the opinion that the power of the court is not limited to that question. The right of expropriation is not an
inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the
power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists
for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in
accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the
City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds
that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right
is being exercised in accordance with law.
Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a question of fact. Whether the land
is public, is a question of fact; and, in our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine
Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that
the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions. Is it possible that the owner of valuable land in

It has been contended and many cases are cited in support of that contention, and section 158 of volume 10 of
Ruling Case Law is cited as conclusive that the necessity for taking property under the right of eminent domain is
not a judicial question. But those who cited said section evidently overlooked the section immediately following (sec.
159), which adds: "But it is obvious that if the property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public
improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and the owner's
constitutional rights call for protection by the courts. While many courts have used sweeping expression in the
decisions in which they have disclaimed the power of supervising the power of supervising the selection of the sites
of public improvements, it may be safely said that the courts of the various states would feel bound to interfere to
prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature, by an attempted appropriation of land in utter
disregard of the possible necessity of its use, or when the alleged purpose was a cloak to some sinister scheme."
(Norwich City vs. Johnson, 86 Conn., 151; Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544; Wheeling, etc. R. R.
Co. vs. Toledo Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368; State vs. Stewart, 74 Wis., 620.)
Said section 158 (10 R. C. L., 183) which is cited as conclusive authority in support of the contention of the
appellant, says:
The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the
necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select
the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed
improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site,
are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or
to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people.
Practically every case cited in support of the above doctrine has been examined, and we are justified in making the
statement that in each case the legislature directly determined the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain in the particular case. It is not denied that if the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is
presented to the legislative department of the government and that department decides that there exists a necessity
for the exercise of the right in a particular case, that then and in that case, the courts will not go behind the action of
the legislature and make inquiry concerning the necessity. But, in the case of Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo,
Ry, etc., Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106 Am. St. rep., 622, 628]), which was cited in support of the doctrine laid down in
section 158 above quoted, the court said:
But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how may be taken, then the
necessity of taking particular property is a question for the courts. Where the application to condemn or
appropriate is made directly to the court, the question (of necessity) should be raised and decided in
limene.
The legislative department of the government was rarely undertakes to designate the precise property which should
be taken for public use. It has generally, like in the present case, merely conferred general authority to take land for
public use when a necessity exists therefor. We believe that it can be confidently asserted that, under such statute,

the allegation of the necessity for the appropriation is an issuable allegation which it is competent for the courts to
decide. (Lynch vs. Forbes, 161 Mass., 302 [42 Am. St. Rep., 402, 407].)
There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is given authority to exercise the
right of eminent domain, and a decision by the municipality that there exist a necessity for the exercise of that right
in a particular case. The first is a declaration simply that there exist reasons why the right should be conferred upon
municipal corporation, while the second is the application of the right to a particular case. Certainly, the legislative
declaration relating to the advisability of granting the power cannot be converted into a declaration that a necessity
exists for its exercise in a particular case, and especially so when, perhaps, the land in question was not within the
territorial authority was granted.
Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality the power to exercise the right of
eminent domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned. But when that right or authority is exercised
for the purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry
and to hear proof upon the necessity in the particular case, and not the general authority.
Volume 15 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (Cyc.), page 629, is cited as a further conclusive authority upon
the question that the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is a legislative and not a judicial
question. Cyclopedia, at the page stated, says:
In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary,
the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political
and not judicial in their character. The determination of those questions (the necessity and the
expediency) belongs to the sovereign power; the legislative department is final and conclusive, and the
courts have no power to review it (the necessity and the expediency) . . . . It (the legislature) may
designate the particular property to be condemned, and its determination in this respect cannot be
reviewed by the courts.
The volume of Cyclopedia, above referred to, cites many cases in support of the doctrine quoted. While time has
not permitted an examination of all of said citations, many of them have been examined, and it can be confidently
asserted that said cases which are cited in support of the assertion that, "the necessity and expediency of
exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial," show clearly and
invariably that in each case the legislature itself usually, by a special law, designated the particular case in which the
right of eminent domain might be exercised by the particular municipal corporation or entity within the state.
(Eastern R. Co. vs. Boston, etc., R. Co., 11 Mass., 125 [15 Am. Rep., 13]; Brooklyn Park Com'rs vs. Armstrong, 45
N.Y., 234 [6 Am. Rep., 70]; Hairston vs. Danville, etc. Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 598; Cincinnati vs. Louisville, etc. Ry. Co.,
223 U. S., 390; U.S. vs. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S., 53; U.S. vs. Gettysburg, etc. Co., 160 U. S.,
668; Traction Co. vs. Mining Co., 196 U.S., 239; Sears vs. City of Akron, 246 U.S., 351 [erroneously cited as 242
U.S.].)
In the case of Traction Co. vs. Mining Co. (196 U.S., 239), the Supreme Court of the United States said: "It is
erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond the control of the courts in exercising the power of eminent
domain, either as to the nature of the use or the necessity to the use of any particular property. For if the use be not
public or no necessity for the taking exists, the legislature cannot authorize the taking of private property against the
will of the owner, notwithstanding compensation may be required."
In the case of School Board of Carolina vs. Saldaa (14 Porto Rico, 339, 356), we find the Supreme Court of Porto
Rico, speaking through Justice MacLeary, quoting approvingly the following, upon the question which we are
discussing: "It is well settled that although the legislature must necessarily determine in the first instance whether
the use for which they (municipalities, etc.) attempt to exercise the power is a public one or not, their (municipalities,
etc.) determination is not final, but is subject to correction by the courts, who may undoubtedly declare the statute
unconstitutional, if it shall clearly appear that the use for which it is proposed to authorize the taking of private
property is in reality not public but private." Many cases are cited in support of that doctrine.

Later, in the same decision, we find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico says: "At any rate, the rule is quite well settled
that in the cases under consideration the determination of the necessity of taking a particular piece or a certain
amount of land rests ultimately with the courts." (Spring Valley etc. Co. vs. San Mateo, etc. Co., 64 Cal., 123.) .
In the case of Board of Water Com'rs., etc. vs. Johnson (86 Conn., 571 [41 L. R. A., N. S., 1024]), the Supreme
Court of Connecticut approvingly quoted the following doctrine from Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.), section
599: "In all such cases the necessity of public utility of the proposed work or improvement is a judicial question. In
all such cases, where the authority is to take property necessary for the purpose, the necessity of taking particular
property for a particular purpose is a judicial one, upon which the owner is entitled to be heard."
(Riley vs.Charleston, etc. Co., 71 S. C., 457, 489 [110 Am. St. Rep., 579]; Henderson vs. Lexington 132 Ky., 390,
403.)
The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants
of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to
delegate. (Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St., 541, 545; Greasy, etc.
Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.)
In the case of New Central Coal Co. vs. George's etc. Co. (37 Md., 537, 564), the Supreme Court of the State of
Maryland, discussing the question before us, said: "To justify the exercise of this extreme power (eminent domain)
where the legislature has left it to depend upon the necessity that may be found to exist, in order to accomplish the
purpose of the incorporation, as in this case, the party claiming the right to the exercise of the power should be
required to show at least a reasonable degree of necessity for its exercise. Any rule less strict than this, with the
large and almost indiscriminate delegation of the right to corporations, would likely lead to oppression and the
sacrifice of private right to corporate power."
In the case of Dewey vs. Chicago, etc. Co. (184 Ill., 426, 433), the court said: "Its right to condemn property is not a
general power of condemnation, but is limited to cases where a necessity for resort to private property is shown to
exist. Such necessity must appear upon the face of the petition to condemn. If the necessary is denied the burden is
upon the company (municipality) to establish it." (Highland, etc. Co. vs. Strickley, 116 Fed., 852, 856;
Kiney vs. Citizens' Water & Light Co., 173 Ind., 252, 257 ; Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544 [137
Am. St. Rep. 338].)
It is true that naby decisions may be found asserting that what is a public use is a legislative question, and many
other decisions declaring with equal emphasis that it is a judicial question. But, as long as there is a constitutional or
statutory provision denying the right to take land for any use other than a public use, it occurs to us that the question
whether any particular use is a public one or not is ultimately, at least, a judicial question. The legislative may, it is
true, in effect declare certain uses to be public, and, under the operation of the well-known rule that a statute will not
be declared to be unconstitutional except in a case free, or comparatively free, from doubt, the courts will certainly
sustain the action of the legislature unless it appears that the particular use is clearly not of a public nature. The
decisions must be understood with this limitation; for, certainly, no court of last resort will be willing to declare that
any and every purpose which the legislative might happen to designate as a public use shall be conclusively held to
be so, irrespective of the purpose in question and of its manifestly private character Blackstone in his
Commentaries on the English Law remarks that, so great is the regard of the law for private property that it will not
authorize the least violation of it, even for the public good, unless there exists a very great necessity therefor.
In the case of Wilkinson vs. Leland (2 Pet. [U.S.], 657), the Supreme Court of the United States said: "That
government can scarcely be deemed free where the rights of property are left solely defendant on the legislative
body, without restraint. The fundamental maxims of free government seem to require that the rights of personal
liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least no court of justice in this country would be warranted in
assuming that the power to violate and disregard them a power so repugnant to the common principles of justice
and civil liberty lurked in any general grant of legislature authority, or ought to be implied from any general
expression of the people. The people ought no to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well-

being without very strong and direct expression of such intention." (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 603;
Lecoul vs. Police Jury 20 La. Ann., 308; Jefferson vs. Jazem, 7 La. Ann., 182.)

question whether a public use exists or not, then it seems that it must follow that they can examine into the question
of the necessity.

Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the English Law said that the right to own and possess land a place to live
separate and apart from others to retain it as a home for the family in a way not to be molested by others is
one of the most sacred rights that men are heirs to. That right has been written into the organic law of every civilized
nation. The Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902, and of August 29, 1916, which provide that "no law shall be enacted in
the Philippine Islands which shall deprive any person of his property without due process of law," are but a
restatement of the time-honored protection of the absolute right of the individual to his property. Neither did said
Acts of Congress add anything to the law already existing in the Philippine Islands. The Spaniard fully recognized
the principle and adequately protected the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands against the encroachment upon the
private property of the individual. Article 349 of the Civil Code provides that: "No one may be deprived of his
property unless it be by competent authority, for some purpose of proven public utility, and after payment of the
proper compensation Unless this requisite (proven public utility and payment) has been complied with, it shall be
the duty of the courts to protect the owner of such property in its possession or to restore its possession to him , as
the case may be."

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a
public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the
land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R.
Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily
in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of
property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more
sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for
greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation. (Bensely vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases cited
[73 Am. Dec., 576].)
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate exercise of
government authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government,
the inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict
observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and
to protect it from abuse. Not only must the authority of municipal corporations to take property be expressly
conferred and the use for which it is taken specified, but the power, with all constitutional limitation and directions for
its exercise, must be strictly pursued. (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited;
Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)
It can scarcely be contended that a municipality would be permitted to take property for some public use unless
some public necessity existed therefor. The right to take private property for public use originates in the necessity,
and the taking must be limited by such necessity. The appellant contends that inasmuch as the legislature has given
it general authority to take private property for public use, that the legislature has, therefore, settled the question of
the necessity in every case and that the courts are closed to the owners of the property upon that question. Can it
be imagined, when the legislature adopted section 2429 of Act No. 2711, that it thereby declared that it was
necessary to appropriate the property of Juan de la Cruz, whose property, perhaps, was not within the city limits at
the time the law was adopted? The legislature, then, not having declared the necessity, can it be contemplated that
it intended that a municipality should be the sole judge of the necessity in every case, and that the courts, in the
face of the provision that "if upon trial they shall find that a right exists," cannot in that trial inquire into and hear
proof upon the necessity for the appropriation in a particular case?
The Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking of private property for public use. Suppose the owner of the
property denies and successfully proves that the taking of his property serves no public use: Would the courts not
be justified in inquiring into that question and in finally denying the petition if no public purpose was proved? Can it
be denied that the courts have a right to inquire into that question? If the courts can ask questions and decide, upon
an issue properly presented, whether the use is public or not, is not that tantamount to permitting the courts to
inquire into the necessity of the appropriation? If there is no public use, then there is no necessity, and if there is no
necessity, it is difficult to understand how a public use can necessarily exist. If the courts can inquire into the

The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in
aparticular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the
State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general
authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The
moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the
general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain is purely legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in
authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the question of the right to exercise it in a
particular case. (Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48
Minn., 540.)
And, moreover, the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided that their exists a
necessity for the appropriation of the particular land described in the complaint. Exhibits 4, 5, 7, and E clearly
indicate that the municipal board believed at one time that other land might be used for the proposed improvement,
thereby avoiding the necessity of distributing the quiet resting place of the dead.
Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for the alleged improvements, the defendants further contend that
the street in question should not be opened through the cemetery. One of the defendants alleges that said cemetery
is public property. If that allegations is true, then, of course, the city of Manila cannot appropriate it for public use.
The city of Manila can only expropriate private property.
It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general
community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the community
or neighborhood. (11 C. J., 50.)
Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses
under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in
good faith for future use. (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases cited.)
The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental authority. The Spanish GovernorGeneral, in an order creating the same, used the following language:
The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been founded and maintained by the
spontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protector, merchants and industrials, benefactors of
mankind, in consideration of their services to the Government of the Islands its internal administration,

government and regime must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those born
and educated in China in order that the sentiments which animated the founders may be perpetually
effectuated.
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese,
which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question
public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city
of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property.
But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street,
especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of
great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the
greatest necessity exists therefor.
While we do not contend that the dead must not give place to the living, and while it is a matter of public knowledge
that in the process of time sepulchres may become the seat of cities and cemeteries traversed by streets and daily
trod by the feet of millions of men, yet, nevertheless such sacrifices and such uses of the places of the dead should
not be made unless and until it is fully established that there exists an eminent necessity therefor. While cemeteries
and sepulchres and the places of the burial of the dead are still within
the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still devoted to pious uses and sacred
regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that such places,
under such circumstances, should be violated.
In such an appropriation, what, we may ask, would be the measure of damages at law, for the wounded sensibilities
of the living, in having the graves of kindred and loved ones blotted out and desecrated by a common highway or
street for public travel? The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacy of a remedy at law is too
apparent to admit of argument. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes
the sad duty of the living; but, except in cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the
last resting place of our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for
that object. (Railroad Company vs. Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn., 400; Evergreen Cemetery Associationvs. The City of
New Haven, 43 Conn., 234; Anderson vs. Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744; Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.)
In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record
contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and
adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch
XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.
City Fiscal for petitioners.
Manuel Villaruel, Jr. and Feliciano Tumale for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void.
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF"
provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of
Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for
operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years
after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:
RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the
City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots
in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon
City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002)
seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the
Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal both petitioners and respondent agreed to
the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the instant petition.

Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and
that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the
Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further
ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is
obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used
for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of
the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under
the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed
in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a
house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.
We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We
quote with approval the lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance:

We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid
exercise of police power. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec.
12, Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows:
(00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to
law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote, the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the
city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or
penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of
subsection (jj) of this section.
We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles. Occupying the forefront
in the bill of rights is the provision which states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state
interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.
These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of
sovereignty.

The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police
power to the City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax,
fix the license fee, and regulatesuch other business, trades, and occupation as may be
established or practised in the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537).
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL
33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A
fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in
question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery,
because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable
with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and
maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the
penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the
ordinance in question be justified under sub- section "t", Section 12 of Republic Act 537 which
authorizes the City Council to'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city
and provide for their burial in such proper place and in such manner as
the council may determine, subject to the provisions of the general law
regulating burial grounds and cemeteries and governing funerals and
disposal of the dead.' (Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537).
There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically
termed by the respondents, 'donation'

Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and
Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment
of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use
but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does
not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It
has been said that police power is the most essential of government powers, at times the
most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs.
Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power
embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The
Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost
become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the
state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. Being coextensive with
self-preservation and survival itself, it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under the modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of police power have become almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all
embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the
needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent
or scope of the police power by which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve
public interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).
The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause
being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of
government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form
of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the
general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of

a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for
the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is
not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private
property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not unmindful of the heavy burden shouldered by
whoever challenges the validity of duly enacted legislation whether national or local As early as 1913, this Court
ruled in Case v. Board of Health (24 PhiL 250) that the courts resolve every presumption in favor of validity and,
more so, where the ma corporation asserts that the ordinance was enacted to promote the common good and
general welfare.
In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA
849) the Court speaking through the then Associate Justice and now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando stated
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the a of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically
by Justice Malcolm 'The presumption is all in favor of validity. ... The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular ... municipality and with all
the facts and lances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative
body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to
the well-being of the people. ... The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation. (U.S. v. Salaveria (1918], 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the
presumption of validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision
in Ebona v. Daet, [1950]85 Phil. 369.)
We have likewise considered the principles earlier stated in Case v. Board of Health supra :

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from
a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the
dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its
own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the
law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to
set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements
which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to
home-owners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal
corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always
received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the
questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and
permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as
having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence
operations.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

... Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses,
a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals
and the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out
of the nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and
may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor
injurious to the rights of the community. An property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property,
like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their
enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and
regulations, established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power
vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the
police power, is possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general
health, morals, and safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive
inhibition of the organic law and providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner
as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.
but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to
Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the
ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to
Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the
son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned,
Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus
weakened and died.

EN BANC

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and
death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B.
ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T.
GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA
J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C.
ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S.
FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO
GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER
ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR
TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious
resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battlecry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in
the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal
adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of
private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific
injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the
bondage of the soil." 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and
separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions
for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an
agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this
end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right
of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted
by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially
superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial

law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners.

would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform.
Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of
the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well
as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases
ofChavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v.
The National Land Reform Council. 9 The determination of just compensation by the executive authorities
conformably to the formula prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not
foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature
because no valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners
are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7
hectares.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from
the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the
interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10,
1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including
serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one
common discussion and resolution, The different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment,
however, and will first be explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas
Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano,
Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of
powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said
measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention
limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a
valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by
a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v.
Dulay 5and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights
is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their
property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places
the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is
imposed on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands
occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure

Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits on
tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings
below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a
final ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was
merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except
Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be
declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83- hectare
land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a
compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated
April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments
have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental.
Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks
to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise
legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the
transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised,
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial
amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of
the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and
accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this
Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the
contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.

Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally
understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On
the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in
an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair
market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several
modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or
bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved
by the PARC.

On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is
unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and

The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of
the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the
CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers,
although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been
violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP)
which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On September 10,
1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and
riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event,
the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and
Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the
minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount
has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence
the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own
property.

(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate
from the House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the
requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of
lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation
Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private
respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987,
he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued.
These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the
private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:

The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for
an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the
landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the
land, in violation of the uniformity rule.

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.

In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas"
clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the
feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its
promulgation.

(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987
Constitution.

On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a
different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first
distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this
viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money
without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in existence can be the subject of
an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated
as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional
amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.

(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is
anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the
President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the
proper exercise of the police power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the
retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He
likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring
that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be
considered as advance payment for the land.

10

is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small
landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is
undemocratic.

assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ
of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the
government.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration
filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and
229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution which reads:

In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not
own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to
cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as
required by law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the
additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.

The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
I
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21. 1972, the
tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after
that date should therefore be considered amortization payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December
14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and
229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public respondent's acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do
not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or
removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers
and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted
decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right
of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used
for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family.
And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have
already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small
Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978,
(Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981
(Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative
Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the
Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the
corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this
right.

Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the
government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the
executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call
the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of
separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional.
The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was
done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the
Constitution would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring
therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and
voted on the issue during their session en banc. 11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will
assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry
into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is
satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove
the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect
and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper
parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied this
exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues
like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be
done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the
light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies
that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.

The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the
pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules,

11

For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall,
and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public official,
betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution.

simple reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation
measures, had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely
vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.

It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they
do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A.
No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial
provisions. This section declares:

... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. And so
we shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already
been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power
of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under
Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines
was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to
pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No.
131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to
be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or
repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative
simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of
legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she
possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the
challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not
inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion
fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in
the CARP Law.18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a
valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure
even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one
the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.19 The
creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI,
are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the

Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain,
directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary
according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed
five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject
to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is
actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands
have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain
the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be
expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a
catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be
inferred from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was
called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots.
Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No.
27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos,
whose word was law during that time.
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement
for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and effect if they were among those
enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated
November 29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to
compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true
as a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is
that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be
exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable
delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will
intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is
purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the
courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public official, or
board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the
great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause

12

when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a
decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is
a question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude
the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v.
NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in
exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain
because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police
power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals.
The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

purpose," the pertinent measure need have afforded no compensation whatever. With the
progressive growth of government's involvement in land use, the distance between the two
powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain
interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend expressly
approved in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the
reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to match that of the police power's standard of
"public purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of
Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose,
Justice Douglas declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be
beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise
of eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.

In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a
famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which
might cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted
by a coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights
thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be
sustained without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there was
a valid exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power
deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by
the State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect
the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction
here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains
in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The
state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of
the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious as it may because of further
changes in local or social conditions the restriction will have to be removed and the owner
will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of
eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The
employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long been accepted. 26 As for the power of
expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following
significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain
powers on different planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as
encompassing public acquisition of private property for improvements that would be available
for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they assigned the
less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's
reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as
suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public

28

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court
sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal
had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the Terminal, which had been designated a
historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem,
however, was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although
other landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that there was here no
taking, the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it
said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was
explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer to
neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a
landmark the rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to
countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed,
theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the
right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To
the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise
of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out
such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are
challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has
already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the

13

deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being
questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed
violations of due process in connection with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required
under the power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention
limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the
area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform,
an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular
interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)
it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds
that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and
entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between
these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on
this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment
of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a
concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as
distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the
validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the
end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts.
There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person
invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the
nation who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With
regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private
lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously,
there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable
to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the
parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other
conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to
assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private
rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored
justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme
law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is
absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this
principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just
compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute
public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly
acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be
covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the
decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative
and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the
absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is
known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Taada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question
of policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power, which
now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even
so, this should not be construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views
may not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of
private landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing
apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority,
which we may assert only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's
river between the American bank and the international line, as well as all of the upland north of
the present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of
navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith," that determination is

14

conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and
there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less
than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken
from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc.
No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the
necessary measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers
who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the
fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's
loss.40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the
use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has
dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them
to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions
concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be
in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are
envisioned in the measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of
the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its
payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e)
of the CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall
take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to
issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the
administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which
provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation
for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit
evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for
decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for
decision.

