TANADA v.

TUVERA, 1986
FATCS: Due process was invoked by group of Tanada in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
ISSUE: Specifically,
1 What is meant by law of general applicability?
2. What is meant by publication?
3. Where is the publication to be made?
4. When is the publication to be made?
HELD: All laws as defined shall immediately upon their approvals or as soon as thereafter possible, be
published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on
another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The term laws
should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to
the people in general although there are some that do not apply directly; covered by this rule are
presidential decrees and executive orders Publication of statues must be in full otherwise it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the law; Publication of statutes
must be made in Official Gazette and not elsewhere; Laws must be published as soon as possible to give
effect to the law pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code.

CATALAN v. BRAGANZA, 2007

FACTS: Felicitas married Orlando Catalan on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter they
became a naturalized American citizen and obtained a decree of divorce in Orlando on 1988.
Subsequently, Orlando went back to the Philippines and married respondent Merope in Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Felicidad Catalan filed a petition for declaration of nullity against Orlando and Merope
contending that it was a bigamous marriage because merope had a prior marriage which is still validy
subsisting. Orlando argues that Felicidad is not the real party in interest to file the case thus praying for

the dismissal of the petition. The RTC Rendered a decision declaraing the marriage between Orlando and
merope void ab initio. The CA Reversed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens
and whether they had actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.
WON petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the
respondents on the ground of bigamy.

HELD:
1.

No. A review of the records, the SC note that other than the allegations in the complaint and the
testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their
naturalization and divorce. The Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the
petitioner to refute or contest the allegation in respondents brief, that she and respondent
Orlando were American citizens at the time they secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient
to establish the fact of naturalization and divorce. SC note that it was the petitioner who alleged in
her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a
judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it
and mere allegation is not evidence.
Before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
Petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of
the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the
same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and
the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid
divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss
the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas AmorCatalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
Globe Mackay vs.CA
FACTS: Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay in
dual capacity as purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations
manager. In 1972, the respondent discovered fraudulent anomalies and transactions in the said
corporation for which it lost several hundred thousands of pesos. The private respondent reported
to his superiors including Henry, the petitioner. However, he was confronted by Hendry stating
that Tobias was the number one suspect. He was ordered to take a one week forced leave. When
he returned to work, Hendry called him crook and swindler, and left a scornful remark to the
Filipinos. The petitioners also charged six criminal cases against the respondentfive cases of
estafa and one for violating Article 290 of the RPC (Discovering Secrets through Seizure of

Correspondence). The petitioner also sent a poison letter to RETELCO causing the respondent to
be unemployed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the respondent.
HELD: Petitioners invoked the right of damnun absque injuria or the damage or loss which does
not constitute a violation of legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. However, this
is not applicable in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had
the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must be held liable.
The court awarded Tobias the following: Php 80, 000 as actual damages, Php 200, 000 as moral
damages, Php 20, 0000 as exemplary damages; Php 30, 000 as attorneys fees; and, costs.
Petition was denied and the decision of CA is AFFIRMED.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. CA
FACTS: Private respondent Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Gasheem
Shookat, an Iranian Citizen, of breach of promise to marry. She said that both of them agreed to
marry after the end of the school semester and the petitioner asked the approval of her parents.
She stated that the petitioner forced to live with him in his apartments. Respondent was a virgin
before she was forced to live with the Iranian (petitioner). A week before she filed her complaint,
petitioner maltreated, assaulted and asked not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
On the petitioners counterclaim, he said that he never proposed marriage with the
private respondent; he neither forced her to live with him and he did not maltreat her but only told
her to stop from coming into his apartment because he discovered that she had deceived him by
stealing his money and passport. He insisted that he must be awarded for damages for he
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation due to the complaint of the private
respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is to be held liable for damages for breach of promise to
marry.
HELD: A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This court held that
where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of fraud and deceit and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. Such act done by the
petitioner is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country. The court
ordered that the petition be denied with costs against the petitioner.

Donato vs. Luna

FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with
the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before
the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on
September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the
marriage which was Donatos second since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was already
married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage
was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and
undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage.
Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and
wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September
26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon
learning that Donato already previously married.
ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended in view
of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the
ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
HELD:
Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage
can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was proved
that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation
to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction
for the crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent
judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We
make no pronouncement as to costs.