G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken

for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law
by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am.
Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an

intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far
as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (19741975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession.
If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more
lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of
the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation
which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission
on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am
quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar
who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the

clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret
this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their
legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation
may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the
Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications
under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers
who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the
firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is
defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both
the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will

require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the
lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those
of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of
the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "modelmaking" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision
and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated
concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing,
and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model",
of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative
courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research
has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily
in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional
context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly

with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management,

functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for
the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently
engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what
it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a
single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and
some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many
others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff
large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the
Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability
to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs
of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more
closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is
practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a
foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate
lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while
the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is
one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and
the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak.
No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject
study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning:
(1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to
the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a
corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization
and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For
that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to
make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational
entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder
in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches
from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms
of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from
other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis
supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been
found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the
groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis
the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways
both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of
financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool
for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic,
managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used
directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such
tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may
be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major
part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar
facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly

supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change
to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of
"law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel
has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's
strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers,
coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the
legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not
the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least,
also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not
only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star",
"The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would
admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?;
or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice
Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp.
128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the
legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers,"
Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law
as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can
be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid.,
p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score
national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for
Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the

United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting
and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that
they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation,
U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms
and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or
more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the
responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party
when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring
represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis issine qua non for
foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said:
"They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle
and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J.
Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers
of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer
in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified
for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute
of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public
Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary
or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of
the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation
is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself
that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme
Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with
righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did
any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on
the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002]

MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,

RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J.
CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge,
Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
Before us is an original Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Petitioner Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag (Petitioner for brevity) questions the
constitutionality of the appointment and the right to hold office of the following: (1) Alfredo L.
Benipayo (Benipayo for brevity) as Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC for
brevity); and (2) Resurreccion Z. Borra (Borra for brevity) and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. (Tuason
for brevity) as COMELEC Commissioners. Petitioner also questions the legality of the appointment
of Velma J. Cinco[1] (Cinco for brevity) as Director IV of the COMELECs Education and
Information Department (EID for brevity).

The Facts
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as Acting Director IV of the
EID. On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of
petitioner as Director IV of EID in a Temporary capacity. On February 15, 2001, Commissioner
Rufino S.B. Javier renewed again the appointment of petitioner to the same position in a
Temporary capacity.[2]
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman,[3] and Borra[4] and Tuason[5] as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term
of seven years and all expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed
the position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason likewise took their oaths of office and
assumed their positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the President submitted to
the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason for confirmation.[6] However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on
said appointments.
On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason to the same positions and for the same term of seven years, expiring on February 2,
2008.[7] They took their oaths of office for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted on
June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.[8]
Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their
appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions. [9] The Office of the
President submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on
Appointments.[10] They took their oaths of office anew.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11,
2001[11] addressed to petitioner as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the
EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law
Department.COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioners
reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 [12] addressed to the COMELEC en
banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayos failure to consult the
Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the reassignment of petitioner.
On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the
EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.[13]Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that
transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until
June 13, 2001. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001,[14] citing
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, which states in part:
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by
the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, as an exception to the
foregoing prohibitions, has RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, to appoint, hire new
employees or fill new positions and transfer or reassign its personnel, when necessary in the
effective performance of its mandated functions during the prohibited period, provided that the

changes in the assignment of its field personnel within the thirty-day period before election day
shall be effected after due notice and hearing.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a
Memorandum dated April 23, 2001.[15] Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal
complaint[16] with the Law Department[17] against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated
Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws,
rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant
petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that
the ad interimappointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on
the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and
reappointments of its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails as illegal her removal as
Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. Simultaneously, petitioner
challenges the designation of Cinco as Officer-in-Charge of the EID. Petitioner, moreover,
questions the legality of the disbursements made by COMELEC Finance Services Department
Officer-in-Charge Gideon C. De Guzman to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason by way of salaries and
other emoluments.
In the meantime, on September 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo renewed once again
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as
Commissioners, respectively, for a term of seven years expiring on February 2, 2008.[18] They all
took their oaths of office anew.
The Issues
The issues for resolution of this Court are as follows:
1. Whether or not the instant petition satisfies all the requirements before this Court may exercise its power of
judicial review in constitutional cases;
2. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad
interim appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1
(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;
3. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of
office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution;
4. Whether or not Benipayos removal of petitioner from her position as Director IV of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department is illegal and without authority, having been done without the approval
of the COMELEC as a collegial body;
5. Whether or not the Officer-in-Charge of the COMELECs Finance Services Department, in continuing to
make disbursements in favor of Benipayo, Borra, Tuason and Cinco, is acting in excess of jurisdiction.

First Issue: Propriety of Judicial Review

Respondents assert that the petition fails to satisfy all the four requisites before this Court may
exercise its power of judicial review in constitutional cases. Out of respect for the acts of the
Executive department, which is co-equal with this Court, respondents urge this Court to refrain
from reviewing the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments issued by the President to
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason unless all the four requisites are present. These are: (1) the existence
of an actual and appropriate controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising
the constitutional issue; (3) the exercise of the judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional issue is the lis mota of the case.[19]
Respondents argue that the second, third and fourth requisites are absent in this
case. Respondents maintain that petitioner does not have a personal and substantial interest in the
case because she has not sustained a direct injury as a result of the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason and their assumption of office. Respondents point out that petitioner
does not claim to be lawfully entitled to any of the positions assumed by Benipayo, Borra or
Tuason. Neither does petitioner claim to be directly injured by the appointments of these three
respondents.
Respondents also contend that petitioner failed to question the constitutionality of the ad
interim appointments at the earliest opportunity. Petitioner filed the petition only on August 3, 2001
despite the fact that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were issued as
early as March 22, 2001. Moreover, the petition was filed after the third time that these three
respondents were issued ad interim appointments.
Respondents insist that the real issue in this case is the legality of petitioners reassignment from
the EID to the Law Department. Consequently, the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments
is not the lis mota of this case.
We are not persuaded.
Benipayo reassigned petitioner from the EID, where she was Acting Director, to the Law
Department, where she was placed on detail service.[20]Respondents claim that the reassignment
was pursuant to x x x Benipayos authority as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, and as
the Commissions Chief Executive Officer.[21] Evidently, respondents anchor the legality of
petitioners reassignment on Benipayos authority as Chairman of the COMELEC. The real issue
then turns on whether or not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of the COMELEC. Even if petitioner
is only an Acting Director of the EID, her reassignment is without legal basis if Benipayo is not the
lawful COMELEC Chairman, an office created by the Constitution.
On the other hand, if Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC Chairman because he assumed office
in accordance with the Constitution, then petitioners reassignment is legal and she has no cause to
complain provided the reassignment is in accordance with the Civil Service Law. Clearly,
petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the constitutionality of Benipayos
assumption of office. Petitioners personal and substantial injury, if Benipayo is not the lawful
COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi to raise the constitutional issue in
this petition.

Respondents harp on petitioners belated act of questioning the constitutionality of the ad

interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason.Petitioner filed the instant petition only on
August 3, 2001, when the first ad interim appointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001.
However, it is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue
was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to
raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it is not
raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it
cannot be considered on appeal.[22] Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of thead
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this Court,
which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent
body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when a
constitutional issue may be passed upon.[23] There is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional
issue on time.
Moreover, the legality of petitioners reassignment hinges on the constitutionality of
Benipayos ad interim appointment and assumption of office.Unless the constitutionality of
Benipayos ad interim appointment and assumption of office is resolved, the legality of petitioners
reassignment from the EID to the Law Department cannot be determined. Clearly, the lis mota of
this case is the very constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of paramount importance to the public. The
legality of the directives and decisions made by the COMELEC in the conduct of the May 14, 2001
national elections may be put in doubt if the constitutional issue raised by petitioner is left
unresolved. In keeping with this Courts duty to determine whether other agencies of government
have remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them,
this Court may even brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve any constitutional issue
raised.[24] Here the petitioner has complied with all the requisite technicalities. Moreover, public
interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
Second Issue: The Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment
Petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment to the COMELEC is a temporary appointment
that is prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides as follows:
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the
last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in
a temporary or acting capacity. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment can be withdrawn or revoked by the
President at her pleasure, and can even be disapproved or simply by-passed by the Commission on
Appointments. For this reason, petitioner claims that an ad interim appointment is temporary in
character and consequently prohibited by the last sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution.

Based on petitioners theory, there can be no ad interim appointment to the COMELEC or to the
other two constitutional commissions, namely the Civil Service Commission and the Commission
on Audit. The last sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution is also found in
Article IX-B and Article IX-D providing for the creation of the Civil Service Commission and the
Commission on Audit, respectively. Petitioner interprets the last sentence of Section 1 (2) of Article
IX-C to mean that the ad interim appointee cannot assume office until his appointment is confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments for only then does his appointment become permanent and no
longer temporary in character.
The rationale behind petitioners theory is that only an appointee who is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments can guarantee the independence of the COMELEC. A confirmed
appointee is beyond the influence of the President or members of the Commission on Appointments
since his appointment can no longer be recalled or disapproved. Prior to his confirmation, the
appointee is at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers since his appointment can
be terminated at any time for any cause. In the words of petitioner, a Sword of Damocles hangs
over the head of every appointee whose confirmation is pending with the Commission on
Appointments.
We find petitioners argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character.The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
provides as follows:
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the
President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is
utterly without basis.
More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an ad interim appointment is
permanent in character. In Summers vs. Ozaeta,[25]decided on October 25, 1948, we held that:
x x x an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), Section 10, Article VII
of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. It is an
appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment
is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said

appointment is of course distinguishable from an acting appointment which is merely temporary,

good until another permanent appointment is issued. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and
thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately.The appointee can at once assume office
and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of
the Commission on Appointments,[26] this Court elaborated on the nature of an ad
interim appointment as follows:
A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in
recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on
Appointments may the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim
appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his
function without loss of time. His title to such office is complete. In the language of the
Constitution, the appointment is effective until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Petitioner cites Blacks Law Dictionary which defines the term ad interim to mean in the
meantime or for the time being. Hence, petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment is
undoubtedly temporary in character. This argument is not new and was answered by this Court
in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[27] where we explained
that:
x x x From the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner should experience difficulty in
understanding the situation. Private respondent had been extended several ad interim appointments
which petitioner mistakenly understands as appointments temporary in nature. Perhaps, it is the
literal translation of the word ad interim which creates such belief. The term is defined by Black to
mean in the meantime or for the time being. Thus, an officerad interim is one appointed to fill a
vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its
regular incumbent (Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not the
meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In referring to Dr. Estebans
appointments, the term is not descriptive of the nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it
is used to denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is, done by the
President of the Pamantasan in the meantime, while the Board of Regents, which is originally
vested by the University Charter with the power of appointment, is unable to act. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the term ad interim appointment, as used in letters of appointment signed by the
President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress
is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any
time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal
meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to explain the nature of
an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals,[28] where
the Court stated:

We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the
appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is temporary or in an acting
capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment was made. In the instant case, the
appointment extended to private respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was issued without
condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent status of private respondents appointment as
Executive Assistant II was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service Commission Regional
Office No. 12.Petitioners submission that private respondents ad interim appointment is
synonymous with a temporary appointment which could be validly terminated at any time is
clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the
Board disapproves them.(Emphasis supplied)
An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a
government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection
that [n]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.[29] Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the
appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is
possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any
withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office. [30] Once an appointee has
qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by
the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the
requirements of due process.
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The
first cause is the disapproval of his ad interimappointment by the Commission on
Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on
Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly
imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute,
in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can
complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of
the ad interim appointees.
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an
appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the
pleasure of the appointing power.[31] A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of
tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the
COMELEC. Thus,
in Brillantes
vs.
Yorac,[32] this
Court
struck
down
as unconstitutional the designation by then President Corazon Aquino of Associate Commissioner
Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC. This Court ruled that:
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore
revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its
validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and for
whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such
designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.

xxx
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on
Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guarantee is
not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by
designation of the President of the Philippines.
Earlier, in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista,[33] a case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which
did not have a provision prohibiting temporary or acting appointments to the COMELEC, this
Court nevertheless declared unconstitutional the designation of the Solicitor General as acting
member of the COMELEC. This Court ruled that the designation of an acting Commissioner would
undermine the independence of the COMELEC and hence violate the Constitution. We declared
then: It would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the
Constitution to appoint a permanentCommissioner than to designate one to act temporarily.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the
recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity,
unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac[34] and Solicitor General Felix Bautista
in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.[35] The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of
Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC shall be independent [36], this provision
should be harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that
the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interimappointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to
make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give
meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution.
The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution - on the nomination of officers
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments - did not provide for ad
interim appointments. The original intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away
with ad interimappointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session throughout the
year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of the need to avoid
disruptions in essential government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to
reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad interim appointments. The following
discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission elucidates this:
FR. BERNAS: X x x our compulsory recess now is only 30 days. So under such circumstances, is it
necessary to provide for ad interim appointments?Perhaps there should be a little discussion on
that.
xxx

MS. AQUINO: My concern is that unless this problem is addressed, this might present problems
in terms of anticipating interruption of government business, considering that we are not certain
of the length of involuntary recess or adjournment of the Congress. We are certain, however, of the
involuntary adjournment of the Congress which is 30 days, but we cannot leave to conjecture the
matter of involuntary recess.
FR. BERNAS: That is correct, but we are trying to look for a formula. I wonder if the
Commissioner has a formula x x x.
xxx
MR. BENGZON: Madam President, apropos of the matter raised by Commissioner Aquino and
after conferring with the Committee, Commissioner Aquino and I propose the following
amendment as the last paragraph of Section 16, the wordings of which are in the 1935
Constitution: THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS
DURING THE RECESS OF CONGRESS WHETHER IT BE VOLUNTARY OR
COMPULSORY BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL
DISAPPROVAL BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT
ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS.
This is otherwise called the ad interim appointments.
xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to the proposed amendment of Commissioners Aquino
and Bengzon, adding a paragraph to the last paragraph of Section 16? (Silence) The Chair hears
none; the amendment is approved.[37] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the
President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise
would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three constitutional
commissions.In his concurring opinion in Guevara vs. Inocentes,[38] decided under the 1935
Constitution, Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jr. explained the rationale behind ad
interim appointments in this manner:
Now, why is the lifetime of ad interim appointments so limited? Because, if they expired before the
session of Congress, the evil sought to be avoided interruption in the discharge of essential
functions may take place. Because the same evil would result if the appointments ceased to be
effective during the session of Congress and before its adjournment. Upon the other hand, once
Congress has adjourned, the evil aforementioned may easily be conjured by the issuance of
other ad interim appointments or reappointments. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the timely application of the last sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
barely avoided the interruption of essential government services in the May 2001 national
elections. Following the decision of this Court in Gaminde vs. Commission on
Appointments,[39]promulgated on December 13, 2000, the terms of office of constitutional officers
first appointed under the Constitution would have to be counted starting February 2, 1987, the date

