Professional Documents
Culture Documents
School of Law
LlB 314
Transportation and Public Service Act
Submitted by:
Abangan, Richard Jr.
Atienza, Joao
Chanyapat, Mary
Garcia, Stephen John
Jongoy, Kent Francesco C.
Lim, Hadjie
Patinggan, Denmark
Table of Contents:
1. Synthesis/Discussion
2. Case Digests
27
27
29
31
33
35
36
PNB vs. CA
38
42
46
47
49
51
52
56
58
59
Mecenas vs. CA
60
62
63
65
66
68
69
71
72
73
75
78
80
82
GENERAL CONCEPTS
MARITIME LAW
(3)
Registration of Vessels
Vessels are now registered through the Maritima
industry Authority. It is a rule that the person who is the
registered owner of the vessel is presumed to be the owner
of the vessel. Moreover, it is likewise a settled rule that the
sale or transfer of the vessel is not binding on third persons
unless the same is registered. As stated in the case of
Rubiso vs. Rivera;
The requisite of registration on the registry, of the
purchase of a vessel, is necessary and indispensable in
order that the purchasers rights may be maintained
against a claim filed by a third person. Such registration
is required both by the Code of Commerce and by Act
No. 1900.
The sale on behalf of the defendant Rivera was
prior to that made at public auction to Rubiso, but the
registration of this latter sale was prior by many days to
the sale made to the defendant.
However, the requisites of registration in the
registry, of the purchase of a vessel, is necessary and
indispensable in order that the purchaser's rights may be
Poliand
Industrial
vs.
National
own labor, preserving the goods or the ship which the owner
or those entrusted with the care of them have either
abandoned in distress at sea, or are unable to protect and
secure.
Claim for Valid Salvage
In the case of Barrios vs. Go Thong & Co., the Court
found that "no marine peril attended the claim for salvage,
and what transpired was a quasi-contract of 'towage'
because in consenting to plaintiff's offer to tow the vessel,
defendant thereby impliedly entered into a juridical relation
of 'towage' with the owner of the towing vessel, captained by
plaintiff. Thus, 'the circumstances that although the
defendant's vessel was in a helpless condition due to engine
failure, it did not drift too far from the place where it was,
that the weather was fair, clear and good, that there were
only ripples on the sea which was quiete smooth, that there
was moonlight, that although said vessel was drifting
towards the open sea, there was no danger of its floundering
or being stranded as it was far from any island or rocks, and
its anchor could be released to prevent such occurrence, all
show that there was no marine peril, and the vessel was not
a quasi-derelict, as to warrant a valid salvage claim for the
towing of the vessel."
COGSA (ARTS. 1753 and 1766, NCC; Applications)
History
The Carriage of Goods by Sea was originally passed by
the Congress of the United States on April 16, 1936 as Public
Act. No. 521. COGSA contains advanced legislation, which is
in consonance with modern maritime rules and the practices
of great shipping countries of the world. However, when the
New Civil Code took effect On August 30, 1950, it becomes
the primary law on goods that are being transported from a
foreign port to the Philippines, and the COGSA becomes to
be a suppletory law for such type of transportation international shipping.
Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled that the rights and
obligations of common carrier are governed by the
suppled) (Domingo
Agencies, Inc.).
Ang
v.
American
Steamship
Furthermore, transshipment cargo made via an interisland vessel is governed under the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act, hence, it may be a subject to the prescription required
therein (American Insurance Co v. Compania Maritima).
Definition of delivery
Since the prescriptive period under COGSA is computed
from the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods
should have been delivered, the Supreme Court in the case
of Union Carbide Phils Inc. v. Manila Railroad defined
delivery as delivery to the arrastre operator. That delivery is
evidenced by tally sheets which show whether the goods
were landed in good order or in bad order, a fact which the
consignee or shipper can easily ascertain through the
customs broker.
No retroactivity of amended complaint
An amended complaint does not retroact to the date of
filing the original except if the amendment merely
supplements and amplifies the facts alleged in the original
pleading. This exception, however does not apply to parties
impleaded for the first time in an amended complaint.
In the case at bar, "respondent failed to meet the
requirement of filing a notice of loss or damages and
therefore the prescriptive period of one year started to run of
April 15, 1992. While the initial complaint filed on March 11,
1993 was within the prescriptive period, Wallem was only
impleaded on June 7, 1993. Therefore, the complaint against
Wallem should be dismissed. (Wallem Philippines
Shipping, Inc. v. S.R. Farms, Inc.)
COGSA and Bill of Lading
Art. 1749. A stipulation that the common carrier's
liability is limited to the value of the goods appearing in the
bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater
value, is binding.
Maritime Law
1.
[G.R. No. 92735. June 8, 2000]
MONARCH INSURANCE CO., INC., TABACALERA
INSURANCE CO., INC and Hon. Judge AMANTE
PURISIMA, petitioners,
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS and ABOITIZ SHIPPING
CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts:
Monarch and Tabacalera are insurance carriers of lost
cargoes. They indemnified the shippers and were
consequently subrogated to their rights, interests and
actions against Aboitiz, the cargo carrier. Because Aboitiz
refused to compensate Monarch, it filed two complaints
against Aboitiz.
