VOL.

160, APRIL 15, 1988

751

Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz

August 1986 in accordance with the organizational structure of the

Department of Health under Hospital Order No. 30, Series of 1986,
issued by respon________________

No. L-78946. April 15, 1988.

DR. NENITA PALMA-FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. DR.

ADRIANO DE LA PAZ, DR. SOSEPATRO AGUILA, and THE
SECRETARY OF HEALTH, respondents.
Administrative Law; Department of Health; Power to appoint
and remove subordinate officers and employees vested in the
Secretary of Health.Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one
of the National Health Facilities attached to the Department of
Health, the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and
employees, like petitioner, is vested in the Secretary of Health, not
the Medical Center Chief. The latters function is confined to
recommendation.
Same; Same; Same; Argument that petitioner was not
appointed but merely transferred in the interest of the public service
will not alter the situation.Respondent Medical Center Chiefs
argument that petitioner was not appointed but was merely
transferred in the interest of the public service to the Research
Office pursuant to Section 24 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 807, or
the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines will not alter the
situation. Even a transfer requires an appointment, which is
beyond the authority of respondent Medical Center Chief to extend,
supra. Besides, the transfer was without petitioners consent, was
tantamount to removal without valid cause, and as such is invalid
and without any legal effect (Garcia, et al. vs. Lejano, et al., 109
Phil. 116). A removal without cause is violative of the
Constitutional guarantee that no officer or employee of the civil
service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by
law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Position of Chief of Clinics and
Assistant Director for Professional Services are basically one and
the same except for the change in nomenclature.Petitioners
designation as Assistant Director for Professioinal Services on 8

EN BANC.

752

752

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz

dent Medical Center Chief did not make her occupancy of that
position temporary in character. It bears stressing that the
positions of Chief of Clinics and Assistant Director for Professional
Services are basically one and the same except for the change in
nomenclature. Petitioners permanent appointment on 1 May 1985
to the position of Chief of Clinics, therefore, remained effective.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent Medical Center
Chief cannot rely on Section 2, Article III of the Freedom
Constitution and its implementing Rules and Regulations,
Neither can respondent Medical Center Chief rely on Section 2,
Article III of the Freedom Constitution and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations embodied in Executive Order No. 17, Series of
1986. The relevant provision was effective only within a period of
one year from February 25, 1986." The Hospital Orders in question
were issued only on 29 May, 1987.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Neither
Executive
Order No. 119justifiespetitioners removal.Executive Order No.
119, or the Reorgariization Act of the Ministry of Health
promulgated on 30 January 1987, neither justifies petitioners
removal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Argument
that petitioners term of office ended on January 30, 1987 and that
she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold-over
capacity, untenable.The argument that, on the basis of this
provision, petitioners term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and
that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a

hold-over capacity and could be transferred to another position

without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The
occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to
facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February
1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to 2
February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De
Leon, et al. vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra, et al., G.R. No.
78059,31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions of the
latter on security of tenure govern.

protest with the respondent Secretary of Health, with copies

furnished the Commissioner of Civil Service, and the Chairman of
the Government Reorganization Commission, but the same
remained unacted upon and proved an inadequate remedy.
Besides, an action for quo warranto must be filed within one year
after the cause of action accrues (Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court),
and the pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to
suspend the running of the one-year period (Cornejo vs. Secretary
of Justice L-32818, June 24,1974, 57 SCRA 663).

Same; Quo Warranto; Petitioner has a valid cause of action;

Quo warranto is the proper remedy.It follows from the foregoing
disquisition that petitioner has a valid cause of action. Where there
is usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the proper
remedy.

PETITION for quo warranto and preliminary injunction to

review the order of the Secretary of Health.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Oscar C. Fernandez for petitioner.

