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32

TACTICS
IN THEFRANCO.PRUSSIAN
WAR
FROMOPENINGSHOTSTOTIIE BATTTEOFSEDAN
By Mikelohnson
3. French"shell"wasonlyeffective
at certainpre-setranges.
4. TheFrenchMitrailleusewasnot aslethalasexpected
dueto
Although an inreasingnumber of books are coming forward
thesarcity
of mentrainedto operateandservicetheweapon
regarding the ampaignsand battles of the Franco-Prussian
and its very narrow coneof fire.
War, and thereare now someexcellentsetsof rulescoverins
Iwould alsolike to makeafew pointson the diagrams
which
this fascinaring
conflicr.whoseduthorsclearlyhavean insighi
into thisperiod,I find that neithersourceof informationseems youwill find in thesearticlesl
to deal conciselywith tacticsusedand formarionsadoptedby 1nThe diagmmsmainlydepictinfantryformations.I havenor
"clutteredthemup" withcavalryandtoomanyartillery
bothsides.
units
In my opinion this is why the period, althoughenjoying
asthe roleoftheselatterarmsis bestexplainedin the textas
popularitya few yearsago fuelled by the releaseof some
a supplement
to the diagrams.
astounding
rangesof figuresnotablyin 15and25mm(andnow 2. The essentialinfantry fightingunit on borh sideswasthe
in 10mn),hasneverreallybrokenintothe NineteenthCentury
battalion.In realitymanymorebattalionswouldparticipare
Period's"big league"whichis dominatedby Napoleonics
and
in the eflgagement
than the diagramswouldsuggest,
but as
ACW. All the other ingredientsare there spectacular wargamingis all aboutrecreatinghistoryin miniatwe- in
uniforms,battleswith momentsof dramaandpivotaltension,
organisational
as well as visualscale- by deployingyour
andweaponsof
dauntinglethality.
Withoutanunderstandingof 15mmor 25mmbattalionsasdepicredin th diagramsyou
tacticsand formationsthose lovinglypaintedarmiesare all
will apturethe "feel" of thesedesperatebattlsin the
dressedupwithnowheretogo, andleft tolanguishonthe shelf
Imperialphaseof thewar. Ifyou fightin 6or 2mm(yegods!)
or edgeevernearerto the "ForSale"columnofthis masazine.
youcanpourin morebattalions,but still followthebatralion
ln theseaniclesI hopeto changeall rhatl
leveltactics.
Suffice it to say that researchedrules will reflect the
You will seethat in the text and in the diagams,I referto
developments
in weapontechnologyin thisperiod,the salient "Prussia"
and"Prussians".
This is because
thewaris DoDularlv
onesofwhichcanbe summarised
asfollows:
knownlrn thi\ countDat leasr)
astheFranco-Prus:ran
War.In
l The FrenchChassepot
rifle in the mainoutrangedthoseof fact, as a quick perusalof any Order oI Battle will show,a
theirGermancounterpa(s.
considemble
numberof troopsfrom Prussia's
GermanAllies
2. The German Krupps artillery outrangedand was more (forexanple Bavaria)foughtalongsiderhePrussians
andtheir
effectivethan Frenchartillery, mainly due ro the "shell" organisation
chieflyfollowedby the Prussianpattem.So, for
rounds being fitted with percussionfuses, leading to Prussia.read"PrussiaandhercermanAlies".
explosionon impactat allranges.
Enoughof the preliminaries,
to battle . . .

