Salafism

Religion: Oxford Research Encyclopedias

Salafism
Joas Wagemakers
Subject: Islamic Studies, Religion and Politics Online Publication Date: Aug 2016
DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.013.255

Summary and Keywords

Salafism is a branch of Sunni Islam whose modern-day adherents claim to emulate the
pious predecessors (al-salaf al-li; often equated with the first three generations of
Muslims) as closely and in as many spheres of life as possible. Different scholars of Islam
throughout time have striven to emulate the early Muslim generations in the legal
sphere, in theological matters, or in both. The ideas espoused by these scholars have
more or less culminated in the Wahhabi movement that started on the Arabian Peninsula
in the 18th century, which in turn helped spread a Salafi message to the rest of the Arab
and Muslim worlds and even beyond. As such, the trend now referred to as Salafism came
about, expressing itself ideologically in teachings that are meant to present the trend as
exclusively and meticulously adhering to the example of the salaf, while rejecting all
other sources of influence. Practically, Salafism can be divided into three branches:
quietist Salafism, whose adherents shun political activism and concentrate on cleansing
and teaching Islam in all its purity; political Salafism, which does concentrate on
political commitment as an integral part of Islam through contentious debates,
parliamentary participation, and founding political parties; and Jihadi-Salafism, whose
followers seek to overthrow supposedly apostate regimes in the Muslim world through
violent jihad. Although the term Salafism is heavily contested among Salafiswith
adherents of one branch often not allowing the application of the label to be applied to
the other branchesits various ideas and manifestations show that Salafism is quite a
diverse phenomenon.
Keywords: Salafism, al-salaf al-li, Wahhabism, jihad

Defining Salafism
The core meaning of the term Salafi is like the salaf or salaf-like. In defining the
trend that Salafis collectively form, which we now know as Salafism, it is sensible to take
this basic meaning as a starting point. According to several famous adths, the Prophet

Page 1 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

Muhammad claimed that the best of my community (khayr ummat) or the best
people (khayr al-ns) are my generation [qarn] and then the ones who follow them
[thumma lladhna yalnahum] and then the ones who follow them [thumma lladhna
yalnahum].1 On the basis of such texts, one could argue that the first three generations
of Islam were the best ones the religion has ever seen (and will ever see). These three
generationssometimes with additions from later timeshave become known among
many Sunni Muslims as the pious predecessors (al-salaf al-li). In defining whom
modern-day Salafis are and what they stand for, we could therefore say that Salafism, as
a worldwide trend in the 20th century, represents those Sunni Muslims who claim to be
like the salaf and, as such, say they emulate the pious predecessors as closely and in
as many spheres of life as possible.
The people labeled Salafis in this article do not always refer to themselves that way nor
are they in agreement about whobesides themselvesis a Salafi. The term Salafism is
therefore hotly contested among adherents to this trend, which makes it difficult to say
what percentage of Muslims worldwide may be labeled Salafis. This contestation is
related to two different factors. First, the term Salafism is often associated with
terrorism and violence in media discourse, both in the West and in the Muslim world,
particularly since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Many
Salafis reject such acts of violence and often insist on not being associated with the
perpetrators of these attacks by rejecting the latter as worthy of the label of Salafis.
Second, Salafi, referring as it does to what they believe are the best generations of
Islam, has come to acquire an aura of religious authority. It is, in other words, a term that
gives the impression of purity and authenticity to its bearers, thereby making it a desired
label to apply to oneself. Despite such contestations, a relatively clear trend of Muslims
whose teachings are claimed to be geared entirely to emulating the salaf can be
discerned.

Precursors to Salafism
What sets modern-day Salafis apart from other contemporary Muslims is their claim to
emulate the salaf in a very detailed way that is applied in every sphere of life. Given their
belief that Islam should be directed entirely toward living like the pious predecessors,
Salafis claim that their ideas and teachings amount to nothing more or less than Islam in
all its purity. Although Salafis have made this emulation of the salaf their focal point and,
as such, emphasize it to a far greater extent than other Muslims do, a much more general
focus on paying special attention to the first three generations of Islamand especially
the Prophet Muhammadcan be discerned among broader groups of Sunni Muslims.

Page 2 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

These, although not always full-blown Salafis themselves according to the criteria used in
this article (i.e., those of modern-day Salafis), can be said to have acted as precursors to
the 20th-century trend we now know as Salafism.
After the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE, believers could no longer rely on his
living example to guide them in their lives. Instead, in their search for answers to their
questions on religion, they had to base themselves on the Qurn, the memorized
practices (sunan, sing. Sunna) of early believers (including the Prophet), these peoples
considered opinion (ray) and the consensus (ijm) of Muslim scholars (ulam). One
group of early Islamic scholars who advocated using all of these sources in answering
questions and who allowed for input from ulam themselves, were referred to as the
people of considered opinion (ahl al-ray) because of their emphasis on their own
scholarly views as a source for establishing legal rulings.

The Traditionists
In opposition to these ulam, another group known as the people of the [Prophetic]
tradition or traditionists (ahl al-adth) emerged. One of the best-known exponents of
this group was Amad b. anbal (780855), the eponymous founder of the anbal
school of Islamic law (shara). The ahl al-adth claimed that, in the absence of the
Prophet, the large (and growing) number of traditions ascribed to Muhammad were a
better, purer, and more authentic source of what Muslims should or should not do than
the opinions of the scholars. As such, a debate between the ahl al-ray and the ahl aladth came about that was not decided in favor of either party, but did lead to a
realization among the former group that the traditions (adths) ascribed to the Prophet
could not be ignored. Under the guidance of especially Muammad b. Idrs al-Shfi
(767820), the eponymous founder of the Shfi school of Islamic law, a middle way
was found between the different approaches that incorporated both the Qurn and the
Sunna of the Prophet as majorthough not the onlysources of a single legal system that
developed into various schools (madhhib, sing. madhhab). The result became the legal
basis of what can be considered orthodox or mainstream Islam as adhered to by most
Sunni Muslims.2
The ahl al-adths approach to Islamic law was a key legal point for them that set them
apart from orthodox Sunnis. While the latter strive to live pious lives according to the
rules of their respective madhhib, which truly value and greatly appreciate the Qurn
and the Sunna but combine them with other sources of law, the ahl al-adth focused
entirely on these two texts at the expense of almost everything else in the legal sphere.
Although modern-day Salafism mostly distinguishes itself from other trends in Islam in

Page 3 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

the theological realm by adhering to what its adherents see as a Salafi creed (aqda) and
therefore encompasses much more than this legal approach, its views of the madhhib
are often similar to those of the ahl al-adth.

