Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Powell v. McCormack
395 U.S. 486 (1969)
Facts:
Powell was elected by the citizen of NY to be
their Representative in the House for the 90th
Congress. When the oath was being administered he
was asked to step aside.
A Select Committee
determined that although Powell
met the
Constitutional requirements, they felt because he
asserted an unwarranted privilege of immunity from NY
courts, and wrongfully diverted funds, and made false
reports on expenditures of foreign currency, he should
be excluded from taking his seat. House speaker
McCormack determined that a majority vote would
render Powells seat vacant, and a vote thereby was
rendered.
Issue:
Whether the House alone, under Article I, Sec.
5, has the power to determine who is qualified to be a
member, under the textual commitment, to be the
judge of the qualifications of is own members?
Holding:
No, the House can only judge the three
qualifications as set forth in the Constitution.
Procedure: District Ct. dismissed for lack of
jurisdictional subject matter.
Ct of App affirmed
Dismissal. Reversed.
Rule: Requirements for a seat within the
Congress, AI; S2, age, citizenship, and residence.Ct.
Rationale: Article I, Sec 5 does not confer
judicially unreviewable powers upon the Congress as it
relates to the setting of qualifications of its members.
If it did that would be a political question that this court
would be barred from entering into. Historically the
Constitution leaves the House without authority to
exclude persons, who met the Constitutional
requirements, and who have been duly elected by their
constituents. Congress has the power to punish its
members behavior, and expel but it does not have the
Constitutional power to exclude or deny entrance.
PL A: The Constitution provides definite criteria
for entrance into the House of Representative, and
does not confer the power to exclude afterward to
members of the House.
Def A: Under the Constitutions AI, S5 the House has
power to determine the qualifications necessary for
membership within.
Political Questions: Lack of respect due a
coordinate branch of government, or involvement in
the initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
LAMBERTO MACIAS et.al Vs. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS et.al
Held:
Yes. The court ruled that Republic Act 3040
clearly violates the constitutional provision of Article VI,
Section 5 Paragraph 3 and 4 that states (3)" Each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city
with a populaton of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one
representative. and, (4) Within three years following
the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.", in several ways
namely, (a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal
with a bigger number of inhabitants got four only; (b) it
gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a
bigger population got three only; . . .;. Such violation of
the Constitutional mandate renders the law void.
On the printed-form, three-day requirement.
The Constitution provides that "no bill shall be passed
by either House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at
least three calendar days prior to its passage, except
when the President shall have certified to the necessity
of its immediate enactment." Petitioners presented
certificates of the Secretary of the House of
Representatives to show that no printed copy had been
distributed three days before passage of the bill (on
May 10, 1961) and that no certificate of urgency by the
President had been received in the House.
AGAPITO vs. AQUINO
GR No. 120265 9/18/1995
FACTS:
Agapito Aquino ran as a representative of 2 nd
district of Makati in May 1995 election. In his certificate
of candidacy, he indicated in the residence portion
that he lives in Makati for 10 months. The MOVE
MAKATI, a political party and Mateo Bendon, chairman
of Lakas NUCD-UMDP filed a petition to disqualify
Agapito Aquino, for he lacks the residency requirement
of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the May
1995 election.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not petitioner is disqualified in
running for Representative of 2nd district of Makati.
(2) Whether or not the COMELEC has
jurisdiction to resolve the disqualification case of the
petitioner.
HELD:
The court ruled that COMELEC was correct in
disqualifying the petitioner. It is clear in the 1987
Constitution, Section 6 of Article VI that a residence of
at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of
election is one of the requirements to be a member of
the House of Representative. The court further ruled
that the residency referring hereto is one that of
domicile which is pertaining to a permanent
residence. In this case, the petitioner failed to prove
the Makati is his domicile, in fact he possessed a
condominium unit on a lease contract which is an
indication that he will never intend to consider it as his
permanent home.
On the second issue about jurisdiction, the
court ruled that COMELEC is still in the right position to
resolve the disqualification issue of the petitioner,
because the latter was not yet proclaimed as
Representative of the 2nd district of Makati. As long as
he has not yet taken an oath of office, he cannot be
said to be a member of the house of representative.
MARCOS vs COMELEC
GR No. 119976 9/18/1995
FACTS:
On March 8, 1995 Imelda Romualdez Marcos
filed her candidacy for Representative of 1 st District of
Leyte. In her certificate of candidacy she wrote 7
months as the period of her actual residency of the
constituency which she seeks to be elected. Her
opponent, private respondent in this case, filed a
petition to disqualify her on the ground that she was
not able to satisfy the at least 1 year residency
requirement immediately preceding before the day of
election in the same year.
domicile.
Facts:
Boado,
G.R.
No.
Facts:
Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the
position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union
during the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and
Local Elections. Engineer Carlos Boado, Rogelio L. De
Vera, Fernando Calonge, Benito Carrera, Salvador
Carrera and Domingo Carrera sought DumpitMichelena's disqualification and the denial or
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the
ground of material misrepresentation under Sections
74 and 78of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Boado, et al.
alleged that Dumpit-Michelena, the daughter of
Congressman Tomas Dumpit, Sr. of the Second District
of La Union, is not a resident of Agoo, La Union. Boado,
et al. claimed that Dumpit-Michelena is a resident and
was a registered voter of Naguilian, La Union and that
Dumpit-Michelena only transferred her registration as
voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on October 24,
2003. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already
acquired a new domicile in San Julian West when she
purchased from her father, Congressman Dumpit, a
residential lot on April 19, 2003. She even designated
one Gardo Fontanilla as a caretaker of her residential
house. Dumpit-Michelena presented the affidavits and
certifications of her neighbors in San Julian West to
prove that she actually resides in the area. COMELEC
rules in favor of Boado et al. The COMELEC En Banc
denied in its ruling the motion for reconsideration filed
by Dumpit-Michelena. Hence, the present recourse by
Dumpit-Michelena.
