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Procedural Justice and the Cooperative Worker:


An Interactional Model of Union Participation
JERRY BRYAN FULLER, JR.
Louisiana Tech University, Ruston, LA 71272
KIM HESTER
Arkansas State University, State University, AR 72467
Using data collected from a United Steelworkers of America local, we examine
the extent to which fair union decision-making processes (procedural justice)
and member disposition interact to promote union-supportive behavior.
Although results indicate both procedural justice and a collectivist work disposition are positively related to union-supportive behavior, hierarchical regression reveals that procedural justice influences the behavior of members with
individualistic work dispositions but not the behavior of members with a collectivist work disposition. So, employers who adopt human resource practices consistent with the high- performance work paradigm may foster increased levels of
union-supportive behavior, and unions may need to take member disposition into
account when selecting training programs aimed at fostering union-supportive
behavior.

I. Introduction
Due to the democratic nature of labor organizations, member participation in union
activities such as attending meetings, voting in elections, filing grievances, and encouraging other members to support the union are essential for the effective functioning and
viability of unions. Member participation serves several purposes including creating
a unified membership, preventing oligarchy, and fulfilling the representative purpose
of the union (Fullagar et al., 1995). In short, union success is dependent on members participation (Bulger and Mellor, 1997: 935).
Because of the importance of member participation in unions, researchers interested in the effective functioning of labor organizations have sought direction from theory and constructs developed to understand cooperative behavior in work settings
(Skarlicki and Latham, 1996). Foremost among these constructs is organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), defined as cooperative behavior that has positive consequences for the organization but is not required or formally rewarded (Van Dyne
JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH
Volume XXVIII, Number 1

Winter 2007

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et al., 2000: 3). Union participation is largely analogous to organizational citizenship


behavior, because the only behavior required of a union member is paying dues and
because union participation is not explicitly rewarded (Skarlicki and Latham, 1996).
Consequently, researchers have begun to explore new models of cooperative behavior in unions by drawing on the extensive body of literature focusing on cooperative
behavior in firms.
Most OCB research has examined contextual antecedents (Van Dyne et al., 2000).
Of all the contextual variables that influence organizational citizenship behavior, procedural justice, which is defined as the fairness of the organizational decision-making
processes, is perhaps the most promising because it can be promoted through training. Drawing on the positive results found in employer settings, union-participation
researchers have found that fair decision-making processes in unions are positively
related to organizational citizenship behaviors in labor organizations (Skarlicki and
Latham, 1996). These findings are particularly interesting because they indicate labor
organizations can increase the members union-supportive behavior by training stewards and other union officials in the tenets of procedural justice.
Although considerable attention has been given to contextual factors, a smaller
body of research has shown that some dispositional factors predict cooperative behavior, and this research should be of particular interest to unions due to employers
increasing interest in using disposition in personnel selectionan area where unions
typically have little influence (Clark, 2000). More succinctly, if employers are increasingly likely to select people predisposed to cooperate with them, labor organizations
should be interested in understanding how these cooperative workers are likely to
affect their efforts to develop healthy, active union locals.
Research suggests that a greater understanding of cooperative behavior depends
on developing knowledge about how disposition works in combination with contextual
factors (Chatman and Barsade, 1995; Moorman and Blakely, 1995; Organ, 1994).
From a practical perspective, an interactional approach to cooperative behavior is particularly important because the efficacy of a training program can largely depend on
disposition (Stewart et al., 1996). Despite this fact, research has not examined the
extent to which the relationship between procedural justice and cooperative behavior
is influenced by any dispositional variable. Therefore, our research tests a model of
union participation that includes both procedural justice and an individuals propensity
to cooperate, i.e., individualism/collectivism.
II. Procedural Justice
In her review of the procedural justice literature, Konovsky (2000) noted that fairness
was identified long ago by Barnard, in his 1938 book, Functions of the Executive, as
one of the fundamental bases of cooperative behavior in organizations (p. 490).
Research has supported Barnards insight that the fairness of organizational decisionmaking procedures is positively related to cooperative behavior, especially discretionary cooperative behaviors (Tyler, 1999).

