Journal of International Development

J. Int. Dev. 25, 769786 (2013)

Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/jid.2940

INTRODUCTION
THE NEW DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
LANDSCAPE: ACTORS, APPROACHES,
ARCHITECTURE
CHARLES GORE*
University of Glasgow, Scotland

Abstract: The old aid architecture is being replaced by a more complex and diverse landscape of
development cooperation in which there are new actors, new approaches and attempts to create an
overarching architecture which, by embracing all, is expected to be more developmentally effective.
The papers in this special issue address different aspects of the new landscape. This paper provides
an overview of the landscape and summarizes the ndings of the papers. It argues that they show that
the new development cooperation landscape is characterized by both vibrant dynamism and systemic
inertia and that to achieve progress in development cooperation, more support needs to be given to
bottomup processes of change which can generate effective development outcomes. Copyright
2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords: aid; development cooperation; SouthSouth cooperation; global partnership

INTRODUCTION

The annual Development Studies Association conference held in London in November

2012 was based on an open call for papers, and a range of important topics were discussed.
However, the issue around which most energy was generated was the role of new actors in
development cooperation, the potential of new beyond-aid forms of development
cooperation and the nature and effects of new development partnerships which have
ourished over the last decade. The interest in this area has been pushed to the fore partly
by the vibrant expansion of SouthSouth development cooperation and the increasing role

*Correspondence to: Charles Gore, Honorary Professor, Department of Economics, Adam Smith Business
School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, Scotland.
E-mail: charles.gore1@gmail.com

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of non-state actors, including both non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private

philanthropic foundations, in development activities. But at the same time, there was a
widespread perception that, as one participant put it, Old Aidland is in existential crisis.
This special issue of the Journal of International Development includes a collection of
papers presented at the conference which discuss different elements of the new
development cooperation landscape.1 The present introductory paper provides an overview
of the landscape, locates individual papers within this terrain and summarizes their key
ndings, and discusses the implications of these ndings for how best to make progress
in improving development cooperation.

2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

LANDSCAPE
In the past, development cooperation was usually understood to mean ofcial
development assistance (ODA). There was a clear sense of what ODA was, and there
was also a well-dened aid architecture through which three leading institutionsthe
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)regulated and structured the practices of donors and recipients. This
architecture is in the process of being replaced by a more complex and diverse landscape
of development cooperation, which is characterized by new actors and new approaches,
and is now understood as being something broader than aid. A new development
cooperation architecture is also emerging but is still in very early phases of formation.
Business as usual is regarded as unacceptable by most stakeholders. But what replaces
it is still struggling to be born (Eyben and Savage, 2013).

2.1

Actors

The most basic feature of the new development cooperation landscape is a proliferation of
actors providing development assistance in the form of concessional nance and knowhow. There are ve major types of actors providing such assistance to developing
countries: OECD DAC donor countries, non-DAC governmental providers of
development cooperation, global funds, private foundations and international NGOs.
Zimmermann and Smith (2011) usefully further classify the non-DAC providers of
development cooperation into three groups: non-DAC countries which are establishing
new aid programmes which align with OECD DAC norms (such as Eastern and Central
European countries); providers of SouthSouth development cooperation (such as India,
China, Brazil and Venezuela), who do not conceive of themselves as donors and do not
appreciate being described as such; and Arab donors (such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait)
which are comfortable with describing themselves as donors but do not align their aid with
DAC norms. Zimmerman and Smith describe the rst of these groups as emerging
donors, but a more common convention in the literature is to describe all three in this way.
The nancial contributions of the different actors provide a rough measure of their
relative importance in the global landscape of development cooperation. The World Bank
1

For an overview of the whole conference, see Gore (2013a).

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estimates that in 2010, net ODA disbursements from DAC donors reached $127.3 bn (at
constant 2009 prices), whereas in 2009, non-DAC donors and providers of development
cooperation contributed $11 m and private sources contributed $52.5 bn (World Bank,
2012). 2 Thus, despite the proliferation of actors, DAC donor countries still dominate
development aid. But nancial support from non-DAC sources has been growing much
faster than those from DAC member countries, and this trend has been further accentuated
since the nancial crisis, with net aid disbursements from DAC member countries falling
since 2010.
Another important feature of the new development cooperation landscape is that the
relative importance of ODA as a source of external nance for developing countries has
diminished signicantly. This reects the rapid growth of foreign direct investment, the
increasing importance of remittances and the globalization of nancial ows. The share
of ODA in the net resource receipts of developing countries (excluding remittances) has
been only 20 per cent in recent years (OECD, 2012a),3 though many low-income countries
and least developed countries still rely heavily on ODA as the major source of external
nance. With these structural shifts, there has been an increasing concern to move
beyond aid and to recongure its role (or non-role) within a wider development
cooperation addressed to current global and national development challenges.
This beyond-aid agenda has various strands including the following: (i) the
transformation of the way aid is provided so that it catalyses domestic resource
mobilization and leverages other sources of external nance, such as foreign direct
investment and remittances, for development purposes (Kharas, Makino and Jung,
2011); (ii) the pursuit of policy coherence for development in donor countries so
that all policies at the national level which affect developing countries take
account of, and support, development cooperation objectives (Carbone, 2012); (iii)
the introduction of new innovative sources of nance (Girishankar, 2009); and (iv)
the redesign of the broader international development architecture, including the
international trade regime, the international nancial architecture, the international
knowledge architecture (which affects R&D, technological learning, technology
transfer and technology acquisition), the international migration regime, as well as
the climate change mitigation and adaptation regime, so that it is more
development-friendly (see, for example, UNCTAD, 2010a). In all cases, such wider
development cooperation involves even more diversity in the actors engaged and
more complexity in coordinating actions to achieve effective development outcomes.