Monarch sought recovery of P29,719.88 representing
the value of three (3) pallets of glass tubing that sank with
the M/V P. Aboitiz, plus attorneys fees of not less than
P5,000.00, litigation expenses, interest at the legal rate on
all these amounts, and cost of suit. Tabacalera sought
Yes.
The failure of Aboitiz to present sufficient evidence to
exculpate itself from fault and/or negligence in the sinking of
its vessel in the face of the foregoing expert testimony
constrains us to hold that Aboitiz was concurrently at fault
and/or negligent with the ship captain and crew of the M/V P.
Aboitiz. [This is in accordance with the rule that in cases
involving the limited liability of shipowners, the initial burden
of proof of negligence or unseaworthiness rests on the
claimants. However, once the vessel owner or any party
asserts the right to limit its liability, the burden of proof as to
lack of privity or knowledge on its part with respect to the
matter of negligence or unseaworthiness is shifted to it. This
burden, Aboitiz had unfortunately failed to discharge.] That
Aboitiz failed to discharge the burden of proving that the
unseaworthiness of its vessel was not due to its fault and/or
negligence should not however mean that the limited
liability rule will not be applied to the present cases. The
peculiar circumstances here demand that there should be no
strict adherence to procedural rules on evidence lest the just
claims of shippers/insurers be frustrated. The rule on limited
liability should be applied in accordance with the latest ruling
in Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. General Accident Fire and
Life Assurance Corporation, Ltd.,] promulgated on January
21, 1993, that claimants be treated as "creditors in an
insolvent corporation whose assets are not enough to satisfy
the totality of claims against it."
2.
[G.R. No. 156978 May 2, 2006]
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
-versusNEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., Respondent.
Facts:
Societe Francaise Des Colloides loaded a cargo of
textiles and auxiliary chemicals from France on board a
vessel owned by Franco-Belgian Services, Inc. The cargo was
consigned to General Textile, Inc., in Manila and insured by
respondent New India Assurance Company, Ltd. While in
3.
[G.R. No. 121833]
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
-versus COURT OF APPEALS, MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., COMPAGNIE MARITIME DES CHARGEURS REUNIS,
and F.E. ZUELLIG (M), INC., Respondents.
Facts:
Respondent
Malayan
Insurance
Company,
Inc.
(Malayan) filed five separate actions against several
defendants for the collection of the amounts of the cargoes
allegedly paid by Malayan under various marine cargo
policies issued to the insurance claimants. The shipments
were supported by their respective bills of lading and insured
separately by Malayan against the risk of loss or damage. In
the five consolidated cases, Malayan sought the recovery of
amounts totaling P639,862.02.
Aboitiz raised the defenses of lack of jurisdiction, lack of
cause of action and prescription. It also claimed that M/V P.
Aboitiz was seaworthy, that it exercised extraordinary
diligence and that the loss was caused by a fortuitous event.
After trial on the merits, the RTC of Manila rendered a
Decision dated 27 November 1989, adjudging Aboitiz liable
on the money claims. Aboitiz, CMCR and Zuellig appealed
the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 March 1995, the Court of Appeals (Ninth Division)
affirmed the RTC decision. It disregarded Aboitizs argument
that the sinking of the vessel was caused by a force majeure,
in view of this Courts finding in a related case, Aboitiz
Shipping Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al. (the 1990
GAFLAC case). In said case, this Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals finding that the sinking of M/V P. Aboitiz was caused
by the negligence of its officers and crew. It is one of the
numerous collection suits against Aboitiz, which eventually
reached this Court in connection with the sinking of M/V P.
Aboitiz.
Issue:
Whether or not Aboitiz can avail limited liability on the basis
of the real and hypothecary doctrine of maritime law.
Ruling:
DENIED PETITION.
On 02 May 2006, the Court rendered a decision in
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. New India Assurance
Company, Ltd. (New India), reiterating the well-settled
principle that the exception to the limited liability doctrine
applies when the damage is due to the fault of the
shipowner or to the concurrent negligence of the shipowner
and the captain. Where the shipowner fails to overcome the
presumption of negligence, the doctrine of limited liability
cannot be applied. In New India, the Court clarified that the
earlier pronouncement in Monarch Insurance was not an
abandonment of the doctrine of limited liability and that the
circumstances therein still made the doctrine applicable.
In New India, the Court declared that Aboitiz failed to
discharge its burden of showing that it exercised
extraordinary diligence in the transport of the goods it had
on board in order to invoke the limited liability doctrine.