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Two broad theoretical frameworks have been developed to explain the effects of
procedural justice. The first is a self-interest or control model largely based on social
exchange theory (Tyler et al., 1997). According to this approach, people are concerned
about fair procedures because they wish to maximize their personal outcomes/rewards
(Tyler, 1989). The original conceptualization of the self-interest model proposes that
procedures are perceived as fair when individuals believe that they have some control
over the decision-making processthe ability to present evidence or have a voice
in the process (Thibaut and Walker, 1975). From a social exchange perspective, when
the organization and its representatives use fair decision-making procedures, an obligation arises for people to help the organization in returnthe norm of reciprocity.
The second major framework developed to explain the effects of procedural justice is based loosely on social identity theory. This group value or relationship model
suggests that in long-term relationships, control becomes less important than maintaining the social relationship with the group. Tyler (1989: 831) states, the basic
assumption of the group-value model is that people value membership in social
groups. That is, people use organizational membership to create and maintain a
favorable identity (Tyler, 1999: 203). According to the relational model, fair decisionmaking procedures are related to cooperative behaviors because they indicate that the
individual is not only a member of a high-status organization, but also because they
indicate the individual is a respected member of the organization (Tyler, 1999). Thus,
people who believe they have favorable organizational status are motivated to cooperate with the organization in order to promote and maintain their positive social identities (Tyler, 1999: 203).
Both control and group-value models of procedural justice have been validated by
empirical research, and comparisons of the two models indicate that both control issues
and relational issues are important in shaping perceptions of fairness (Tyler, 1989). In
short, although the self-interest and relational models provide different explanations of
why procedural justice promotes cooperative behavior, they both predict that when
people believe their organization uses fair decision-making procedures, they are motivated to help the organization.
If fairness is important because it is a fundamental value of work organizations
(Konovsky, 2000), it should also be important in unions where voice is perhaps the
core organizational value. In two separate studies, training union stewards and officials
in fair decision-making procedures positively influenced members participation in the
union (Skarlicki and Latham, 1996). The results of these studies are important because
they indicate the potential for the application of procedural justice concepts in labor
organizations. Skarlicki and Latham conclude that unions could increase the participation of their membership by training local officials and stewards in the tenets of
procedural justice. Therefore, herein, we expect that procedural justice is positively
related to union-supportive behaviors.
H1: Procedural justice is positively related to union participation.

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Although there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that procedural justice


training for union stewards and officers is one way unions can act unilaterally to
increase membership participation, none of this research has taken into account potential actions by employers that might affect the efficacy of this training. According to
Godard and Delaney (2000), industrial relations research needs to account for the
implications of the high-performance work paradigm not only for employers, but
also for labor organizations. Many new and innovative management techniques are
increasingly emphasizing participatory management and team-based systemsTQM,
employee-involvement programs, high-performance workplaces. Employers are also
increasingly utilizing task-force teams whose members rotate among activities (Borman et al., 1997). Yet not all American workers are able to perform well in team-based
organizations (Kochan et al., 1994). Therefore, increased effort is being placed on both
attracting and identifying individuals who can be more productive in cooperative work
systems. Specifically, organizations adopting elements of high-performance work systems seek workers who are more cooperative. That is, these employers will be seeking workers who contribute discretionary effort toward organizational goals, work
better in team structures, and are more likely to adapt their behavior to situational
demandsall of which are characteristics of a collectivist work disposition (Chatman
and Barsade, 1995). Given the benefits collectivists offer team-based organizations and
the fact that the workforce in the United States will increasingly become comprised
of members of more collectivist groups, i.e., Asians, Hispanics, and Blacks (Earley and
Gibson, 1998), employers are increasingly likely to hire individuals with collectivist
dispositions. Therefore individualism/collectivism appears to be a dispositional factor
that is worthy of consideration for its impact on labor organizations.
III. Individualism/Collectivism
Individualism/collectivism is an analytical dimension that captures the relative importance people accord to personal interests and to shared pursuits (Wagner, 1995: 153).
Individualists are self-orientedthe pursuit of personal interests supercedes actions
that benefit any group or collective (Earley and Gibson, 1998). The identities of individualists are based on the self and they define themselves as individuals, bounded by
their own skin (Wagner, 1995: 154). Individualists are characterized by open emotional expression and by their focus on creating and maintaining a positive self-concept, which is based on personal success (Oyserman et al., 2002). Individualists value
competition, pleasure, social recognition, and a comfortable life (Triandis et al., 1985).
In contrast, collectivism is defined as a set of feelings, beliefs, behavioral intentions, and behaviors related to solidarity and concern for others (Hui, 1988: 17). Collectivists are people who sacrifice the pursuit of personal goals and pursue group goals
(Triandis et al., 1985). The identities of collectivists are derived from the social system
rather than their own personal attributes, which results in an increased emphasis on
membership in organizations, as well as the associated emotional dependence between
the individual and the collective (Hui, 1988). The collectivist defines self-interested
behavior as attending to group rather than self-interests and attending to social roles

