G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015 - WILFRED N.CHIOK, Petitioner, v.

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND RUFINA CHUA, Respondents.; G.R. No. 180021 - RUFINA CHUA, Petitioner,
v. WILFRED N. CHIOK, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (AS AN UNWILLING COPARTY PETITIONER), Respondent. : DECEMBER 2015 - PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE - CHANROBLES VIRTUAL LAW LIBRARY
G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015
Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, in an Information.
Chiok pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued, with both parties presenting
their evidence in support of their respective claims and defenses.The RTC convicted Chiok of the
crime of estafa.Chiok filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC conviction but was denied.
The CA Thirteenth Division dismissed the appeal of Chiok. The CA in a Special Division of Five
rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the Decision of the trial court, and acquitted Chiok
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Chiok also filed his own
motion for reconsideration, on the civil liability imposed on him. The CA denied the motions tor
reconsideration of both parties on the civil aspect of the case.Hence, these consolidated petitions
questioning the CA acquittal by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus, and the civil aspect
of the case by way of appeal by certiorari.
Issues
Whether or not Chiok is civilly liable to Chua.
III. Chiok is civilly liable to Chua.
While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on his alleged
misappropriation of Chua's money did not meet the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
the court hold that the monetary transaction between Chua and Chiok was proven by
preponderance of evidence.
There is also no merit in Chiok's claim that his absolution from civil liability in the BP 22 case
involving the same transaction bars civil liability in this estafa case under the doctrine of res
judicata in the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment."
Under this doctrine, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters
determined in the former suit. This principle of res judicata bars the re-litigation of particular facts or
issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.
Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be simultaneously availed of by the offended
party, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application here.
Moreover, the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment presupposes
that facts and issues were actually and directly resolved in a previous case.84 However, the

records show that in the BP 22 case, the facts and issues proving the transaction were not actually
and directly resolved in the decision. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby
absolves the accused from criminal as well as civil liability and orders these cases DISMISSED for
lack of evidence to support the charges levelled against him.

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC.,

ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO
BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO,
MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON,
AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.

PETITIONER, vs. SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ,

B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G.
ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR., MARIANO M.
CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO V.

Facts: San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties) is a domestic corporation engaged in
the real estate business.During this time, BF Homes was under receivership. The receiver
is Atty. Florencio Orendain. San Miguel purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F.
Homes, Inc. (BF Homes) 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes
Paraaque, containing a total area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of
P106,248,000.00. Some of the parcels of land for which San Miguel paid the full price were not
delivered. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. San Miguel filed a
complaint-affidavit charging BF Homes in violation of PD 957 due to nondelivery of titles. At
the same time, San Miguel sued BF Homes for specific performance in HLURB,
compelling BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs.
San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP Las Pias, citing
the pendency of BF Homes receivership case in the SEC. BF Homes opposed the motion to
suspend. SEC terminated BF Homes receivership. San Miguel filed a motion to withdraw the
sought suspension of proceedings due to the termination of receivership. The OCP Las Pias
dismissed San Miguel Properties criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No.
957. San Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. San Miguel appealed the OCPs
resolution to the DOJ. DOJ denied the appeal. San Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. San Miguel elevated DOJs resolutions to the CA but was dismissed by the CA.San
Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Issue:
WON there is prejudicial question?
Held:
No. Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency,
raises a prejudicial question. The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a
criminal case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties submission that there could be no
prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was

pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that
sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of
Section 25of Presidential Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for
specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere
except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.
The action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel
Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the
criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede
that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery
of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes
in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the
criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate,
thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case. A prejudicial question need not
conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial
question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain
the further prosecution of the criminal case.