Thus, the Court rejected Aboitizs argument that the award of
damages to respondent therein should be limited to its pro
rata share in the insurance proceeds from the sinking of M/V
P. Aboitiz.
The instant petitions provide another occasion for the
Court to reiterate the well-settled doctrine of the real and
hypothecary nature of maritime law. As a general rule, a ship
owners liability is merely co-extensive with his interest in the
vessel, except where actual fault is attributable to the
shipowner. Thus, as an exception to the limited liability
doctrine, a shipowner or ship agent may be held liable for
damages when the sinking of the vessel is attributable to the
actual fault or negligence of the shipowner or its failure to
ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel. The instant petitions
cannot be spared from the application of the exception to
the doctrine of limited liability in view of the unanimous
findings of the courts below that both Aboitiz and the crew
failed to ensure the seaworthiness of the M/V P. Aboitiz.
4.
[G.R. No. 160088 July 13, 2011]
AGUSTIN P. DELA TORRE
-versusTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Respondent Crisostomo G. Concepcion (Concepcion)
owned LCT-Josephine, a vessel registered with the Philippine
Coast Guard. On February 1, 1984, Concepcion entered into
a "Preliminary Agreement" with Roland de la Torre (Roland)
for the dry-docking and repairs of the said vessel as well as
for its charter afterwards. Under this agreement, Concepcion
agreed that after the dry-docking and repair of LCTJosephine, it "should" be chartered for P 10,000.00 per
month.
On June 20, 1984, Concepcion and the Philippine Trigon
Shipyard Corporation (PTSC), represented by Roland, entered
into a "Contract of Agreement," wherein the latter would
charter LCT-Josephine retroactive to May 1, 1984.
On November 22, 1984, TSL, this time represented by
Roland per Agustins Special Power of Attorney, subchartered LCT-Josephine to Ramon Larrazabal (Larrazabal)
for the transport of cargo consisting of sand and gravel to
Leyte.
On November 23, 1984, the LCT-Josephine with its
cargo of sand and gravel arrived at Philpos, Isabel, Leyte.
The vessel was beached near the NDC Wharf. With the
vessels ramp already lowered, the unloading of the vessels
cargo began with the use of Larrazabals payloader. While
the payloader was on the deck of the LCT-Josephine scooping
a load of the cargo, the vessels ramp started to move
downward, the vessel tilted and sea water rushed in. Shortly
thereafter, LCT-Josephine sank.
Concepcion demanded that PTSC/ Roland refloat LCTJosephine. The latter assured Concepcion that negotiations
were underway for the refloating of his vessel. Unfortunately,
this did not materialize.
For this reason, Concepcion was constrained to institute
a complaint for "Sum of Money and Damages" against PTSC
and Roland before the RTC.
RTC ruled that defendants should pay LCT-Josephine.
Agustin, PTSC and Roland went to the CA on appeal. The
appellate court, in agreement with the findings of the RTC,
affirmed its decision in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not there is applicability of the Code of
Commerce, more specifically, the Limited Liability Rule.
Ruling:
With respect to petitioners position that the Limited
Liability Rule under the Code of Commerce should be applied
to them, the argument is misplaced. The said rule has been
explained to be that of the real and hypothecary doctrine in
maritime law where the shipowner or ship agents liability is
held as merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel
such that a total loss thereof results in its extinction.
The only person who could avail of this is the
shipowner, Concepcion. He is the very person whom the
Limited Liability Rule has been conceived to protect. The
petitioners cannot invoke this as a defense.
Vessels
Minor Craft
5.
[G.R. No. L-29166 October 22, 1928]
AUGUSTO LOPEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
-versusJUAN DURUELO, ET AL., defendants.
ALBINO JISON, appellee.
Facts:
On February 10, 1927, plaintiff Augusto Lopez was
desirous of embarking upon the interisland steamer San
Jacinto in order to go to Cebu, the plaintiff embarked at the
landing in the motorboat Jison which was engaged in
conveying passengers and luggage back and forth from the
landing to the boats at anchor.
As the motorboat approached San Jacinto in a perfectly
quiet sea, it came too near to the stern of the ship, and as
the propeller of the ship had not yet ceased to turn, the
blades of the propeller strucked the motorboat and sank it at
once. As it sank, the plaintiff was thrown into the water
against the propeller, and the revolving blades inflicted
various injuries upon him. The plaintiff was hospitalized. He
filed a complaint seeking to recover damages from the
defendant. The defendant however alleged that the
complaint does not have a right of action, a demurrer was
submitted directed to the fact that the complaint does not
allege that the protest had been presented by the plaintiff,
within twenty-four hours after the occurrence to the
For that reason, Rivera took possession of said pilot boat Valentina,
as its sole owner.
On the same year, after the sale of the boat, suit having been
brought in the justice of the pace court against Sy to enforce payment
of a certain sum of money, the latter's creditor Rubiso acquired said
vessel at a public auction sale. The certificate of sale and
adjudication of the boat in question was issued by the sherrif on
behalf of Rubiso, in the office of the Collector of Customs, on the
same year and was also entered in the commercial registry after two
months.
So that the pilot boat Valentina was twice sold: first privately by
its owner Sy to Rivera and afterwards by the sheriff at public auction
in conformity with the order contained in the judgment rendered by
the justice of the pace, court, on the same year, against Sy and in
behalf of Rubiso.
Issue:
Which of the parties (Rubiso and Rivera) is the real owner of Pilot
Boat Valentina?
