HEIRS OF ARTURO REYES,

represented by Evelyn R. San

Buenaventura, Petitioners vs.
ELENA SOCCO-BELTRAN,
Respondent.
Facts:
The subject property in this case is
one originally owned by spouses,
Marcelo Laquian and Constancia
Socco, which they bought with
Japanese money. When Marcelo died,
the property was left to the wife.
Upon the death of Constancia, the
property was left to her heirs siblings.
Among them were Elena Socco-Beltran
and Miguel R. Socco. They executed an
unnotarized document entitled
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of
the Deceased. The parcel of land was
divided into 3 not yet having titles of
its own (lot no. 6 A C).
When Elena was about to file
application for purchase of Lot No. 6-B
before the DAR alleging that it was
adjudicated to her in the extra Judicial
Settlement, Arturo Reyes opposed the
petition on the ground that such land
was sold to him by Miguel Socco that it
was evidence by Contract to Sell.
That I am one of the co-heirs of the
Estate of the deceased Constancia
Socco; and that I am to inherit as such
a portion of her lot consisting of Four
Hundred Square Meters (400) more or
less located on the (sic) Zamora St.,
Municipality of Dinalupihan, Province
of Bataan, bounded as follows: x x x x
That for or in consideration of the
sum of FIVE PESOS (P5.00) per square
meter, hereby sell, convey and

transfer by way of this conditional sale

the said 400 sq.m. more or less unto
Atty. Arturo C. Reyes, his heirs,
administrator and assigns x x x
Issue: Whether or not petitioners have
a better right to the subject property
over the respondent?
Held: Elena was held to have a better
right. Petitioners cannot derive title to
the subject property by virtue of the
Contract to Sell. It was unmistakably
stated in the Contract and made clear
to both parties thereto that the
vendor, Miguel R. Socco, was not yet
the owner of the subject property and
was merely expecting to inherit the
same as his share as a co-heir of
Constancias estate. It was also
declared in the Contract itself that
Miguel R. Soccos conveyance of the
subject to the buyer, Arturo Reyes,
was a conditional sale. It is, therefore,
apparent that the sale of the subject
property in favor of Arturo Reyes was
conditioned upon the event that
Miguel Socco would actually inherit
and become the owner of the said
property. Absent such occurrence,
Miguel R. Socco never acquired
ownership of the subject property
which he could validly transfer to
Arturo Reyes.
Under Article 1459 of the Civil Code on
contracts of sale, The thing must be
licit and the vendor must have a right
to transfer ownership thereof at the
time it is delivered. The law
specifically requires that the vendor
must have ownership of the property
at the time it is delivered. Petitioners
claim that the property was
constructively delivered to them in

1954 by virtue of the Contract to Sell.

However, as already pointed out by
this Court, it was explicit in the
Contract itself that, at the time it was
executed, Miguel R. Socco was not yet
the owner of the property and was
only expecting to inherit it. Hence,
there was no valid sale from which
ownership of the subject property
could have transferred from Miguel
Socco to Arturo Reyes. Without
acquiring ownership of the subject
property, Arturo Reyes also could not
have conveyed the same to his heirs,
herein petitioners.
RUDOLF LIETZ, INC., vs CA and
AGAPITO BURIOL
Facts: Respondent Agapito Buriol
owned a unregistered parcel of land in
Palawan, which he entered into a lease
agreement with Flavia Turatello and
Sani, Italian Citizen, that covered 1
hectare of Buriols property for a period
of 25 years and renewable for the
same. The lessees took possession of
the land after paying 10k. This oral
agreement was later reduced to
writing. A year before, respondent sold
to petitopner Rudolf Leitz the same
land for 30k.
A parcel of land, consisting of FIVE (5)
hectares, more or less, a portion of
that parcel of land declared in the
name of Agapito Buriol, under Tax
Declaration No. 0021, revised in the
year 1985, together with all
improvements thereon, situated at the
Island of Capsalay, Barangay Port
Barton, municipality of San Vicente,
province of Palawan which segregated
from the whole parcel described in
said tax declaration, has the following

superficial boundaries: NORTH, Sec.