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and obligations (Oyserman et al., 2002; Wagner, 1995). Collectivists are restrained in
their open expression of emotion and value cooperation, equality, harmonious relationships, and honesty (Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis et al., 1985).
Research has indicated that collectivism is positively related to cooperative behavior in a number of different settings, including at work (Moorman and Blakely, 1995),
nonprofit organizations (Van Dyne et al., 2000), and even simulated organizations (Chatman and Barsade, 1995). Although we could find no research relating collectivism to
union participation, Kelly and Kellys (1994) research indicate work collectivism is positively related to intent to participate in union activities in a British sample, so collectivists,
because their self-concept is based on the groups to which they belong, participate in
group activities because it affirms their self-concept (Shamir, 1990). Accordingly, we
hypothesize that collectivism will be positively related to union participation.
H2: Collectivism will be positively related to union participation.

IV. An Interactional Model of Union Participation


Although the literature on procedural justice and individualism/collectivism is largely
unrelated, both have been discussed as factors that contribute to resolving what Lind
(2001) calls the fundamental social dilemmathe choice between pursuing personal
or collective objectives in social settings. Hardins (1968) Tragedy of the Commons
presents the classic social dilemma using cattle ranchers who must share a pasture. In
this situation, the ranchers must limit the number of cattle they graze or the pasture will
eventually become overgrazed and unproductive for all. The dilemma in this situation
is that no rancher has a short-term incentive to limit the number of cattle grazed on
the shared rangeland, particularly if the other ranchers limit their use of the land
(Schneider and Northcraft, 1999).
According to the justice literature, fairness judgments guide people in situations
involving social dilemmas (Lind, 2001). That is, people use their assessment of procedural justice as a substitute for trust and as a heuristic for deciding whether or not
to cooperate with others. Thus, when people feel they have been treated unfairly, they
pursue activities that advance their own self-interests. However, when people are
treated fairly, they dont respond to choice situations in individual mode, but rather in
group mode and pursue activities that promote group interests (Lind, 2001: 67). Alternately, the individualism/collectivism literature suggests that disposition resolves the
dilemma of pursuing personal or collective interests, i.e., self-orientation versus collective-orientation (Earley and Gibson, 1998). Thus, procedural justice and collectivism appear to be related to organizational citizenship behavior for similar reasons
both move people to support the needs of the group (Moorman and Blakely, 1995).
Organ (1994: 468) suggested that attitudes about specific aspects of the work context might be related to OCB mainly by virtue of some underlying disposition(s).
Consistent with this, we believe that the interaction of procedural justice and individualism/collectivism may provide a better understanding of union participation than a
simple main effects model. The effects of procedural justice will likely be more pro-