Issue:
Whether or not Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the
residency requirement under the Local Government
Code of 1991.
Held:
No. Dumpit-MIchelena failed to comply with the
1-yr. residency requirement in the place where she
intends to be elected. Her purchase of a parcel of land
in San Julian West where she eventually built a house is
not an indication of the right to vote or to be voted for
an office. Further, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be
concurrence of the following requirements:(1) an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts
which correspond with the purpose. Dumpit-Michelena
failed to establish that she has abandoned her former
domicile. Evidence shows that her house in Agoo is
beach house and a beach house is at most a place of
temporary relaxation. It can hardly be considered a
place of residence. Moreover, her designation of a
caretaker only shows that she does not regularly reside
in the place. She also has a number of residences but
the acquisition of another one does not automatically
make the most recently acquired residence her new
Group 2
PACETE VS COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
Facts:
8-31-1964 - petitioner was appointed by Pres Marcos as
a Municipal Judge in Pigcawayan, Cotabato
9-11-1964 - assumed the office as a Municipal Judge
1965 session - time when his appointment was
submitted because in 1964, the Congress was in
recess.
5-20-1965-appointment was confirmed
2-7-1966 (9 months after confirmation), the Secretary
of Justice, through Judicial superintendent advised
petitioner to vacate in his position due to the motion
for reconsideration filed by one of the members of COA
(Guanzon), in view of the derogatory information he
has received, Secretary of COA informed the Secretary
of Justice. "The mere presentation of such matter will
automatically vacate the position in question"
Petitioner's contention: Motion for Reconsideration
should be approved as a BODY, not by a single person.
Issue: WON the appointment tot he petitioner is valid
despite
the
presence
of
MFR?
Held: YES, under Rule 21, Revised Rules on
Commission.
The law states that " 1 days after approval, If a
majority of the members present concur to grant a
reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened to
reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on
the table, shall be final disposition of such a motion"
-The Action was filed 9 months after the confirmation of
the appointment.
-The motion for reconsideration was not concurred by
the MAJORITY of the members, the MFR was filed by
one member of the COA, and Secretary of COA already
reported the matter to Secretary of justice which is
improper.
-The President shall have thepower to make
appointments during recess of COngress but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission of appointments of next
adjournment
of
Congress.
-----------------------------------------CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO, INC VS HON
PEDRO GIMENEZ (AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINES)
AND
HON
ISMAEL
MATHAY
(AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK)
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609,
otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee
Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July
1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee
of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To
the
not
senate
urea
is to
and
exempt urea
formaldehyde.
Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the AntiGraft law is a penalty or a precautionary measure; and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude
the members of Congress from the mandate of R.A.
3019.
FACTS:
On July 1, 1959, pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the
Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner had bought
foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde, raw materials for resin glues, and was
thus paying for the margin fees at that time. Relying on
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of the said
bank declaring that the separate importation of urea
and formaldehyde is exempt from the said fee, the
petitioner sought for a refund of the margin fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempt
from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee
HELD:
Urea and formaldehyde are not exempt from fees by
law. RA 2609 only exempts urea formaldehyde and not
the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde as
they are different, the former being a finished product.
The enrolled bill which uses the term urea
formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts. The
courts cannot speculate that there had been an error I
printing of the bill as this shall violate the principle of
separation of powers. Shall there have been any error
in the printing, the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by a judicial decree.
DE VENECIA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO. 130240, 5 FEBRUARY 2002
Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as
Criminal
Case
18857)
was
filed
with
the
Sandiganbayan
(First
Division)
against
then
Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur
for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).
After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution
filed a Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.
In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan
granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to
suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply.
Thus, on 12 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18
August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court.
Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a
motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on
separation of powers and claiming that he can only
act as may be dictated by the House as a body
pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13
August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan
AVELINO V. CUENCO
Group 3
FACTS:
The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto
proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful
Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano
Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanadas request to
deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against
then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the
leadership of the Senate President followed by his
supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent
Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his
supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to
adjourn the session then walked out. Only12 Senators
were left in the hall. The members of the senate left
continued the session and Senator Cuenco was
appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and
was recognized the next day by the President of the
Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly
approved.
HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the
subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the
court will be against the doctrine of separation of
powers. To the first question, the answer is in the
negative, in view of the separation of powers, the
political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.192;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect
its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to
take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of
the electors of the suspended senators were alleged
affected without any immediate remedy.
A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affect only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to
choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable,
the majority of the Senators want petitioner top reside,
his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the
Supreme Court.2. It was held that there is a quorum
that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four
justice agree that the Court being confronted with the
practical situation that of the twenty three senators
who may participate in the Senate de liberations in the
days immediately after this decision, twelve senators
will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will
side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious
to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends
exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by
JOSE
ALEJANDRINO,
petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents.
Note: Under the enrolled bill in the outline but the
issue of the case is about discipline of members.
Facts:
The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine
Senate composed of the respondent Senators, on
February 5, 1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all
the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his
office for the period of one year from the first of
January, 1924. That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino,
Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby
declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having
treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera,
Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of the
debate regarding the credentials of said Mr.
Alejandrino.
Issue:
WON the Congress may suspend Alejandrino for 1
year?
Held:
No. The power of the Senate to punish its members for
disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend on
appointive member from the exercise of his office for
one year. The Constitution has purposely withheld from
the two Houses of the Legislature and the GovernorGeneral alike the power to suspend an appointive
member of the Legislature. Suspension deprives the
electoral district of representation without that district
being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy.
