Submarine Power Cables Laying Procedure The Fleet and Reliability Analysis

Journal of Marine Engineering & Technology
ISSN: 2046-4177 (Print) 2056-8487 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tmar20
Submarine power cables: laying procedure, the

fleet and reliability analysis
Np Ventikos Assistant Professor & Di Stavrou
To cite this article: Np Ventikos Assistant Professor & Di Stavrou (2013) Submarine power
cables: laying procedure, the fleet and reliability analysis, Journal of Marine Engineering &
Technology, 12:1, 13-26
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20464177.2013.11020273
Published online: 01 Dec 2014.
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Date: 16 June 2016, At: 14:24
Submarine power cables: laying procedure, the fleet and reliability analysis
Submarine power cables:

laying procedure, the fleet and
reliability analysis
Downloaded by [36.78.158.9] at 14:24 16 June 2016
NP Ventikos, Assistant Professor and DI Stavrou, Naval Architect and Marine Engineer,
School of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, NTUA, Greece
This paper investigates the possible problems of laying submarine power cables (SPC).
Itprovides information about the power cables themselves, the laying procedure, and the
respective fleet. It also describes the medium voltage (MV) transmission grid in Greece
and determines the correlation of different parameters that affect the operation of the
network. Furthermore, a reliability analysis, based on a statistical model, is conducted;
the model is used to evaluate the operational characteristics of cables, such as the rate
of failures from natural or human causes, and is also used to choose between different
candidate cable routes in order to determine the one with the maximum reliability.
AUTHORS BIOGRAPHIES
Dr Nikolaos P Ventikos is an Assistant Professor in the School
of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering at the National
Technical University of Athens (NTUA), Greece. Dr Ventikoss
expertise is in marine safety; risk analysis/assessment; marine
(oil) pollution; maritime security; human factors; and statistical
modelling. He was awarded the GP Livanos Grand Prize on
Environmental Issues (2000).
Dimitrios I Stavrou is a Lieutenant Commander in the Hellenic
Navy. He serves the Amphibious Assault Forces Command as
Chief Engineer. He also served in frigates for two years, in submarines for 10 years (six as chief engineer) and in landing ships
(two years as chief engineer). He was awarded the Diploma
of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering by the National
Technical University of Athens, Greece. His research interests
focus on models of reliability.
INTRODUCTION
ubmarine power cables have for many years played a

significant role in the transfer of energy on a worldwide scale. In Greece, the initial use of power cables
was limited to providing electricity to inshore lighthouses. However, the increasing demands for electric energy
on the islands, in combination with the disproportional cost
of maintaining local electric energy production plants, led
to a significant development of submarine power cables for

the transfer of electricity from the mainland.1 Moreover, the
use of submarine power cables was expanded to other applications, such as the interconnection of autonomous power
transmission grids to meet the needs of consumption during
periods of high demand, to transfer electric energy produced
from offshore wind parks, to provide electric power to offshore oil and gas production platforms (in an effort to optimise the onboard space and reduce maintenance costs), and
to perform electric heating to submarine pipelines in order to
prevent wax and hydrate deposits.2,3
The cables must have suitable specifications for surviving
in a significantly corrosive water environment and the capability of unimpeded electric energy transfer without failures.
The quality of construction of cables needs to be of a high
standard in order to endure the potential mechanical strains
of natural or human origin. In addition to a cables technical characteristics, which enable it to function in a difficult
environment, there are a variety of parameters related to the
laying procedure or the retraction after failure. Laying procedures are undertaken by specifically designed/built vessels
with modern systems of position tracking and navigation.
The success of the effort is safeguarded by special equipment
that ensures both the proper laying procedure as well as the
protection of cables. Mistakes at any stage may result in huge
financial and social cost.
Volume 12 No 1 January 2013 Journal of Marine Engineering and Technology
Stavrou_JMET_Jan.indd 13
13
1/22/13 8:07 AM
Aside from the characteristics of cables and their laying

procedure, a reliability analysis is needed. The evaluation of
interconnection is necessary to improve the protection for
future prevention of failures. Furthermore, means for the proper selection of choice between two or more interconnections is
needed, taking into account and aiming at maximum reliability.
The aim of this study is to present/determine possible
aspects of the laying procedure of submarine cables in
Greece; particularly, reference is made to the fleet, the laying procedure itself, and the equipment which may be used
towards this end. Moreover, a descriptive statistical analysis is attempted in the context of presenting the submarine
medium-voltage power transmission grid in Greek waters.
Finally, a reliability analysis based on a statistical model is
made in order to evaluate the performance and protection of
cable routes, in terms of reliability.
SUBMARINE POWER CABLES (SPCs)

Construction elements
There are a lot of similarities between submarine power

cables and underground power cables; however, the differences refer mainly to the adverse environmental conditions in
which submarine cables should operate.4,5,6,7,8
The SPC comprises the following elements, as shown
in Fig 1:
The conductor: it is made of copper (Cu) or aluminium
(Al). It is the means by which the current passes through;