Ruling:
It is undeniable that Rivera acquired by purchase the pilot boat
Valentina on a date prior to that of the purchase and adjudication
made at publication, by and on behalf of Rubiso; but it is no less true
that the sale of the vessel by Qui to Rivera, on January 4, 1915, was
entered in the customs registry on March 17, 1915, while its sale at
public action to Rubiso on the 23rd of January of the same year,
1915, was recorded in the office of the Collector of Customs on the
27th of the same month, and in the commercial registry on the 4th of
March, following; that is, the sale on behalf of the defendant Rivera
was prior to that made at public auction to Rubiso, but the registration
of this latter sale was prior by many days to the sale made to the
defendant.
was
prior
the
The
the
for
8.
[G.R. No. 155014 November 11, 2005]
CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., Petitioner,
- versus M/V LOK MAHESHWARI,
THE SHIPPING CORPORATION OF INDIA, and PORTSERV
LIMITED Promulgated: and/or TRANSMAR SHIPPING, INC.,
Respondents.
Facts:
An oceangoing vessel of Indian registry is owned by
SCI, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
India and principally owned by the Government of India. It
was time-chartered by SCI to Halla, a South Korean company.
Halla, in turn, sub-charted the Vessel through a time charter
to Transmar. Transfer further sub-charted the Vessel to
Portserv. Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations
organized and existing under the laws of Canada.
Later, Portserv requested Crescent, a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of Canada that is
engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil
9.
[G.R. No. 143866. August 22, 2005]
POLIAND INDUSTRIAL LIMITED, petitioner,
10.
[G.R. NO. 166845 December 10, 2008]
TSUNEISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES (CEBU),
INC., Petitioner,
-versusNEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC., SULFICIO O. TAGUD,
JR., AND THE REHABILITATION RECEIVER FOR NEGROS
NAVIGATION CO., INC.
Facts:
NCC is a shipping company that is primarily engaged in
the business of transporting through shipping vessels,
passengers and cargoes at various ports of call in the
country. THI, on the other hand, is engaged in the business
of shipbuilding and repair. NCC engaged the services of THI
for the repair of its vessels.
THI filed a case for sum of money and damages against
NNC for failure of the latter to pay the services of the former
for the repair of the vessels.
The Cebu RTC issued an order granting the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of
NNC. By virtue of the writ of preliminary attachment, Sheriff
levied on one of the vessels of NNC, the M/V St. Peter the
Apostle.
11.
[G.R. No. 115286 August 11, 1994]
INTER-ORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., SEA
HORSE SHIP, INC. and TRENDA WORLD SHIPPING
(MANILA), INC., petitioners,
-versusNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
RIZALINO D. TAYONG, respondents.
Facts:
This is a claim for death compensation benefits filed by
Constancia Pineda as heir of her deceased son, seaman
Jeremias Pineda, against Interorient Maritime Enterprises,
Inc. and its foreign principal, Fircroft Shipping Corporation
and the Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. The following
facts were found by the POEA Administrator.
On September 28, 1989, he finished his contract and
was discharged from the port of Dubai for repatriation to
Manila; that his flight schedule from Dubai to the Philippines
necessitated a stopover at Bangkok, Thailand, and during
said stopover he disembarked on his own free will and failed
to join the connecting flight to Hongkong with final
destination to Manila; that on October 5, 1990, it received a
fax transmission from the Department of Foreign Affairs to
the effect that Jeremias Pineda was shot by a Thai Officer on
duty on October 2, 1989 at around 4:00 P.M.; that the police
report submitted to the Philippine Embassy in Bangkok
confirmed that it was Pineda who "approached and tried to
stab the police sergeant with a knife and that therefore he
was forced to pull out his gun and shot Pineda"
Petitioner contends that they are not liable to pay any
death/burial benefits pursuant to the provisions of Par. 6,
Section C. Part II, POEA Standard Format of Employment
which state(s) that "no compensation shall be payable in
respect of any injury, (in)capacity, disability or death
resulting from a willful (sic) act on his own life by the
seaman"; that the deceased seaman died due to his own
willful (sic) act in attacking a policeman in Bangkok who shot
him in self-defense.
After the parties presented their respective evidence,
the POEA Administrator rendered his decision holding
petitioners liable for death compensation benefits and burial
expenses.
Petitioners appealed the POEA decision to the public
respondent. In a Decision dated March 30, 1994, public
respondent upheld the POEA.
Thus, this recourse to this Court by way of a special civil
action for certiorari per Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners can be held liable for the death of
seaman Jeremias Pineda?
Held:
The petitioners contention that the assailed Resolution
has no factual and legal bases is belied by the adoption with
approval by the public respondent of the findings of the
POEA Administrator, which recites at length the reasons for
holding that the deceased Pineda was mentally sick prior to
his death and concomitantly, was no longer in full control of
his mental faculties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED and the Decision assailed in this petition
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
12.
[G.R. No. 154305. December 9, 2004]
MACONDRAY & CO., INC., petitioner,
-versusPROVIDENT INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondent.