of ratification of the Constitution, regardless of the date of their actual appointment. By this
reckoning, the terms of office of three Commissioners of the COMELEC, including the Chairman,
would end on February 2, 2001.[40]
Then COMELEC Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou was appointed only on January 11, 2000
to serve, pursuant to her appointment papers, until February 15, 2002, [41] the original expiry date of
the term of her predecessor, Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, who was elevated to this Court. The original
expiry date of the term of Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores was also February 15, 2002,
while that of Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was November 3, 2001. [42] The original expiry dates
of the terms of office of Chairperson Demetriou and Commissioners Flores and Desamito were
therefore supposed to fall after the May 2001 elections. Suddenly and unexpectedly, because of
the Gaminde ruling, there were three vacancies in the seven-person COMELEC, with national
elections looming less than three and one-half months away. To their credit, Chairperson
Demetriou and Commissioner Flores vacated their offices on February 2, 2001 and did not question
any more before this Court the applicability of the Gaminde ruling to their own situation.
In a Manifestation[43] dated December 28, 2000 filed with this Court in the Gaminde case,
Chairperson Demetriou stated that she was vacating her office on February 2, 2001, as she believed
any delay in choosing her successor might create a constitutional crisis in view of the proximity of
the May 2001 national elections. Commissioner Desamito chose to file a petition for
intervention[44] in the Gaminde case but this Court denied the intervention. Thus, Commissioner
Desamito also vacated his office on February 2, 2001.
During an election year, Congress normally goes on voluntary recess between February and
June considering that many of the members of the House of Representatives and the Senate run for
re-election. In 2001, the Eleventh Congress adjourned from January 9, 2001 to June 3,
2001.[45] Concededly, there was no more time for Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, who were originally
extended ad interim appointments only on March 22, 2001, to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments before the May 14, 2001 elections.
If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were not extended ad interim appointments to fill up the three
vacancies in the COMELEC, there would only have been one division functioning in the
COMELEC instead of two during the May 2001 elections. Considering that the Constitution
requires that all x x x election cases shall be heard and decided in division, [46] the remaining one
division would have been swamped with election cases. Moreover, since under the Constitution
motions for reconsideration shall be decided by the Commission en banc, the mere absence of one
of the four remaining members would have prevented a quorum, a less than ideal situation
considering that the Commissioners are expected to travel around the country before, during and
after the elections. There was a great probability that disruptions in the conduct of the May 2001
elections could occur because of the three vacancies in the COMELEC. The successful conduct of
the May 2001 national elections, right after the tumultuous EDSA II and EDSA III events, was
certainly essential in safeguarding and strengthening our democracy.
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power to
make ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by
the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to make ad
interim appointments is lodged in the President to be exercised by her in her sound
judgment. Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
can choose either of two modes in appointing officials who are subject to confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in session, the President may nominate the
prospective appointee, and pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the nominee
cannot qualify and assume office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend
an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to immediately qualify and assume office.
Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or extend an ad
interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President because the Constitution
grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the
President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the instant case.
The issuance by Presidents of ad interim appointments to the COMELEC is a long-standing
practice. Former President Corazon Aquino issued an adinterim appointment to Commissioner
Alfredo E. Abueg.[47] Former President Fidel V. Ramos extended ad interim appointments to
Commissioners Julio F. Desamito, Japal M. Guiani, Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall and Manolo F.
Gorospe.[48] Former President Joseph Estrada also extended ad interimappointments to
Commissioners Abdul Gani M. Marohombsar, Luzviminda Tancangco, Mehol K. Sadain and
Ralph C. Lantion.[49]
The Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments may indeed briefly put the appointee
at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers. This situation, however, is only for a
short period - from the time of issuance of the ad interim appointment until the Commission on
Appointments gives or withholds its consent. The Constitution itself sanctions this situation, as a
trade-off against the evil of disruptions in vital government services. This is also part of the checkand-balance under the separation of powers, as a trade-off against the evil of granting the President
absolute and sole power to appoint. The Constitution has wisely subjected the Presidents appointing
power to the checking power of the legislature.
This situation, however, does not compromise the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional body. The vacancies in the COMELEC are precisely staggered to insure that the
majority of its members hold confirmed appointments, and not one President will appoint all the
COMELEC members.[50] In the instant case, the Commission on Appointments had long confirmed
four[51] of the incumbent COMELEC members, comprising a majority, who could now be removed
from office only by impeachment. The special constitutional safeguards that insure the
independence of the COMELEC remain in place.[52] The COMELEC enjoys fiscal autonomy,
appoints its own officials and employees, and promulgates its own rules on pleadings and
practice. Moreover, the salaries of COMELEC members cannot be decreased during their tenure.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute
temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Third Issue: The Constitutionality of Renewals of Appointments
Petitioner also agues that assuming the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of
office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are constitutional, the renewal of the their ad
interim appointments and their subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the

prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides
as follows:
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven yearswithout reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the
last members for three years, without reappointment. X x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim appointee is by-passed by the Commission on
Appointments, his ad interim appointment can no longer be renewed because this will violate
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution which prohibits reappointments. Petitioner asserts
that this is particularly true to permanent appointees who have assumed office, which is the
situation of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason if their ad interim appointments are deemed permanent in
character.
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of
the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority
of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on
Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the
Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and
binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no
longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but
because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the
appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the
Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that
has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of
the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or
withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the
President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is recognized
in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which provides as follows:
Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President. Nominations or
appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the
close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless new nominations or
appointments are made, shall not again be considered by the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be
considered again if the President renews the appointment.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the President can renew the ad interim appointments of
by-passed appointees. Justice Roberto Concepcion, Jr. lucidly explained in his concurring opinion
in Guevara vs. Inocentes[53] why by-passed ad interim appointees could be extended new
appointments, thus:

In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval by the Commission,

because the incumbent can not continue holding office over the positive objection of the
Commission. It ceases, also, upon the next adjournment of the Congress, simply because the
President may then issue new appointments - not because of implied disapproval of the
Commission deduced from its inaction during the session of Congress, for, under the Constitution,
the Commission may affect adversely the interim appointments only by action, never by
omission. If the adjournment of Congress were an implied disapproval of ad interim appointments
made prior thereto, then the President could no longer appoint those so by-passed by the
Commission.But, the fact is that the President may reappoint them, thus clearly indicating that the
reason for said termination of the ad interim appointments is not the disapproval thereof allegedly
inferred from said omission of the Commission, but the circumstance that upon said adjournment
of the Congress, the President is free to make ad interim appointments or
reappointments. (Emphasis supplied)
Guevara was decided under the 1935 Constitution from where the second paragraph of Section 16,
Article VII of the present Constitution on ad interimappointments was lifted verbatim.[54] The
jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution governing ad interim appointments by the President is
doubtless applicable to the present Constitution. The established practice under the present
Constitution is that the President can renew the appointments of by-passed ad
interim appointees. This is a continuation of the well-recognized practice under the 1935
Constitution, interrupted only by the 1973 Constitution which did not provide for a Commission on
Appointments but vested sole appointing power in the President.
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies
neither
to
disapproved
nor
by-passed ad
interimappointments. A
disapproved ad
interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval
is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is
prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad
interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final
disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will not
result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that [t]he Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment.
(Emphasis supplied) There are four situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is
where an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such person cannot be reappointed to the
COMELEC, whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will then be actually serving more
than seven years. The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of
his term and then resigns before his seven-year term of office ends. Such person cannot be
reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a
reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years. The third situation is
where the appointee is confirmed to serve the unexpired term of someone who died or resigned,
and the appointee completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as a
member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the
appointee also serving more than seven years.

The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven
years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation.Even if it will not result in his serving more
than seven years, a reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also prohibited
because his situation will be similar to those appointed under the second sentence of Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution. This provision refers to the first appointees under the Constitution
whose terms of office are less than seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under
any situation. Not one of these four situations applies to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.
The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has served any term of
office as COMELEC member whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five or
three years, or even for an unexpired term of any length of time can no longer be reappointed to the
COMELEC. Commissioner Foz succinctly explained this intent in this manner:
MR. FOZ. But there is the argument made in the concurring opinion of Justice Angelo
Bautista in the case of Visarra vs. Miraflor, to the effect that the prohibition on
reappointment applies only when the term or tenure is for seven years. But in cases where
the appointee serves only for less than seven years, he would be entitled to
reappointment. Unless we put the qualifying words without reappointment in the case of
those appointed, then it is possible that an interpretation could be made later on their
case, they can still be reappointed to serve for a total of seven years.
Precisely, we are foreclosing that possibility by making it clear that even in the case of
those first appointed under the Constitution, no reappointment can be
made.[55] (Emphasis supplied)
In Visarra vs. Miraflor,[56] Justice Angelo Bautista, in his concurring opinion, quoted Nacionalista
vs. De Vera[57] that a [r]eappointment is not prohibited when a Commissioner has held office only
for, say, three or six years, provided his term will not exceed nine years in all. This was the
interpretation despite the express provision in the 1935 Constitution that a COMELEC member
shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be reappointed.
To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase without reappointment appears twice in Section 1
(2), Article IX-C of the present Constitution. The first phrase prohibits reappointment of any person
previously appointed for a term of seven years. The second phrase prohibits reappointment of any
person previously appointed for a term of five or three years pursuant to the first set of appointees
under the Constitution. In either case, it does not matter if the person previously appointed
completes his term of office for the intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any kind.
However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad
interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To
hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the
running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on
Appointments.
The phrase without reappointment applies only to one who has been appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his

term of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous
appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to
absurdities and negate the Presidents power to make ad interimappointments.
In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of
time, on the ad interim appointments first issued to appointees. If such ad interim appointments can
no longer be renewed, the President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments
because most of her appointees will effectively be disapproved by mere inaction of the Commission
on Appointments. This will nullify the constitutional power of the President to make ad
interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. This
Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government services.
The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional commissions. The
framers of the present Constitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons. The first is to
prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed even if
they served for less than seven years. The second is to insure that the members of the three
constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years. As reported in
the Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Vicente B. Foz, who sponsored[58]the
proposed articles on the three constitutional commissions, outlined the four important features of
the proposed articles, to wit:
Mr. Foz stated that the Committee had introduced basic changes in the common provision
affecting the three Constitutional Commissions, and which are: 1) fiscal autonomy which
provides (that) appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released to the
Commission in the same manner (as) provided for the Judiciary; 2) fixed term of office
without reappointment on a staggered basis to ensure continuity of functions and to
minimize the opportunity of the President to appoint all the members during his
incumbency; 3) prohibition to decrease salaries of the members of the Commissions during
their term of office; and 4) appointments of members would not require
confirmation.[59] (Emphasis supplied)
There were two important amendments subsequently made by the Constitutional Commission
to these four features. First, as discussed earlier, the framers of the Constitution decided to require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of all appointments to the constitutional
commissions.Second, the framers decided to strengthen further the prohibition on serving beyond
the fixed seven-year term, in the light of a former chair of the Commission on Audit remaining in
office for 12 years despite his fixed term of seven years. The following exchange in the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
MR. SUAREZ: These are only clarificatory questions, Madam President. May I call the
sponsors attention, first of all, to Section 2 (2) on the Civil Service Commission wherein it
is stated: In no case shall any Member be appointed in a temporary or acting capacity. I
detect in the Committees proposed resolutions a constitutional hangover, if I may use the
term, from the past administration. Am I correct in concluding that the reason the
Committee introduced this particular provision is to avoid an incident similar to the case of
the Honorable Francisco Tantuico who was appointed in an acting capacity as Chairman of
the Commission on Audit for about 5 years from 1975 until 1980, and then in 1980, was

appointed as Chairman with a tenure of another 7 years. So, if we follow that appointment
to (its) logical conclusion, he occupied that position for about 12 years in violation of the
Constitution?
MR. FOZ: It is only one of the considerations. Another is really to make sure that any
member who is appointed to any of the commissions does not serve beyond 7
years.[60] (Emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Christian Monsod further clarified the prohibition on reappointment in this
manner:
"MR. MONSOD. If the (Commissioner) will read the whole Article, she will notice
that there is no reappointment of any kind and, therefore as a whole there is no way that
somebody can serve for more than seven years. The purpose of the last sentence is to make
sure that this does not happen by including in the appointment both temporary and acting
capacities."[61] (Emphasis supplied)
Plainly, the prohibition on reappointment is intended to insure that there will be no reappointment
of any kind. On the other hand, the prohibition on temporary or acting appointments is intended to
prevent any circumvention of the prohibition on reappointment that may result in an appointees
total term of office exceeding seven years. The evils sought to be avoided by the twin prohibitions
are very specific - reappointment of any kind and exceeding ones term in office beyond the
maximum period of seven years.
Not contented with these ironclad twin prohibitions, the framers of the Constitution tightened
even further the screws on those who might wish to extend their terms of office. Thus, the word
designated was inserted to plug any loophole that might be exploited by violators of the
Constitution, as shown in the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:
MR. DE LOS REYES: On line 32, between the words appointed and in, I propose to insert the
words OR DESIGNATED so that the whole sentence will read: In no case shall any Member be
appointed OR DESIGNATED in a temporary or acting capacity.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas): What does the Committee say?
MR. FOZ: But it changes the meaning of this sentence. The sentence reads: In no case shall any
Member be appointed in a temporary or acting capacity.
MR. DE LOS REYES: Mr. Presiding Officer, the reason for this amendment is that some lawyers
make a distinction between an appointment and a designation. The Gentleman will recall that in the
case of Commissioner on Audit Tantuico, I think his term exceeded the constitutional limit but the
Minister of Justice opined that it did not because he was only designated during the time that he
acted as Commissioner on Audit. So, in order to erase that distinction between appointment and
designation, we should specifically place the word so that there will be no more ambiguity. In no
case shall any Member be appointed OR DESIGNATED in a temporary or acting capacity.
MR. FOZ: The amendment is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. DE LOS REYES: Thank you.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none;
the amendment is approved.[62]
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous
appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. A reappointment
presupposes a previous confirmed appointment. The same ad interim appointments and renewals of
appointments will also not breach the seven-year term limit becauseall the appointments and
renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on
February 2, 2008.[63] Any delay in their confirmation will not extend the expiry date of their terms
of office. Consequently, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad
interim appointments of these three respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be
exorcised by the twin prohibitions in the Constitution. The continuing renewal of the ad
interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of office expire on
February 2, 2008, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C
of the Constitution.
Fourth Issue: Respondent Benipayos Authority to Reassign Petitioner
Petitioner claims that Benipayo has no authority to remove her as Director IV of the EID and
reassign her to the Law Department. Petitioner further argues that only the COMELEC, acting as a
collegial body, can authorize such reassignment. Moreover, petitioner maintains that a
reassignment without her consent amounts to removal from office without due process and
therefore illegal.
Petitioners posturing will hold water if Benipayo does not possess any color of title to the office
of Chairman of the COMELEC. We have ruled, however, that Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC
Chairman, and consequently he has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for so
long as his ad interim appointment remains effective. Under Section 7 (4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C,
Book V of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chairman of the COMELEC is vested with the
following power:
Section 7. Chairman as Executive Officer; Powers and Duties. The Chairman, who shall be the
Chief Executive Officer of the Commission, shall:
xxx
(4) Make temporary assignments, rotate and transfer personnel in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Service Law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own
authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in accordance with the Civil Service Law. In
the exercise of this power, the Chairman is not required by law to secure the approval of the
COMELEC en banc.

Petitioners appointment papers dated February 2, 1999, February 15, 2000 and February 15,
2001, attached as Annexes X, Y and Z to her Petition, indisputably show that she held her Director
IV position in the EID only in an acting or temporary capacity.[64] Petitioner is not a Career
Executive Service (CES) officer, and neither does she hold Career Executive Service Eligibility,
which are necessary qualifications for holding the position of Director IV as prescribed in the
Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission. [65] Obviously,
petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as Director IV. In Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuevas
vs. Atty. Josefina G. Bacal,[66] this Court held that:
As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her
appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no security of
tenure in respect of that position. As held in Achacoso v. Macaraig:
It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed. Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as
temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and at a
moments notice, conformably to established jurisprudence x x x.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security
of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will
have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of
it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it
in the first place, or as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity
in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as
permanent even if it may be so designated x x x.
Having been appointed merely in a temporary or acting capacity, and not possessed of the
necessary qualifications to hold the position of Director IV, petitioner has no legal basis in claiming
that her reassignment was contrary to the Civil Service Law. This time, the vigorous argument of
petitioner that a temporary or acting appointment can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of
the appointing power happens to apply squarely to her situation.
Still, petitioner assails her reassignment, carried out during the election period, as a prohibited
act under Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides as follows:
Section 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service - Any public official who makes
or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service
including public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of
the Commission.
Petitioner claims that Benipayo failed to secure the approval of the COMELEC en banc to effect
transfers or reassignments of COMELEC personnel during the election period. [67] Moreover,

petitioner insists that the COMELEC en banc must concur to every transfer or reassignment of
COMELEC personnel during the election period.
Contrary to petitioners allegation, the COMELEC did in fact issue COMELEC Resolution No.
3300 dated November 6, 2000,[68] exempting the COMELEC from Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus
Election Code. The resolution states in part:
WHEREAS, Sec. 56 and Sec. 261, paragraphs (g) and (h), of the Omnibus Election Code provides
as follows:
xxx
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service Any public official who
makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil
service including public school teachers, within the election period except upon
approval of the Commission.
WHEREAS, the aforequoted provisions are applicable to the national and local elections on May
14, 2001;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to appoint, transfer or reassign personnel of the Commission
on Elections during the prohibited period in order that it can carry out its constitutional duty to
conduct free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by
the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, as an exception to the
foregoing prohibitions, has RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, to appoint, hire new
employees or fill new positions and transfer or reassign its personnel, when necessary in the
effective performance of its mandated functions during the prohibited period, provided that the
changes in the assignment of its field personnel within the thirty-day period before election day
shall be effected after due notice and hearing. (Emphasis supplied)
The proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, requiring due notice and hearing before any
transfer or reassignment can be made within thirty days prior to election day, refers only to
COMELEC field personnel and not to head office personnel like the petitioner. Under the Revised
Administrative Code,[69] the COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer specifically vested with the power
to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The COMELEC Chairman will logically exercise the
authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
3300. The COMELECen banc cannot arrogate unto itself this power because that will mean
amending the Revised Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en banc cannot legally do.
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or reassignment of
COMELEC personnel should carry the concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial
body. Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to require such concurrence will render the resolution

meaningless since the COMELECen banc will have to approve every personnel transfer or
reassignment, making the resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for
what it is, an approval to effect transfers and reassignments of personnel, without need of securing
a second approval from the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer or
reassignment.
The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to transfer or reassign
COMELEC personnel. The person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The
COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment of
COMELEC personnel during the election period. Thus, Benipayos order reassigning petitioner
from the EID to the Law Department does not violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election
Code. For the same reason, Benipayos order designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID is
legally unassailable.
Fifth Issue: Legality of Disbursements to Respondents
Based on the foregoing discussion, respondent Gideon C. De Guzman, Officer-in-Charge of the
Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections, did not act in excess of jurisdiction
in paying the salaries and other emoluments of Benipayo, Borra, Tuason and Cinco.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995

EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner,
vs.
ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court revives the issue of whether
or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction In the split
decision of 4 March 1992 in the consolidated cases of Garcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission
on Elections, 1 this Court ruled in the negative because of the absence of any specific conferment
upon the COMELEC, either by the constitution or by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction to issue such
extraordinary writs. It held that jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or
causes of action, must exist as a matter of law, whether the jurisdiction is original or appellate, and
since these two classes of jursdiction are exclusive of each other, each must expressly conferred by

law. One does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other. This Court proceeded to state that in the
Philippine setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
which has always been expressly conferred either by Constitution or by law. It is never derived by
implication. Although the Constitution grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it
any power to exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus unlike the case of this Court which is specifically conferred with such authority in
Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that the doctrines laid down inPimentel vs.
COMELEC 2 that neither the Constitution nor any law has conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC
to issue such writs still finds application under the 1987 Constitution.
In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on Elections, 3 this Court reiterated the
Garcia and Uy doctrine.
In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent COMELEC adhered to the affirmative view of
the issue, citing as authority therefore its own decision of 29 July 1993 in Dictado vs. Cosico and the
last paragraph of Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697, which reads:
Sec. 50. Definition.
xxx xxx xxx
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions
for certiorariprohibition, and mandamus involving election cases.
The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set aside and nullified for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He contends that while the
COMELEC's position is inherently compelling, it deserves scant consideration in view of Garcia and
Uy and Veloria and the nature and purpose of B. P. Blg. 697 which was to govern solely the Batasang
Pambansa election of 14 May 1984; hence, it was a temporary statute which self-destructed after
such election.
The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are uncomplicated and undisputed.
In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita Cumba
were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The
latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former.
Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.
On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with
a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court hereby declares the protestant
as having won the mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of

Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the local election held on May 11, 1992, the protestant
having obtained six (6) votes more than that of the protestee's votes.
Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the private respondent on 1
July 1994.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing her notice of
appeal and paying the appellate docket fees.
On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.
On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which
the private respondent opposed on 22 July 1994.
On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal. The
corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a
motion for a reconsideration of the order of execution and the sheriff held in abeyance the
implementation of the writ. This motion was denied on 5 August 1994.
The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the
aforesaid other of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of
execution. The petition was docketed as SPR No. 1-94.
On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition. 4 The dispositive
portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES that is [sic] has
exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law, and therefore, assumes
jurisdiction of the instant petition for certiorari which is hereby GRANTED. The Order of
the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the Writ of
Execution issued on August 4, 1994 LIFTED.
Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position .as Municipality
Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pending resolution of the appeal before this
Commission in the case of Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No. 108-94.
In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases, the respondent COMELEC
maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction, viz., Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697,
which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881),and that it is not exactly correct that this law self-destructed after the May 1984 election. It
further reasoned out that in the performance of its judicial functions, the COMELEC, is the most
logical body to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases
where it has appellate jurisdiction. It ratiocinated as follows:

It is therefore clear that if there is a law which specifically confers jurisdiction to issue
the prerogative Writs, then the Commission has jurisdiction.
Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that law.
B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE
ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984 AND
THE
SELECTION
OF
SECTORAL
REPRESENTATIVES
THEREAFTER,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50
provides:
Sec. 50. Definition. Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers
which may be raised by any candidate, political party or coalition of
political parties before the board or directly with the Commission.
The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election
cases.(Emphasis supplied).
We have debated among ourselves whether Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697, has been
repealed. We have come to the conclusion that it has not been repealed. The repealing
provision in the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985), provides:
Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. Presidential Decree No. 1296 otherwise
known as the The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed.
All other election Laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations
or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Code is hereby
repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg.
20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of
Regions IX and XII. (Emphasis supplied).
B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereof is not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Besides, in the cited
Garcia/Uy cases, as reiterated in the Veloria case, the Supreme Court itself said,
reiterating previous cases, that implied repeal of statutes is frowned upon, thus:
Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned upon, so also should the grant
of original jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial body be
tabooed. (Garcia/Uy/Veloria Cases: Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx

It is equally clear that Executive Order No. 90 . . . did not modify or repeal,
whether expressly or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752. It is common
place Learning thatimplied repeal are not favored in Law and are not
casually to be assumed. The first effort of a court must always be to
reconcile or adjust the provisions of one statute with those of another so
as to give sensible effect to both provisions (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, 55
SCRA 261 (1974); Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190, 196-197 (1971);
National Power Corporation vs. ARCA, 25 SCRA 931 (1968); U.S. vs.
Palacios, 33 Phil. 208 (1916); and Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377(1965). Only when there is
clear inconsistency and conflict between the provisions of two (2)
statutes, may a court hold that the provisions later in point of time have
impliedly repealed the earlier ones" that (Philippine American
Management Co., Inc., vs. Philippine American Management Employees
Association, 49 SCRA 194 (1973); and Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190
(1971) (Larga vs. Ranada, Jr., No. L-7976, August 3, 1984, 164 SCRA
25).
It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed after the
Batasang Pambansa elections of 1984; because of the provisions of Section 1 (Title
and Applicability) which provides: "This act shall be known and cited as "The Law on the
1984 Batasang Pambansa Election." It shall govern the election for the regular
Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral
representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution.
While that may be true with most of its provisions which were applicable only for the
particular election (like election and campaign periods, voting constituency, etc.) most if
not all of the remaining provisions could be applicable to future elections. It is not lost to
the Commission that B.P. Blg. 697 was passed also "for other purposes."
But the important consideration is that the authority granted to the Commission under
B.P. Blg. 697 is not inconsistent with our election laws. It should be mentioned that the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6638 which governed the local elections of January 18,
1988, as to the number of councilors in specified cities (Sec. 3) and the number of
Sangguniang members in different provinces and cities (Sec. 4) are still applicable up to
this day. In fact, it became one of the important controlling provision which governed the
May 11, 1992 elections. If provisions of Republic Act No. 6636 which are not
inconsistent with the present election laws did not self-destruct, why should Section 50
of B.P. Blg. 697?
Another provision which did not self-destruct is that which provides that "any city or
municipal judge, who includes or excludes any voter without any legal basis in inclusion
and exclusion proceedings, shall be guilty of an election offense," although this
provision is found in Section 10 of Executive Order No. 134 supposedly with limited

application as the enabling act for the elections for Members of Congress on May 11,
1987 and for other purposes.
Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari, jurisdiction to the Commission on
Elections because the Pimentel case said there was none, to fill a void in the law, and
avoid an incongruous situation.
A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately but in its
relation to the statute's totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed as
to "harmonized it with the pre-existing body of laws." Unless clearly
repugnant, provisions of statutes must be reconciled. . . . (Commissioner
of Customs vs. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. L-28329, August 7, 1975, 66
SCRA 113).
xxx xxx xxx
The statutory construction rule is: "When the Legislature enacts provision,
it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same
subject matter and that in the absence of any express repeal or
amendment therein, the new provision should be deemed enacted
pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in the prior statutes." (Legaspi
vs. Executive Secretary, L-36153, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 253).
The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicial functions to take
jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because it has appellate
jurisdiction in election cases granted by the Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has
no more appellate jurisdiction over such cases And in the case of the Supreme Court,
Justice de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in his dissenting opinion that under
the Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in election cases should
properly be limited to decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections, not
from lower courts.
It was of course different under the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388, September 2,
1971) because the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals then had appellate
jurisdiction in election case decided by the lower courts.
In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals havecertiorari jurisdiction over election cases from the lower courts because
after reiterating the ruling in the Garcia and Uy cases, the Supreme Court said:
In view of this pronouncement, an original civil action of certiorari,
prohibition ormandamus against a regional trial court in an election contest
may be filed only in the Court of Appeals or in this Court being the only
courts given such original jurisdiction under the Constitution and the Law.
(Emphasis supplied).

While these two appellate Courts do have the jurisdiction under the Constitution and the
law, it is most logical for the Commission whenever it performs judicial functions to have
the authority to issue these prerogative writs. . . .
...
In traversing the first issue, we are citing our decision laid down in the case of Antonio
Dictado vs. Hon. Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio Tiongco promulgated on July 29, 1993.
In this case, the Commission en banc had occasion to rule on the question of whether
or not the Commission has the authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari in
election cases.
The Commission En Banc, speaking through Hon. Commissioner Regalado E.
Maambong, ruled that there is [a] law which grants the Commission, the exclusive
authority to issue special writs ofcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases,
and there are also Supreme Court decisions, recent in fact, which declare that the
Commission has no such authority precisely because; according to the decisions, there
is no law granting such authority, and without any hint whatsoever of the existence of
Sec. 50 of Batas vs. Pambansa Blg. 697.
As gleaned from the case of Dictado, respondents were arguing that Sec. 50 of BP Blg.
697 was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985).
Furthermore, in their answer, respondents cited Supreme Court decisions where it was
declared that, indeed, the Commission has no jurisdiction to issue special writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
It is still the position of this Commission that Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 has not been
repealed.
As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of the Courts of Justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess, of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII).
Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art.
IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the
determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by constitutional
mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. 5
It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the trial court's order of execution
pending appeal and the writ of execution because

[a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed on July 12, 1994 the
court a quo had already lost jurisdiction over the case for as early as July 8, 1994, it had
already acknowledged through its order issued on that date, the perfection of the appeal
of petitioner as in fact it ordered the elevation of the records of the case to this
Honorable Commission. 6
Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant special civil action.
In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition
and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist
from enforcing is challenged resolution.
As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her Comment, opposed the petition by invoking the
very arguments adduced by the respondent COMELEC in its challenged the resolution and the
dissenting opinion in the Garcia and Uy cases.
In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the respondent COMELEC postulates that it
issued the said resolution after it had taken cognizance of the appeal interposed by the private
respondent from the RTC decision, unlike in the Garcia and Uy cases, and therefore, in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, thus:
it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent powers to employ means necessary to
carry into effect the powers conferred upon it by law (Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the Revised
Rules of Court) and verily, there was no need for any statutory grant for that purpose.
Indeed, in annulling the Order of Execution of the Regional Trial Court, public
respondent did not exceed its jurisdiction since its action in this regard was necessary to
preserve the subject of the appeal and to maintain the status quo of the parties pending
the final outcome of its review of the correctness of the appealed decision. 7
It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts still had jurisdiction over the cases unlike
in the instant case where the trial court had already given due course to the appeal and elevated the
records of the case to the COMELEC which had taken cognizance of the appeal.
This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it on its merits.
The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced by the Office of the Solicitor General is
unacceptable. It goes against its theory in the assailed resolution and is not supported by the facts.
The challenged resolution involves a case which the COMELEC docketed as a special relief case
(SPR. No. 1-94). Under Rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the special relief cases are petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and contempt proceedings. The ordinary appeal from the RTC
decision was, as disclosed in the challenged resolution; docketed as EAC No. 108-94. 8 Clearly then,
the COMELEC had recognized and taken cognizance of two cases: one, the ordinary appeal from the
RTC decision (EAC No. 108-94), and two, the special civil action for certiorari docketed as SPR No.
1-94. The two cases were not consolidated. The dissimilarities between them need no further
elaboration. Since it issued the challenged resolution under the latter case, it cannot now be heard to
state that it issued it as an incident in the former, the ordinary appeal. This erroneous contention of

the Office of the of the Solicitor General notwithstanding, the position taken by the COMELEC in its
resolution now in question paves the way for a re-examination of this Court's pronouncement in
theGarcia and Uy cases.
As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and later, in Veloria, 10 this Court ruled that the COMELEC has
no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus because there is
no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction.
The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly granted it
such jurisdiction. Indeed, it did. Nevertheless, considering that the said law was, per Section 1
thereof, "to govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14,
1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution," and in
view of the passage of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) by the regular Batasang
Pambansa, 11 this Court is then confronted with the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697
became functus officio after the 14 May 1984 election of members of the regular Batasang Pambansa
or the selection thereafter of the sectoral representatives at the latest, and whether it was repealed by
the Omnibus Election Code.
The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg. 697 whose
lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984 election or the subsequent selection of sectoral representatives.
In fact, by the very wording of the last paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit:
Sec. 50. Definition.
xxx xxx xxx
The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. (Emphasis
supplied).
it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a specific period of time. Taken
in the context of the conspicuous absence of such jurisdiction as ruled in Pimentel vs. Commission on
Elections, 12 it seems quite obvious that the grant was intended as a remedial legislation to eliminate
the seeming incongruity or irrationality resulting in a splitting of jurisdiction pointed out in the
dissenting opinion of Justice De Castro in the said case.
But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697? The repealing clause of
the latter reads as follows:
Sec. 282. Repealing clause. Presidential decree No. 1296, otherwise known as The
1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other election laws, decrees,
executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions
of this Code are hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 .and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook
of Regions IX and XII.

The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing clause. It has been said:
An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are
repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or result
by implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an express
recognition that there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as
indicative of the legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot
be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act to be
repealed. It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare any
inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the condition that a
substantial conflict is found under application of the rules of implied repeals. If its
inclusion is more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detriment than an
aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is construed as an express
limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts. 13
This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the revision or
codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or
code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14
By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear that the Batasang
Pambansa had intended to codify all prior election statutes and to replace them with the new Code. It
made, in fact, by the second sentence, a reservation that all prior election statutes or parts thereof not
inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shall remain in force. That sentence
predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be
found on existing and prior acts of the same subject matter. Such being the case, the
presumption against implied repeals and the rule on strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore. For the legislature is presumed to know the existing
laws so that, if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is
to express it. The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the
statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the
matter, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the
new and the old laws. 15
This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of
the Omnibus Election Code to determine if the former is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the
latter, It found none.
In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling in
the Garcia and Uyand Veloria cases, We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg.
697 providing as follows:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the
authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now proceed to review the substance of
the challenged resolution.
That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the petitioner's
motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all too obvious. Since both
the petitioner and the private respondent received copies of the decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal
therefrom may be filed within five days 16 from 1 July 1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion
for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the appeal.
Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have
supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an
appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal, 17 or on 6 July
1994. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8
July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of
the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was divested of its
jurisdiction over the case. 18 Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July
1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. It could
have been otherwise if the motion was filed before the perfection of the appeal. 19 Accordingly, since
the respondent COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged resolution of 9 February 1995 of
the Commission on Elections in SPR No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita Cumba vs. Manuel M. Relampagos, et
al. " is AFFIRMED.
The temporary restraining order issued on 21 February 1995 is hereby LIFTED.
No pronouncemnt as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 108399. July 31, 1997]

RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior

and Local Government (DILG), the BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS
composed of Atty. RUBEN M. RAMIREZ, Atty. RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS,
and Atty. ENRIQUE C. ROA, GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, in her capacity as
Director of the Barangay Bureau, City Treasurer Atty. ANTONIO ACEBEDO,
Budget Officer EUFEMIA DOMINGUEZ, all of the City Government of
Manila, petitioners, vs. ROBERT MIRASOL, NORMAN T. SANGUYA,
ROBERT DE JOYA, ARNEL R. LORENZO, MARY GRACE ARIAS, RAQUEL
L. DOMINGUEZ, LOURDES ASENCIO, FERDINAND ROXAS, MA.
ALBERTINA RICAFORT,and BALAIS M. LOURICH, and the HONORABLE
WILFREDO D. REYES,Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
36, Metro Manila, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 19, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 36), nullifying an order of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), which in effect cancelled the general elections for
the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) slated on December 4, 1992 in the City of Manila, on the
ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 served the purpose of the first
elections for the SK under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160).
[1]

Section 423 of the Code provides for a SK in every barangay, to be composed of a

chairman, seven (7) members, a secretary, and a treasurer. Section 532(a) provides that
the first elections for the SK shall be held thirty (30) days after the next local elections. The
Code took effect on January 1, 1992.
The first local elections under the Code were held on May 11, 1992. Accordingly, on
August 27, 1992, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 2499, providing
guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK on September 30, 1992. The
guidelines placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the DILG,
with the technical assistance of the COMELEC. After two postponements, the elections
were finally scheduled on December 4, 1992.
[2]

Accordingly, registration in the six districts of Manila was conducted. A total of 152,363
youngsters, aged 15 to 21 years old, registered, 15,749 of them filing certificates of
candidacies. The City Council passed the necessary appropriations for the elections.
On September 18, 1992, however, the DILG, through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan
III, issued a letter-resolution exempting the City of Manila from holding elections for the SK
on the ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered
the first under the newly-enacted Local Government Code. The DILG acted on a letter of
Joshue R. Santiago, acting president of the KB City Federation of Manila and a member of