The isolation system: a system of successive layers
made of isolating materials that prevent the conductor

from contact with the atmosphere;
Semi-conductive screen layers: they come between the
conductor and the isolator so as to form a stable dielectric
surface not being affected by local stress caused from
irregularities of the inner (conductor) and outer (insulator) screen layers;
A watertight sleeve: it protects the conductor and the
isolation system from penetration of water. This bimetallic sleeve is made of lead (Pb), or alternatively, aluminium (Al), or copper (Cu);
The armour: it is made of steel wires (alternatively
stainless steel or alloy of aluminium). The main purpose
of the armour is to provide the cable with both tension
stability and mechanical protection during storage, load,

installation, function and repair;
The outer sleeve: it gives the outer view of the cable
whereas, at the same time, it protects the armour from
scratches. The outer sleeve consists of spiral overlay of
wires or extruded polymer.
Peripheral components
To achieve successful interconnections between cables, and
therefore the efficient operation of the system, certain peripheral components are also used, the most important being the
submarine cable joints. Data from recorded failures of submarine power cables indicate that joints account for 10.4%
of the failures.7
Factory joints are mainly used during the process of
production. Other kind of joints, such as installation joints,
can be used onboard during laying or repairing procedures,
and shore joints are used to connect submarine cables to
underground cables in order to reduce the total cost of the
installation. The adequate functionality of shore joints is of
high importance due to the nodal role they have operating
in special environmental conditions (eg, a combination of
shallow water and fine-grained sand), and they must provide
utmost reliability and flexibility.10
Significant attention during the cable laying procedure is
given to the protective set-up of the cables, especially in areas
where the prevailing conditions can cause serious damage to
the cable, eg, areas with rocky bottoms, or areas with intense
professional fishing activities.7,11,12 In effect, the protection
of the cable can be achieved by using a concrete mattress,
or by using restraining or hanging systems that shoulder the
responsibility of holding the weight of the cables, or by rock
placement or articulated piping.7,13,14 For example, dividing
shells are used to protect the cable from damage caused by
the friction between the outer shell of cables and the seabed.15
Last but not least, equipment for electrical grounding of
the cable is also used at the terminal points to ensure effective
grounding.
LAYING PROCEDURE OF SPCs

The laying procedure of a submarine cable is a complex
and laborious task due to the fact that the success of
Single-core cables
Crosssection
(mm)
1x50
1x50
1x95
1x95
Conductor
Al
Cu
Cu
Cu
Manufacturer
Fulgor
F&G
F&G
Fulgor
Three-core cables
Crosssection
(mm)
3x35
3x35
3x50
3x150
3x185
3x95
Conductor
Manufacturer
Al
Cu
Al
Al
Cu
Cu XLPE
Fulgor
Fulgor
Fulgor
Fulgor
C. de L.
Fulgor- Alcatel
Fig 1: (left) A MV SPC with XLPE isolation;9 (right) the types of SPC that have been used in Greece from their initial use in 1968
up to the present time
14
Journal of Marine Engineering and TechnologyVolume 12 No 1 January 2013
1/22/13 8:07 AM
the project depends on several, different and sometimes

conflicting parameters. Miscalculation during the design
phase, or mishandling during implementation, can boost
the project cost to exceptional levels, prove extremely
time-consuming, or even postpone the whole operation.
The first phase of the activity addresses the preliminary
design which defines in detail all factors that affect the
laying procedure; the second phase covers the actual laying procedure itself.
Specifically, an analysis during the first phase of the
operation includes the following components:12,28
1. Loading of the cable onboard the cable laying vessels

preliminary checks focusing on the various stages of the
laying procedure;
2. Landing of the first end of the cable;
3. Laying of the cable between the two terminal points (on
the seabed or under the seabed); with an average speed
for the laying procedure of 30m/min;16
4. Landing of the second end of the cable.
1. Geological structure of the region of the interconnection;

2. Survey of the sea area of interest, which includes:
a. Detailed study of the morphology of the seabed of
the coupling zone;
b. Examination of the morphology of the subsoil
beneath the seabed;
c. Checking the setting of the subsoil beneath the
seabed;
d. Research of the coupling zone with marine magnetometer;
3. Examination of terminal points, including:
a. Research on the morphology of the coastal region of
the terminal points;
b. Research on the seabed topography of the terminal
points;
c. Underwater inspection of the landing areas using an
underwater detector, for metal objects or previous
submerged submarine cables);
4. Oceanographic, hydrographic data;
5. Natural hazards, including:
a. Active faults, earthquakes and gravitational movement of sediment;
b. Gaseous hydrocarbons and related landforms (eg,
craters-pockmarks);
c. Water gravity waves (tsunamis);
d. Landforms erosion, transport and deposition of
sediment;
e. Steep slopes;
f. Uneven topography of the seabed;
6. Human related hazards, including:11,12
a. Anchoring of ships;
b. Fishing activities;
c. Failures during the laying procedure;
d. Other aspects of human activities.
In the early stages of submarine cable planning, consideration

must be given to the multiple purpose vessels that can meet
the needs for the task of laying the cables. The tremendous
development in the field of submarine cables, in addition to
the complex diversities of each operation, highlight the need
for vessels with special characteristics that can be used exclusively for cable laying operations (or almost exclusively with
the subsequent integration of supporting missions).
A modern CLV that is able to lay power cables may also
have the capability of laying communication cables,13 but
the reverse is not always valid due to the essential difference in specific weight between power and communication
cables; this can exclude a number of vessels from the specific mission.
The organisation/company undertaking the responsibility of a cable laying operation has the obligation to develop
and present detailed instructions on the nature of the planned
work, the means and the necessary equipment that will be
used, and the description of the exact procedures that will be
employed during the progress of the work. Additional items
that must meet the consideration at the preliminary analysis
are the owners special requirements (preferred cable route,
landing points and others), and regulatory factors on the area
that might affect the laying procedure.
The phase of the actual cable laying is detailed in the
following steps:6
THE FLEET OF CABLE LAYING VESSELS