By suspension, the seat remains filed but the occupant
is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to
qualified expulsion or removal. It is beyond the power
of any branch of the Government of the Philippine
Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than
that prescribed by the Organic Law.
Osmea vs. Pendatun
GR No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
Note: Under the enrolled bill in the outline but the
issue of the case is about discipline of members.
FACTS:
In a privilege speech before the House of
Representatives, Congressman Sergio Osmea from
the 2nd District of Cebu made serious imputations of
HELD:
Yes. Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides that Each house may determine the rules of
its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds of all
its Members, suspend or expel a Member. Rules of
proceedings are needed for the orderly conduct of the
sessions of Congress. Unless such rules violate
fundamental or individual rights, they are within the
exclusive discretion of each House to formulate and
interpret and may not be judicially reversed.
Furthermore, parliamentary immunity guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear
of being made responsible in criminal and civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside the
Congressional hall. However, it does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered
disorderly or unbecoming.
In the case at bar, the special Committee performed its
task, reported it to the House and the majority
approved the suspension order by reasons of serious
disorderly behavior; all in accordance with the above
provision. Hence, the petition of Osmea was denied
and affirmed the suspension order.
356 SCRA 636 Political Law The Legislative
Department Suspension of a Member of
Congress Violations of RA 3019
FACTS:
Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then
Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID)in October 1988, approved the
application for legalization of the stay of 32 aliens. Her
act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith
and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act) and a violation of
Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the
legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized
by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be
disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against
Santiago. Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against
Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty
since she was just recovering from a car accident which
(56 SCRA
FACTS:
On March 30, 1964 in the Senate, they debated
a bill called House Bill (HB) No. 9266, a bill of local
application,and then they revised it. Afterwards, the
one that they printed is the original one.
For some reason, the Senate President and the
House Speaker signed the bill without reading. And the
President signed it also. The bill thereupon became RA
4065. The controversy started when the respondent
city mayor mounted public denunciation and Sen.
Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled
copy of HB 9266 signed into law was a wrong version
of the bill actually passed by the senate because it did
not embody the amendments introduced by him and
approved by the senate.
RULING:
(1) No. The Supreme Courtcited that it
was stated in the journal that it was passed on time so
we cannot examine the contents of the journal. We
cannot examine if it is true or not. It is conclusive upon
the courts.
Section 313, of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that;
"Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2)
The proceedings of the Philippine Commissions, or of
any legislative body that may be proved for the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journal of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk or secretary or printed by their order: Provided,
That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a fullfledged member of Congress who is now confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness
on six counts[1] is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to
fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
ISSUE:
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused
from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general?
HELD:
No. The present Constitution adheres to the same
restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to
surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of
the law. The requirement that he should be attending
sessions or committee meetings has also been
removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough
that Congress is in session.The accused-appellant
argues that a member of Congress function to attend
sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum
to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from
day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as
such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any
reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members
to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of
more than six months is not merely authorized by law,
it has constitutional foundations.Accused-appellants
reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[2], which
states, inter alia, that : The Court should never
remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily
armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and
publicly demanded the resignation of the President and
key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion. A series of
negotiations quelled the teeming tension and
eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of
the militant soldiers that evening.
RULING:
No.It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a
crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. No less than the Constitution
provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
The Rules also state that no person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal action.
FACTS:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense when he caused the publication in
several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines of an open letter to the President of the
Philippines, dated November 14, 1958. The letter
describes the allegedly three (3) operational plans
under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers,
with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
I. The first plan was said to be "an insidious plan or a
massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National
Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and
glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to
become a candidate for President in 1961".To this end,
the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk
that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy
No. 1 in the Philippines. It further adds that the
planners have under their control 1) Col. Nicanor
Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3)
Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel
Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the
Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose
Reyna of the Public information Office, DND.
II. Plan No. II was said to be a "coup d'etat", in
connection with which the "planners" had gone no
further than the planning stage, although the plan
"seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future
developments".
3. Plan No. III was characterized as a modification of
Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the
public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which
Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the
authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally
the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain
popular and civilian support.
An ordinary civil action was instituted by
Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban,
of several sums of money, by way of damages for the
publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant
Bartolome Cabangbang.Upon being summoned, the
Cabangbang moved to dismiss the complaint upon the
ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and
that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication.
ISSUE:
WON the open letter is covered by the privilege
communication endowed to members of Congress.
RULING:
No. Article VI Section 15 provides that: The
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of
the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned
in any other place. The phrase "speech or debate
therein" that is to say, in Congress used in this
provision refers to utterances made by Congressmen in
the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in
the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as
well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same
is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
________________________________________________________
Adaza v. Pacana
135 SCRA 431
FACTS:
Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana
is the vice-governor. Their respective term of office
expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the
Batasang Pambansa (BP) elections in 1984 and
respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana
took his oath of office as the governor. Petitioner has
brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom,
claiming to be the lawful occupant of the position.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not a provincial governor who was
elected as Mababatas Pambansa (MP) can exercise the
functions of both simultaneously; and
2) whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the
position of MP but lost, can continue serving as vice
governor and subsequently succeed to the office of
governor if said office is vacated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening
in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing as counsel,
albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in
contravention of the Constitutional provision.
HELD:
Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and
unambiguous. A member of the BP may not hold any
other office in the government. A public office is a
public trust. A holder thereof is subject to regulations
and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot
complain of any restrictions on his holding of more
than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere
private citizen, runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides
that governors, or members of sangguniang or
barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of candidacy
be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
When respondent reassumed the position of vicegovernor after the BP elections, he was acting within
the law. Thus, the instant petition is denied.