INTRODUCTION

PART1:FRENCH
TACTICALDOCTRINE
circumstances
of battledid not warant a "furia francese"sryle
ot attack.rhenorherradicswouldbe implemenled
a\ ihe
Until 1869Frenchinfantrytacticshadbeensteepedin the vatue Commanderthoughtf'r. ideally (o crearethe circumsrances
of offensiveaction, relying heavilyon French6lan and the where such an attack would meet with success.In shorr,
inesistiblemomenrumof the bayonetcharge- tacticswhich dynamismandvenatility.
came to be known as "fuia francese' (French Fury). These
And then camethe 1869Drillbook. In 1867(in the lishr of
were the tacticswhich had been adoptedin the Crimeaand Pru\sia\crulhingdeteatot Ausrnain a mere6 seek\rh; year
morerecentlyin AustriaandItaly. Refarringto DiagrarnA1, an before) Committeeswere establishedby NapoleonIII to
attack would commencewith a probe by a thin screenof re-evaluatethe tacticsof "
futia francese". mey h^d ro examine
skirnishers(typicallyChasseurs
a Pidif theywereavailable,if just how successful
suchtacticswouldbe whenpittedaAainsta
not Zouavesor Tirailleu^ Algeriens- the dreadedTurcos) modern(and recenrlyvicrorioustarmy equippad*irh breechdesignedto draw fire on themselves
and protectrhe massed loadingartilleryandbrcechloadingrifles.The reportsofthese
tbrmationsmovingup behindthem.Theseskirmishenwereto c-ommittees
were not unanimousin their recommendations.
thin out the enemyranks,and wefe certainlynot to beome Although the t^ctics of futia
tancese" still enjoyed nuch
boggeddown.in long range firing. Forwardmotion was all. suppon(especiallyin the rank and file and junior NCO'Sof
Behind them the battalionswould be advancingdeployed, France'slmperial amy, as well as among those in high
wherethe gound permitted,altematelyin Iineandin column. command)there was a movementtowardsadoptinga more
Whenthe columnswerewithin chargingdistance(seeDiagram defensiveposture.It has to be said that rhe resultof all the
A2) the skirmishline would part like a curtain,allowint the reports,counter-reports
and obseNations
wasinconclusive.
lt
column,lo chargeforqard. supporredb) rhe vo eysof rheir wasnot until 1869that a new infantryDrillbook appeared.It
comradesin line who would rhen advanceeeneraltvto waslhe worst of all worlds,neitherreinstatingthe racticsof
consohdare
the gainedground.The columns.tayonets6iea "furia tancese", nor comprehensively adopting the new
andsometimes
in echelon,wouldsweepall beforethem.The defensive
tactics.Inhindsight,j ustwhenFranceneededa clear
tactrwasnot universallysuccessfut,
but wasideallysuitedto statement
of tacticaldoctrine,therewasconfusion.
Thedamase
thefrenchlemperament
wdsdone,and Francewenrro war qirh her confidence
in rie
Another hallmarkof Frenchtacticaldoctdneprior to the bayonetchargeseverelyshaken.
oulbrealo[ lhe Franco-Pru!:idn
War wd, fiexibitiry.
It rhe
The operingengagement
of the War - the Frenchatrackat

1. INFANTRYTACTICS

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"ilna
Saarbrucken - saw the French using the favoured
fiatcese" tacti6, but ftankly as the French attacked in such
overwhelmingnumbers, almost any tactical formation *ould
still haveresultedin a Frenchvictory. However, the subsequent
batdesof those fateful days of August 1870and the Battle of
Sedanat the beginning of Septmberbore witnessto the fact
tlat the defensive tactics had become prcmineot in French
military thinldng, and had become"the official line".
So let us tak a loserlook at these defensivetactics. They
stressedtbe desirability of solid defensive positions giving a
good field of fire for the French Chassepot rifles. Such
"positio6 magnifiques" t}?ic.aly comprised ridges, hills and
prominent spuis, upon the top and facing slopesof which the
French infantry would be lessdenselydployd than before,
lying prone in line fomation. Where time allowed, shelter
trenches(mercly "scrape$') and other rudimentaryearthworks
were prepard. Vilages and walled farms were swiftly transformed into loopholed bastionsto form strongholdsin the line
of defence.Woods and vineyardstoo would be defended.As
canbe seenfrom Diagram 81, behind this solid line and on the
reversslopethe rserveswould be formed up in closcolumn.
Howver, in front of this seeminglyimpregnableline would be
swarmsof skirnishers (again, Chasseursa Pied, Zouavesand
Turco6,but in grcater numbersthan the 'Jful,afdncrs" tactics)
using cover whereverpossibleand picking off enemygunners
and infantry The whole idea was that the enemywould break
itself by attempting to storm such a position, and would then
(seeDiagam 82) be ddven off by a counter-attackcomprised
of open oder formations screenedby skirmishersor, i{ the
enemy werc sufficiently dmoralised, by deep columns (as
Diagram82 shows).To the detriment of the Frcnch, in practice
suchcountr-attackswere too localisedandtoo ftontal for their
succssto be sustainedand developed,asthere appeaNto have
beenlittle wil left in those in high commandto launch flank or
generalcounter-attack, or for neighbouringfiiendly forcesto
abandontheir own '?osrtions magnifiques" and march to the
soundof the guns.
In summary,apart from their opening gambit at Saarbruck-

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en, where time allowed the French infanfy adopted the


defensive tactics (notably at Spicheren and Froeschwiler),
though when hard-pressedthey simply had to cope with the
Fig. "Bl " r French "Defemlve"

EnmyAilack

\Z
. . l a a a a 5 r i .

Key:

fiifiEiffi*nnirety
Fig."82": French"Delenslve"

S O U T H

E A S T

L O N D O N
W A R G A M E S
PRESENT

S U N D A Y1 6 t h . O C T O B E R- 1 O

G R O U P

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posilion asit presenteditself. The battle of Sedanis a stunning


example,asthe Frenchamongstorden, counter-ordersandthe
resultant disorder, held on for as long as possible, partially
relieved by localisedcounter-attacks,until pelted inro submission by the Prussian artillery wbich had dominated the
surounding hills.