[G.R. No. 114266. December 4, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. ROGELIO VILLANUEVA and MAMERTO DURANA,
accused. MAMERTO DURANA, accused-appellant.
Facts:
On 12 November 1992, around ten-thirty in the evening, at Barangay Tagpuro, Tacloban City,
Diosdado Meniano and his wife Gloria were awakened by a loud voice from outside their house
challenging Diosdado to a fight.Elenita Meniano, sister-in-law and neighbor of Diosdado. They
were awakened by the shouts of Mamerto Durana challenging Diosdado to a fight;that they
watched the incident through the window and saw Diosdado hacked by Villanueva after the former
went down from his house; that after Diosdado was slain, she saw Durana brandishing a bolo near
the crime scene.
Accused-appellant argues that the instant case was filed in court for murder only against the other
accused, Rogelio Villanueva, on the basis of the resolution of the prosecutor; that he was not made
a respondent in the investigation; that despite the sworn statements of witnesses Gloria Meniano
and Elenita Meniano who pointed to him as co-conspirator, he was not included in the charge for
murder because, according to the police, he would be used as a witness against the accused
Villanueva.

Issue:
WON the court a quo erred in failing to consider the fact that accused-appellant was not a party
respondent during the preliminary investigation of the case
Held: No. The argument is without merit. It is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation
does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective; neither does
it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, nor does it constitute a ground for quashing the
information.If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on
motion of the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings on the
criminal case in abeyance. In this case, accused-appellant failed to invoke such right to preliminary
investigation before or at the time he entered his plea at arraignment. He can no longer invoke that
right at this late stage of the proceedings. The court found accused-appellant MAMERTO DURANA
guilty of murder and imposing upon him a prison term of reclusion perpetua, as well as ordering
him to indemnify the heirs of Diosdado Meniano in the amount of P50,000.00 is AFFIRMED, with
costs against accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 170288

September 22, 2006

PEDRO E. BUDIONGAN, JR., Municipal Mayor; JOSIL E. TRABAJO, Municipal Vice Mayor and
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan; FULGENCIO V. PAA, Municipal Treasurer;
TACIANA B. ESPEJO, Municipal Budget Officer; and SB Members: RUFINO G. ADLAON, TITO R.
MONTAJES, MARIO M. SORIA, ALFONSO L. UNAJAN, CARLITO B. TORREFRANCA, VICENTE
A. TORREFRANCA, JR., etitioners,
vs.
HON. JACINTO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., Asst. Special Prosecutor I; HON. CORNELIO L. SONIDO,
Acting Director, Prosecution Bureau IV; HON. ROBERT E. KALLOS, Deputy Special Prosecutor;
HON. DENNIS M. VILLA IGNACIO, The Special Prosecutor; HON. WENDELL E. BARRERASSULIT, Acting Director, Case Assessment, Review and Re-investigation Bureau; and OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, public respondents.
VALERIANO U. NADALA, ARLENE PAINAGAN-PALGAN, private respondents.
Facts: By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, series of 2001, the Municipality of Carmen, Bohol
appropriated the amount of P450,000.00 for the purchase of a road roller for the municipality.
However, the Municipal Development Council through Resolution No. 3 recommended that the
amount of P450,000.00 be realigned and used for the asphalt laying of a portion of the Tan
Modesto Bernaldez Street. Petitioner Municipal Treasurer, Fulgencio V. Paa, issued a Certificate
of Availability of Funds for the project.Bidding was conducted on March 5, 2002. The next day,
Mayor Budiongan issued the Notice of Award and Notice to Commence Work in favor of Herbert
Malmis General Merchandise and Contractor, Inc. who emerged as the lowest complying bidder.
The Sangguniang Bayan passed Resolution No. 60,4 series of 2002, authorizing Mayor Budiongan
to sign and enter into contract with Malmis relative to the above project in the amount of
P339,808.00. With such authority, Malmis commenced with the project.Thereafter, it was
discovered that there was yet no ordinance approving the realignment of the funds. Thus, the
Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance No. 8,5 series of 2002, approving the realignment of the