Facts:
CANPOTEX SHIPPING SERVICES LIMITED INC., shipped
on board the vessel M/V Trade carrier certain goods in favor
of ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION. Subject shipments were
insured with Provident Insurance Corp. against all risks.
When the shipment arrived, consignee discovered that
the shipment sustained losses. Provident paid for said losses.
Formal claims were then filed with Trade & Transport but
MACONDRAY refused and failed to settle the same.
MACONDRAY denies liability over the losses, it, having no
absolute relation with Trade & Transport, the alleged
operator of the vessel who transported the shipment; that
accordingly, MACONDRAY is the local representative of the
shipper; the charterer of M/V Trade Carrier and not party to
this case; that it has no control over the acts of the captain
and crew of the carrier and cannot be held responsible for
any damage arising from the fault or negligence of said
captain and crew; that upon arrival at the port, M/V Trade
13.
Special Contracts
Charter Party
14.
[G.R. No. 131166. September 30, 1999]
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. petitioner,
-versusSULPICIO LINES, INC., GO SIOC SO, ENRIQUE S. GO,
EUSEBIO S. GO, CARLOS S. GO, VICTORIANO S. GO,
DOMINADOR S. GO, RICARDO S. GO, EDWARD S. GO,
ARTURO S. GO, EDGAR S. GO, EDMUND S. GO,
FRANCISCO SORIANO, VECTOR SHIPPING
CORPORATION, TERESITA G. CAEZAL AND SOTERA E.
CAEZAL, respondents.
Facts:
On December 20, 1987, motor tanker MV Vector,
carrying petroleum products of Caltex, collided in the open
sea with passenger ship MV Doa Paz, causing the death of
all but 25 of the latters passengers. Among those who died
were Sebastian Canezal and his daughter Corazon Canezal.
On March 22, 1988, the board of marine inquiry found that
Vector Shipping Corporation was at fault. On February 13,
1989, Teresita Caezal and Sotera E. Caezal, Sebastian
Caezals wife and mother respectively, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages
arising from breach of contract of carriage against Sulpicio
Lines. Sulpicio filed a third-party complaint against Vector
and Caltex. The trial court dismissed the complaint against
Caltex, but the Court of Appeals included the same in the
liability. Hence, Caltex filed this petition.
Issue:
Is the charterer of a sea vessel liable for damages resulting
from a collision between the chartered vessel and a
passenger ship?
Held:
16.
[G.R. No. L-49407 August 19, 1988]
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitionerappellant,
-versusTHE COURT OF APPEALS and DEVELOPMENT
INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, respondentsappellees.
Facts:
17.
[G.R. No. 88052 December 14, 1989]
JOSE P. MECENAS, ROMEO P. MECENAS, LILIA P.
MECENAS, ORLANDO P. MECENAS, VIOLETA M.
ACERVO, LUZVIMINDA P. MECENAS; and OFELIA M.
JAVIER, petitioners,
-versusHON. COURT OF APPEALS, CAPT. ROGER SANTISTEBAN
and NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC., respondents.
Facts:
On April 22, 1980, two vessels, the M/T Tacloban City
(owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and
operated by PNOC Shipping and Transport Company) and the
M/V Don Juan (owned and operated by Negros Navigation
Co., Inc.) collided in the Talbas Strait. As a result of the
collision, the Don Juan sank despite the good weather and
calm seas. Hundreds of passengers died. Some heirs of the
deceased passengers filed suit against Negros Navigation
and the captain of the Don Juan, Captain Roger Santisteban.
The trial court awarded P400,000 in damages for the death
of plaintiffs parents while the court of appeals reduced the
amount to P100,000 for actual and compensatory
damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in reducing the award of the
trial court.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Negros Navigation is
liable to pay P800,000 total in damages broken down as
follows:
P126,000 as actual damages
P60,000 as compensatory damages
P307,000 as exemplary damages
Salvage Law
18.
[G.R. No. L-17192 March 30, 1963]
COGSA
19.
[G.R. No. L-22491 January 27, 1967]
DOMINGO ANG, plaintiff-appellant,
-versusAMERICAN STEAMSHIP AGENCIES, INC., defendantappellee.
Facts:
Yau Yue Commercial Bank Ltd. of Hongkong agreed to
sell 140 packages of galvanized steel durzinc sheets to one
Herminio G. Teves for the sum of $32,458.26 subject to
terms and agreements. Pursuant to said terms and
arrangements, Yau Yue through Tokyo Boeki Ltd. shipped the,
of which the American Steamship Agencies, Inc. is the agent
in the Philippines, under a shipping agreement, consigned
"to order of the shipper with Herminio G. Teves as the party
to be notified of the arrival of the 140 packages of
21.
[G.R. No. L-27798 June 15, 1977]
UNION CARBIDE PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly National
Carbon Philippines, Inc.), plaintiff-appellant,
-versusMANILA RAILROAD CO., substituted by the PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL RAILWAYS, MANILA PORT SERVICE and
AMERICAN STEAMSHIP AGENCIES, INC., defendantsappellees.