L.., Bromley, X..t, BF2 9PG,

theory) at a respectfuldistance.In this way the Frenchinfantry


would still enjoy artillery support, thereby bolstering their

A point which should not be missed was that the French


artillery had to limber up andwith&aw to the rear tins (usualy
becominginqeasingly congested)in order to be resupplied.
It wasmadeabsolutelyclearto battery commandenthat their
prime target wasthe enemyinfantry, Counter-batteryfire was
2. FRENCHARTILLERY TACTICS
only to take placeto support French infantry attacks,or if the
The French Mitrailleuses rrere attached to the anillerv battery commander was aware that the enemy baftery in
balteries.altboughon a fe* occasions
theyweredetacbedand question was beginning to break his immediate infantry
used foNard with the infantry, sometimeswith remarkable support. It is readily apparentthat the burden of silencingthe
success.There seems to have been very little attempt to enemy artillery was to fall on th French infantry and
camouflageor concealthem. Whereverthey were located,onc skirmishers.
the Prussiangunnen had found their range, they were swiftly
silenced.
3. FRENCHCAVALRYTACTICS
As to the artillery proper, the mainstaywas the canonde 4.
Tlte canon.le 12 batteies werc held back in the Corps artillery In a word, French cavalry reconnaissancewas appalling. The
rcsefle and were only to be usdto fiI gapsor support najor tendency was for reconnaissanceto be undertaken by a
fforts. The result wasthat the reserveartilery often cloggedup combined arms forc (say a squadron or two of cavalry, a
the roadsto the rear, andarrivedon the scenetoo late- if at all - battalion of Tucos or Cbasseursa Pied and a troop of anillery)
to play any influential role. Incidentally, the referenceto "4" which had the effect of reshicting its movement io the roads,
and "12" deodtesweight of shot in kilogams, not pounds.
and reducingits speedand ranee.
From historical accounts it appean that there was little
On the actual battlefield, the c.avalrybrigades were often
concertedaction asbattery commandentended to go into and placdunder an infantry commander.
out of action very much as they pleased,whether to confuse
Again and aeainin the early battles, they were formed up in
Prussianrangefindersor to minimiseany risk of the gunsbeing close oder, and used for shock action in desperatecounterlost to enemyinfantry or cavalry aftacks.lndeed aJterthe first attacks even against unshaken infantry and over unrccon"frontier battles", experiencedbattery commanders,who werc
noitred ground, These magnificent regiments were almost
painJuly aware of the potency of the Prussianeuns, would invariably cut to piecesby the hail of artillery fire andsmallarms
deliberately deploy on a revene slope and have their guns fire into which they rushedheadlong,and were then ddven off
hand-pushed forwad to dliver canister to approaching by fiesh Prussiancavalry. It seemsthal there was never any
Prussianinfantry. Another tactic would be to have the guns rcalistic prospectof their heroism alld sacrificebuying victory,
positionedhigher than and behind the Frcnch infantry, whos rather they bought time for hard-pressedFrcnch inJantryto fall
Chassepotrifles would keep the Prussiangunners (at least in back and re-gloup.

IN THEFRANCO.PRUSSIAN
WAR
TACTICS
FROMOPENINGSHOTSTOTHEBATTTEOFSEDAN
TACTICALDOCTRINE
PART2: PRUSSIAN
By Mikelohrcon
(As mentioned before in these articles, the States alied to
Prussiawould havecloselyfollowed the Prussiansystem,either
throughsimilaritiesin training or through beingsubordinatedto
Prussiancommand-)