(CLVs) OPERATED IN GREECE
Specifications of CLVs
The aspects and conditions that can be attributed to the operations of laying submarine cables led to the development of
an independent fleet with special characteristics; to this end,
CLVs hold a nodal position within the framework of such
operations.
Sometimes, the existence of special operational conditions, such as shallow waters, may demand the additional use
of other type of vessels, like floating barges with or without
self-propulsion temporarily modified for the needs of the
specific operation.17
The special characteristics and operational aspects that
must be considered during the shipbuilding of a CLV comprise the following:18
1. Loading capacity (turntables, fixed cable tanks, cable
drums);
2. Ability to define accurate position (eg, DGPS);
3. Ability to maintain accurate position, eg, anchoring systems, or dynamic positioning systems (DPS);
4. Jointing house;
5. Laying procedure control room (LPCR);
6. Cable tension mechanisms;
7. Emergency cutter;
8. Remote operated vehicle (ROV) and ROV supporting
equipment;
9. Other equipment;
10. Helicopter landing pad.
Table 1 lists the CLVs that have been deployed and
o perated in Greek waters for undersea power cable laying
operations over the last twenty years.
15
1/22/13 8:07 AM
Name
LDT(m) /Payload V (kn)
Skagerrak 1976
112328
2010(REB)
NORB
13 773/9373
Giulio
Verne
1987
S. KOR
133308
10 617/8840
10
Atalanti
2010
GRE
93274
5242/4000
12
Stanelco
1975
65136
1981(REB)
NOR
2128/1730
11
Argo 11
1996
HOL
16 023
12
Ikaros
1975
5283.5
1985(REB)
DAN
/370
11
Astrea
Build
65145
1987
7117.57.3 2590/2853
2007(REB)
ALE
10
14.7
Table 1: Specifications of CLVs operated in Greece
SUBMARINE MV POWER TRANSMISSION

GRID IN GREECE DATABASE OF
FAILURES
The Greek submarine medium-voltage (MV) SPC network
consists of 69 links with 169 cables of different cross-sections; the total cable length equals 1092km. SPCs are made
according to the national standard GR-214 for paper isolation
and the national standard TP-195 for X-LPE isolation.
The data analysed in this paper refer to failures in medium-voltage SPCs from the year 2000 to-date. A total of 96
cases of failure were recorded for all 69 links listed in Greek
waters.
Descriptive statistics of the factors causing failures to

the MV SPC network in Greece
The results from processing the 96 cases of failure regarding both downtime and cost of repair indicate that the
mean time that an interconnection stays out of service due
to a single failure is about 46 days per failure, with the
maximum duration reaching to 329 days. The mean cost
of repair is 46 000 Euros, which can rise to 246 000 Euros
for a single failure. Table 2 shows the total repair cost of
cables per year and the annual average days that cables
were out of service.
The costs do not include societal costs due to any resulting power cut. Moreover, the correlations between the factors
that cause failures of the network have been examined; in
particular:
Age of the cable at the time of failure: the study of failures
in relation to the age of cables at the time of failure shows
an empirical distribution that can be fitted by the normal
16
Year
Repair cost
X1000 Euros
Days out of
service
2000
13.25
53
2001
21.46
34
2002
66.14
65
2003
53.16
40
2004
46.23
40
2005
73.48
60
2006
55.65
57
2007
31.02
32
2008
9.27
67
Table 2: Total repair cost from 2000 to 2008 and the annual
average days out of service of cables in Greece
distribution with a mean value of 18.65 years and a standard
deviation of 9.95 years; these are illustrated in Fig 2(A);
Depth of the point of failure: correlating the point of failure
with the depth of the cables demonstrates that the failures follow an exponential distribution. The majority of failures are
recorded at the proximity of the so-called terminal points and
they become less frequent as the depth of the sea increases.
Fig 2(B) shows the failure frequency against the depth at the
points of failures;
Distance of the point of failure from the coast: the study
of failures against the area of incidents demonstrates that the
failures follow an exponential distribution. Like above, the
majority of failures are recorded close to the terminal points
and they become less frequent as the distance from the coast
increases. Fig 2(C) shows the resulting distribution of SPCs
against the distance of the points of failure from the coast;
Material of conductor: in absolute numbers the study shows
that of 96 failures, 64 of them correspond to copper conductors and 32 to aluminium. Further investigation into determining the rates demonstrates that there are 9.84 failures per
100km of cable for copper conductors and 6.71 failures per
100km of cable for aluminium conductors. The above results
are illustrated in Fig 2(D);
Isolation system of the cable: the processing of failures
shows that of 96 failures, 88 of them occurred with paper isolation and only eight happened with XLPE isolation. Further
investigation demonstrates that the rate of failures per 1km of
cable is 0.0982 failures/km for paper isolation and 0.0407 failures/km for XLPE isolation. XLPE isolation has been used in
SPCs in Greece from 2000, whereas paper isolation has been
used since 1968. The above results are illustrated in Fig 2(E);
Region of the interconnection: the 96 failures occurred in
28 interconnections of submarine cable routes. The allocation
of the failures according to the region of the interconnection is illustrated in Fig 2(F). Particularly, the actual number
of failures, the length of the laid cable and the percentage
of failures per kilometre of laid cable are recorded; for the
1/22/13 8:07 AM
Fig 2: Correlations/distributions of factors that affect the occurrence of failures to SPCs

17
1/22/13 8:07 AM
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF MV SPC

NETWORK
Statistical model
Fig 3: Cause of failures according to human and natural

hazards
north Aegean Sea the figures are 0.0742 failures/km, for the
central Aegean Sea 0.0696 failures/km, for the south Aegean
Sea 0.0104 failures/km, while for the eastern Aegean Sea the
figure is 0.1045 failures/km. Finally, for the Ionian Sea they
reach 0.6780 failures/km.
The model is based on that presented by Nakamura

(1991).19 Initially, four parameters were used, although subsequently these were transformed into three. Furthermore,
a method called dimensional reduction is used to achieve
the objective of calculating the failure rate. The method
of dimensional reduction is used to reduce/merge the
three failure distributions to one. Certain adjustments
were employed to make the original model suitable for
application with regards to the Greek submarine electrical
network. The final result was the calculation of failures
per 250m and year of existing and proposed submarine
medium-voltage network.
The parameters that have been considered in the context
of the presented model comprise:
The depth of the cable route/depth at the point of failure
of the cable;
The length of the cable route/minimum distance of the
point of failure from the coast;