Same; Exhaustion of administrative remedies; Rule is not a

hard and fast one but admits ofexception.The doctrine on
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not preclude petitioner
from seeking judicial relief. This rule is not a hard and fast one but
admits of

The Solicitor General for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

753

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988

Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz
exceptions among which are that (1) the question in dispute
is purely a legal one and (2) the controverted act is patently
illegaT (Carino vs. ACCFA, No. L-19808, September 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 183). The questions involved here are purely legal. The
subject Hospital Orders violated petitioners constitutional right to
security of tenure and were, therefore, patently illegal. Judicial
intervention was called for to enjoin the implementation of the
controverted acts.
Same; Same; Petitioner has substantially complied with the
requirements of exhaustion of administrative remedies.There was
substantial compliance by petitioner with the requirement of
exhaustion of administrative remedies since she had filed a letter-

753

This is a Petition for Quo Warranto filed by petitioner, Dr.

Nenita Palma-Fernandez, claiming entitlement to the position
of Assistant Director for Professional Services at the East
Avenue Medical Center (formerly Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan)
alleged to be unlawfully held by private respondent. Dr,
Sosepatro Aguila.
The background facts follow:
On 1 May 1985, petitioner was extended a permanent
appointment to the position of Chief of Clinics at the Hospital
ng Bagong Lipunan (now East Avenue Medical Center) by then
Minister of Health and Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Center, Jesus C. Azurin.
Previous to this appointment, petitioner, a career physician,
occupied the positions of Medical Specialist H. in 1978, Medical
754

754

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz

Specialist II from October 1982 to April 1985, until her
appointment as Chief of Clinics on 1 May 1985. Even during her
incumbency as Medical Specialist II, petitioner was already
designated as Acting Chief of Clinics since September 1983 up
to her permanent appointment to said position.
As Chief of Clinics, petitioner exercised direct control and
supervision over all heads of departments in the Medical
Center. In 1986, the new organizational structure of the Center
retitled the position of Chief of Clinics to Assistant Director for
Professional Services. In partial implementation of this new
set-up, respondent Dr. Adriano de la Paz, as Medical Center
Chief, issued Hospital Order No. 30, Series of 1986, on 8 August
1986, designating petitioner as Assistant Director of
Professional Services (Annex 3, Comment, p. 48, Rollo). As such,
she continued to exercise direct control and supervision over all
heads of departments in the Medical Center.
On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 119 known as the
Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health was
promulgated.
On 29 May 1987, respondent De la Paz, as Medical Center
Chief, designated respondent Dr. Aguila, who was then Medical
Specialist I. as Assistant Director for Professional Serviees vice
Dr. Nenita Palma-Fernandez, who will be transferred to the
Research Office. (Hospital Order No. 21, series of 1987, Annex
B, Petition). Said order was purportedly issued in the interest
of the hospital service.
On the same date, Hospital Order No. 22, series of 1987,
(Annex C, Petition), was issued by respondent De la Paz,
whereby petitioner was relieved of her present duties and
responsibilities as Chief of Clinic and hereby transferred to the
Research Office. This order being issued in the interest of the
hospital service.

Upon receipt of Hospital Order No. 22, petitioner filed on 1

June 1987 a letter-protest with respondent Secretary of Health,
furnishing copies to respondents De la Paz and Aguila, as well
as to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Chairman of the
Government Reorganization Commission.
Failing to secure any action on her protest within a months
time, petitioner filed on 8 July 1987 the instant Petition for Quo
Warranto with Preliminary Injunction against respondents Dr.
755

VOL. 160, APRIL 15, 1988

Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz
de la Paz, Dr. Aguila, and the Secretary of Health.
On 14 July 1987, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the implementation of Hospital Orders Nos. 21
and22, series of 1987.
After considering and deliberating on all Comments, the
Reply, and the Rejoinder of the Solicitor General to said Reply,
the Court, on 17 March 1988, Resolved to give due course to the
Petition, and dispensing with memoranda, declared the case
submitted for resolution.
The Solicitor General has aptly framed the issues for
resolution as follows:
1. 1.Whether or not respondent De la Paz has the power or
authority to issue the two Hospital Orders in question;
2. 2.Whether or not petitioner has a valid cause of action;
and
3. 3.Whether or not the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies precludes the filing of the
instant Petition.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Health,
makes common cause with petitioner and answers the first and

755

third issues in the negative, and the second in the affirmative.