1. INT'ANTRYTACTICS
Prussian infantry, supported by their artillery, were used
aggressively,at times recklessly. Their main function was
Due to their numerical superiority in most of the initial
battles,andto theirsuperiorcommandandcontrol,theywould
pin the enemyfrontallywhilstexpanding
eitheror bothof their
own flanksin order to find the extrmitiesof the enemy'sflank.
That flank would then be poundedmercilesslyby their artillery
beforethe Prussianinfantry wassentin- Thesesimpleprinciples
werenot alwaysfollowed-mostnotablyinthecaseof theattack
by the PrussianGuard at St. Privat, to which I wil refer againat
fte endofthissection.
In diagrams
C1 andC2I haveattemptedto showthegradual
build-up of Prussianforces prior to the attack. It will be seen
that the Prussianswould first send out a sqeen of skirmishers
(Jaeger, Schutzenor Fusilier battalions), behind which the
main force would be moving forward in line formation, in close
ordei. The battalions on the extreme flanks would be moving
outwards,with the skirmisherscreenexaendingin front of them,
whilst the rcsefles would be following up behind, initially in
columnformation andthen changingto line to occupythe "gap"
createdin the centreby the outward movementof the flanks. In
diagan Cl, one of the reservebattalionshas rernainedin
columnas it hasreceivedordersthat it will soonbe reouired
olher rhanat rhe cenlre!Accordingly.the pictureemergesof
the main tactic being a seriesof infantry battalionsin line, with
skimisherstothefront, andarelativelyweakreservebehind.
ln diagram C2, the French right flank has been found, and
already the Prussianinfantry is beginning to nvelopeit. The
reservebattalion hasbeen rapidly movedin column to support
the impending attack. The remainder of the Prussianforce
would occupythe French to their front, either by spidted
in{antry attacksin their own right, or by smallarmsfire from the
skirmishercor the lines behind, in both casessupportedby a
delugeof Prussianartillery fire.
Thesefomationswouldreadilyadaptto the defence,sayin
the face of a French couoter-attack.The skirmisherswould be
pulledin to alow the Prussian
battalionsin linetoparalysethe
French attack by voley fire, whilst the tu(hermost Prussian
battalionswould movein on tle flanks of the Frenchthrust.
DiagramsC3 and C4ilustrate the coupdeBruce, the Prussiatr
assaulton the French right flank. For those of us who have a
limited sizetable, or only say an hour or two availablebefore
beingcalledoff to other duties,the tabletop encountermaywell
commenceat this Doint.
ln DiagramsCJ and C4, precededand then accompaniedby
an artillery barrage on the French lines, the skimish screen
movesforward with the main attacking battalions behind Gee
Diagram C3). These battalions would either remain in close
order line or, if the French were judged to be suficiently
broken. would advancein column, There is someconfusionas
to how thesecolumnswere constituted.Dependingon the

Fig."Cl": PrusslanPosldonal
Stage1

tI

Flg."C2":Pruai.nPositional
Sta962

@
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. i ,

6 o d

u .
_ r . s

p.3:.+.-.

Fig."C3": PrusslanAltackStaEe1

'"",y

\,--"/
es""""'

Flg."Ol": PrusslanAttack

" " """,

z, ,,-;rt'

circumstances,in particular the degree of rcsistance being


offered by the French, the columnswould be of full battalion
streneth (4 companiet, half battalion sfength or a seriesof
companystrength (about 250 men) columns, the latter being
refened to in variousaccountsascompanycolumns.Flexibility
is the key. If there wasaconsidembleamountof Frcnchanillery
andrifle fire to contendwiah,thenthe Prussiancommandermay
have opted for any particular battalion to attack by say 2
companies in separate single company columns, lvith the
remaining 2 companiesof the battalion thrcwn forward in
skirmishorder. This would increasehis mobility and lessenthe
size of the target they presentedto any enemywith sufricient
energyleft to rcsist.On the other hand, the impactof each
column of only 250men wasfar lessthan a column madeup of
the entirebattalion(1000men).

In Diagam C4, the Frcnch flank beginsto disintegrateand


the Prussianattack goesin. First the skirmisherswithdraw, to
allo* the main punch to be delivered, in this case by two
battalions in column and one in line. In practic, pockets of
enemyresistancewould often force attackingPrussiancolumns
to brcak down; they would then be urged to rnove forward in
open order and usingcoverwhere available.Prussianweight of
numben would normally eDsurethat the momentum of the
attack was maintained. As the French flank breaks under the
onslaught,the rest of the Prussianfront in that sector moves
foNard andthe processof rolling up the Frenchline begins.
And lvhat of the PrussianGuard at St. Privat? Due to the
impatienceoftheir commander,they wereodered to attackthe
village of that name, acrossopen ground with a slight uphill
gradient, in closeorder line (someformations were initially in
half-battalion columns, but changedto close order line as the
attack progessed), but without any significant skirmisher
scren and, most importantly of all, without prcliminary
anillery bombardmentof the enemy, who were essentiallyin
had coverin the village. The FrenchChassepotrifles cut them
to ribbons. The Prussianattack faltered and they were pinned
do*n andwereonly able to resumetheir attackoncethe belated
artilery bombardmenthad done its work on the French lines
and oncethe Frenchwere in dangerof being totally outflanked
by an attack, in this casby Saxons,comingin from the far side
of the villase.

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2. PRUSSIANARTILLERY TACTICS
Therc is absolutelyno doubt at all that the Prussiansusedtheir
artillery asan infantry suppon weapon.It wasalwaysdeployed
as rapidly as possibleand pushedwel forward with the main
infantry line.
Whetherin attakor defence,its first priority would normally
be to silence enemy battedes and Mitrailleuse positions. It
would thn pound the enemyinfantry.
Unlike their French counterparts,Prussianbattedes would
invariably be groupedaogetherand would act in concrt.
It is worth noting that the resupplycaissonscameup closeto
the batteries to replenish their ammunition, thereby ensuring
continuity of fire - lhere wasno needIor the batteriesto retire to
the rear for that purpose.
Furthermore,if batterieswere to limber up to movercloserto
the enemy lines, it was usual for say haff of the battries to
move, wiahthe remaindermaintainingtheil fire. Oncethe fiIst
batterieswere in their new position and firing, the rmainder
would fo ow.
The Prussiansrecognisedvery early on that the powerof their
artillry was neededto counter the fire superiority of French
inJantry.When that power was not used, the Prussianinfantry
suffercd heavily- asthe PrussianGuard found to its cost at St.
Privat.