Cause of failure: the study of failures in relation to the
cause demonstrates that the percentage of failures attributed
to anchors is 35.4%, to fishing equipment 22.9%, to the friction of the cable 11.5%, to joint failures 10.4%, to the quality
of sedimentation 8.3%, to cable failure 4.2%, and to other
causes 7.3%. The figures for the effect of the human factor
on failure shows that human activity is blamed for 63.4% of
the recorded failures, whereas the percentage of failures due
to natural hazards is 22.6%, and the percentage of hardware
failures is 12.9%. The overall causes of failures are illustrated
in Fig 3.
Protection of the cable in the area of damage: the study of
failures in relation to the external protection of cables demonstrates that the vast majority of problems occur to unprotected
cables, with a percentage of 82.8%; the cables with light
protection follow with 16.1%, whereas well-protected cables
suffer failures corresponding to only 1.1%.
The seabed characteristics of the cable route at the area
of failure;
The level of protection of the cable along the cable route
at the area of failure.

The choice of these factors is justified from their significant impact on the rate of failures, as was shown in the
analysis earlier in this paper. During laying procedures normal/acceptable environmental conditions are assumed; for
example in case of bad weather the laying operation would
cease until the weather got better. Moreover, the absence of
significant sea currents is assumed within the application of
the proposed model.
For the needs of the statistical model a random interconnection is divided into two equal parts. Each one of them
(from the terminal point to the middle of the route) consists of
parts equal to 250m, Lj with j = 0,1,2,8; The length above
2.25km (up to the middle of the cable) is considered as one
Fig 4: Illustration of the set-up of
the 3-dimension statistical model
for reliability analysis of MV SPCs
18
1/22/13 8:08 AM
and it is called L9.Each one of those parts is laid to a specific

depth, Di with i = 0,1,2,...7; The parameters of length Li and
depth Dk are discussed later.
In addition to the above, for each cable the number of
failures was studied at intervals of one year. The employed
data of failures provide a reliable basis for the period between
2000 and 2011, which is the time period under examination
in this paper.
According to these assumptions, each cable has a unique
identity which corresponds to it from the time of its laying
up to-date. In effect, each cable segment of 250m at a specific
depth is assigned to each year that passes in a unique way
with a white square segment. Fig 4 (taken from Nakamura19)
represents the set-up of the implemented model. Assuming a
failure after some years of the laying procedure at a specific
length and depth the respective square element is illustrated
with a darker colour.
As shown in Fig 4, every square segment has three
dimensions: the resolution of x-axis equals 250m per cell,
of y-axis year per cell and, of z-axis, the particular depth of
the cable. For example, if the focus is upon the connection
between the Greek islands of Paros and Naxos with a life
of cable from 2004 up to-date, and a total length of 3500m,
then x-axis includes seven cells, y-axis 14 units of 250m
each, and the z-axis reaches a maximum depth of 35m.
With the above considerations, a flat area which reflects
the 69 deployed links with 169 wires of a total length
of 1092km was constructed; hence the set-up consists of
about 45 311 cells.
Detailed description of the parameters of the

employed statistical model
Depth of the cable route at the point of failure Dk
(k=0 to 7)
This is the distance of each cable segment from the sea
surface. In the case of failure, this depth corresponds to the
depth of the segment that suffers the fault. The total depth is
divided for the first 70m into intervals of 10m each. Beyond
this threshold there is no further partition, thus taking it as a
unified segment; the descriptive statistics show that failures
at a depth of more than 70m are uniformly distributed. For
cases in which the segment under examination follows a
(significantly) inclined bottom, eg, from depth D1, to depth
D2, then the referred depth of the cable segment equals Dk=
(D1+D2)/2. It is assumed that the change of the depth at each
interval is less than 10m. This means that in the case of a
seabed with an inclination of more than 4%, the choice of
the average depth must be done with caution.
Mud
In effect, the domain of this parameter is:

D {D0, D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7} =
D{09m, 1019m, 2029m, 3039m, 4049m, 5059m,
6069m, more than 70m}.
Length of the cable route at the point of failure/mini-
mum distance from the coast Lj (j = 0 to 9)

This parameter focuses on the point of failure in terms
of the length of the segment of the cable that suffers the
problem and its minimum distance from the coast, ie, from
the two terminal points of the submarine cable. The total
length of cables is partitioned for the first 2.25km (from
both sides of terminal points) to segments of 250m each.
Beyond the threshold of 2.25km (hence towards the middle part of the cable, if this is of adequate length) there
is no further partition, taking it as a unified segment. The
descriptive statistics show that failures further in from
2.25km are uniformly distributed. The domain of the
parameter is given (in km) as:
L {L0, L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7, L8, L9} =
{00.24, 0.250.49, 0.500.74, 0.750.99, 1.001.24,
L
1.251.49, 1.501.74, 1.751.99, 2.002.24, above 2.25}
Modified protection Ei (i = 1 to 4)
The seabed is organised into four categories: muddy, sandy,
gravel, and rocky; according to the characteristics of the seabed the required protection of the cable is differentiated. The
experience of repairing failures has indicated that for both
muddy and sandy sea bottoms there was a natural penetration
of the cable within the seabed of about 0.30.5m.
Furthermore, the protection of cables along cable routes
integrates two different aspects: on the one hand, there is the
protection of cables from both natural and human-related
hazards, such as from the burying of cables in trenches, the
usage of protection set-up systems (such as concrete mattresses or the placement of rocks), or the use of restraining
or hanging systems (eg, dividing shells and chains); and on
the other hand, there is the self-protection of the cable due
tothe armour that is used during manufacturing. In this case,
the important issues relate to the choice of the right material
for the wires of the armour and the usage of single or double
armour to provide both tension stability and mechanical protection to the cable.
Considering the high correlation between the features of
the seabed and the protection characteristics of cables these
two parameters were integrated into the model as a unified
variable called modified protection. Table 3 illustrates the
Sand
Gravel
Rock/Stone
E1
Totally unprotected
Totally unprotected
Totally unprotected
Totally unprotected
E2
E3
Inside tube or dividing shells