For their part, Respondents De la Paz and Aguila uphold the
opposite views.
We rule for petitioner.
1. Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one of the
National Health Facilities attached to the Department of
Health, the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers
and employees, like petitioner, is vested in the Secretary of
Health, not the Medical Center Chief. The latters function is
confined to recommendation. Thus, Section 79 (D) of the
Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 79 (D). Power to appoint and remove.The Department
Head, upon the recommendation of the Chief of the bureau or office
concerned, shall appoint all subordinate officers and employees
whose appointment is not expressly vested by law in the President
of the Philippines, and may remove or punish them, except as
especially provided otherwise, in accordance with the Civil Service
Law. x x x
The Department Head also may, from time to time, in the
interest of the service, change the distribution among the several
bureaus and offices of his Department of the employees or
subordinates authorized by law.
756

756

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz

Executive Order No. 119, or the Reorganization Act of the

Ministry of Health, likewise stated:
SEC. 26. New Structure and Pattern. x x x
The new position structured and staffing pattern of the
Ministry shall be prescribed by the Minister within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the approval of this executive order subject
to approval by the Office of the Compensation and Classification

and the authorized positions created thereunder shall be filled

thereafter with regular appointments by him or the President, as
the case may be as herein provided. x x x

Respondent Medical Center Chiefs argument that petitioner

was not appointed by was merely transferred in the interest of
the public service to the Research Office pursuant to Section 24
(c) of Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines will not alter the situation. Even a transfer
requires an appointment, which is beyond the authority of
respondent Medical Center Chief to extend, supra. Besides, the
transfer was without petitioners consent, was tantamount to
removal without valid cause, and as such is invalid and without
any legal effect (Garcia, et al. vs. Lejano, et al., 109 Phil. 116).
A removal without cause is violative of the Constitutional
guarantee that no officer or employee of the civil service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law
(Article IX, B, Section 2(3), 1987 Constitution).
1

Petitioners designation as Assistant Director for

Professional Services on 8 August 1986 in accordance with the
organizational structure of the Department of Health under
Hospital Order No. 30, Series of 1986, issued by respondent
Medical Center Chief did not make her occupancy of that
position temporary in character. It bears stressing that the
positions of Chief of Clinics and Assistant Director for
Professional Services are basically one and the same except for
the change in nomenclature. Petitioriers permanent
appointment on 1 May 1985 to the position of Chief of Clinics,
therefore, remained effective.
Neither can respondent Medical Center Chief rely on Section
2, Article III of the Freedom Constitution and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations embodied in Executive Order No. 17,
Series of 1986. The relevant provision was effective only within
a period of one year from February 25, 1986" The Hospital
Orders in question were issued only on 29 May, 1987.
2

Executive Order No. 119, or the Reorganization Act of the

Ministry of Health promulgated on 30 January 1987, neither
justifies petitioners removal. The pertinent provision thereof
reads:
Sec. 26. New Structure and Pattern.Upon approval of this
Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall,
in a holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties
and responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and
benefits unless in the meantime they are separated from
government service pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or
Article III of the Freedom Constitution.

3. The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies

does not preclude petitioner from seeking judicial relief. This
rule is not a hard and fast one but admits of exceptions among
which are that (1) the question in dispute is purely a legal one
and (2) the controverted act is patently illegaT (Carino vs.
ACCFA, No. L-19808, September 29,1966,18 SCRA 183). The
questions involved here are purely legal. The subject Hospital
Orders violated petitioners constitutional right to security of
tenure and were, therefore, patently illegal. Judicial
intervention was called for to enjoin the implementation of the
controverted acts.

The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioners

term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued
in the performance of her duties merely in a hold-over capacity
and ould be transferred to another position without violating
any of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position
in a hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate
reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987
(under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to 2
February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective
(De Leon, et al. vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra, et al., G.R, No.
78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions of the
latter on security of tenure govern.

There was substantial compliance by petitioner with the

requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies since she
had filed a letter-protest with the respondent Secretary of
Health, with copies furnished the Commissioner of Civil
Service, and the Chairman of the Government Reorganization
Commission, but the same remained unacted upon and proved
an inadequate remedy. Besides, an action for quo
warranto must be filed within one year after the cause of action
accrues (Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court), and the pendency of
administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the
running of the one-year period (Cornejo vs. Seeretary of
Justice L-32818, June 24,1974,57 SCRA 663).