2.2

Goals

The multiplication of actors would have less serious consequences for outcomes if all were
working on the same page. But different actors have different approaches which are rooted
2

Adugna et al. (2011: 23) state that available estimates for private aid to developing countries in 2009 range from
$22 bn (OECD DAC estimate) to $53 bn (Hudson Institute estimate). UN (2012: 22) estimates SouthSouth
development cooperation as between $13 and $15 bn, though data gaps make this an underestimate. For a
comprehensive assessment of traditional and non-traditional development assistance ows, see Greenhill, Prizzon
and Rogerson (2013).
3
Development Initiatives (2012) estimate that in 2010, ODA constituted only seven per cent of total international
resource ows to developing countries, including other forms of ofcial nancing, public and private borrowing,
foreign direct investment and other capital ows, remittances, non-DAC aid ows and assistance from NGOs and
private foundations.
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in their goals and their models of development cooperation practice. The most basic faultlines in the new development landscape are rooted in different goals. All actors are acting
in the name of development, of course. But development is understood in many
different ways, and development cooperation is affected accordingly.
Following the fundamental insight of Severino and Ray (2009), it may be
suggested that there are now three different types of goals which animate the activity
of development cooperation. The rst, and most traditional, type is to promote greater
national economic independence of developing countries, to facilitate their economic
convergence with developed countries and to enable them to achieve sustained
economic growth and structural transformation so that ofcial aid is no longer
needed. The second type of goal, which has been particularly enhanced after the
adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), is to reduce extreme
poverty and provide a minimally adequate living standard globally by tackling
specic human development deprivations. This is essentially a rights-based agenda.
The MDGs themselves are often decried from a human rights' perspective. But
although the MDG targets are not rights as such, achieving them actually involves
the progressive realization of the substance of selected social and economic rights
(Gore, 2013b). Some development cooperation actors who are attached to this second
type of goal go further and seek to promote the framework and process conditions of
rights realization so that not only the substance of social and economic rights
embodied in the MDGs is delivered to people through development cooperation but
that their ability to claim their rights to that substance is also assured. This is poverty
reduction plus empowerment. The third type of goal is to provide global public
goods. These include security, which particularly depends on stabilizing fragile states
and ensuring post-conict countries do not relapse into war; the reduction of risks
associated with infectious diseases; the mitigation of dangerous climate change and
the promotion of biodiversity; and the propagation of environmental practices which
reduce the overload on global ecological systems. A global public good which has
been a central part of the development cooperation agenda for many actors since
the early 1980s is to institute the basic conditions of a liberal international economic
order. This includes an open, predictable, non-discriminatory and transparent
international trade regime and an international nancial architecture which supports
nancial stability.
It is impossible to quantify what proportion of development assistance is provided
to these three different types of goal which, in any case, can be interrelated. But there
is a strong tendency towards a bifurcation in the development cooperation landscape.
On the one hand, OECD DAC donors, NGOs and global funds are generally
concerned with the realization of the global poverty reduction agenda and rightsbased goals, and also, to an extent which is very difcult to assess, the achievement
of global public goods. On the other hand, SouthSouth development cooperation
and perhaps also Japanese and Korean aidis directed to promote economic
convergence through building up national productive capacities. DAC donors,
however, are increasingly asserting the importance of economic growth, productivity
and competitiveness as a means to poverty reduction. At the same time, there is a
growing concern amongst developing countries to ensure that economic convergence
is also sustainable and inclusive, which is to say, in their terms, that the primary goal
of development cooperation should be sustainable development (UN ECOSOC,
2012).
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DOI: 10.1002/jid

Introduction
2.3

773

Models

Different approaches to development cooperation are also rooted in different models of