Blind Emulation versus Independent Interpretation

While the ahl al-adth never became a dominant trend in Sunni Islam, its focus on going
back to the Qurn and the Sunna in the legal sphere rather than relying on a broader set
of legal sources always seems to have found individual adherents throughout the Muslim
world. This often expressed itself in rejecting the ulams blind emulation (taqld) of the
schools of Islamic law and, instead, advocating that scholars use independent and direct
interpretation of the Qurn and Sunna (ijtihd), while lay Muslims could rely on taqld or
could even use ijtihd themselves. Important scholars advocating these approaches
include, respectively, Amad b. Taymiyya (12631328) and his student Muammad b.
Qayyim al-Jawziyya (12921350), both of whom are major sources of inspiration to Salafis
today.3
Perhaps less directly influential for modern-day Salafism, but equally adamant in their
refusal of taqld were the scholars Muammad b. Ibrhm b. al-Wazr (d. 1436) and
Muammad b. Isml al-ann (16881768). Both hailed from Yemen and rejected
taqld when they believed authentic traditions of the Prophet went against Islamic legal
views as expressed by ulam. Similarly, Shh Wal Allh (17031762) from the Indian
subcontinentthough less negative about the role of the madhhib for the Muslim
community (umma) as a wholedid see excessive taqld as a cause of Muslims straying
from Islams original message.4 These three scholars, in turn, strongly influenced the
Yemeni scholar Muammad b. Al al-Shawkn (d. 1834) and the Indian/Pakistani ahl-e
adth movement,5 respectively. The former as well as the latter not only rejected taqld in
many cases but also were in close contact with and influential to the Arabian movement
started by the religious reformer Muammad b. Abd al-Wahhb (17031792) that proved
to be a great source of influence to modern-day Salafism.6

Wahhabism
The focus on the salaf (and especially the Prophet Muhammad), at the expense of other
sources of Islamic law, was thus adopted by the ahl al-adth and individual scholars
throughout the Middle Ages, culminating in the Wahhabi movement that started through
a pact between Ibn Abd al-Wahhb and the tribal leader Muammad b. Sad (1710
Page 4 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

1765). Together, these two men conquered large parts of the Arabian Peninsula, with Ibn
Sad assuming most of the political and military leadership, while Ibn Abd al-Wahhbs
primary contribution was providing the overarching belief system that united the tribes
under the command of the former. As such, an ideology that could be described as a
Najdi (Central Arabian) version of Salafism was spread across the Arabian Peninsula.7
Although Wahhabi scholars also advocated a return to the pious predecessors, as other
scholars had done in the legal sphere, Ibn Abd al-Wahhb and his followers did not so
much do this in legal terms but focused mostly on theology and cleansing the creed of
Islam from deviant influences that it had acquired throughout the centuries. Reaching
back to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and others, who had held views on Islamic
theology that were similar to what they espoused, Wahhabi scholars sought to restore the
alleged purity of Islam under the guidance of the Saudi rulers. Because of this addition of
a clear theological dimension to the desire to emulate the salaf, Wahhabism can be said
to represent the first truly Salafi movement (as defined in this article), although it took
until the 20th century before this turned into the fully fledged worldwide trend we know
today. Wahhabism has, however, provided the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with the
ideological underpinnings of the state since the 18th century.8

Modernist Salafis
Attempts to return Islam to the supposed purity of the salaflegally, theologically, or
sometimes bothhave thus been part of Islam for centuries. Wahhabism on the Arabian
Peninsula, moreover, gave actual Salafi scholars and adherents a territorial base in Saudi
Arabia that has lasted until today. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, another trend
came to the fore that has also become known as Salafism. This trend, mostly associated
with the Iranian activist and thinker Jaml al-Dn al-Afghn (18381897) and the
Egyptian scholar Muammad Abduh (18491905), was modernist in nature and sought
to reconcile the teachings of Islam with the challenges of modernity. Research has shown
that neither of these two men likely saw themselves as actual Salafis, however. They did
not refer to their modernist reformism as Salafism, and, perhaps most important, held
views quite at odds with those of the modern-day movement known as Salafism.9
Reformers who may be labeled modernist Salafis did exist, however, and could be
found in Syria and Iraq in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Men such as Mamd
Shukr al-Als (18561924) from Baghdad and the Damascene Jaml al-Dn al-Qsim
(18661914) held ideas that were not exactly like Wahhabism, but did share its claim to
go back to the salaf in all its teachings. For modernist Salafis, this expressed itself in an

Page 5 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

admiration for scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya, a strong tendency to reject taqld, and an
aversion to what they saw as man-made additions to Islam. Yet the objective of these
modernist Salafis was different from those of the Wahhabis. While the latter wanted to
return to the salaf to purify Islam, the former stressed their focus on the pious
predecessors to strip the religion of elements they deemed backward in order to
modernize Islam.10 It is doubtful that modernist Salafis ever formed a real trend as such
and, because their modernist bent is so different from purifying Salafism, they will not
be dealt with any further in this article.

The Spread of Salafism

Salafism champions the strict emulation of the salaf, which sets it apart from orthodox or
mainstream Sunni Muslims, who do not imitate the pious predecessors directly but
view them through the prism of the Islamic scholarly tradition as embodied by the
madhhib and their ulam. Orthodox Sunnis nevertheless see the Prophet Muhammad
and his companions as examples after which they should model their lives. Although this
is a different and more general approach toward early Islam than Salafis advocate, it
does show that orthodox Sunnis also attach great importance to the actions of the
Prophet and his companions. As such, Sunnis can be said to be somewhat susceptible to
Salafism as an approach that remains within the Sunni tradition and seemingly only
stresses one aspect of itthe role of the salafabove all else. This is not to say that
orthodox Sunnis are all potential Salafis; in fact, some orthodox Sunnis are quite opposed
to the Salafi approach of Islamic tradition.11 It does mean, however, that Sunnis
admiration of the pious predecessorseven if only generallyfacilitates the spread of
Salafism among them, especially given Salafis allegedly greater authenticity and purity
resulting from their concentration on the salaf.
The spread of Salafism in the 20th century and its emergence as a worldwide trend
(rather than an ideology espoused by individuals or local movements such as Wahhabism)
should be explained in this context of general Sunni proclivity toward the salaf. Although
indigenous Salafi scholars and movements in various places have undoubtedly
contributed to the rise of Salafism, the most important factor in the trends spread has
been the influence of Wahhabism since the 1950s. This influence has been due to three
factors. First, there was the rise of the oil industry in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the
Gulf. Because of the booming oil business since the second half of the 20th century, many
Arabs emigrated to Saudi Arabia or other Gulf countries to find jobs there. Apart from
employment, they also often found Wahhabi ideas there, influencing their own beliefs,
which they subsequently took with them when they returned to their home countries,
Page 6 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

sometimes even resulting in the founding of Salafi organizations.12 Second, in response to

the anti-monarchical rhetoric from socialist Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s and
revolutionary post-1979 Iran, Saudi Arabia actively started pursuing a policy of spreading
Wahhabism as a conservative counter-narrative, backed up by money made in the oil
industry.13 Third, the defeat of several Arab states in the June 1967 war with Israel and,
by extension, the de-legitimization of Arab socialism, as espoused by Egyptian President
Jaml Abd al-Nir (Nasser; r. 19541970), led to a search for an alternative discourse,
which provided fertile ground for Wahhabism.14 As such, Salafism was spread across the
Muslim world and even beyond when Middle Eastern Salafis moved to European
countries and elsewhere to preach their message there.