Buried in trench 1.0m

Under concrete mattresses

E4
Under concrete mattresses

Inside tube or dividing
shells or chains
Table 3: Categorisation of the modified protection to represent the quality of seabed along with the protection of cables
19
1/22/13 8:08 AM
20
2.00
2.24
ABOVE
2.25
L8
L9
Nf
Nt
Nf
Nf
Nt
Nt
Nf
Nf
Nt
Nf
Nt
22
22
22
1417
16
198
E2
E3
22
108
14
2724
(09)
D0
22
22
22
22
22
E4
154
44
264
418
1078
1224
242
E1
44
66
88
513
E2
22
84
104
94
E3
(1019)
D1
22
22
E4
1210
308
176
220
355
984
380
405
66
E1
154
110
110
47
E2
E3
(2029)
D2
E4
154
22
102
311
827
286
350
23
44
44
E1
66
66
44
44
E2
22
44
E3
(3039)
D3
E4
66
E1
843
168
110
717
165
317
67
154
Table 4: Allocation of SPCs to the Greek electrical network according to the selected characteristics Ei, Lj, Dk
1.74
1.99
Nt
L7
Nf
1.49
1.74
22
Nt
L6
Nf
L5
132
Nt
0.50
0.74
L2
1.25
1.49
Nf
1.00
1.24
44
Nt
0.25
0.49
L1
L4
Nf
0.75
0.99
88
Nt
0.00
0.24
L0
L3
E1
363
66
44
E2
22
66
E3
(4049)
D4
E4
66
706
209
306
44
E1
44
110
E2
E3
(5059)
D5
E4
520
772
110
306
64
E1
44
E2
E3
(6069)
D6
E4
11
21124
350
262
42
42
22
22
22
22
E1
528
E2
E4
E3
70 ABOVE
D7
1/22/13 8:08 AM
way this new parameter is set-up; it also takes into consideration the possible depth of penetration from a ship anchor
and the specifications for the laying procedures, as they are
edited from the Hellenic Distribution Network Operator.20,21
The modified protection is based on the combination of the
characteristics of the seabed along the cable route with the
protection of the cable itself. In effect, the domain of this
variable is: E {E1, E2, E3, E4}.
Modification-fitting of Ei
The raw data presented in Table 4 provide information for

both the actual number of failure segments and total segments
corresponding to each Ei level. The data refer to the MV SPC
network in Greece over the last decade. The failure rate per
250m and year at any combination between Ei, Lj, and Dk is:
P( Ei , L j , Dk ) =
N f ( Ei , L j , Dk )
N t ( Ei , L j , Dk )
(1)
where Nf (Ei, Lj, Dk) is the number of failure segments and

Nt (Ei, Lj, Dk) corresponds to the corresponding number of
total segments.
Fig 5 shows that no failures were recorded at the highest
protection level, namely E4. In this case, the use of actual
failures to calculate the failure rate with equation (1) equals
zero for this protection level.
However, to be able to predict the failures, these are best
fitted through a theoretical distribution; a discrete distribution
is employed due to the nature of the parameter of interest. In
particular, the Poisson distribution with = 0.2 is selected.
To this end, the approximation of actual failures is illustrated
in Fig 5, along with the modified factors according to the
Poisson distribution; the rate of failures, the safety factor and
the failure factor for each level Ei are calculated and presented
accordingly.
The safety factor shows the relative correlation
between the failure rates of the four employed protection
levels, taking as the basis the failure rate of protection
level E 1 which equals one. It is calculated from the following equation:
P( E1 )
S ( Ei ) =
P( Ei )
(2)
Finally, the failure factor is calculated; this factor indicates the tendency for failure at each level of protection with
respect to level E1:
F ( Ei ) =
According to Fig 6, the number of cable failures can be

calculated for any combination of Lj and Dk by using the
safety factor:
4
N f ( L j , Dk|E1 ) = N f ( Ei , L j , Dk ) . S ( Ei )
4
N t ( L j , Dk ) = N t ( Ei , L j , Dk )
where Nf (Ei, Lj, Dk) and Nt (Ei, Lj, Dk) are calculated from
Table 3. For integrating the parameter Lj into the dimensional reduction, the number of equivalent failure elements
Nf(Lj|E1) and the number of total elements Nt(Lj) must be
calculated for each combination of Lj and Dk.
7
N f ( L j|E1 ) = N f ( L j , Dk|E1 )
7
Fig 6 presents the number of equivalent failures and the

number of total segments calculated from equation (6) and
(7), respectively. The equivalent failures are also illustrated
through the Log-Normal distribution.22,23 The approximation of equivalent failures is called modified failures and is
represented in the column labelled Mod. fail. of Fig 6. The
safety factor and the failure factor are respectively derived
from the following formulas:
S( L j ) =
P( L1| E1 )
P( L j| E1 )
(8)
F(L j ) =
1