how development cooperation works. An important question here is the nature of the
changes associated with the increasing privatization of development cooperation as NGOs
act as implementation agents for ODA, and implicit state aid is distributed through tax
breaks to private foundations engaged in development cooperation. But the focus here will
only be on the contrasts and continuities between the DAC model of development
assistance and SouthSouth development cooperation.
In broad terms, the current DAC model of development assistance is founded on an
approach rst set out by OECD DAC in its seminal report Shaping Development
Cooperation in the Twenty-rst Century (OECD, 1996). According to this approach,
donors should seek to work in partnership with recipients, aligning and harmonizing their
nancial and technical aid to support the implementation of locally owned country
development strategies focused on achieving mutually shared development results. The
introduction of this approach can be seen as an attempt to move away from a principalagent model of development cooperation in which donors (the principals) use money,
conditionality and advice to persuade, buy or force developing countries (the agents) to
implement policies which the donors know the developing countries need. In the 1990s,
there was increasing evidence and agreement that this did not work. At the end of the
1990s and early 2000s, three processes were started which enabled the new model to be
realized: rst, the IMF and World Bank introduced the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
as a condition for lending to low-income and highly indebted poor countries; second, the
MDGs emerged out of the International Development Targets which the OECD had
originally proposed in 1996 and were agreed through the technical specication of the
goals the Millennium Declaration (Hulme, 2009); and third, OECD DAC launched a
process to improve aid effectiveness which resulted in a set of targets, for both donor
and self-selected recipient countries, which were designed to promote ownership,
harmonization, alignment, results orientation and mutual accountability and which were
agreed in the Paris Declaration in 2005. These processes structured how the new
partnership model has worked in practice.
SouthSouth cooperation is characterized by diversity as there has been no
overarching effort to standardize practice. However, it is founded on shared principles
which have been spelled out at various times, including in 1955 at the rst African
Asian conference held in Bandung and by Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in a visit to
10 African countries in 1964 (Chandy and Kharas, 2011), and recently in a Ministerial
Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of China and the Group of 77 in New York in
2009 (UNCTAD, 2010b: box 1). These guiding principles stress that SouthSouth
cooperation, like the latest DAC approach, is based on partnership. But the South
South partnership approach is explicitly rooted in complete equality, mutual respect,
mutual interest as well as respect for national sovereignty in the context of shared
responsibility, shared experiences and sympathy and an orientation towards
enhancing the collective self-reliance of developing countries (Ibid: 8). This has been
described as a paradigm where Horizontal Partnerships, based on equity, trust,
mutual benet and long-term relations become an alternative way to do development
cooperation (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, 2012: 291).
How things work out on the ground is necessarily different from underlying principles.
But these principles result in various common tendencies in SouthSouth cooperation,
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including the bundling of concessional ofcial nance with trade and investment activities;
the commercial tying of aid to access to natural resources or the purchase of goods and
services from rms of the country providing support; the use of little, if any, policy
conditionality and in particular, the avoidance of any hard or soft conditionality which
makes assistance contingent on the promotion of liberalization, privatization, human rights
and democratic forms of governance; a tendency to provide most support to infrastructure
and production sectors, though humanitarian assistance and social welfare issues are not
ignored; the use of concessional loans as an important modality of assistance, particularly
by larger southern providers, even in the poorest countries; and a stress on the importance
of knowledge sharing, training and technology transfer rather than technical cooperation
oriented to make aid delivery happen smoothly (UN, 2010: chapter 3).
As summarized here, the contrast between vertical (NorthSouth) and horizontal
(SouthSouth) models of partnership is in danger of being a caricature. DAC donors also
engage in triangular cooperation, indirectly supporting SouthSouth cooperation. Isenman
and Shakow (2010) also argue that the DAC model is actually schizophrenic, in the sense
that it includes the model sketched previously and also increasing commitment to global
funds. The summary also leaves out geo-political interests, whereas these affect what
happens in both models. Yet, whilst recognizing these caveats, these models are important
as one of the key features of the new landscape is the increasingly widespread presence of
a working alternative approach to the DAC model. Moreover, this alternative is not simply
working but SouthSouth cooperation is often perceived by programme countries to be
more responsive and tailored to their needs and priorities and SouthSouth infrastructure
cooperation is assessed by recipient countries as being cost effective due to lighter
procedural requirements, lower transaction costs, faster delivery speeds and greater
predictability than DAC aid (UN, 2012: 22). SouthSouth cooperation is thus enabling
a liberating end for TINA (There is No Alternative) at the recipient country level.