And while it may be that the designation of respondent

Aguila as Assistant Director for Professional Services and the
relief of petitioner from the said position were not disapproved
by respondent Secretary of Health, it by no means implies that
the questioned acts of respondent Medical Center Chief were
approved by the former official.

WHEREFORE, the Writ of Quo Warranto is granted and

petitioner, Dr. Nenita Palma-Fernandez, is hereby held entitled
to the position of Assistant Director of Professional Services of
the East Avenue Medical Center up to the expiration of her
term. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued
enjoining the implementation of Hospital Orders Nos. 21 and
22, both dated 29 May 1987, is hereby made permanent.

2. It follows from the foregoing disquisition that petitioner

has a valid cause of action. Where there is usurpation or
intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the proper remedy.
(Lota vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-14803, June 30,1961, 2 SCRA
715).

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz,Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmient
o, Corts andAquino, JJ., concur.
Writ granted.

o0o
Copyright 2016 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

VOL. 33, JUNE 30, 1970

Republic vs. Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
No, L-27006. June 30, 1970,

527

would have to readduce its evidence on the value of the land, and second
set of commissioners of. appraisal must be appointed. Proceedings would
be thus unnecessarily complicated and multiplied.

PETITION for certiorari against the order of the Court of First

Instance of Pampanga.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, presided formerly by Judge
L. Pasicolan, and now by Judge Andres C. Aguilar, the spouses
FRANCISCO ROQUE and FRANCISCA HENSON, and the
spouses JUAN PUNZALAN and EUFROSINA WINGCO,
respondents.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Special civil actions; Eminent domain; Power of court in

expropriation case to determine issue of ownership of land sought to be
condemned.The court that hears the expropriation case has the
jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceeding, the conflicting claims of
ownership of the condemned or sought to be condemned property and
adjudge the rightful owner thereof. This is evident from Section 9 of the
Revised Rule 69.

Bausa, Ampil & Suarez for respondents spouses Roque and

Henson.

Same; Same; Same; Inquiry into validity of certificate of title

covering a condemned lot does not constitute reopening of registration
proceeding.The court's power to determine the issue of conflicting claims
of ownership over a condemned lot does not go against the doctrine of
inviolability of the Torrens title; because if it could be established, a
declaration by the court of the nullity of the sale of the lot sought to be
condemned and the consequent cancellation of the certificate of
528

528

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of First Instance of Pampanga

title issued as a result of the sale, would not constitute a reopening

of the registration proceeding by virtue of which the lot was brought under
the operation of the Torrens System. In other words, the land will remain
a registered land; it is merely the right of the present registered owners
over the said property that would be affected. For if the sale is valid, then
the persons who bought the land must be the ones to be paid by the
condemnor; but if invalid, the money will be paid to someone else. If this
issue were to be tried in a separate action, then, should their title be
upheld, a multiplicity of expropriations would ensue, and the Government

Magno B. Pablo, Chief Judicial Cases Division, LTA for

petitioner.
Zoilo A. Andin for respondents spouses Punzalan and
Wingco.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Petition for certiorari against the order of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga in an expropriation case (Civil Case No,
1130), declaring itself without jurisdiction to pass upon the
question of ownership of one of the condemned lots, in the same
proceeding.
The controversy here is an incident an the case filed by the
Republic of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, f or the -expropriation of the so-called Henson Estate,
situated in the municipality of Angeles of that province and
belonging to the heirs of the deceased Jose P.
Henson, viz., Amanda Henson-Nepomuceno, Manuela Henson vda.
de Suarez, Sor Maria Luisa Henson, Mariano Henson, Ines Henson
vda. de Dizon, Francisco Henson-Roque, and the minors Placido H.
de Guzman, Jr.
529

VOL. 33, JUNE 30, 1970

Republic vs. Court of First Instance of Pampanga
and Vitali H. de Guzman, who were all named defendants in the
complaint. The records show that when the complaint was filed on
18 September 1956, the estate had already been subdivided and