fund.Malmis was paid the contract price. Private respondents Arlene P. Palgan and Valeriano U.
Nadala filed a complaint against the petitioners before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Visayas alleging illegality in the conduct of the bidding, award and notice to commence work since
there was no fund appropriated for the purpose.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas found probable cause and recommended the
filing of an information for violation of Article 2207 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, two separate Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan (1) for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and (2) for violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner
Budiongan.Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Office of the Special Prosecutor
which was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution dated October 19, 2005.
issue: WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING RESOLUTIONS DATED
APRIL 28, 2004 AND OCTOBER 19, 2005 FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR VIOLATION OF
SEC. 3(e) OF RA 3019 AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONERS; and
Held: The petition lacks merit.The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but
is merely a right conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair
the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information. If
absence of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information invalid nor affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise
invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case.Petitioners were not
deprived of due process because they were afforded the opportunity to refute the charges by filing
their counter-affidavits. The modification of the offense charged did not come as a surprise to the
petitioners because it was based on the same set of facts and the same alleged illegal acts.
Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute commission of grave
errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to warrant a reconsideration or
reinvestigation of the case as required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman.Thus, the modification of the offense charged, even without affording the
petitioners a new preliminary investigation, did not amount to a violation of their rights.Furthermore,
the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or
at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.

G.R. Nos. 169727-28 August 18, 2006

BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (4th Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Facts:

In 1998, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (Blue
Ribbon) and on National Defense and Security (collectively, Senate Blue Ribbon Committee)
carried out an extensive joint inquiry into the "coup rumors and the alleged anomalies" in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines-Philippine Retirement Benefits Systems (AFP-RSBS). In its
Report, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee outlined, the anomalies in the acquisition of lots in
Tanauan, Batangas, Calamba, Laguna and Iloilo City by the AFP-RSBS, and described the modus
operandi of the perpetrators.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to "prosecute and/or cause
the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, who had signed the
unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of certain parcels of land," Ombudsman
Investigators Ricardo Sullano, Rodil Buenaventura and Anatolio Alejandrino of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military conducted a fact-finding investigation.The Ombudsman
approved the recommendation of the Panel of Prosecutors without prejudice to the liability of the
landowners involved in the transactions. Petitioner and his co-accused filed their respective
Motions for Reconsideration of the investigating panels Memorandum. Petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue: WON THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUSTAINING THE
OMBUDSMANS FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE COMMISSION OF ESTAFA THRU
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT AND OF VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019
Held: No. The petition has no merit. The rule is that as far as crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan are concerned, the determination of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation, or reinvestigation for that matter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of his discretion,
whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as
defined by law. Whether or not the Ombudsman has correctly discharged his function is a matter
that the trial court may not be compelled to pass upon.
As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsmans investigatory power, exercised through
the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to determine the presence or absence of probable
cause, except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In such case, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, if the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into
consideration in the determination of probable cause, there is abuse of discretion.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Appellee, - versus -JACK RACHO y RAQUERO,Appellant.

G.R. No. 186529
August 3, 2010

Facts: On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities
who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The team members posted
themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day,
a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent
pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle,
the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying
shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom
which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. The team then brought
appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the
presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for
transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing,
dangerous drugs. During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. On July
8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article
II, R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the
first time he legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.
Held: The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act
that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the
arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had
just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any
suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and
conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information
given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have
been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with
the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting
team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the
informant not only the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not
certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he
would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a
warrant.
People vs. Cubcubin [GR 136267, 10 July 2001]
Facts: At about 3:30 a.m. of 26 August 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police
station,received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along Julian