01-017; and remaining property of the
vendor; EAST, by Seashore; SOUTH,
01-020; and WEST, by 01-018 (now
Elizabeth Lietz)
Petitioner later discovered petitioner
owned only 4 hectares with one more
hectare covered by lease. 3 hectares
delivered. Petitioner filed a complaint
for Annulment of Lease with Recovery
of Possession with Injunction and
Damages against respondent.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the delivery of the entire
five hectares or its equivalent?
Held: No, In the case where the area of
the immovable is stated in the
contract based on an estimate, the
actual area delivered may not
measure up exactly with the area
stated in the contract. According to
Article 1542 of the Civil Code, in the
sale of real estate, made for a lump
sum and not at the rate of a certain
sum for a unit of measure or number,
there shall be no increase or decrease
of the price although there be a
greater or lesser area or number than
that stated in the contract. However,
the discrepancy must not be
substantial. A vendee of land, when
sold in gross or with the description
more or less with reference to its area,
does not thereby ipso facto take all
risk of quantity in the land. The use of
more or less or similar words in
designating quantity covers only a
reasonable excess or deficiency.
Where both the area and the
boundaries of the immovable are
declared, the area covered within the

boundaries of the immovable prevails

over the stated area. In cases of
conflict between areas and
boundaries, it is the latter which
should prevail. What really defines a
piece of ground is not the area,
calculated with more or less certainty,
mentioned in its description, but the
boundaries therein laid down, as
enclosing the land and indicating its
limits. In a contract of sale of land in a
mass, it is well established that the
specific boundaries stated in the
contract must control over any
statement with respect to the area
contained within its boundaries. It is
not of vital consequence that a deed
or contract of sale of land should
disclose the area with mathematical
accuracy. It is sufficient if its extent is
objectively indicated with sufficient
precision to enable one to identify it.
An error as to the superficial area is
immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the
vendor is to deliver everything within
the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the
entirety thereof that distinguishes the
determinate object.
DOLORES SALINAS, assisted by
her husband, JUAN CASTILLO, vs
BIENVENIDO S. FAUSTINO and
ILUMINADA G. FAUSTINO,
Facts
Bienvenido S. Faustino, by deed of
Absolute Sale, purchase from his coheirs and first cousin Bejamin Salinas
and Dolores Salinas their shares to a
parcel of land in the name of their
Grandmother Carmen Labitan with
300.375sq more or less and and with
boundaries described herein.

Respondent bought from the petitioner

1381 sqm of land evidence by tax
declaration with boundaries. They filed
a complaint for recovery of possession
with damages against petitioner
because they would not leave the land.
Respondent alleges that they allowed
the petitioner to stay on the 628sqm of
land with tax declaration with
boundaries in the name of petitioner
on the condition that they would
voluntarily and immediately remove
the house and vacate that portion of
the land should they (respondents)
need the land; and that when they
asked petitioner and her co-heiroccupants to remove the house and
restore the possession of the
immediately-described portion of the
land.
The petitioner answered such land is
hers and that the signature on the
deed was forged. The forgery being
unsupported, the trial court looked into
the property such property though the
parties know to be one thing are
described differently and that the deed
of sale only conveyed 300.375 sqm yet
the respondent claims 1381.
The trial court concluded that the
respondent owns only the land sold.
The respondent appealed to CA which
affirmed with modification that the

respondent owns the remaining of the

basis of the appellate courts

whole which 753n sqm.

conclusion is erroneous.

Issue: Whether or not a description of

As the immediately preceding

a lot area can be used as evidence for

paragraph reflects, the Plan of Lot 3,

purchase and ownership of the lot

Bk 5-K, Psd-82 was prepared

HELD:
Indeed, in a contract of sale of land in
a mass, the specific boundaries stated
in the contract must control over any
statement with respect to the area
contained within its boundaries. Thus,
it is the boundaries indicated in a deed
of absolute sale, and not the area in
sq. m. mentioned therein 300.375 sq.
m. in the Deed of Sale in respondents
favor that control in the determination
of which portion of the land a vendee
acquires.

forSpouses Faustino and Salinas first

cousin co-heir Benjamin Salinas on
February 10, 1960. Why the appellate
court, after excluding the 628 sq. m.
lot covered by a Tax Declaration in the
name of petitioner from the 1,381 sq.
m. lot surveyed for Benjamin
P. Salinas in 1960, concluded that
what was sold via the 1962 Deed of
Sale to respondent Faustino was the
remaining 753 sq. m., despite the
clear provision of said Deed of Sale
that what was conveyed was 300.375
sq. m., escapes comprehension. It
defies logic, given that respondents

In concluding that Faustino acquired

base their claim of ownership of the

via the June 27, 1962 Deed of Sale the

questioned 628 sq. m. occupied

total land area of 753 sq. m., the Court

by Salinas on that June 27, 1962 Deed

of Appeals subtracted from the total

of Sale covering a 300.375 sq. m. lot.

