Lawrence Lazarus

Does Moore succeed in refuting Idealism?

2007
G. E. Moores, The Refutation of Idealism, was published in Mind in 1903 and as the
title states; it is an attempt at disputing the validity of that subject. Modern Idealism,
Moore explains, asserts that the universe is spiritual; that is, it is very different
indeed from what it seems and that it has quite a large number of properties which it
does not seem to have. 1 Therefore everyday objects; chairs and tables, are not as
different from us as it would seem; being spiritual they would possess, as we do,
higher forms of consciousness. At this juncture Moore makes it clear that his
refutation does not lie at challenging Idealism on these grounds, as he does not
attempt to prove that reality is not spiritual Reality maybe spiritual, for all I know,
and I devoutly hope it is.2 However, he asserts that if any necessary element of a
theory can be disproved, the whole premise would collapse. For Moore, the formula
esse est percipi is an essential principle, and it is this postulation that he contests, if
successful, Moore believes it would prove a decisive and ruinous blow for Idealism.
The proposition; given in the Berkeleyan system esse est percipi (to be is to be
perceived) would be more accurately expressed, Moore claims, as esse must be
percipi wherever you can truly predicate esse you can truly predicate percipi3
Therefore, if esse is percipi it is at once equivalent to saying that whatever is, is
experienced it is mental. Before advancing Moores criticism to this claim, I
will just convey two terms that Moore uses: (1) consciousness, in respect of which
all sensations are alike; and (2) something else, in respect of which one sensation
differs from another. It will be convenient if I may be allowed to call this second term
the object of a sensation.4 For example, we have consciousnesses of a yellow or
green sensation and the object of that sensation is the individual colour, therefore in
every sensation there are two distinct elementsconsciousness of a given sensation
and an awareness of its distinct colour. Hence, esse and percipi are not, as the Idealists
think, analytically connected, that is, an object that is necessarily an object of
experience, as that would be self-contradictory.
If therefore, any one tells us that the existence of blue is the same thing as the
existence of the sensation of blue he makes a mistake and a self-contradictory
mistake, for he asserts either that blue is the same thing as blue together with
consciousness, or that it is the same thing as consciousness alone.5
1

The Refutation of Idealism, p. 1

Ibid, p. 3
3
Ibid, p. 5
4
Ibid, p. 17
5
Ibid, p. 18
2

Therefore, the proposition esse est percipi must be flawed because a sensation is a
class of awareness, and that awareness is distinct from its relation to its colour. How a
sensation relates to its object is identical to all other instances of experience to its
object. Or as A. J. Ayer summarises Moores argument; if I am having a sensation of
the colour blue, my consciousness and the colour must be different things, since the
element of consciousness is present also in other instances, such as my sensation of
pain, whereas blue is not.6 Consequently, Moore states that esse is as distinct from
percipi as green is from sweet.7
A number of arguments have been advanced that oppose Moores position. Firstly, A.
J. Ayer does not believe that Berkeley had intended for his principle to be logically
necessary, that is, the esse being synonymous with percipi in such a way that the
terms were inseparably connected: Berkeley did not maintain a general connection
between being and being perceived but a specific connection, which he treated as
analytic, between being a sensible quality and being perceived. 8 As Moores
refutation seems to hinge on disproving esse est percipi as a fundamental
requirement of Idealism, it would seem a damaging blow to his argument if
Berkeleys formula only need apply to specifics. When certain terms are presented,
something experienced will followif I have a headache it follows that pain is felt.
The analytic connection is not between being and being experienced, but rather
between being an object of a headache and being experiencedthis applies to all
aspects of perception.9 Moore is wrong in believing that Idealists hold a selfcontradictory view by thinking that if anything x is known to exist, the consequence
immediately follows that it is perceived. Thus understood, to be is to be perceived is
not a mere identity: if being perceived follows from being, these two cannot be
identical.10 Berkeleys assertion is not that they are identical, rather that a sensible
quality necessarily stands to its object.
Ayer raises a further point in contesting Moores assertion; he writes only a couple of
sentences on the matter but broaches an interesting point. Waltzing is not identical to
dancing, since the tango is also a dance. This does not mean that a person can waltz,
without dancing the waltz.11 Analogously, Moore does not claim that the sense-data of
blue and green exists without being sensed. The point being, a person is unable to
sense blue without experiencing an object of blue. Not all Idealists rely on the
Berkeleyan formula for the theory to hold, Bosanquet claims that cognition is
achieved through a relation of ideas. That is, various parts of a sensation are related
to one another by relations of similarity and dissimilarity; these relations create a
unity; this relational unity cannot exist except through the activity of mind. 12
Bosanquet explains how the various aspects of sensation hang togetherthere is no
interaction between them; they hold through their identity and difference, and that
unity exists through consciousness alone. Therefore, blue has the characters of blue
but that must be active in the mind. 13 Idealism, in this view, can establish grounds for
6

Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p. 57

The Refutation of Idealism, p. 16
8
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p. 57
9
Russell and Moore: The Analytic Heritage, p. 145-6
10
100 Years of Philosophy, p. 210
11
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, p. 57
12
Current Issues in Idealism, p. 27
13
Ibid, p. 27-8
7

legitimacy even if Moore was able to destroy the essence of act-object distinction in
esse est percipi. The structuring activity of mind brings both act and object a unity
through consciousness.
C. J. Ducasse makes claim that there are certain classes of argument that esse is
percipi is true.14 Before describing Ducasses case, there is a distinction in language
between certain expressions that need to be understoodthe cognate accusative and
the objective accusative. That is, for example, between striking a stroke and striking a
man. Now the question in hand is whether a cognition, such as blue is connate with
the aspect of experiencing called seeing or if it is alien to it. The answer to this
question will illustrate whether the esse of blue is its percipi. Blue, is not an object
of experience, but of a species of experience itself, that is, to sense blue is then to
sense bluely. As I sense blue in an involuntary and non motor way, what I know is
connate with the knowing. What is known, by the knowing process is its own
determinate nature of that occasion. As to the relationship of the blue and it being
sensed, here the noun blue is kind of activity whereas the verb to sense blue is used
linguistically to denote an occurrence of an activity the various tenses of the verb
expressing the various possible temporal relations between the time at which we
mention some case of that kind of activity and the time we mention as time of that
case itself.15
Ducasse argues therefore, that what we sense is not blue but a case of blue.
An obvious objection to this hypothesis, one that Ducasse himself pre-empted; that is,
we can never actually sense a kind of blue but only a particular case of blue.
Ducasse states in defence of his proposal that blue is the name of a certain
determinable kind [a species] and that blue is just an expression that is applied to
determinates but not to a particular case a determinate shade of blue is logically not
a case but a species 16 Ducasse is saying that we do not sense a case of blue but a
determinate species of that colour. That is, we sense bluely in a specific way of a
particular case of blue.
Ducasses argument is complicated and I have only managed to offer a limited
prcis to its meaning, but its attempt to challenge Moores assertion that to be is
necessarily connected to its perception holds appeal. It seems fair to draw a
distinction between striking a stroke (cognate accusative) and striking a man
(objective accusative) insofar as a man is an object much the same as a blue car
whereas the striking of a stroke is characteristic of seeing the blueness of the car. If
this proves that the esse of blue is not its percipi, Ducasse has proved Moore wrong.
The knowing process does indeed seem to include an activity of knowing that exists
in an inseparable but distinct way to its object.
I do not think that Moore has proved that esse and percipi are as distinct as green and
sweet, neither has he convinced me that the Berkeleyan formula holds meaning that
if erroneous would undermine that philosophy. The linguistic game that is played-out
seems highly dubious too, on both Moores part as well as his critics, as the process of
cognition appears to transcend anything that the limitation and meaning of words can
describe. Even if Moore was successful at disproving to be is to be perceived, I do
not think that would retain sufficient gravitas to reject Idealism on those grounds
alone. The Berkeleyan idiom has historical significance in defining Idealism, but I
14

Ducasse, p. 225-51
Ibid, p. 233
16
Ibid, p. 233-4
15

dont believe that Moore was correct in thinking that its negation could solely refute
the theory. Many Idealists define their philosophy by describing a homogenous
interaction of act and object without relying on esse est percipi to classify their
theory.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ayer, A. J.,

Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. London: Butler & Tanner

Ltd, 1982

Ayer, A. J.,

Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage. London:

Macmillan and Co Ltd, 1971

Ducasse, C, J.,

Moores Refutation of Idealism, In Schilpp, P, (ed): The

Philosophy of G. E. Moore. USA: Open Court Publishing Co,
1968

Moore, G. E.,

The Refutation of Idealism, In Philosophic Studies. London:

Lund Humphries, 1958

Passmore, J.,

100 Years of Philosophy. London: Cox & Wyman, 1966

Wilson, F.,

Moores Refutation of Idealism, In Coates, P. & Hutto, D (ed)

Current Issues in Idealism. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996