To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be
usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees
promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be
either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever
was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a
matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power
to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task
would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the
owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to
appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the
due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be
said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict
application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality
or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the
assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its
discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could
substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is
concerned.
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the
courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its
predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation,
independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for
such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in
the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and
fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over
the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the
property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors
and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered
the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the
landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real
value of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any
means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the
courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.

15

The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall compensate the landowner
in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in
accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions
hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as
the excess hectarage is concerned Twenty-five
percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at
any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and
up to fifty (50) hectares Thirty percent (30%)
cash, the balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below
Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to
be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares,
physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day
treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face
value of the bonds shall mature every year from
the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year:
Provided, That should the landowner choose to
forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part,
he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP
bonds may be used by the landowner, his
successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the
amount of their face value, for any of the following:

(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the

government, including assets under the Asset
Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed
by government financial institutions in the same
province or region where the lands for which the
bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of governmentowned or controlled corporations or shares of
stock owned by the government in private
corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the
provisional release of accused persons, or for
performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government
financial institution, provided the proceeds of the
loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise,
preferably in a small and medium- scale industry,
in the same province or region as the land for
which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to
government: Provided, That the use of these
bonds for these purposes will be limited to a
certain percentage of the outstanding balance of
the financial instruments; Provided, further, That
the PARC shall determine the percentages
mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate
family of the original bondholder in government
universities, colleges, trade schools, and other
institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of
the original bondholder in government hospitals;
and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time
to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it
requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is
the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is
entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible
to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has
always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of
the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)

16

In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration,

46

this Court held:

It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at
the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just
compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure
of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value
of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is
entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not
compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price
to be given and received for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is
also to the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus

The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot
compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the
condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at the time
and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power of
eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon
both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a
reliable and constant standard of compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money,
which must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the
power of the Legislature to substitute for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other
valuable advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money
and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we
do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation
where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a
specific and perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as
they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for
the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino
nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not
cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to
secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are
as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling
life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is
no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution"
among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at
least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of
land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be

needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by
our present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as
a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation
that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way
but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial
limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their intention was to
allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if
the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other
things of value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that
prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which
they presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the
members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive
agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the
demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment
should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as
"progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no
special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the
general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the
landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided
for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting
that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a
cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its
enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved
at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are
aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's
hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless
countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we
find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is
noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be
needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No
less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any
time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable
because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of
value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little
inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these
countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not
begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of
this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.

17

The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any
more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This
repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that
in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city
assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on
the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to
him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator
only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and
in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment
fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition
under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51
... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the
property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass
to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to
this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the
condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not
to the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the
construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation
although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further
said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as
soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not
pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively
examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is
such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably
taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared
that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the
land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had
to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the
land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged
membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper
for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary
after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered
as advance payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or
LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of
ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land
is fully paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under
E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the express
provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree
No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead
grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners
with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet
to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474
because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised
their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights
provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.
V
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter
attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be
sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that
they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In
the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and
expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use
Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward,
and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means.
Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and
for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are
removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not
only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and
helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be
his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it
bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last
can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the
dream."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

18

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED
against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of
compensation to their respective owners.

THIRD DIVISION

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and
recognized.
G.R. No. 156684
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall
enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

April 6, 2011

RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioners appeal the adverse decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 1 and resolution promulgated on
January 17, 2003,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the order issued in their favor on
February 19, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, in Mandaluyong City (RTC). 3 Thereby, the CA upheld
Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, adopted by the City of Mandaluyong (City) authorizing its then City Mayor to
take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the parcel of land registered in the names of the petitioners.
We affirm the CA.
Antecedents
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street and
Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they
rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of income.
On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to
authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the
petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. The
resolution reads as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. 552, S-19974
RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING HON. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS TO TAKE THE NECESSARY LEGAL STEPS FOR THE
EXPROPRIATION OF A PARCEL OF LAND SITUATED ALONG DR. JOSE FERNANDEZ STREET, BARANGAY MAUWAY,
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, OWNED BY MR. ANTONIO YUSAY
WHEREAS, there is a parcel of land situated along Dr. Jose Fernandez Street, Barangay Mauway, City of Mandaluyong,
owned and registered in the name of MR. ANTONIO YUSAY;
WHEREAS, this piece of land have been occupied for about ten (10) years by many financially hard-up families which the
City Government of Mandaluyong desires, among other things, to provide modest and decent dwelling;
WHEREAS, the said families have already negotiated to acquire this land but was refused by the above-named owner in
total disregard to the City Governments effort of providing land for the landless;
WHEREAS, the expropriation of said land would certainly benefit public interest, let alone, a step towards the
implementation of social justice and urban land reform in this City;

19

WHEREAS, under the present situation, the City Council deems it necessary to authorize Hon. Mayor BENJAMIN
S. ABALOS to institute expropriation proceedings to achieve the noble purpose of the City Government of
Mandaluyong.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion. Thus, they appeal to the Court, posing the
following issues, namely:
1. Can the validity of Resolution No. 552 be assailed even before its implementation?

NOW, THEREFORE, upon motion duly seconded, the City Council of Mandaluyong, in session assembled,
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to authorize, as it is hereby authorizing, Hon. Mayor BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
to institute expropriation proceedings against the above-named registered owner of that parcel of land situated
along Dr. Jose Fernandez Street, Barangay Mauway, City of Mandaluyong, (f)or the purpose of developing it to a
low-cost housing project for the less privileged but deserving constituents of this City.
ADOPTED on this 2nd day of October 1997 at the City of Mandaluyong.
Sgd. Adventor R. Delos Santos
Acting Sanggunian Secretary
Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the Citys exercise of its power
of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the petitioners became
alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution No.
552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.

2. Must a citizen await the takeover and possession of his property by the local government before he can go to
court to nullify an unjust expropriation?
Before resolving these issues, however, the Court considers it necessary to first determine whether or not the action for
certiorari and prohibition commenced by the petitioners in the RTC was a proper recourse of the petitioners.

Ruling
We deny the petition for review, and find that certiorari and prohibition were not available to the petitioners under the
circumstances. Thus, we sustain, albeit upon different grounds, the result announced by the CA, and declare that
the RTC gravely erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
1.Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of
a resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod

The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate the legal steps
towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of
the petitioners was premature.

The special civil action for certiorari is governed by Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, whose Section 1
provides:

On January 31, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for lack of merit, opining that certiorari did
not lie against a legislative act of the City Government, because the special civil action of certiorari was only available to
assail judicial or quasi-judicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the special civil action of prohibition did not also lie under the circumstances considering
that the act of passing the resolution was not a judicial, or quasi-judicial, or ministerial act; and that notwithstanding the
issuance of Resolution No. 552, the City had yet to commit acts of encroachment, excess, or usurpation, or had yet to act
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

However, on February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners motion for reconsideration, set aside its decision and
declared that Resolution No. 552 was null and void. The RTC held that the petition was not premature because the passage
of Resolution No. 552 would already pave the way for the City to deprive the petitioners and their heirs of their only property;
that there was no due process in the passage of Resolution No. 552 because the petitioners had not been invited to the
subsequent hearings on the resolution to enable them to ventilate their opposition; and that the purpose for the expropriation
was not for public use and the expropriation would not benefit the greater number of inhabitants.
Aggrieved, the City appealed to the CA.
In its decision promulgated on October 18, 2002, the CA concluded that the reversal of the January 31, 2001 decision by the
RTC was not justified because Resolution No. 552 deserved to be accorded the benefit of the presumption of regularity and
validity absent any sufficient showing to the contrary; that notice to the petitioners (Spouses Yusay) of the succeeding
hearings conducted by the City was not a part of due process, for it was enough that their views had been consulted and
that they had been given the full opportunity to voice their protest; that to rule otherwise would be to give every affected
resident effective veto powers in law-making by a local government unit; and that a public hearing, although necessary at
times, was not indispensable and merely aided in law-making.
The CA disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City dated
February 19, 2002 in SCA Case No. 15-MD, which declared Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997 of the City of Mandaluyong
null and void, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.5

For certiorari to prosper, therefore, the petitioner must allege and establish the concurrence of the following
requisites, namely:
(a) The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 6
It is further emphasized that a petition for certiorari seeks solely to correct defects in jurisdiction, 7 and does not
correct just any error or mistake committed by a court, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
unless such court, board, or officer thereby acts without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 8
The first requisite is that the respondent tribunal, board, or officer must be exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Judicial function, according to Bouvier,9 is the exercise of the judicial faculty or office; it also means the
capacity to act in a specific way which appertains to the judicial power, as one of the powers of government. "The
term," Bouvier continues,10 "is used to describe generally those modes of action which appertain to the judiciary as
a department of organized government, and through and by means of which it accomplishes its purpose and
exercises its peculiar powers."
Based on the foregoing, certiorari did not lie against the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was not a part of the
Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted
Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment or opinion.

20

Nor did the Sangguniang Panglungsod abuse its discretion in adopting Resolution No. 552. To demonstrate the
absence of abuse of discretion, it is well to differentiate between a resolution and an ordinance. The first is upon a
specific matter of a temporary nature while the latter is a law that is permanent in character. 11 No rights can be
conferred by and be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body
has to say in the light of attendant circumstances. In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the
resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of all gravely, for its
expression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally protected right.
Moreover, Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) required the City to pass an ordinance, not adopt a
resolution, for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. In this regard, Section 19 of The Local
Government Code clearly provides, viz:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer
has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount
to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at
the time of the taking of the property.
A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not
sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. Indeed, in Municipality of Paraaque v. V.M.
Realty Corporation,12 a case in which the Municipality of Paraaque based its complaint for expropriation on a
resolution, not an ordinance, the Court ruled so:
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise
thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate
private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed
"through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates
to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution
of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through
an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a resolution may suffice to support
the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. This case, however, is not in point because the applicable law at that
time was BP 337, the previous Local Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution would enable
an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, the present Local Government Code which was already
in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third
reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply
adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from
the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would
lead to an injustice." In the instant case, there is no reason to depart from this rule, since the law requiring an
ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the
people. Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language from "resolution" under BP 337 to "ordinance"
under RA 7160 demands a strict construction. "No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity,
and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without
his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation."

"Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer
has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount
to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at
the time of the taking of the property." (Emphasis supplied)

In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that its Sangguniang Bayan passed an ordinance on
October 11, 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, and ratified all the acts of its mayor
regarding the subject expropriation.

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:

" x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question
submitted before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether
those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue
rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint?"

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9 Article III of the Constitution and
other pertinent laws.

This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner merely alleged the existence of such an ordinance, but
it did not present any certified true copy thereof. In the second place, petitioner did not raise this point before this
Court. In fact, it was mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing. In any event, this allegation does not
cure the inherent defect of petitioners Complaint for expropriation filed on September 23, 1993. It is hornbook
doctrine that:

The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based
on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial courts Decision which
dismissed the expropriation suit.13 (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance authorizing and providing for the expropriation, the
petition for certiorari filed in the RTC was dismissible for lack of cause of action.

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2.Prohibition does not lie against expropriation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

The special civil action for prohibition is governed also by Section 2 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states:

FIRST DIVISION
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and
orderly administration of justice.14 The writ of prohibition is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.15 For grave abuse of discretion to be a ground for prohibition, the petitioner must first demonstrate
that the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, has
exercised its or his power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so
patent and gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law.16 On the other hand, the term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board, or officer has
jurisdiction over a case but has transcended such jurisdiction or acted without any authority.17
The petitioner must further allege in the petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or
adequate.18 A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that
judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court. 191avvphi1
The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition was not available to the petitioners as a remedy against the
adoption of Resolution No. 552, for the Sangguniang Panglungsod, by such adoption, was not exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions, but only expressing its collective sentiment or opinion.
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of the land under expropriation
proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of
just compensation to the owner. 20 This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as
necessitating the taking of private land intended for public use, 21 and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made
subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial
review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be
paid to the affected landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their
property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become
available.
Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners property was issued. As of then, it was premature for the
petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the
power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper
court.22 Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said
to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of eminent
domain.23
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70618.Costs to be paid by the
petitioners. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 87335 February 12, 1990

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
CRISTINA DE KNECHT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Villanueva, Talamayan, Nieva, Elegado, and Ante Law Offices for respondent Cristina de Knecht.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue posed in this case is whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of this
Court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.
On February 20, 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City
an expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets
among them Cristina De Knecht (de Knecht for short) together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and some fifteen other
defendants, docketed as Civil Case No. 7001-P.
On March 19, 1979 de Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the
President of the Philippines, prematureness of complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties.
On March 29, 1979 de Knecht filed an ex parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial court of a restraining
order to restrain the Republic from proceeding with the taking of immediate possession and control of the property
sought to be condemned. In June, 1979 the Republic filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the
property to be expropriated on the ground that it had made the required deposit with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) of 10% of the amount of compensation stated in the complaint. In an order dated June 14, 1979 the lower
court issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic to enter into and take possession of the properties sought
to be condemned, and created a Committee of three to determine the just compensation for the lands involved in
the proceedings.
On July 16, 1979 de Knecht filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. L51078 and directed against the order of the lower court dated June 14, 1979 praying that the respondent be
commanded to desist from further proceeding in the expropriation action and from implementing said order. On
October 30, 1980 this Court rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. The order of June
14, 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take c enter upon the possession of the
properties sought to be condemned is set aside and the respondent Judge is permanently
enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 7001-P, entitled 'Republic of the
Philippines vs. Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos, et al.' except to dismiss said case. 1
On August 8, 1981 defendants Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de Elizalde, Francisco Elizalde and Antonio Roxas
moved to dismiss the expropriation action in compliance with the dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision of this
Court which had become final and in order to avoid further damage to same defendants who were denied

22

possession of their properties. The Republic filed a manifestation on September 7, 1981 stating, among others, that
it had no objection to the said motion to dismiss as it was in accordance with the aforestated decision.
On September 2, 1983, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss said case due to the enactment of the Batas
Pambansa Blg. 340 expropriating the same properties and for the same purpose. The lower court in an order of
September 2, 1983 dismissed the case by reason of the enactment of the said law. The motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied in the order of the lower court dated December 18, 1986.
De Knecht appealed from said order to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered on
December 28, 1988, 2 the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE. As prayed for in
the appellant's brief another Order is hereby issued dismissing the expropriation proceedings
(Civil Case No. 51078) before the lower court on the ground that the choice of Fernando ReinDel Pan Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be
extended is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
No pronouncement as to Costs.

Hence the Republic filed that herein petition for review of the A aforestated decision whereby the following issues
were raised:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE ENACTMENT OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 340 IS THE PROPER
GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE EXPROPRIATION CASE. (PROPERLY PUT,
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DIS CRETION
IN DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 7001-P UPON JUDICIAL NOTICE OF B.P. BLG. 340).
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE DPWH'S "CHOICE" OF LAND TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS STILL
AN ISSUE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SAID "CHOICE" HAVING BEEN SUPPLANTED
BY THE LEGISLATURE'S CHOICE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE LAW OF THE CASE THEORY SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE
CASE AT BAR. 4
The petition is impressed with merit. There is no question that as early as 1977, pursuant to the Revised
Administrative Code, the national government, through the Department of Public Works and Highways began work
on what was to be the westward extension of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) outfall (or outlet) of the Manila
and suburbs flood control and drainage project and the Estero Tripa de Gallina. These projects were aimed at: (1)
easing traffic congestion in the Baclaran and outlying areas; (2) controlling flood by the construction of the outlet for
the Estero Tripa de Gallina (which drains the area of Marikina, Pasay, Manila and Paranaque); and (3) thus
completing the Manila Flood and Control and Drainage Project.
So the petitioner acquired the needed properties through negotiated purchase starting with the lands from Taft
Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard including the lands in Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets. It acquired through negotiated

purchases about 80 to 85 percent of the lands involved in the project whose owners did not raise any objection as
to arbitrariness on the choice of the project and of the route. It is only with respect to the remaining 10 to 15 percent
along the route that the petitioner cannot negotiate through a sales agreement with a few land owners, including de
Knecht whose holding is hardly 5% of the whole route area. Thus, as above related on February 20, 1979 the
petitioner filed the expropriation proceedings in the Court of First Instance.
There is no question that in the decision of this Court dated October 30, 1980 in De Knecht vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L51078, this Court held that the "choice of the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets as the line through which the EDSA
should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval." 5 It is based on the
recommendation of the Human Settlements Commission that the choice of Cuneta street as the line of the
extension will minimize the social impact factor as the buildings and improvement therein are mostly motels. 6
In view of the said finding, this Court set aside the order of the trial court dated June 14, 1979 authorizing the
Republic of the Philippines to take possession of the properties sought to be condemned and enjoined the
respondent judge from taking any further action in the case except to dismiss the same.
Said decision having become final no action was taken by the lower court on the said directive of this Court to
dismiss the case. Subsequently B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa on February 17, 1983. On
the basis of said law petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case before the trial court and this was granted.
On appeal by de Knecht to the Court of Appeals the appellate court held that the decision of the Supreme Court
having become final, the petitioner's right as determined therein should no longer be disturbed and that the same
has become the law of the case between the parties involved. Thus, the appellate court set aside the questioned
order of the trial court and issued another order dismissing the expropriation proceedings before the lower court
pursuant to the ruling in De Knecht case.
While it is true that said final judgment of this Court on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties,
it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take private properties for public use upon the payment of the just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. 7 Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken
by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or
by legislation. 8
When on February 17, 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 expropriating the very properties subject
of the present proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears that it was based on supervening events that
occurred after the decision of this Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through the
Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets.
The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. All
residents in the area have been relocated and duly compensated. Eighty percent of the EDSA outfall and 30% of
the EDSA extension had been completed. Only private respondent remains as the solitary obstacle to this project
that will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area.
The Solicitor General summarizing the situation said
The construction and completion of the Metro Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and
the EDSA extension are essential to alleviate the worsening traffic problem in the Baclaran
and Pasay City areas and the perennial flood problems. Judicial notice may be taken that
these problems bedevil life and property not only in the areas directly affected but also in
areas much beyond. Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 was enacted to hasten 'The Project' and thus
solve these problems, and its implementation has resulted so far in an 80% completion of the
EDSA outfall and a 30% completion of the EDSA extension, all part of 'The Project'.

23

This instant case stands in the way of the final solution of the above-mentioned problems,
solely because the single piece of property I occupied' by De Knecht, although already
expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340, is the only parcel of land where Government engineers
could not enter due to the 'armed' resistance offered by De Knecht, guarded and surrounded
as the lot is perennially by De Knecht's fierce private security guards. It may thus be said that
De Knecht, without any more legal interest in the land, single-handedly stands in the way of
the completion of 'The Project' essential to the progress of Metro Manila and surrounding
areas. Without the property she persists in occupying and without any bloodletting, the EDSA
outfall construction on both sides of the said property cannot be joined together, and the flood
waters of Pasay, Paraaque and Marikina which flow through the Estero Tripa de Gallina
will continue to have no way or outlet that could drain into Manila Bay. Without said property,
the EDSA extension, already 30% completed, can in no way be finished, and traffic will
continue to clog and jam the intersections of EDSA and Taft Avenue in Baclaran and pile up
along the airport roads.
In sum, even in the face of BP340, De Knecht holds the Legislative sovereign will and choice
inutile. 9
The Court finds justification in proceeding with the said expropriation proceedings through the Fernando Rein-Del
Pan streets from ESDA to Roxas Boulevard due to the aforestated supervening events after the rendition of the
decision of this Court in De Knecht.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

B.P. Blg. 340 therefore effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of this Court. And the trial
court committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case pending before it on the ground of the
enactment of B.P. Blg. 340.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 69260 December 22, 1989

Moreover, the said decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter (over two years
later in this case) making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety
of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding
legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting B.P. Blg. 340. Thus the
anterior decision of this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative flat.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 28, 1988 and its resolution dated March 9, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order
of Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasay City in Civil Case No. 7001-P dated September 2,
1983 is hereby reinstated without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

MUNICIPALITY OF BIAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE MAR GARCIA, Judge of the Regional Trial Court at Bian, Laguna (BRANCH XXXIV, Region IV),
and ERLINDA FRANCISCO, respondents.
The Provincial Fiscal for petitioner. Roman M. Alonte for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
Three (3) questions are resolved in the action of certiorari at bar. The first is whether the special civil action of
eminent domain under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court is a case "wherein multiple appeals are allowed, 1 as regards
which 'the period of appeal shall be thirty [30] days, 2 instead of fifteen (15) days. 3 The second is whether or not the
Trial Court may treat the motion to dismiss" filed by one of the defendants in the action of eminent domain as a
"motion to dismiss" under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, reverse the sequence of trial in order and hear and
determine said motion to dismiss, and thereafter dismiss the expropriation suit as against the movant. And the third
is whether or not a "locational clearance issued by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission relative to use
of land is a bar to an expropriation suit involving that land.
The expropriation suit involved in this certiorari proceeding was commenced by complaint of the Municipality of
Bian, Laguna 4 filed in the Regional Trial Court of Laguna and City of San Pablo, presided over by respondent
Judge Jose Mar Garcia. The complaint named as defendants the owners of eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in
Bian with an aggregate area of about eleven and a half (11-1/2) hectares. The land sought to be expropriated was
intended for use as the new site of a modern public market and the acquisition was authorized by a resolution of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Bian approved on April 11, 1983.