________________________________________________________
HELD:
The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the
Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez
cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His
appearance could theoretically be for the protection of
his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against
the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez. He had
acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He
acquired them "after the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979,
after the contested election of Directors, after the quo
warranto suit had been filed, and one day before the
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And
what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for the
Acero group, but which was objected to by petitioners
Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the
objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the
ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.
PUYAT vs DE GUZMAN
113 SCRA 31
The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), Hon. Sixto T. J. De
Guzman, Jr., granting Assemblyman Estanislao A.
Fernandez leave to intervene in a SEC Case.
FACTS:
On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of
the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a private
corporation, was held six of the elected directors
were herein petitioners that may be called the Puyat
Group, while the other five were herein respondents,
the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in
control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
710 SCRA 1
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R.
No. 209251.
FACTS:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in
the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds
of the members of the Congress. It underwent several
legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to
the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or
PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in
the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done
in the following manner:
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified
as a member of the House of Representatives for
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
RULING:
The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case,
first, the case is moot and academic for it is evident
from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April
6, 1992, that they seek to unseat the respondent from
his position as Congressman for the duration of his
term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending
June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case
rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal.
Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election returns and
qualification of its members.
The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been
to file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate
of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto
case with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten
days after Dazas proclamation.
________________________________________________________
Bondoc vs. Pineda
201 SCRA 792
FACTS:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano
Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were
candidates for the position of Representative for the
Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed
winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is
composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the
SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of
Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1
member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had
been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.
Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC
Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to
proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision,
Congressman Camasura received a letter informing
him that he was already expelled from the LDP for
allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of
Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP
members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party.
On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the
Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP,
the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the
request of the dominant political party therein, may
change that partys representation in the HRET to
thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by
the tribunal in an election contest pending therein
HELD:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating
the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent
and
impartial
tribunal
for
the
determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be nonpartisan. They must discharge their functions with
complete detachment, impartiality and independence
even independence from the political party to which
they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of
party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion
of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman
Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience
vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of
the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the
recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion, an injustice and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion
resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security
of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore,
membership in the HRET may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the
members congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political
party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation
with another political party or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that
he has formally affiliated with another.
________________________________________________________
PENA V. HRET
G.R. No. 123037
FACTS:
Pena and Abueg were rivals for the Congressional seat
in Palawan during the May 8, 1995 elections.
Apparently, Abueg was proclaimed winner.
On May 22, Pena filed a petition AD CAUTELAM with the
HRET, claiming that the elections in the 2 nd district of
Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread
vote--buying, intimidation and terrorism and other
serious irregularities committed before, during and
after the voting, and during the counting of votes and
the preparation of election returns and certificates of
canvass which affected the results of the election.
Because of these irregularities, Pena stated that he lost
the election by almost 7k votes. He then assailed
Abuegs proclamation.
Abueg filed an answer and a motion to dismiss on June
23, averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction
over the petition, the same being insufficient in form
and substance. In essence, the motion to dismiss
anchors its challenge on the fact that the petition failed
to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and
disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did it point
GUERRERO VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 137004
FACTS:
On May 8, 1998, Farias fi led his Certifi cate of
Candidacy with the COMELEC, substituting
candidate Chevylle V. Farias who withdrew on April
3, 1998.
On May 9, 1998, Ruiz fi led an "Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion To Resolve Petition" with the COMELEC,
attaching thereto a copy of the Certificate of
Candidacy of Farias.
On May 10, 1998, the Second Division of the
COMELEC dismissed Ruizs petition, and stated,
"[T]here is none in the records to consider
respondent an official candidate to speak of without
the filing of said certificate. Hence, there is no
certificate of candidacy to be cancelled, consequently,
no candidate to be disqualified.
On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through
as scheduled. The post-election tally of votes in
Ilocos Norte showed that Farias got a total of
56,369 votes representing the highest number of votes
received in the first district. Farias was duly proclaimed
winner.
On May 16, 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that Farias could not
validly substitute for Chevylle V. Farias, since the latter
was not the official candidate of the Lakas ng
Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but was
anindependent candidate. Another person cannot
substitute for an independent candidate.
On June 3, 1998, Farias took his oath of offi ce
as a member of the House of Representatives.
On June 10, 1998, petitioner herein filed his "PetitionIn-Intervention" in COMELEC Case No. SPA 98-227.
Petitioner averred that he was the official candidate
of the
Liberal
Party
(LP)
in
said
elections
for Congressman, and stood to be adversely affected
by Case No. SPA 98-227. Guerrero contended that
Farias, having failed to file his Certificate of Candidacy
on or before the last day therefor, being midnight of
March 27, 1998, Farias illegally resorted to the remedy
of substitution provided for under Section 77of the
Omnibus Election Code and thus, Farias disqualification
was in order.
Guerrero then asked that the position of Representative
of the first district of Ilocos Norte be declared vacant
FACTS:
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty
four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned
from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its
number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their
former party to only 17 members. On December 5,
1988, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members
except the petitioner and including therein respondent
Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this court on January 13, 1989,
to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the
respondent briefly stated, the contention of the
petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the
Commission on Appointments because his election
thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in
Cunanan v. Tan.
For his part, the respondent argues that the question
raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains
that he has been improperly impleaded, the real part&
respondent being the House of Representatives which
changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he
stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required
that the political party be registered to be entitled to
proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a
stable political party;
2. Whether it is necessary for the party to be registered
to be entitled to proportional representation in the CA
HELD AND RATIO:
Both petitioner and respondent invoke the case of Cunanan v.
Tan. In the said case, 25 Members of the Nacionalista Party
reorganized themselves and formed the Allied Majority. 3
Nacionalista Congressmen, originally chosen,were deprived of
their seats by colleagues who joined the Allied Majority. Carlos
Cunanans ad interim appointment was rejected by the CA.