City Council of Manila, which called attention to the fact that in the City of Manila elections
for the Kabataang Barangay (the precursor of the Sangguniang Kabataan) had previously
been held on May 26, 1990. In its resolution, the DILG stated:
[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the legislature to
exempt from the forthcoming Sangguniang Kabataan elections those kabataang barangay chapters
which may have conducted their elections within the period of January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992
under BP 337. Manifestly the term of office of those elected KB officials have been
correspondingly extended to coincide with the term of office of those who may be elected under
RA 7160.
On November 27, 1992 private respondents, claiming to represent the 24,000
members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the
RTC of Manila to set aside the resolution of the DILG. They argued that petitioner
Secretary of Interior and Local Government had no power to amend the resolutions of the
COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs and that the DILG resolution in question
denied them the equal protection of the laws.
On November 27, 1992, the trial court, through Executive Judge, now COMELEC
Chairman, Bernardo P. Pardo, issued an injunction, ordering petitioners to desist from
implementing the order of the respondent Secretary dated September 18, 1992, . . . until
further orders of the Court. On the same day, he ordered petitioners to perform the
specified pre-election activities in order to implement Resolution No. 2499 dated August
27, 1992 of the Commission on Elections providing for the holding of a general election of
the Sangguniang Kabataan on December 4, 1992 simultaneously in every barangay
throughout the country.
The case was subsequently reraffled to Branch 36 of the same court. On January 19,
1993, the new judge, Hon. Wilfredo D. Reyes, rendered a decision, holding that (1) the
DILG had no power to exempt the City of Manila from holding SK elections on December
4, 1992 because under Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall is vested solely in the COMELEC; (2) the COMELEC had
already in effect determined that there had been no previous elections for KB by calling for
general elections for SK officers in every barangay without exception; and (3) the
exemption of the City of Manila was violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because, according to the DILGs records, in 5,000 barangays KB elections
were held between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 but only in the City of Manila,
where there were 897 barangays, was there no elections held on December 4, 1992.
Petitioners sought this review on certiorari. They insist that the City of Manila, having
already conducted elections for the KB on May 26, 1990, was exempted from holding
elections on December 4, 1992. In support of their contention, they cite 532(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which provides that:
All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the different sanggunians
shall be deemed vacant until such time that the sangguniang kabataan chairmen shall have been
elected and the respective pederasyon presidents have been selected: Provided, That, elections for

the kabataang barangay conducted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 at any time between January 1,
1988 and January 1, 1992 shall be considered as the first elections provided for in this Code. The
term of office of the kabataang barangay officials elected within the said period shall be extended
correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under this Code. (emphasis
added)
They maintain that the Secretary of the DILG had authority to determine whether the City
of Manila came within the exception clause of 532(d) so as to be exempt from holding the
elections on December 4, 1992.
The preliminary question is whether the holding of the second elections on May 13,
1996 rendered this case moot and academic.There are two questions raised in this
case. The first is whether the Secretary of Interior and Local Government can exempt a
local government unit from holding elections for SK officers on December 4, 1992 and the
second is whether the COMELEC can provide that the Department of Interior and Local
Government shall have direct control and supervision over the election of sangguniang
kabataan with the technical assistance by the Commission on Elections.
[3]

We hold that this case is not moot and that it is in fact necessary to decide the issues
raised by the parties. For one thing, doubt may be cast on the validity of the acts of those
elected in the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila because this Court enjoined the
enforcement of the decision of the trial court and these officers continued in office until
May 13, 1996. For another, this case comes within the rule that courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review. For the question whether the COMELEC can validly vest in the DILG the control
and supervision of SK elections is likely to arise in connection with every SK election and
yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections.
[4]

In the Southern Pacific Terminal case, where the rule was first articulated, appellants
were ordered by the Interstate Commerce Commission to cease and desist from granting
a shipper what the ICC perceived to be preferences and advantages with respect to
wharfage charges. The cease and desist order was for a period of about two years, from
September 1, 1908 (subsequently extended to November 15), but the U.S. Supreme
Court had not been able to hand down its decision by the time the cease and desist order
expired.The case was decided only on February 20, 1911, more than two years after the
order had expired. Hence, it was contended that the case had thereby become moot and
the appeal should be dismissed. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:
The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are usually
continuing (as are manifestly those in the case at bar), and these considerations ought not to be,
as they might be, defeated, by short-term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review, and
at one time the government, and at another time the carriers, have their rights determined by the
Commission without a chance of redress.
[5]

In Roe v. Wade, petitioner, a pregnant woman, brought suit in 1970 challenging antiabortion statutes of Texas and Georgia on the ground that she had a constitutional right to
terminate her pregnancy at least within the first trimester. The case was not decided until
1973 when she was no longer pregnant. But the U.S. Supreme Court refused to dismiss
[6]

the case as moot. It was explained: [W]hen, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the
litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will
come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a
case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive. Our laws should not be that
rigid. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly
could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.
[7]

We thus reach the merits of the questions raised in this case. The first question is
whether then DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III had authority to determine whether
under 532(d) of the Local Government Code, the City of Manila was required to hold its
first elections for SK. As already stated, petitioners sustain the affirmative side of the
proposition. On the other hand, respondents argue that this is a power which Art.IX,C, 2(1)
of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC. Respondents further argue that, by mandating
that elections for the SK be held on December 4, 1992 in every barangay, the COMELEC
in effect determined that there had been no elections for the KB previously held in the City
of Manila.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
First. As already stated, by 4 of Resolution No. 2499, the COMELEC placed the SK
elections under the direct control and supervision of the DILG. Contrary to respondents
contention, this did not contravene Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution which provides that
the COMELEC shall have the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall. Elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of the COMELEC in the
same way that, as we have recently held, contests involving elections of SK officials do
not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. In Mercado v. Board of Election
Supervisors, it was contended that
[8]

COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is null and void because: (a) it prescribes a separate set
of rules for the election of the SK Chairman different from and inconsistent with that set
forth in the Omnibus Election Code, thereby contravening Section 2, Article 1 of the said
Code which explicitly provides that it shall govern all elections of public officers; and, (b)
it constitutes a total, absolute, and complete abdication by the COMELEC of its
constitutionally and statutorily mandated duty to enforce and administer all election laws
as provided for in Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution; Section 52, Article VIII
of the Omnibus Election Code; and Section 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title 1, Book V of
the 1987 Administrative Code.
[9]

Rejecting this contention, this Court, through Justice Davide, held:

Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IXC of the Constitution on the COMELECs exclusive appellate jurisdiction over contests involving
elective barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force
at the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification of the
Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and the
elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay and the six sangguniang bayan
members. They were to be elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. They are also
the same officers referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on

election of barangay officials. Metropolitan and municipal trial courts had exclusive original
jurisdiction over contests relating to their election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to
the Regional Trial Courts.
....
In the light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK (formerly KB)
officials do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the Constitution
had made the SK chairman an elective barangay official. His being an ex-officio member of the
sangguniang barangay does not make him one for the law specifically provides who are its elective
members, viz., the punong barangay and the seven regular sangguniang barangay members who are
elected at large by those who are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the
Constitution and who are duly registered voters of the barangay.
[10]

The choice of the DILG for the task in question was appropriate and was in line with
the legislative policy evident in several statutes.Thus, P.D. No. 684 (April 15, 1975), in
creating Kabataang Barangays in every barangay throughout the country, provided in 6
that the Secretary of Local Government and Community Development shall promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary to effectively implement the
provisions of this Decree. Again, in 1985 Proclamation No. 2421 of the President of the
Philippines, in calling for the general elections of the Kabataang Barangay on July 13-14,
1985, tasked the then Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Education, Culture
and Sports, and the Commission on Elections to assist the Kabataang Barangay in the
conduct of the elections. On the other hand, in a Memorandum Circular dated March 7,
1988, President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Secretary of Local Government to issue
the necessary rules and regulations for effecting the representation of the Kabataang
Barangay, among other sectors, in the legislative bodies of the local government units.
The role of the COMELEC in the 1992 elections for SK officers was by no means
inconsequential. DILG supervision was to be exercised within the framework of detailed
and comprehensive rules embodied in Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC. What was
left to the DILG to perform was the enforcement of the rules.
Second. It is contended that, in its resolution in question, the COMELEC did not name
the barangays which, because they had conducted kabataang barangay elections
between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992, were not included in the SK elections to
be held on December 4, 1992. That these barangays were precisely to be determined by
the DILG is, however, fairly inferable from the authority given to the DILG to supervise the
conduct of the elections. Since 532(d) provided for kabataang barangay officials whose
term of office was extended beyond 1992, the authority to supervise the conduct of
elections in that year must necessarily be deemed to include the authority to determine
which kabataang barangay would not be included in the 1992 elections.
The authority granted was nothing more than the ascertainment of a fact, namely,
whether between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 elections had been held in a given
kabataang barangay. If elections had been conducted, then no new elections had to be
held on December 4, 1992 since by virtue of 532(d) the term of office of the kabataang

barangay officials so elected was extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of
office of those elected under [the Local Government Code of 1991]. In doing this, the
Secretary of Interior and Local Government was to act merely as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will
was to take effect. There was no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a law. That this is constitutionally permissible is the
teaching of our cases.
[11]

[12]

Third. Respondents claim, however, that the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila
were void because (a) they were called at the instance of then Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez
who did not have authority to do so and (b) it was not held under COMELEC supervision.
The 1990 elections for the Kabataang Barangay were called by then Manila Mayor
Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., who in his Executive Order No. 21 dated April 25, 1990 stated:
WHEREAS, the Kabataang Barangay as an organization provided for under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 337, has been practically dormant since the advent of the present national administration;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to involve the youth in the affairs and undertakings of the
government to ensure the participation of all sectors of our population in the task of nation
building;
WHEREAS, the last elections for the Kabataang Barangay officers were held in November 1985
yet, which is over their three years term of office;
WHEREAS, most of the present crop of KB officers are way past the age limit provided for under
the law;
....
The elections were actually held on May 26, 1990 in the 897 barangays of
Manila. Later, on June 30, 1990, KB City Federation elections were conducted.
It was precisely to foreclose any question regarding the validity of KB elections held in
the aftermath of the EDSA revolution and upon the effectivity of the new Local
Government Code that the exception clause of 532(d) was inserted. The proceedings of
the Bicameral Conference Committee which drafted the Code show the following:
[13]

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Isa-cite na lang ko ano iyong title o chapter o section, ha!
HON. LINA: . . .
Page 436, lines 13 to 14 delete within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and in lieu
thereof, insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of the Code. The rationale. . . .
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: How should it be read?
HON. LINA: It will read as follows: Provided however, that the Local Government Units which have
conducted elections for the Kabataang Barangay as provided for, in Batas Pambansa Bilang
337, up to the effectivity. . . .
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: So, any deletion from the word within, ha, up to. . . .

HON. LINA: Remove the words, the phrase, within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and
insert from 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: From?
HON. LINA: From 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code. Kasi meron nang mga election, eh, na
ginawa, eh. There are five thousand barangays, based on the record of the DILG, out of forty
thousand, imagine that, na nag-conduct na ng election nila based on the KB Constitution and ByLaws, and theyre sitting already, now if we do not recognize that, mag[ka]karoon sila ng question.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Accepted, Mr. Chairman.

Section 532(d) may thus be deemed to be a curative law. Curative laws, which in
essence are retrospective in effect, are enacted to validate acts done which otherwise
would be invalid under existing laws, by considering them as having complied with the
existing laws. Such laws are recognized in this jurisdiction.
[14]

Fourth. It is finally contended that the exemption of the barangays of the City of Manila
from the requirement to hold elections for SK officers on December 4, 1992 would deny
the youth voters in those barangays of the equal protection of laws. Respondents claim
that only in the barangays in the City of Manila, which then numbered 897, were elections
for SK not held in 1992 on the ground that between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992
there had already been SK elections held, when, according to petitioners own evidence,
during that period, SK elections had actually been conducted in 5,000 barangays.
Whether this claim is true cannot be ascertained from the records of this case. Merely
showing that there were 5,000 barangays which similarly held KB elections between
January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 does not prove that despite that fact these same
barangays were permitted to hold elections on December 4, 1992. For one thing,
according to the Manila Bulletin issue of November 18, 1992 (p. 9), 568 barangays in the
Province of Bulacan did not have SK elections on December 4, 1992 either, because they
already had elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992. For another, even
assuming that only barangays in Manila were not permitted to hold SK elections on
December 4, 1992 while the rest of the 5,000 barangays were allowed even if KB
elections had already been held there before, this fact does not give the youth voters in
the 897 Manila barangays ground for complaint because what the other barangays did
was contrary to law.There is no discrimination here.
In People v. Vera this Court struck down the Probation Law because it permitted
unequal application of its benefits by making its applicability depend on the decision of
provincial governments to appropriate or not to appropriate funds for the salaries of
probation officers, with the result that those not disposed to allow the benefits of
probations to be enjoyed by their inhabitants could simply omit to provide for the salaries
of probation officers. The difference between that case and the one at bar lies in the fact
that what youth voters in the other barangays might have been allowed was not a right
which was denied to youth voters in Manila. If those barangays were not entitled to have
SK elections on December 4, 1992 but nevertheless were allowed to have such elections,
that fact did not mean those in Manila should similarly have been allowed to conduct
elections on December 4, 1992 because the fact was that they already had their own, just
two years before on May 26, 1990. Respondents equal protection argument violates the
dictum that one wrong does not make another wrong right.
[15]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is

REVERSED and the case filed against petitioner by private respondents is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS G.R. No. 188920

V. DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G.
VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ,
SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO,
SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ,
HARLIN CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G.
MACUSI and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO,
Petitioners, Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Carpio,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta,
Bersamin,
Del Castillo,
Abad,
Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, and
Mendoza, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and Promulgated:
J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA,
Respondents. February 16, 2010
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
ABAD, J.:

This petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already resolved by the Court involving a
leadership dispute within a political party.In this case, the petitioners question their expulsion
from that party and assail the validity of the election of new party leaders conducted by the
respondents.
Statement of the Facts and the Case
For a better understanding of the controversy, a brief recall of the preceding events is in order.
On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the
Liberal Party (LP), announced his partys withdrawal of support for the administration of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman,
and a number of party members denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made the
announcement without consulting his party.
On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local
autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all
positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP
president. Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition[1] with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the partys
electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council
(NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP
Constitution,[2] party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on
November 30, 2007.
On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LPs NECO and
NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion
could be likened to people power, wherein the LP majority removed respondent Drilon as
president by direct action. Atienza also said that the amendments[3] to the original LP
Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not
been properly ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and the other officers already ended on
July 24, 2006.
On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution,[4] partially granting respondent
Drilons petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new
election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the
others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the
Salonga Constitution. But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been
properly ratified, Drilons term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP
president in a holdover capacity until new officers were elected.

Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April 17,
2007 a divided Court issued a resolution,[5] granting respondent Drilons petition and denying
that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC had
jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had been
validly amended; and that, as a consequence, respondent Drilons term as LP president was to
end only on November 30, 2007.
Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent
Drilons term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were supposedly qualified
to vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons associated with petitioner
Atienza sought to clarify their membership status and raised issues regarding the composition of
the NECO.Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the
new LP president.
On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G. Valencia, Danilo
E. Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin Cast-Abayon, Melvin G.
Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory
injunction[6] before the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O.
Acosta, the party secretary general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the
presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which elected him was invalidly
convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition
ought to have been based on a list appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir
Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as common exhibit in the earlier cases and it
showed that the NECO had 103 members.
Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not
invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the
status of guests during the meeting. Atienzas allies allegedly raised these issues but respondent
Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and railroaded the proceedings. He suspended the
meeting and moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice to Atienzas
allies.
On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas election as LP president
faithfully complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The partys
60th Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the NECO members
because supervening events changed the bodys number and composition. Some NECO
members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after accepting positions in the
government. Others had lost their re-election bid or did not run in the May 2007 elections,
making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP members who got elected to public
office also became part of the NECO. Certain persons of national stature also became NECO

members upon respondent Drilons nomination, a privilege granted the LP president under the
amended LP Constitution. In other words, the NECO membership was not fixed or static; it
changed due to supervening circumstances.
Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza, ZaldivarPerez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers on March 2,
2006. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that NECO subsequently
ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like petitioners Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez,
forfeited their party membership when they ran under other political parties during the May
2007 elections. They were dropped from the roster of LP members.
On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners Atienza, et
al.s petition. It noted that the May 2007 elections necessarily changed the composition of the
NECO since the amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators, members of the
House of Representatives, governors and mayors members of that body. That some lost or won
these positions in the May 2007 elections affected the NECO membership. Petitioners failed to
prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president was not properly convened.
As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC
observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political
party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to
resolve.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners Atienza, et
al. filed this petition for certiorariunder Rule 65.
The Issues Presented
Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:
1. Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable party;
and
2. Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the requisite
legal standing to question Roxas election.
Petitioners Atienza, et al., on the other hand, raise the following issues:
3. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO
membership that elected respondent Roxas as LP president;

4. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue
concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the
expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party; and
5. Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.s
constitutional right to due process by the latters expulsion from the party.