24

One of the defendants was Erlinda Francisco. She filed a "Motion to Dismiss" dated August 26, 1983, on the
following grounds; (a) the allegations of the complaint are vague and conjectural; (b) the complaint violates the
constitutional limitations of law and jurisprudence on eminent domain; (c) it is oppressive; (d) it is barred by prior
decision and disposition on the subject matter; and (e) it states no cause of action. 5 Now, her motion to dismiss"
was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections within the time specified in the summons, each defendant, in
lieu of an answer, shall present in a single motion to dismiss or for other apppropriate relief, all
of his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his property for the use or
purpose specified in the complaint. All such objections and defenses not so presented are
waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on the plaintiffs attorney of record and filed with
the court with the proof of service.
Her "motion to dismiss" was thus actually a pleading, taking the place of an answer in an ordinary civil action; 6 it
was not an ordinary motion governed by Rule 15, or a "motion to dismiss" within the contemplation of Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court.
On October 23, 1983, respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiff Municipality.
On February 3, 1984, Erlinda Francisco filed a "Motion for Separate Trial," invoking Section 2, Rule 31. 7 She
alleged that there had already been no little delay in bringing all the defendants within the court's jurisdiction, and
some of the defendants seemed "nonchalant or without special interest in the case" if not mere "free riders;" and
"while the cause of action and defenses are basically the same;" she had, among other defenses, "a constitutional
defense of vested right via a pre-existing approved Locational Clearance from the H.S.R.C." 8 Until this clearance
was revoked, Francisco contended, or the Municipality had submitted and obtained approval of a "rezoning of the
lots in question," it was premature for it to "file a case for expropriation. 9 The Court granted the motion. By Order
dated March 2, 1984, it directed that a separate trial be held for defendant Erlinda Francisco regarding her special
defenses mentioned in her .. Motion for Separate Trial and in her Motion to Dismiss, distinct from and separate from
the defenses commonly raised by all the defendants in their respective motions to dismiss."
At the separate trial, the Fiscal, in representation of the Municipality called the Trial Court's attention to the
irregularity of allowing Francisco to present her evidence ahead of the plaintiff, "putting the cart before the horse, as
it were." He argued that the motion to dismiss was in truth an answer, citing Rural Progress Administration v. Judge
de Guzman, and its filing did "not mean that the order of presentation of evidence will be reversed," but the usual
procedure should be followed; and the evidence adduced should be deemed "evidence only for the motion for
reconsideration of the writ of possession." 10
Nevertheless, at the hearing of March 5, and March 26, 1984, the Court directed Francisco to commence the
presentation of evidence. Francisco presented the testimony of Atty. Josue L. Jorvina, Jr. and certain exhibits the
Land Use Map of the Municipality of Bian, the Locational Clearance and Development Permit issued by the
H.S.R.C. in favor of "Erlinda Francisco c/o Ferlins Realty & Development Corporation, and Executive Order No. 648
and Letter of Instruction No. 729, etc. Thereafter, the respondent Judge issued an Order dated July 24, 1984
dismissing the complaint "as against defendant ERLINDA FRANCISCO," and amending the Writ of Possession
dated October 18, 1983 so as to "exclude therefrom and from its force and effects said defendant .. and her
property ..." His Honor found that1) a Locational Clearance had been issued on May 4,1983 by the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission to the "Ferlin's Realty .. owned by defendant Erlinda Francisco to convert .. (her) lot to a
commercial complex;"

2) according to the testimony of Atty. Jorvina of the H.S.R.C., a grantee of a locational clearance acquires
a vested right over the subject property in the sense that .. said property may not be subject of an
application for locational clearance by another applicant while said locational clearance is subsisting;"
3) such a clearance should be "considered as a decision and disposition of private property co-equal with
or in parity with a disposition of private property through eminent domain;
4) the clearance was therefore "a legal bar against the right of plaintiff Municipality .. to expropriate the
said property."
The Municipality filed on August 17, 1984 a Motion for Reconsideration. Therein it (a) reiterated its contention
respecting the irregularity of the reversal of the order of trial, supra. 11 (b) decried the act of the Court in considering
the case submitted for decision after the presentation of evidence by Francisco without setting the case for further
hearing for the reception of the plaintiffs own proofs, (c) pointed out that as admitted by Atty. Jorvina, the locational
clearance did not "mean that other persons are already prevented from filing locational clearance for the same
project, and so could not be considered a bar to expropriation, (d) argued that the locational clearance issued on
May 4, 1983, became a "worthless sheet of paper" one year later, on May 4, 1984 in accordance with the explicit
condition in the clearance that it "shall be considered automatically revoked if not used within a period of one (1)
year from date of issue," the required municipal permits to put up the commercial complex never having been
obtained by Francisco; and (e) alleged that all legal requirements for the expropriation of the property had been duly
complied with by the Municipality. 12
The Municipality set its motion for reconsideration for hearing on August 28, 1984 after furnishing Francisco's
counsel with copy thereof The Court however re-scheduled the hearing more than two (2) months later, on
November 20, 1984. 13 Why the hearing was reset to such a remote date is not explained.
On September 13, 1984, Francisco filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Execution and/or Finality of Order," contending that
the Order of July 27, 1984 had become "final and executory on August 12, 1984" for failure of the Municipality to file
a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the reglementary period," 14 i.e "fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order .. appealed from. 15
On October 10, 1984, the Court issued an Order declaring the Municipality's motion for reconsideration dated
August 15, 1984 to have been "filed out of time," on account of which the Court 49 could not give due course to
and/or act x x (thereon) except to dismiss (as it did thereby dismiss) the same." 16 It drew attention to the fact that
notice of its Order of July 24, 1984 (dismissing the complaint as against Francisco) was served on plaintiff
Municipality on July 27, 1984, but its motion for reconsideration was not presented until August 17, 1984, beyond
the fifteen-day period for appeal prescribed by law. And on October 15, 1985, His Honor promulgated another Order
directing the issuance of (1) a writ of execution of the Order of July 24, 1984, and (2) a "certificate of finality" of said
order. 17
The Municipality attempted to have the respondent Court reconsider both and Orders of October 10, and October
15, 1984. To this end it submitted a motion contending that: 18
1) "multiple appeals are allowed by law" in actions of eminent domain, and hence the period of
appeal is thirty (30), not fifteen (15) days;
2) moreover, the grant of a separate trial at Francisco's instance had given rise "ipso facto to a
situation where multiple appeals became available (Sections 4 and 5, Rule 36, .. Santos v.
Pecson, 79 Phil. 261);"

25

3) it was wrong for the Trial Court to have acted exparte on the motion for execution, the motion
being "litigable in character;" and
4) it (the Municipality) was denied due process when the Court, after receiving Francisco's
evidence and admitting her exhibits, immediately resolved the case on the merits as regards
Francisco, without setting the case "for further hearing for reception of evidence for the plaintiff."
The motion was denied, by Order dated October 18, 1984; hence, the special civil action of certiorari at bar.
1. There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. 19 It ends with an order,
if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right
to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint." 20 An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course,
since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the
Merits. 21 So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules
expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the
right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be flied or heard. 22
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. 23 The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings
of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing
more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to
be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied
party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.
A similar two-phase feature is found in the special civil action of partition and accounting under Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court. 24
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a coownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally prescribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. 25 This phase may end with a declaration that
plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. 26 It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is
proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in
question is in order. 27 In the latter case, "the parties may, ff they are able to agree, make partition among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. 28, In
either case i.e. either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed the order is a final one, and
may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. 29
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by
the court. In that event partition shall be done for the parties by the Court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. 30 This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the Court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the
recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
question." 31 Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable.
Now, this Court has settled the question of the finality and appealability of a decision or order decreeing partition or
recovery of property and/or accounting. In Miranda v. Court of Appeals, decided on June 18, 1986,32 the Court

resolved the question affirmatively, and expressly revoked the ruling in Zaldarriaga v. Enriquez 33 -that a decision or
order of partition is not final because it leaves something more to be done in the trial court for the complete
disposition of the case, i.e, the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings for the determination by said
commissioners of just compensation, the submission of their reports, and hearing thereon, and the approval of the
partition-and in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso 34 -that a judgement for recovery of property with account is not final, but
merely interlocutory and hence not appealable until the accounting is made and passed upon. As pointed out in
Miranda, imperative considerations of public policy, of sound practice and adherence to the constitutional mandate
of simplified, just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action require that judgments for recovery (or
partition) of property with accounting be considered as final judgments, duly appealable. This, notwithstanding that
further proceedings will still have to be rendered by the party required to do so, it will be ventilated and discussed by
the parties, and will eventually be passed upon by the Court. It is of course entirely possible that the Court
disposition may not sit well with either the party in whose favor the accounting is made, or the party rendering it. In
either case, the Court's adjudication on the accounting is without doubt a final one, for it would finally terminate the
proceedings thereon and leave nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits of the issue. And it goes without
saying that any party feeling aggrieved by that ultimate action of the Court on the accounting may seek reversal or
modification thereof by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. 35
The Miranda doctrine was reiterated in de Guzman v. C.A.- 36 Valdez v. Bagaso; 37 Lagunzad v. Gonzales; 38 Cease
v. C.A., 39 Macadangdang v. C.A. 40 and Hernandez v. C.A., 41 Gabor v. C.A. 42 Fabrica v. C.A . 43
No reason presents itself for different disposition as regards cases of eminent domain. On the contrary, the close
analogy between the special actions of eminent domain and partition already pointed out, argues for the application
of the same rule to both proceedings.
The Court therefore holds that in actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than two (2)
appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation 44 is thirty (30) days counted from
notice of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for actions in general, conformably with
the provision of Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, in relation to paragraph 19 (b) of the Implementing
Rules to the effect that in "appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and
other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal
being required. 45
The municipality's motion for reconsideration filed on August 17, 1984 was therefore timely presented, well within
the thirty-day period laid down by law therefor; and it was error for the Trial Court to have ruled otherwise and to
have declared that the order sought to be considered had become final and executory.
2. As already observed, the Municipality's complaint for expropriation impleaded eleven (11) defendants. A
separate trial was held on motion of one of them, Erlinda Francisco, 46 it appearing that she had asserted a
defense personal and peculiar to her, and inapplicable to the other defendants, supra. Subsequently, and
on the basis of the evidence presented by her, the Trial Court promulgated a separate Order dismissing
the action as to her, in accordance with Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court reading as follows:
Sec. 4. Several judgments in an action against several defendants, the court may, when a
several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action
to proceed against the others.
It is now claimed by the Municipality that the issuance of such a separate, final order or judgment had given rise
"ipso facto to a situation where multiple appeals became available." The Municipality is right.
In the case at bar, where a single complaint was filed against several defendants having individual, separate
interests, and a separate trial was held relative to one of said defendants after which a final order or judgment was
rendered on the merits of the plaintiff s claim against that particular defendant, it is obvious that in the event of an

26

appeal from that separate judgment, the original record cannot and should not be sent up to the appellate tribunal.
The record will have to stay with the trial court because it will still try the case as regards the other defendants. As
the rule above quoted settles, "In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is
proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. " 47 In lieu of
the original record, a record on appeal will perforce have to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court.
More than one appeal being permitted in this case, therefore, "the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a
record of appeal being required as provided by the Implementing Rules in relation to Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129,
supra. 48

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177611

April 18, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES), Petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO L. LEGASPI, SR., QUEROBIN L. LEGASPI, OFELIA LEGASPI-MUELA, PURISIMA LEGASPI VDA.
DE MONDEJAR, VICENTE LEGASPI, RODOLFO LEGASPI II, and SPOUSES ROSALINA LIBO-ON and
DOMINADOR LIBO-ON, Respondents.

3. Erlinda Francisco filed a "motion to dismiss" intraverse of the averments of the Municipality's complaint for
expropriation. That "motion to dismiss" was in fact the indicated responsive pleading to the complaint, "in lieu
of an answer." 49

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

Now, the Trial Court conducted a separate trial to determine whether or not, as alleged by Francisco in her "motion
to dismiss," she had a "vested right via a pre-existing approved Locational Clearance from the HRSC.," making the
expropriation suit premature. 50 While such a separate trial was not improper in the premises, 51 and was not put at
issue by the Municipality, the latter did protest against the Trial Court's (a) reversing the order of trial and receiving
first, the evidence of defendant Francisco, and (b) subsequently rendering its order sustaining Francisco's defense
and dismissing the action as to her, solely on the basis of said Francisco's evidence and without giving the plaintiff
an opportunity to present its own evidence on the issue. The Trial Court was clearly wrong on both counts. The
Court will have to sustain the Municipality on these points.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the
Decision dated 26 April 20071 rendered by the Eighteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
85735,2 denying for lack of merit the Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, thru
the University of the Philippines in the Visayas (UPV), for the nullification of the orders dated 17 November
20033 and 31 May 20044 issued by the Hon. Roger B. Patricio, Presiding Judge of Branch 38 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, in the expropriation case docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 19921.

Nothing in the record reveals any valid cause to reverse the order of trial. What the Trial Court might have had in
mind was the provision of Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court allowing "any of the grounds for dismissal" in
Rule 16 to "be pleaded as an affirmative defense and authorizing the holding of a "preliminary hearing .. thereon as
if a motion to dismiss had been filed." Assuming this to be the fact, the reception of Francisco's evidence first was
wrong, because obviously, her asserted objection or defense that the locational clearance issued in her favor by the
HSRC was a legal bar to the expropriation suit was not a ground for dismissal under Rule 16. She evidently meant
to prove the Municipality's lack of cause of action; but lack of cause of action is not a ground for dismissal of an
action under Rule 16; the ground is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, which is obviously not the
same as plaintiff's not having a cause of action.

In December 1978, respondent Rosalina Libo-on (Rosalina) accomplished a letter of intent signifying her willingness
to sell to UPV Lot No. 1 of Psu-193912 Amd., the 40,133-square meter property situated at Miag-ao, Iloilo
registered in her name under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. F-20020 of the Iloilo provincial
registry.5Forthwith, a Deed of Definite Sale was executed by the parties whereby Rosalina, with the conformity of
her then tenant, Vicente Libo-on, sold the subject parcel in favor of UPV for the stated consideration
of P56,479.50.6 As a consequence, UPV immediately took possession of the property and, in line with its
educational development plan, started building thereon road networks, infrastructure and school facilities. The
record shows that further use and development of the property was subsequently taken up at the 1093rd meeting of
the UP Board of Regents held in Quezon City on 15 December 1995. 7

Nothing in the record, moreover, discloses any circumstances from which a waiver by the Municipality of the right to
present contrary proofs may be inferred. So, in deciding the issue without according the Municipality that right to
present contrary evidence, the Trial Court had effectively denied the Municipality due process and thus incurred in
another reversible error.

On 4 January 1980, however, Rosalina wrote a letter, informing UPV that she was rescinding the sale of the subject
parcel on the ground that she was no longer the owner of the property in view of her 5 September 1978 conveyance
thereof by way of barter or exchange in favor of respondents Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr., Querobin Legaspi, 8 Ofelia
Legaspi-Muela, Purisima Legaspi Vda. De Mondejar, Vicente Legaspi, Rodolfo Legaspi II and the Spouses Rosalina
and Dominador Libo-on, among others. UPV subsequently learned that Lot 1 was subdivided into ten lots
denominated and later registered in the names of respondents 9 in the following wise:

4. Turning now to the locational clearance issued by the HSRC in Francisco's favor on May 4, 1983, it seems
evident that said clearance did become a "worthless sheet of paper," as averred by the Municipality, upon the
lapse of one (1) year from said date in light of the explicit condition in the clearance that it 44 shall be
considered automatically revoked if not used within a period of one (1) year from date of issue," and the
unrebutted fact that Francisco had not really made use of it within that period. The failure of the Court to
consider these facts, despite its attention having been drawn to them, is yet another error which must be
corrected.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Order issued by His Honor on July 24,1984 in Civil Case No. 8-1960 is ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE, and the case is remanded to the Trial Court for the reception of the evidence of the plaintiff
Municipality of Bian as against defendant Erlinda Francisco, and for subsequent proceedings and judgment in
accordance with the Rules of Court and the law. Costs against private respondent.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio

The Facts

Lot No.

Area (Sqm.)

TCT No.

Registered Owner

21609-A

9,078

8192

Querobin Legaspi, et al.

21609-B

2,648

8193

Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr.

21609-C

4,374

8194

Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr.

21609-D

16,286

8195

Querobin Legaspi, et al.

21609-E

1,494

8196

Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr.

21609-F

1,250

8197

Ofelia Legaspi Muela

21609-G

1,251

8198

Rodolfo Legaspi

21609-H

1,250

8199

Querobin Legaspi

27

21609-I

1,251

8200

Purisima Legaspi Vda. De Mondejar

21609-J

1,251

8201

Vicente Legaspi

On 8 August 1991, petitioner, thru UPV, filed against respondents the complaint for eminent domain docketed
before the RTC as Civil Case No. 19921. Petitioner alleged, among other matters, that the subject parcel is within
the approved and delineated campus of the UPV which had well-established its presence in the area by building its
laboratories, classrooms, faculty and student centers, among other facilities; and, that it had been constrained to
resort to expropriation in view of the failure of its efforts to negotiate with respondents for the retention of the
property on which it constructed considerable improvements already being used for academic purposes.
Maintaining that the fair market value of the property at the time of its entry was P49,298.00, UPV sought
confirmation of its right of condemnation as well as the fixing of the just compensation for the property. 10
On 2 September 1991, the RTC issued an order granting petitioners motion to allow UPV to continue its
possession of the subject parcel upon deposit with the Iloilo Provincial Treasurer of the sum of P50,070.00,
representing the provisional valuation of the property.11 In their answer dated 16 December 1991, however,
respondents averred that petitioners right of expropriation should only be limited to the three lots covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-8193, 8194 and 8196, 12 containing an aggregate area of 8,516 square
meters. Finding no opposition to petitioners motion for a declaration on its right to expropriate the same, the RTC
issued an order of condemnation dated 1 April 1992, 13 upholding UPVs right to expropriate said three parcels which
had been denominated as Lot Nos. 21609-B, 21609-C and 21609-E, to wit:
WHEREFORE, an ORDER OF CONDEMNATION is hereby entered covering the above-mentioned parcels of land,
[petitioner] having a lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation to be determined by three (3) Commissioners who
shall ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be taken.
Appointment of the three (3) Commissioners is hereby held in abeyance to give the court sufficient time to select the
three (3) competent and disinterested persons as Commissioners provided for under Section 5 of Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Notify Counsels.
Considering that the foregoing condemnation order covered only three (3) of the ten (10) lots comprising the subject
property, petitioner moved for the continuation of the condemnation proceedings insofar as the remaining seven lots
were concerned.14 On 10 November 1994, petitioner also filed an amended complaint, impleading as additional
defendants the Rural Bank of Miag-ao (Iloilo), Inc. (RBMI), the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Iloilo
Finance Corporation (IFC), in view of the mortgages constituted in their favor by respondents over some of the lots
into which the Lot 1 had been subdivided. 15 Claiming to have relied on the certificates of title presented to them by
the mortgagors, however, RBMI, PNB and IFC filed their individual answers maintaining that the said mortgages
were entered into for value and in good faith. 16 The issues thus joined and the pre-trial conference subsequently
terminated, the RTC went on to issue the 7 July 1997 pre-trial order summarizing the parties admissions, their
respective positions as well as the issues to be tried in the case. 17
On 13 April 1998, the Office of the UPV Chancellor sent respondent Rodolfo Legaspi a letter, protesting against the
latters occupation of a portion of the property in litigation. 18 Calling the RTCs attention to its 2 September 1991
Order which allowed UPVs continued possession of the property, petitioner also filed its 7 July 1998 manifestation
and motion praying for the grant of a writ of possession over the entirety of Lot 1. 19 Without resolving the motion,
however, the RTC went on to issue the 16 June 2000 order,20 fixing the just compensation for Lot Nos. 21609-B,
21609-C and 21609-E, based on the evidence adduced by the parties and the report submitted by the
commissioners, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, order is hereby issued fixing the just compensation of subject Lots Nos.
21609-B, 21609-C and 21609-E covering a total area of 8,516 sq. meters, as fifty one thousand ninety six pesos
(P51,096.00) at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per sq. meter. Accordingly, the [petitioner] is hereby ordered to pay
[respondents] Judge Rodolfo L. Legaspi, et al fifty one thousand ninety six pesos (P51,096.00) for the total just
compensation of the three (3) aforementioned subject lots. This amount includes the amount of fifty thousand
seventy pesos (P50,070.00) deposited by the [petitioner] in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Iloilo.

There being no evidence presented by the parties to support their respective claims for damages, none is herein
awarded.21
On 17 November 2003, the RTC further issued the herein assailed condemnation order of the same date, upholding
petitioners authority to expropriate the remaining seven lots comprising the property, namely, Lot Nos. 21609-A,
21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J. Excluding therefrom the area occupied by the Villa
Marina Beach Resort which respondent Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr. operated in the premises, 22 the RTC ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, an Order of Condemnation is hereby entered allowing the [petitioner] to expropriate for public use
the remaining seven (7) subject Lot Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J all
situated in Barangay Sapa, Miag-ao, Iloilo, except such area therein as is occupied by the Villa Marina Beach resort
and which [respondent] Rodolfo L. Legaspi, Sr. has been operating a business.
In properly fixing the just compensation to be paid to the [respondents] Legaspis over the aforesaid 7 lots, the
Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Assessor and the Provincial Engineer, all of the Province of Iloilo, are hereby
appointed as commissioners to assist the Court in the fixing the just compensation of the subject lots. Before these
commissioners so appointed discharge their respective duties, they may take their oath to faithfully perform their
duties as such commissioners and their oaths shall be filed before this Court as part of the records of the
proceedings in this case.
The commissioners who are hereby appointed are requested to make known their acceptance within ten (10) days
from receipt of this order.
On 19 December 2003, petitioner23 and UPV24 filed motions for reconsideration of the foregoing order on the ground
that the exclusion of the Villa Marina Beach Resort area from the condemned lots is bereft of legal basis and
contrary to the evidence presented in the case which showed that the same is an integral part of the UPVs
developmental plan for research and educational use. On 22 December 2003, respondents also filed their
manifestation and partial motion for reconsideration of the same order alleging, among other matters, that Lot Nos.
21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J comprise the area occupied by Villa Marina Beach Resort; that
Lot No. 21609-A is the area where respondent Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr. operates a business called Omps Corner; that
UPV has no intended use for Lot No. 21609-D which is being used for residential purposes by respondent Vicente
Legaspi; and, that the foregoing lots, together with the portion of Lot No. 1 of Psu-193912 Amd. utilized by the
Municipality of Miag-ao as a public cemetery should be excluded from petitioners exercise of its right of
expropriation.25 Finding that the exclusion of the aforesaid lots would not defeat UPVs plan for its campus, the RTC
issued the order dated 31 May 2004,26 the decretal portion of which states as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the [petitioners] Motion for Reconsideration dated December 19, 2003 without merit, the
same is denied. The Manifestation and Partial Motion for Reconsideration dated December 19, 2003 of
[respondents] Legaspis being meritorious is, thus, granted and the Order dated November 17, 2003 of this Court is
partially reconsidered and judgment is hereby entered denying the expropriation of subject Lots Nos. 21609-A,
21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J.
As a consequence hereof, the order of this Court appointing as Commissioners the Provincial Treasurer, the
Provincial Assessor and the Provincial Engineer, all of the Province of Iloilo is likewise reconsidered and set aside.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General, Atty. Cornelio Salinas, Atty. Rodolfo Legaspi,
Sr., Atty. Legaspi II, Atty. Alejandro Somo, the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Assessor and the Provincial
Engineer, all of the Province of Iloilo.
No pronouncement as to costs.27
Aggrieved, petitioner filed on 16 August 2004 the Rule 65 petition for certiorari and mandamus docketed before the
CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 85735, assailing the RTCs order dated 31 May 2004 on the ground that grave abuse of
discretion attended the denial of the expropriation of the subject lots after the right to expropriate the same was
earlier upheld in the likewise assailed order dated 17 November 2003. 28 On 26 April 2007, the CAs then Eighteenth
Division rendered the herein assailed decision denying the petition on the ground that, under Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the proper remedy from said assailed orders was an ordinary appeal which, once lost,

28

cannot be substituted by a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and mandamus. Even if petitioners choice of remedy were,
moreover, to be considered proper under the circumstances, the CA ruled that the RTCs issuance of said assailed
orders was well within its power and duty to review, amend or reverse its findings and conclusions if it deems it
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. 29 Without moving for a reconsideration
of the foregoing decision, petitioner filed the petition at bench on 25 June 2007.