Facts:
On December 18, 1961 the vessel Daishin Maru arrived
in Manila with a cargo of 1,000 bags of synthetic resin
consigned to General Base Metals, Inc. which later sold the
cargo to Union Carbide Philippines, Inc. On the following day
that cargo was delivered to the Manila Port Service in good
order and condition except for twenty- five bags which were
in bad order. Only eight hundred ninety-eight (898) bags of
resin (out of the 1,000 bags) were delivered by the customs
broker to the consignee. One hundred two bags were
22.
[G.R. No. L-37604 October 23, 1981]
EASTERN AND AUSTRALIAN STEAMSHIP CO., LTD. AND
F. E. ZUELLIG, INC., petitioners,
vs.
GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. and COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH
XIII,respondents.
FACTS:
Steamship Chitral, owned and operated in the
Philippines by Eastern and Australian Steamship Co., Ltd.
was under a contract of carriage of goods by shipper Jackson
and Spring (Sydney) Pty. Ltd. The said contract of carriage
pertains to the shipment of a one (1) case warman pump
from the shipper to its consignee, Benguet Consolidated
located in Manila, Philippines. The said cargo equipment was
insured through the Great American Insurance, Co. for P
35,921.81 against all risks. However, upon the vessels
arrival in the Philippines, the shipment was not delivered
even with the consistent demand from the consignee and
shipper. Due to the existence of an insurance contract, the
23.
[G.R. No. 74125 July 31, 1990]
UNIVERSAL SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
-versusINTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT and ALLIANCE
ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the Manila agent, owner and operator of
SEVALCO Ltd. In March 1974, through M/V Taiwan,
SEVALCO Ltd. entered into a contract to deliver shipments to
consignee S. Lersen Company, Ltd. and Muang Ngarm
Retreads,Ltd. located in Bangkok, Thailand. The shipments
were insured by Alliance Assurance Company, Ltd. MV
Taiwan arrived in Thailand but failed to unload and deliver
the shipment for S. Lersen Company, Ltd. However, the
shipment for Muang Ngarm Retreads, Ltd. was delivered but
was with weight shortage. According to the report submitted
by the vessel master, the shipment was damaged due to
partial or total dissolution to saltwater caused by a broken
pipe line in the vessel wherein the cargoes were placed.
Consignees filed formal claims for loss and damage to their
cargoes against the insurer. The insurer paid both claims in
the amounts of I2,180 and 2,547, respectively. The
respondent/ insurer-subrogee filed an action against
petitioner to collect the amount it paid to the consignees.
The trial court ordered the petitioners to pay the
respondent/insurer-subrogee the amount it paid to the
consignee. It was also upheld by the Court of Appeals, hence
this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over
the case.
2. Whether or not the respondent/ insurer-subrogees cause
of action has already prescribed.
RULING/S:
The court denied the petition for review on certiorari for
lack of merits.
24.
[G.R. No. 124050. June 19, 1997]
MAYER STEEL PIPE CORPORATION and HONGKONG
GOVERNMENT SUPPLIES DEPARTMENT, petitioners,
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS, SOUTH SEA SURETY AND
INSURANCE CO., INC. and the CHARTER INSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Mayer Pipe Corporation was contracted by
Hong
Kong
Government
Supplies
Department
to
manufacture and supply various types of steel pipes and
fittings. Under its contract, Mayer agreed to deliver the steel
pipes and fittings to Hong Kong. It also insured the same
against all risks with South Sea Surety and Insurance Co.
and Charter Insurance Corp. To assure that the cargoes are
all of good condition as specified in the contract, both parties
employed a supply inspector which examined the cargoes
before its shipment. After inspection, all steel pipes were
declared of good condition and was delivered to the
consignee. After arriving in Hong Kong, the cargoes were
discovered to be partially damaged. The consignee filed an
indemnity claim against the insurer under the insurance
contract. The insurer paid the agreed value of the shipment
as stipulated in their insurance contract. Petitioners likewise
demanded from the respondents the payment of the cost of
the
repair
of
the
damaged
steel
pipes.
The
respondent/insurer denied the request. They contended that
the damage was caused due to factory defects as specified
by their insurance inspector. The petitioner filed a case
before the trial court and the latter ordered the
respondent/insurer to pay the amount representing the
repair fees. The decision was appealed in the Court of
Appeals and was affirmed with revisions. The appellate court
affirmed that the damage sustained by the cargoes was not
due to factory defects and added that the cause of action of
the petitioners has already prescribed. Accordingly, the
action under Section 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act has already prescribed since it was filed only on April 17,
1986, more than two years from the time the goods were
unloaded from the vessel. The provision expressly provides
that "the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all
liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought
within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when
the goods should have been delivered." The appellate court
ruled that this provision applies not only to the carrier but
also to the insurer. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioners are barred by prescription
under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
RULING/S:
The petition is granted and the decision of the appellate
court is set aside and the decision of the trial court is
reinstated.