Jorge Tan was designated in his place. Cunanan contended the
validity of the rejection. The Court agreed that Allied Majority
was merely a temporary combination; officially, they were still
part of the Nacionalista Party. Thus, the reorganization of the CA
at that time was not based on proportional representation. The
Court held that mere shift of votes should not affect the
organization of the CA, or else, it would forever be at the mercy
of the House of Representatives. The petitioner argues that
LDP is not a permanent party and has not yet achieved
stability. However, the LDP has already been inexistence for a
year. They command the biggest following. They not only
survived but prevailed. Regarding being a duly registered
party, the LDP was granted its registration as a political party
by the COMELEC. Thus, shattering the argument of the
petitioner that registration is required.
Case Digest by : Yanong, Maria Anny G.
Coseteng vs Mitra
(G.R. No.86649) (1990)
FACTS:
Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in
representatives from diverse political parties Petitioner
Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate
elected under the banner of KAIBA.
A year later, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino or
LDP was organized as a political party. As 158 out of
202 members of the House of Representatives formally
affiliated with the LDP, the House committees,
including the House representation in the Commission
on Appointments, had to be reorganized. Petitioner
Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra
requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be
appointed as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives,
revised the House majority membership in the
Commission on Appointments to conform with the new
political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP,
with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman
Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member
representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this
Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the
Supreme Court declare as null and void the election of
respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco,
Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat,
Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the
Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from
acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents
from recognizing them as members of the Commission
on Appointments on the theory that their election to
that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of
proportional representation
ISSUE:
1. WON the question raised is political.
2. WON the members of the House in the Commission
on Appointments were chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties
therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
HELD:
1.
No, it is not. The political question issue was
settled in Daza vs. Singson, where this Court ruled that
the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of
filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed
by the Constitution is justiciable, and, even if the
question were political in nature, it would still come
within our powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1,
of the Constitution, which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
2.
Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Commission
be
based
on
the
representation of the political parties.
proportional
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18.
HELD:
We find the respondent's claim to membership
in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and
election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in
accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and therefore violative of the same
because it is not in compliance with the requirement
that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional
membership of the political parties in the Commission
on Appointments by adding together two halves to
make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added
member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional
membership of the minority political party, who is
deprived of half a representation.
The Constitution does not require the election and
presence
of
twelve
Senators
and
twelve
Representatives in order that the Commission may
function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the
Commission on Appointments, provides that "the
Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the
members", and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is
provided that the Commission "shall meet only while
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a
majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers
and functions as are herein conferred upon it". In
implementing these provisions, the Rules of the
Commission on Appointments provide that the
presence of at least thirteen (13) members is
necessary to constitute a quorum, "Provided however,
that at least four (4) of the members constituting the
quorum should come from either house".
GUINGONA v. GONZALES
214 SCRA 789 (1993)
FACTS:
It is an established fact to which all the parties agree
that the mathematical representation of each of the
political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:
LDP
7.5
LP-PDP-LABAN
.5
NPC
2.5
LAKAS-NUCD 1.5
The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional
half membership into a whole membership of one
senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to
elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's
fractional membership was correspondingly reduced
leaving the latter's representation in the Commission
on Appointments to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate. This is a clearly a
violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in
compliance with its mandate that membership in the
B. Legislative Process
- Requirements as to bills
Valentin Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board
151 SCRA 208
The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill
Delegation of Power Delegation to Administrative
Bodies
FACTS:
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board was
enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to
regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The
said law sought to minimize the economic effects of
piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of
videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie
industry. The proliferation of videograms has
significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from
the movie industry, and that such loss may be
recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of
HELD: No.
HELD: YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title
be comprehensive enough to include the general
purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case
at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane
to,
and
is
reasonably
necessary
for
the
accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which
is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB
as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject
and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
regulatory
and
control
mechanisms
scattered
throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to
the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was
conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to
seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and
implementation of the law. Besides, in the very
language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to
solicit such assistance is for a fixed and limited
period with the deputized agencies concerned being
subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].
Case Digest by : Tacder , Lovella Fe M.
Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:
Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached
portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for
the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA
4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions
implementing the same for electoral purposes be
nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato are
transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This
brought about a change in the boundaries of the two
provinces.
2.
Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the
municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and
that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo,
Tabangao,
Tiongko,
Colodan
and
1.
The constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to
refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is
to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here
is the second directive. The subject of the statute must
be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional
requirement "breathes the spirit of command."
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation
to read during its deliberations the entire text of the
bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became RA 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House where the
bill, being of local application, originated.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if
the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire
into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not
it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in
express terms where it is clearly inferable from the
details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to
or indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope of
the act, is bad.
4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" projects
for a
writ of
FACTS:
1.) Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of the
country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan
Pambansa representing their millions of constituents,
as parties with general interest common to all the
people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital
interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs
2.) Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the first
paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.
1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree
of 1977 on the ff. grounds:
- It infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing
the illegal transfer of public moneys
- It is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify
the objectives and purposes for which the proposed
transfer of funds are to be made
- It allows the President to override the safeguards,
form and procedure prescribed by the Constitution in
approving appropriations
- it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers
on the transfer of funds by the President and the
implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the
Treasurer are without or in excess of their authority and
jurisdiction
- The threatened and continuing transfer of funds by
the president and the implementation thereof by the
budget minister and the treasurer of the Philippines are
without or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction.
3.) Solicitor General, for the public respondents,
questioned the legal standing of petitioners. He further
contended that:
by
the
Commission
before
FACTS:
This is a MR of the previous case.
Petitioner's
contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed
to have superseded art. 82 of the Omnibus
Investments
Code
of
1987
(E.O.