529

partitioned among the above-named heirs. One of the lots assigned

to defendant Francisca Henson-Roque was Lot No. 6, Block 6, plan
Psd-2017, with an area of 757 square meters.
After a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of all the
defendants, one Antonio Feliciano, representing himself to be the
owner of the lot identified as Lot No. 6, Block 6, plan Psd-2017,
with proper leave of court, filed a motion in intervention praying
for the dismissal of the case as far as such property was concerned.
The motion was opposed by the plaintiff Republic of the
Philippines, pointing out that the sale of the land by Francisca
Henson-Roque to movant-intervenor was made on 16 September
1957, or a year after the filing of the expropriation case, in violation
of Section 20 of the Land Reform Act of 1955 (Republic Act
1400). Acting on the foregoing motions, the court, in its order of 6
October 1958, declared as null and void the sale of the lot to
Antonio Feliciano; reconsidered the order allowing the intervention
of Feliciano and treated Francisca Henson as the defendant in the
case; and directed the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel the
certificate of title (TCT No. 17235-R) issued in the name of
Feliciano.
1

It appears, however, that on 5 August 1958, or before the above

order was issued, Feliciano sold the same lot to the spouses Juan
Punzalan and Eufrosina Wingco, as a result of which TCT No.
17235-R in the name of Feliciano was

cancelled and another one (TCT No. 19484-R) was issued in favor
of the Punzalan spouses, Required later to show cause why the sale
of the lot to them should not be declared invalid and their title
cancelled, the Punzalans contested the jurisdiction of the lower
court, submitting that not being a land registration court, it is
without authority to pass upon the validity of the sale and of the
certificate of title. Besides, it was claimed that the sale of the lot to
them was in good f aith and f or value. On 30 January 1959, the
lower court promulgated an order stating that since the issue in
that incident revolves around the validity of the sale of the lot (after
the expropriated case had started), which issue would call for the
determination of the interests of third parties in the property, the
proper procedure would be to have the said question ventilated and
threshed out in a separate action.
Thereafter, in a joint motion dated 28 July 1960, plaintiff and
defendants manifested in court that they had come to an amicable
settlement of their controversy. the defendants agreeing to the sale
of their land and to the government's immediate taking of
possession thereof upon payment of the provisional value to be
fixed by the court. Taking cognizance of such agreement between
the parties, the court, on 3 August 1960, entered an order of
condemnation against the defendants' properties. The value of the
condemned land was later provisionally fixed at P3.00 per square
meter, and the amounts accruing to each of the defendants ordered
delivered to them.
2

_______________
SEC. 20, Prohibition against alienation.Upon the filIng of the petition referred to
In sections twelve and sixteen, the landowner cannot alienate any portion of the land
covered by such petition. except in pursuance of the provisions of -this Act, or enter into
any form of contract to defeat the purposes of this Act, and no ejectment proceedings
against any tenant or occupant of the land covered by the petition shall be instituted or
prosecuted until it becomes certain that the land shall not be acquired by the
Administration."
1

530

530

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of First Instance of Pampanga

On 21 August 1960, the defendants prayed for the modification

of the condemnation-order, to exclude therefrom eight lots which
the said defendants allegedly wanted to retain for themselves. One
such lot was the parcel of land, Lot 6, Block 6, plan Psd-2017. Then,
it seems that another motion dated 8 February 1962, was also filed
by defendants, increasing to sixteen the number of lots sought to
be excluded from the condemnation-order. The prayer for exclusion
this time was based on the contention that the
_______________
2

Order of 9 August 1960.