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nounced for individualists than for collectivists. If individualists are predisposed to


respond to social dilemmas in individual mode, they may be prompted to shift to
group mode via the fairness heuristic. However, since collectivists are predisposed
to respond to social dilemmas in group mode, contextual inducements to cooperate
are likely to have little incremental effect on cooperative behavior. Consistent with
this, Wagner (1995) found that contextual influences thought to promote cooperative
behaviorlowering group size and increasing identifiabilitywere more influential
for individualists than collectivists. Based largely on Wagners findings, Smith et al.
(1995) concluded that there is likely to be variation in the payoff of efforts to promote cooperative behavior in American firms due to differences in individualism/
collectivism. Specifically, such efforts should be maximally useful when targeted
toward individualists but not useful among collectivists (Smith et al., 1995: 13).
Therefore, we expect that the relationship between procedural justice and union participation is moderated by individualism/collectivism.
H3: The relationship between procedural justice and union participation should be
stronger for individualists than for collectivists.

V. Method
Table 1 contains a summary of the sample statistics.1
Measures. We assessed the reliability of our measurement scales utilizing coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951). We included gender, union tenure, and race as control variables because they were related to union participation in prior research (Aryee
and Chay, 2001; Iverson and Kuruvilla, 1995; Mellor, 1990). Furthermore, labor relations climate was also included as a control variable as it was negatively related to
union participation in prior research (Angle and Perry, 1986). Except for participation in union activities, the response format for all scales range from 1, strongly disagree to 5, strongly agree. Perceived labor relations climate was assessed with
five items from Hammer et al.s (1991) scale (e.g., The relationship between the union
and management is hostile) (alpha  .83; mean  2.81, standard deviation  .73).
Procedural justice was measured using Moormans (1991) 7-item scale. These items
were adapted for use in a union setting by substituting union local for organization
in the instruction section (e.g., In order to ensure that fair decisions have been made,

Table 1
Summary of Sample Statistics
Sample Size Gender Tenure Race -

511 members of a United Steelworkers local (a 24% response rate)


Male: 93.1%
Female: 6.9%
05 years: 3.8%
615 years: 7.2%
15 years: 89%
Caucasian: 90.8%
African-American: 5%
Native American: 4%
Hispanic: 0.2%

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your union local has developed procedures designed to hear the concerns of all individuals or groups affected by the decisions) (alpha  .96; mean  3.66; standard deviation  .77). Individualism/collectivism (I/C) was measured with Wagners (1995)
4-item scale (e.g., People in a group should realize that they sometimes are going to
have to make sacrifices for the sake of the group as a whole) (alpha  .83; mean 
4.11; standard deviation  .50). Participation in union activities was assessed with
Parks et al.s (1995) 3-item scale (e.g., encourage other members to support the union
position on an issue) (alpha  .76). Participants were asked to indicate their participation in different union activities in the last 12 months as yes, which was coded as
a 2, and no which was coded as a 1 (mean  1.41; standard deviation  .41).2
Hierarchical Regression Techniques. Hierarchical regression was used to test
the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable. This
approach was chosen over an ANOVA approach, which would have required creating categorical variables, thereby lowering the power for detecting an interaction
between procedural justice and individualism/collectivism as well as introducing the
potential for producing spurious interaction effects (Cohen et al., 2003). Hierarchical
regression was also chosen over a structural equations model due to problems currently
associated with modeling interactions between continuous variables and the interpretability of the results (Joreskog, 1998).
The variables were entered in three steps: control variables, main effect variables,
and finally the interaction term. Following Aiken and Wests (1991) recommendation
for reducing nonessential ill-conditioning, both main effects variables, i.e., procedural justice and individualism/collectivism, were centered prior to creating the interaction term.
VI. Discussion
Table 2 contains the empirical results of the hierarchical regression analysis.3 Although
gender, union tenure, and race are unrelated to union participation, the results indicate that labor relations climate is negatively related to union participation in the second and third regression equations. The results support Hypothesis 1: procedural
justice is positively related to union supportive behavior ( p  .003 in equation 2; and
p  .001 in equation 3). The results also support Hypothesis 2, although the weight
of the evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis in this caseno relationship between
individualism/collectivism and union participationis less than the evidence supporting the first hypothesis ( p  .09 in equation 2; and p  .07 in equation 3). More
importantly, however, the results show that the interaction term combining procedural justice and individualism/collectivism is statistically significant (p  .04), which
supports Hypothesis 3. Therefore, the relationship between procedural justice and
union participation must be considered a conditional effect. Although the incremental
variance explained by the interaction term is small, Champoux and Peters (1987) suggest that the size of the incremental variance explained is an incomplete measure of the
magnitude of the moderator effects and that a graphical depiction of the interaction
provides a supplemental means of expressing the strength of the interaction. Therefore,