2.4

Architecture

The proliferation of actors and diversity of approaches in the new development

cooperation landscape has led to increasing concerns that the old aid architecture
governing development cooperation is no longer t for purpose. There may be more
resources available, but they are not articulated together towards effectively achieving
development outcomes and there thus needs to be a more comprehensive approach to
improving the quality of development cooperation. Various topdown processes have been
launched with this in view.
One important strand of these processes involves governance reforms within multilateral
organizations engaged in development cooperation to improve their relevance and
representativeness. These reforms include the following: (i) efforts to increase the
representation and voice of developing countries within the World Bank and IMF
(Vestergaard and Wade, 2013); (ii) the redesign of the OECD DAC mandate and the
launching of an OECD Strategy on Development Strategy which aims to integrate
developing country perspectives into OECD policy analysis, to strengthen OECD
members' capacity to design policies consistent with development, to provide good
practice policy guidelines and advice in areas where it has expertise and contribute to
global processes associated with the emergence of a new development cooperation
architecture (OECD, 2010, 2012b; Eyben, 2012); and (iii) the reform of the United Nations
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(UN) system, in particular, to ensure that its many constituent parts deliver its technical
cooperation activities and standard setting advice as one. Another important strand is
increasing political commitment to the formulation of a global development agenda
through the G20 (Beeson and Bell, 2009; Wade, 2011; Cammack, 2012). Finally, there
are ongoing efforts to increase dialogue amongst the multiple providers of development
cooperation and even to bring them together within some kind of all-embracing global
partnership which acts with a common purpose and in a more coordinated way.
Two new institutions have played an important role in fostering dialogue: the DAC
Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) and the UN Development Cooperation
Forum (DCF). The WP-EFF, established in 2003 and located within OECD, expanded after
2005 to over 80 members, including both donors and recipients. It is this institution that has
managed the Paris process to improve aid effectiveness, facilitating dialogue, monitoring
performance and organizing a sequence of High-level Fora on aid effectiveness. In its third
High-Level Forum held in Accra in 2008, the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) in
development and aid was also explicitly recognized, and as a result, an Open Forum for
CSO Development Effectiveness was set-up by the CSOs, dening the CSO's own principles
of effectiveness as distinct but equal development actors (Open Forum for CSO Development
Effectiveness, 2010; 2011). The DCF was established within the UN in 2005 and reports to
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The DCF is much more
representative than WP-EFF (Killen and Rogerson, 2010), and many developing countries,
for example, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), have regarded the Paris process
as simply implementing a donor agenda (South Centre, 2008). But unlike the WP-EFF, it
has not been seeking to hold countries to account in efforts to improve development
cooperation effectiveness. Instead, its overall aim is to review trends in international
development cooperation, including strategies, policies and nancing; promote greater
coherence among development activities of different development partners; and provide
policy guidance and options as well as recommendations on practical measures to enhance
the coherence and effectiveness of development cooperation (United Nations, 2010: 113).
An important outcome of the Fourth High-level Forum (HLF4) on aid effectiveness held
in Busan in 2011 was the agreement to replace WP-EFF with a new institution, a Global
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), which will seek not simply
to increase aid effectiveness but to promote effective development cooperation as agreed at
HLF4. This new institution will have a broader membership than the WP-EFF, and its
secretariat will include both the OECD DAC and also United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP). The DCF has also been invited to play a role in its work in
consulting on the implementation of agreements reached in Busan (OECD, 2011a: 12).
The next step in building the development cooperation architecture will be the
negotiation of the post-2015 framework which succeeds the MDGs, and in particular,
the specication of any successor to Millennium Development Goal 8 (MDG8),
Developing a Global Partnership for Development. This negotiation is taking place in
a global economy still suffering from the effects of the nancial crash, debt and deleverage.
Many DAC donors face a scal crisis, which is exacerbating the recurrent difculty of
explaining the legitimacy of development aid to domestic constituents. A goal of northern
countries is thus to get the richer developing countries to share a greater burden in
addressing global issues and also nancing development cooperation (Greenhill and
Prizzon, 2012). But Southern providers of development cooperation, as part of their basic
principles, do not see their nancial contributions as ODA and maintain that SSC must not
be analysed and evaluated on the same standards as those used for NorthSouth relations
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(UNCTAD, 2008: box 1). The more powerful developing countries do not want to be
enmeshed through a monitoring framework into burden-sharing. They are wary of
hegemonic incorporation in which they participate within a new more inclusive
institutional framework, but the agreements which are reached are scripted by the
hegemon or hegemonic core (Vestergaard and Wade, 2013: 352). Thus, they re-assert
constantly that SouthSouth cooperation should be considered to be a complement to,
rather than a substitute for, NorthSouth cooperation.
What is remarkable is that people are now starting to refer to the Global Partnership for
Effective Development Cooperation agreed in Busan as the Global Partnership for
Development (World Bank, 2013: 8; Mawdsley et al., 2013: 8) in effect eliding the
post-Busan process with the post-2015 process. Some participants in the post-Busan
process are also explicitly envisioning that the post-Busan Global Partnership becomes
the forum for action on the how of achieving the post-2015 global development goals
(GPEDC, 2013a). With the DCF holding a meeting in June 2013 on MDG8 as part of
UN-convened discussion on the post-2015 agenda, the current situation eerily resembles
that at the end of the 1990s when OECD and the UN each, in parallel, had different
systems of goals and targets to focus global development efforts (Hulme, 2009). A
compromise will eventually emerge, as it did with the MDGs. But the political settlement
of the new development cooperation architecture is anybody's guess.