No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino
promulgated in the exercise of legislative authority, is
in the nature of a substantive act of Congress defining
the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII, 2 of the
Constitution.
RULING:
YES (as in previous case). Art. 78 of the Omnibus
Investment Code on Judicial Relief was thereafter
amended by B.P. Blg. 129, 3 by granting in 9 thereof
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the CA over the
decisions and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies.
When the Omnibus Investments Code was promulgated
on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal from the decisions
and final orders of the BOI to the Supreme Court was
again granted.
By then, however, the present
Constitution had taken effect. 4 The Constitution now
provides in Art. VI, 30 that "No law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice
and concurrence." This provision is intended to give the
Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed
under its appellate jurisdiction. For the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and
thereby undermine its essential function of expounding
the law in its most profound national aspects.
Now, art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code,
by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court
from the decisions and final orders of the BOI,
increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since
it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of
this Court, this provision never became effective, with
the result that it can never be deemed to have
amended BPBlg. 129, 9.
exonerated
private respondent from
the administrative charges.
Based from Sec 7 of Rule III of AO No. 7 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), when a
respondent is absolved from all administrative charges,
the decision of the ombudsman is FINAL AND
UNAPPEALABLE.
Fabian is arguing that the Office of the Ombudsman
has no authority under the law to restrict, in the
manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of
appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit
the power of review of this Court. For Sec. 27 of RA No.
6770 states that all administrative disciplinary cases of
the Office of Ombudsman MAY BE APPEALED TO THE
SC by filling a petition of certiorari within 10 days from
the receipt of the written notice of the order in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
But RA no. 6770 violates Sec 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that no law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC
as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
consent.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and
orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected
unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the
appellate court is involved in which case it may be
raise at any time or on the courts own motion. Thus, if
a statute on which a courts jurisdiction in a proceeding
depends is unconstitutional, the court has no
jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may
determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that it may inquire into the
constitutionality of the statute.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
ISSUES:
W/n Mariwasa correctly filed its appeal with the CA.
RATIO:
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought
through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in
Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders
of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the CA on a verified petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide
for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasijudicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art.
VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the
ASSOCIATION
VS.
FACTS:
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General
Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled An Act
Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the
Government of the Philippines from January 1 to
December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes was
approved by the President and vetoed some of the
provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a
member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category
claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the
Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised
before the Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare
unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide
Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of
the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and
Management and the National Treasurer and questions:
1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the
President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the
constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in
the appropriation for debt services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of
the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the
same
respondents.
Petitioners
contest
the
constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions
added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and
DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President
in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl Highway Authority.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the president on four
special provisions is constitutional and valid?
HELD:
Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided
for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the
entire appropriation for debt service. The said
provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/
debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot
be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation.
VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said
provision allows for the use of income & creation of
revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas
State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres.
Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing
law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law.
VETO VALID.
the
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto by the president of section 55
of the 1989 appropriations bill and subsequently of its
counterpart section 16 of the 1990 appropriations bill,
Facts:
portion
constitutional
of
the
General
Appropriations
bill
is
Rulings:
officials.
However,
President
Corazon
General
Appropriations
Bill
(GAB) for
1992,
Fund
Adjustment;
included
therein
are
INS VS CHADHA
FACTS
ISSUE:
HELD
Yes, Act invalidated. The court recognize the argument
of efficiency regarding a single house vote.
Efficiency is achieved by this measure because the
attorney general may frequently override deportation
and calling both houses of the legislature to vote for
each instance would be time consuming and
burdensome. However, the constitution is very clear
that legislative decisions are to be bicameral. There
are reasons relating to fair representation of states that
maintain this justification as paramount, particularly
when weighed against arguments of efficiency. The
act of overriding an executive veto is inherently
legislative and therefore requires bicameral, legislative
support.
HELD:
YES. The functions referred to in R.A 1241
which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to
Administrative, not judicial functions. For the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission
was created to carry out the reorganization of the
Executive Branch of the National Government which
plainly did not include the creation of courts. If a
statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be
clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies
with quasi-judicial function, then certainly such
conferment cannot be implied from a mere grant of
power to a body such as the Government Survey and
Reorganization Commission to create functions in
connection with the reorganization of the Executive
Branch of the Government.
Bowsher v. Synar
Miller vs Mardo
2 SCRA 898
FACTS:
Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No.3
of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint
against Bill Miller, owner and manager of Miller Motors,
claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956
to October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was
allegedly arbitrarily dismissed without being paid
separation pay.
Facts:
In 1985, Congress passed the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act with the goal of
reducing the federal budget deficit. A minimum
acceptable amount was calculated for the budget
deficit. If the actual deficit exceeded this amount,
Congress authorized the Comptroller General to
recommend mandatory budget cuts that would then be
executed by the President of the United States.
Facts:
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to
question the veto authority of the president involving
the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the
constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the
countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that
Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot
specify the items as to which those funds would be
TAADA v. TUVERA
[136 SCRA 27 (1985)]
Facts:
The petitioner seek a writ of mandamus to
force the respondent public offi cial to pursue
mandatorily a publication in the Offi cial Gazette of
various Special Laws and other Orders to inform
every individual or people bound in such laws
pursuant to Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution. In view thereon, the respondents
would have this case dismissed on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring this
petition.
Petitioners argue that since the subject of
the petition concerns a public right and its object
is to oblige public duty, they need not show any
specific interest.
Issue:
is
an
essential
requirement
for
the
Prohibition
with
Petition
for
Preliminary
where
Restraining Order.
laws
themselves
provide
for
their
own
effectivity dates.
