TACTICAL NOTEBOOK T M

THE BALKANS WARS

Ottoman Divisions on the

Dardanelles in 1913

ing the Dardanelles closed to the (mostly

Greek) ships of the Balkan League.

Finding reliable information about the

organization of the Ottoman Army of
the First and Second Balkans Wars is
difficult. Even Loebells Jahresberichte,
the German yearbook that kept tabs on
all of the worlds armies, provided none
of the customary organizational data on
the Ottoman land forces.

In addition to providing a narrative

account of the other campaign fought
on the Gallipoli Peninsula over control
of the Dardanelles, Rohde described, in
some detail, the Ottoman formations
involved. By combining these descriptions with the few bits of information
provided by Loebells Jahresberichte for
1912 and 1913, it is possible to come up
with a reasonably complete picture of
the state of the defenders of Gallipoli.

Those wishing insight into the way

Ottoman divisions and units were put
together must therefore derive their information from sources that were written for a purpose other than describing
organization. One such source is the
definitive (and perhaps only) book on
the fighting on the Dardanelles in 1913,
Hans Rohdes Die Operationen an den
Dardanellen im Balkankriege 1912/
1913.
Rohde was a former German infantry
officer who served in the Ottoman Army
during both of the Balkans Wars. During the winter of 1912/1913, he was an
orderly officer in the headquarters of
the Ottoman army responsible for keep-

Ottoman formations were, at least in

theory, organized on a triangular basis. An army corps was divided into
three infantry divisions. Each of these
was, in turn, divided into three infantry
regiments of three battalions. This applied to both active (Nizam) and territorial (Redif) divisions.
In some cases, such as that of the 31st
and 32nd Nizam Divisions, practice
followed theory. In addition to following the standard pattern, these divisions
enjoyed a rational system for numbering subunits. The number of the high-

est numbered infantry regiment, for

example, was three times that of the
division. The numbers for the other
two infantry regiments were (respectively), one or two less than the number
of the highest numbered regiment. The
chasseur battalion, which belonged to
no regiment, had the same number as
the division.
Because these 31st and 32nd Nizam
divisions came to the Dardanelles for
the purpose of making a tactical amphibious landing, they were sent into
action without their field artillery.
(Given the difficulties of embarking
horse drawn artillery, these two divisions had to make due with an attached
battalion of mountain guns and the guns
of the escorting naval vessels.)
The 31st and 32nd Nizam Divisions
also seem to be missing their pioneer
companies. While these units may have
been left at the dock to because of lack
of shipping space, the tiny footprint
of a 1913 Ottoman pioneer company
would lead one to believe that the two
divisions didnt have such units in the
first place.

Model Nizam Divisions

February, 1913
31st Nizam Division

32nd Nizam Division

50th Nizam Division

Infantr y R egiment 91

I nfantry Regiment 94

Infantr y R egiment 88

Infantr y R egiment 92

I nfantry Regiment 95

Infantr y R egiment 89

Infantr y R egiment 93

I nfantry Regiment 96

Infantry Regimentt 90

31 Chasseurs

32 Chasseurs

50 Chasseurs

Mountain Artillery

III./Field Artillery
Regiment 2

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AUGUST 1993

Rifle Regiment 9

Redif Regiment Trapez unt

Infantry Regim ent 79

I nfantry Regiment 80

Pioneer Company

I/ 29
I/30

Pioneer C ompany

M retebb "Pom Pom"

Ba ttalion Ba ttery

Re dif Battalion Soma

Rifle Regiment 8

Inf antry Regim ent 73

27 Chasseurs

Mretebb Division

27th Division

BULAJIR

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"Pom Pom"
Ba ttery

Ca valry

Ar my Troops

Divisional Field
Artillery Battalion

Redif Regime nt Simctli

Redif Regim ent Afiun

Re dif Division
Afiun Karahissar
R edif R egiment Kara hissar

150m m
Howitzer
Batte ry

Divisional Field
Ar tillery
Batte ry

"Pom Pom"
Battery

Redif Regiment Jasar

Redif Regiment Bigha

Re dif Division
Tsc harnak-Ka le
R edif Re giment Tscharnak-Kale

MAIDOS

O TTOMAN TRO OPS ON THE GALLIPO LI PENINS ULA

2 Febru ary, 1913

Divisional Field
Artillery

Divisional MG C ompany

Redif R egiment Edrimit 2

Redif Regiment Aivardschik

Re dif Division
Edrim it
Redif R egiment Edrimit 1

TACTICAL NOTEBOOK T M
THE BALKANS WARS

AUGUST 1993

TACTICAL NOTEBOOK T M

THE BALKANS WARS

Ottoman Divisions on the

Dardanelles in 1913
(Continued)
A better view of a complete Ottoman
division can be seen in the 27th and
50th Nizam divisions. Both of these
divisions were employed entirely on
dry land and thus retained what seems
to be a full complement of divisional
artillery - a battalion of three batteries
of 75mm field guns. (The 27th served
on the Gallipoli Peninsula throughout
the campaign. The 50th, which arrived
in the last weeks of the campaign, fought
on the mainland of Asia Minor.)
The fact that the regimental numbers
fail to match the neat system employed
by the 31st and 32nd divisions indicates that the numerical relationship
between regiments and their parent divisions was somewhat irregular.
If these four divisions are representative, a typical Nizam division in 1913
had three infantry regiments (of three
battalions each) plus an independent
battalion of chasseurs. Two of these
infantry regiments had machine gun
companies.