S( L j )
(9)
37598
0.0021
1.0000
1.0000
4232
0.0038
0.5628
1.7768
1.59
3305
0.0005
4.3952
0.2275
0.11
176
0.0006
3.5108
0.2848
97
97
45311
Nf(Ei)
Nt(Ei)
E1
53
79.47
E2
29
15.89
E3
15
E4
(7)
k =0
F(Ei)=
1/S(Ei)
Nf(Ei)
(6)
k =0
N t ( L j ) = N t ( L j , Dk )
S(Ei)
Ei
(5)
i =1
Nf(Ei)/
Nt(Ei)
Transf.
(4)
i =1
Failure
factor
F
Failures
(3)
Modification-fitting of Lj
Safety
factor
S
Total
Rate of
segments failures
Factor
1
S ( Ei )
Fig 5: The modified-fitted parameter of protection and its related factors (left); the fitting of the protection parameter with the
Poisson distribution for = 0.2(right)22
21
1/22/13 8:08 AM
Modification-fitting of Dk
Case study No1: Implementation of the model for

an existing cable route
For integrating the parameter Dk into the dimensional reduction, the number of failures equivalent to both E1 and L1 and
the total segments respectively at any Dk, can be calculated as:
10
N f ( Dk |E1 , L1 ) = N f ( L j , Dk |E1 ) . S ( L j )
This case study focuses on the link between the island of

Aegina (Aigina) and Methana.24 The link consists of three
cables of 3x150mm Al with a nominal voltage of 20kV. The
maximum laying depth is 105m and the length is 9.2km.
Two of the cables were laid in 1976 and the third was laid
in 1997.
After implementing the model presented in this paper,
the reliability for the specific cable routes is calculated to be
Rtotal = 0.0762 failures per 250m per year. The three cables
have been laid close to each other and provided with similar
external protection, hence the reliability for the three individual cable routes is the same. The respective MTBF equals
13.12 years per cable. If the same cable was installed unprotected then the reliability of each cable would be Rtotal(unpr.) =
0.2135 failures per 250m per year and the new MTBF would
be 4.68 years. The resulting reliability diagram for this interconnection is shown in Fig 8.
From the failure data recorded between 2000 and 2011,
for cable route No 3 one failure was recorded in 2009 and,
for cable routes Nos 1 and 2, another failure was recorded in
2010. These failures verify the value of MTBF that has been
calculated in this case study. Moreover, the recorded failure in
cable No 3 occurred 240m from the coast of Methana where
the protection of the cable was limited, whereas the recorded
failures of cables Nos 1 and 2 occurred 230m and 3350m,
respectively, off the coasts of Aegina where the level of protection was also limited.
(10)
j =1
10
N t ( Dk ) = N t ( L j , Dk )
(11)
j =1
Fig 7 presents the equivalent failures calculated from the

implementation of equation (10). The equivalent failures
of Dk are best fitted through the Poisson distribution.22,23
Therefore, the approximation of the modified failures is represented in the column labelled Mod. Fail. (in Fig 7). The
total equation (11) is also shown in Fig 7, along with the rate
of failures per 250m of cable for each Dk.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELIABILITY

MODEL FOR A SPECIFIC CABLE ROUTE
The failure factors that have been calculated in Figs 5, 6 and

7 imply the possibility of failure for each combination of
parameters Ei, Lj and Dk. The failure rate at any (Ei, Lj, Dk) of
the cable is derived as:
Rl = F ( Ei ) . F ( L j ) . P( Dk |E1 , L0 )
(12)
for i = 1 to n, where n is the total number of the segments of

the cable.
For the entire length of the cable the reliability is:
Case study No2: Implementation of the model for

the selection of a hypothetical cable route
Rtotal = Rl
(13)
i =1
This case study addresses the preliminary design of a hypothetical connection between the island of Syros and Lavrio
in the region of Attiki, as shown in Fig 9; the target of this
new connection is to transfer the electric power produced
from wind parks into the mainland.25 In this context, during
the phase of preliminary design two different cable routes
are identified and proposed. Route A is of 82.5km length
with a maximum depth up to 300m, and route B is of 84km
Mean time between failures (MTBF)

The mean time between failures refers to the safe operating
time for a cable route. The MTBF is:
MTBF =
1
Rtotal
Length
Li
(14)
Eqt.
Failures
Nf(Lj|E1)
Mod. fail.
Nf(Lj|E1)
Total
Segm.
Nt(Lj)
Rate of
failures
Nf(Lj|E1)/
Nt(Lj)
Safety
factor
S(Lj)
Failure
factor
F(Lj)
L0
(00.24)
76.5373
53.95755
3280
0.0233
1.00
1.000
L1
(0.250.49)
7.3768
21.21745
2635
0.0028
8.34
0.120
L2
(0.500.74)
11.1256
9.836608
2218
0.0050
4.65
0.215
L3
(0.750.99)
7.1256
5.160313
2157
0.0033
7.06
0.142
L4
(1.001.24)
5.6884
2.955343
2248
0.0025
9.22
0.108
L5
(1.251.49)
4.0000
1.806222
2135
0.0019
12.45
0.080
L6
(1.501.74)
1.0000
1.160678
2025
0.0005
47.25
0.021
L7
(1.751.99)
4.3952
0.776249
1884
0.0023
10.00
0.100
L8
(2.002.24)
2.0000
0.536373
2093
0.0010
24.42
0.041
L9
(>2.25)
16.0000
0.380855
24621
0.0006
35.91
0.028
Fig 6: The modified-fitted parameter of length and its related factors (left); the fitting of the parameter of length with the
Log-Normal distribution (right)23
22
1/22/13 8:08 AM
Depth
Dk
D0
(09)
Eqt.
Failures
Nf(Dk|E1,L0)
Mod. fail.
Nf(Dk|E1,L0)
Total
Segm.
Nt(Dk)
Rate of
failures
Nf(Dk|E1,L0)/
Nt(Dk)
127.92
143.04
4779
0.0299
D1
(1019)
66.62
286.09
4229
0.0676
D2
(2029)
281.38
286.09
4525
0.0632
D3
(3039)
18.64
190.73
2449
0.0779
D4
(4049)
61.35
95.36
3168
0.0301
D5
(5059)
18.44
38.15
1488
0.0256
D6
(6069)
(above
70)
24.91
12.72
1816
0.0070
457.69
3.63
22436
0.0002
D7
1056.96
Fig 7: The modified-fitted parameter of depth and its related factors (left); the fitting of depth with the Poisson distribution for
= 2 (right)22,23
Fig 8: Schematics of the reliability analysis