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Table 2
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis
Union Participation
Step and Variables Entered

Step 1Control Variables


Gender
Union tenure
Race
Labor Relations Climate

.04
.02
.02
.06

.05
.02
.01
.10*

.43
.03
.01
.10*

Step 2Main Effects


Individualism/Collectivism (I/C)
Procedural Justice
Step 3Interaction
I/C X Procedural Justice
R2
DR2
F Change
F Overall

.01
.01
0.85
0.85

.08
.14**

.08
.16**

.04**
.03**
7.04**
2.93**

.09*
.05**
.01*
4.13*
3.11**

Notes: N  511. The coefficients are the standardized Beta weights for the variables in each equation.
 (*, **) p  .10 (.05, .01).

we plotted the form of the interaction following Aiken and Wests (1991) suggested procedures (Figure 1). The high and low values for procedural justice and individualism/collectivism represent one standard deviation above and below the mean. Figure 1
indicates that whereas a moderately strong relationship between procedural justice and
union participation exists for people with individualistic dispositions, the same cannot
be said for people with collectivist dispositions. Specifically, union participation among
collectivists remains consistently high regardless of the level of procedural justice
(r  .03, p  .10). However, among individualists, participation in union activities
depended on the level of perceived procedural justice (r  .36, p  .01). According to
Cohen (1977), the amount of variance in participation accounted for by procedural justice among individualists represented a medium effect size. Therefore, because the character of the relationship, i.e., positive versus no relationship, between procedural justice
and union participation is different for collectivists and individuals, our supplemental
analysis of the interaction suggests a stronger moderating effect than what might be
indicated by the incremental variance accounted for by the interaction term.
VII. Conclusion
Our research is the first to examine the extent to which the relationship between union
decision-making processes and union participation is moderated by member disposi-

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Figure 1
Plot of First-Order Interaction

tion. Our results indicate that procedural justice has a pronounced effect on the cooperative behavior of individualists, but doesnt affect the cooperative behavior of collectivists. Thus, the interactional model appears to offer a clearer picture of who is
likely to be influenced by procedural justice in unions. Figure 1 illustrates a particularly noteworthy aspect of the resultscollectivists consistently engage in union
participation regardless of the perceived level of procedural justice. From a social
dilemma perspective, the form of the interaction supports the view that procedural
justice plays an important role in shifting individualists from individual mode to
group mode with regard to union participation. However, Figure 1 suggests that collectivists remain in group mode regardless of the level of perceived procedural
justice. Overall, our results suggest that neither a justice perspective nor an individualism/collectivism perspective offers a complete understanding of how individuals