NO, the appellate court erred in applying the provisions
under Commonwealth Act No. 65 otherwise known as the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. Sec. 3(6) shall not apply to
actions brought by the shipper against the insurer. Since
both parties are not under the contract of carriage but are
governed by the stipulations of their insurance contract,
hence the Insurance Code must be applied. An insurance
contract is a contract whereby one party, for a consideration
known as the premium, agrees to indemnify another for loss
or damage which he may suffer from a specified peril. An "all
risks" insurance policy covers all kinds of loss other than
those due to willful and fraudulent act of the insured. Thus,
when private respondents issued the "all risks" policies to
petitioner Mayer, they bound themselves to indemnify the
latter in case of loss or damage to the goods insured. Such
obligation prescribes in ten years, in accordance with Article
1144 of the New Civil Code
25.
[G.R. No. 119571. March 11, 1998]
MITSUI O.S.K. LINES LTD., represented by MAGSAYSAY
AGENCIES, INC., petitioner,
-versusCOURT OF APPEALS and LAVINE LOUNGEWEAR MFG.
CORP., respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd., entered into a
contract of carriage through Meister Transport, Inc., an
international freight forwarder, with private respondent
Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing Corporation to transport
goods of the latter from Manila to Le Havre, France.
Petitioner undertook to deliver the goods to France within 28
days from the initial loading of the cargoes to the vessel.
However, due to delays in Kaoshiung, Taiwan the cargoes
only arrived in France after almost 4 months. Consignee only
paid half of the actual price of the cargoes since it arrived
26.
[G.R. No. L-7280. January 20, 1956.]
TAN LIAO, Plaintif-Appellant,
-versusAMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., DefendantAppellee.
Facts:
Plaintiff entered into a contract with Ken Sales Co., Inc.,
of New York City, though the latter's agents in Manila, the
People Trading, for the importation of cases of fresh hen
eggs to be shipped on the S.S. Marine Leopard, sailing from
New York. Upon notification and receipt of the payment,
made by letter of credit of the Philippine Trust Co. Of Manila,
the Kent Sales So., Inc. issued an invoice in favor of plaintiff,
and on the same day contracted with the Defendant
shipping company to have the eggs shipped to Manila on the
vessel S.S. "Marine Leopard" in accordance with Bill of
Lading. Also on the same day, the Defendant received at the
port of New York the cases of eggs in question and looked
them on the S.S. "Marine Leopard."
Upon arrival in San Francisco, California, the Defendant
unloaded the cases of eggs from the S.S. "Marine Leopard
and shipped on another of Defendant's ships, the S.S."
General Meigs, which arrived in manila.
It is claimed by Plaintiff that the discharge of his cargo
at the port of Francisco was wrongful and unjustified, and a
violation of the bill of lading, which provided that the eggs
would be shipped to Manila on the S.S. "Marine Leopard."
When they were discharged in San Francisco, the eggs were
exposed to the hot summer whether without having been
placed in refrigeration. The eggs could have been
transhipped on the S.S. "Clovis Victory", also one of
Defendant's ships, that arrived in Manila. Because of the
delay in the shipment and the careless and repeated
handling of the cases of eggs by mechanical devices, a
substantial number of eggs arrived broken and damaged.
Defendant, on the other hand, alleged that under the
terms of the Bill of Lading, it was at liberty to tranship the
cargo in question on any other vessel.
After the trial, the lower court found that Plaintiff had
suffered a loss of more than 25,000 pesos by reason of the
delayed arrival of his cargo of eggs, which Defendant could
have transshiped on the S.S. "Clovis Victory". However, the
Court found Defendant's defense of prescription meritorious
since the filing of the complaint by the plaintiff was after
beyond 1 year after the delivery of the goods or the date
when the goods should have been delivered, and so
dismissed the case. As a consequence thereof, the plaintiff
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the instant case falls within the
prescriptive provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
2. Whether or not there is a distinction between damage to
the goods and damages to the shipper or consignee.
Ruling:
Both issues are answered in nugatory.
In any event the carrier and the ship shall be
discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage
unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the
goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered. Provided, That, if a notice of loss or damage,
either apparent or concealed, is not given as provided for in
this section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of
the shipper to bring suit within one year after the delivery of
the goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered (Sec. 3, paragraph 6 of Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act)..
Plaintiff makes a distinction between damage to the
goods and damages to the shipper or consignee, and claims
that while the former fails within the prescriptive period in
question, the latter is governed by the provision of the Code
of Civil Procedure (now the New Civil Code) on limitation of
actions.
SC: We see no difference between the two. Whatever
damage or injury is suffered by the goods while in transit
would result in loss or damage to either the shipper or the
consignee. As long as it is claimed, therefore, as it is done
here, that the losses or damages suffered by the shipper or
consignee were due to the arrival of the goods in damaged
or deteriorated condition, the action is still basically one for
damage to the goods, and must be filed within the period of
one year from delivery or receipt, under the above-quoted
provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
27.
Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court upholds the decision of the CA as
regards the issue on the limited liability of respondents.