for the interconnection between AeginaMethana
Fig 9: Two alternative cable routes, A and B, are proposed and examined to decide which one would be chosen (in terms of
reliability)
23
1/22/13 8:08 AM
Lavrio
Cable
A
Sea depth
From LP
(Land point)
to 10m
From
10m to
20m
From
10m onwards
Syros
Cable
B
200m
10m
Trench 1.0m in
sandy substrate
Trench 0.6m in
rocky substrate
800m
500m
Trench 1.0m in
sandy substrate
PVC pipe 200mm

in rocky substrate
40250m
41490m
Cable in deposition in sandy substrate
Sea
depth
From LP
(Land point)
to 10m
From
10m to
20m
From
20m onwards
Cable
A
Cable
B
250m
50m
Trench 1.0m in
sandy substrate
Trench 1.0m in
sandy substrate
1000m
200m
Trench 1.0m in
sandy substrate
Trench 1.0m in
sandy substrate
40000m
41750m
Cable in deposition in sandy substrate
Table 5: Characteristics of proposed routes A and B from preliminary design
Fig 10: Reliability results for the two candidate routes, A and B.
24
1/22/13 8:08 AM
length with maximum depth up to 270m.The main characteristics of these two candidate cable routes are displayed
in Table 5.
Fig 10 shows the results of the reliability analysis for
both cable routes A and B. According to the analysis the
most critical areas for the routes are located near terminal
points; namely near the coasts. The highest probability
of failure is assigned to route B and more specifically
near the coasts of the island of Syros. Moreover, cable
route B appears to have more segments with minimum or
less possibility of failures than the respective values of
route A.
The comparison between the estimated MTBF for the
two candidate cable routes shows that route B appears to be
a better choice than adopting route A; the model yields the
following MTBFs:
MTBFA = 1/RA = 20.46 years;

MTBFB = 1/RB = 22.31 years.
In the case that the cables deployed for both alternative
cable routes were unprotected, then the respective values for
MTBF would reduce significantly to:
MTBFA(unprotected) = 1/RA = 6.6 years;
MTBFB (unprotected) = 1/RB = 12.97 years.
Hence, route A appears to be (significantly) less reliable
than route B, even though route B has a critical segment
for which additional protection should be considered due to
intense local human activities.
CONCLUSIONS
The use of submarine power cables is very important for

Greece with regards to the transfer of energy and the electrical interconnection of the islands with the mainland. The
descriptive statistics focusing on the failures of the submarine
medium-voltage network in Greek waters give the following
conclusions:
1. The rate of failures in the Hellenic electrical subsea
network is 0.0562 failures per km per year. This also
depends on the region of interest with a minimum rate
of 0.0104 failures per km per year (for the south Aegean
Sea) to a maximum rate of 0.6780 failures per km per
year (for the Ionian Sea; the latter high value should alert
the responsible authorities and proceed to further investigation/survey for this region);
2. The age of cables at the time of failure shows an empirical distribution that can be fitted by the normal distribution with a mean value of 18.65 years and a standard
deviation of 9.95 years;
3. Failures related to conductors made of copper are 50%
more per 100km than those related to aluminium;
4. The XLPE isolation seems to be better than the paper isolation. The use of XLPE isolation has been applied since
the year 2000 and, therefore, the sample of the XLPE
isolation system cables is still significant lower than the
one corresponding to paper isolation;
5. The study of failures against the depth and the minimum

distance from shores of the point of failure yields a negative exponential distribution. More specifically, the bulk
of failures are recorded near landing points and there is a
strong reduction in their numbers as cables routes draw
away from the shores and depth increases;
6. Failures related to human-derived hazards amount to
63.4%, whereas failures related to natural hazards are
22.6% and those due to hardware failure are just 12.9%.
According to a Cigre (Council for Large Electrical
Systems) study in 1986, failures related to human and
natural hazards were 82% and those related to hardware
failure (joints) were 18%;26
7. The type of protection for cables plays a significant role
in order to avoid damages.
A statistical analysis/model using four parameters (depth,
distance, protection of cable and type of seabed) that affect
submarine cables with regards to failures is presented in this
paper. The application of this reliability model can be used for
studying the reliability of medium-voltage power cables in a
two-fold manner:
1. To determine critical and safe areas along a certain cable
route. This is achieved by calculating the reliability
of each segment of cable (of 250m length). Moreover,
through the development of a reliability-driven diagram
the segments that have adequate protection, or the segments of the cable that need to be reinforced, can be
illustrated;
2. During the phase of preliminary design the optimum
route for laying the cable can be chosen. More specifically, the model can assess the reliability of candidate
cable routes and help select the safest one, ie, the route
with the higher reliability or with the higher Mean
Time Between Failures (MTBF), and can be adequately
justified.
References
1. RAE. 2005. Workgroup for the power interconnection