WARRIORMINIATURES

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3. PRUSSIANCAVALRY TACTICS
It hasto b said that Prussiancavalrywas occasionallyusdin
patrols, but the practicewas
bold atrdaggressive
reconnaissance
not widespread,andoften the opposingarmieswould be only a
short distanceapan, without knowing.
Similarly, there appearsto havebeen a limited useof cavalry
Ior what shouldhave been a relendesspursuit of a beatenfoe.
Notably after Froeschwi er, MacMahon's mauled almy was
allowedto slip awayand the Prussiansactuallylost track of it.
As with the Frenchcavalry, the main preserveof the cavalry
was shock aclion, involving massedcavalry charging boot to
boot in line formation. Von Brcdow's "Death Ride", involving
PrussianCuirassielsand lnncels, was a suc.essful(if costly)

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chargebreakiDgthe Frenchgunline, principally due to its useof


the lie of the land, circumventingwoodsand usingundulations
to block the French line of sight. Without these factors the
chargewould undoubtedlyhavefailed at evenmore severcost.

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I n t h i ! i r r t i c l e .I $ i \ h t o h i g h l i g h r$ n r . o t r h e \ a t i c . r I i o i n r s
.. I
\ . . r . r . , . .' r . l e . I ,
hos thc\ ml\ berelLct.d in \ouf rulcs.
I r m r l s u n r i n .Ish . r t\ o u \ i l l r l r e . r d \ h r \ c i r c c e s \ r o x r r c l s t o r e
d i t h c h r l l d o z e no . ! o r u l e b o o k \ f o r t h i s p e r i o d $ h i c h $ r t l
x m p L \c o \ e r I o r m x t i o n ! .l i r e p o $ e r . m o . a l ! Ln n d c o m m ! n d S . r
s h x t f t r l l o $ si s m l l ] c rx n r d d i r i o n a lh \ c r o l o p i o a l . u L c .t.i n d
''rrps ro gi\. !ddiriondl
f l ! \ o u r r c \ o u r b a t t l . \ . l a n h f u tt o t h e
r r c r ' c s! c t u a L l \c n r p l o \ . d .
F o r r r \ p a n I u s c 1 1 1 6D ; . r l F o f C 1 o , 1r u l . s ( T D F G ) a d a p r c d
n ) r u s e $ r r h 1 5 m m l i g L r r e s s o l h r r t h . { r o u n dj \sdcoaul cb l . d u t
Io l' to 15r:rrd\

s k t r m l s hf o r m a t i o nt b e n s c ] \ c s t o m o i c r h r o u g hr h e p i n n c d
s k i r m i s h e \rc r . . n ) o r i f r h c i r n o r a l e b r c r k \ a n d r h c ) d i s p . r s .
( l c ! \ i n g l o r c \ r m t l e d e n \ c c o l L r m nbsc h i n dr o r h c m e r c \ o r
l a c t o f l I o l c n c m \ m a s s c dr i l l e t t r c ) . I n d e f e n c er.k i r m i s h c r s
\ h o u l da l a i n b c u \ e da sI \ c r c e nr o p t u r c c rt h e l o r c c !p o s i r i o n c d
h . h i n d . t o s . i p c r t e n . m \ g u n n c r s .i ) b r e . r t u p n l r . r c k i . g
2. lrench Inrrtia
Y o u r r u l e ss h o u l dr c l l e c lr h . r c t u c l a n c o
c t F r e n c hc u r r d u n i t s .
a n d a n \ F r e n c h i n f a . r r \u n i r s $ h i c ha . e . n t r e n c h e do r o c c u p \a
.,i:.. hrl.ropm
..r.,.,,,
. r o r e. . , n r 1 r, p r . I t . r r . , r
f r i c n d l ! L r n ni n t r o u b l c .I s u s l c s rr h r r t h e \ $ i l l o n l \ m a k c\ u c hr
m o \ . r i ! l o r . r l o n r D 6i \ l h u \ n I h r u $ p . r r e t e \ a n t u n i i p c r