Nos. 21609-B, 21609-C and 21609-E, with an aggregate area of 8,516 square meters. 37Without any appeal having
been perfected therefrom, the RTCs 1 April 1996 order attained finality and left no more question as to the propriety
of the acquisition of said lots for the public purpose alleged in the complaint from which the instant suit originated.
Accordingly, the RTC correctly went on to issue the order dated 16 June 2000, fixing the just compensation for Lot
Nos. 21609-B, 21609-D and 21609-E at P51,096.00, less theP50,070.00 UPV appears to have already deposited
with the Provincial Treasurer of Iloilo.38

The Issue
Petitioner urges the nullification of the CAs assailed 26 April 2007 Decision on the following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND AFFIRMING THE ORDER DATED MAY 31, 2004 OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ILOILO CITY WHICH DID NOT STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED. 30
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition impressed with merit.
Expropriation or the exercise of the power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state and of those entities
to which the power has been lawfully delegated to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just
compensation.31 Governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings therefor consist of two (2) stages: (a)
the condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use;
and, (b) the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court
with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. 32 The nature of these two stages was discussed in the
following wise in the case of Municipality of Bian vs. Judge Garcia, 33 to wit:
1. There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the
action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be
a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to
the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings
of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing
more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to
be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied
party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.
It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that the outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings be it an order of
expropriation or an order of dismissal finally disposes of the case and is, for said reason, final. The same is true of
the second phase that ends with an order determining the amount of just compensation 34 which, while essential for
the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings and the
outcome of the initial finding by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. 35 In the same manner that the order of
expropriation may be appealed by any party by filing a record on appeal, a second and separate appeal may
likewise be taken from the order fixing the just compensation. Indeed, jurisprudence recognizes the existence of
multiple appeals in a complaint for expropriation because of said two stages in every action for expropriation. 36
In the case at bench, the RTC split the determination of UPVs right of expropriation over the ten lots into which Lot
No. 1 of Psu-193912 Amd. had been subdivided. Considering the lack of opposition on the part of respondents, the
RTC issued the order dated 1 April 1996, upholding UPVs right to expropriate the three (3) lots denominated as Lot

On the other hand, with respect to Lot Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J,
the record shows that the RTC issued the herein assailed 17 November 2003 order which, while likewise upholding
UPVs right of expropriation over said lots, ordered the exclusion of the portion occupied by Villa Marina Beach
Resort from the 31,617 square meters comprising said lots. 39 Acting on the motions for reconsideration of said order
filed by petitioner, UPV and respondents, however, the RTC issued the second assailed 31 May 2004 order,
altogether denying said right of expropriation, 40 upon the following succinct findings and conclusions:
It bears stressing that even before the filing of the original complaint, [respondent] Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr. was already
operating as his business establishment the Villa Marina Resort and this must be the reason why [petitioner] had
expressly excluded this area from the area it intended to expropriate, the amended complaint notwithstanding, and
must also be the reason why former UP President Angara wrote a letter (Exh. 10) to defendant Legaspi, Sr.
conveying a happy compromise acceptable to all.
It likewise bears stressing the fact that insofar as Lot No. 21609-A, a portion thereof has been utilized by defendant
Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr.s "Omps Corner" and the rest of the said lot has been utilized by the Municipality of Miag-ao,
Iloilo as a public cemetery.
The total area covered by Lots Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J is only
31,617 sq. meters. Based on the locations of these lots, acquisition by [UPV] would not impair or defeat the purpose
of its campus site. In other words, without including in the expropriation the Villa Marina Resort, the "Omps Corner"
and the public cemetery and the residential land where [respondent] Vicente Legaspis family is residing, [UPVs]
operation as a university would not be adversely affected.
As to the Villa Marina Resort and the "Omps Corner" these places have been utilized by defendant Rodolfo
Legaspi, Sr. for his business even before the filing of the instant complaint. As to [respondent] Vicente Legaspis lot,
including this in the expropriation would force his family to go astray as they have no place where to live.
As to the portion being utilized as public cemetery, this Court believes and so holds that allowing the plaintiff to
expropriate the same would be bordering to the long cherished and revered customs and tradition of respecting the
dead. x x x41
The order of denial of UPVs right to expropriate Lot Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I
and 21609-J, is final in nature and not merely interlocutory. However, instead of perfecting an appeal from said
order which it received on 16 June 2004,42 petitioner filed on 16 August 2004 the Rule 65 petition for certiorari
docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 85735, on the ground that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
in denying the expropriation of the subject lots after its right to expropriate the same had been earlier determined.
Narrow in scope and unflexible in character,43 a petition for certiorari is, concededly, intended to correct errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction 44 and lies only when there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 45 Hence, the CA denied the
petition filed by petitioner on the principle that certiorari cannot be used as substitute for an appeal that has been
lost.46
Although certiorari cannot be generally used as a substitute for a lapsed appeal, the CA lost sight of the fact,
however, that the rule had been relaxed on a number of occasions, where its rigid application will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.47 This Court has allowed the issuance of a writ of certiorari despite the
availability of appeal where the latter remedy is not adequate or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient or there is
need to promptly relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal. 48 In
SMI Development Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines, 49 this Court significantly upheld the CAs grant of the
Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed in lieu of an ordinary appeal which was not considered a speedy and adequate
remedy that can sufficiently address the urgent need of the National Childrens Hospital to expand and extend
quality medical and other health services to indigent patients. Indeed, certiorari and appeal are not mutually

29

exclusive remedies in certain exceptional cases, such as when there is grave abuse of discretion or when public
welfare so requires.50

the ground of a public cemetery can be taken for other public uses under a general authority, 65 there is, likewise, no
showing in the record of the location and area of the public cemetery of Miag-ao in relation to the subject property.

Petitioner has more than amply demonstrated that the RTCs issuance of the assailed orders dated 17 November
2003 and 31 May 2004 was attended with grave abuse of discretion. In the context of a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari, grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.51 It has been ruled that the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.52 To our
mind, the grave abuse of discretion imputable against the RTC was manifest as early in the assailed 17 November
2003 order where, without giving any rationale therefor, and while it upheld petitioners right of expropriation over
Lot Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J, it excluded the area occupied by
the Villa Marina Beach Resort owned and operated by respondent Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr. No less than the
Constitution mandates that "(n)o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." 53

In sum, we find the RTC gravely abused its discretion when, without stating the factual and legal bases therefor, it
issued the assailed 17 November 2003 condemnation order, excluding the area occupied by the Villa Marina Resort
from petitioners exercise of its right of expropriation. The RTC likewise gravely abused its discretion when, in total
disregard of the evidence on record, it issued the second assailed 31 May 2004 order which reconsidered its first
assailed order and altogether denied petitioners right of expropriation over Lot Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F,
21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J.

Since it is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court, 54 the rule is settled that a
decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and
deemed legally inexistent.55 In Yao v. Court of Appeals,56 this Court ruled as follows:

SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CAs Decision dated 26 April 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, another is entered NULLYING the assailed orders dated 17 November 2003 and 31 May 2004 and directing
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38 to resolve the case in compliance with Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution and in accordance with the evidence on record.

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount
component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The
parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons
that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and
against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to
know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the
parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint
the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to
the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a
safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the
sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment
on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for
sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision.
Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless
disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial
responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.
The RTC compounded its error when, acting on the motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, it issued the
assailed 31 May 2004 Order, denying petitioners right of expropriation over Lot Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F,
21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J, on the ground that the same were already used by respondents for their
businesses and/or residences. Subject to the direct constitutional qualification that "private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation," 57 the power of eminent domain is, after all, the ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose 58 thru a method
that partakes the nature of a compulsory sale. 59 The fact that said lots are being utilized by respondents Legaspis
for their own private purposes is, consequently, not a valid reason to deny exercise of the right of expropriation, for
as long as the taking is for a public purpose and just compensation is paid.1wphi1
Our review of the documents attached to the pleadings filed in connection with the petition before the CA and this
Court also failed to yield any basis for the RTCs pronouncement that UPV excluded the area occupied by the Villa
Marina Resort from its exercise of the right of expropriation. This is belied by petitioners motion for continuation of
the condemnation proceedings for the seven remaining lots into which Lot No. 1 of Psu-193912 Amd. had been
subdivided,60 UPVs 13 April 1998 letter-protest against respondent Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr.s occupation of the
property,61 its motion for the grant of a writ of possession of the entire lot 62 and the motions for reconsideration of
petitioner and UPV filed from the condemnation order dated 17 November 2003. 63 Considering that the site of the
Villa Marina Resort appears to have already been earmarked for UPVs proposed National Institute of Marine
Biotechnology,64 the RTC clearly abused its discretion when it ruled that the exclusion of 31,617 square meters from
the original 40,133 sought to be expropriated would not adversely affect UPVs operations. Granted that no part of

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

30

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138896

June 20, 2000

BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU, petitioner,

vs.
Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR namely: EUGENIO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO,
ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE SYLIANCO, LAWSON SYLIANCO, LAWINA S. NOTARIO,
LEONARDO SYLIANCO JR. and LAWFORD SYLIANCO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the regional
trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the March 29, 1999 Order1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City (Branch 58) in Civil Case No. CEB-21978, in which it dismissed a Complaint for eminent
domain. It ruled as follows:
Premises considered, the motion to dismiss is hereby granted on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction over
the case. Accordingly, the Orders dated February 19, 1999 and February 26, 1999, as well as the Writ of
Possession issued by virtue of the latter Order are hereby recalled for being without force and effect. 2
Petitioner also challenges the May 14, 1999 Order of the RTC denying reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) 3 a Complaint to expropriate a
property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public
use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is
the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An
action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not
with this Court."4
Assailed RTC Ruling
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title
to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be
filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value
of the subject property was less than P20,000, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:
The instant action is for eminent domain. It appears from the current Tax Declaration of the land involved that its
assessed value is only One Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Pesos (P1,740.00). Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph
(3), of Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property with an assessed
value of less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. In the case
at bar, it is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, where the property
involved is located.

The instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of real property is a real action affecting title to or
possession of real property, hence, it is the assessed value of the property involved which determines the
jurisdiction of the court. That the right of eminent domain or condemnation of real, property is included in a real
action affecting title to or possession of real property, is pronounced by retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, thus, "Real
actions are those affecting title to or possession of real property. These include partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosures of mortgage on, real property. . . ." 5
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law.6 In a Resolution dated July 28,
1999, the Court denied the Petition for Review "for being posted out of time on July 2, 1999, the due date being
June 2, 1999, as the motion for extension of time to file petition was denied in the resolution of July 14, 1999." 7 In a
subsequent Resolution dated October 6, 1999, the Court reinstated the Petition. 8
Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this sole issue for the consideration of this Court:
Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed
value of the subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos? 9
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue: Jurisdiction over an Expropriation Suit
In support of its appeal, petitioner cites Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . .
. ." It argues that the present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Complaint for Eminent Domain affects the title to or possession of
real property. Thus, they argue that the case should have been brought before the MTC, pursuant to BP 129 as
amended by Section 3 (3) of RA 7691. This law provides that MTCs shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
civil actions that involve title to or possession of real property, the assessed value of which does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, fifty thousand pesos exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The test to determine
whether it is so was laid down by the Court in this wise:
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the
subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum
of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the
defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases,

31

besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed
to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the
time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the
Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901). 10
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the
exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. 11 In National Power
Corporation v. Jocson, 12 the Court ruled that expropriation proceedings have two phases:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally
disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an
order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings
before the Trial Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof)
shall be filed or heard."
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the
second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the
authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. 1 In the
main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable
of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to
determine the just compensation for it.1avvphi1 This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed,
that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.
Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that "condemnation proceedings are within the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," 14 the forerunners of the regional trial courts. The said case was decided
during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first
instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of
pecuniary estimation." 15 The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these
jurisprudential precedents.
We are not persuaded by respondents' argument that the present action involves the title to or possession of a
parcel of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an eminent authority in remedial law, that
condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples of real actions that affect the title to or possession of a
parcel of land. 16
Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real and personal actions. His
discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar
lectures, he emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.

To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate private property under
the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute respondents' title to or possession of the same.
Indeed, it is not a question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title
to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control individual property for the
public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare may demand." 17
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is
directed to HEAR the case. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-106528 December 21, 1993
PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE DOMINGO D. PANIS as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, THE HONORABLE RICARDO
DIAZ, as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, the CITY OF MANILA, ANTONIO GONZALES, JR., KARLO
BUTIONG, LEONARDO AQUINO, EDILBERTO LOPEZ, ANTILANO FERRER, LEONCIA DAVILLO JAMERO, LUIS FERNANDEZ,
PATRICIO DE GUZMAN, RICARDO DE LEON, VIRGILIO TORNERO, FAUSTO FERNANDEZ, DOMINGO MEREN, EDUARDA
JACINTO, MAGDALENA VELEZ, LUSITO ALMADRONES, MYRNA BARREDO EBREO, FULGENCIO CORSINO, PEDRO
VELASQUEZ, JUAN INOBAYA, NENITA ARCE, MAGNO ORTINEZ, ARMANDO PARAGAS, HIPOLITO ESTABILLO, FELICIANO
FAUSTINO, VIRGILIO EDIC, JOSE TINGZON, JOSUE MARIANO, MARIA YERO, MA. DOLORES QUIZON, ISIDERO TAGUILIG,
CIRIACO MENDOZA, JUAN ROMERO, JOSE LAGATA, FRUCTUSO PUSING, TEOFILO TERSOL, ANTONIO LACHICA, PIO
RAJALES, REGINA VIERNES, JUAN ROMERO, DOMINGO EDIC, EDUARDA GONZALES, PABLO QUIRANTE, LEONORA
SANTIA, MARIA RIVERA, ELENA ARCE, LAZARO GOMEZ, PEDRO MENDOZA, DOMINADOR ADAO, JUAN PANTERA,
FRISCA MANDOT, SOCORRO SANTOS AND GLORIA JEBUNAN, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari to review: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23338, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner, assailing the orders of (a) respondent Judge Domingo
D. Panis of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, in Civil Case No. 90-53531, and (b) respondent Judge
Ricardo D. Diaz, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, in Civil Case No. 90-53346; and (2) its Resolution
dated July 30, 1992, which denied the motion for reconsideration of the decision.
Philippine Columbian Association, petitioner herein, is a non-stock, non-profit domestic corporation and is engaged
in the business of providing sports and recreational facilities for its members. Petitioner's office and facilities are
located in the District of Paco, Manila, and adjacent thereto, is a parcel of land consisting of 4,842.90 square meters
owned by petitioner.
Private respondents are the actual occupants of the said parcel of land, while respondents Antonio Gonzales, Jr.
and Karlo Butiong were duly-elected councilors of the City of Manila.
In 1982, petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein private respondents before the metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila. Judgment was rendered against the said occupants, ordering them to vacate the lot and pay
reasonable compensation therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals
and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85262.

32

As a result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, a motion for
execution of judgment, which was granted on April 9, 1990. A writ of demolition was later prayed and likewise issued
by the same court on May 30, 1990.
On June 8, 1990, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, a petition for injunction
and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order against the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and
petitioner herein (Civil Case No. 90-53346) to enjoin their ejectment from and the demolition of their houses on the
premises in question.
On June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53531 against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, for the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot subject of
the ejectment proceedings in Civil Case No. 90-53346. Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
alleging, inter alia, that the City of Manila had no power to expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for
public use and welfare; that the expropriation is politically motivated; and, that the deposit of P2 million in the City of
Manila representing the provisional value of the land, was insufficient and was made under P.D. 1533, a law
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
On September 14, 1990, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, denied petitioner's motion to dismiss and
entered an order of condemnation declaring that the expropriation proceeding was properly instituted in accordance
with law. The Court also ordered the parties to submit, within five days, the names of their respective nominees as
commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the land in question.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying its motion to dismiss, and later a motion to defer
compliance with the order directing the submission of the names of nominees to be appointed commissioners. The
City of Manila, however, filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession over the subject lot,
mentioning the P2 million deposit with the Philippine National Bank, representing the provisional value of the land.
In separate orders dated October 5 and 8, 1990, the court issued the writ of possession, and at the same time,
denied petitioner's motion to defer compliance and motion for reconsideration.
On September 21, 1990, as a result of the expropriation proceedings, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila,
in Civil Case No. 90-53346 issued an order, granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the private
respondents. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied.
Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition before the Court of Appeals a petition assailing the orders
dated September 14, 1990, and October 5 and 8, 1990 of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court, and the Order
dated September 21, 1990 of Branch 27 of the same court (CA-G.R. SP No. 23338). The Court of Appeals rendered
a Decision on November 31, 1992, denying the petition, and a Resolution on July 30, 1992, denying consideration
thereof.
Hence, this petition.
The land subject of this case is the 4,842.90 square meter lot, which was formerly a part of the Fabie Estate. As
early as November 11, 1966, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 5971, seeking to
expropriate the Fabie Estate. Through negotiated sales, the City of Manila acquired a total of 18,017.10 square
meters of the estate, and thereafter subdivided the land into home lots and distributed the portions to the actual
occupants thereof.
The remaining area of 4,842.90 square meters, more or less, was sold in 1977 by its owner, Dolores FabiePosadas, to petitioner. Since the time of the sale, the lot has been occupied by private respondents. On 23, 1989,

the City Council of Manila, with the approval of the Mayor, passed Ordinance No. 7704 for the expropriation of the
4,842.90 square meter lot.
Petitioner claims that expropriation of the lot cannot prosper because:
(1) the City of Manila has no specific power to expropriate private property under the 1987 Constitution; and (2)
assuming that it has such power, this was exercised improperly and illegally in violation of the Public use
requirement and petitioner's right to due process.
Petitioner argues that under the 1987 Constitution, there must be a law expressly authorizing local governments to
undertake urban land reform (Art. XIII, Sec. 9).
Petitioner forgot that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, R.A. No. 409, expressly authorizes the City of Manila
to "condemn private property for public use" (Sec. 3) and "to acquire private land . . . and subdivide the same into
home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents" (Sec. 100).
The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila general powers over its territorial
jurisdiction, including the power of eminent domain, thus:
General powers. The city may have a common seal and alter the same at pleasure, and
may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real and personal property
for the general interest of the city, condemn private property for public use, contract and be
contracted with, sue and be sued, and prosecute and defend to final judgment and execution,
and exercise all the powers hereinafter conferred (R.A. 409, Sec. 3; Emphasis supplied).
Section 100 of said Revised Charter authorizes the City of Manila to undertake urban land reform, thus:
Sec. 100. The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide
the same into home lots for sale on easy terms for city residents, giving first priority to
the bona fidetenants or occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and lowsalaried employees. For the purpose of this section, the city may raise the necessary funds by
appropriations of general funds, by securing loans or by issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may
acquire the lands through expropriation proceedings in accordance with law, with the approval
of the President . . . (Emphasis supplied).
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire private lands in the city
and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and
low-salaried employees of the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does
not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need
them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 [1987] ).
Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and
landed estates (Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993; J.M. Tuason and
Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970] ). It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to
be expropriated in this case is less than half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by
changing conditions (Sumulong v. Guerrero, supra; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987];
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing.
This concept is specifically recognized in the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

33

The state shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private
sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at
affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in
urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment
opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect
the rights of small property owners (Art. XIII, Sec. 9; Emphasis supplied).
The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject lot has likewise been complied with. Although the
motion to dismiss filed by petitioner was not set for hearing as the court is required to do (National Housing
Authority v. Valenzuela, 159 SCRA 396 [1988]), it never questioned the lack of hearing before the trial and appellate
courts. It is only now before us that petitioner raises the issue of due process.
Indeed, due process was afforded petitioner when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order,
denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals, in determining whether grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent courts,
passed upon the very same issues raised by petitioner in its motion to dismiss, which findings we uphold. Petitioner
therefore cannot argue that it was denied its day in court.
The amount of P2 million representing the provisional value of the land is an amount not only fixed by the court, but
accepted by both parties. The fact remains that petitioner, albeit reluctantly, agreed to said valuation and is therefore
estopped from assailing the same. It must be remembered that the valuation is merely provisional. The parties still
have the second stage in the proceedings in the proper court below to determine specifically the amount of just
compensation to be paid the landowner (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 67, Sec. 5; National Power Corporation v.
Jocson, 206 SCRA 520 [1992] ).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15870 December 3, 1919
VISAYAN REFINING COMPANY, DEAN C. WORCESTER, and FRED A. LEAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL CAMUS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal and HON. QUINTIN
PAREDES, Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands, respondents.
Kincaid and Perkins for petitioners.
Assistant Attorney-General Reyes for respondents.
STREET, J.:
This is an original petition, directed to the Supreme Court, containing an alternative prayer for a writ of certiorarior
prohibition, as the facts may warrant, to stop certain condemnation proceedings instituted by the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and now pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal. The respondents have
interposed what is called an answer, but which is in legal effect merely a demurrer, challenging the sufficiency of the

allegations of the petition. The matter having been submitted upon oral argument, the cause is now before us for the
decision of the question thus presented.
It appears that upon September 13, 1919, the Governor-General directed the Attorney-General to cause
condemnation proceedings to be begun for the purpose of expropriating a tract of land of an area of about
1,100,463 square meters, commonly known as the site of Camp Tomas Claudio. Said land is located in the
municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal, and lies along the water front of Manila Bay, a few miles south of the
city of Manila. It is stated in communication of the Governor-General that the property in question is desired by the
Government of the Philippine Islands for military and aviation purposes.
In conformity with the instructions of the Governor-General, condemnation proceedings were begun by the AttorneyGeneral on September 15, 1919, by filing a complaint in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal. Numerous persons are named in the complaint as defendants
because of their supposed ownership of portions of the property intended to be expropriated. In the list of persons
thus impleaded appear the names of the three petitioners herein, namely, the Visayan Refining Co., Dean C.
Worcester, and Fred A. Leas, who are severally owners of different portions of the property in question.
In the communication of the Governor-General, the Attorney-General was directed immediately upon filing the
complaint to ask the court to give the Government the possession of the land to be expropriated, after the
necessary deposit should be made as provided by law. Accordingly in the complaint itself the Attorney-General
prayed the court promptly and provisionally to fix the sum of P600,000 as the total value of the property and to put
the Government in immediate possession when said sum should be placed at the disposition of the court. An order
was accordingly made on September 15, 1919, by the Honorable Judge Manuel Camus, of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Rizal, fixing the value of the property provisionally at the amount stated and ordering
that the plaintiff be placed in possession, it being made to appear that a certificate of deposit for the amount stated
had been delivered to the provincial treasurer.
At this stage of the proceedings in the Court of First Instance the three respondents already mentioned, to wit, the
Visayan Refining Co., Dean C. Worcester, and Fred A. Leas, interposed a demurrer, questioning the validity of the
proceedings on the ground that there is no Act of the Philippine Legislature authorizing the exercise of the power of
eminent domain to acquire land for military or aviation purposes.
Contemporaneously with the filing of their demurrer, the same parties moved the Court of First Instance to revoke
its order of September 15, giving the plaintiff provisional possession. This motion is based substantially on the same
ground as the demurrer, that is, the lack of legislative authority for the proposed expropriation, but it contains one
additional allegation to the effect that the deposit in court of the sum of P600,000, had been made without authority
of law. In support of this contention it was shown, by means of an informal communication from the Insular Auditor,
that the money in question had been taken from the unexpended balance of the funds appropriated by Acts Nos.
2748 and 2785 of the Philippine Legislature for the use of the Militia Commission. This appropriation showed, upon
the date said deposit of P600,000 was made, an unexpended balance of P1,144,672.83.
On October 3, 1919, the Judge of the Court of First Instance overruled the demurrer interposed by the three parties
mentioned and denied their motion to vacate the order granting possession to the Government. The present
proceeding was thereupon instituted in this Court in the manner and for the purpose already stated.
General authority to exercise the power of eminent domain is expressly conferred on the Government of the
Philippine Islands, as now constituted by section 63 of the Philippine Bill, which reads as follows:
That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, subject to the limitation and
conditions prescribed in this Act to acquire, receive, hold, maintain, and convey title to real and personal
property, and may acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right of eminent domain. (Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902.)