land area of 1,381 sq. m. reflected in

Exh. A, which is Plan of Lot 3, Block 5k, Psd-8268, as prepared for Benjamin
R. Salinas containing an area of 1,381
sq. m. and which was prepared on
February 10, 1960 by a private land
surveyor, the 628 sq. m. area ofthe
lot claimed by Salinas as reflected in
Tax Declaration No. 1017 in her name.
As will be shown shortly, however, the

The Court of Appeals thus doubly

erred in concluding that 1) what was
sold to respondents via the June 27,
1962 Deed of Sale was the 1,381 sq.
m. parcel of land reflected in the PlanExh. A prepared in 1960 for
Benjamin Salinas, and
2) Salinas occupied 628 sq. m. portion
thereof, hence, Spouses Fausto own
the remaining 753 sq. m.

RAYMUNDO S. DE LEON, vs.BENITA

T. ONG
Facts: Petitioner sold to respondent 3
parcels of land with improvements,
which are mortaged to Real Savings
and Loan Association (RSLAI).
Petitioner and Respondent executed a
notarized deed of absolute sale with
assumption of mortgage.
That for and in consideration of the
sum of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P1.1 million),
Philippine
currency, the receipt whereof is
hereby acknowledged from
[RESPONDENT] to the entire
satisfaction of [PETITIONER], said
[PETITIONER] does hereby sell,
transfer and convey in a manner
absolute and irrevocable, unto
said [RESPONDENT],
his heirs and assigns that certain real
estate together with the buildings and
other improvements existing thereon,
situated in
[Barrio] Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal
under the following terms and
conditions:
1. That upon full payment of
[respondent] of the amount of FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED
(P415,000), [petitioner] shall execute
and sign a deed of assumption of
mortgage in favor of [respondent]
without any further
cost whatsoever;
2. That [respondent] shall assume
payment of the outstanding loan of
SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P684,500) with
REAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
Respondent paid the amount.
Petitioner handed the keys and
informed mortgagor of sale and
authorize it to accept payment from
respondent and release certificate of

title and petitioner to assume payment

of outstanding loan. Respondent
undergo credit investigation.
Subsequently, respondent learned that
petitioner sold the same property to
Leona Viloria. The locks were changed
making keys useless. Respodent
proceeded to RSLAI, but said that
petitioner already paid due and taken
back the certificate of title.
Issue: 1. whether the parties entered
into a contract of sale or a contract to
sell?2. Whether or not double sale.
Held: The deed executed by the
parties (as previously quoted) stated
that petitioner sold the properties to
respondent "in a manner
absolute and irrevocable" for a sum of
P1.1 million. With regard to the
manner of payment, it required
respondent to pay
P415,500 in cash to petitioner upon
the execution of the deed, with the
balance15 payable directly to RSLAI
(on behalf of
petitioner) within a reasonable time.16
Nothing in said instrument implied
that petitioner reserved ownership of
the properties
until the full payment of the purchase
price.17 On the contrary, the terms
and conditions of the deed only
affected the manner of
payment, not the immediate transfer
of ownership (upon the execution of
the notarized contract) from petitioner
as seller to
respondent as buyer. Otherwise
stated, the said terms and conditions
pertained to the performance of the
contract, not the
perfection thereof nor the transfer of
ownership.
Settled is the rule that the seller is
obliged to transfer title over the
properties and deliver the same to the
buyer.18 In this regard,

Article 1498 of the Civil Code19

provides that, as a rule, the execution
of a notarized deed of sale is
equivalent to the delivery of
a thing sold.
In this instance, petitioner executed a
notarized deed of absolute sale in
favor of respondent. Moreover, not
only did petitioner
turn over the keys to the properties to
respondent, he also authorized RSLAI
to receive payment from respondent
and release
his certificates of title to her. The
totality of petitioners acts clearly
indicates that he had unqualifiedly
delivered and transferred
ownership of the properties to
respondent. Clearly, it was a contract
of sale the parties entered into.
2. Double sale, yet the sale cannot be
perfected because the property was
already passed to the first buyer.
Asset Privatization Trust vs T.J.
Enterprises
Facts: Asset Privatization Trust was a
government entity created for the
purpose to conserve, to provisionally
manage and to disposed assets of the
government institutions. Petitioner
acquired from Development Bank of
the Philippines machinery and
refrigeration equipment. It was stored
in a compound that is being leased.
Selling the items as is where is basis.
Petitioner and respondent entered in
absolute deed of sale machinery and
refrigeration equips lot 2 3 5.
Respondent paid full amount.
Respondent demanded delivery of
items. Respondent were able to take
lot 3 and 5, but the whole of lot 2.