On
Held:
1985,
the
Central
Bank
of
the
offi cial
records,
and
other
documents
and
Liquidation
Thereafter,
Employees
of
the
the
Philippine
Veterans
Philippine
Union-N.U.B.E.,
Veterans
herein
Bank.
Bank
petitioner,
R.A.
Gazette,
as
they
constitute
vital
role
in
the
legislative acts.
7169
providing
for
the
rehabilitation
of
Despite
the
legislative
mandate
for
the
Moreover,
petitioners
learned
that
of
employee
benefits
upon
motion
of
bank.
R.A.
7169,
the
liquidation
court
FACTS:
Judge
Vega
liquidation
proceedings
continued
of
the
bank
with
the
alleging
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A. 7169 became the
application of said Special Law be effective on
January 2, 1992.
RULING:
Yes. The RA 7169 clearly provided that it
should take eff ect upon its approval. The head of
state signed it on January 2, 1992. Hence, the said
law became effective its application on said date.
Its succeeding publication was not necessary for
its effectivity but for compliance. The nature of the
said Special Laws is internal and not have general
application, as a result, it took effect on the date
provided for, and for this reason was rightfully
invoked by the petitioners.
The Supreme Court upheld that while as a
rule
laws
completion
take effect
of
their
after
15 days
publication
in
following
the
Offi cial
given
due
course
and
granted.
The
Group 8
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. HON. SENATOR RICHARD J.
GORDON, et al.
G.R. No. 174340 October, 17, 2006
FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon
requested
PCGG
Chairman
Sabio
and
his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
3.
NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his
right against self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction
was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latters
verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to
sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person
might incriminate him. There is no conflict of
authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged
is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not
enough for the witness to say that the answer will
incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his
liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear
reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as
from his general conception of the relations of the
witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the
province of the court to determine whether a direct
answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact
that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that
he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to
claim the protection of the constitutional provision
against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same
time liable to prosecution and punishment for such
violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by
reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against
an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third
person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all
the facts and circumstances of the case whether the
witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is
not relieved from answering merely on his own
declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but
rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
HELD:
YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner
incarcerated.
1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right
to review the findings of the Senate. In the above
quoted resolution, the Senate in stating that petitioner
has failed and refused, and continues to fail and
refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the
amount of P440,000 and that the situation of
petitioner has not materially charged since he was
committed to prison, clearly shows that the
Senate believes that Arnault was still trying to deceive
them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated unto itself
to review such finding and held that Arnault
satisfactorily answered the questions of the Senate in
ISSUE
Whether or not the Joint Committee performing
election canvass even after the termination of the
session of Congress is constitutional.
HELD:
Yes, because even if the legislative functions of the
Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the
final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11,
2004, its non-legislative functions are not affected.
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its
non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim
the duly elected President and Vice President, its
existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well
as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the
preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the
certificates of canvass cannot be considered an expired
mandate.
In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of
Congress convened by express directive of Section 4,
Article VII to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the
newly elected President and VP has not, and cannot,
adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board
of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered
functus officio. Its membership may change, but it
retains its authority as a board until it has
accomplished its purposes.
Brillantes vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 163193; June 15, 2004
FACTS:
Congress enacted Republic Act 8436 which authorized
the Commission on Elections to use the automated
election system (AES) for the national and local
elections. Aside from the process of voting, counting
and canvassing of results, RA 8436 also mandated the
poll body to acquire automated counting machines
(ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials;
and to adopt new electoral forms and printing
materials.
In 2002, COMELEC adopted in its Resolution 02-0170, a
modernization program for the 2004 elections. This
program consisted of three phases to wit:
(1) PHASE I Computerized system of registration and
voters validation or the so-called "biometrics" system
of registration;
(2) PHASE II Computerized voting and counting of
votes; and
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELECs conduct of an
unofficial tabulation of presidential election results
based on a copy of the election returns was
constitutional
HELD:
NO, since there is no constitutional or statutory basis
for COMELEC to undertake an unofficial tabulation of
results whether manual or automated process.
Based on Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, the
sole and excessive authority to officially canvass the
votes for the elections of the President and the Vice
President rests upon the Congress. Subsequently,
Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act
No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the dulyaccredited citizens arm to conduct the unofficial
counting of votes for the national or local elections.
Since the COMELEC is prohibited from conducting an
official canvass of the votes cast for the President and
VP, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from
making an unofficial canvass of said votes.
HELD:
ISSUES:
NO.
HELD:
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states and enter into
treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution
with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the
Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a
check on the executive in the field of foreign relations,
to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and
growth.
FACTS:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
II.
The power to create a local government unit is vested
with the Legislature. The acts of the Legislature and
Executive in enacting into law RA 9355 should be
respected as petitioners failed to overcome the
presumption of validity or constitutionality.
III.
Recent and prevailing jurisprudence considers the
operative fact doctrine as a reason for upholding the
validity and constitutionality of laws involving the
creation of a new local government unit as in the
instant
case.
As regards the first ground, the movants reiterate the
same arguments in their respective Comments that
aside from the undisputed compliance with the income
requirement, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands, has also complied with the
population
and
land
area
requirements.
The arguments are unmeritorious and have already
been passed upon by the Court in its Decision, ruling
that R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional, since it failed to
comply with either the territorial or population
requirement contained in Section 461 of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991.
When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new
province on December 3, 2006, it had an official
population of only 106,951based on the2000 Census of
Population conducted by the National Statistics Office
(NSO), which population is short of the statutory
requirement
of
250,000
inhabitants.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del
Norte conducted a special census of population in
Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population
count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the
NSO as required by the Local Government Code.
Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the
population count of 371,000, the population of the
original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte)
would not be reduced to less than the minimum
requirement prescribed by law at the time of the
creation
of
the
new
province.