34

Section 3 of the Jones Act contains the further provision that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation." In addition to this there is found in the same section the familiar provision, already
expressed in section 5 of the Philippine Bill, that no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of property
without due process of law, or deny any person the equal protection of the laws. (Acts of Congress of August 29,
1916, sec. 3.)
Section 64 of the Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2711) expressly confers on the Government
General the power, among others:
To determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of eminent domain in behalf of
the Government of the Philippine Islands; and to direct the Attorney-General, where such at is deemed
advisable, to cause the condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court having proper jurisdiction.
The procedural provisions relative to the conduct of expropriation proceedings are contained in section 241 to 253,
inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, supplemented as they are by various later Acts of the Legislature. Among
the salient features of the scheme of expropriation thus created are these: (1) If the court is of the opinion that the
right of expropriation exists, three commissioners are appointed to hear the parties, view the premises, and assess
the damages to be paid for the condemnation (sec. 243 Code Civ. Proc.); (2) after hearing the evidence submitted
by the parties and assessing the damages in the manner prescribed by law (sec. 244), the commissioners make
their report to the court, setting forth all their proceedings; and it is expressly declared that "none of their
proceedings shall be effectual to bind the property or the parties until the court shall have accepted their report and
rendered judgment in accordance with its recommendations" (sec. 245); (3) the court then acts upon the report,
accepting the same in whole or in part, or rejecting, recommitting, or setting aside the same, as it sees fit (sec. 246).
It is further declared in section 246 that
The court . . . may make such final order and judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his rights under the law, and to the defendant just compensation for the land
so taken; and the judgment shall require payment of the sum awarded as provided in the next section
(i.e., sec. 247) before the plaintiff can enter upon the ground and appropriate it to the public use.
Sections 247 and 251 of the same Code are of sufficient importance in this connection to warrant quotation in their
entirety. They are as follows:
SEC. 247. Rights of Plaintiff After the Judgment. Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of
compensation as fixed by the judgment, or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the
costs, the plaintiffs shall have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the
same to the public use defined in the judgment. In case the defendant and his attorney absent
themselves from the court or decline to receive the same, payment may be made to the clerk of the court
for him, and such officer shall be responsible on his bond therefor and shall be compelled to receive it."
SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect. The record of the final judgment in such action shall
state definitely, by meters and bounds and adequate description, the particular land or interest in land
condemned to the public use, and the nature of the public use. A certified copy of the record of the
judgment shall be recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds for the province in which the estate is
situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated the land and estate so
described.
The provisions which deal with the giving of immediate possession when the Government of the Philippine Islands
is the plaintiff are found in Act No. 2826, which is in part as follows:

SEC. 2. When condemnation proceedings are instituted by or in favor of the Insular Government . . . in
any competent court of the Philippines, the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter immediately upon the land
covered by such proceedings, after depositing with the provincial treasurer the value of said land in cash,
as previously and promptly determined and fixed by the competent court, which money the provincial
treasurer shall retain subject to the order and final decision of the court: Provided, however, That the
court may permit that in lieu of cash, there may be deposited with the provincial treasurer a certificate of
deposit of any depository of the Government of the Philippine Islands, payable to the provincial treasurer
on sight, for the sum ordered deposited by the court. The certificate and the sums represented by it shall
be subject to the order and final decision of the court, and the court shall have authority to place said
plaintiff in possession of the land, upon such deposit being made, by the proper orders and a mandate, if
necessary.
SEC. 3. . . . Upon the payment by the plaintiff to the defendants of the compensation awarded by the
sentence, or after the tender of said sum to the defendants, and the payment of the costs, or in case the
court orders the price to be paid into court, the plaintiff shall be entitled to appropriate the land so
condemned to the public use specified in the sentence. In case payment is made to the court, the clerk of
the same shall be liable on his bond for the sum so paid and shall be obliged to receive the same.
In connection with the foregoing provisions found in laws enact under the American regime is to be considered the
following provision of the Civil Code:
ART. 349. No one may be deprived of his property unless it be by competent authority for some purpose
of proven public utility and after payment of the proper compensation.
Unless this requisite has been complied with, it shall be the duty of the court to protect the owner of such
property in its possession or to restore its possession to him, as the case may be.
Taken together the laws mentioned supply a very complete scheme of judicial expropriation, deducing the authority
from its ultimate source in sovereignty, providing in detail for the manner of its exercise, and making the right of the
expropriator finally dependent upon payment of the amount awarded by the court.
As has already been indicated the petition before us proceeds on the idea that the expropriation proceedings in
question cannot be maintained by the Philippine Government in the absence of a statute authorizing the exercise of
the power of eminent domain for military and aviation purposes; and while it is not urged that a special legislative
Act must be passed every time any particular parcel of property is to be expropriated, it is
claimed and this really amounts to the same thing that the Government cannot institute and prosecute
expropriation proceedings unless there is already in existence a legislative appropriation especially destined to pay
for the land to be taken.
We are of the opinion that the contentions of the petitioners, in whatever way they may be understood or expressed,
are not well founded. There is one point at least on which all must agree, namely, that if land can be taken by the
Government for a public use at all, the use intended to be made of the land now in question, that is, for military and
aviation purposes, is a public use. It is undeniable that a military establishment is essential to the maintenance of
organized society, and the courts will take judicial notice of the recent progress of the military and naval arts
resulting from the development of aeronautics.
The question as to the abstract authority of the Government to maintain expropriation proceedings upon the
initiative of the Governor-General should not be confused with that which has reference to the necessity for a
legislative appropriation. They really involve different problems and will be separately considered.
Upon the first, we are of the opinion that in this jurisdiction at least expropriation proceedings may be maintained
upon the exclusive initiative of the Governor-General, without the aid of any special legislative authority other than

35

that already on the statute books. Furthermore, if the Government complies with the requirements of law relative to
the making of a deposit in court, provisional possession of the property may be at once given to it, just as is
permitted in the case of any other person or entity authorized by law to exercise the power eminent domain. Special
legislative authority for the buying of a piece of land by the Government is no more necessary than for buying a
paper of pain; and in the case of a forced taking of property against the will of the owner, all that can be required of
the government is that should be able to comply with the conditions laid down by law as and when those conditions
arise.
The contention that the authority to maintain such a proceeding cannot be delegated by the Legislature to the Chief
Executive, is in our opinion wholly erroneous and apparently has its basis in a misconception of fundamentals. It is
recognized by all writers that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the
existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. Philosophers and legists may
differ as to the grounds upon which the exercise of this high power is to be justified, but no one can question its
existence. No law, therefore, is ever necessary to confer this right upon sovereignty or upon any government
exercising sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers.
As is well said by the author of the article on Eminent Domain in the encyclopdic treaties Ruling Case Law.
The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the constitution. It
is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any recognition of it in the constitution.
The provisions found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public use
do not by implication grant the power to the government of the state, but limit a power which would
otherwise be without limit. (10, R. C. L., pp. 11, 12.)
In other words, the provisions now generally found in the modern laws of constitutions of civilized countries to the
effect that private property shall not be taken for public use without compensation have their origin in the recognition
of a necessity for restraining the sovereign and protecting the individual. Moreover, as will be at once apparent, the
performance of the administrative acts necessary to the exercise of the power of eminent domain in behalf of the
state is lodged by tradition in the Sovereign or other Chief Executive. Therefore, when the Philippine Legislature
declared in section 64 of the Administrative Code, that the Governor-General, who exercises supreme executive
power in these Islands (sec. 21, Jones Act), should be the person to direct the initiation of expropriation
proceedings, it placed the authority exactly where one would expect to find it, and we can conceive of no ground
upon which the efficacy of the statute can reasonably be questioned.
We would not of course pretend that, under our modern system of Government, in which the Legislature plays so
important a role, the executive department could, without the authority of some statute, proceed to condemn
property for its own uses; because the traditional prerogatives of the sovereign are not often recognized nowadays
as a valid source of power, at least in countries organized under republican forms of government. Nevertheless it
may be observed that the real check which the modern Legislature exerts over the Executive Department, in such a
matter as this, lies not so much in the extinction of the prerogative as in the fact the hands of the Executive can
always be paralyzed by lack of money something which is ordinarily supplied only by the Legislature.
At any rate the conclusion is irresistible that where the Legislature has expressly conferred the authority to maintain
expropriation proceedings upon the Chief Executive, the right of the latter to proceed therein is clear. As is said by
the author of the article from which we have already quoted, "Once authority is given to exercise the power of
eminent domain, the matter ceases to be wholly legislative. The executive authorities may then decide whether the
power will be invoked and to what extent." (10 R. C. L., p. 14.)
The power of eminent domain, with respect to the conditions under which the property is taken, must of course be
exercised in subjection to all the restraints imposed by constitutional or organic law. The two provisions by which the
exercise of this power is chiefly limited in this jurisdiction are found in the third section of the Jones Act, already
mentioned, which among other things declares (1) that no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of
property without due process of law and (2) that private property shall not be taken for public use without just

compensation. The latter of these provisions is directly aimed at the taking of property under the exercise of the
power of eminent domain; and as this requirement, in connection with the statutes enacted to make sure the
payment of compensation, usually affords all the protection that the owner of property can claim, it results that the
due process clause is rarely invoked by the owner in expropriation proceedings.
Nevertheless it should be noted that the whole problem of expropriation is resolvable in its ultimate analysis into a
constitutional question of due process of law. The specific provisions that just compensation shall be made is merely
in the nature of a superadded requirement to be taken into account by the Legislature in prescribing the method of
expropriation. Even were there no organic or constitutional provision in force requiring compensation to be paid, the
seizure of one's property without payment, even though intended for a public use, would undoubtedly be held to be
a taking without due process of law and a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
This point is not merely an academic one, as might superficially seem. On the contrary it has a practical bearing on
the problem before us, which may be expressed by saying that, if the Legislature has prescribed a method of
expropriation which provides for the payment of just compensation and such method is so conceived and adapted
as to fulfill the constitutional requisite of due process of law, any proceeding conducted in conformity with that
method must be valid.lawphi1.net
These considerations are especially important to be borne in mind in connection with the second contention made
by counsel for the petitioners, namely, that land cannot be expropriated by the Government in the absence of a
legislative appropriation especially destined to pay for the land to be taken. To this question we now address
ourselves; and while we bear in mind the cardinal fact that just compensation must be made, the further fact must
not be overlooked that there is no organic or constitutional provision in force in these lands Islands requiring that
compensation shall actually be paid prior to the judgment of condemnation.
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent
that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute assurance that no piece of
land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. It is true that in rare
instances the proceedings may be voluntarily abandoned before the expropriation is complete or the proceedings
may fail because the expropriator becomes insolvent, in either of which cases the owner retains the property; and if
possession has been prematurely obtained by the plaintiff in the proceedings, it must be restored. It will be noted
that the title does not actually pass to the expropriator until a certified copy of the record of the judgment is recorded
in the office of the register of deeds (sec. 251, Code Civ. Proc.). Before this stage of the proceedings is reached the
compensation is supposed to have been paid; and the court is plainly directed to make such final order and
judgment as shall secure to the defendant just compensation for the land taken. (Sec. 246, Code Civ. Proc.).
Furthermore, the right of the expropriator is finally made dependent absolutely upon the payment of compensation
by him. (Sec. 3, Act No. 2826; sec. 247, Code Civ. Proc.).
It will be observed that the scheme of expropriation exemplified in our statutes does not primarily contemplate the
giving of a personal judgment for the amount of the award against the expropriator; the idea is rather to protect the
owner by requiring payment as a condition precedent to the acquisition of the property by the other party. The power
of the court to enter a judgment for the money and to issue execution thereon against the plaintiff is, however,
unquestioned; and the court can without doubt proceed in either way. But whatever course be pursued the owner is
completely protected from the possibility of losing his property without compensation.
When the Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally take the form of an order merely requiring the payment
of the award as a condition precedent to the transfer of the title, as a personal judgment against the Government
could not be realized upon execution. It is presumed that by appearing as plaintiff in condemnation proceedings, the
Government submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court and thereby waives its immunity from suit. As a
consequence it would be theoretically subject to the same liability as any other expropriator. Nevertheless, the
entering of a personal judgment against it would be an unnecessary, as well as profitless formality.

36

In the face of the elaborate safeguards provided in our procedure, it is frivolous to speculate upon the possibility that
the Legislature may finally refuse to appropriate any additional amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that
may be necessary to pay the award. That it may do. But the Government can not keep the land and dishonor the
judgment. Moreover, in the eventuality that the expropriation shall not be consummated, the owners will be
protected by the deposit from any danger of loss resulting from the temporary occupation of the land by the
Government; for it is obvious that this preliminary deposit serves the double purpose of a prepayment upon the
value of the property, if finally expropriated and as an indemnity against damage in the eventuality that the
proceedings should fail of consummation.
It appears that the money represented by the certificate of deposit which was placed at the disposal of the lower
court, pursuant to the requirements of section 2 of Act No. 2826, was taken from certain appropriations under the
control of the Militia Commission, a body created by section 29 of Act No. 2715, for the purpose, among others, of
advising the Governor-General upon measures relative to the organization equipment, and government of the
National Guard and reserve militia. Counsel for the petitioners say that money appropriated for the purpose of the
Militia Commission cannot be lawfully used to acquire the land which is now the subject of expropriation, because
no authority for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is to be found in any of the Acts appropriating money
for said Commission; from whence it is argued that the certificate of deposit affords no protection to the owners of
property.
The point appears to be one of little general importance, and we will not multiply words over it. Suffice it to say that
in our opinion the Insular Auditor was acting within his authority when he let this money out of the Insular Treasury;
and being now within the control of the lower court, it will doubtless in due time be applied to the purpose for which
the deposit was made.
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the action taken by the lower court in the condemnation
proceedings aforesaid was in all respects regular and within the jurisdiction of the court. The writ prayed for in the
petition before us, therefore, can not be issued. The application is accordingly denied, with costs against the
petitioners.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo and Avancea, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves the right to prepare a separate opinion.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 107916 February 20, 1997

PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN
DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
The main issue presented in this case is whether a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a
municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Petitioner seeks the reversal of the
Court of Appeals decision and resolution, promulgated on July 15, 1992 and October 22, 1992 respectively, 1and a
declaration that Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 of the Bunawan Sangguniang Bayan is null and void.
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No.
43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot
No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and
Other Government Sports Facilities." 2
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved
said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still
available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." 3
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a petition for Eminent Domain against
petitioner Percival Moday before the Regional Trial Court at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. 4 The complaint was later
amended to include the registered owners, Percival Moday's parents, Zotico and Leonora Moday, as party
defendants.
On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject
Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the government's best
interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property.

37

Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the Regional Trial Court granted respondent
municipality's motion to take possession of the land. The lower court held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's
failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is
merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B.P.
Blg. 337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts
enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 5 The dispositive portion
of the lower court's Order dated July 2, 1991 reads:
WHEREFORE, it appearing that the amount of P632.39 had been deposited as per Official
Receipt No. 5379647 on December 12, 1989 which this Court now determines as the
provisional value of the land, the Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of the Property
filed by petitioner through counsel is hereby GRANTED. The Sheriff of this Court is ordered to
forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved.
Let the hearing be set on August 9, 1991 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning for the purpose of
ascertaining the just compensation or fair market value of the property sought to be taken,
with notice to all the parties concerned.
SO ORDERED. 6

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the legality of the condemnation proceedings
initiated by the municipality. According to petitioners, the expropriation was politically motivated and Resolution No.
43-89 was correctly disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, there being other municipal properties
available for the purpose. Petitioners also pray that the former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo be ordered to pay
damages for insisting on the enforcement of a void municipal resolution.
The Court of Appeals declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for disapproving the resolution "could
be baseless, because it failed to point out which and where are those available lots.'" Respondent court also
concluded that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's resolution as invalid,
expropriation of petitioners' property could
proceed. 13
The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State
power that is inseparable from sovereignty. 14 It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory
sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. 15 Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the
power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public
utilities. 16 For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and
there must be just compensation. 17

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on October 31, 1991.
Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court, but the same was dismissed by respondent appellate court on July 15, 1992. 7 The Court of Appeals held that
the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property
could proceed.
Respondent appellate court also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on October 22, 1992.

The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly
provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government Code 18 in force at the time expropriation
proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:
Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its head and acting
pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.

Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject property: the Association of
Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal
Gymnasium, which is made of concrete.
In the instant petition for review filed on November 23, 1992, petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals and a declaration that Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null
and void.
On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and restraining public respondent
Judge Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her July 2, 1991 Order and respondent municipality from using and
occupying all the buildings constructed and from further constructing any building on the land subject of this
petition. 9
Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of Restraining Order and for Contempt, the Court issued a
Resolution on March 15, 1995, citing incumbent municipal mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to
pay the fine and to demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built in violation of the restraining order. 10
Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested that he lost in the May 8, 1995 election. 11 The
incumbent Mayor Leonardo Barrios, filed a Manifestation, Motion to Resolve "Urgent Motion for Immediate
Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order" and Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for the Municipality of
Bunawan. 12

What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right since the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. (1) Within thirty days after receiving copies
of approved ordinances, resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal
mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the
provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who shall examine them
promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of any defect or impropriety
which he may discover therein and make such comments or recommendations as shall
appear to him proper.
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, resolution or
executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it
shall declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part, entering
its actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect
of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or executive order in question in
whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

38

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not
render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of
the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual
milieu then obtaining, the Court's pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, 19 where we cited significant early
jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar.
The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the powers
conferred upon the council or president making the same." Absolutely no other ground is
recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its
consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (board's)
disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact
that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by
law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative function of the municipal
council or president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority. 20
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for
the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang
Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337.
Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition
for the condemnation of petitioners' property.
As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Percival Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor
Anuncio C. Bustillo when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in previous elections. Petitioners
claim that then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if
there were other properties belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that
the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan. 21
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and
due process of law must be
observed. 22 The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of
the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, 23 has ruled that the necessity of exercising
eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. 24 Government may not capriciously choose what
private property should be taken.
After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations.
The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that the municipality does own vacant land
adjacent to petitioners' property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In the questioned decision, respondent
appellate court similarly held that the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any of respondent
municipality's "other available properties available for the same purpose." 25 The accusations of political reprisal are
likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds that petitioners' demand that the
former municipal mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in the case of "Percival Moday." et al. v. Municipality of Bunawan, et al." (CA G.R. SP No. 26712) are
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on December 8, 1993 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, petitioner,
vs.
V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of private
property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly
requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of
the Municipal Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent

39

proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are
complied with.
Statement of the Case
These principles are applied by this Court in resolving this petition for review on certiorari of the July 22, 1996
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA GR CV No. 48048, which affirmed in toto 3 the Regional Trial Court's
August 9, 1994 Resolution. 4 The trial court dismissed the expropriation suit as follows:
The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain is not disputed. However,
such right may be exercised only pursuant to an Ordinance (Sec. 19, R.A No. 7160). In the
instant case, there is no such ordinance passed by the Municipal Council of Paraaque
enabling the Municipality, thru its Chief Executive, to exercise the power of eminent domain.
The complaint, therefore, states no cause of action.
Assuming that plaintiff has a cause of action, the same is barred by a prior judgment. On
September 29, 1987, the plaintiff filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same parcels
of land which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17939 of this Court (page 26, record). Said
case was dismissed with prejudice on May 18, 1988 (page 39, record). The order of dismissal
was not appealed, hence, the same became final. The plaintiff can not be allowed to pursue
the present action without violating the principle of [r]es [j]udicata. While defendant in Civil
Case No. 17939 was Limpan Investment Corporation, the doctrine of res judicata still applies
because the judgment in said case (C.C. No. 17939) is conclusive between the parties and
their successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio vs. Estate of the late Anita de Leon). The herein
defendant is the successor-in-interest of Limpan Investment Corporation as shown by the
"Deed of Assignment Exchange" executed on June 13, 1990.

On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a
counterclaim, 13alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed
pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the
cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondent's motion, its Answer
was treated as a motion to dismiss. 14 On March 24, 1991, 15 petitioner filed its opposition, stressing that the trial
court's Order dated February 4, 1994 was in accord with Section 19 of RA 7160, and that the principle of res
judicata was not applicable.
Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution 16 nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order and dismissing
the case. Petitioner's motions for reconsideration and transfer of venue were denied by the trial court in a
Resolution dated December 2, 1994. 17 Petitioner then appealed to Respondent Court, raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Resolution of the Paraaque Municipal Council No. 93-95, Series of 1993 is a
substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180 [sic] in the exercise of the
power of eminent domain by the plaintiff-appellant.
2. Whether or not the complaint in this case states no cause of action.
3. Whether or not the strict adherence to the literal observance to the rule of procedure resulted in
technicality standing in the way of substantial justice.
4. Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to the present case.

As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court's Decision. Respondent Court, in its
assailed Resolution promulgated on January 8, 1997, 19 denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.

WHEREFORE, defendant's motion for reconsideration is hereby granted. The order dated
February 4, 1994 is vacated and set aside.

Hence, this appeal. 20

This case is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

The Issues

SO ORDERED. 5

Before this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.:

Factual Antecedents

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, 6 the Municipality of Paraaque filed on
September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation 7 against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area of about 10,000 square
meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No.
48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged
by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project." 8 Parenthetically, it was also for this
stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, 9 previously
made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not
accept. 10

1. A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an
ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public
interest is primarily involved. 21
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:

Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, issued an
Order dated January 10, 1994, 11 giving it due course. Acting on petitioner's motion, said court issued an Order
dated February 4, 1994, 12 authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its
clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.

18

Resolution Different from an Ordinance

Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation
case "substantially complies with the requirements of the law" 22 because the terms "ordinance" and "resolution" are
synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to
initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain." 23 Petitioner seeks to

40

bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, which provides. "If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare
through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its
chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings." 24 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may
delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. 25 An LGU may therefore exercise
the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and
restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." 26 In this case, Section 19 of RA
7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It
provides as follows:
Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the
power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of
the property to be expropriated: Provided,finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value
at the time of the taking of the property. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive,
in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to
be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 27
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution
of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through
an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals 28 to show that a resolution may suffice to support
the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. 29 This case, however, is not in point because the applicable law at that
time was BP 337, 30 the previous Local Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution would enable
an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, 31 the present Local Government Code which was
already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A
municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. 32 An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third

reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all
the Sanggunian members.33
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply
adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from
the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." 34 In the instant case, there is no
reason to depart from this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the
people. 35 Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language from "resolution" under BP 337 to
"ordinance" under RA 7160 demands a strict construction. "No species of property is held by individuals with
greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of
an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation." 36
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an
LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely
prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. 37 It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is
controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the
discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI
thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU act pursuant
to an ordinance.
In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy embodied in Section 2, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides that "territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy." It merely upholds the law as worded
in RA 7160. We stress that an LGU is created by law and all its powers and rights are sourced therefrom. It has
therefore no power to amend or act beyond the authority given and the limitations imposed on it by law. Strictly
speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" domain, since it
must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent
domain. 38Indeed, "the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its
will or modify or violate it." 39
Complaint Does Not State a Cause of Action
In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that its Sangguniang Bayan passed an ordinance on
October 11, 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, and ratified all the acts of its mayor
regarding the subject expropriation. 40
This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner merely alleged the existence of such an ordinance, but
it did not present any certified true copy thereof. In the second place, petitioner did not raise this point before this
Court. In fact, it was mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing. 41 In any event, this allegation does not
cure the inherent defect of petitioner's Complaint for expropriation filed on September 23, 1993. It is hornbook
doctrine that
. . . in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, the question submitted before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point,
for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to

41

be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint? 42
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation which was based
on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of action.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's Decision which
dismissed the expropriation suit.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

Second Issue: Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals 43 and the trial court, 44 all the requisites for the application of res
judicataare present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case
involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and
proceedings, 45 cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of
eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and
unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power,
can "reach every form of property which the State might need for public use." 46 "All separate interests of individuals
in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant
to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in
the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of
the property whenever the public interest requires it." 47 Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever
barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply
to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the
ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State
or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its
power of eminent domain over the same property. 48 By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its
delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings,
once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied with. Parenthetically and by
parity of reasoning, the same is also true of the principle of "law of the case." In Republic vs. De Knecht, 49 the Court
ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a
prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State
or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal
requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain,
but also clearly defeat social justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's proper exercise of its power of
eminent domain over subject property. Costs against petitioner.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59050, and its
Resolution dated February 18, 2002, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision affirmed
the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the respondent Municipality (now City)
of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and take possession of the subject property.
The Antecedents
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public
Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located.
The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass
through in case of conflagration.2 Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical
outlets.3 The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. PT-66585,4 which is abutting E. R. Santos Street.
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance5 authorizing the municipal mayor to
initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance
stated that the property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to purchase the property for public use as
an access road but they rejected the offer.

SO ORDERED.
On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching Cuancos for the
expropriation of the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct
an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion. The plaintiff appended to the
complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. 6
The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration
covering the property. On plaintiffs motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be

42

expropriated. On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal
portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated
(JILCSFI) which had purchased the property.7 Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a
width of three meters; the road was called Damayan Street.

For the defendant-intervenor, Normita del Rosario, owner of the property located across the subject property,
testified that there are other roads leading to E. R. Santos Street. She asserted that only about ten houses of the
urban poor are using the new road because the other residents are using an alternative right-of-way. She averred
that she did not actually occupy her property; but there were times that she visited it. 19

In their answer,8 the defendants claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI
as evidenced by a deed of sale9 bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife.

Danilo Caballero averred that he had been a resident of Sto. Tomas Bukid for seven years. From his house, he
could use three streets to go to E. R. Santos Street, namely, Catalina Street, Damayan Street and Bagong Taon
Street. On cross-examination, he admitted that no vehicle could enter Sto. Tomas Bukid except through the newly
constructed Damayan Street.20

When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-in-intervention,
which motion the RTC granted on August 26, 1994. 10
In its answer-in-intervention, JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the plaintiffs
exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It
alleged that the property sought to be expropriated is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to
it. The intervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-defendants for reimbursement in case the subject property is
expropriated.11 In its amended answer, JILCSFI also averred that it has been denied the use and enjoyment of its
property because the road was constructed in the middle portion and that the plaintiff was not the real party-ininterest. The intervenor, likewise, interposed counterclaims against the plaintiff for moral damages and attorneys
fees.12
During trial, Rolando Togonon, the plaintiffs messenger, testified on direct examination that on February 23, 1993,
he served a letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, the Technical Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure, to Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco at his store at No. 18 Alkalde Jose Street, Kapasigan, Pasig. A lady received the same and brought it inside
the store. When she returned the letter to him, it already bore the signature of Luz Bernarte. He identified a
photocopy of the letter as similar to the one he served at the store. On cross-examination, he admitted that he never
met Luz Bernarte. 13
Edgardo del Rosario, a resident of Sto. Tomas Bukid since 1982 declared that he would pass through a wooden
bridge to go to E. R. Santos Street. At times, the bridge would be slippery and many had met accidents while
walking along the bridge. Because of this, they requested Mayor Vicente Eusebio to construct a road therein. He
attested that after the construction of the cemented access road, the residents had water and electricity. 14
Augusto Paz of the City Engineers Office testified that, sometime in 1992, the plaintiff constructed a road
perpendicular from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid; he was the Project Engineer for the said undertaking.
Before the construction of the road, the lot was raw and they had to put filling materials so that vehicles could use it.
According to him, the length of the road which they constructed was 70 meters long and 3 meters wide so that a fire
truck could pass through. He averred that there is no other road through which a fire truck could pass to go to Sto.
Tomas Bukid.15
Manuel Tembrevilla, the Fire Marshall, averred that he had seen the new road, that is, Damayan Street, and found
that a fire truck could pass through it. He estimated the houses in the area to be around 300 to 400. Tembrevilla
also stated that Damayan Street is the only road in the area. 16

Eduardo Villanueva, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and President of JILCSFI, testified that the parcel of land
was purchased for purposes of constructing a school building and a church as worship center. He averred that the
realization of these projects was delayed due to the passing of the ordinance for expropriation. 21
The intervenor adduced documentary evidence that on February 27, 1993, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco and the coowners agreed to sell their property covered by TCT No. PT-66585 for P1,719,000.00.22 It paid a down payment
of P1,000,000.00 for the property. After payment of the total purchase price, the Ching Cuancos executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale23 over the property on December 13, 1993. On December 21, 1993, TCT No. PT-92579 was issued in
the name of JILCSFI.24 It declared the property for taxation purposes under its name. 25
On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the plaintiff, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the Court Resolves to DECLARE the plaintiff as having a lawful right to take the property in question for purposes
for which the same is expropriated.
The plaintiff and intervenor are hereby directed to submit at least two (2) names of their recommended
commissioners for the determination of just compensation within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.26
The RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there was substantial compliance with the
definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most
convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.
Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA on the following assignment of errors:
First Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUS[LY] ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE SUBSTANTIALLY
COMPLIED WITH THE LAW WHEN IT EXPROPRIATED JILS PROPERTY TO BE USED AS A RIGHT OF WAY.

Finally, Bonifacio Maceda, Jr., Tax Mapper IV, testified that, according to their records, JILCSFI became the owner
of the property only on January 13, 1994. 17
The plaintiff offered in evidence a photocopy of the letter of Engr. Jose Reyes addressed to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco
to prove that the plaintiff made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property to the co-owners. However, the RTC
rejected the same letter for being a mere photocopy.18

Second Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING JILS EVIDENCE PROVING THAT THERE WAS NO PUBLIC
NECESSITY TO WARRANT THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.27
The Court of Appeals Decision

43

In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC. 28 The CA agreed with the trial court that
the plaintiff substantially complied with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, particularly the requirement that a valid and
definite offer must be made to the owner. The CA declared that the letter of Engr. Reyes, inviting Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco to a conference to discuss with him the road project and the price of the lot, was a substantial compliance
with the "valid and definite offer" requirement under said Section 19. In addition, the CA noted that there was also
constructive notice to the defendants of the expropriation proceedings since a notice of lis pendens was annotated
at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 on November 26, 1993. 29
Finally, the CA upheld the public necessity for the subject property based on the findings of the trial court that the
portion of the property sought to be expropriated appears to be, not only the most convenient access to the interior
of Sto. Tomas Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area, particularly fire trucks. Moreover, the CA
took into consideration the provision of Article 33 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code, which regards the "construction or extension of roads, streets, sidewalks" as public use, purpose or welfare. 30
On April 6, 2001, JILCSFI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision alleging that the CA erred in relying
on the photocopy of Engr. Reyes letter to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco because the same was not admitted in evidence
by the trial court for being a mere photocopy. It also contended that the CA erred in concluding that constructive
notice of the expropriation proceeding, in the form of annotation of the notice of lis pendens, could be considered as
a substantial compliance with the requirement under Section 19 of the Local Government Code for a valid and
definite offer. JILCSFI also averred that no inspection was ever ordered by the trial court to be conducted on the
property, and, if there was one, it had the right to be present thereat since an inspection is considered to be part of
the trial of the case.31
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It held that it was not precluded from considering the
photocopy32 of the letter, notwithstanding that the same was excluded by the trial court, since the fact of its
existence was duly established by corroborative evidence. This corroborative evidence consisted of the testimony of
the plaintiffs messenger that he personally served the letter to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, and Municipal Ordinance
No. 21 which expressly stated that the property owners were already notified of the expropriation proceeding. The
CA noted that JILCSFI failed to adduce controverting evidence, thus the presumption of regularity was not
overcome.33
The Present Petition
In this petition, petitioner JILCSFI raises the following issues: (1) whether the respondent complied with the
requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property
prior to the filing of the complaint; (2) whether its property which is already intended to be used for public purposes
may still be expropriated by the respondent; and (3) whether the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under
Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with.The petitioner stresses that the law explicitly
requires that a valid and definite offer be made to the owner of the property and that such offer was not accepted. It
argues that, in this case, there was no evidence to show that such offer has been made either to the previous owner
or the petitioner, the present owner. The petitioner contends that the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Reyes, notifying
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco of the respondents intention to construct a road on its property, cannot be considered
because the trial court did not admit it in evidence. And assuming that such letter is admissible in evidence, it would
not prove that the offer has been made to the previous owner because mere notice of intent to purchase is not
equivalent to an offer to purchase. The petitioner further argues that the offer should be made to the proper party,
that is, to the owner of the property. It noted that the records in this case show that as of February 1993, it was
already the owner of the property. Assuming, therefore, that there was an offer to purchase the property, the same
should have been addressed to the petitioner, as present owner.34 The petitioner maintains that the power of
eminent domain must be strictly construed since its exercise is necessarily in derogation of the right to property
ownership. All the requirements of the enabling law must, therefore, be strictly complied with. Compliance with such
requirements cannot be presumed but must be proved by the local government exercising the power. The petitioner
adds that the local government should, likewise, comply with the requirements for an easement of right-of-way;
hence, the road must be established at a point least prejudicial to the owner of the property. Finally, the petitioner

argues that, if the property is already devoted to or intended to be devoted to another public use, its expropriation
should not be allowed.35
For its part, the respondent avers that the CA already squarely resolved the issues raised in this petition, and the
petitioner failed to show valid and compelling reason to reverse the CAs findings. Moreover, it is not the function of
the Supreme Court to weigh the evidence on factual issues all over again. 36 The respondent contends that the
Ching Cuancos were deemed to have admitted that an offer to purchase has been made and that they refused to
accept such offer considering their failure to specifically deny such allegation in the complaint. In light of such
admission, the exclusion of the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Reyes, therefore, is no longer significant. 37
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by the
Supreme Court in petitions for review on certiorari.38 Findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are
final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. 39Nonetheless, where it is shown that the conclusion is a
finding grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures or where the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts, the Supreme Court may reexamine the evidence on record. 40
Eminent Domain: Nature and Scope
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any
property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The nature and scope of such power has been
comprehensively described as follows:
It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the
common need and advance the general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every independent
government without the necessity for constitutional recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions of
civilized countries relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the
government, but limit the power which would, otherwise, be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides that
"[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." Furthermore, the due process and
equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power. 41
Strict Construction and Burden of Proof
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily
in derogation of private rights.42 It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the
sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency
asserting the power.43 The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the
condemnor.44 When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or
clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained. 45
Corollarily, the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show
the right of condemnation.46 It has the burden of proof to establish that it has complied with all the requirements
provided by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local government units is grounded on Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160
which reads:

44

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer
has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount
to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court based on the fair market value at
the time of the taking of the property.
The Court declared that the following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local
government unit must be complied with:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and
the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other
pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but
said offer was not accepted.47
Valid and Definite Offer
Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code provides:
ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale. (a) The offer to buy private property for public use or purpose
shall be in writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for its acquisition, and the price
offered.

(3) Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds together with a statement that such fund shall not be
disbursed or spent for any purpose other than to pay for the purchase of the property involved.
The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the
property before filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter.48 It is incumbent upon the condemnor to
exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. 49 Failure to prove compliance with the
mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint. 50
An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. 51 It creates a
power of acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the offerors promise into a
contractual obligation.52 Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of
contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. 53 An offer would require,
among other things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract. 54
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage
settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and
delay of a court action.55 The law is designed to give to the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the
expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation. This is a substantial right which should be
protected in every instance.56 It encourages acquisition without litigation and spares not only the landowner but also
the condemnor, the expenses and delays of litigation. It permits the landowner to receive full compensation, and the
entity acquiring the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the property. A reasonable offer in good faith, not
merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or
his privy.57 A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice.
The expropriating authority is burdened to make known its definite and valid offer to all the owners of the property.
However, it has a right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title covering the land to be expropriated. Hence,
it is required to make its offer only to the registered owners of the property. After all, it is well-settled that persons
dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on its
face.58
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and
valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the respondent
to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly
bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. The letter reads:
MR. LORENZO CHING CUANCO

(b) If the owner or owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of sale shall be executed and payment forthwith
made.
(c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price higher than that offered to them, the local
chief executive shall call them to a conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the selling price. The
chairman of the appropriation or finance committee of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any member of
thesanggunian duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in the conference. When an agreement is
reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall be drawn and executed.

18 Alcalde Jose Street

Capasigan, Pasig
Metro Manila
Dear Mr. Cuanco:

(d) The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents:

(1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive to enter into a contract of sale. The resolution
shall specify the terms and conditions to be embodied in the contract;

This refers to your parcel of land located along E. Santos Street, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig, Metro Manila embraced
in and covered by TCT No. 66585, a portion of which with an area of fifty-one (51) square meters is needed by the
Municipal Government of Pasig for conversion into a road-right of way for the benefit of several residents living in
the vicinity of your property. Attached herewith is the sketch plan for your information.

(2) Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract; and

45

In this connection, may we respectfully request your presence in our office to discuss this project and the price that
may be mutually agreed upon by you and the Municipality of Pasig.

COURT:
Proceed.

Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
Very truly yours,
BY ATTY. JOLO:
(Sgd.)
Q Mr. Witness, do you know Mr. Lorenzo Ching [Cuanco]
ENGR. JOSE L. REYES
A I do not know him.
Technical Asst. to the Mayor on Infrastructure59
Q As a matter of fact, you have not seen him even once, isnt not (sic)?
It bears stressing, however, that the respondent offered the letter only to prove its desire or intent to acquire the
property for a right-of-way.60 The document was not offered to prove that the respondent made a definite and valid
offer to acquire the property. Moreover, the RTC rejected the document because the respondent failed to adduce in
evidence the original copy thereof.61 The respondent, likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter
were sent to and received by all the co-owners of the property, namely, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching
Cuanco and Ernesto Kho.

A Yes, Sir.
Q This Luz Bernarte, do you know her?
A I do not know her.

The respondent sought to prove, through the testimony of its messenger, Rolando Togonon, that Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco received the original of the said letter. But Togonon testified that he merely gave the letter to a lady, whom
he failed to identify. He stated that the lady went inside the store of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, and later gave the letter
back to him bearing the signature purportedly of one Luz Bernarte. However, Togonon admitted, on crossexamination, that he did not see Bernarte affixing her signature on the letter. Togonon also declared that he did not
know and had never met Lorenzo Ching Cuanco and Bernarte:

Q As a matter of fact, you did not see Mrs. Bernarte even once?
A That is correct.

Q And after you received this letter from that lady, what did you do afterwards?

Q And as a matter of fact, [M]r. Witness, you did not see Mrs. Luz Bernarte affixing her signature on the bottom
portion of this demand letter, marked as Exh. "C-2"?

A I brought it with me, that letter, and then I went to Caruncho.

A Yes, Sir.62

Q So, [M]r. Witness, you are telling this Honorable Court that this letter intended to Mr. Lorenzo was served at Pasig
Trading which was situated at No. 18 Alkalde Jose Street on February 23, 1993?

Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a
specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.

A Yes, Maam.
ATTY. TAN:
That is all for the witness, Your Honor.
COURT:
Do you have any cross-examination?
ATTY. JOLO:
Just a few cross, Your Honor, please. With the kind permission of the Honorable Court.

There is no legal and factual basis to the CAs ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal
portion of petitioners TCT No. PT-92579 is a substantial compliance with the requisite offer. A notice of lis
pendens is a notice to the whole world of the pendency of an action involving the title to or possession of real
property and a warning that those who acquire an interest in the property do so at their own risk and that they
gamble on the result of the litigation over it. 63 Moreover, the lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the
title only on November 26, 1993, long after the complaint had been filed in the RTC against the Ching Cuancos.
Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the ordinance that "the property owners were already
notified by the municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road," a substantial
compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Presumably,
theSangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous premise that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached the co-owners of the
property. In the absence of competent evidence that, indeed, the respondent made a definite and valid offer to all
the co-owners of the property, aside from the letter of Engr. Reyes, the declaration in the ordinance is not a
compliance with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.

46

The respondent contends, however, that the Ching Cuancos, impliedly admitted the allegation in its complaint that
an offer to purchase the property was made to them and that they refused to accept the offer by their failure to
specifically deny such allegation in their answer. This contention is wrong. As gleaned from their answer to the
complaint, the Ching Cuancos specifically denied such allegation for want of sufficient knowledge to form a belief as
to its correctness. Under Section 10,64 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, such form of denial, although not specific, is
sufficient.

The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to
comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. Case law has it that
in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and
route of the land to be taken66 unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. 67Expropriation is
justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. 68Government may not
capriciously choose what private property should be taken. 69

Public Necessity

The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas
Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways
through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except
through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine
necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and
practical necessity will suffice.70

We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be expropriated by the respondent because
it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its members. As aptly explained by
this Court in Manosca v. Court of Appeals,65 thus:
It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad Co., that:
A historical research discloses the meaning of the term "public use" to be one of constant growth. As society
advances, its demands upon the individual increases and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the
individual may be devoted. for "whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use."

Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioners
property and not elsewhere.71 We note that the whereas clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot
is the shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R. Santos Street. The respondents
complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioners lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress
and egress. However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims.

Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:

On this point, the trial court made the following findings:

The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of
streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two
cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and
other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use.

The contention of the defendants that there is an existing alley that can serve the purpose of the expropriator is
not accurate. An inspection of the vicinity reveals that the alley being referred to by the defendants actually passes
thru Bagong Taon St. but only about one-half (1/2) of its entire length is passable by vehicle and the other half is
merely a foot-path. It would be more inconvenient to widen the alley considering that its sides are occupied by
permanent structures and its length from the municipal road to the area sought to be served by the expropriation is
considerably longer than the proposed access road. The area to be served by the access road is composed of
compact wooden houses and literally a slum area. As a result of the expropriation of the 51-square meter portion of
the property of the intervenor, a 3-meter wide road open to the public is created. This portion of the property of the
intervenor is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid since it is not only a short cut to the
interior of the Sto. Tomas Bukid but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area, not to mention the 3-meter
wide road requirement of the Fire Code.72

Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, has viewed the
Constitution a dynamic instrument and one that "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically so as to enable it to
meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself,
has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as
"public welfare."
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalos) birthplace
become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case
deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual
consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially
to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be
derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage
still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the
expropriation of property, does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the establishment of an easement
of right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point least prejudicial to the servient state, and
that there must be no adequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner asserts that the portion of the lot sought to
be expropriated is located at the middle portion of the petitioners entire parcel of land, thereby splitting the lot into
two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and worship center.

However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was
conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the
trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. It
bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are
entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. 73 Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified
of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no
probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be
rejected.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without
prejudice to the refiling thereof. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

47

G.R. No. 110478

October 15, 2007

FERMIN MANAPAT, 1 Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 116176
DOMINGO LIM, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Respondents.

decided to effect, on its own, the subdivision of the property and the sale of the individual subdivided lots to the
public.6 Petitioners Manapat and Lim and respondents Loberanes, Quimque, Vega, Santos, Oracion and Mercado
in these consolidated cases were among those who purchased individual subdivided lots of Grace Park directly
from RCAM and/or PRC.7
A significant turn of events however happened in 1977 when the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1072,8 appropriating P1.2M out of the Presidents Special Operations Funds to cover
the additional amount needed for the expropriation of Grace Park. The National Housing Authority (NHA), PHHCs
successor, then filed several expropriation proceedings over the already subdivided lots for the purpose of
developing Grace Park under the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) and subdividing it into small lots for distribution
and resale at a low cost to the residents of the area. 9 The following cases were filed by the NHA with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City: C-6225, C-6226, C-6227, C-6228, C-6229, C-6230, C-6231, C-6232, C-6233,
C-6234, C-6235, C-6236, C-6237, C-6238, C-6255 and C-6435. 10
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered separate decisions dismissing the expropriation cases, with the
exceptions of Cases Nos. C-6233 and C-6236 in which it ordered the condemnation of the involved lots. 11 On
motion for reconsideration by the NHA in Cases Nos. C-6227, C-6228, C-6230, C-6234, C-6235, C-6238 and C6255, the trial court later amended its decision, set aside its dismissal of the said cases, ordered the condemnation
of the involved lots and fixed the amount of just compensation at P180.00 per square meter. In Cases Nos. C-6225,
C-6229, C-6231, C-6232, C-6237 and C-6435, the RTC however denied NHAs motion for reconsideration. 12

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 116491-503
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
MAXIMO LOBERANES, ELADIO QUIMQUE, CESARIO VEGA, JUANITO SANTOS, ALEJANDRO ORACION
and GONZALO MERCADO, Respondents.
DECISION

NHA eventually appealed to the CA the decisions in Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C-6231, C-6232, C-6237 and C6435 on the issue of the necessity of the taking, and the amended ruling in Cases Nos. C-6227, C-6228, C-6230, C6234, C-6235, C-6238 and C-6255 on the issue of just compensation. 13 The CA consolidated the appeals and
docketed them as CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212. NHA likewise filed with the CA an appeal from the decision in C6226, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 27159.
On May 27, 1993, the appellate court rendered its Decision 14 in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212 disposing of the
appealed cases as follows:

NACHURA, J.:
For the resolution of the Court are three consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. G.R. No. 110478 assails the May 27, 1993 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV Nos.
10200-10212. G.R. No. 116176 questions the June 28, 1994 Decision 3 of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No.
27159. G.R. Nos. 116491-503 assails the March 2, 1994 and the July 25, 1994 Resolutions 4 of the CA also in CAG.R. CV Nos. 10200-10212.
The three-decade saga of the parties herein has for its subject parcels of land forming part of what was originally
known as the Grace Park Subdivision in Caloocan City and formerly owned by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila (RCAM) and/or the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The Facts
Sometime in the 1960s, RCAM allowed a number of individuals to occupy the Grace Park property on condition that
they would vacate the premises should the former push through with the plan to construct a school in the area. The
plan, however, did not materialize, thus, the occupants offered to purchase the portions they occupied. Later, as
they could not afford RCAMs proposed price, the occupants, organizing themselves as exclusive members of the
Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. Tenants Association, Inc., petitioned the Government for the acquisition of the said property,
its subdivision into home lots, and the resale of the subdivided lots to them at a low price. 5
Acting on the associations petition, the Government, in 1963, through the Land Tenure Administration (LTA), later
succeeded by the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), negotiated for the acquisition of the
property from RCAM/PRC. But because of the high asking price of RCAM and the budgetary constraints of the
Government, the latters effort to purchase and/or to expropriate the property was discontinued. RCAM then

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Reversing and setting aside the decisions of dismissal in Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C-6231, C6232, C-6237 and C-6435; and in lieu thereof an order of condemnation is entered declaring that plaintiffappellant NHA has a lawful right to take the lots involved for the public use described in the complaints;
2) Affirming the decisions in Case Nos. C-6227, C-6228, C-6234, C-6235, C-6238 and C-6255 insofar as
said decision granted the expropriation; declaring that plaintiff-appellant NHA has a lawful right to take
the lots involved for the public use stated in the complaint; but annulling and setting aside the just
compensation fixed by the trial court at P180.00 per square meter in the said cases;
3) Ordering the remand of all the appealed cases, except for Case No. C-6230, to the trial court for
determination of the just compensation to which defendants are entitled in accordance with Rule 67 of
the Revised Rules of Court;
4) Finding the compromise agreement in Case No. C-6230, entitled, "NHA v. Aurora Dy dela Costa, et
al." in accordance with law, and not contrary to morals or public policy, and rendering judgment in
accordance therewith;
5) Ordering Remedios Macato to be joined as defendant with Julia C. Diaz in Case No. C-6227.

48

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
Rosemarie and Dolores Guanzon, two of the owners of the lots in C-6225, filed before this Court a petition for
review on certiorari of the aforesaid decision of the appellate court [Their petition was docketed as G.R. Nos.
110462-74]. On September 5, 1994, we dismissed their petition for failure to sufficiently show that the CA had
committed any reversible error in the challenged decision. 16 An Entry of Judgment was issued on February 2,
1995.17
Likewise, Julia Diez and Remedios Macato, the owners of the lots in C-6227, assailed before us the afore-quoted
CA decision through a petition under Rule 45. On July 28, 1993, however, in G.R. No. 110770, we denied their
Motion for Extension of Time to file a petition for review on certiorari for their failure to submit an affidavit of service
of the motion as required by
Circular No. 19-91.18 After denying their motion for reconsideration, 19 we issued an Entry of Judgment on August 27,
1993.20

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration of defendant-appellant Vivencio S. de Guzman of the decision
promulgated May 27, 1993 and of plaintiff-appellant National Housing Authority of the resolution promulgated March
2, 1994 are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.28
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, NHA filed with this Court a Consolidated Petition for Review 29under
Rule 45, as aforesaid, assailing the March 2, 1994 and the July 25, 1994 Resolutions of the appellate court. NHAs
petition was docketed as G.R. Nos. 116491-503 against respondents Loberanes and Quimque (in C-6231), Vega,
Santos, Oracion and Mercado (in C-6435).
In a separate development, the CA, on June 28, 1994, rendered its Decision 30 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27159, reversing
the RTCs ruling in C-6226. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision dated October 29, 1986 is hereby
REVERSED for want of merit. Let the record of this case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.31

Petitioner Manapat, the defendant-landowner in C-6229, also elevated the case before us via a petition for review
on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 110478.21 We initially dismissed this petition for having been filed out of
time,22 but we reinstated it on motion for reconsideration. 23
In the meantime, the other defendants-landowners in the expropriation casesRCAM/PRC in C-6225, Maximo
Loberanes and Eladio Quimque in C-6231, Alejandro Oracion, Gonzalo Mercado, Cesario Vega and Juanito Santos
in C-6435, and Remedios Macato in C-6227moved for the reconsideration of the said May 27, 1993 Decision of
the CA.24 In the March 2, 1994 Resolution,25 the appellate court resolved the motions in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration of movants Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila and Philippine Realty Corporation (in Special Civil Action No. 6225) and movant-intervenor Remedios
Macato (in Special Civil Action No. 6227) are DENIED.
The motions for reconsideration of movants Gonzalo Mercado, Cesario Vega and Juanito Santos (in Special Civil
Action No. 6435) and movants Maximo Loberanes and Eladio Quimque (in Special Civil Action No. 6231) are
GRANTED. The motion for reconsideration of movant Alejandro Oracion (in Special Civil Action No. 6435) is
partially granted to the extent of Three Hundred (300) square meters of Lot 22, Block 157. The decision of this Court
promulgated May 27, 1993 is accordingly MODIFIED. Lot No. 26, Block No. 157 owned by Cesario Vega and
Juanito Santos, and Lot No. 4, Block No. 157 owned by Maximo Loberanes and Eladio Quimque are declared
exempt from expropriation and the corresponding complaints for expropriation (sic) DISMISSED insofar as said lots
are concerned. Lot No. 22, Block No. 157 owned by movant Alejandro Oracion is declared exempt from
expropriation to the extent of Three Hundred (300) square meters. Only the remaining Ninety (90) square meters
shall be the subject of expropriation, the portion to be determined by the lower court in the manner most beneficial
to the owner and consistent with the objective of PD 1072.
SO ORDERED.26
Aggrieved by the said March 2, 1994 CA Resolution specifically with regard to the exemption from expropriation of
the lots of Loberanes, Quimque, Mercado, Vega and Santos, and the partial exemption of the lot of Oracion, NHA
moved for the reconsideration of the same. In the subsequent July 25, 1994 Resolution, 27 the appellate court denied
NHAs motion, together with the belated motion of Vivencio S. de Guzman, the defendant-landowner in C-6255. The
dispositive portion of the July 25, 1994 Resolution reads:

Discontented with the appellate courts ruling, petitioner Domingo Lim, one of the owners of the lots subject of C6226, elevated the case to us via a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 116176. 32
The Issues
Thus, for resolution by this Court are the following consolidated cases: (1) G.R. No. 110478 of Manapat; (2) G.R.
Nos. 116491-503 of the NHA; and (3) G.R. No. 116176 of Lim.
In G.R. No. 110487, petitioner Manapat argues in the main that, as he is also a member of the tenant association,
the beneficiary of the expropriation, it would be incongruous to take the land away from him only to give it back to
him as an intended beneficiary. Accordingly, the CA, in its May 27, 1993 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212,
should not have allowed the expropriation of his lot. To further support his stance, Manapat raises the following
grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ISSUANCE MADE IN THE EXERCISE OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER, SPECIFYING THE LOTS TO BE EXPROPRIATED AND THE PURPOSE FOR
WHICH THEY ARE INTENDED, REMOVES FROM THE JUDICIARY THE DETERMINATION OF THE
NECESSITY OF THE TAKING, THERE BEING NO SHOWING OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 33
II
SUPERVENING EVENT RENDERS IMPROPER THE DISPOSITION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR AN ORDER OF CONDEMNATION DECLARING THAT NHA HAS A LAWFUL RIGHT TO TAKE THE
LOT OF FERMIN MANAPAT FOR SUPPOSED PUBLIC USE AND FOR REMAND OF HIS CASE TO
THE TRIAL COURT FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION. 34
III

49

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT FERMIN MANAPAT IS NOT ONLY A
BONA FIDE OCCUPANT IN THE GRACE PARK SUBDIVISION FOR PURPOSES OF P.D. 1072 BUT
LIKEWISE HAS A TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 42370 OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS
FOR THE CITY OF CALOOCAN OVER THE SAME LOT SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED WHICH
SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK AS DISPOSED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS.35
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THAT THE EVENTUAL BENEFICIARIES
OF ITS BENEVOLENT EXPROPRIATION ARE SQUATTERS.36
NHA, in its petition in G.R. Nos. 116491-503, primarily contends that the CA erred when it issued its March 2, 1994
Resolution and modified the May 27, 1993 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212 to the extent that it applied
retroactively Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, thus exempting from expropriation the 300-sq m
lots of respondents Loberanes, Quimque, Vega, Santos, Oracion and Mercado. NHA summarized its arguments as
follows:
I
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in applying retroactively Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7279 to the
subject expropriation cases instituted back in 1977 by petitioner-appellant NHA. 37
A. Republic Act 7279 passed in 1992 should operate prospectively and, therefore, should not be given
retroactive effect.38
Republic Act 7279 is a substantive and penal law with a penalty clause which cannot apply retroactively
especially to pending actions.39

There really was no genuine necessity for the expropriation of the lots in question to satisfy the purpose
thereof as alleged in the complaint therefor.45
3
Respondent Court did not sustain the clear finding of the trial court that no evidence sufficient to prove its
claim that the expropriation of said lots and subdividing them again into much smaller lots for resale to
their present occupants would provide the latter with more healthful, decent and peaceful surroundings
and thus improve the quality of their lives was ever presented by respondent NHA. 46
Stripped of non-essentials, the petitions raise only one fundamental issue, and that is, whether the NHA may validly
expropriate the parcels of land subject of these cases.
The Courts Ruling
The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State. Also called the power of
expropriation, it is described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may
be acquired for some public purpose through a method "in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State." 47By virtue
of its sovereign character, the exercise of the power prevails over the non-impairment clause, 48 and is clearly
superior to the final and executory judgment rendered by a court in an ejectment case. 49
Being inherent, the power need not be specifically conferred on the government by the Constitution. Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, which mandates that "private property shall not be taken for a public use without just
compensation," merely imposes a limit on the governments exercise of the power and provides a measure of
protection to the individuals right to property.50
Just like its two companion fundamental powers of the State, 51 the power of eminent domain is exercised by the
Legislature. However, it may be delegated by Congress to the President, administrative bodies, local government
units, and even to private enterprises performing public services. 52

B. Republic Act No. 7279 and PD 1072 are not in pari materia. 40
The retroactive application of Article VI, Section 10 of RA 7279 will affect vested rights of petitioner-appellant NHA
arising from its exercise of the power of eminent domain. 41
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the impractical consequences resulting from a selective
expropriation of lots.42
In G.R. No. 116176, petitioner Lim, a non-member of the tenant association who bought from RCAM/PRC four lots
of the subdivided Grace Park Subdivision,43 argues as follows:
1
Respondent NHA may not, as it would herein, legally re-group several smaller lots into which a much
bigger lot had previously been subdivided, and consider and treat them as one again for the purpose of
subdividing it once more into still smaller lots for distribution to its supposed or intended beneficiaries. 44
2

Albeit the power partakes of a sovereign character, it is by no means absolute. Its exercise is subject to limitations,
one of which is, precisely, Section 9, Article III of the Constitution.
Over the years and in a plethora of cases, this Court has recognized the following requisites for the valid exercise of
the power of eminent domain: (1) the property taken must be private property; (2) there must be genuine necessity
to take the private property; (3) the taking must be for public use; (4) there must be payment of just compensation;
and (5) the taking must comply with due process of law.53 Accordingly, the question that this Court must resolve is
whether these requisites have been adequately addressed.
It is incontrovertible that the parcels of land subject of these consolidated petitions are private property. Thus, the
first requisite is satisfied.
With respect to the second, it is well to recall that in Lagcao v. Judge Labra, 54 we declared that the foundation of the
right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. As a rule,
the determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiciable question. 55 However, when
the power is exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is essentially a political question. 56Thus, in City
of Manila v. Chinese Community,57 we held:
The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity
for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of
the improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the

50

public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and
the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to
determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for those of the
representatives of the people.
In the instant cases, the authority to expropriate came from Presidential Decree No. 1072, issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1977. At that time, and as explicitly recognized under the 1973 Constitution, President
Marcos had legislative powers. Perforce, the expropriation of the subject properties identified with specificity in the
P.D. --- was directed by legislation. The issue of necessity then assumed the nature of a political question.
As to the third requisite of "public use," we examine the purpose for which the expropriation was undertaken by
NHA. As set forth in its petition, NHA justifies the taking of the subject property for the purpose of improving and
upgrading the area by constructing roads and installing facilities thereon under the Governments zonal
improvement program and subdividing them into much smaller lots for distribution and sale at a low cost to qualified
beneficiaries, mostly underprivileged long-time occupants of Grace Park. Around 510 families with approximately 5
members each will be benefited by the project. 58 The only remaining obstacle in the completion of this project is the
lots subject of these consolidated petitions as the other lots in Grace Park have already been expropriated. 59
The Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP), being implemented for government by NHA, draws breath from policy
mandates found in the 1987 Constitution.60 It is an integral part of the governments "socialized housing" program
which, in Sumulong v. Guerrero,61 we deemed compliant with the "public use" requirement, it being a program
clearly devoted to a "public purpose." Justice Irene R. Cortes, speaking eloquently for the Court, said:
"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our
society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities" (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par.
1). This definition was later expanded to include among others:
a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the middle and lower income groups of the
society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities;
b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers as well as the provision of
related facilities and services;
c) Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating homelots to the dwellers in the area or
property involved, rearrangement and re-alignment of existing houses and other dwelling structures and
the construction and provision of basic community facilities and services, where there are none, such as
roads, footpaths, drainage, sewerage, water and power system, schools, barangay centers, community
centers, clinics, open spaces, parks, playgrounds and other recreational facilities;
d) The provision of economic opportunities, including the development of commercial and industrial
estates and such other facilities to enhance the total community growth; and
e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective to provide and maintain housing for the
greatest number of people under Presidential Decree No. 757. (Pres. Decree No. 1259, sec. 1)
xxxx
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public
purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the
Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to establish, maintain and ensure adequate
social services including housing [Art. II, sec. 7]. The 1987 Constitution goes even further by providing that:

The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the
nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all. [Art. II, sec. 9]
The state shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing
program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic
services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote
adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect
the rights of small property owners. (Art. XIII, sec. 9, Emphasis supplied)
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly
affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing
measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who
satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who
need it, all at once.
Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the mushrooming of crowded makeshift dwellings is a
worldwide development particularly in developing countries. So basic and urgent are housing problems that the
United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the "International Year of Shelter for the Homeless" "to focus
the attention of the international community on those problems". The General Assembly is "[s]eriously concerned
that, despite the efforts of Governments at the national and local levels and of international organizations, the living
conditions of the majority of the people in slums and squatter areas and rural settlements, especially in developing
countries, continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute terms." [G.A. Res. 37/221, Yearbook of the United
Nations 1982, Vol. 36, p. 1043-4]
In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" falls within the confines of "public use". It
is, particularly important to draw attention to paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224 which should be construed in
relation with the preceding three paragraphs. Provisions on economic opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost
housing, or slum clearance, relocation and resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the
project.62
It need only be added, at this juncture, that the "public use" requisite for the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. At present, it may not be amiss to state
that whatever is beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. 63
Still, petitioner Manapat insists that, being himself a beneficiary of the expropriation (because he has been a longtime resident of Grace Park), it would be incongruous for government to take his land away from him only to give it
back to him. This contention sadly fails to comprehend the public purpose for the taking under the "socialized
housing" program. The parcels of land subject of the expropriation are, precisely, being taken so that they can be
subdivided into much smaller lots --- at an average of 66.5 square meters per lot 64 --- for distribution to deserving
dwellers in the area. Upon the completion of the project, Manapat, and those similarly situated as he, cannot assert
any right to be awarded the very same lots they currently occupy, nor be entitled to the same area of the land they
now have.
Then, we have petitioner Lim and respondents Vega, Santos, Oracion, and Mercado, who argue that the lots they
own should not be expropriated are already titled in their names and are very small in area, being already the
subdivided portions of the original Grace Park Subdivision.
We are not persuaded.
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration 65 is instructive. In that case, this Court adopted the
dissenting opinion of Justice J. B. L. Reyes in Republic v. Baylosis, 66 that the propriety of exercising the power of

51

eminent domain cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis, given that the Constitution speaks of
lands, not of landed estates. Speaking through Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique M. Fernando, the Court said:
This is not to say of course that property rights are disregarded. This is merely to emphasize that the philosophy of
our Constitution embodying as it does what Justice Laurel referred to as its "nationalistic and socialist traits
discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of [its] provisions" although not extending as far as the
"destruction or annihilation" of the rights to property, negates the postulate which at one time reigned supreme in
American constitutional law as to their well-nigh inviolable character. This is not so under our Constitution, which
rejects the doctrine of laissez faire with its abhorrence for the least interference with the autonomy supposed to be
enjoyed by the property owner. Laissez faire, as Justice Malcolm pointed out as far back as 1919, did not take too
firm a foothold in our jurisprudence. Our Constitution is much more explicit. There is no room for it for laissez faire.
So Justice Laurel affirmed not only in the above opinion but in another concurring opinion quoted with approval in at
least two of our subsequent decisions. We had occasion to reiterate such a view in the ACCFA case, decided barely
two months ago.
This particular grant of authority to Congress authorizing the expropriation of land is a clear manifestation of such a
policy that finds expression in our fundamental law. So is the social justice principle enshrined in the Constitution of
which it is an expression, as so clearly pointed out in the respective dissenting opinions of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and
Chief Justice Paras in the Baylosis case. Why it should be thus is so plausibly set forth in the ACCFA decision, the
opinion being penned by Justice Makalintal. We quote: "The growing complexities of modern society, however, have
rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The
areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter
optionally, and only because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual
or group of individuals, continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the
government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times.
Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces.
Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its
declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice."

The Court is not unaware of the condition now imposed by R.A. No. 7279 71 that, for purposes of urban development
and housing under the Act, where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall
be exempted.72 "Small property owners" are owners of residential lands with an area not exceeding 300 sq m in
highly urbanized cities and 800 sq m in other urban areas and who do not own any other real property.73 Invoking
this limitation under the said law, the appellate court in the questioned rulings exempted from expropriation the lots
owned by Loberanes, Quimque, Mercado, Vega and Santos, and partially exempted the lot of Oracion.1wphi1
The CAs ruling on this point is incorrect. R.A. No. 7279 was enacted in 1992, almost two decades after the
expropriation cases against the property owners herein were instituted with the RTC in 1977. Nova constitutio
futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis. A new statute should affect the future, not the past. The law looks
forward, not backward.74 Article 4 of the Civil Code even explicitly declares, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided."75 In these consolidated cases, the Court finds that the language of R.A. No. 7279
does not suggest that the Legislature has intended its provisions to have any retroactive application. On the
contrary, Section 49 of the said law indicates that it "shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation."76 The laws prospective application being clearly stated, the Court cannot agree
with the disposition of the appellate court that the subject lots not exceeding 300 sq m are exempt from
expropriation.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the May 27, 1993 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
10200-10212 and the June 28, 1994 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 27159 are AFFIRMED; and the March 2, 1994
and the July 25, 1994 Resolutions in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 10200-10212 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

In a more recent decision,67 we had occasion to declare that the fact that the property is less than -hectare and
that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation does not diminish its public use character, inasmuch as
"public use" now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban
land reform and housing.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

The Courts departure from the land size or area test finds further affirmation in its rulings in Mataas na Lupa
Tenants Association, Inc. v. Dimayuga68 and the aforecited Sumulong v. Guerrero.69
Given this discussion, it is clear that "public use," as a requisite for the exercise of eminent domain in the instant
cases, has been adequately fulfilled.
To satisfy the fourth requisite, we affirm the appellate courts disposition that the subject cases be remanded to the
trial court for the determination of the amount of just compensation. Under case law, the said determination is a
judicial prerogative.70 As to the observance of the fifth requisite, the due process clause, in the expropriation
proceedings, all the parties have been given their day in court. That they are now before this Court is attestation
enough that they were not denied due process of law.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it is unmistakable that all the requirements for the valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain have been complied with. Thus, our answer to the singular and fundamental issue in these
consolidated cases is: YES, the NHA may validly expropriate the subject parcels of land.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21064 June 30, 1970

J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and THE AUDITOR
GENERAL, respondents-appellants.
Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for petitioner-appellee.

One final matter: the propriety of the application by the CA of R.A. No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992.

52

Besa, Aguilar and Gancia, Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C.
Zaballero, Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon and Special Attorney Magno B. Pablo for respondents-appellants.
RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:
From our decision of February 18, 1970, reversing the judgment of the lower court holding that Republic Act No.
2616 as amended is unconstitutional, printed motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner-appellee on March
31, 1970 reiterating its arguments as to its alleged invalidity for being violative of the due process and equal
protection guarantees. On May 27, 1970, a detailed opposition to such a motion for reconsideration was filed by the
Solicitor General, the Honorable Felix Q. Antonio, on behalf of respondents-appellants. Then came a rejoinder of
petitioner, on June 15, 1970, to the pleading of the Solicitor General. The motion for reconsideration is thus ripe for
determination. With due recognition of the vigor and earnestness with which petitioner argued its motion, based on
what it considered to be our applicable decisions, the Court cannot grant the same. Our decision stands.
1. It was a unanimous Court that could not locate a constitutional infirmity vitiating Republic Act No. 2616 directing
the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. There are points of differences in the three written opinions,
but there is none as to the challenged legislative act being invulnerable on the grounds therein asserted to justify its
sought for nullification. While, to repeat, petitioner apparently remains unconvinced, standing fast on the contentions
to which it would seek to impart greater plausibility, still the intent of the framers of the Constitutional Convention, as
shown not only by the specific provisions allowing the expropriation of landed estates, but also by the social justice
provision as reflected in our decisions, save possibly Republic vs. Baylosis, 1 preclude a favorable action on the
impassioned plea of petitioner for a reconsideration of our decision. At any rate, petitioner-appellee can take comfort
in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, with which four other members of the Court, including the Chief
Justice, are in agreement, to enable it to raise questions, the answers to which, if its view would be sustained,
would certainly afford sufficient protection to what it believes to be an unconstitutional infringement on its property
rights.
2. It may not be amiss to make more explicit and categorical what was held in our opinion that Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 2616 prohibiting a suit for ejectment proceedings or the continuance of one already commenced even in the
absence of expropriation proceedings, is unconstitutional, as held in Cuatico v. Court of Appeals. 2 Greater
emphasis likewise should be laid on our holding that while an inaccuracy apparent on the face of the challenged
statute as to the ownership of the Tatalon Estate does not suffice to call for its invalidity, still to erase even a fanciful
doubt on the matter, the statement therein found in Section 1 of the Act that in addition to petitioner-appellee,
Gregorio Araneta & Co., Inc. and Florencio Deudor, et al. are included, cannot be understood as conferring on any
juridical or natural persons, clearly not entitled thereto, dominical rights over such property in question.

Then came this portion of the opinion: "This is not the first time that this Court has been called upon to pass upon
the validity of a provision which places a landowner in the situation of losing his dominical rights over the property
without due process or compensation. We refer to the provisions of Republic Act 2616 before they were amended
by Republic Act No. 3453. Note that, as originally provided, Republic Act No. 2616 prohibited the institution of an
ejectment proceeding against any occupant of any lot in the Tatalon Estate or the continuance of one that
has already been commenced after the expropriation proceedings shall have been initiated and during the
pendency of the same. On the surface this provision would appear to be valid if the same is carried out in the light
of the provisions of our Constitution relative to cases of eminent domain, for in that case the rights of the owner of
the property to be expropriated are protected. But then an attempt came to circumvent that provision in an effort to
safeguard or protect the interest of some occupants of the land, which reached this Court for adjudication, as when
some occupants attempted to block their ejectment upon the plea that the government would soon start
expropriation proceedings even if no sufficient funds were appropriated to provide compensation to the owner and
even if it was not in a position to take possession of the estate, and so the owner contested the attempt invoking its
rights under the Constitution. And this Court upheld the contention of the owner by declaring the attempt
unconstitutional." 5
The conclusion that inevitably was called for is worded thus: "It is, therefore, imperative that we declare, as we now
do, that Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453 which prohibits the filing of an ejectment proceeding, or the continuance
of one that has already been commenced, even in the absence of expropriation proceedings offends our
Constitution and, hence, is unenforceable." 6
What we said then, we reaffirm now, as was indeed evident in our decision sought to be reconsidered but perhaps
not given the importance which, in the opinion of petitioner-appellee, it was entitled to. Nothing in our decision can
be taken to detract in any wise from the binding force and effect of the Cuatico ruling which declared
unconstitutional Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453.
4. We likewise ruled that the mistake imputed to Congress in apparently recognizing the rights of ownership in
entities or individuals not possessed of the same could not invalidate the challenged statute. In the same way, it
cannot be made the basis for non-existent rights of ownership to the property in question. It is in that sense that, as
noted in our decision, no fear need be entertained that thereby the petitioner-appellee would be adversely affected.
The government certainly would not pay to a party other than the owner the claim for just compensation which,
under the Constitution, it is required to meet. Neither, then can any party who is not in that situation have any
standing whatsoever. This much is beyond dispute. To repeat, the apprehension entertained by petitioner-appellee,
perhaps indicative of it, excess of caution, is without legal foundation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for the reconsideration of our decision of February 18, 1970, filed by petitioner-appellee,
is denied.

3. In the aforesaid decision of Cuatico v. Court of Appeals, reference was made to the amendatory Act, Republic Act
No. 3453 to Section 4 as it originally was worded in Republic Act No. 2616, the amendment consisting of the
following: "Upon approval of this amendatory Act, no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted
against the present occupants of any lot in said Tatalon Estate, and no ejectment proceedings already commenced
shall be continued, and such lot or any portion thereof shall not be sold by the owners of said estate to any person
other than the present occupant without the consent of the latter given in a public instrument." 3 The question before
the, Court, according, to the opinion penned by Justice Bautista Angelo, was: "Are the provisions embodied in the
amendatory Act which prescribe that upon approval of said Act no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or
prosecuted against any occupant of any lot in the Tatalon Estate, or that no ejectment proceedings already
commenced shall be continued, constitutional and valid such that it may be said that the Court of Appeals abused
its discretion in denying the petitions for suspension filed by petitioners.?" 4

53

empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment
of export processing zones, in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the
Mactan Export Processing Zone.
On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to
take immediate possession of the premises. On December 23, 1980, the private respondent flied its
answer.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59603

April 29, 1987

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Elena M. Cuevas for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and
1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such
that in determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis should
be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a
certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu
and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export
processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among others, four
(4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name
of the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the
respondent in acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property.
The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a
complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private
respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as amended, which

At the pre-trial conference on February 13, 1981, the respondent judge issued an order stating that the
parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties and
that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits is set on April 2, 1981.
On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge issued the order of condemnation declaring the petitioner
as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The respondent judge also issued a
second order, subject of this petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated.
On June 19, 1981, the three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the
amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the
properties.
On July 29, 1981, the petitioner Med a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of February 19, 1981
and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections
5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through
commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No.
1533.
On November 14, 1981, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and gave the
latter ten (10) days within which to file its objection to the Commissioner's Report.
On February 9, 1982, the petitioner flied this present petition for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary restraining order, enjoining the trial court from enforcing the order dated February 17, 1981
and from further proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of
commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned. Stated in another way, is the
exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and
constitutional?
The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in setting the
commissioner's report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which is the applicable law herein,
the basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is
lower. Therefore, there is no more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the

54

Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider other highly variable factors in order to
determine just compensation. The petitioner further maintains that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the
assessors and the property owners themselves the power or duty to fix the market value of the
properties and that said property owners are given the full opportunity to be heard before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Thus, the vesting on the
assessor or the property owner of the right to determine the just compensation in expropriation
proceedings, with appropriate procedure for appeal to higher administrative boards, is valid and
constitutional.
Prior to the promulgation of P.D. Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533, this Court has interpreted the eminent
domain provisions of the Constitution and established the meaning, under the fundametal law, of just
compensation and who has the power to determine it. Thus, in the following cases, wherein the filing
of the expropriation proceedings were all commenced prior to the promulgation of the aforementioned
decrees, we laid down the doctrine onjust compensation:

P.D. No. 76:

"For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired
by the government for public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value
declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the Assessor,
whichever is lower."
P.D. No. 464:
"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation
proceedings. In determining just compensation which private property is acquired by the
government for public use, the basis shall be the market value declared by the owner or
administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower."

Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals (93 SCRA 503, 516),

P.D. No. 794:

"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation
proceedings. In determining just compensation when private property is acquired by the
government for public use, the same shall not exceed the market value declared by the
owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value
as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower."

"And in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, the Court,
speaking thru now Chief Justice Fernando, reiterated the 'well-settled (rule) that just compensation
means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is
more and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for
the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the
expropriating entity."

P.D. No. 1533:

"Section 1. In determining just compensation for private property acquired
through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the
value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property
or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is
lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to
acquire the property."

Garcia v. Court ofappeals (102 SCRA 597, 608),

"Hence, in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to
which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and not merely the
condition it is in the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. All the facts as
to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities may
be shown and considered in estimating its value."
Republic v. Santos (141 SCRA 30, 35-36),
"According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners' report. It
may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just
compensation for the property expropriated. This Court may substitute its own estimate of
the value as gathered from the record (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil.
286)."
However, the promulgation of the aforementioned decrees practically set aside the above and many
other precedents hammered out in the course of evidence-laden, well argued, fully heard, studiously
deliberated, and judiciously considered court proceedings. The decrees categorically and peremptorily
limited the definition of just compensation thus:

We are constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional
and void and accordingly dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to
determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners
under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the
taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was
not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings
would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the
valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two.
The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a
grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just
compensation is concerned.
In the case of National Housing Authority v. Reyes (123 SCRA 245), this Court upheld P.D. No. 464,
as further amended by P.D. Nos. 794, 1224 and 1259. In this case, the petitioner National Housing
Authority contended that the owner's declaration at P1,400.00 which happened to be lower than the

55

assessor's assessment, is the just compensation for the respondent's property under section 92 of
P.D. No. 464. On the other hand, the private respondent stressed that while there may be basis for the
allegation that the respondent judge did not follow the decree, the matter is still subject to his final
disposition, he having been vested with the original and competent authority to exercise his judicial
discretion in the light of the constitutional clauses on due process and equal protection.
To these opposing arguments, this Court ruled ihat under the conceded facts, there should be a
recognition that the law as it stands must be applied; that the decree having spoken so clearly and
unequivocably calls for obedience; and that on a matter where the applicable law speaks in no
uncertain language, the Court has no choice except to yield to its command. We further stated that
"the courts should recognize that the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent
decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice or the constitutional provision on just
compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property."
While the Court yielded to executive prerogative exercised in the form of absolute law-making power,
its members, nonetheless, remained uncomfortable with the implications of the decision and the
abuse and unfairness which might follow in its wake. For one thing, the President himself did not seem
assured or confident with his own enactment. It was not enough to lay down the law on determination
of just compensation in P.D. 76. It had to be repeated and reiterated in P.D. 464, P.D. 794, and P.D.
1533. The provision is also found in P.D. 1224, P.D. 1259 and P.D. 1313. Inspite of its effectivity as
general law and the wide publicity given to it, the questioned provision or an even stricter version had
to be embodied in cases of specific expropriations by decree as in P.D. 1669 expropriating the
Tambunting Estate and P.D. 1670 expropriating the Sunog Apog area in Tondo, Manila.
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts
under P.D. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees,
still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by
the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
In overruling the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and objection to the commissioner's report, the
trial court said:
"Another consideration why the Court is empowered to appoint commissioners to assess the just
compensation of these properties under eminent domain proceedings, is the well-entrenched
ruling that 'the owner of property expropriated is entitled to recover from expropriating authority
the fair and full value of the lot, as of the time when possession thereof was actually taken by the
province, plus consequential damages including attorney's fees from which the
consequential benefits, if any should be deducted, with interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate
sum due to the owner from and after the date of actual taking.' (Capitol Subdivision, Inc. v.
Province of Negros Occidental, 7 SCRA 60). In fine, the decree only establishes a uniform basis
for determining just compensation which the Court may consider as one of the factors in arriving
at 'just compensation,' as envisage in the Constitution. In the words of Justice Barredo,
"Respondent court's invocation of General Order No. 3 of September 21, 1972 is nothing short of
an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority, which no judge duly imbued with the implications
of the paramount principle of independence of the judiciary should ever think of doing." (Lina v.
Purisima, 82 SCRA 344, 351; Cf. Prov. of Pangasinan v. CFI Judge of Pangasinan, Br. VIII, 80

SCRA 117) Indeed, where this Court simply follows PD 1533, thereby limiting the determination of
just compensation on the value declared by the owner or administrator or as determined by the
Assessor, whichever is lower, it may result in the deprivation of the landowner's right of due
process to enable it to prove its claim to just compensation, as mandated by the Constitution. (Uy
v. Genato, 57 SCRA 123). The tax declaration under the Real Property Tax Code is, undoubtedly,
for purposes of taxation."
We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may
only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such
amount. A return to the earlier well-established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with the
principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional
rights." (See Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438, 462; citing Mercado v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal, 116 SCRA 93.) The doctrine we enunciated in National Housing Authority v. Reyes,
supra, therefore, must necessarily be abandoned if we are to uphold this Court's role as the guardian
of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses and as the final
arbiter over transgressions committed against constitutional rights.
The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings,
its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just compensation
were made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not
only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only a
fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at
the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of
documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be
arbitrary and confiscatory.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation.
The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several
barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never
taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice,
corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for
generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and
estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot
be absolute substitutes for just compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the
opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what
is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not
even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The Idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a
demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so.

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It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax
documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the
haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a
fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.

G.R. No. 135087

March 14, 2000

HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner,

vs.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondent.
DECISION

As was held in the case of Gideon v. Wainwright (93 ALR 2d,733,742):

"In the light of these and many other prior decisions of this Court, it is not surprising that the Betts
Court, when faced with the contention that 'one charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel
must be furnished counsel by the State,' conceded that '[E]xpressions in the opinions of this court lend
color to the argument. . .' 316 U.S., at 462, 463, 86 L ed. 1602, 62 S Ct. 1252. The fact is that in
deciding as it did-that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial" the
Court in Betts v. Brady made an ubrupt brake with its own well-considered precedents. In returning to
these old precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but restore constitutional principles
established to achieve a fair system of justice. . ."
We return to older and more sound precedents. This Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. (See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra).
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation
of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "justness" of the decreed compensation.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very
purpose why this Court exists in the first place.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining
order issued on February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners1 pray for the reversal of the Order
dated July 28, 1998 issued by Branch 155 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No. 875 entitled
"City of Mandaluyong v. Alberto S. Suguitan, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED and
an ORDER OF CONDEMNATION is hereby issued declaring that the plaintiff, City of
Mandaluyong, has a lawful right to take the subject parcel of land together with existing
improvements thereon more specifically covered by Transfer Certificate Of Title No. 56264 of
the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila District II for the public use or purpose as stated in
the Complaint, upon payment of just compensation.
Accordingly, in order to ascertain the just compensation, the parties are hereby directed to
submit to the Court within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof, a list of independent
appraisers from which the Court will select three (3) to be appointed as Commissioners,
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 67, Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.2
It is undisputed by the parties that on October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Mandaluyong City issued Resolution No. 396, S-19943 authorizing then Mayor Benjamin B. Abalos to
institute expropriation proceedings over the property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni Avenue and
Sto. Rosario streets in Mandaluyong City with an area of 414 square meters and more particularly
described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 56264 of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila
District II. The intended purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical
Center.
Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995 offering to buy his
property, but Suguitan refused to sell.4 Consequently, on March 13, 1995, the city of Mandaluyong
filed a complaint5 for expropriation with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. The case was docketed as
SCA No. 875.
Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss6 the complaint based on the following grounds (1) the power of
eminent domain is not being exercised in accordance with law; (2) there is no public necessity to
warrant expropriation of subject property; (3) the City of Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said
property without payment of just compensation; (4) the City of Mandaluyong has no budget and
appropriation for the payment of the property being expropriated; and (5) expropriation of Suguitan's
property is but a ploy of Mayor Benjamin Abalos to acquire the same for his personal use. Respondent

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filed its comment and opposition to the motion. On October 24, 1995, the trial court denied Suguitan's
motion to dismiss.7
On November 14, 1995, acting upon a motion filed by the respondent, the trial court issued an order
allowing the City of Mandaluyong to take immediate possession of Suguitan's property upon the
deposit of P621,000 representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based upon the
current tax declaration of such property. On December 15, 1995, the City of Mandaluyong assumed
possession of the subject property by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the trial court on
December 14, 1995.8 On July 28, 1998, the court granted the assailed order of expropriation.
Petitioners assert that the city of Mandaluyong may only exercise its delegated power of eminent
domain by means of an ordinance as required by section 19 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, 9 and not
by means of a mere resolution.10 Respondent contends, however, that it validly and legally exercised
its power of eminent domain; that pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 7160, a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation
proceedings with the Regional Trial Court. Respondent's position, which was upheld by the trial court,
was explained, thus: 11
. . . in the exercise of the respondent City of Mandaluyong's power of eminent domain, a
"resolution" empowering the City Mayor to initiate such expropriation proceedings and
thereafter when the court has already determine[d] with certainty the amount of just
compensation to be paid for the property expropriated, then follows an Ordinance of the
Sanggunian Panlungosd appropriating funds for the payment of the expropriated property.
Admittedly, title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator
only upon full payment of the just compensation. 12
Petitioners refute respondent's contention that only a resolution is necessary upon the initiation of
expropriation proceedings and that an ordinance is required only in order to appropriate the funds for
the payment of just compensation, explaining that the resolution mentioned in article 36 of the IRR is
for purposes of granting administrative authority to the local chief executive to file the expropriation
case in court and to represent the local government unit in such case, but does not dispense with the
necessity of an ordinance for the exercise of the power of eminent domain under section 19 of the
Code. 13
The petition is imbued with merit.
Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular
uses to promote public welfare. 14 It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in
the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. 15 Thus,
the right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government without the necessity for
constitutional recognition. 16 The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating
to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government, but
limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. 17 Thus, our own Constitution provides that
"[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." 18 Furthermore, the due
process and equal protection clauses 19 act as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of
this governmental power.

Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual's right to private property, a
constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity
and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty, 20 the need for its circumspect operation
cannot be overemphasized. In City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila we said: 21
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is
that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals
with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and the laws more sedulously,
than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right,
and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent,
the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt[ful] interpretation. (Bensley vs.
Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Gal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most
delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny.
Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which all free
constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of
the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the
power, and to protect it from abuse. . . . (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec.
1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such
power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and public utilities,
although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the
delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating
law. 22
The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is section 19 of
RA 7160 which provides that:
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the
benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws;Provided, however, That the power of
eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of
the property to be expropriated;Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
value at the time of the taking of the property.

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Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the
courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the
delegating law. 23 In fact, the courts have adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving questions
involving the proper exercise of this delegated power by local bodies, as compared to instances when
it is directly exercised by the national legislature. 24
The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been complied with
by the local government unit concerned:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the
benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 25
In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over
petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this
case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution,
for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. We reiterate our ruling in Municipality of Paraaque
v. V.M. Realty Corporation 26 regarding the distinction between an ordinance and a resolution. In that
1998 case we held that:
We are not convinced by petitioner's insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a third reading is necessary
for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.
We cannot uphold respondent's contention that an ordinance is needed only to appropriate funds after
the court has determined the amount of just compensation. An examination of the applicable law will
show that an ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with the proper court since,
beginning at this point, the power of eminent domain is already being exercised.
Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation proceedings are comprised of
two stages:
(1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; it

ends with an order, if not in a dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has
a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint;
(2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for
the property sought to be taken; this is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. 27
Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the defendant is indispensable
to the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, it is but the last stage of the expropriation
proceedings, which cannot be arrived at without an initial finding by the court that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in
the complaint. An order of condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the
question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.
Also, it is noted that as soon as the complaint is filed the plaintiff shall already have the right to enter
upon the possession of the real property involved upon depositing with the court at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated. 28 Therefore, an ordinance promulgated by the local legislative body
authorizing its local chief executive to exercise the power of eminent domain is necessary prior to the
filing by the latter of the complaint with the proper court, and not only after the court has determined
the amount of just compensation to which the defendant is entitled.
Neither is respondent's position improved by its reliance upon Article 36 (a), Rule VI of the IRR which
provides that:
If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase,
LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the sanggunian authorizing its chief
executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.
The Court has already discussed this inconsistency between the Code and the IRR, which is more
apparent than real, in Municipality of Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation, 29 which we quote
hereunder:
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to
authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA
7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic
that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule
issued for its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight
in the wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in
exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an
ordinance.
Therefore, while we remain conscious of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, we
cannot grant judicial sanction to a local government unit's exercise of its delegated power of eminent
domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.

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It should be noted, however, that our ruling in this case will not preclude the City of Mandaluyong from
enacting the necessary ordinance and thereafter reinstituting expropriation proceedings, for so long as
it has complied with all other legal requirements.30
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 28, 1998 decision of Branch 155 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SCA No. 875 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

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