The Courts Ruling

One. Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition for
failure of petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead the LP as an indispensable party. Roxas, et al.
point out that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the
NECO, the controversy could not be adjudicated with finality without making the LP a party to
the case.[7]
But petitioners Atienza, et al.s causes of action in this case consist in respondents Roxas, et al.s
disenfranchisement of Atienza, et al. from the election of party leaders and in the illegal
election of Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al. were supposedly excluded from the
elections by a series of despotic acts of Roxas, et al., who controlled the proceedings. Among
these acts are Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party, their exclusion from the NECO, and
respondent Drilons railroading of election proceedings. Atienza, et al. attributed all these illegal
and prejudicial acts to Roxas, et al.
Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been sought
from it, the LP is not an indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.s prayer for the undoing
of respondents Roxas, et al.s acts and the reconvening of the NECO are directed against
Roxas, et al.
Two. Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no legal
standing to question the election of Roxas as LP president because they are no longer LP
members, having been validly expelled from the party or having joined other political
parties.[8] As non-members, they have no stake in the outcome of the action.
But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[9] legal standing in suits is
governed by the real parties-in-interest rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This
states that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-ininterest. And real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiffs standing is
based on his own right to the relief sought. In raising petitioners Atienza, et al.s lack of standing

as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et al. would have the Court hypothetically assume the
truth of the allegations in the petition.
Here, it is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.s allegations that respondents Roxas, et al.
deprived them of their rights as LP members by summarily excluding them from the LP roster
and not allowing them to take part in the election of its officers and that not all who sat in the
NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. If Atienza, et al.s allegations were correct,
they would have been irregularly expelled from the party and the election of officers,
void. Further, they would be entitled to recognition as members of good standing and to the
holding of a new election of officers using the correct list of NECO members. To this extent,
therefore, Atienza, et al. who want to take part in another election would stand to be benefited
or prejudiced by the Courts decision in this case. Consequently, they have legal standing to
pursue this petition.
Three. In assailing respondent Roxas election as LP president, petitioners Atienza, et al.
claim that the NECO members allowed to take part in that election should have been limited to
those in the list of NECO members appearing in the partys 60thAnniversary Souvenir Program.
Atienza, et al. allege that respondent Drilon, as holdover LP president, adopted that list in the
earlier cases before the COMELEC and it should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al. The
Courts decision in the earlier cases, said Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the next party
election. Thus, Roxas, et al. in effect defied the Courts ruling when they removed Atienza as
party chairman and changed the NECOs composition.[10]
But the list of NECO members appearing in the partys 60 th Anniversary Souvenir
Program was drawn before the May 2007 elections. After the 2007 elections, changes in the
NECO membership had to be redrawn to comply with what the amended LP Constitution
required. Respondent Drilon adopted the souvenir program as common exhibit in the earlier
cases only to prove that the NECO, which supposedly elected Atienza as new LP president on
March 2, 2006, had been improperly convened. It cannot be regarded as an immutable list,
given the nature and character of the NECO membership.
Nothing in the Courts resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO membership
should be pegged to the partys 60thAnniversary Souvenir Program. There would have been no
basis for such a position. The amended LP Constitution did not intend the NECO membership
to be permanent. Its Section 27[11] provides that the NECO shall include all incumbent senators,
members of the House of Representatives, governors, and mayors who were LP members in
good standing for at least six months. It follows from this that with the national and local
elections taking place in May 2007, the number and composition of the NECO would have to
yield to changes brought about by the elections.

Former NECO members who lost the offices that entitled them to membership had to be
dropped. Newly elected ones who gained the privilege because of their offices had to come
in. Furthermore, former NECO members who passed away, resigned from the party, or went on
leave could not be expected to remain part of the NECO that convened and held elections on
November 26, 2007. In addition, Section 27 of the amended LP Constitution expressly
authorized the party president to nominate persons of national stature to the NECO. Thus,
petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot validly object to the admission of 12 NECO members
nominated by respondent Drilon when he was LP president. Even if this move could be
regarded as respondents Roxas, et al.s way of ensuring their election as party officers, there was
certainly nothing irregular about the act under the amended LP Constitution.
The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP
Constitution. Respondents Roxas, et al. explained in details how they arrived at the NECO
composition for the purpose of electing the party leaders.[12] The explanation is logical and
consistent with party rules. Consequently, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion
when it upheld the composition of the NECO that elected Roxas as LP president.
Petitioner Atienza claims that the Courts resolution in the earlier cases recognized his
right as party chairman with a term, like respondent Drilon, that would last up to November 30,
2007 and that, therefore, his ouster from that position violated the Courts resolution. But the
Courts resolution in the earlier cases did not preclude the party from disciplining Atienza under
Sections 29[13]and 46[14] of the amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove him
or any officer for cause as it saw fit.
Four. Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its
jurisdiction when it ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality
of their expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership
controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings of the Court, they claim, categorically
upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party leadership disputes.[15]
But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the validity of the
expulsion of petitioners Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly
that elected respondent Roxas as LP president. Given the COMELECs finding as upheld by this
Court that the membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP Constitution, the
resolution of the issue of whether or not the party validly expelled petitioners cannot affect the
election of officers that the NECO held.
While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members belong to their faction,
they did not specify who these members were and how their numbers could possibly affect the
composition of the NECO and the outcome of its election of party leaders. Atienza, et al. has

not bothered to assail the individual qualifications of the NECO members who voted for
Roxas. Nor did Atienza, et al. present proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then
assembled. In other words, the claims of Atienza, et al. were totally unsupported by evidence.
Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party
impacts on the party leadership issue or on the election of respondent Roxas as president so that
it was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances, the
validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be
settled within the party. It is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction.
What is more, some of petitioner Atienzas allies raised objections before the NECO assembly
regarding the status of members from their faction. Still, the NECO proceeded with the election,
implying that its membership, whose composition has been upheld, voted out those objections.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are
generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC
may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by
the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections[16] that the COMELECs
powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the
ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its
acts. The Court also declared in another case[17] that the COMELECs power to register political
parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus,
the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it,
as an incident of its power to register political parties.
The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the
COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing
authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It
is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination
for candidates to local elective posts.[18] In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the
official standard bearer of the party.
The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that will redound to
the benefit of its official candidates.It imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered political
parties that have to be carried out through their leaders. The resolution of the leadership issue is
thus particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections.[19]

Five. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple
issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionallyprotected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should
have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the
party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of
administrative proceedings[20] and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid
down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.[21]
But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of
political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies
created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are
performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality contemplates an authority to which the
state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function. [22] The
constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the states powers thus, apply
too, to administrative bodies.
The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the states powers are found in Article III
of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking
of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the
states powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect
ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private
individuals or entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such
private acts apply. The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the
state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies
involving private parties.[23]
Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an
intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state
instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life,
liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested
right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only
rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to
those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a
contract among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been
violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due
process issue against the government or any of its agencies.
But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in
membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct
its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca

v. Mula,[24] the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public
interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also
consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to
the free choice of the people.[25]
To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas
election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the
party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs performance
of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the
issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an
issue of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the
limited scope of its power over political parties.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of
the Commission on Elections dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001.
SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 105628 August 6, 1992

RODULFO SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF VIRAC and JOSE "CITO"
ALBERTO II, respondents.
G.R. No. 105725 August 6, 1992
EMMANUEL R. ALFELOR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE CITY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF IRIGA CITY and JOSE C.
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
G.R. No. 105727 August 6, 1992
LEANDRO I. VERCELES, SR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CATANDUANES and ROSALIE
ALBERTO-ESTACIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105730 August 6, 1992
JESUS TYPOCO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CAMARINES NORTE, and
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF JOSE PANGANIBAN, CAMARINES NORTE, respondents.

G.R. No. 105771 August 6, 1992

ALBERTO U. GENOVA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CABUSAO, NEBRIDO F.
SANTIAGO, and EUGENIO AGUILAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 105778 August 6, 1992
MARIO S. MANLICLIC, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF GEN. NATIVIDAD, NUEVA ECIJA,
BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS OF PRECINCT NOS. 12-A AND 13, BARANGAY MATAAS NA KAHOY,
GEN. NATIVIDAD, NUEVA ECIJA; BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS OF PRECINCT NOS. 15-A,
BARANGAY PICALEON, GEN. NATIVIDAD, NUEVA ECIJA; PRECINCT NO. 25-A OF SAPANG BATO, GEN.
NATIVIDAD, NUEVA ECIJA; THE ELECTION REGISTRAR and APOLONIO PASCUAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 105797 August 6, 1992
FRANCISCO G. RABAT, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DAVAO ORIENTAL and
ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
G-R. No. 105919 August 6, 1992
DATU MOHAMMAD A. SINSUAT, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DATU MICHAEL SINSUAT and ATTY. RUBEN PLATON, respondents.
G.R. No. 105977 August 6, 1992
ROSARIO A. VELASCO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF TERNATE, CAVITE, and
CONDRADO LINDO, respondents.
RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The special civil actions for certiorari hereby jointly resolved, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seek to set aside the Resolutions of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the
following Special Cases (SPC):
1) G.R. No. 105628 SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from the ruling of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac, Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from
the canvass of one (1) election return;
2) G.R. No. 105725 SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the City Board of
Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of six (6)

election returns and in UND No. 92-243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to
include in the canvass the election returns involved therein;
3) G.R. No. 105727 SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of petitioner from the
ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Catanduanes which ordered the
inclusion in the canvass the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Virac, excluding
the returns from 48 precincts;
4) G.R. No. 105730 SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte which dismissed petitioner's
opposition to the composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers;
5) G.R. No. 105771 SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur which, among others, rejected petitioner's
objection to certain election returns;
6) G.R. No. 105778 SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for non-compliance with
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166;
7) G.R. No. 105797 SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Davao Oriental which rejected petitioner's objections to the canvass of
some certificates of canvass;
8) G.R. No. 105919 SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioner's appeal from the ruling of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Upi Nuro, Maguindanao;
9) G.R. No. 105977 SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre-proclamation petition,
which is an appeal from the rulings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate,
Cavite, and denying a subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in said amended
petition.
Comments had been filed only in G.R. No. 105727 and G.R. No. 105797. This Court dispenses with
the Comments in the other cases.
Petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions above specified as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance of and
decided the appeals without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis supplied).

The 1973 Constitution prescribed another rule. Its Section 3, subdivision C of Article XII provided as
follows:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election
cases may be heard and decided by divisions, except contests involving Members of
the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. . . .
It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that election cases include preproclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the
Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the
same at the first instance. In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are
classified as Special Cases 1 and, in compliance with the above provision of the Constitution, the two
(2) Divisions of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear and decide these Special
Cases. 2 Rule 27 thereof governs Special Cases; specifically, Section 9 of the said Rule provides that
appeals from rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions to which they
are assigned and not by the Commission en banc. Said Section reads:
Sec. 9. Appeals from rulings of Board of Canvassers. (a) A party aggrieved by an
oral ruling of the board of canvassers who had stated orally his intent to appeal said
ruling shall, within five days following receipt of a copy of the written ruling of the board
of canvassers, file with the Commission a verified appeal, furnishing a copy thereof to
the board of canvassers and the adverse party.
(b) The appeal filed with the Commission shall be docketed by the Clerk of Court
concerned.
(c) The answer/opposition shall be verified.
(d) The Division to which the case is assigned shall immediately set the case for
hearing. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
A motion to reconsider the decision or resolution of the Division concerned may be filed within five (5)
days from its promulgation. 3 The Clerk of Court of the Division shall, within twenty-four (24) hours
from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner of such fact; in turn, the latter shall certify
the case to the Commission en banc. 4 Thereafter, the Clerk of Court of the Commission shall
calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en bancwithin ten (10)
days from the certification. 5
Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without first
referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set
aside. Consequently, the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a
Division.

A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically, be in order. However, Section
16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed
terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved. The said section provides as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated
at the beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of
canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a
regular election protest by the aggrieved party. However, proceedings may continue
when on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that
the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to
continue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a
petition for certiorari.
The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions commenced at noon
of 30 June 1992. 7 These cases have thus been rendered moot and such a resolution would only be
an exercise in futility.
Accordingly, the instant petitions are DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing by petitioners of
regular election protests. If the winning candidates for the positions involved in the Special Cases
subject of these petitions have already been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests
shall be deemed suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these
petitions before this Court.
The Temporary Restraining Orders issued in G.R. No. 105727, G.R. No. 105730 and G.R. No.
105797 are hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139 members, represented by its President, Amado
P. Macasaet and its Executive Director Ermin F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional validity of
Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its
corresponding Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers.
On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Comelec Space. The Commission shall procure free print space of not less
than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every
province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of
candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of
said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of
said province or city.
Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. "Comelec Space" shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the
newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make
known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs
of government.
"Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital
election information.
Sec. 4. Allocation of Comelec Space. (a) "Comelec Space" shall also be available to
all candidatesduring the periods stated in Section 2 hereof. Its allocation shall be equal
and impartial among all candidates for the same office. All candidates concerned shall
be furnished a copy of the allocation of "Comelec Space" for their information, guidance
and compliance.
(b) Any candidate desiring to avail himself of "Comelec Space" from newspapers or
publications based in the Metropolitan Manila Area shall submit an application therefor,
in writing, to the Committee on Mass Media of the Commission. Any candidate desiring
to avail himself of "Comelec Space" in newspapers or publications based in the
provinces shall submit his application therefor, in writing, to the Provincial Election
Supervisor concerned. Applications for availment of "Comelec Space" maybe filed at
any time from the date of effectivity of this Resolution.

(c) The Committee on Mass Media and the Provincial Election Supervisors
shall allocate available"Comelec Space" among the candidates concerned by lottery of
which said candidates shall be notified in advance, in writing, to be present personally
or by representative to witness the lottery at the date, time and place specified in the
notice. Any party objecting to the result of the lottery may appeal to the Commission.
(d) The candidates concerned shall be notified by the Committee on Mass Media or the
Provincial Election Supervisor, as the case maybe, sufficiently in advance and in writing
of the date of issue and the newspaper or publication allocated to him, and the time
within which he must submit the written material for publication in the "Comelec Space".
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. No
newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion,
features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments which
manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly or repeatedly
referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However, unless the
facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the
determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the
accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest.
(Emphasis supplied)
Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E.
Maambong sent identical letters, dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers like
the Business World, the Philippine Star, the Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal, all members of
PPI. These letters read as follows:
This is to advise you that pursuant to Resolution No. 2772 of the Commission on
Elections, you aredirected to provide free print space of not less than one half (1/2)
page for use as "Comelec Space"or similar to the print support which you have
extended during the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections which was 2 full pages for
each political party fielding senatorial candidates, from March 6, 1995 to May 6, 1995, to
make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and
programs of government.
We shall be informing the political parties and candidates to submit directly to
you their pictures, biographical data, stand on key public issues and platforms of
government either as raw data or in the form of positives or camera-ready materials.
Please be reminded that the political parties/candidates may be accommodated in your
publication any day upon receipt of their materials until May 6, 1995 which is the last
day for campaigning.
We trust you to extend your full support and cooperation in this regard. (Emphasis
supplied)

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground
that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its
agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner
also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free
"Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute
impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. 1
On 20 April 1995, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining Comelec from enforcing
and implementing Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, as well as the Comelec directives addressed to
various print media enterprises all dated 22 March 1995. The Court also required the respondent to
file a Comment on the Petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free
print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for noncompliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely
established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the
procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements
for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the
Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives
are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of
the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible
exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and
information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a
fair, impartial and credible election. 2
At the oral hearing of this case held on 28 April 1995, respondent Comelec through its Chairman,
Hon. Bernardo Pardo, in response to inquiries from the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court,
stated that Resolution No. 2772, particularly Section 2 thereof and the 22 March 1995 letters
dispatched to various members of petitioner PPI, were not intended to compel those members to
supply Comelec with free print space. Chairman Pardo represented to the Court that Resolution and
the related letter-directives were merely designed to solicit from the publishers the same free print
space which many publishers had voluntarily given to Comelec during the election period relating to
the 11 May 1992 elections. Indeed, the Chairman stated that the Comelec would, that very afternoon,
meet and adopt an appropriate amending or clarifying resolution, a certified true copy of which would
forthwith be filed with the Court.
On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the Solicitor General a manifestation which
attached a copy of Comelec Resolution No. 2772-A dated 4 May 1995. The operative portion of this
Resolution follows:
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts No. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws, the

Commission on Elections RESOLVED to clarify Sections 2 and 8 of Res. No. 2772 as

follows:
1. Section 2 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to
mean as requiring publishers of the different mass media
print publications to provide print space under pain of
prosecution, whether administrative, civil or criminal, there
being no sanction or penalty for violation of said Section
provided for either in said Resolution or in Section 90 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code, on the grant of "Comelec space."
2. Section 8 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to
mean as constituting prior restraint on the part of publishers
with respect to the printing or publication of materials in the
news, opinion, features or other sections of their respective
publications or other accounts or comments, it being clear
from the last sentence of said Section 8 that the Commission
shall, "unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate
otherwise . . .respect the determination by the publisher
and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the
accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and
of public interest."
This Resolution shall take effect upon approval. (Emphasis in the original)
While, at this point, the Court could perhaps simply dismiss the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
as having become moot and academic, we consider it not inappropriate to pass upon the first
constitutional issue raised in this case. Our hope is to put this issue to rest and prevent its
resurrection.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is not a model of clarity in expression. Section 1 of Resolution No.
2772-A did not try to redraft Section 2; accordingly, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 persists in its
original form. Thus, we must point out that, as presently worded, and in particular as interpreted and
applied by the Comelec itself in its 22 March 1995 letter-directives to newspaper publishers, Section 2
of Resolution No. 2772 is clearly susceptible of the reading that petitioner PPI has given it. That
Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten publishers who would disregard it or its
implementing letters with some criminal or other sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the
Comelec's original intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from
publishers. A written communication officially directing a print media company to supply free print
space, dispatched by a government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by a member of the
Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the
company so addressed. That the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the
imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such directions, only aggravates the
constitutional difficulties inhearing in the present situation. The enactment or addition of such
sanctions by the legislative authority itself would be open to serious constitutional objection.