Less than a year after the proclamation of the new
province, the NSO conducted the2007Census of
Population. The NSO certified that as of August 1,
2007,Dinagat Islands had a total population of
only120,813,which was still below the minimum
requirement
of
250,000
inhabitants.
Based on the foregoing, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply
with the population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants
as
certified
by
the
NSO.
Moreover, the land area of the province failed to
comply with the statutory requirement of2,000 square
kilometers. R.A. No. 9355 specifically states that the
Province of Dinagat Islands contains an approximate
land area of802.12 square kilometers. This was not
disputed by the respondent Governor of the Province of
Dinagat Islands in her Comment. She and the other
respondents instead asserted that the province, which
is composed of more than one island, is exempted from
the land area requirement based on the provision in
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (IRR), specifically paragraph
2 of Article 9which states that [t]he land area
FACTS:
the
Party-List
System
Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over
the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay
party-list organizations, respectively, who took the
seats at the House of Representatives that such
organizations
won
in
the
2007
elections.
HELD:
HRET has jurisdiction over the controversy POLITICAL
LAW
jurisdiction
of
the
HRET.
As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA
7941 v. Commission on Elections, a party-list
representative is in every sense "an elected member of
the House of Representatives." Although the vote cast
in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote,
in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in
appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives. Both the Constitution and the PartyList System Act set the qualifications and grounds for
disqualification
of
party-list
nominees.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged
the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors that they ought to
represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a
nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or
organization
which
he
seeks
to
represent."
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nominee the need for him
or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of
his party-list organization in the context of the facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans
relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and
the marginalized and underrepresented interests that
they
presumably
embody.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act
does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe,
when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon,
that it has the power to do so as an incident of its
authority to approve the registration of party-list
organizations. But the Court needs not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been
argued
by
the
parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things,
the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list
nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives
no
less
than
the
district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the
cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been
proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends, and
Group 10
Group 10 Milana, et.al
FACTS:
MAGDALO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
FACTS:
Last 2009, MagdalosaPagbabago (MAGDALO) filed a
Petition for Registration with the Comelec for
registration and accreditation as a party-list for
participation in the then upcoming 2010 National
Elections. After review and deliberation, Comelec
issued a Resolution that denied the Petition for
Registration of MAGDALO on the grounds that its
Chairman and most of the members were, as a matter
of common knowledge, implicated in the Oakwood
Siege sometime back, thus giving rise to the notion
that the group seeks to achieve its goals through
violent or unlawful means. Upon denial of their
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration, MAGDALO filed
for a Petition for Certiorari seeking reversal of original
Comelec decision and for the latter to issue a
Certificate of Registration for the party.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed a grave abuse in
discretion when it denied the Petition of Registration of
Magdalo
RULING:
FACTS:
This a petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores
(petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14,
2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(public respondent), which respectively dismissed
the
legality
of
the
assumption
of
offi ce
of
Act.
Villanueva's change of affi liation from CIBACs
Youth Sector to Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFW) and families sector not aff ected six months
prior to elections.
The Public Respondent answers:
Sandiganbayan
representative
only
applicable
to
fi rst
three
criminal
case
issued
on
an
order
September
of
2005.
90-day
The
said
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conditions and qualifi cations
for
youth
sector
representatives
apply
to
respondent Villanueva.
Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
Whether
or
interrupts
not
the
the
suspensive
three-term
condition
limitation
rule
of
COMELEC.
RULING:
resolved
the
petition
declaring
the
affi liation
must be
made
six
months
before
elections.
Aldovino,
Danilo
B.
Faller,
and
Ferdinand
N.
ASIDE.
held
the
Court.
It
noted
that
preventive
ALDOVINO v. COMELEC
than
the
voluntary
renunciation
that
the
Constitution itself disallows to evade the threeterm limit as it is easier to undertake and merely
FACTS:
requires
charge
preventive
terms,
obligatorily.
following:
1998-2001,
2001-2004,
and
an
that
easily
can
be
fabricated
dismissed
suspension
has
administrative
soon
been
after
forced
NAVAL v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014
CASE:
A provincial board member cannot be elected and
serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms.
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari to assail the
(a) COMELEC Second Divisions Resolution granting the
petition filed by Julia, seeking to cancel the CoC as
member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Camarines
Sur of Naval, who is allegedly violating the three-term
limit imposed upon elective local officials; and (b)
COMELEC En Bancs Resolution denying Navals Motion
for Reconsideration to the Resolution issued by the
COMELEC Second Division.
FACTS:
From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been
elected and had served as a member of the
Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines
Sur.
On October 12, 2009, the President approved R.A. No.
9716, which reapportioned the legislative districts in
Camarines Sur. Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken
from the old Second District to form the present Third
District. The present Second District is composed of the
two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with
five towns from the old First District.
ISSUE:
HELD:
ISSUE:
WoNNavals election to the same position as a
Sanggunian member violated the three term limit rule.
HELD:
Yes. With 26 in favor and 17 against, the Constitutional
Commission approved that there is no immediate reelection after three successive terms. For the body
believed that the imposition of term limits would be
tantamount to squandering the experience of seasoned
public servants and a curtailment of the power of the
citizens to elect whoever they want to remain in the
office.
Further, the petition is denied. The resolutions of the
COMELEC are affirmed.
of
present a
11-3. The
respondents were
convincing
case
sufficient
not
to
able
to
overcome
SABILI vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012
Facts:
1. COMELEC denied Sabilis Certificate of Candidacy for
mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply with the one
year residency requirement.
2. When petitioner filed his COC 1 for mayor of Lipa
City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he
hadbeen a resident of the city for two (2) years and
eight (8) months.
3. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed
his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family
were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay
(Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
4. Respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent)
filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate
for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification.