SOLLER vs SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
In the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was shot and killed along the
national highway at Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while driving a motorcycle together with petitioner
Soller's son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to a medical clinic located in the house of
petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller, the Municipal Mayor, and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the
Municipal Health Officer. The incident was reported to and investigated by petitioner SPO4 Mario
Matining. An autopsy was conducted on the same night on the cadaver of Jerry by petitioner Dr.
Preciosa Soller with the assistance of petitioner Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner
Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife.
On the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later filed against the petitioners by the
widow of Jerry Macabael with the Office of the Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to
mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by (a) altering his wound (b)
concealing his brain; (c) falsely stating in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in
truth he had only one; and (d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening
around his wound when in truth there was.
Petitioners spouses Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry Macabael, and
claimed, among others that Jerry Macabael was brought to their private medical clinic because it
was there where he was rushed by his companions after the shooting, that petitioner Prudente
Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely requested by his wife Preciosa Soller, who was the
Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy considering that the procedure involved sawing
which required male strength, and that Mrs. Macabael's consent was obtained before the autopsy.
The two (2) police officers denied having planted three (3) shells at the place where the shooting
took place.
The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an Information for Obstruction of Justice
(Violation of P.D. 1829), and two (2) Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners
filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the
offenses charged; this motion was opposed by respondent People. The Sandiganbayan denied
petitioners' Motion to Quash on the ground that the accusation involves the performance of the
duties of at least one (1) of the accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly charged
together with that official, then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the entire case and over all
the co-accused.
Motion for Reconsideration was filed on the premise that it is not among the functions of the mayor
to conduct autopsies so that any misdeed, if indeed there was any, could not be an offense which
would put him under the jurisdiction of the court. However, the same was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the
law should be inquired into. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the
statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied. For this purpose in
criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at the time of the
commencement of the action.
What determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the specific factual allegation in the
information that would indicate close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official
duties and the commission of the offense charged in order to qualify the crime as having been
committed in relation to public office.
In this case, the Informations failed to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses charged
in relation to their offices. Neither are there specific allegations of facts to show the intimate
relation/connection between the commission of the offense charged and the discharge of official
functions of the offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of criminal
offenders was committed in relation to the office of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as
Mayor is included in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as amended. Although the
petitioners were described as being "all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal
Health Officer, SPO II, PO I, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife", there was no allegation that the
offense of altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the
veracity, authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for murder
or of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and police report to mislead the
law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the offender was done in the
performance of official function. Indeed the offenses defined in P.D. 1829 may be committed by
any person whether a public officer or a private citizen, and accordingly public office is not an
element of the offense. Moreover, one of the Informations state that the fabrication of information in
the police and autopsy report "would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of
herein petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller". Thus, there is a categorical indication
that the petitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to commit the offenses and they would
have committed the offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold the position of
Municipal Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.
A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor as enumerated in Section 444
of the Local Government Code will readily show that the preparation of police and autopsy reports
and the presentation and gathering of evidence in the investigation of criminal cases are not
among such duties and functions, and the broad responsibility to maintain peace and order cannot
be a basis for construing that the criminal acts imputed to petitioner Mayor fall under his functions

as Municipal Mayor. What is obvious is that petitioners spouses probably acted as the parents of
the alleged assailant and if at all, were motivated by personal reasons rather than official duty.
Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were intimately connected
with the discharge of the official functions of accused Mayor Soller, the offenses charged in the
subject criminal cases fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan.

DUCANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with
Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. The office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of
Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713.
Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP alleged, he
admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. Citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan and
Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al., he asserted that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as
amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A. No. 8249, 10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try
and hear the case because he is an official of the executive branch occupying the position of a
Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade 27.
In its Opposition, the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject law
would clearly show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials
of the executive branch other than the Regional Director and those specifically enumerated. This is
so since the term "Regional Director" and "higher" are separated by the conjunction "and," which
signifies that these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are conjoined together
"relating one to the other" to give effect to the purpose of the law. The fact that the position of
Regional Director was specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies the
lawmakers' intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of salary grade, fall within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions where
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that
Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A. No. 8249 unequivocally provides that respondent court has jurisdiction
over officials of the executive branch of the government occupying the position of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those
officials who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g). Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A. No. 8249, only
Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD:
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 provides that, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2)
officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades.
While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade
27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may
not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big-time
cases involving the so-called "big fishes" in the government rather than those accused who are of
limited means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry," which, in turn, helps the
court decongest its dockets.
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category,
it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any
position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). The accused was the Regional
Director of the Land Transportation Office, Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the
commission of the crime in 1992, his position was classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.
The Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to
the reliefs prayed for.