3 WHAT THE PAPERS SAY

The papers in this special issue focus on various elements within the new development
cooperation landscape. Eun Mee Kim and Jae Eun Lee are concerned with the global
architecture of development cooperation, and in particular, the changes which have
occurred as an outcome of the HLF4 on aid effectiveness held in Busan in 2011. They
ask whether the semantic transition from the Paris aid effectiveness agenda to the postBusan development effectiveness agenda is a real paradigm shift; they explore the extent
to which an all-embracing global partnership of effective development cooperation is
likely to emerge in the follow-up process; and they consider the role of South Korea both
in the dynamics of the Busan HLF and also the follow-up process.
They argue that what happened in Busan was a double compromise: rstly, between
those who wanted to complete the unnished aid effectiveness agenda and those who
wanted to move beyond aid to effective development cooperation; and secondly, between
DAC donors and Southern providers of development cooperation. The latter agreed to
endorse the document, according to Kim and Lee, when their development cooperation
commitments were recognized as being differential (not different) and when their
obligations in relation to the outcome document were voluntary. Kim and Lee present
a rather positive view of HLF4 in successfully bringing together all the diverse actors;
fostering agreement on a set of shared principles which built on but modied the Paris
principles; and identifying some priority topics which must be addressed for effective
development cooperation. The paper provides up-to-date information on the follow-up
process through the GPEDC. They are cautiously optimistic about its prospects but say that
it will depend on whether the DAC donors, the BRICs and other emerging donors will
engage with the unfolding process, implementing what they have agreed in Busan. The
paper also argues that South Korea played a signicant role in HLF4, particularly in
bringing different actors together and arguing for a shift from aid effectiveness to
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development effectiveness, and its role will remain important in the follow-up process. The
country can also bring value-added into development cooperation by propagating a
comprehensive development style of cooperation which it, and also some other Asian
countries, practice.
The next two papers, by Lauren Walshe Roussel and by Balzs Szent-Ivnyi and
Andrs Ttnyi, focus on different types of new non-DAC donor and examine processes
of change at the national level by drawing on interviews with key development assistance
stakeholders. Walshe Roussel's paper is a case study of Nicaragua. She discusses the
effects of the increasing importance of new non-DAC actors and nancial ows on
DAC donors and the recipient government and assesses what this means for the current
and future state of development cooperation in the country. Szent-Ivnyi and Ttnyi's
paper considers the case of 10 East-Central European (ECE) new member states of the
European Union (EU) which have re-emerged as donors of foreign aid in the past
10 years. Creating a bilateral international development policy, in line with common
EU practice, was an explicit requirement of accession, and Szent-Ivnyi and Ttnyi
focus on the Canadian International Development Agency and UNDP capacity building
programmes which were designed to turn these countries into good donors, their outputs
and outcomes, and the perceptions of the experts interviewed on the challenges the new
donors face.
Walshe Roussel paints quite a complex picture of the donor landscape in Nicaragua as
some DAC donors phase out their aid programmes under the administration of Daniel
Ortega (2007 to the present) whilst emerging donors, as she describes them in the paper,
particularly Latin American, are coming in. But overall, she shows that the competitive
pressures on the remaining DAC donors which result from the activities of these new
actors is changing the whole dynamic of aid in the country. She nds in particular that
the presence of emerging donors has enhanced national ownership of national policies.
This is not a simple process in the sense that the Ortega administration was independently
intent on re-setting its own development agenda. But the nancial support of the emerging
donors made this intent viable. Interestingly, this effect has occurred even though the
country remains quite highly aid dependent in aggregate. Because of the existence of
alternative ofcial sources of external nance, the Nicaraguan government began to refuse
money from DAC donors in the implementation of national development agenda if it did
not t. Signicantly, the DAC donors have welcomed this increase in assertiveness, and in
a second key effect of the presence of emerging donors, Walshe Roussel argues that
DAC donors are changing their approach to development. They are in fact moving closer
to the practices of the emerging donors as they look, for example, towards prioritizing
key sectors like renewable energy and to shifting towards a more mutual benet approach
in which public money is linked to building private sector capabilities and more aligned
with national priorities. In this way, the presence of emerging donors is, as Walshe
Roussel puts it, changing the whole concept of aid (p. 809) for the DAC donors. What
is happening, she argues, undermines the notion of a sharp and static categorical divide
between DAC and emerging donors. The dynamic interactive processes which are
unfolding are blurring distinctions.
The ndings of Szent-Ivnyi and Ttnyi's paper are similarly interesting. The capacitybuilding programmes sought to increase the quantity of ODA disbursements by the ECE
countries and also to improve their quality, but Szent-Ivnyi and Ttnyi nd limited
progress on both dimensions. There is a clear increase in ODA spending in the period
20022006 and advice on such things as ODA delivery mechanisms, tendering and
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contracting and project management, as well as the establishment of UNDP trust funds, all
helped to speed things up and get money moving. But a large part of the increase is
attributable to the fact that ECE countries began contributing to the community budget,
a portion of which qualies as ODA, and in any case after joining the EU, the rapid growth
in ODA/gross national income ratios stalled. With regard to the quality of aid, training on
such matters as programming methods, institutional set-up for efcient aid delivery,
evaluation, monitoring and data reporting were all undertaken. There were some notable
successes such as the establishment of SlovakAid. But in general, the ECE countries'
new aid policies tend to be ad hoc, rather than characterized by strategic thinking; there
is a strong desire to preserve visibility and not have their aid subsumed within joint
programming approaches; there is a tendency to work mainly through nancing national
NGOs which then implement their own project ideas in the recipient countries; and there
is little focus on evaluating results. In general, Szent-Ivnyi and Ttnyi attribute these
weaknesses to an underlying lack of political commitment to the whole aid business and
also to staff capacity problems, which have been quite intractable because of the low
prestige of development cooperation.
Szent-Ivnyi and Ttnyi's ndings in Eastern and Central Europe are important because
one possible approach to managing the presence of new providers of development
assistance is to increase their DAC-ability (Kim and Lightfoot, 2011). DAC-able donors
would not only dene their aid using the OECD DAC denition but also share their values,
reproduce their practices and take part in the extensive peer review system. But SzentIvnyi and Ttnyi's analysis demonstrates the profound problems which would arise in
any programme which might be designed to increase the DAC-ability of non-DAC donors.
It also underlines once more the problems of using conditionality, this time in relation to
EU accession, to change policy behaviour. As one senior ECE diplomat quoted in the
paper puts it: Don't have any illusions. If the EU didn't require us to do development
policy, we wouldn't be doing it. The returns are just too small (p. 828). Szent-Ivnyi and
Ttnyi conclude that these countries are best regarded as premature donors in the sense
that they became donors of foreign aid before they were actually ready for it (p. 830).4
The next paper in the collection, by Owen Barder et al., stays in Europe but turns to
another subjectthe degree of progress which is being made in terms of supporting
countries through development cooperation which goes beyond aid, in particular through
promoting policy coherence for development. Using the Centre for Global Development's
Commitment for Development Index, which ranks countries' development cooperation
performance on seven dimensionsaid, trade, investment, migration, environment,
security and technologythe paper assesses the commitment to development in 21
European countries, individually and collectively, and changes over time in 16 of these
countries. It also compares the European performance, with that of Australia, Canada,
Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and USA.
As with any aggregate index which seeks to capture cross-country comparisons in policy
performance, it is possible to quibble with the precise indicators which are used to construct
the Commitment to Development Index. But the main conclusions are clear. Although
European countries score very highly in generosity and effectiveness of their aid provision
disbursing about 60 per cent of the world's aid though they only constitute about 25 per
4