1. The Skirnrilh Scrren


\\'hcthcr Frcnch or f.us\ir.. use lighr infxntr! (Cha\scurs.
Z o u . r \ . \ . T u r l o s . J a e g c r .S c h L { z e nltb r r h c r o t e \ h i c h t h e \
s e r e d c s s . . d t o p l , r \ . T h . \ \ c r c d e s i g n r dL op r o b e .l o b . a n l. .lrtiller) In Supporl
i r r n a n t .r o s h i c l dr h ef o r c c sn r o \ i n ! u p b e h i . d t h c ma n dl o d r a \ r / \ d d + i I o r . i n h r r t f \ u n i r s m o r r l . i f i r i e n d h ! i 1 1 e . \i !
t i r e l $ : r \ t r o m r h o l e i o r c c s .I n r f i t f t i r c l .o r c o u n r e r - r t r a c ka. t F I R I N G N r l h i n c a f s h L nr h l r n r o \ e . E a A h o i t I s u g g r \ ts i l h i n
I h e o p n m u m m o n t e n l r h . \ $ c r c r o f a r t l i k e a c u n a r n . t o 1 0 0\ i r f d s( 8 . a l I ' t o 1 5 ! a r d s )i o r h e r . x r o r o n r i r h c r l t a n t .
''c\xrurlrc
. r o r l l o \ \ r h . i i r r c e sb e h i n dt h e mt u m o i c f o r $ a r d 1. Ntitrailleuseln Support
t o f u f i l t h e a r t . r c kT i m i n gi s a l l . I n t ! r t i c u l a r . r h . c n r i r ea r l a c k A d d + l t o F . c n c hi n f a n r r \ u n i t s n l o r e l ci f F r e n c hU i t r a i l t c u ! .
s i l l b e c o m cd i ! l o c e d i l r h o s cs k i n n i s h e ras r c p i n n e dd o $ . f o ' b a t t e r i c \a r . F l l i l \ ( l \ \ i l h i r e r ^ h o t r h a r m o \ . E a r \ h o r f o r
. r . _ r r , , , r r o \ .i a r, \ i r l r a i l l e u s . l I s L r s s e $
.. t.,,
f..e. .e\_, ,r
n i t b i n 1 5 ( Ir x r d s( 6 . a t l t o 1 5 \ . a . d s ) t o

1i3
the rearoron eitherflank.Thisis in additiontoanyincrement thesetendedonly to be usedwhenmovingup to the front line
undr3. above.
out of rangeor out of sightfrom theenemy,or in a final assault
againstpoor or brokentroops.In TDFG the lowestPrussian
5. PosiaionbgofFrench Mitraileu$ Batteris
1000menin
roll a D6 per Mitrailleusebattery'A infantryunitis a battalionof20figuresrepresenting
Beforbattlecommences
the
field.
However,I
would
make
this
rule
flexible
to
allowalso
placed
an
independent
as
roll of l meansthatthe batterycanbe
(10
(5
for
half-battalion
columns
figures)
or
company
columns
battery,for examplewellforwardwith theinfantry.A roll of 2-6
figures),
with
the
following
rules:
meansthat it must be assignedto a specific artillery battery
throughoutthe gameandwill be positionedandwill movewith 10.1 Haf-Battalion Columns:
it at all times, and furthermore must fire on the same target
minus1 on first moveofmelee
unlesspreventedby reasonof range.
but savingthrows for artillery casualtiesonly (a 6 on a
D6,
throwper casualty).
6. Fbing FrcnchArlillcry ard Mitrailleuse Batteries
As mentioned,theprioritytargetwasinfantry,andtherehadto 10.2Corhpany
Colunns:
- minus1on first moveofmelee
be a compelling
reasonforbatteriesto actin concertandaimat
- but savingthrowsfor artillerycasualties
the sametarget.Acordingly:
(a5 ora6on a
per
(a 6 on a
D6,
throw
casualty)
and
rifle
fire
casualties
6.1 Where the htnded terget is enemyartillerJ batteries,this
per
D6,
throw
casualty).
will only be permitted:
- to support French in{antry or artillery attacks on the 10-3 WhetherHalf-Battalion or CompanyColumnssr usd:
- whenin attackthe remainingfiguresof the battalion
target battery; OR
- iI the target battery is causingmorale checksto inlantry
which are not themselves
in columnformationmust be
or cavalrywithin 200yards(8" at 1"to 25yards)to the front
thrownforwardin skinnishorderwithin 12"(300yardsat
oronaflank.
l":25 yards)of thefront of the columns.
- ifcompanycolumnsareused,theremustbea minimum
6.2 Whrethe intendedlarget is nemycavrlry' thiswil only be
player
oftwo perbattalion.Thispreventsthewily Prussian
permrtEd:
putting
from
three-quarters
line
infantry
into
of
his
- if the cavalryis actuallythreatening
thatbattery;OR
skinnishformation!
- iJ the cavalry is threateninga friendlyunit within 200
yards(8"asabove)to thefrontorona flank.
ll. Frcnchor PrussianColumns- whnthe atrackis Haltd
Wlere
a columnhasbeenpinned(in TDFG this meansit has
6.3 Where 2 or more batteries are requird to fire on same
been
forced
to go pronehavingreeived
at least4casualtiesthat
tsrget, this is always REQUIRED in the case of a
- if it is orderedto
tum
tuom
rifle
or
Mitrailleuse
fire)
then
Mitrailleusebattery(subjectto range)whichis wishingto
it has resumeforwardmovenent-a D6 mustbe rolled.Ifthe resulth
fire on the sametargetastheartillerybatterytowhich
batteies
or lowerthanthe TOTAL numberofcasualtiesfor that unit (not
the
case
of
separate
artillery
beenassigned.
In
aDindependent
Mitrailleusebatterywishingto fire on the iusttheonesreceivedin that tum) the unitcanresumeforward
movementin whicheverformationis chosen.whethercolumn
sametarget,thisis only permitted:
orotherwise.Ifthe resultis higher,the unitMUST resunethe
- if the targetunit threatensbothbatteries;OR
- to suppo( French infantry or cavalry attack on the
targetunit; OR
12. Frnchor Prussirn Cavalry Chargs
- a rollof6on a D6 (to reflectcoincidence
l) AND IN ALL 12.1 Recaling a Charge. Once orde$ are acted on for cavalry
CASES:
to charge,theycannoteasilybe recalled.Accordinglythe
- therelevanttestsin 6.1 and6.2arsatisfied.
chargewill continueuntil:
7. Firing PrussianArtillery
Thereare NO RESTRICTIONSon the type of targelor on a
numberof batteriesselectingthe sametarget-As a matterof
practice,to ensuresurvivaland to maintainthe upPerhand,
Prussian gunners usually silenced the enemy anillery and
Mi[ailleuse batteries fi]st, afld then tumed on the enemy
itselo.
inJantry(or cavalryif it presented
8. ResupplyingArtilry and Mitraileoses
8.1 Frenchartilery andMitrailleusebatteriesmustlimberup,
withdraw off-table and remain off'table Ior a full move to
rcsuppry.
8.2 Prussianartillery batteries must limber up and withdraw
onemoyeonly.It thentakesafull nove to be resupplied.
8.3 Whilstbatteriesare beingresuppliedtheycannotfire, and
rememberthattheyaretirnbereduP.
onceresupplied
9. The French- Furia Franceseor Dfnsive?
For the openingbattles,the generalrule shouldbe for the
French to 6ght using the defensivetactics, occupyingridges,
- andusualyoutnumbered
by 3:2at least.
hillsandfarmhouses
However,why not add somevariety by allowingthe army
commander
or oneofthe divisionalor brigadeconmandersto
go "Furia Francese"(through an excessof cognac and
nostalgial)?
10. Prulsian Infrntry Columns
Whetherfull battalion,half'battalionor companycolumns,