Salafi Theology
The spread of Salafism through Wahhabi propaganda from Saudi Arabia was meant to act
as a conservative antidote to more radical ideologies from Egypt and Iran (after the 1979
Islamic Revolution). Yet present-day Salafism can be quite radical itself in the sense that
its adherents sometimes advocate overthrowing regimes in the Muslim world or support
terrorist attacks, while other Salafis abhor such violence. This suggests that Salafism is
not a homogeneous trend but quite diverse. Part of this diversity can be ascribed to
theology, which is the most important aspect in which Salafis seek to emulate the pious
predecessors, but which is also one of the most internally contested aspects of their
broader ideology.
Salafi theological views are often framed in opposition to other movements and trends
within Islam, including ones that no longer exist as such. In fact, Salafis often seem to
make their theological case by pointing out whom they are not and what they reject,
rather than saying what they stand for themselves, which is perhaps not surprising given
that Salafis distinguish themselves through their claim to salaf-inspired purity.
Generally speaking, in theological issues Salafis have a strong tendency to rely on what
believers consider inerrant revelation (way) as expressed in the texts of the Qurn.
Simultaneously, they reject the excessive spiritualism associated with Sufism, the
deviant doctrines of the medieval rationalist Mutazila movement, the supposedly
compromised and sullied message of what might be termed orthodox Sunni Ashar/
Mturd theology, and the allegedly extremist views on faith (mn) and unbelief (kufr)
by the Murjia and Khawrij, both of them early Islamic trends. This has resulted in a
Salafi aqda that is both distinct from those of others in several of its aspects and also
supposedly accords with what the salaf believed.

Page 7 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

The Unity of God

The first half of the Islamic confession of faith (shahda) states that there is no god but
God. Given the centrality of what Muslims call the unity of God (tawd) in all of Islam,
the belief in one deity is certainly not unique to Salafis. The latter do, however, give a
very specific meaning to tawd that distinguishes them from other trends within Islam in
order to make clear that Salafism is entirely innocent of any form of polytheism (shirk).
More precisely, Salafis distinguish the unity of lordship (tawd al-rubbiyya), the
unity of divinity (tawd al-ulhiyya, also known as tawd al-ilhiyya or tawd al-ibda
the unity of worship) and the unity of [Gods] names and attributes (tawd al-asm
wa-l-ift). While the former refers to the English word monotheism in the sense that it
denotes the belief that there is only one Lord and Creator, the latter two require some
explanation because they clearly distinguish Salafis from some other Muslims.
Tawd al-ulhiyya refers to the belief that only God may be worshipped and that popular
practices like the veneration of saints or Shiite imams or the seeking of intercession
with God from deceased family members or scholars are forms of polytheism. On the
basis of Q. 9:31 ([Jews and Christians] have taken their rabbis and their monks as lords
[arbban] apart from God; translation by A. J. Arberry), Salafis also believe that
following legislative systems other than the shara is a form of unbelief, although they
differ on the gravity of this and what consequences it should have. Tawd al-asm wa-lift, finally, refers to the belief that God is entirely unique in all his characteristics.
Salafis read verses from the Qurn about Gods physical attributes (eyes, hands, etc.;
see, e.g., Q. 54:14; 38:75; 67:1) literally and reject the metaphorical explanation of such
verses by the Mutazila, yet they also believe that like Him there is naught (Q. 42:11;
translation by A. J. Arberry). Salafis reconcile these seemingly contradictory verses by
accepting that God apparently has these characteristics but without speculating as to
what they look like exactly. This line of thinking squares mostly or even entirely with the
anbal approach of not [asking] how (bi-l kayfa), but contrasts with Ashar/Mturd
theology, which allowed for somewhat more speculation on this subject.15

Faith
The concept of tawd al-ulhiyya is not uniformly interpreted by Salafis. Related to this
lack of unity is the question of what constitutes faith. Some prominent Muslim scholars,
like Ab anfa al-Numn b. Thbit (d. 767) and the anaf scholar Ab Jafar Amad b.
Muammad al-aw (d. 933), believed that faith is found in peoples hearts and speech
only, not in acts.16 The early Islamic Murjia (postponers) held similar beliefs17 and, on

Page 8 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

top of this, also claimed that the judgment of Muslims faith should be postponed and left
to God, hence their name.18 This position meant, in effect, that acts did not influence the
presence or level of a Muslims faith at all as long as they were not supported by
corresponding beliefs or speech.
A second position in the debate on what constitutes faith was held by, for example, the
Mutazila, anbals, and the early Islamic Khawrij trend. All of these stated that faith did
include acts and that these should, in fact, be seen as an integral part of it. That position
meant that acts could have an impact on mn, irrespective of whether they were
supported by corresponding beliefs and/or speech. This resulted in the position that
Salafis also hold nowadays, namely, that faith is expressed through belief (itiqd) or
assent (tadq) in the heart (bi-l-qalb), speech (qawl) or verbal affirmation (iqrr) that
shows this faith with the tongue (bi-l-lisn), and corresponding acts with the limbs (alaml bi-l-jawri).19

Unbelief
Differences between Salafis and those they agree with on the different elements of faith
become apparent once one focuses on the opposite of mn: unbelief. Salafis believe that
sins can take place on three levels of faith: first, they distinguish the soundness of the
religion (iat al-dn), which refers to parts of Islam that are so basic to the religion
like the belief in the existence of one godthat any violation of them (e.g., by bowing to
an idol) is immediately labeled kufr; second, Salafis recognize the compulsory of the
religion (wjib al-dn), which pertains to tenets of Islam whose rejection is seen as a
major sin (kabra, pl. kabir), but not as kufr (such sins include drinking wine); and third,
the perfection of the religion (kaml al-dn) denotes things that are commendable
(mustaabb) and whose violation is not sinful at all.20
Sins on the first two levels of faith are divided into two forms of unbelief: major unbelief
(kufr akbar) and minor unbelief (kufr aghar). The latter consists of major sins that are
not committed out of actual unbelief, but because of temptation, bribery, or other factors
that do not reflect kufr in a Muslims heart. If such a sin, however, is of the utmost gravity
(like the aforementioned prostration before an idol) or is underpinned by unbelief in ones
heart or speech, it is elevated to the level of kufr akbar. Salafis distinguish three ways of
showing that a sinful act is supported by actual unbelief: if a Muslim makes clear that he
or she (1) acted out of conviction (itiqd), despite realizing that Islam prohibits this act;
(2) permitted him- or herself to do something (istill) by turning something forbidden
(arm) into something that is allowed (all); or (3) expressed negation (jad or jud)
of Islam through a certain act. If Muslims consciously support their sinful acts with such

Page 9 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

meanseven if they are merely major sinsSalafis believe such people are guilty of
major unbelief. This is a clear distinction between Salafis and the Khawrij, who are said
to have labeled any major sin kufr, irrespective of the intentions of the culprit. Apart from
this relative carefulness by Salafis in labeling something kufr akbar, they also recognize
that there are general obstacles to reaching this verdict, such as if a Muslim made an
honest mistake (khaa) or acted out of compulsion (ikrh) or ignorance (jahl), to name
but a few.21