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resolve social dilemmassocial dilemmas are likely to be better understood by incorporating both individual differences and contextual influences.
It is perhaps not surprising that individualists are most strongly affected by procedural justice given that procedural justice theory has been developed largely in the
United Statesa highly individualistic culture. Indeed, organizational justice theory
and research has done little to explore the effect of disposition on the outcomes of
procedural justice. Future research should build on our study by employing our model
in other types of organizationsprivate for-profits and nonprofits.
In our opinion, our results most likely occurred because individualists and collectivists define their organizational roles differently. According to the relational model
of justice, individuals gain status and a positive identity when they are treated fairly
by organizational authorities. This is likely true for individualists, whose source of
identity is centered on the self. However, collectivists gain status by virtue of their
membership in the group rather than their status within the group, so the source of a
collectivists positive identity is the group itself. This difference is likely to affect
how individualists and collectivists define their roles. Tepper et al. (2001) found that
the relationship between procedural justice and employer-supportive behavior was
moderated by the extent to which individuals define citizenship behavior as in-role, i.e.,
as part of their job, or extra-role. Tepper et al.s results indicated that the relationship
between procedural justice and OCB is stronger for people who define OCB as extrarole than for those who define OCB as in-role. According to Moorman and Blakely
(1995), collectivists may consider OCB to be in-role rather than extra-role behavior
while individualists may view OCB as extra-role because this type of behavior is discretionary and not explicitly recognized by the organizational reward system
(p. 140). To the extent that this is true, our results are consistent with the view that
collectivists consider union participation as in-role whereas individualists define
union-supportive behavior as extra-role. Therefore, models of union participation
may be underspecified if they do not account for member individualism/collectivism.
The high-performance work paradigm may not only have implications for employers, but also for unions. Until now, most unions have been resistant and often hostile to
many types of employer-union involvement programs because of fear that these programs may eventually lead to weakening of union solidarity (Hall, 1996; Osburn et al.,
1990). However, actions likely to be taken by employers to staff their organizations with
individuals that fit team-based structures may have just the opposite effect. That is, by
adopting selection practices consistent with the high-performance work paradigm,
unionized employers may actually increase the level of union participation.
Another implication of our results is that union leadership may benefit from assessing the dispositional makeup of union locals prior to implementing training programs
aimed at fostering union participation at the local level. Given that one of the great challenges union leaders face is how to effectively use limited resources to build stronger,
more energized locals (Clark, 2000), the efficacy of any training program to increase
union participation should be of considerable importance. Like any good human resource
manager, the first question union leaders need to ask before implementing any training

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program is Will training address the problem? Our results suggest that procedural justice
training programs may have little or no effect on union participation when employers
have focused on hired individuals with collectivist dispositions, particularly in green field
settings. Alternatively, procedural justice training is likely to be a particularly effective
means for labor unions to promote union participation in locals comprised largely of individualists in jobs requiring low levels of interdependence with individual-level pay-forperformance or where competitive dispositions are desired.
The obvious limitation of our work is the potential for artificial inflation of the
relationships between the study variables due to common methods variance. While it
would have been ideal to measure union participation behaviors from another source
as a check on the validity of the measures, no other source of the data was available
from the local union, and research indicates that self-reports of union participation
are highly correlated with archival data (McShane, 1986). Note also that artificial inflation of relationship measures is the exception rather than the rule in percept-percept
research designs (Crampton and Wagner, 1994) and that research using multi-source
data has shown that procedural justice is positively related to union participation (Skarlicki and Latham, 1996). Lastly, research indicates that statistically significant interaction terms revealed through hierarchical regression analysis are unlikely to result
from correlated errors resulting from percept-percept research designs (Evans, 1985).
Therefore, the interaction between procedural justice and individualism/collectivism
found herein is unlikely to be a result of common methods bias.
Finally, our results may be important in a broader sense than previously discussed.
According to Jarley et al. (1997), the present type of study is important because it examines the extent to which traditional organizational science concepts and measures developed for employers may generalize to other organizations such as unions. For example,
individualism/collectivism has been found to moderate the relationship between various antecedents and employer-related attitudes or behaviors (Hui et al., 2003). Our results
suggest that theory and concepts developed for employers, such as the individualism/
collectivism moderator model (Hui et al., 2003), can generalize to labor unions. However, in this case, the implications are very different for unions than they are for employers because unions lack the ability to control the dispositions of their membership.
NOTES
1The

sample consisted of the members of a United Steelworkers of America local in the southeastern United
States, which represents workers employed at a large, single facility that manufactures a wide variety of
vehicle tires. The unions decision to participate in the research was voted on in a regular monthly meeting
by those in attendance. Each union member was mailed a survey with a return envelope with prepaid
postage. Included in the mailing were letters from both the authors and the union local president guaranteeing anonymity and confidentiality. Participation in the survey was voluntary. All surveys included in the following analysis were returned within one month from the time the survey was mailed.
2The
3An

survey is available from the authors.

alternate version of Table 2 containing standard errors and t-values for each beta coefficient is available from the authors.

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