Theobjectiveis attained;or
The cavalry wins .he nexr rnelee(for examplewhre the
cavalry has been counter-chargedbefore it reachesits
objective);or
The cavalry is forced to retire in any event due to failing
moraleor losinga melee,
12.2 Chargingorer unreconnoitrcdgrcund. Eachchargemove,
roll two D6. In TDFG therc aretwo operationsper tum,
so if cavalryis chargingin both operationsthen the dice
will haveto be rolled for eachoperation. lf a double4, 5 or
6 is thrownyour cavalryhasproblemsasit indicatesthat
the ground over which thy are hargingis seriously
pitted,for examplewith unseendrainageditches,rabbit
warrensandsoon. Youwill now needto roll a furtherD6
with the followingconsequences
for yourcavalry:
A m of I or 2: Irse 1 figure as a casualty(in TDFG 1
fisure = s0 nen)
A roll of3 or 4: Lose I figure as a casualtyand 1 figule
movesat halfspeedandlagsbehind
A roll ofs or 6: Whathappensheredependson whether
the chargemove is the one which brings your cavalryinto
contactwith theenemy:
If the move in question IS the one which brings your
charging cavalry into contact with the enemy, the

19

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MODERNPERIOD
ChillMg.r 20{0 El.s
at6
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f2.95
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Iirdd.h Equipmdr hnk
.,/p
Mod.D Aimn Hddbek
3.5
e2.15
Baul.an6(Sftmnos)
t3.95
C.Ar Comand.r
An & sd (an avallMdhg

29 BERESFORD
AVENUE.SKEGNESS,
LINCOLNSHIRE,
PE253JF.
lcEac Raas' uK l0%(Mir 30pJ

(tM
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W.R.G RULES & BOOKS


ORDERrim d y bur *. *iU siill b.

ACTION TJNDER

sIEcE (Ar. & Med siegs)

NapoleonicNavalRules
By steve Bemie f3.75

Swod & Shicld(Skimish)


f2.15
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MEDIEVAL PERIOD

t2_25
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Swod & Pisbl (Skimhh)

R.vis.d l95c20l)l) Rules

w.R.G.BOOI$

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WE NOW STOCK H & ROS


WWN TANKS & EQUIPMENT

ditch/rabbit warens are deemedto be within a few yards


of the target unjt and will lherefore causemaxinum
disruption. Accordingly, your unit will lose 1 figure as a
casualtyand 1 figure movesat half speedand lagsbehind
AND 30% of the charginefigures making contact suffer
-l in theresultantmelee.
If the movein questionIS NOT the one which bringsyour
chargingcavalry into contact with the enemy, then your
cavalryhasmanagedto negodarethe tenain difficulty and
there is no efJecton its pedormance.