Excommunication
The concepts of faith and unbelief are not just divisive between Salafis and others but
also between Salafis themselves. This becomes particularly clear when one looks at the
logical extension of this debate on mn and kufr: excommunication (takfr, calling
Muslims unbelievers (kuffr, sing. kfir)). This concept is contentious among Salafis
anyway, but even more so when applied to the political rulers of Muslim countries
because of their unwillingness to apply the shara at the state level. Given that Salafis
generally believe, on the basis of Q. 9:31, that not following the laws of Islam is like
worshipping other lords and thus a violation of the tawd al-ulhiyya, they see the
application of positive law or man-made laws (qawnn waiyya) as a form of unbelief.
Exactly what type of unbelief this is and whether the culprit is thus a kfir or merely a
fsiq (sinner)22 is an issue that greatly divides Salafis.
Four different positions can be distinguished in the debate over the excommunication of
the rulers. The first could be said to be that of (among others) the Murjia, who would not
pronounce takfr over such acts at all, since they excluded acts from faith altogether. This
means that they believed neglecting to apply the shara had no effects on a Muslims
faith. The second position would be that of some Salafis, who argue that not applying
Islamic law is a major sin and thus a form of minor unbelief, except when it is supported
by itiqd, istill, or jud. The third position is held by other Salafis, who agree with the
second position but hold that some rulers application of non-Islamic laws is so structural
and systematic that it constitutes a total exchange (tabdl) of laws, thus ensuring that no
further proof of that rulers unbelief is necessary to label this act major unbelief and to
apply takfr. A fourth position is that of the Khawrij, whom are said to have
excommunicated people for any major sins, regardless of whether the sins were
underpinned by intentions of unbelief or not. Thus, Salafis do not agree entirely on how
to deal with rulers breaches of the shara and how to label the culprits. It is clear that
Salafis distinguish themselves from both the Murjia and the Khawrij, although this has
not stopped Salafis who differ on this point from vilifying each other as neo-Murjia and
neo-Khawrij to de-legitimize the others ideas on the issue of takfr.23
Page 10 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

Ideological Instruments of Exclusiveness

Considering the alleged purity of the pious predecessors that Salafis strive to emulate
so meticulously in their theological ideas, it is perhaps not surprising that their worldview
is one in which they try to remain faithful to their own beliefs while guarding these from
outside influences. This results in a certain exclusiveness that Salafis express through
their belief that they are the sect saved (from hellfire) (al-firqa al-njiya) or the
victorious group (al-ifa al-manra). These terms are derived from adths claiming
that Jews and Christians have split up into 71 or 72 sects (firqa), while the Islamic
community would split up into 73 sects, all of which are in hell, except for one. That is
the group [jama]. Such a reference to a special group also appears in a adth
mentioning that a group [ifa] from my umma will remain committed to the truth (al laqq).24
Because the sect or group described in such adths is clearly set apart from others
in a positive way as the one exclusively adhering to the truth, it is not surprising that
Muslims want to associate with this group and portray themselves as its adherents.
Salafis are no exception in this regard and they therefore also claim that these terms
apply to them. For Salafis, the truth mentioned in one of these adths is obviously
Islam as espoused by the pious predecessors. Salafis also strongly associate this with
not following what they perceive to be deviant branches of Islam and, instead, staying on
the straight path (al-sir al-mustaqm). This term, which can also be found in Q. 1:6,
has long been part of Salafis vocabulary as a means to stay pure in their beliefs and
customs.25

Strangers and Strange Elements

One term Salafis use to describe their position as true believers amidst so many people
who deviate from their views is strangers (ghurab). This concept refers to adths
stating Islam began as a stranger [inna l-Islm badaa gharban] and it will return as it
began [wa-sayadu kam badaa], as a stranger or slightly different words. These words
are meant to have a positive connotation, Salafis believe, on the basis of one adth,
which adds so good tidings [b] to the strangers [al-ghurab].26 Even more explicitly
positive is another adth stating: Be in the world [kun f l-duny] as if you are a stranger
or a traveller [bir al-sabl].27 Because of the exclusiveness that Salafis attach to their
views, the term ghurab is a label that Salafis often apply to themselves. Moreover, this
term also embodies the idea that true Muslims do not really belong anywhere else but

Page 11 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

in Islam. As a result, any opposition that Salafis may encounter in society against their
strict or exclusive views can be seen as confirmation that they are the strangers
referred to in these adths and that they therefore must be on the right path.28
While strangers is a positive term among Salafis, strange elements or
innovations (bida, sing. bida) certainly are not. Salafis believe that, throughout the
centuries, many of these man-made additions to the religion have entered Islam because
of Muslims use of sources outside the Qurn and the Sunna, such as scholars own
views, the consensus of the ulam, speculative theology (kalm), and rationalism (aql).
As a result, both Sunni doctrine and Islamic law have supposedly become polluted. Salafis
therefore focus part of their attention on the cleansing (tafiya) of Islam of such things
and, for example, make a considerable effort to weed out what they see as false adths
from books of Qurnic exegesis (tafsr) and Islamic law (fiqh) in order to restore the
religion to the purity it had in the days of the salaf. None of this means, however, that
Salafis are entirely against renewal (tajdd). They, in fact, support the latter as a revival
of true Islam, which is believed to happen at the turn of every century but does not add
anything new to the religion, while bida are actual human additions to the beliefs of the
pious predecessors.29

Loyalty and Disavowal

Given Salafis stress on keeping their beliefs clean from outside influences, they need a
strong sense of commitment to their own group and everything it stands for while at the
same time keeping outside influences at bay. The most important ideological instrument
used by Salafis to bring this about is loyalty and disavowal (al-wal wa-l-bar). Wal
refers to the loyalty and faithfulness Salafis claim one should have toward God, Islam,
and other Muslims, while bar denotes the disavowal and rejection one must display
toward everything that deviates from these.
In practice, Salafis use al-wal wa-l-bar in three ways. The first of these is the most
common and encompasses the strict commitment that Salafis display toward Islam in the
social and personal sphere. This is expressed through the use of Muslim names for
children rather than, for example, English ones; the celebration of the feast of the
breaking of the Raman fast (d al-fir) and the feast of sacrifice (d al-a) while
shunning other feasts and holidays (including the birthday of the Prophet); greeting
fellow-Muslims in the properly Islamic way rather than just saying hello; and so on.
Such rules have the potential, of course, to keep Salafis away from others entirely, which
especially in a non-Muslim context like in Western countriescan hamper the
integration of their communities in society.30 In fact, Salafis often claim that if Muslims

Page 12 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

cannot live as fully fledged believers in their home countries, they shouldlike the
Prophet himself is said to have done when he fled from Mecca to Medina in 622make a
hijra (emigration) to a Muslim country.31
A second, more controversial form of al-wal wa-l-bar includes a political interpretation
of the concept, which states that Muslims must never engage in asking non-Muslims for
help (al-istina bi-l-kuffr) or give help to non-Muslims against fellow-believers (inat alkuffr), especially in times of war. This type of al-wal wa-l-bar can be seen as entailing
strong political solidarity among Muslims while simultaneously avoiding any diplomatic
or military ties with non-Muslim countries. This dimension of the concept became
particularly prominent when Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to ward off a potential Iraqi
invasion of its land, invited 500,000 (mostly non-Muslim) American soldiers to defend the
kingdom against the (mostly Muslim) Iraqi army, which led to protests in Saudi Arabia
itself and rejection among Salafis elsewhere.32
The final form of al-wal wa-l-bar is the legal one, which states that Muslims loyalty to
God should also extend to his laws, meaning that the shara should be applied in full and
that man-made laws should be rejected outright. This last dimension is far less common
than the first two.33