Interestingly, the Czech Republic became a full member of the DAC in May 2013 and many other ECE countries
are set to join by the end of this year. Formal DAC-ability will therefore happen (Szent-Ivnyi, personal
communication).

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cent of world incometheir overall collective score on the Commitment to Development

Index is only average, below New Zealand and Canada and above USA, Japan and South
Korea. There is also little sign of any signicant changes resulting from the commitment,
at both the individual country and community level, in the European Consensus on
Development, to take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies
that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies
support development objectives (European Commission, 2006: 22). No individual country
scores highly on all seven dimensions of policy tracked by the index, and collectively
European countries lag behind particularly on their trade policies and technology policies.
As a result, the paper argues that European countries approach to development can be
characterized as energetically tackling the symptoms of poor economic opportunities for
developing countries by providing substantial and effective aid, but doing less to tackle
the underlying structural causes of poverty (p. 848). The paper briey discusses blockages
to greater policy coherence for development, emphasizing short-termism and the diffuse
nature of the benets of policy shifts. But on a positive note, it argues that because within
Europe, some countries are doing much better than others on specic dimensions, there is
considerable low hanging fruit, in the sense that major gains could be made to policy
coherence for development by diffusing these best practices to more European countries.
The nal two papers each focus much more closely on local realities in developing
countries. Celestine Krsschell's paper examines the experiences of a Swiss international
non-governmental organization (INGO), HELVETAS, in implementing accountability
initiatives in Nepal, Bangladesh and Mozambique. Promoting multiple accountabilities is
an important element in the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness (Open
Forum, 2010). The paper focuses on the challenge of doing this in fragile contexts and in
particular, the dilemma which HELVETAS faces as an INGO balancing upward
accountability to donors and downward accountability towards beneciaries as well as
promoting public accountability of the local state to citizens and the social accountability
of local NGOs with which HELVETAS works to their clients. Emer Brangan's paper is
concerned with the problem of articulating global standards and norms with locally-lived
experiences and meanings. The focus of her analysis is the World Health Organization's
(WHO) global strategy, recommendations and guidelines on the role of physical activity
in reducing the global burden of non-communicable diseases. Using ethnographic research
in a South African township, she considers the extent to which local conceptions of
physical activity, health and well-being, and their interrelationships, correspond with those
of the WHO, and she suggests how it might be possible to achieve a better social
embeddedness of policy on prevention.
Both these papers bring this collection back to the ground. Krsschell describes the
multiple weaknesses of the local state in all three countries where the research takes place.
There is ambiguous legislation, the lack of a public culture of accountability to local
citizens, a tendency to prioritize upward accountability to central government, distrust of
public institutions, patron-client relations, and self-censorship and self-exclusion on the
part of marginalized and poor groups. But the results of the accountability initiatives are
positive. Signicantly, Krsschell nds that these initiatives have provided a catalyst for
building a more democratic governance culture at the local level. This is only a start,
and she stresses that what is being built is soft accountability, in the sense of answerability
for actions, rather than hard accountability, in the sense of the capacity to ensure that action
is taken. But the research shows that the effort of an INGO to promote downward
accountability to people in the countries where it works can be an incubator for public
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C. Gore

and social accountability (p. 864) within those countries. The Public Audit tool, which is
used in local infrastructure projects, such as trail bridges in Nepal, is seen as particularly
powerful as a nexus for building multiple accountabilities.
Brangan's analysis takes us even further into the reality of the lives of the people
who are the subjects and objects of development cooperation. Using direct quotes from
respondents, she dramatically conveys what physical activity, and its costs and benets,
mean to people living in a low income township with high rates of unemployment and
crime. For them, physical activity was not just conceived as exercise, which in some
cases, seemed absurd given their circumstances, but rather in the sense of being busy,
involved, capable and independent (p. 876). Repeatedly, what respondents spoke of as
being bad was just sitting, a state of passive inactivity associated with being
unemployed, unengaged and inactive in a broad sense. When juxtaposed with the words
of the local residents, WHO's global strategy appears to be rooted in another world.
Brangan argues that WHO recognizes that a topdown prescriptive approach has not
succeeded and thus its strategy needs to be socially embedded, but has not yet achieved
it. She therefore makes four suggestions to do this. The rst is to reect on goals and
put well-being rather than health as the centre of policy change. Well-being requires
health but also a decent place to live, nancial security, involvement in interesting and
productive activities, good family relationships and safety from crime and violence
(p. 876). The second is to move away from a linear conception in which physical activity
is a source of health, which is then assumed to be the source of well-being, to a more
complex exploration of the various links between physical activity, health and well-being.
The third is to address macro-factors which structure the opportunities available to
township residents in education, housing and employment as well as health. Finally, it
is necessary to build policy not simply on expert discourse and quantitative statistics,
but also to take into account other forms of knowledge, and in particular, to identify
experiences, values and meanings through local narratives.