CONCLUSIONANDSO{JRCES
I hope thesearticles prove to be useful and will help to give a
framework for youl Franco-Prussianbatdes, and in particular
witi iUustrare
the powerslruggle
whichwaswagedberweenrhe
FrenchChassepotrifle andthe PrussianKrupps breech-loading
artillery.
There is no doubt about it, tbe Frnchhavean uphill struggle
to beat their more numerousPrussianadversaries.but siven
gooduseofterfain anddeploynenroflighr infantrytheF;nch
are well able to keep the Prussianartillry at bay and to stun if
not repel the Prussianinfantry.
Which bringsme on to a widerissue why w wargameat all.
For me the enjolment is not in actually wiDning (fairly rare
occasionsan'way!) but in rccreating the style of warfare in
miniature and recapturing the "feel" of a Franco-Pnssian
battle, in recognition of the hardshipsbome by the soldiersof
the day a]ndthe esptit de cotps and camaruileriewh]'chWriIJlg
from that commonexprience.
As to sources,I would just like to pay tribute to three in
particular. Firsdy, me Ro,'.l to Sedan, a marv[ous book
published for the Royal Historical Society, the author being

t2.15
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KoAs Col)rlrtrdr (Div Scalc)!3.95
TEnrh (wwl TEnchwarhrc) 12.25
K6icftosh (w\M Skimish) t3.50
Dogfigh over F|and.6 (An) $.25

f2.50

Rules for Naporons crmp6igE


in EulG bv A w.hon
{3.75

arsicds

Adion Under Sail .&n Ed.


Md l3rh C.nbry d!.s
l3dr c.nbry Any Lnb

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t2)5
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No.l D'.ftusims
No5 nE Swc.,.s
No6 Thellarcvenms
No7 TheSdom

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A.C.W.aATTLE CUIDESt195 d,
c.tlysburg
S{ond aul Run
Stoffi Riv..
Antibn
Fird Bull Run
WilsonCE.l
FEdoi.k$urg
c.d.rMountain

VO FLAGS
The full 6nge of Revo Flags
dd TE sfe6 also sl@ked
sends a.E. (2 IRCS)fd r opy
W NEW I99'I CATALOCUE

Rry w"E llndhn FiCbdng)

fuchard Holmes. Secondly,the writings of StepbenShannvrho


cenainly has a graspfor the period. Thirdly, as an insight for
what it meant to the everydayFrench Line inlantryman in this
pei,od, The Debacleby Emile Zola, an English translation is
availablein the PenguinClassicseries. It is worth reading for
the descriptionof the battle of Sedanand the graphic portmyal
of the Bavariaoattackon Bazeilles.

sO,MO+SECONDIIANDWARGAMESFIGIJRES
Alwaysin stock.AII scales.
Mostmanufacturrs.
SAEstatingintercsts
for lbtsto:
A.J. Dumelow,
53StantonRoad,Stapenhill,
Burton-on-Trert,StalIsDEIS9RP,
Telephone:(02t3)530556.

SCHEMATICA
SOFTWARE
Rules
on Diskforlhe Atari,Amiga& IBM/rc
NRVDr5X5,
MW mrr,l^Ts fORTHrrtrTui,rN.^ NrWStrrn Of 0r5r5t$NCtNC rOU
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4"ry''J|i4F'Jnipor|yfoo(
vrrcr]^r w ff rI- qnc{,^qii:Ffdh*,.rI
n6rro\cl tL|*id'oB
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rrc ANo $Or - CNiis rheGE6ni.e ton Lib Medielrd,,.trlborcqi roll*ii8 ri
ri* ad dmiQ ot i\e riG, Kpde fie rnlrr or fi. Rmiere ror fl9-95
$^$ tt r! ^NotM nvts rln +1ts nr^ ro rl. 4rly $dFdl piod ' o.".
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A l d e . b o w . r , o n ! l - ' ! I r y k F n b o dq L r n d4 n h . t l , 6 . r ] l c
,,to M,hbb CrO$ ACnONleiro, e$ll, M|crO rN$ ^rvribdry @nbarvr00, !r1 1
NAVtf nr sY,nMrfror,nrrldRp$.ddrdhl,ilrDrrv
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ldrs b n t2.95 o' tl4 95'it 016 m d&!or.hoke^l irhe6rhi d !r9.9r Pnri
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$e loo{bh or Hisi oeisiry).chq6 dc. ro

3,no( 5?&{N$orro[ H^DnnD,


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