Salafism in Practice
Apart from the differences in theology, Salafis are also divided on their method (manhaj)
of how to apply their views in practice. The term manhaj has been applied by Salafis to
roughly three areas. The first is their method of reading the Qurn and the Sunna.
Unlike other Muslims, who apply extra-textual means to interpret these sources, Salafis
read these sources literally, such as in the example of Gods attributes. As such, they
distinguish themselves from the Mutazila (and, to a lesser extent, from orthodox Sunnis
following an Ashar/Mturd theology), who apply rationalism, metaphorical
interpretation (tawl), and speculative theology (kalm) to the texts.
Second, their manhaj with regard to worship (ibda) is to stay away from the veneration
of saints and rituals such as the commemoration of the martyrdom of usayn, which
they see as veiled forms of shirk. In this way, Salafis differentiate between their method
of worship and other forms of popular religion as well as Shiite customs.
Thirdand most importantSalafis use the term manhaj to indicate their method of
dealing with politics and society. Whereas the other two forms of manhaj distinguish
Salafis from other Muslims, this third dimension shows the fault-lines among Salafis
Page 13 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

themselves because it makes clear how they differ in their engagement with societal
affairs, political questions in their countries, and the regimes under whose rule they live.
It is for this reason that Salafis are often divided along the lines of this third dimension of
manhaj.34 Although theological differences also exist between Salafis, it is their
engagement with politics and society that makes them most distinct from one another in
practice. As such, three branches of Salafis can roughly be distinguished: quietist Salafis,
political ones, and Jihadi-Salafis, each of which can be divided into separate subbranches.

Quietist Salafis
Probably the majority of Salafis worldwide consists of quietists: Salafis who are politically
quietist in the sense that they stay away from political activism such as running for
parliament, attending political demonstrations, signing and presenting petitions,
engaging in political debates, and founding political parties. To quietist Salafis, such
activities are merely a diversion that leads people away from the eternal message of
Islam. Instead, Salafis, on the one hand, focus on cleansing Islamic tradition in a
process that they claim will bring them closer and closer to reaching the supposed purity
of the salaf, while, on the other hand, teaching this allegedly pristine form of Islam to
their adherents through education (tarbiya) and missionary activities (dawa).35
Quietist Salafis reasons for not engaging in political activism include more than just the
fickle nature of politics. To quietists, activities such as demonstrations, political parties,
and debates on contentious political issues divide the umma andmore importantcause
strife (fitna), which can only lead to bigger problems (instability, chaos, or even civil war)
than the ones people were trying to solve in the first place. This does not mean that
quietists do not care about politics or about the political problems facing Muslim
countries, however. Eventually, they believe, an Islamic state or caliphate will arise and
Islamic policies will be applied, but not before society is ready for it, which is unlikely
to happen anytime soon. For the time being, quietists therefore advocate religious
solutions to political conflicts, calling on Muslims to be pious and remain faithful to Islam
rather than to take political action or frame conflicts in sectarian terms, pitting good
Sunni Muslims versus deviant Shiites, thereby building on anti-Shiite feelings that are
broadly shared among Salafis of all types.
The series of revolutions and revolts that have taken place in the Arab world since 2010
(the Arab Spring) is a case in point that clearly shows quietists unwillingness to
support political activism: quietist Salafis have broadly rejected these uprisings as
causing fitna, feeling vindicatedthough not happywhen the revolts in several
countries turned into armed conflicts in which sometimes thousands of people were
Page 14 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

killed. All of this means that quietists are rather subservient to the existing regimes and
unlikely to rise up against them. Sometimes quoting Q. 13:11 (God changes not what is
in a people, until they change what is in themselves; translation by A. J. Arberry),
thereby indicating that dictatorial rulers will only adjust their behavior once they are
intrinsically motivated to do so, quietist Salafis advocate only giving discreet advice
(naa) to rulers. In practice, however, most quietist Salafis rely on a policy of listening
and obedience (sam wa-a), neatly summing up their attitude toward the rulers.
Quietists differ in their exact relationship with the rulers of their countries, and they can
be divided into three categories: aloofists, loyalists, and propagandists.36
The adherents to one sub-branch of quietist Salafism can be labeled aloofists because
they are aloof from political action and ties with the rulers altogether. Strongly
independent and entirely focused on cleansing Islamic tradition and calling on others to
join them in emulating the salaf, aloofist quietists can be described as the most purely
apolitical Salafis because of their total rejection of getting involved in political activism
and relationships with regimes in any way, even if the latter is merely limited to discreet
advice. It is not clear how big this sub-trend within quietist Salafism is, possibly because
its adherents are ideologically motivated to maintain a low profile, but it is closely
associated with the strongly independent-minded Albanian-born scholar Muammad
Nir al-Dn al-Albn (19141999), who grew up in Syria and eventually became the
leading scholar of the quietist Salafi community in Jordan.37 Another scholar who may be
associated with this trend, though perhaps less fully than al-Albn, is the Yemeni Muqbil
b. Hd al-Wdi, who was the leader of the Salafi community in his country until his
death in 2001.38
The second sub-branch of quietist Salafism is made up of loyalists, a reference to their
loyalty to the regimes of the Muslim world. Although these quietists are as unlikely to
engage in political activism as their aloofist fellow-quietists, they can be called upon to
support their regimes when the latter need them. This attitude is particularly clear in
Saudi Arabia, where there is an official scholarly Salafi establishment that is made up of
ulam who are not engaged in parliamentary action, political debates, or demonstrations
in the streets, but whose religious legitimization is needed by the regime to justify its
policies. As such, these scholars do engage in giving the rulers discreet advice and
although they may not always agree with their political leaderscan be relied upon to
support them in times of need. This trend is more widespread than just in Saudi Arabia,
but is perhaps best exemplified in the careers of Saudi scholars like Abd al-Azz b. Bz
(d. 1999) and Muammad b. li al-Uthaymn (d. 2001), who both held top positions in
the official scholarly Salafi establishment in Saudi Arabia.39
The third and final sub-branch of quietist Salafism is slightly different from the second
one and can be labeled propagandists because they take their loyalty to especially the
Page 15 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

Saudi regime to such heights that they have a tendency to see love of the kingdom almost
as an article of faith and tend to denounce all who dare criticize the Saudi state.
Associated mostly with the Saudi ulam Muammad b. Amn al-Jm (d. 1996) and
particularly Rab b. Hd al-Madkhal (b. 1932), this trend often engages in refuting
political and radical Muslim thinkers and their ideas, a process known as wounding and
setting right (al-jar wa-l-tadl). It is especially members of the Muslim Brotherhood (AlIkhwn al-Muslimn) as well as the more politically committed (and therefore critical)
Salafis that are the target of these refutations.40 Because of their highly visible character
and the support they receive from the Saudi state, propagandists are quite popular
among quietist Salafis in various European countries, such as France41 and the
Netherlands.42