531

VOL. 33, JUNE 30, 1970

Republic vs. Court of First Instance of Pampanga
said lots were already sold to third parties when the expropriation
case was instituted on 18 September 1956. By order of 3 April 1962,
the lower court granted the defendants' motion and directed the
exclusion of the enumerated 16 lots from the .order of
condemnation. The records show, however, that on 27 February
1963, the court changed its stand and ordered the re-inclusion of'
Lot 6, Block 6 in the list of expropriable properties, declaring
further that the issues of the validity of the two sales and the
propriety of the cancellation of the titles issued to the vendees
should be determined at the instance of the af f ected party or
parties.
On 17 July 1963, the Punzalans once more applied to the court
for the exclusion of the lot from the order of 3 August 1960, and for
the cancellation of the lis pendens notice at the back of their
certificate of title. This motion was denied by the court on 28
August 1963, reasoning that to grant movants' prayer at that point
would amount to prejudging the matter of the validity of their
(movants) title to the land. On 25 October 1963, the court issued
another order giving the government 30 days within which to
initiate the necessary action to settle the question of the
Punzalan's title over the property. When the given period elapsed
without the government's making any move on the premises, the
Punzalans filed another motion in the expropriation case
reiterating their prayer for the exclusion of the lot from the
condemnation-order
and
for
cancellation
of
the lis
pendensannotation on their title. On 17 December 1963, the court
denied movants' motion; ordered the lifting of Its previous order of
25 October 1963, and declared itself possessed of authority to pass
upon the issue raised in that incident, in accordance with Section
10, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. There was a lull in the proceeding
in the lower court until 14 September 1966, when the judge to
whom the case was reassigned issued an order disavowing
jurisdiction over the question
3

_______________

Now Section 9, Revised Rule 67.

Following the retirement of the judge who was previously hearing the expropriation

531
case.

532

532

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of First Instance of Pampanga

of the validity of the subsequent sales of the lot, and directing its
exclusion from the order of condemnation of 3 August 1960. When
its motion for reconsideration of this latest order was denied, the
plaintiff Republic of the Philippines came to this Court by way of
the present certiorari proceeding.
The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court that
hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in
the same proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to
be condemned, must be resolved in the affirmative, That the court
is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of
the condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge
the rightful ul owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is
evident from Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which provides:
"SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims.If the ownership of the
property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part
thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation
for the property to be paid to the clerk of court for the benefit of the persons
adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment
shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the
defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or
retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made."
(Italics supplied)

In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person

or persons claiming ownership of the properties to be expropriated
would not preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent
the court from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely
require, in such eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of
eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true
ownership of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with
accuracy.
5

Now, to determine the person who is to be indemnified

second set of commissioners of appraisal must be appointed.

Proceedings would be thus unnecessarily complicated and
multiplied.

_______________
See Manila Railroad Co. vs. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326; Metropolitan Water District
vs. Director of Lands. 57 Phil. 293,
5

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed f or is granted, and

the respondent court's order of 14 September 1966 is hereby
reversed and set aside, The case is remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. No costs.

Section 1, Revised Rule 69.

533

VOL. 33, JUNE 30, 1970

Republic vs. Court of First Instance of Pampanga
for the expropriation of Lot 6, Block 6, Psd-2017, the court taking
cognizance of the expropriation must necessarily determine if the
sale to the Punzalan spouses by Antonio Feliciano is valid or not.
For if valid, said spouses must be the ones to be paid by the
condemnor; but if invalid, the money will be paid to someone else.
Neither can it be maintained that, not being a land registration
court, the court below is bereft of authority to enter a judgment
cancelling the certificates of title to Feliciano and herein
respondents Punzalan spouses. For it must be realized that should
the parties' evidence so warrant, any order for the cancellation of
the certificates of title that may be found to have been unduly or
illegally obtained, would only be the necessary consequence of the
lower court's vested power to rule on the question of rightful
ownership of the property involved herein. And that would not go
against the doctrine of inviolability of the Torrens title; because if
it could be established, a declaration by the lower court of the
nullity of the sale of the lot to herein respondent spouses and the
consequent cancellation of their certif icate of title would not
constitute a reopening of the registration proceeding by virtue of
which the lot was brought under the operation of the Torrens
System. In other words, the land will remain a registered land; It
is merely the right of the present registered owners over the said
property that would be affected.
It is easy to understand, finally, that if the Punzalans' title were
to be tried in a separate action, then, should their title be upheld,
a multiplicity of expropriations would ensue, and the Government
would have to readduce its evidence on the value of the land, a

533

534

534

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Consolidated Mines, Inc. vs. Nietes

Concepcion,
C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,Fernando, Teehankee, B
arredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Writ granted, respondent court's order reversed and set aside,
Case remanded to lower court for further proceedings.
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