4 PROGRESS IN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: TOPDOWN OR

BOTTOMUP?
The papers in this special issue show that the new development cooperation landscape is
characterized by both vibrant dynamism and systemic inertia. The vibrancy of change is
particularly apparent at the national level. Competitive pressures of new Southern
providers of development cooperation are enabling greater policy assertiveness by the
national government in Nicaragua and changing the behaviour of DAC donors.
Interactions between an INGO and stakeholders in local governance in Bangladesh, Nepal
and Mozambique are facilitating more public and social accountability within these
countries. Some Asian providers of development cooperation, both DAC and non-DAC,
are forging a comprehensive development style of development cooperation. But at the
same time, there is major evidence of systemic inertia, particularly with regard to the
following: lack of progress on policy coherence for development in Europe; the
intractability of promoting good donorship in Eastern and Central European countries;
and the inability of WHO to socially embed its global standards and guidelines on the role
of physical activity in preventing non-communicable diseases in local realities.
Kim and Lee mention that the survey prepared by the WP-EFF for the Busan meeting
showed that only one of the 13 targets for improving aid effectiveness set in the Paris
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Declaration was achieved. Some view the results positively as at least some progress has
been being made (Wood et al., 2011). But it is occurring at a snail's pace. The most
signicant progress has been made by the recipient countries in relation to the development
of operational national development strategies and the introduction of high-quality results
oriented frameworks. Little or no progress has been made by donor countries on key
targets, in particular:
Donors are not systematically making greater use of country systems where these
systems have been made more reliable.
Aid for the government sector is not captured systematically in developing country
budgets and public accounts.
Little progress has been made among donors to implement common arrangements or
procedures and conduct joint missions and analytical works.
Aid is becoming increasingly fragmented, despite some initiatives that aim to address
this challenge.
The medium-term predictability of aid remains a challenge in developing countries
because donor communication of information on future aid to individual developing
countries remains isolated rather than being the norm (OECD, 2011b: 16).
Wood et al. (2011) nd that the slow progress made by donor countries in improving aid
effectiveness is due to a lack of political support and bureaucratic inertia. Key constraints
preventing change are: a lack of coherent policies or structures; a focus on compliance and
a risk-averse culture; the over-centralization of many donors' and agencies' systems and
decisions running counter to alignment with country systems; disconnects between
corporate strategies and the aid effectiveness agenda and weak organizational incentives;
changes in organizational status or headquarters location; capacity constraints and staff
reductions; and delayed organizational reforms and budgetary pressures arising from the
nancial crisis (Ibid.: xiii).
Essentially, what the evidence shows is that the drive to move away from the principalagent model of aid and replace it with a partnership model has failed. Vertical partnership
has proved to be an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. What exists now is a hybrid
approach. In the least developed countries, it has been very difcult to ensure that high
levels of aid dependence do not result in donor domination and various practices of both
donors and recipients are weakening ownership (UNCTAD, 2008). But in general, there
is an increasing tendency for DAC donors to achieve their priorities simply by deploying
a large proportion of their funds out of the reach of recipients. The reality of how DAC aid
is working is perhaps best illustrated by two numbers. First, country programmable aid is
only about 60 per cent of total gross bilateral aid (World Bank, 2012). Second, only 41 per
cent of the aid which arrives in the country and is directed to the government sector is
recorded in government budgets and pubic accounts (OECD, 2011b: 48). In effect, what
this means is that a high proportion of bilateral aid does not reach the developing countries.
When it does reach them, it is mostly off-budget and going through parallel
implementation units. There has also been an increasing tendency for DAC donors to
earmark multilateral aid at source for specic initiatives, sectors and themes (Adugna,
2009; Adugna et al., 2011).
A particularly troubling feature of the HLF4 in Busan was that although it pushed
forward institutional innovation at the global level, there was no sustained discussion of
the weak results on aid effectiveness at the event (Mawdsley, Savage and Kim, 2013).
Instead, the failure to meet the targets was muted by the argument that they were too
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C. Gore