HONASAN II vs. PANEL of INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS of the DOJ

FACTS:
After a thorough investigation, respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director Eduardo Matillano found that a
crime of coup d'etat was committed by military personnel and petitioner Senator Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan II on July 27, 2003. On August 4, 2003, he then filed an affidavit-complaint with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) against petitioner. The affidavit-complaint is docketed as I.S. No.

2003-1120 and the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ Panel for
brevity) sent a subpoena to petitioner for preliminary investigation.
Petitioner, together with his counsel, appeared at the DOJ. He led a Motion for Clarification
questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case, asserting that since the imputed acts were committed
in relation to his public office, it is the Office of the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the
jurisdiction to conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation; that should the charge be led in
court, it is the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, that can legally take cognizance of the case
considering that he belongs to the group of public officials with Salary Grade 31; and praying that
the proceedings be suspended until final resolution of his motion.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Department of Justice Panel of Investigators has jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation over the charge of coup d'etat against petitioner.

HELD:
The authority of respondent DOJ Panel is based not on the assailed OMB-DOJ Circular No.
95-001 but on the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV,
governing the DOJ and and Section 1 of P.D. 1275.
Petitioner claims that it is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation under paragraph (1), Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which
confers upon the Office of the Ombudsman the power to investigate on its own, or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the 1987
Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 cannot prevail over the Constitution,
pursuant to Article 7 of the Civil Code.
The Court is not convinced. The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and
Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other
government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the
Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases
against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction take over at any stage.

RODRIGUEZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACT:

On September 24, 1996, acting upon an information that rampant illegal logging activities have
been going on in different areas of Taytay, Palawan, a joint team composed of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tiniguiban Command, the Bantay Palawan,
and the Philippine Marines confiscated freshly cut/processed ipil lumber at Sitio Maypa, Barangay
Pancol, Taytay. The cutting and sawing of the lumber, which were alleged to have been done under
the supervision of Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego upon orders of herein petitioner
Mayor Evelyn Rodriguez and Association of Barangay Captains President Roberto Rodriguez,
were without proper permit or license.
On November 7, 1996, Enrique A. Cuyos, Sr. of the EIIB, Region IV-A, Palawan filed complaints for
robbery and violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829 5 (DECREE PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION
OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS) against petitioners
Mayor Rodriguez and Barangay Captain Abonita before the Provincial Prosecution Office of
Palawan.
By Resolution of February 18, 1997, the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator recommended the
filing of an information against petitioners for violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829, and the
forwarding of the records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman-Luzon for review and further
proceedings, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez being a public officer and the charge against her being
work-connected.
Following its review of the case, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Luzon, by a Joint Review
Action of October 19, 1998, resolved to, as it did file an information for violation of Section 1(b) P.D.
1829 on December 8, 1998 against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan.
A warrant of arrest was accordingly issued against petitioners. Before the 1st Division of the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond as
did Barangay Captain Abonita.
Petitioners question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they arguing that they are not tasked
with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 (REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES) as neither of them are law enforcement officers or prosecutors but are mere
executive officials of their respective local government units with entirely different official functions
and, as such, the accusation against them is not in relation to their office. Petitioners thus conclude
that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as Section 4 of
R.A. 8249 limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to those offenses defined and penalized in
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Mayor Rodriguez, who holds a position of "Grade 27" under the Local
Government Code of 1991, committed the offense charged in relation to her office.

HELD:
In Montilla v. Hilario, this Court laid down the principle that for an offense to be committed in
relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not
accidental, in that in the legal sense, the offense can not exist without the office.
As an exception to Montilla, this Court, in People v. Montejo, held that although public office is not
an element of an offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately
connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive
to commit the crime and had the accused would not have committed it had he not held the
aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to
his office.
In the present case, public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction of justice
under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense
alleged to have been committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such, however, that the offense may
not have been committed had said petitioner not held the office of the mayor. As found during the
preliminary investigation, petitioner Rodriguez, in the course of her duty as Mayor, who is tasked to
exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces, used her
influence, authority and office to call and command members of the municipal police of Taytay to
haul and transfer the lumber which was still subject of an investigation for violation of P.D. 705.
What determines the jurisdiction of a court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the information. The averment in the information that petitioner Rodriguez, as
municipal mayor, took advantage of her office and caused the hauling of the lumber to the
municipal hall to obstruct the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705 effectively vested
jurisdiction over the offense on the Sandiganbayan.