Since the subject cargoes were lost while being
transported by respondent common carrier from Hong Kong
to the Philippines, Philippine law applies pursuant to the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 1753. The law of the country to which the goods
are to be transported shall govern the liability of the
common carrier for the loss, destruction or deterioration.
Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the
rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed
by the Code of Commerce and by special laws.
The rights and obligations or respondents common
carrier are thus governed by the provisions of the Civil Code,
and the COGSA, which is a special law, applies suppletorily.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code applicable to
this case are as follows:
Art. 1749. A stipulation that the common carrier liability
is limited to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of
lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value,
is binding.
Art. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be
recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction,
or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and
just under the circumstances, and has been fairly and freely
agreed upon.
In addition, Sec. 4, paragraph (5) of the COGSA, which
is applicable to all contracts for the carriage of goods by sea
to and from Philippine ports in foreign trade, provides:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or
become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection
with the transportation of goods in an amount exceeding
28.
[G.R. No. 165647 March 26, 2009]
PHILIPPINES FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner,
-versusWALLEM PHILS. SHIPPING, INC., UNKNOWN OWNE
AND/OR Promulgated: UNKNOWN CHARTERER OF THE
VESSEL M/S OFFSHORE MASTER AND SHANGHAI
FAREAST SHIP
BUSINESS COMPANY, Respondents.
Facts:
Anhui Chemicals Import & Export Corporation loaded on
board M/S Offshore Master a shipment consisting of bags of
sodium sulphate anhydrous (shipment), complete and in
good order for transportation to and delivery at the port of
Manila for consignee covered by a bill of lading. The bill of
lading reflects the gross weight of the total cargo. The Owner
and/or Charterer of M/V Offshore Master is unknown while
the shipper of the shipment is Shanghai Fareast Ship
Business Company. Both are foreign firms doing business in
the Philippines, thru its local ship agent, respondent Wallem.
Ruling:
1. No. It is beyond question that respondents vessel is a
common carrier. Thus, the standards for determining the
existence or absence of the respondents liability will be
gauged on the degree of diligence required of a common
carrier. Moreover, as the shipment was an exercise of
international trade, the provisions of the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act (COGSA), together with the Civil Code of the Code
of Commerce, shall apply.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them. Subject to certain exceptions
enumerated under Art. 1734 of the Civil Code, common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods. The extraordinary responsibility
of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by
the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered,
actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or
to the person who has a right to receive them.
For marine vessels, Art. 619 of the Code of Commerce
provides that the ship captain is liable for the cargo from the
time it turned over to him at the dock or afloat alongside the
vessel at the port of loading, until he delivers it on the shore
or on the discharging wharf at the port of unloading, unless
agreed otherwise.
Lastly, Sec. 2 of the COGSA, provides that under every
contract of carriage of goods by sea, the carrier in relation to
the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care, and
discharge of such goods, shall be subject to the
responsibilities and liabilities and entitled to the rights and
immunities set forth in the Act. Sec. 3(2) thereof then states
that among the carriers responsibilities are to properly and
carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and
discharge the goods carried.
On the other hand, handling cargo is mainly the
arrastre operator's principal work so its drivers/operators or
employees should observe the standards and measures
necessary to prevent losses and damage to shipments under
its custody.
29.
[G.R. No. 168433 February 10, 2009]
UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner
-versusABOITIZ SHIPPING CORP. EAGLE EXPRESS LINES,
DAMCO INTERMODAL SERVICES, INC., and PIMENTEL
CUSTOMS BROKERAGE CO., Respondents.
Facts:
Three units of waste water treatment plant with
accessories were purchased by SMS from Super Max of
Tapei, Taiwan. The goods came from USA and arrived at the
port of Manila on board MV Scandutch Star. The same were
then transported to Cebu on board MV Aboitiz Supercon II.
After its arrival at the port of Cebu and clearance from the
Bureau of Customs, the goods were delivered to and
received by SMC at its plant site. It was then discovered that
one electrical motor of DBS Drive Unit was damaged.
Pursuant to an insurance agreement, plaintiff paid SMC.
In turn, SMC executed a Subrogation in favor of plaintiff.
Consequently, the plaintiff filed a complaint as
subrogatee of SMC seeking to recover from defendants the
amount it had paid SMC.
The CA ruled that the plaintiff's right of action against
respondents did not accrue because UCPB failed to file a
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint filed against Wallem was
barred by prescription.
Ruling:
Section 3 (6) of the COGSA provides that a suit for
recovery may be made one year from delivery of goods or
from the date the goods should have been delivered if a
notice of loss or damages is not filed within three days of
delivery.
Respondent failed to meet the requirement of filing a
notice of loss or damages and therefore the prescriptive
period of one year started to run of April 15, 1992.
While the initial complaint filed on March 11, 1993 was
within the prescriptive period, Wallem was only impleaded
on June 7, 1993.
An amended complaint does not retroact to the date of
filing the original except if the amendment merely
supplements and amplifies the facts alleged in the original
pleading. This exception, however doesnt apply to parties
impleaded for the first time in an amended complaint.
Therefore, the complaint against Wallem was dismissed.