They were barred from hauling by the

employees of the lessee.
Respondent filed a case, but was later
able to get the remaining materials.
However, it was found to be damage
and have missing materials.
Issue: whether there was a
constructive delivery of the machinery
and equipment upon the execution of
the deed of absolute sale between
petitioner and respondent?
Held: The ownership of a thing sold
shall be transferred to the vendee
upon the actual or constructive
delivery thereof. The thing sold shall
be understood as delivered when it is
placed in the control and possession of
the vendee.
As a general rule, when the sale is
made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent
to the delivery of the thing which is
the object of the contract, if from the
deed the contrary does not appear or
cannot clearly be inferred. And with
regard to movable property, its
delivery may also be made by the
delivery of the keys of the place or
depository where it is stored or kept.
In order for the execution of a public
instrument to effect tradition, the
purchaser must be placed in control of
the thing sold.
However, the execution of a public
instrument only gives rise to a prima
facie presumption of delivery. Such
presumption is destroyed when the
delivery is not affected because of a
legal impediment. It is necessary that
the vendor shall have control over the
thing sold that, at the moment of sale,
its material delivery could have been
made.]Thus, a person who does not
have actual possession of the thing
sold cannot transfer constructive

possession by the execution and

delivery of a public instrument.
In this case, there was no constructive
delivery of the machinery and
equipment upon the execution of the
deed of absolute sale or upon the
issuance of the gate pass since it was
not petitioner but Creative Lines which
had actual possession of the property.
The presumption of constructive
delivery is not applicable as it has to
yield to the reality that the purchaser
was not placed in possession and
control of the property.
Board of Liquidators vs Exequiel
Floro
Facts: the Board of Liquidators is a
government agency who took over the
functions of the defunct Surplus
Property Liquidating Committee.
Melecio Malabanan entered into an
agreement with the board for the
salvage of surplus properties sunk in
territorials waters off the provinces of
La Union and Batangas. The
agreement was for 1 year upon
execution and 6 months extension.
The contract was extended twice for
1year. 13k steel matting salvaged.
Four months previously, Malabanan
entered into agreement with Exequiel
Floro that Floro would advance money,
repayment, thereof being secured by
quantities of steel mattings which
Malabanan consign to Floro upon
default authorized to sell.
He defaulted. Floro sold 11k of steel
matting to recover advances.
Malabanan filed for insolvency and
listed the Board and Floro as creditors.
11k of steel matting and other
properties was presented to aggregate
debt. Board claimed ownership of steel
matting. Floro opposed because he
sold it.

Issue: Whether or not Malabanan have

acquired the title to the steel matting?
Held: We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that the contract between
Malabanan and the Board had effect of
vesting Malabanan with title to, or
ownership of the steel mattings in
question as soon as they were brought
up from the bottom of the sea.
10. For and in consideration of the
assignment by the BOARD OF
LIQUIDATORS to the CONTRACTOR
(Malabanan) of all right, title and
interest in and to all surplus
properties salvaged by the
CONTRACTOR under this contract, the
CONTRACTOR shall pay to the
Government Ninety Pesos (P90.00) per
long ton(2,240 lbs.) of surplus
properties recovered.
11. Payment of the agreed price shall
be made monthly during the first ten
(10) days of every month on the basis
of recovery reports of sunken surplus
properties salvaged during the
preceding month, duly verified and
audited by the authorized
representative of the BOARD OF
LIQUIDATORS.
That Malabanan was required under
the contract to post a bond of
P10,000.00 to guarantee compliance
with the terms and conditions of the
contract; that the operation for
salvage were entirely at Malabanan's
expense and risks; that gold, silver,
copper, coins, currency, jewelry,
precious stones, etc. were excepted
from the contract, and were instead
required to be turned over to the
Board for disposition; that the
expenses for storage, including guard
service, were for Malabanan's account
all these circumstances indicated
that ownership of the goods passed to