ambitious and should be re-considered as ideals rather than targets (Ibid.). The shift
towards a development effectiveness focus could have acted as a major driver of change
to re-think the rationale for aid in a world dominated by private capital ows but with
signicant market failures in the supply of long-term nance, and to re-think the uses of
aid so that it works catalytically for development outcomes. But instead of re-building
the foundation of development cooperation in this way, aid has now become a four-letter
word. The language of effective development cooperation is being used to establish a new
global governance apparatus which brings together a broader range of actors, embraces a
wider set of resource ows, and, perhaps most crucially, re-invigorates the role and
relevance of the DAC. Whether this new architecture will actually improve aid
effectiveness is highly debatable. In essence, a new global edice is being built from the
topdown on an unstable and subsiding foundation.5
An important insight from the papers of this collection is that signicant progress in
development cooperation is coming from bottomup processes. This has important policy
implications. A purely topdown approach to making progress in development cooperation
through institutional redesign, particularly if it moves ahead on new issues whilst failing to
address systemic inertia in old ones, is likely to ounder. Much more support must now be
given to bottomup processes of change which generate effective development outcomes.
Three examples may illustrate what such support might mean in practice. First, it is apparent
from the intensive empirical work done for the DCF that one of the most effective ways to
improve aid effectiveness at the country level is to establish mutual accountability frameworks.
Progress has been very slow in setting up such frameworks, with only 15 per cent of countries
holding donors accountable as a group and only four per cent holding donors individually
accountable (UN ECOSOC, 2011). But such mutual accountability frameworks not only
enhance ownership by fostering a country strategy for managing aid as part of a broader
development strategy but also provide a way of enabling the governmental coordination of both
DAC and non-DAC providers of development assistance. In the Nicaragua case, where the
latest stage of the dynamic between these parties involves the possibility of the latter being
invited to the round tables of the former, such a framework could be particularly useful.
The second example concerns the importance of effective state institutions in recipient
countries for development outcomes. Although, as indicated earlier, SouthSouth
cooperation is sometimes regarded more highly than DAC aid, it is no panacea. Evidence from
Africa and least developed countries shows that poor countries often do not have a pro-active
strategy for managing SouthSouth development cooperation and this can diminish its
developmental effectiveness (UNCTAD, 2010b). Ultimately, the effectiveness of both
SouthSouth and NorthSouth development cooperation depend on developmentally-effective
state institutions in partner countries. Building institutions which embody and empower
developmental state capabilities should be a major strand of bottomup processes to improve
development cooperation.6
5

Given that some DAC members have been reporting some loans with no subsidy element as ODA, there is ongoing discussion of what actually constitutes ODA. One principle guiding this discussion is the need to maintain
the credibility of the ODA concept in the period leading up to 2015 (OECD, 2013: 7).
6
UNCTAD (2011) argues that SouthSouth cooperation can be a game-changer because it is possible to establish
a virtuous circle between SSC and the building of developmental state capabilities, whereas the NorthSouth
cooperation continues to focus on an overambitious good governance agenda that has had the tendency of
disabling such capabilities. The outcome document of HLF4 recognizes the importance of effective state
institutions, but the proposed monitoring framework for the GPEDC suggests that this should be monitored
through the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment score on public nancial management
(GPEDC, 2013b), reinforcing an excessively narrow view of good development governance.
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The third example concerns the problem of articulating global standards with local settings.
This problem is becoming all the more urgent as the realization of global goals, such as the
MDGs and their post-2015 successor, depends critically on their interiorization at the national
level. The process of doing this requires, as Brangan points out, increasing attention to local
knowledge as well as local values. Topdown prescriptions are likely to fail if they cannot be
socially embedded.
Although more support needs to be given to bottomup processes, action at the global level
also remains vital. This is evident in the follow-up work on mutual accountability which shows
that national authorities need to draw from global standards in setting their local indicators and
recommends a global-light set of indicators (Martin, Watts and Rabinowitz, 2012). The need
for high-level agreements is also evident in the very weak progress made in the beyond-aid
agenda at the global level. The last UN report on trends and progress in international
development cooperation nds that most MDG8 commitments are unfullled and the crisis
is eroding debt sustainability, trade negotiations are stalemated and access to affordable
medicines and technology is patchy (UN, 2012: 1). Moreover, a recent assessment of the aid
and beyond-aid commitments of rich countries in the Monterrey Consensus indicates that there
is as much systemic inertia in the beyond-aid agenda as in the aid effectiveness agenda
(Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2013).
In the end, making progress in development cooperation will require both topdown and
bottomup processes. The best approach is likely to involve the following: a global-light
approach to improving the aid regime which respects different approaches and enables them
to function effectively together without a unied overarching system of rules; the creation of
a more development-friendly international economic architecture which includes continued
attention to improving the aid regime but also goes beyond it to encompass in particular the
international trade architecture, international nancial architecture and the international
knowledge architecture; more attention to national policy coherence for development by
DAC donors and in SouthSouth cooperation; and nally, vigorous support to bottomup
processes of change which increase diversity, dynamism, mutual learning and policy innovation
in development cooperation and which thereby lead to better development outcomes. In this
way, it may eventually be possible to ensure that development cooperation actually improves
the lives of the villagers in Nepal dependent on trail bridges, as well as the lives of the township
residents in South Africa whotoday, tomorrow and tomorroware just sitting.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I gratefully acknowledge comments from Owen Barder, Richard Carey, Emma Mawdsley and
Paul Mosley on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to thank all the anonymous referees
who assessed papers for this special issue. Their excellent comments proved invaluable. Many
thanks are also due to Patricia Anderson and Louise Rand Silva for efcient editorial support.

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