Political Salafis
Unlike the apolitical quietists, political Salafis do engage in activities such as
demonstrations, founding political parties, writing and presenting petitions, and political
debate. They sometimes even run for parliament in elections. Although their basic
ideology is the same as that of other Salafis, they are much more politically savvy, a
tendency that partly has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhoodinspired movement known
as awakening (awa) that started in Saudi Arabia in the 1960s under the influence of
exiled Brothers and came to prominence in the decades afterward. Under the leadership
of scholars such as Salmn al-Awda (b. 1955) and Safar al-awl (b. 1950), this trend
became particularly well known after it was heavily involved in the protests against the
Saudi invitation of 500,000 American troops onto its soil and the attempts to seek
political and religious reform afterward.43
Another important source of engaging with politics can be found in the Kuwaiti Revival of
Islamic Heritage Society (Jamiyyat Iy al-Turth al-Islm). Between 1981 and the early
1990s, it acted as an umbrella for all kinds of Salafi activities in Kuwait, including
political action. The scholar most responsible for this was Ab Abdallh Abd al-Ramn
b. Abd al-Khliq (b. 1939), who sees Islam as including much more than the activities
that quietists focus on and also believes politics is part of religion. Although his criticism
of Saudi Arabias decision to invite 500,000 American soldiers onto its soil in 1990 led to
his removal from the Jamiyyat Iy al-Turth al-Islm and the subsequent
transformation of this organization into a quietist Salafi one, Ibn Abd al-Khliqs
influence among Salafis in Kuwait and elsewhereparticularly Lebanonhas remained.44
Political Salafism, as rooted in the Saudi and Kuwaiti experiences and in indigenous
trends in other countries, has led to basically two types of politicos among Salafis whose
exact positions are not just shaped by ideology but alsoand perhaps even moreby

Page 16 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

political circumstances. On the one hand, there are those who debate politics, do not
reject demonstrations, and believe Salafis should get involved in contentious issues in
society, but who do not run for parliamentary office or try to found political parties
because they do not want to or are not allowed to. The awa movement in Saudi Arabia
can be seen as an example of this trend, as can the Book and Sunna Society (Jamiyyat alKitb wa-l-Sunna) in Jordan.45 On the other hand, there are those political Salafis who
have, in fact, taken the leap into parliamentary work and have actually founded political
parties through which they run for elections. These include some political Salafis in
Kuwait and their Muslim Community Party (izb al-Umma),46 as well as the more recently
established Light Party (izb al-Nr) in Egypt, which was founded in the aftermath of the
overthrow of Egyptian dictator usn Mubrak in 2011.47 Both trends have spread to
other parts of the Muslim world as well as European countries, through the migration of
some of their primary exponents or the spread of their ideology.48

Jihadi-Salafis
The term Jihadi-Salafis suggests that this group consists of the Salafis who support or
wage jihad. This is not entirely correct, however, since all Salafis believe jihadin its
spiritual, social, and military formsis a legitimate concept in Islam, not just JihadiSalafis. What sets the latter apart from other Salafis is the belief that military jihad
should not justin what may be termed a classical jihadbe waged between Muslims
and non-Muslims to defend or expand the abode of Islam (dr al-Islm) but also to fight
against what they perceive to be the apostate rulers in the Muslim world itself. The latter,
Jihadi-Salafis believe, have forfeited their claim to being Muslims and deserve to be killed
for their application of laws other than those of the shara. This revolutionary type of
jihad deviates from the classical one and is rooted ideologically in the writings of radical
Muslim Brotherhood thinkers like the Egyptian Sayyid Qub (19061966) as well as Salafi
writings that have been radically reinterpreted.49
This mixing of ideas between various types of jihad partly occurred in Afghanistan in the
period 19791989, when the Soviet Union occupied that country to support the
communist government there and, as a result, unleashed a wave of Afghan and Arab
resistance to this occupation. Out of this group of Afghan Arabs, which centered on the
Palestinian-Jordanian Muslim Brother Abdallh Azzm (19411989), the terrorist
organization al-Qida (the Base) arose in the 1990s. Although led by the Saudi Usma
b. Ldin (19572011), the latters deputy and eventual successor, the Egyptian physician
Ayman al-awhir (b. 1950), came up with a new form of jihad labeled global jihad,
which entailed taking the fight to the Western backers of apostate regimes in the
Muslim world to get them to withdraw their support, leaving the leaders in Islamic

Page 17 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

countries weak and easy to topple. It is in this ideological context that attacks such as the
ones on September 11, 2001, and the July 7, 2005, bombings in London should be seen.50
Although al-Qida became the primary exponent of Jihadi-Salafism and most important
advocate of global jihad after 2001, this organization was supported and provided with
justification of its general ideology by a host of scholars around the world, including the
Palestinian-Jordanian Ab Muammad al-Maqdis (b. 1959), his countryman Ab Qatda
al-Filasn (b. 1960), and the Syrian-British Ab Bar al-ars (b. 1959). Moreover, the
popularity of this organization among Jihadi-Salafis outside the Afghanistan/Pakistanregion combined with the American-led war against the groups bases in Afghanistan
ensured that it developed into several local branches. These often engaged in renewing
the revolutionary jihad against the regimes in their own countries and/or fought the
American military stationed there. This was the case in, among other countries, Saudi
Arabia,51 Yemen,52 andperhaps most importantIraq. The latter, led by the Jordanian
militant Ab Muab al-Zarqw (19662006), was responsible for many hundreds of
deaths among American soldiers, who were there in the context of the America-led war in
Iraq that started in 2003, but also among Shiites in various places around the country.53
Al-Qida in Mesopotamiaas the Iraqi branch of the organization was referred tolater
developed into the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI; al-Dawla al-Islmiyya f l-Irq) and, after the
civil war in Syria that started in 2011 provided the organization with a foothold in that
country, the Islamic State in Iraq and Shm (Greater Syria; ISIS; al-Dawla al-Islmiyya f
l-Irq wa-l-Shm). On June 29, 2014, the organization, under the leadership of the Iraqi
Ab Bakr al-Baghdd (real name: Ibrhm Awwd Ibrhm Al al-Badr al-Samarr; b.
1971) even went so far as to announce the establishment of a caliphate and changed its
name again, this time simply into the Islamic State (IS; al-Dawla al-Islmiyya).54 The
idea that a new caliphate had arisen on the basis of Jihadi-Salafi ideas excited many
people and, indeed, thousands of Muslim men and women flocked to Syria and Iraqfor
different reasonsto support IS, but many Jihadi-Salafi scholars (not to mention
mainstream Sunni ulam, who reject Jihadi-Salafism altogether) were quite dismayed.
To them, the use of violence by ISwhich sometimes included beheadings and burning
people aliveas well as that organizations exclusive claim to have re-established the
caliphate were explicitly rejected by many Jihadi-Salafi scholars as premature, unwise,
illegitimate, and even unbecoming of Jihadi-Salafism as a whole.55
The rise of IS and its widely displayed violence have put the media spotlight firmly on a
branch of Salafism that many of the broader trends adherents do not want to associate
with in any way. In fact, quietists often reject labeling groups such as al-Qida and IS as
Salafis, claiming that such organizations have nothing to do with the salaf and, by
extension, Salafism whatsoever. To them, their manhaj of cleansing and teaching Islam
without getting involved in political activismlet alone terrorismis the only correct
Page 18 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

method of emulating the salaf. It is therefore ironic that the very groups that have
probably done more to bring Salafism to peoples attention are precisely those
organizations that most Salafis utterly abhor.

Further Reading
Bonnefoy, Laurent. Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity. London:
Hurst, 2011.
Cavatorta, Francesco, and Fabio Merone, eds. Salafism after the Arab Spring. London:
Hurst, 2016.
Commins, David Dean. Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Commins, David. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I. B. Tauris, 2006.
Gauvain, Richard. Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God. London: Routledge, 2013.
Haykel, Bernard. Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani.
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Lacroix, Stphane. Les Islamistes saoudiens: Une insurrection manque. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 2010.
Lauzire, Henri. The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2016.
Lav, Daniel. Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Meijer, Roel, ed. Global Salafism: Islams New Religious Movement. London: Hurst, 2009.
Pall, Zoltan. Lebanese Salafis between the Gulf and Europe: Development,
Fractionalization and Transnational Networks of Salafism in Lebanon. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2013.
Rougier, Bernard, ed. Quest-ce que le salafisme? Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
2008.
Steinberg, Guido. Religion und Staat in Saudi-Arabien: Die wahhabitische Gelehrten,
19021953. Wrzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2002.

Page 19 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

Wagemakers, Joas. A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad alMaqdisi. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Wagemakers, Joas. Salafism in Jordan: Political Islam in a Quietist Community.
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Weismann, Itzchak. Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman
Damascus. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2001.

Notes:
(1.) a al-Bukhr, book 57 (Kitb Fail Ab al-Nab), chapter 1 (Fail Ab
al-Nab), nos. 23; and a Muslim, book 44 (Kitb Fail al-aba), chapter 52
(Fal al-aba, thumma lladhna Yalnahum, thumma lladhna Yalnahum), nos.
25332536.
(2.) N. J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1999); Wael B. Hallaq, Shara: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
(3.) Bernard Haykel, On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action, in Global Salafism:
Islams New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (London: Hurst, 2009), 3357.
(4.) Jonathan Brown, The Canonization of al-Bukhr and Muslim: The Formation and
Function of the Sunn adth Canon (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2007).
(5.) Mariam Abou Zahab, Salafism in Pakistan: The Ahl-e Hadith Movement, in Global
Salafism: Islams New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (London: Hurst, 2009), 126
142; and Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 18601900
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
(6.) Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawkani
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Guido Steinberg, Religion und
Staat in Saudi-Arabien: Die wahhabitische Gelehrten, 19021953 (Wrzburg: Ergon
Verlag, 2002).
(7.) George S. Rentz, The Birth of the Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia:
Muammad b. Abd al-Wahhb (1703/41792) and the Beginnings of Unitarian Empire in
Arabia (London: Arabian Publishing, 2004).

Page 20 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

(8.) David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006).
(9.) Henri Lauzire, The Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the
Perspective of Conceptual History, International Journal of Middle East Studies 42.3
(2010): 369389; and Henri Lauzire, The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).
(10.) David Dean Commins, Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman
Syria (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Hala Fattah, Wahhabi Influences,
Salafi Responses: Shaikh Mahmud Shukri and the Iraqi Salafi Movement, 17451930,
Journal of Islamic Studies 14.2 (2003): 127148; Munim Sirry, Jaml al-Dn al-Qsim
and the Salafi Approach to Sufism, Die Welt des Islams 51.1 (2011): 75108; Itzchak
Weismann, Between f Reformism and Modernist Rationalism: A Reappraisal of the
Origins of the Salafiyya from the Damascene Angle, Die Welt des Islams 41.2 (2001):
206237; Itzchak Weismann, Genealogies of Fundamentalism: Salafi Discourse in
Nineteenth-Century Baghdad, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36.2 (2009):
267280; and Itzchak Weismann, Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in
Late Ottoman Damascus (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2001).
(11.) Muammad Sad Raman al-B, Al-Salafiyya Marala Zamaniyya Mubraka L
Madhhab Islm (Beirut: Dr al-Fikr al-Muir, 2010).
(12.) Mamoun Fandy, Egypts Islamic Group: Regional Revenge, Middle East Journal
48.4 (1994): 607625.
(13.) Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, trans. Pascale
Ghazaleh (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2004); Reinhard Schulze,
Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der
islamischen Weltliga (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1990); and Saeed Shehabi, The
Role of Religious Ideology in the Expansionist Policies of Saudi Arabia, in Kingdom
without Borders: Saudi Arabias Political, Religious and Media Frontiers, ed. Madawi AlRasheed (London: Hurst, 2008), 183197.
(14.) Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, trans. Anthony F. Roberts
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2002).
(15.) Nader el-Bizri, God: Essence and Attributes, in The Cambridge Companion to
Classical Islamic Theology, ed. Tim Winter (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University
Press, 2008), 121140; and Mohammad Gharaibeh, Zur Glaubenslehre des Salafismus,

Page 21 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

in Salafismus: Auf der Suche nach dem wahren Islam, ed. Behnam T. Said and Hazim
Fouad (Freiburg: Herder, 2014), 106131.
(16.) William Montgomery Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought (Oxford: One
World, 1998); and A. J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical
Development (London: Frank Cass, 1965).
(17.) J. Meric Pessagno, The Murjia, mn and Ab Ubayd, Journal of the American
Oriental Society 95.3 (1975): 382394; and Joseph Schacht, An Early Murciite Treatise,
Oriens 17 (1964): 96117.
(18.) Wilferd Madelung, Der Imam al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim und die Glaubenslehre der
Zaiditen (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965); and William Montgomery Watt, Islamic
Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1962).
(19.) Wilferd Madelung, Early Sunni Doctrine Concerning Faith as Reflected in the Kitb
al-mn of Ab Ubayd al-Qsim b. Sallm (d. 224/839), Studia Islamica 32 (1970): 233
254.
(20.) Joas Wagemakers, The Transformation of a Radical Concept: Al-Wala wa-l-Bara in
the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, in Global Salafism: Islams New Religious
Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (London: Hurst, 2009), 81106.
(21.) Joas Wagemakers, An Inquiry into Ignorance: A Jihd-Salaf Debate on Jahl as an
Obstacle to Takfr, in The Transmission and Dynamics of the Textual Sources of Islam:
Essays in Honour of Harald Motzki, ed. Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort, Kees Versteegh,
and Joas Wagemakers (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2011), 301327.
(22.) Q.: 5:4447.
(23.) Daniel Lav, Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Joas Wagemakers, Seceders and Postponers?
An Analysis of the Khawarij and Murjia Labels in Polemical Debates between Quietist
and Jihadi-Salafis, in Contextualising Jihadi Thought, ed. Jeevan Deol and Zaheer Kazmi
(London: Hurst, 2012), 145164.
(24.) a al-Bukhr, book 56 (Kitb al-Manqib), chapter 27 (Bb), nos. 834 and
835; book 92 (Kitb al-Itim bi-l-Kitb wa-l-Sunna), chapter 10 (Qawl al-Nab all
llh alayhi wa-Sallam: L Tazlu ifatun min Ummat hirna al l-aqq wa-Hum Ahl
al-Ilm), no. 414.

Page 22 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

(25.) Amad b. Abd al-alm b. Abd al-Salm b. Taymiyya, Iqti al-ir al-Mustaqm liMukhlaft Ab al-Jam, ed. Nir b. Abd al-Karm al-Aql, 2 vols. (N.p.: Dr alIshbliy li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawz, 1998).
(26.) a Muslim, book 1 (Kitb al-mn), chapter 65 (Bb Bayn anna l-Islm Badaa
Gharban wa-innahu Yaziru bayna l-Masjidayn), nos. 145146.
(27.) a al-Bukhr, book 76 (Kitb al-Riqiq), chapter 3 (Bb Qawl al-Nab all
llh alayhi wa-Sallam: Kun f l-Duny ka-annaka Gharbun), no. 425.
(28.) Benno Kpfer, Ghurabadas Konzept der Fremden in salafistischen Strmungen:
Von Namen eines Terrorcamps zum subkulturellen Lifestyle, in Salafismus: Auf der
Suche nach dem wahren Islam, ed. Behnam T. Said and Hazim Fouad (Freiburg: Herder,
2014), 442473.
(29.) Ella Landau-Tasseron, The Cyclical Reform: A Study of the Mujaddid Tradition,
Studia Islamica 70 (1989): 79117.
(30.) Uriya Shavit, Can Muslims Befriend Non-Muslims? Debating al-wal wa-l-bar
(Loyalty and Disavowal) in Theory and Practice, Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations
25.1 (2014): 6788; Uriya Shavit, The Wasa and Salaf Approaches to the Religious Law
of Muslim Minorities, Islamic Law and Society 19 (2012): 416457.
(31.) Alan Verskin, Oppressed in the Land? Fatws on Muslims Living under Non-Muslim
Rule from the Middle Ages to the Present (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2013).
(32.) Joas Wagemakers, The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and
Radical Wahhabi Contestations of al-Wal wa-l-Bar, International Journal of Middle
East Studies 44.1 (2012): 93110; and Joas Wagemakers, Framing the Threat to Islam:
Al-Wala wa-l-Bara in Salafi Discourse, Arab Studies Quarterly 30.4 (2008): 122.
(33.) Joas Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad
al-Maqdisi (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
(34.) Quintan Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism 29.3 (2006): 207239.
(35.) Richard Gauvain, Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God (London: Routledge,
2013).

Page 23 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

(36.) Joas Wagemakers, Revisiting Wiktorowicz: Categorising and Defining the Branches
of Salafism, in Salafism after the Arab Awakening: Contending with Peoples Power, ed.
Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone (London: Hurst, forthcoming).
(37.) Stphane Lacroix, LApport de Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani au salafisme
contemporain, in Quest-ce que le salafisme? ed. Bernard Rougier (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 2008), 4564; Stphane Lacroix, Between Revolution and
Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary
Salafism, in Global Salafism: Islams New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (London:
Hurst, 2009), 5880; and Joas Wagemakers, Salafism in Jordan: Political Islam in a
Quietist Community (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
(38.) Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity
(London: Hurst, 2011); and Bernard Haykel, The Salafis in Yemen at a Crossroads: An
Obituary of Shaykh Muqbil al-Wadii of Dammaj (d. 1422/2001), Jemen Report 2 (2002):
2837.
(39.) Nabile Mouline, Les Clercs de lislam: Autorit religieuse et pouvoir politique en
Arabie Saoudite, XVIIIeXXIe sicle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2011);
Madawi al-Rasheed, The Minaret and the Palace: Obedience at Home and Rebellion
Abroad, in Kingdom without Borders: Saudi Arabias Political, Religious and Media
Frontiers, ed. Madawi Al-Rasheed (London: Hurst, 2008), 199219; and Guido Steinberg,
The Wahhabi Ulama and the Saudi State: 1745 to the Present, in Saudi Arabia in the
Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, ed. Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman
(London: Hurst, 2005), 1134.
(40.) Roel Meijer, Politicising al-Jar wa-l-Tadl: Rab b. Hd al-Madkhal and the
Transnational Battle for Religious Authority, in The Transmission and Dynamics of the
Textual Sources of Islam: Essays in Honour of Harald Motzki, ed. Nicolet Boekhoff-van
der Voort, Kees Versteegh, and Joas Wagemakers (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2011),
375399.
(41.) Mohamed-Ali Adraoui, tre salafiste en France, in Quest-ce que le salafisme? ed.
Bernard Rougier (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008), 231241; Mohamed-Ali
Adraoui, Du Golfe aux banlieues: Le Salafisme mondialis (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 2013); Mohamed-Ali Adraoui, Salafism in France: Ideology, Practices and
Contradictions, in Global Salafism: Islams New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer
(London: Hurst, 2009), 364383; and Samir Amghar, Le Salafisme daujourdhui:
Mouvements sectaries en Occident (Paris: Michalon ditions, 2011).

Page 24 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

(42.) Martijn de Koning, Joas Wagemakers, and Carmen Becker, Salafisme: Utopische
idealen in een weerbarstige praktijk (Almere: Parthenon, 2014); and Ineke Roex, Leven
als de profeet in Nederland: Over de salafi-beweging en democratie (PhD Diss.,
University of Amsterdam, 2013).
(43.) Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York: Palgrave,
1999); Stphane Lacroix, Les Islamistes saoudiens: Une insurrection manque (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 2010); Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State:
Islamic Voices from a New Generation (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,
2007); and Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabias Islamic Opposition
(Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000).
(44.) Carine Lahoud-Tatar, Islam et politique au Kowet (Paris: Presses Universitaire de
France, 2011); and Zoltan Pall, Lebanese Salafis between the Gulf and Europe:
Development, Fractionalization and Transnational Networks of Salafism in Lebanon
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013).
(45.) Joas Wagemakers, The Dual Effect of the Arab Spring on Salafi Integration:
Political Salafism in Jordan, in Salafism after the Arab Spring, ed. Francesco Cavatorta
and Fabio Merone (London: Hurst, 2016).
(46.) Carine Lahoud, Kowet: Salafismes et rapports au pouvoir, in Quest-ce que le
salafisme? ed. Bernard Rougier (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2008), 123135.
(47.) Jacob Higilt and Frida Nome, Egyptian Salafism in Revolution, Journal of Islamic
Studies 25.1 (2014): 3354; and Stphane Lacroix, Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the
New Egyptian Salafism (Doha: Brookings Institution, 2012).
(48.) Noorhaidi Hasan, Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts in the Salafi Movement in
Indonesia, in Global Salafism: Islams New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer
(London: Hurst, 2009), 169188.
(49.) Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh, trans. Jon
Rothschild (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003).
(50.) Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
(51.) Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Page 25 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016

Salafism

(52.) Gregory D. Johnsen, The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and Americas War in
Arabia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2013).
(53.) Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of
Martyrdom (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007).
(54.) William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision
of the Islamic State (New York: St. Martins Press, 2015).
(55.) Ql an Dawlat al-Baghdd: Aqwl al-Ulam al-miln wa-Ahl al-Ray alMutabarn wa-Qdat al-Jihd al-Maymn f Khawrij Dawlat al-Mriqn, ed. Katib Rad
al-Khawrij, 2015, http://www.gulfup.com/?tL7iCM.
Joas Wagemakers

Utrecht University

Page 26 of 26

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, RELIGION (religion.oxfordre.com). (c) Oxford University Press
USA, 2016. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy).
date: 15 August 2016