Felipe Boulevard in SanAntonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team responded to the call
and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on the road.
Police photographer Fred Agana took pictures of the crime scene showing the victim slumped on
the handle of the tricycle. PO3 Rosal testified that a tricycle driver, told him that Fidel Abrenica
Cubcubin Jr. and the victim were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe. Garcellano
described Cubcubin as a lean, dark-complexioned man who had on a white t-shirt and brown short
pants. Another tricycle driver, told that Garcellano's description fitted a person known as alias "Jun
Dulce." Armando Plata, who knew where Cubcubin lived, led them to Cubucubin's house in Garcia
Extension, Cavite City. The policemenknocked on the door for 3 minutes before it was opened by a
man who answered the description given by Garcellano and who turned out to be Cubcubin. The
police operatives identified themselves and informed him that he was being sought in connection
with the shooting near the cemetery. Cubcubin denied involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal and
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked permission to enter and look around the house. SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
said that upon entering the house, he noticed a white t-shirt that he found to be "bloodied." When
he picked up the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it. PO3 Rosal stayed with Cubcubin
while he conducted a search. They then took the t-shirt and the two bullet shells. SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
then asked Cubcubin to go with them to Sting Cafe for purposes of identification.
Cubcubin was charged for the crime of murder. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, found
Cubcubin guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death.
Issue: Whether there was "probable cause" for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting
officers, to believe that Cubcubin committed the crime, to allow them to conduct the latter's
warrantless arrest.
Held: Rule 113, Section 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that two
conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just committed an
offense and, second, the arresting peaceofficer or private person has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that "personal
knowledge of facts' in arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." Herein, the arrest of Cubcubin was effected
shortly after the victim was killed. There was no "probable cause for the arresting officers, to
believe that Cubcubin committed the crime.PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on
information given to them by others. Be that as it may, Cubcubin cannot now question the validity of
his arrest without a warrant.The records show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when
arraigned. Cubcubin did not object to the arraignment, and thus has waived the right to object to
the legality of his arrest. On the other hand, the search of Cubcubin's house was illegal and,
consequently, the things obtained as a result of the illegal search.

LORNA M. VILLANUEVA,
Complainant,
versus JUDGE APOLINARIO M. BUAYA,
Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131

November 22, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
FACTS: In a verified affidavit-complaintLorna M. Villanueva, assisted by her father Pantaleon
Villanueva, charged respondent Acting Presiding Judge Apolinario M. Buaya of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Palompon, Leyte, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority.
In an affidavit-complaint executed Villanueva accused then Vice-Mayor Constantino S. Tupa of
Palompon, Leyte, of the crime of Qualified Seduction. She later filed another complaint against the
same accused for violation of Section 5, paragraph (b), Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610
(otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act). The Office of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause. Judge
Noel-Bertulfo allowed Tupa to post bail. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Prudencio O. Borgueta, Jr.
recommended the filing of two separate informations against the accused. He likewise
recommended the cancellation of the bail bond posted by Tupa as, under Section 31, Article XII of
R.A. No. 7610, if the offender is a public officer or employee, the penalty provided in Section 5,
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is imposed in the maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua. Thus, bail is
not a matter of right. He also added that the cancellation of the bail bond was all the more
appropriate since there was strong evidence of guilt against the accused based on Villanuevas
affidavit-complaint and her material declarations during the preliminary investigation.
Tupa contended that for purposes of the right to bail, the criterion to determine whether the offense
charged is a capital offense is the penalty provided by the law, regardless of the attendant
circumstances. Judge Buaya ordered the release of Tupa on bail.Villanueva moved to reconsider
the order arguing that an application for bail should be heard and cannot be contained in a mere
ex-parte motion. Judge Buayas differing treatment of the motion for reconsideration apparently
irked Villanueva, prompting her to file the present administrative complaint against the RTC judge.
She observed the seeming bias and unfairness of Judge Buayas orders when he granted the exparte motion without the required notice and hearing. Judge Buaya maintained his position that the
offense at issue is a bailable offense, therefore, bail is a matter of right and a hearing is not
required.
Issue: WON respondent Judge is GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of
Authority in granting bail without required notice and hearing
Held: Yes. In the present case, Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion to grant bail on the same
day that it was filed by the accused. He did this without the required notice and hearing. He justified
his action on the ex-parte motion by arguing that the offense charged against the accused was a
bailable offense; a hearing was no longer required since bail was a matter of right. Under the
present Rules of Court, however, notice and hearing are required whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion.Likewise, jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving

offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of
discretion.
The Court has always stressed the indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail.
Where bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or the denial of bail hinges on the issue of whether or
not the evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong and the determination of whether or not the
evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the
judge to properly exercise this discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a hearing
should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecutions evidence of
guilt against the accused.