of Cyclades with the mainland. Technical report, 88pp.
2. Hviddsten S, et al. 2004. HV cable design applicable for direct electrical heating of very long flowlines.
Proceeding of Oceans 04 and MTTS/IEEE Techno-Ocean
04, Kobe, Japan.
3. Nexans AS. 2007. Subsea technology, submarine
cables, umbilicals and services, handbill for submarine power
cables. Norway, 36pp.
4. Worzyk T. 2009. Submarine power cables, design
aspects. Springer, Ch.2 Submarine power cables and their
design. Berlin, 306pp.
5. Public Power Corporation, Standard of Public Power
Corporation S.A. GR-214, 11pp.
6. Public Power Corporation, Standard of Public Power
Corporation S.A. TP-195, 11pp.
7. Stavrou D. 2012. Submarine power cables, the fleet,
the laying procedure and reliability analysis of submarine
medium voltage power transmission grid. D Th. NTUA,
Athens, 186pp.
25
1/22/13 8:08 AM
8. Public Power Corporation. 2006. Technical specifications for supply and laying submarine power cables with
X-LPE isolation for the link Kalymnos-Kos. Declaration
2170302, 35pp.
9. Nexans Industries GmbH & Co. 2003. Submarine
power cables, handbill for cables specifications, Deutschland,
16pp.
aspects. Springer, Ch.4 Submarine Cable Joints, Berlin,
306pp.
11. Stephen CD and Alan GH. 2009. Fishing and submarine cables working together. 2nd edition. ICPC, 54pp.
12. Dr Papageorgiou G, Chasiotis Th, Dr Feredinos G
and Bogiatzakis I. 1995. Marine geological and man hazards and their effect on dumping pipes and cables. PATRA,
150pp.
13. International Cable Protection Committee Ltd. 2011.
Presentation about submarine power cables ,45pp.
14. Nexans Norway AS. 2009. Specialised in submarine
projects, cables and umbilical systems for offshore applications, Bremerhaven.
15. Ernesto Z. 2009. HVDC transmission cable systems,
state-of-the-art and future trends. Prysmian Powerlink, ICC
Meeting Subcommitee, Orlando, USA, 46pp.
16. Alcatel-Fulgor. 1998. Technical report for submarine
power cables. HTC 1350/12 12/20 (24) KV, 3x95mm2, XLPE,
55pp.
17. Axelsson T. 2008. Submarine cable laying and installation services for the offshore alternative energy industry.
Energy Ocean 2008, 9pp.
26

aspects. Springer. Ch.7 Installation and protection of submarine power cables, Berlin, 306pp.
19. Nakamura M, et al. 1992. Reliability analysis of submarine power cables and determination of external mechanical protection. IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol.7,
895902pp.
20. Submarine power cables of distribution. 1986. DMKD/
TMSA. Characteristics of submarine power cables of medium
voltage, 64pp.
21. FULGOR, Greek electric cables. 2006. Offer for the
Inquiry of Hellenic PPC DD-164 for the link KalymnosKos. 18pp.
22. Perakis A. 1989. Reliability and safety of marine engineering, theory and applications. Athens. 277pp.
23. Hahn and Shapiro. 1994. Statistical model in engineering, Canada, 355pp.
24. Technical report, Akti Engineering. 2008. Marine and
land surveying services, subsea geophysical research to the
link Aigina-Methana.
25. Public Power Corporation. 2011. Declaration DYPM
40908, for the operation of: Interconnection of Cyclades
islands with the mainland power transmission grid.
26. CIGRE paper. 1986. Methods to prevent mechanical
damage to submarine cables. Paris.
27. CIGRE Study Committee. 2009. Update of service
experience of HV underground and submarine cable systems.
Cigre Working group B1-10 2009.
28. ICPC. 2007. Recommendation No 9: Minimum technical requirements for a desktop study. Portsmouth. 16pp.
1/22/13 8:08 AM

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Journal of Marine Engineering & Technology

ISSN: 2046-4177 (Print) 2056-8487 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tmar20

Submarine power cables: laying procedure, the

Published online: 01 Dec 2014.

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Date: 16 June 2016, At: 14:24

Submarine power cables:

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ubmarine power cables have for many years played a

to a significant development of submarine power cables for

Volume 12 No 1 January 2013 Journal of Marine Engineering and Technology

Aside from the characteristics of cables and their laying

SUBMARINE POWER CABLES (SPCs)

There are a lot of similarities between submarine power

(Al). It is the means by which the current passes through;

made of isolating materials that prevent the conductor

stability and mechanical protection during storage, load,

LAYING PROCEDURE OF SPCs

Journal of Marine Engineering and TechnologyVolume 12 No 1 January 2013

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the project depends on several, different and sometimes

1. Loading of the cable onboard the cable laying vessels

1. Geological structure of the region of the interconnection;

In the early stages of submarine cable planning, consideration

THE FLEET OF CABLE LAYING VESSELS

Volume 12 No 1 January 2013 Journal of Marine Engineering and Technology

LDT(m) /Payload V (kn)

Table 1: Specifications of CLVs operated in Greece

SUBMARINE MV POWER TRANSMISSION

Descriptive statistics of the factors causing failures to

Journal of Marine Engineering and TechnologyVolume 12 No 1 January 2013

Downloaded by [36.78.158.9] at 14:24 16 June 2016

Fig 2: Correlations/distributions of factors that affect the occurrence of failures to SPCs

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF MV SPC

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Fig 3: Cause of failures according to human and natural

The model is based on that presented by Nakamura

point of failure from the coast;

The seabed characteristics of the cable route at the area

at the area of failure.

Journal of Marine Engineering and TechnologyVolume 12 No 1 January 2013

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and it is called L9.Each one of those parts is laid to a specific

Detailed description of the parameters of the

Depth of the cable route at the point of failure Dk

In effect, the domain of this parameter is:

mum distance from the coast Lj (j = 0 to 9)

Inside tube or dividing shells

Inside tube or dividing shells

Under concrete mattresses

Buried in trench 2.0m

Buried in trench 2.0m

Buried in trench 0.8m

Under concrete mattresses

Volume 12 No 1 January 2013 Journal of Marine Engineering and Technology

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Journal of Marine Engineering and TechnologyVolume 12 No 1 January 2013

The raw data presented in Table 4 provide information for

Downloaded by [36.78.158.9] at 14:24 16 June 2016