To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section
2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal
property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such
compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March 1995) until 12
May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often as Comelec may direct during the same period?
The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de
minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the
compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of
expropriation of private personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of
private property for public use need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another
is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown
by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print
space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance
of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. 3Similarly, it has not been suggested,
let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed.
That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not contested by petitioner PPI. We note only
that, under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, the free "Comelec space" sought by the respondent
Commission would be used not only for informing the public about the identities, qualifications and
programs of government of candidates for elective office but also for "dissemination of vital election
information" (including, presumably, circulars, regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by
Comelec). It seems to the Court a matter of judicial notice that government offices and agencies
(including the Supreme Court) simply purchase print space, in the ordinary course of events, when
their rules and regulations, circulars, notices and so forth need officially to be brought to the attention
of the general public.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI reads it, as an
assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space for Comelec
purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as
Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent newspaper
and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes
contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a
constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here
present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain.

We would note that the ruling here laid down by the Court is entirely in line with the theory of
democratic representative government. The economic costs of informing the general public about the
qualifications and programs of those seeking elective office are most appropriately distributed as
widely as possible throughout our society by the utilization of public funds, especially funds raised by
taxation, rather than cast solely on one small sector of society, i.e., print media enterprises. The
benefits which flow from a heightened level of information on and the awareness of the electoral
process are commonly thought to be community-wide; the burdens should be allocated on the same
basis.
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if
read as compelling publishers to "donate" "Comelec space, " may be sustained as a valid exercise of
the police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too casually to require prolonged
consideration on our part. Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of
Comelec) to show that the police power essentially a power of legislation has been
constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission. 4 Secondly, while private property may indeed
be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to
show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. 5
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of
existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without
regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in differing
parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt was
made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space
confronted the Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and
calibrated response to such necessity available to the Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the State.
We turn to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, which needs to be quoted in full again:
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. No
newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion,
features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments which
manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly or repeatedly
referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However, unless the
facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the
determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the
accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest.
It is not easy to understand why Section 8 was included at all in Resolution No. 2772. In any case,
Section 8 should be viewed in the context of our decision in National Press Club v. Commission on
Elections. 6 There the Court sustained the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, known
as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and airtime
for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Comelec. In doing so, the Court carefully
distinguished (a) paid political advertisements which are reached by the prohibition of Section 11 (b),
from (b) the reporting of news, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters,

broadcasters, editors, commentators or columnists which fall outside the scope of Section 11 (b) and
which are protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press:
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application.
Analysis ofSection 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and
sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of print space and air
time for campaign or other political purposes.Section 11 (b) does not purport in any
way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio ortelevision stations of news or
news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and
programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and
expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcaster or editors or commentators
or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth,
so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements
for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as
reaching any report or commentary or other coverage that, in responsible media, is not
paid for by candidates for political office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover
only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) that it does not restrict
either the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon the
qualifications and programs and activities of any and all candidates for office
constitutes the critical distinction which must be made between the instant case and that
of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections. . . . 7 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of the Comelec to establish a
guideline for implementation of the above-quoted distinction and doctrine in National Press Club an
effort not blessed with evident success. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A while possibly helpful,
does not add substantially to the utility of Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. The distinction between
paid political advertisements on the one hand and news reports, commentaries and expressions of
belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be given
operative meaning only in actual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very
specific sets of facts.
At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative action on
the part of Comelec designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of
its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under Section 8.
Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise constitutional issue here sought to be
raised whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the
Comelec's power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for the
operation of media of communication or information [for the purpose of ensuring]
equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefore, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in
connection with the objective of holding free, orderly honest, peaceful and credible
elections

is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis
mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.
Summarizing our conclusions:
1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March
1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to
Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and
nullified.
2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part
and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22
March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby
MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of
Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.

[G.R. No. 93867 : December 18, 1990.]

192 SCRA 358
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Petitioner, vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as ACTING
CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of

Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the
fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat attempt.
The qualifications of the respondent are conceded by the petitioner and are not in issue
in this case. What is the power of the President of the Philippines to make the challenged
designation in view of the status of the Commission on Elections as an independent
constitutional body and the specific provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the
Constitution that "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

The petitioner invokes the case of Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101, where
President Elpidio Quirino designated the Solicitor General as acting member of the
Commission on Elections and the Court revoked the designation as contrary to the
Constitution. It is also alleged that the respondent is not even the senior member of the
Commission on Elections, being outranked by Associate Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg,
Jr.:-cralaw
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and
that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites
the practice in this Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief
Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President of the
Philippines is necessary.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that no such designation is necessary in
the case of the Supreme Court because the temporary succession cited is provided for in
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. A similar rule is found in Section 5 of BP 129 for
the Court of Appeals. There is no such arrangement, however, in the case of the
Commission on Elections. The designation made by the President of the Philippines
should therefore be sustained for reasons of "administrative expediency," to prevent
disruption of the functions of the COMELEC.
Expediency is a dubious justification. It may also be an overstatement to suggest that
the operations of the Commission on Elections would have been disturbed or stalemated
if the President of the Philippines had not stepped in and designated an Acting
Chairman. There did not seem to be any such problem. In any event, even assuming
that difficulty, we do not agree that "only the President (could) act to fill the hiatus," as
the Solicitor General maintains.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in nature, they are not
under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective
functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable
laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and
rulings are subject only to review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the
Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under
that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the
President of the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and
therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation.
Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any
time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent, having

accepted
such
designation,
will
not
withdrawal.chanrobles virtual law library

be

estopped

from

challenging

its

It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be removed at
will from her permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no less true, however,
that she can be replaced as Acting Chairman, with or without cause, and thus deprived
of the powers and perquisites of that temporary position.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the
President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in
favor of the respondent. This is still a government of laws and not of men. The problem
allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for presidential action.
The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections
themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections
would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have
appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the
President to make.
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved
only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation. But while
conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the
Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista case, so
too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission
on Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That
guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on
Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent Haydee
B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the respondent is hereby ordered to desist from serving as
such. This is without prejudice to the incumbent Associate Commissioners of the
Commission on Elections restoring her to the same position if they so desire, or choosing
another member in her place, pending the appointment of a permanent Chairman by the
President of the Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.: rd
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104848 January 29, 1993

ANTONIO GALLARDO, ANTONIO AREVALO, CRESENCIO ECHAVES, EMMANUEL ARANAS, PALERMO SIA,
RONNIE RAMBUYON, PRIMO NAVARRO, and NOEL NAVARRO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SINFOROSO V. TABAMO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial
Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, and PEDRO P. ROMUALDO, respondents.
Villarama & Cruz for petitioners.
Marciano LL. Aparte, Jr. for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners
would have Us prohibit, restrain and enjoin public respondent Sinforoso V. Tabamo, Jr., Presiding
Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mambajao, Camiguin, from continuing with
the proceedings in a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order filed as a taxpayer's suit, docketed therein as Special Civil
Action No. 465 and entitled "Pedro P. Romualdo, Jr. versus Gov. Antonio Gallardo, et al." Petitioners
likewise seek to prohibit the enforcement of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), issued by the
respondent Judge on 10 April 1992, on the ground that the latter acted whimsically, capriciously and
without jurisdiction when he took cognizance of the case and issued the said order. It is the
petitioners' thesis that the said case principally involves an alleged violation of the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code the jurisdiction over which is exclusively vested in the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). It is additionally averred that the action is completely baseless, that the
private respondent is not a real party in interest and that the public respondent acted with undue
haste, manifest partiality and evident bias in favor of the private respondent in issuing the TRO.
In Our Resolution of 20 April 1992, We required the respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the respondent Judge to cease and desist from
implementing and enforcing the challenged Order of 10 April 1922, and from continuing with the
proceedings in Special Civil Action No. 465.
At the time of the filing of both the special civil action and the instant petition, petitioner Antonio
Gallardo was the incumbent Governor of the Province of Camiguin and was seeking re-election in the
11 May 1992 synchronized elections. Petitioners Antonio Arevalo, Cresencio Echaves, Emmanuel
Aranas and Palermo Sia are the provincial treasurer, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and
provincial budget officer of Camiguin, respectively. Their co-petitioners Ronnie Rambuyon, Primo
Navarro and Noel Navarro are all government project laborers. On the other hand, the private
respondent was the incumbent Congressman of the lone Congressional District of Camiguin, a
candidate for the same office in the said synchronized elections and the Regional Chairman of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Region X.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated.

On 10 April 1992, private respondent filed his Petition 1 (Special Civil Action No. 465) before the
court a quo against petitioners Gallardo, Arevalo, Echaves, Aranas and Sia to prohibit and restrain
them from pursuing or prosecuting certain public works projects; from releasing, disbursing and/or
spending any public funds for such projects; and from issuing, using or availing of treasury warrants
or any device for the future delivery of money, goods and other things of value chargeable against
public funds in connection with the said projects as (1) said projects were undertaken in violation of
the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881)
because although they were initiated a few days before 27 March 1992, the date the ban took effect,
they were not covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are
preconditions for the commencement of any public works project; hence, they could not have been
lawfully and validly undertaken; (2) the hiring of hundreds of laborers in the different projects
continues unabated in flagrant violation of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code; (3) the projects were undertaken in violation of the provisions of the Local
Government Code 2 governing the use and expenditure of the twenty percent (20%) development
fund of the Province of Camiguin; (4) these projects, which are "Locally-Funded", were pursued
without the requisite approval of the provincial budget by the Regional Office of Budget and
Management as required by Section 326 of the Local Government Code; (5) some of the projects
which are "Foreign-Assisted" and funded by the Spanish Assistance for Integrated Livelihood
Program (SAIL) lack the required building permits and are without any relevance to those livelihood
projects envisioned by the SAIL; and (6) more importantly, as alleged in paragraph VII of his
Petition: 3
. . . the illegal prosecution of these public work projects requiring massive outlay of
public funds during this election period has been and is being done maliciously and
intentionally for the purpose of corrupting the voters and inducing them to support the
candidacy of Respondent Gallardo and his candidates in the coming May 11, 1992
election.
In support of his prayer for a restraining order to be issued upon the filing of the petition and a writ of
preliminary injunction immediately thereafter, herein private respondent alleges in paragraph XV of
his Petition:
That unless the illegal acts of Respondents are enjoined or restrained immediately first
by the issuance of the restraining order upon the filing of this Petition and immediately
after that a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, great or irreparable loss and injury shall be
caused not only to Petitioner himself, as a candidate and as a taxpayer, but also to the
entire LDP slate of candidates, whose supporters are being corrupted and illegally
induced to vote for Respondent Antonio A. Gallardo and his candidates in consideration
of their employment in these projects, but (sic) most of all the greatest and most
irreparable loss, damage and injury, in terms of wanton, irresponsible, excessive,
abusive and flagrant waste of public money, is now being caused and shall continue to
be caused, primarily and principally to the sixty-thousand or more taxpayers of the
Province of Camiguin, whom Petitioner represents as Congressman and whose
interests Petitioner is sworn to uphold, promote and protect. 4

The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a ) those that are Locally-Funded,
consisting of twenty-nine (29) different projects for the maintenance or concreting of various roads,
the rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those
designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the construction of
the Human Resource Development Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and
waterworks systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and
laboratory equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment. 5
On the same day that the private respondent filed his petition, public respondent Judge issued the
questioned TRO, 6 the pertinent portion of which reads:
It appearing from the verified petition in this case that great and irreparable damage
and/or injuryshall be caused to the petitioner as candidate and taxpayer, such damage
and injury taking the form and shape occasioned by the alleged wanton, excessive,
abusive and flagrant waste of public money, before the matter can be heard on notice,
the respondents are hereby Temporarily Restrained from pursuing or prosecuting the
projects itemized in Annexes "A" and "A-1" of the petition; from releasing, disbursing
and/or spending any public funds for such projects; from issuing, using or availing of
treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other
things of value chargeable against public funds in connection with said projects.
(Emphasis supplied).
In the same order, the public respondent directed the petitioners to file their Answer within ten (10)
days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction for 24 April 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, alleging as grounds therefor the following:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO.
465, BEING (sic) A SUIT INTENDED TO ENJOIN AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE.
II
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S JURISDICTION IS LIMITED TO CRIMINAL ACTIONS
FOR VIOLATION OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE.
III
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
COMPLAINTS/PETITION BASED ON ELECTION OFFENSES PRIOR TO THE
CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BY THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; FURTHER, PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT TO FILE

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 465 SINCE THE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE

ELECTION OFFENSES BELONGS TO THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.
IV
PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST ALL HIS ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES
V
THE PETITION DATED 09 APRIL 1992 FILED WITH PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS
COMPLETELY BASELESS SINCE:
A. THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY
PETITIONERS ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE PUBLIC WORKS BAN
ENFORCED BY THE COMELEC.
B. THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS WERE COMMENCED ONLY
AFTER APPROVAL OF THE DETAILED ENGINEERING PLANS AND
SPECIFICATIONS AND PROGRAM OF WORK.
C. THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS WERE PROPERLY SUPPORTED
BY A BUDGET DULY PASSED AND APPROVED BY THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN.
D. THE DEVELOPMENT FUND MAY VALIDLY BE USED TO FINANCE
THE MAINTENANCE OF PROVINCIAL ROADS.
VI
THE TAXPAYER'S SUIT FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IMPROPER SINCE
HE IS NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.
VII
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH UNDUE HASTE, MANIFEST PARTIALITY
AND EVIDENT BIAS IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST
PETITIONERS IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER. 7
As adverted to earlier, We issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 20 April 1992.
After considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the Petition, the Comment thereto
and the Reply to the Comment, We gave due course 8 to this Petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda which they complied with.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Special Civil Action No. 465. The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link

the private respondent's principal grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w),
Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular emphasis
on the last two (2) paragraphs which read:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters.
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any public
official or employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a
regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or
expends any public funds for:
(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public
works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. During the period of
forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any
person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or
works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury
warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of
value chargeable against public funds.
Private respondent likewise focuses on Resolution No. 2332 (not 2322 as erroneously stated in page
10 of his Petition) of the COMELEC, promulgated on 2 January 1992, implementing the aforesaid
paragraphs (v) and (w) of Section 261 and fixing the duration of the 45-day ban for purposes of the
synchronized elections from 27 March 1992 to 11 May 1922.
Essentially, therefore, Civil Case No. 465 before the trial court is for the enforcement of laws involving
the conduct of elections; corollarily, the issue that is logically provoked is whether or not the trial court
has jurisdiction over the same. If the respondent Judge had only hearkened to this Court's teaching
about a quarter of a century earlier, this case would not have reached Us and taken away from more
deserving cases so much precious time.
Zaldivar vs. Estenzo, 9 decided by this Court on 3 May 1968, had squarely resolved the issue above
posed. Speaking through then Associate Justice Enrique Fernando (who later became Chief Justice),
this Court explicitly ruled that considering that the Commission on Elections is vested by the

Constitution with exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court over a case involving the
enforcement of the Election Code "is at war with the plain constitutional command, the implementing
statutory provisions, and the hospitable scope afforded such grant of authority so clear and
unmistakable in recent decisions." 10
Said case was decided under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution and R.A. No. 180, otherwise known
as the Revised Election Code, which took effect on 21 June 1947. The present Constitution and
extant election laws have further strengthened the foundation for the above doctrine; there can be no
doubt that the present COMELEC has broader powers than its predecessors. While under the 1935
Constitution it had "exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections," exercised "all other functions . . . conferred upon it by law" 11 and had the power
to deputize all law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government for the purpose of
insuring free, orderly and honest elections, 12 and under the 1973 Constitution it had, inter alia, the
power (a) "[E]nforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections" 13 (b) "[D]eputize, with
the consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities
of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the purpose of ensuring free,
orderly, and honest elections,"14 and (c) "[P]erform such other functions as may be provided by
law," 15 it was not expressly vested with the power to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct of
an election. That power could only originate from a special law enacted by Congress; this is the
necessary implication of the above constitutional provision authorizing the Commission to "[P]erform
such other functions as may be provided by law."
The present Constitution, however, implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such
rules and regulations. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article IX-C thereof reads as follows:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. It is thus clear that its
incorporation into the present Constitution took into account the Commission's power under the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), which was already in force when the said
Constitution was drafted and ratified, to:
xxx xxx xxx
Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Code or other laws
which the Commission is required to enforce and administer, . . . . 16
Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid statutory
authority to grant the Commission broader and more flexible powers to effectively perform its
duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions. Doubtless, if its rule-making power is

made to depend on statutes, Congress may withdraw the same at any time. Indeed, the
present Constitution envisions a truly independent Commission on Elections committed to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, 17 and to serve as the guardian of
the people's sacred right of suffrage the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful
change of government and in achieving and promoting political stability.
Additionally, by statutory mandate, the present Commission on Elections possesses, inter alia, the
following powers:
l) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials
or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and
instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties relative to the
conduct of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets eighteen years of age
and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders.
The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the preceding
paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to electoral processes who
violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders, decisions or
rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the
corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such
officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation or
failure. 18
2) To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful,
libelous, misleading or false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing. 19
Needless to say, the acts sought to be restrained in Special Civil Action No. 465 before the court a
quo are matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. As a matter of fact, the
specific allegations in the petition therein of violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261
of the Omnibus Election Code provide a stronger basis and reason for the application of
the Zaldivar doctrine. At most, the facts in the latter case do not illustrate as clearly the announced
doctrine as the facts in this case do. In Zaldivar, no specific provision of the Revised Election Code
then in force was alleged to have been violated. What was sought to be enjoined was the alleged
wielding by Zaldivar, then a municipal mayor, of the power, by virtue of his office, to appoint special
policemen or agents to terrorize voters into supporting the congressional candidate of his choice. In
holding that the then Court of First Instance did not have jurisdiction over the case, this Court
considered the constitutional power of the Commission on Elections to have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and to exercise all other
functions which may be conferred by law. We likewise relied on the provisions of the Revised Election
Code vesting upon the COMELEC (a) direct and immediate supervision over municipal, city and
provincial officials designated by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections and (b)
authority to suspend them from the performance of such duties for failure to comply with its
instructions, orders, decisions or rulings and recommend to the President their removal if found guilty
of non-feasance, malfeasance or misfeasance in connection with the performance of their duties
relative to the conduct of elections. 20

Under the present law, however, except in case of urgent need, the appointment or hiring of new
employees or the creation or filling up of new positions in any government office, agency or
instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, is
banned during the period of forty-five (45) days before a regular election and thirty (30) days before a
special election if made without the prior authority of the Commission on Elections. A violation thereof
constitutes an election offense. 21 Then too, no less than the present Constitution and not just the
Election Law as was the case at the time of Zaldivar expressly provides that the Commission may
"[R]ecommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive,
order, or decision." 22
Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Commission with the power to "investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." 23
It may thus be said without fear of contradiction that this vast array of powers and functions now
enjoyed by the Commission under the present Constitution provides a stronger foundation for, and
adds vigor and vitality to, theZaldivar doctrine.
The rationale of the said doctrine needs to be stressed here so that henceforth, no judge will lose his
bearings when confronted with the same issue. Otherwise, he should be held to account for either the
sheer ignorance of the law or the callous disregard of pronouncements by this Court to accommodate
partisan political feelings. We declared in the said case:
The question may be asked: Why should not the judiciary be a
co-participant in this particular instance of enforcing the Election Code as its authority
was invoked? The obvious answer is the literal language of the Constitution which
empowers the Commission on Elections to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of the elections." Moreover, as was
so aptly observed by the then Justice Frankfurter, although the situation confronting the
United States Supreme Court was of a different character: "Nothing is clearer than that
this controversy concerns matters that brings courts into immediate and active relations
with party contests. From the determination of such issues this Court has traditionally
held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of
the people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an essentially
political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the law." 24 Then, too,
reference by analogy may be made to the principle that sustains Albano v. Arranz. For
even without the express constitutional prescription that only this Court may review the
decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on Elections, it is easy to understand
why no inference whatsoever with the performance of the Commission on Elections of
its functions should be allowed unless emanating from this Court. The observation of
Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v. Arranz,25 while not precisely in point,
indicates the proper approach. Thus: "It is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if
the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to arrogate unto itself the

power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections;

that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."
This conclusion finds' support from a consideration of weight and influence. What
happened in this case could be repeated elsewhere. It is not improbable that courts of
first instance would be resorted to by leaders of candidates or political factions
entertaining the belief whether rightly or wrongly that local officials would employ all the
power at their command to assure the victory of their candidates. Even if greater care
and circumspection, than did exist in this case, would be employed by judges thus
appealed to, it is not unlikely that the shadow of suspicion as to alleged partisanship
would fall on their actuations, whichever way the matter before them is decided. It is
imperative that the faith in the impartiality of the judiciary be preserved unimpaired.
Whenever, therefore, the fear may be plausibly entertained that an assumption of
jurisdiction would lead to a lessening of the undiminished trust that should be reposed in
the courts and the absence of authority discernible the from the wording of applicable
statutory provisions and the trend of judicial decisions, even if no constitutional mandate
as that present in this case could be relied upon, there should be no hesitancy in
declining to act. 26
The foregoing disquisitions should have rendered unnecessary the resolution of the remaining
collateral issues raised in this petition. In view, however, of their importance, they will be dealt with in
a general way.
It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under
the election laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The
Constitution itself grants to it exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal
officials. 27 Neither can We agree with the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in the
court below involves the prosecution of election offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs incident
to or in connection with alleged election offenses; specifically, what is sought is the prevention of the
further commission of these offenses which, by their alleged nature, are continuing.
There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no legal standing to
initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the
law to prevent any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing a
complaint in connection therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
initiation of complaints for election offenses may be donemotu propio by the Commission on Elections
or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or organization under
the party-list system or any of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission. 28 However, such
written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the Commission; or with the offices of
the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or the State
Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal." 29 As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not
seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He merely sought a stoppage
of the public works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while
he may have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he committed a serious
procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority.

We have, therefore, no alternative but to grant this petition on the basis Our resolution of the principal
issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasized that in so holding that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465, We are not to be understood as
approving of the acts complained of by the private respondent. If his charges for the violation of
paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code are true, then no one
should be spared from the full force of the law. No government official should flout laws designed to
ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections or make a mockery of our
electoral processes. The bitter lessons of the past have shown that only elections of that nature or
character can guarantee a peaceful and orderly change. It is then his duty to respect, preserve and
enhance an institution which is vital in any democratic society.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged order of respondent Judge
of 10 April 1992 in Special Civil Action No. 465 is SET ASIDE and said Civil Case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED, without prejudice on the part of the private respondent to file, if he is so minded, the
appropriate complaint for an election offense pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 102925 March 5, 1992
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE represented by ZOILO DEJARESCO, JR., as its Past Chairman and
President, and FRAULIN A. PEASALES as its Corporate Secretary, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by HON. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, its Chairman; HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, respondents.
G.R. No. 102983 March 5, 1992
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTERS SA PILIPINAS; MAKATI BROADCASTING NETWORK; MOLAVE
BROADCASTING NETWORK; MASBATE COMMUNITY BROADCASTING CO., INC., RADIO MINDANAO
NETWORK, INC.; ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORP.; FILIPINAS BROADCASTING; RADIO PILIPINO CORP.;
RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC.; EAGLE BROADCASTING CORP.; MAGILIW COMMUNITY
BROADCASTING CO., INC.; for themselves and in behalf of the mass media owners as a class; ANDRE S.
KHAN; ARCADIO M. CARANDANG, JR.; MALOU ESPINOSA MANALASTAS; MIGUEL C. ENRIQUEZ; JOSE
ANTONIO K. VELOSO; DIANA G. DE GUZMAN; JOSE E. ESCANER, JR.; RAY G. PEDROCHE; PETER A.
LAGUSAY; ROBERT ESTRELLA; ROLANDO RAMIREZ; for themselves as voters and in behalf of the
Philippine electorate as a class; ORLANDO S. MERCADO and ALEJANDRO de G. RODRIGUEZ; for
themselves as prospective candidates and in behalf of all candidates in the May 1992 election as a

class, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:

In the three (3) consolidated Petitions before us, the common question raised by petitioners is the
constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646.
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from
selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates
for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and
taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of
the candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and
violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the
prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for
suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely,
media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the
prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public
information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11
(b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based
campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers
and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in
the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
The statutory text that petitioners ask us to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b) of
Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms of election
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be
unlawful;
xxx xxx xxx
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or
any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or
air time for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided
under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office
shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.
(Emphasis supplied)

Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 should be taken together with Sections 90 and 92 of B.P.
Blg. 881, known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, which provide respectively as
follows:
Sec. 90. Comelec space. The Commission shall procure space in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided, however, That in
the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in any other magazine or
periodical in said province or city, which shall be known as "Comelec Space" wherein
candidates can announce their candidacy. Said space shall be allocated, free of charge,
equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the area in
which the newspaper is circulated.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 92. Comelec time. The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be
known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of
the campaign. (Emphasis supplied)
The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of
rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by
huge campaign "war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time
"for campaign or other political purposes" except to the Commission on Elections ("Comelec"). Upon
the other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure
"Comelec space" in newspapers of general circulation in every province or city and "Comelec time"
on radio and television stations. Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec
space" and "Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all candidates within
the area served by the newspaper or radio and television station involved.
No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective sought to be secured by
Section 11 (b) (of Republic Act No. 6646) in relation to Sections 90 and 92 (of the Omnibus Election
Code). That objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is
characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of
society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with the bulk of our population falling below that "poverty
line." It is supremely important, however, to note that objective is not only a concededly legitimate
one; it has also been given constitutional status by the terms of Article IX(C) (4) of the 1987
Constitution which provides as follows:
Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation
of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all
grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to

ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable,
equal rates therefor,for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in
connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. (Emphasis supplied)
The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and
information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the
Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as
uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with
"public information campaigns and forums among candidates." 1
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of
speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken
in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a
specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." It is difficult to overemphasize the special
importance of the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a democratic polity, in
particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of the electoral process itself, the process by
which the people identify those who shall have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that
these rights are accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free
speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant values
even in the most democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself
for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal,
is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II,
Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access
to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." 2
The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of
invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the
Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although
such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free
press. For supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable
without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general, time-honored one
that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must
discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion. 3
Put in slightly different terms, there appears no present necessity to fall back upon basic principles
relating to the police power of the State and the requisites for constitutionally valid exercise of that
power. The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone
beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional
repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b)
has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during
election periods.

In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the character and extent of
the limitations resulting from the particular measure being assayed upon freedom of speech and
freedom of the press are essential considerations. It is important to note that the restrictive impact
upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain
important limitations.
Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to
election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under
another specific grant of authority by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from
12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of
Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and
sale disguised as a donation, 4 of print space and air time for "campaign or other political purposes."
Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or
television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political
parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and
expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or
columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least
as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates
covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. We read Section
11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.
The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) that it does not restrict either the
reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment upon the qualifications and programs
and activities of any and all candidates for office constitutes the critical distinction which must be
made between the instant case and that of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections. 5 In Sanidad, the
Court declared unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which provided as
follows:
Sec. 19. Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or Announcers During the
plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in connection with the plebiscite
mandated by R.A. No. 6766 on the ratification or adoption of the Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. The Court held that Resolution No. 2167 constituted a restriction of the freedom
of expression of petitioner Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier, "for no
justifiable reason." The Court, through Medialdea, J., said:
. . . [N]either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 [b], 2nd par. of R.A. 6646
can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to
supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to

expression during plebiscite periods.Media practitioners exercising their freedom of

expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in the plebiscite.Therefore, Section
19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis." 6 (Emphasis partly in the
original and partly supplied)
There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b). Section 11 (b) exempts from
its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of print space or air time, which space and
time Comelec is then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge,
among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the province or city served by the
newspaper or radio or television station. Some of the petitioners are apparently apprehensive that
Comelec might not allocate "Comelec time" or "Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis among the
several candidates. Should such apprehensions materialize, candidates who are in fact prejudiced by
unequal or unfair allocations effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial remedies available, so
long at least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the Comelec is entitled to the benefit of the
presumption that official duty will be or is being regularly carried out. It seems appropriate here to
recall what Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral Commission 7 that the possibility of abuse is
no argument against the concession of the power or authority involved, for there is no power or
authority in human society that is not susceptible of being abused. Should it be objected that the
Comelec might refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and "Comelec space," much the same
considerations should be borne in mind. As earlier noted, the Comelec is commanded by statute to
buy or "procure" "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in mass media, and it must be presumed that
Comelec will carry out that statutory duty in this connection, and if it does fail to do so, once again,
the candidate or candidates who feel aggrieved have judicial remedies at their disposal.
The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b) does not cut off the flow of
media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and
promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and television stations remain quite free to carry out their
regular and normal information and communication operations. Section 11 (b) does not authorize any
intervention and much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content of the normal
operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political advertisements which the individual
candidates are quite free to present within their respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec
space. There is here no "officious functionary of [a] repressive government" dictating what events or
ideas reporters, broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write about or display on TV
screens. There is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What Section 11 (b), viewed in
context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan political advertisements to for a other than modern mass
media, and to "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in such mass media.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the
candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4) and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is
precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of
the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of
equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or
empty pockets that Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the

statutory mechanism which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to
bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform
all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
My learned brother in the Court Cruz, J. remonstrates, however, that "t[he] financial disparity among
the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be corrected by legislation except only by the limitation of
their respective expenses to a common maximum. The flaw in the prohibition under challenge is that
while the rich candidate is barred from buying mass media coverage, it nevertheless allows him to
spend his funds on other campaign activities also inaccessible to his strained rival." True enough
Section 11 (b) does not, by itself or in conjunction with Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election
Code, place political candidates on complete and perfect equality inter se without regard to their
financial affluence or lack thereof. But a regulatory measure that is less than perfectly comprehensive
or which does not completely obliterate the evil sought to be remedied, is not for that reason alone
constitutionally infirm. The Constitution does not, as it cannot, exact perfection in governmental
regulation. All it requires, in accepted doctrine, is that the regulatory measure under challenge bear a
reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective. That the supervision or regulation of
communication and information media is not, in itself, a forbidden modality is made clear by the
Constitution itself in Article IX (C) (4).
It is believed that, when so viewed, the limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech
of the candidates themselves may be seen to be not unduly repressive or unreasonable. For, once
again, there is nothing in Section 11 (b) to prevent media reporting of and commentary on
pronouncements, activities, written statements of the candidates themselves. All other fora remain
accessible to candidates, even for political advertisements. The requisites of fairness and equal
opportunity are, after all, designed to benefit the candidates themselves.
Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially electronic media, cannot be
totally disregarded. Realistically, the only limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is on
the right of candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements commonly
repeated in the mass mediaad nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive political commercials when fed
into the electronic media themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It
might be supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to flick off his radio of television
set. But it is rarely that simple. For the candidates with deep pockets may purchase radio or television
time in many, if not all, the major stations or channels. Or they may directly or indirectly own or control
the stations or channels themselves. The contemporary reality in the Philippines is that, in a very real
sense, listeners and viewers constitute a "captive audience." 8
The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated with minddeadening frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so much to inform and educate as to
condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and objective appraisal of candidates'
qualifications or programs as to appeal to the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive
audience. The right of the general listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and
their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves
through modern electronic media and the right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues from
the marketing of "packaged" candidates.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12596

July 31, 1958

JOSE L. GUEVARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.
Dominador D. Dayot for respondent.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Petitioner was ordered by the Commissioner on Elections to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt for having published in the Sunday Times issue of June 2, 1957 an article
entitled "Ballot Boxes Contract Hit", which tended to interfere with and influence the Commission on
Elections and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then pending investigation and
determination before said body "arising from the third petition for reconsideration of May 20, 1957 and
the supplementary petition thereof of June 1, 1957 filed by Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc., praying for
reconsideration of the resolutions of the Commission of May 4 and 13, 1957, awarding the contracts
for the manufacture and supply of 34,000 ballot boxes to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation
and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. and the respective answers of the latter two corporations to said
petitions; and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the
exclusive constitutional function of this Commission and its Chairman Domingo Imperial and Member
Sixto Brillantes in the administration of all the laws relative to the conduct of elections."
Petitioner, answering summons issued to him by the Commission, appeared and filed a motion to
quash on the following grounds:
a) The Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged
contemptuous article, as neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a
power to so punish the same, for should Section 5 of Republic Act No. 180, vesting the
Commission with "power to punish contempts provided for in Rule of the Court under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein," be applied to the case at hand, said
provision would be unconstitutional.

b) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, the same cannot be
applied to the instant case, where the Commission is exercising a purely administrative
function for purchasing ballot boxes.
c) Assuming that the Commission's power to punish contempt exists, said power cannot apply
to the present case because the matter of purchasing the ballot boxes was already a closed
case when the article in question was published.
d) Assuming that controversy contemplated by the law was still pending, the article in question
was a fair report because it could be assumed that the news report of the respondent was
based on the motion for reconsideration filed by the Acme Steel where there was an allegation
of fraud, etc.
The Commission, after hearing, denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of fifteen
(15) days within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court in view of the issue raised which
assails the jurisdiction of the Commission to investigate and punish petitioner for contempt in
connection with the alleged publication. Hence the present petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction.
The facts which gave rise to the present contemptuous incident are: The Commission on Elections,
on May 4, 1957, after proper negotiations, awarded to the National Shipyards & Steel Corporation
(NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ACME), and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. (ASIATIC), the
contracts to manufacture and supply the Commission 12,000, 11,000 and 11,000 ballot boxes at
P17.64, P14.00, and P17.00 each, respectively. On May 8, 1957, both the NASSCO and the ASIATIC
signed with the Commission on Elections the corresponding contracts thereon. On May 13, 1957, the
Commission cancelled the award to the ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract within the
designated time and awarded to the NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the 11,000 ballot
boxes originally alloted to the ACME. The corresponding contracts thereon were signed on May 16,
1957.
Then followed a series of petitions filed by the ACME for the reconsideration of the resolution of the
Commission of May 13, 1957. The first of these petitions was filed on May 14, 1957 which, after
hearing, was denied by the Commission in its resolution of May 16, 1957. The second petition was
filed on May 16, 1957 and was denied on May 17, 1957. The third petition was filed on May 20, 1957,
and because of the seriousness of the grounds alleged therein for the annulment of its previous
resolutions, the Commission resolved to conduct a formal investigation on the matter ordering the
NASSCO and the ASIATIC to file their respective answers. Thereafter, after these corporations had
filed their answers, the Commission held a formal hearing thereon on May 24, 1957. On May 28,
1957, the ACME filed a memorandum on the points adduced during the hearing, and on June 4,
1957, the Commission issued its resolution denying the third motion for reconsideration. The article
signed by petitioner was published in the June 2, 1957 issue of the Sunday Times, a newspaper of
nation-wide circulation.
The question to be determined is whether the Commission on Elections has the power and
jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings against petitioner with a view to imposing upon him the
necessary disciplinary penalty in connection with the publication of an article in the Sunday Times

issue of June 2, 1957 which, according to the charge, tended to interfere with and influence said
Commission in the adjudication of a controversy then pending determination and to degrade and
undermine the function of the Commission and its members in the administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections.
The Commission on Elections is an independent administrative body which was established by our
Constitution to take charge of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and
devise means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of free, orderly, and honest elections
(Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil., 288; Nacionalista Party vs. The Solicitor General,
85 Phil., 101; 47 Off. Gaz. 2356). Its powers are defined in the Constitution. It provides that it "shall
have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide,
save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors
and of other election officials" (Section 2, Article X). The Revised Election Code supplements what
other powers may be exercised by said Commission. Among these powers are those embodied in
Section 5 thereof which, for ready reference, we quote:
SEC. 5. Powers of Commission. The Commission on Elections or any of the members
thereof shall have the power to summon the parties to a controversy pending before it,
issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and otherwise take testimony in any
investigation or hearing pending before it, and delegate such power to any officer. Any
controversy submitted to the Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and decided by it
within fifteen days counted from the time the corresponding petition giving rise to said
controversy is filed. The Commission or any of the members thereof shall have the power to
punish contempts provided for in rule sixty-four of the Rules of Court, under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.
Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall
constitute contempt of the Commission.
Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be
promulgated by the Supreme Court.
It would therefore appear that the Commission on Elections not only has the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections but the power to try, hear and decide any
controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. And as an incident of this
power, it may also punish for contempt in those cases provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein. In this sense, the
Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 13, Article VIII), for it is merely an independent administrative body (The
Nacionalista Party vs. Vera, 85 Phil., 126; 47 Off. Gaz. 2375), may however exercise quasi-judicial
functions in so far as controversies that by express provision of the law come under its jurisdiction. As
to what question may come within this category, neither the Constitution nor the Revised Election
Code specifies. The former merely provides that it shall come under its jurisdiction, saving the right to

vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination of the number and
location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and other election officials, while
the latter is silent as to what questions may be brought it for determination. But it is clear that, to
come under its jurisdiction, the questions should be controversial in nature and must refer to the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of election. The difficulty lies in
drawing the demarcation line between a duty which inherently is administrative in character and a
function which is justiciable and which would therefore call for judicial action by the Commission. But
this much depends upon the factors that may intervene when a controversy should arise.
Thus, it has been held that the Commission has no power to annul an election which might not have
been free, orderly and honest for such matter devolves upon other agencies of the Government
(Nacionalista Party vs. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil., 148; 47 Off. Gaz. 2851); neither does it
have the power to decide the validity or invalidity of votes cast in an election for such devolves upon
the courts or the electoral tribunals (Ibid.); it does not also have the power to order a recounting of the
votes before the proclamation of election even if there are discrepancies in the election returns for it is
a function of our courts of justice (Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722); nor does it
have the power to order the correction of a certificate of canvass after a candidate had been
proclaimed and assumed office (De Leon vs. Imperial, 94 Phil., 680); and only very recently this Court
has held that the Commission has no power to reject a certificate of candidacy except only when its
purpose is to create confusion in the minds of the electors (Abcede vs. Imperial, 103 Phil., 136).
On the other hand, it has been held that the Commission has the power to annul an illegal registry list
of voters (Feliciano, et al. vs. Lugay, et al., 93 Phil., 744; 49 Off. Gaz. 3863); to annul an election
canvass made by a municipal board of canvassers (Mintu vs. Enage, et al., G. R. No. L-1834); and to
investigate and act on the illegality of a canvass of election made by a municipal board of canvassers
(Ramos vs. Commission on Elections, 80 Phil., 722). And as to what are the ministerial duties which
the Commission on Elections must perform in connection with the conduct of elections, the following
resume made by the Commission itself in a controversy which was submitted to it for determination is
very enlightening:
In the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections, the first
duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the multifarious preparatory processes ranging
from the purchase of election supplies, printing of election forms and ballots, appointments of
members of the boards of inspectors, establishment of precincts and designation of polling
places to the preparation of the registry lists of voters, so as to put in readiness on election day
the election machinery in order that the people who are legally qualified to exercise the right of
suffrage may be able to cast their votes to express their sovereign will. It is incumbent upon
the Commission to see that all these preparatory acts will insure free, orderly and honest
elections. All provisions of the Revised Election Code contain regulations relative to these
processes preparatory for election day. It is incumbent upon the Commission on Elections to
see that all these preparatory acts are carried out freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It
is essential that the Commission or its authorized representatives, in establishing precincts or
designating polling places, must act freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is also
essential that the printing of election forms and the purchase of election supplies and their
distribution are done freely, honestly and in an orderly manner. It is further essential that the

political parties or their duly authorized representatives who are entitled to be represented in
the boards of inspectors must have the freedom to choose the person who will represent them
in each precinct throughout the country. It is further essential that once organized, the boards
of inspectors shall be given all the opportunity to be able to perform their duties in accordance
with law freely, honestly and in an orderly manner, individually and as a whole. In other words,
it is the duty of the Commission to see that the boards of inspectors, in all their sessions, are
placed in an atmosphere whereby they can fulfill their duties without any pressure, influence
and interference from any private person or public official. All these preparatory steps are
administrative in nature and all questions arising therefrom are within the exclusive powers of
the Commission to resolve. All irregularities, anomalies and misconduct committed by any
official in these preparatory steps are within the exclusive power of the Commission to correct.
Any erring official must respond to the Commission for investigation. Of these preparatory acts,
the preparation of the permanent list of voters is the matter involved in this case, which to our
mind is completely an administrative matter. (Decision of the Commission on Elections,
October 28, 1951, In Re Petition of Angel Genuino vs. Prudente, et al., Case No. 196)1
Considering that the paramount administrative duty of the Commission is to set in motion all the
multifarious preparatory processes ranging from the purchase of election supplies, printing of election
forms and ballots, appoinments of members of the board of inspectors, appointment of precincts and
designation of polling preparation of registry lists of voters, so as to as to put in readiness on election
day the election machinery, it may also be reasonably said that the requisitioning and preparation of
the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections is by the same token an imperative ministerial
duty which the Commission is bound to perform if the elections are to be held. Such is the incident
which gave rise to the contempt case before us. It stems from the ministerial act of the Commission in
requisitioning for the necessary ballot boxes in connection with the last elections and in so proceeding
it provoked a dispute between several dealers who offered to do the job.
Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several
dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its
administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In
proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial
function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in
the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: "The power to
punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and,
consequently, in the administration of justice" (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.
S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz. 2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise
of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade
Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited
to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of
that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid
(Langenberg vs. Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts vs. Hacney, 58 S.W., 810). We
are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to
submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because of the publication
of the article mentioned in the charge under consideration.

Wherefore, petition is granted. Respondent Commission is hereby enjoined from proceeding with the
case set forth in its resolution of June 20, 1957, with pronouncement as to costs.
The preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent.

G.R. No. L-61998 February 22, 1983

ROGELIO DE JESUS, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., respondents.
Jaime G. Fortes for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

The question of law posed for determination in this petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of
the Sandiganbayan may be propounded thus: Which of these entities have the power to investigate,
prosecute and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office the
Commission on Elections and the Court of First Instance [now the regional trial court] or the
Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan?
After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo defeated candidate of the Nacionalista
Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a
complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation
of the 1978 Election Code. Copy of the complaint was sent to the Ministry of Justice which endorsed
the same to the Provincial Fiscal of Sorsogon for investigation. Noting that petitioner was being
charged in relation to his office, Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog in their capacity as
deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. Thereafter Fiscal Genova issued a
resolution finding the existence of a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of section
89 1 and sub-sections [x] 2 and [mm] 3 of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978. After approval
thereof by the Tanodbayan, the following information, dated January 27, 1982, was filed before the
Sandiganbayan:
That on or about January 30, 1980 and sometime thereafter to February 6, 1980, in the
Municipality of Casiguran Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while discharging the Office of the
Election Registrar in the Municipality of Casiguran, Province of Sorsogon, taking
advantage and abusing his official position, did there and there wilfully unlawfully and
feloniously by reason of his being a registrar knowingly registered persons in order to

vote on January 30, 1980 being an election day and at the same time issuing
Identification cards during election day, thereby violating the provision of the Election
Code of 1978 and at the same time tampering with the election reports by mag it appear
that 10,727 persons were the total number of registered voters for the election of
January 30, 1980, when in truth and in fact the actual total number of voters as sported on January 27, 1980 by the accused was only 10,532 but then changed to
10,727, thereby violating the provisions of Section '89' and Section.'178' under Article
XVI specifically sub- section 'X' and sub-section 'MM' which is a violation of the Election
Code of 1978 to the erosion of public faith and confidence.
The case, docketed as SB Criminal Case No. 5054, was raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the
Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense
xxx xxx xxx
[x] Any election registrar or any person acting in his behalf who issues or causes the
issuance of a voter's certificate of registration or cancels or causes the cancellation
thereof the violation of the provisions of this Code.
xxx xxx xxx
[mm] Any person who, without authority, acts as, or assumes r performs any -function of
a member of the election committee, or the board of canvassers, or deputy of
representative of the Commission.
charged in the information, the same being an election offense over which the power to investigate,
prosecute and try is lodged by law in the COMELEC and the Court of First Instance. In its opposition,
the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayan's exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute
offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against petitioner.
The COMELEC, having learned of the pendency of the case, entered its appearance as amicus
curiae, and through its law department manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez, Jr., submitted a memorandum
supporting petitioner's stand. 4
On August 13, 1982, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution denying the motion to
quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
The legal question posed being one of first impression, this, Court resolved to give due course to the
petition, treating the same as an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
proper mode by which relief from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan could be obtained from this
Tribunal. Petitioner and respondents rely on different provisions of the 1973 Constitution as bases for

their respective contentions. Petitioner invokes Section 2 of Article XII[c] of the 1973 Constitution
which vests upon the COMELEC the power "to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct
of elections," and its implementing legislation, Section 182 of the 1978 Election Code, which provides
the following:
Section 182 Prosecution. The Commission shall, thru its duly authorized legal officer,
have the power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under this Code and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
Petitioner further cites Section 184 of the same Code which invests the court of first instance with
"exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of this
code except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under
the jurisdiction of the city or municipal courts. ... The Solicitor General supports the petitioner's
views. 5
Upon the other hand, the Sandiganbayan, in its resolution of August 13, 1982, 6 asserts its jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 5054 on the authority of Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, which
mandated the creation by the Batasan Pambansa of "a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices, and
such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in governmentowned and controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law."
To the Sandiganbayan, as set forth in the challenged resolution, ... the key phrase in the
determination as to which of the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts of first instance should take
cognizance of an election offense, is the phrase, 'in relation to their office'." Thus, it would distinguish
between election offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office and
those committed not in relation to their office, in this manner:
If the election offense is committed by a public officer or employee NOT in relation to
their office, generally, jurisdiction will be assumed by the regular courts. If, on the other
hand, the offense was committed by a public officer or employee in relation to their
office, then there is no other tribunal vested with jurisdiction to try such offense but this
court, in consonance with the mandate of the Constitution that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction, lover ... offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office.
We find the position of the Sandiganbayan devoid of merit.
The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to
the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses
is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the
COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result
in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere Idle ceremony of the sacred right and
duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and

prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair
its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We
perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the
authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation
to their office, as contra-distinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184,
respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.
Under the Constitution, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over ... offenses committed by
public officers ... in relation to their office as may be determined by law" [Sec. 5, Art. XIII]; while the
Office of the Tanodbayan shall "receive and investigate complaints relative to public office." [Sec. 6,
Art. XIII]. The clause, "as may be determined by law" is, to Our mind imbued with grave import. It
called for a legislation that would define and delineate the power and jurisdiction of both the
Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan, as what, in fact had been provided for in Presidential Decree
Nos. 1606 and 1607, creating the said entities.
Thus, under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:
[a] Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;
[b] Crimes committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and,
[c] Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office.
Plainly, the above quoted paragraph [c] is but a re-statement of the constitutional provision relating to
the Sandiganbayan. It is also to be noted that it is phased in terms so broad and general that it cannot
be legitimately construed to vest said entity with exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses
committed by public officers in relation to their office. Neither can it be interpreted to impliedly repeal
the exclusive and original jurisdiction granted by Section 184 of the Election Code of 1978 to the court
of first instance to hear and decide all election offenses, without qualification as to the status of the
accused.
Apart from the fact that repeals by implication are not favored. it is noted that while Section 184 of the
Election Code deals specifically with election offenses, Section 4[c] of P.D. No, 1606 speaks
generally of "other crimes or offenses committed by public officers ... in relation to their office."
Needless to state, as between specific and general statute, the former must prevail since it evinces
the legislative intent more clearly than a general statute does. 7 And where a reconciliation between
the statute is possible, as in the case at bar, the former should be deemed an exception to the latter. 8

The same principle of statutory construction should be applied with respect to the powers vested
upon the COMELEC and the Tanodbayan in so far as election offenses are concerned.
Moreover, as aptly observed by the COMELEC as well as the Solicitor General, splitting the
jurisdiction over election offenses would serve no beneficial purpose but would rather spawn much
controversy "complaints about unequal protection, about inconsistent decisions, etc. (which are)
not conducive to a fair and speedy administration of justice." [p. 17, Comment, Solicitor General].
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Sandiganbayan Second Division dated August 13, 1982 is
hereby set aside and Criminal Case No. 5054. entitled "People of the Philippines versus Rogelio de
Jesus" is ordered dismissed. The COMELEC is hereby directed to forthwith conduct an investigation,
and if the evidence so warrants, to prosecute the complaint against petitioner before the proper court
of first instance. No costs.
SO ORDERED.