Malabanan as soon as they were

recovered or salvaged (i.e., as soon as
the salvor had gained effective
possession of the goods), and not only
after payment of the stipulated price. .
While there can be reservation of title
in the seller until full payment of the
price (Article 1478, N.C.C.), or, until
fulfillment of a condition (Article 1505,
N.C.C.); and while execution of a
public instrument amounts to delivery
only when from the deed the contrary
does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred (Article 1498, supra), there is
nothing in the said contract which may
be deemed a reservation of title, or
from which it may clearly be inferred
that delivery was not intended.
The contention that there was no
delivery is incorrect. While there was
no physical tradition, there was one by
agreement (traditio longa manu) in
conformity with Article 1499 of the
Civil Code
Art. 1499 The delivery of movable
property may likewise be made by the
mere consent or agreement of the
contracting parties, if the thing sold
cannot be transferred to the
possession of the vendee at the time
of the sale. . . .
SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORP vs
Court of Appeals and Pablo S.
Babasanta, sps. Lu.
Facts: Sps. Lu sold to Pablo Babasanta
2 parcels of land for 15 per sqm
measuring 15,808sqm or 3.1616
hectares. Babasanta paid
downpayment of 50k and several
other payments worth 200k.
Babasanta wrote to Pacita to demand
execution of final deed of sale si he
could fully pay. He received
information that the same land was

sold to another by the spouses. Pacita

replied that full payment was due and
that he backed out when he asked for
reduction in price. The sps also
returned the 50k through Eugenio
Ova. The property was sold to San
Lorenzo Development Corp.
Issue: who between SLDC and
Babasanta has a better right over the
two parcels of land subject of the
instant case in view of the successive
transactions executed by the Spouses
Lu.
Held: An analysis of the facts
obtaining in this case, as well as the
evidence presented by the parties,
irresistibly leads to the conclusion that
the agreement between Babasanta
and the Spouses Lu is a contract to
sell and not a contract of sale.
Babasantas letter dated 22 May 1989
was quite telling. He stated therein
that despite his repeated requests for
the execution of the final deed of sale
in his favor so that he could effect full
payment of the price, Pacita Lu
allegedly refused to do so. In effect,
Babasanta himself recognized that
ownership of the property would not
be transferred to him until such time
as he shall have effected full payment
of the price. Moreover, had the sellers
intended to transfer title, they could
have easily executed the document of
sale in its required form
simultaneously with their acceptance
of the partial payment, but they did
not. Doubtlessly, the receipt signed by
Pacita Lu should legally be considered
as a perfected contract to sell.
Following the above disquisition,
respondent Babasanta did not acquire
ownership by the mere execution of
the receipt by Pacita Lu acknowledging
receipt of partial payment for the
property. For one, the agreement

between Babasanta and the Spouses

Lu, though valid, was not embodied in
a public instrument. Hence, no
constructive delivery of the lands
could have been effected. For another,
Babasanta had not taken possession
of the property at any time after the
perfection of the sale in his favor or
exercised acts of dominion over it
despite his assertions that he was the
rightful owner of the lands. Simply
stated, there was no delivery to
Babasanta, whether actual or
constructive, which is essential to
transfer ownership of the property.
Thus, even on the assumption that the
perfected contract between the
parties was a sale, ownership could
not have passed to Babasanta in the
absence of delivery, since in a
contract of sale ownership is
transferred to the vendee only upon
the delivery of the thing sold.
Article 1544 will come into play on
double sale.
Art. 1544. If the same thing should
have been sold to different vendees,
the ownership shall be transferred to
the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the
ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the
ownership shall pertain to the person
who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents

the oldest title, provided there is good

faith.
The principle of primus tempore,
potior jure (first in time, stronger in
right) gains greater significance in
case of double sale of immovable
property. When the thing sold twice is
an immovable, the one who acquires it
and first records it in the Registry of
Property, both made in good faith,
shall be deemed the owner.Verily, the
act of registration must be coupled
with good faith that is, the registrant
must have no knowledge of the defect
or lack of title of his vendor or must
not have been aware of facts which
should have put him upon such inquiry
and
investigation
as might be
necessary to acquaint him with the
defects in the title of his vendor.
Admittedly, SLDC registered the
sale with the Registry of Deeds after it
had
acquired
knowledge
of
Babasantas
claim.
Babasanta,
however, strongly argues that the
registration of the sale by SLDC was
not sufficient to confer upon the latter
any title to the property since the
registration was attended by bad faith.
Specifically, he points out that at the
time SLDC registered the sale on 30
June 1990, there was already a notice
of lis pendens on the file with the
Register of Deeds, the same having
been filed one year before on 2 June
1989.