The divisional artillery consisted of a

battalion of three batteries of 75mm
field guns. These battalions were designated as the first, second, or third
battalions of a given artillery regiment.
What happened to the regimental headquarters when the division went to war,
however, is somewhat of a mystery.
(It would make sense for an artillery
regiment to be assigned to each army
corps and for each of the three battalions of that regiment be assigned to
each of the three Nizam divisions of
that army corps. There is, however, not
enough evidence to firmly support this
conclusion.)
The standard Ottoman field gun was a
75mm quickfirer of either German
(Krupp) or French (Schneider) manufacture. Because these were often purchased as complete batteries - with guns,
caissons, limbers, and other equipment
- there seems to have been little mixing
of types within battalions.
As might be imagined from what we
know of Balkans Wars that the forces
of poor administration and fierce fighting often combined to make a mockery
of this formal organization. The degree

to which this took place can be seen by

examining the five Ottoman divisions
that were in occupation of the Gallipoli
Peninsula in February of 1913.
The most regular of these divisions
was, naturally enough, the only division of the five that formed part of the
Nizam, the standing army of young
conscripts. The 27th Nizam Division
had lately transfered from its home
station of Beirut and was almost entirely composed of Syrian and Palestinian Arabs.
The second Ottoman division at
Gallipoli in 1913 was the Mretebb
Division. True to its name - mretebb
means combined - the Mretebb Division was formed from a variety of
elements, to include units that has escaped from the Bulgarian, Greek, and
Serbian victories to the north and west.
The Mretebb Division was the largest
of the five divisions on the Gallipoli
Peninsula. Two of its regiments were
elite rifle regiments - model units that
had been trained by German officers.
The rest of the infantry was composed
of men of the Redif. These were organized into an oversized regiment (Redif

Ottom an X A rmy Corps

February , 19 13
3 1st Nizam Divisio n
Infantry Regiment 91

32nd Nizam Division

Infantry Regiment 94

Redif Division Samso un

Redif Reg iment Samsou n

Infantry Regiment 92

Infantry Regiment 95

Redif Regiment Ounja

Infantry Regiment 93

Infantry Regiment 96

Red if Regiment Kerasun

31 Chas seurs

32 Chas seu rs

1 Machine Gun Detachment

M ountain Artillery
Battalion 15

Detachment Noury Bey

Mretebb Regiment

I./Field Artillery
Regiment 18

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504 Broadway, Quantico, VA 22134. Each issue contains 20 articles like the ones reprinted in these pages.
Subscriptions: Trial (4 issues) $14, One Year (12 issues) $35, Two Years $60, Volume I (10/91-9/92) $40.

AUGUST 1993

TACTICAL NOTEBOOK T M
Regiment Trapezunt, of five battalions)
and an oversized battalion (Redif Battalion Soma, of six companies.) The
divisional artillery was, by Ottoman
standards, huge. Six batteries were
formed into two battalions. In addition,
there was a battery of 37mm pompom guns, weapons that resemble
modern automatic grenade launchers.
The other three Ottoman divisions at
Gallipoli were Redif divisions - less
favored units formed by local authorities from older men. Like territorial
units in many armies, the battalions and
regiments were named rather than numbered. One of these - the TscharnakKale Division - was from the Dardanelles region. (Tscharnak-Kale is
the Turkish word for Dardanelles as
well as a city on the Asian side of the
Straits.) The others were from other
parts of the Ottoman Empire.
As was the case with almost all Redif
divisions, there was neither a pioneer
company, a cavalry squadron, nor a
chasseur battalion. Each division,
furthermore, was missing one of its
infantry battalions.
The artillery of these last three divisions varied greatly. One division had
three field gun batteries, another had
two, and the third had one. The
Tscharnak-Kale Division even had a
battery of 150mm howitzers. (In an
army where there was very little heavy
artillery, this was an unusual arrangement.)

THE BALKANS WARS

sions seem to have been assigned machine gun units originally intended for
use in fortresses or cavalry brigades.
The combat troops directly subordinated to the Ottoman army headquarters in Gallipoli were few. There were
three cavalry squadrons detached from
their regiments and a lone battery of
pom-pom guns.
The army corps (X. Army Corps) sent
to reinforce the defenders of Gallipoli
as well as to cooperate with them by
making tactical landings, was composed
of four major elements. Two of these
were the aforementioned 31st and 32nd
Nizam Divisions. The third was a Redif
division (probably Redif Division
Samsoun) and the fourth was an independent mixed brigade named, in the
German style, for its commander, Noury
Bey.

Whereas the machine gun companies

of the Nizam divisions tended to belong
to infantry regiments, very few Redif
regiments had machine gun companies
of their own. Instead, the Redif divi-

The third element of the Ottoman forces

on the Dardanelles was the force on the
Asian side of the straits. While the
forces on Gallipoli had to deal with a
strong enemy attacking on a narrow
front, the forces on the coast of Asia
Minor had to a control a large area that
might serve (as it did in 1915) as a spot
for a secondary landing by enemy
troops.

Redif Division Samsoun consisted of

three Redif infantry regiments, an independent machine gun detachment, and
an undersized battalion of two field
artillery batteries.

To meet this unusual requirement, the

Ottoman authorities formed an unusual
organization. The Detached Division
Mendres was an independent formation of division size operating in the
area of the town of Mendres. It consisted of two Redif infantry regiments
(of four battalions each), three cavalry
regiments, an artillery regiment (of eight
batteries), and a cavalry machine gun
detachment. Two of the cavalry regiments and the field artillery regiments
were ad hoc (Mretebb) units.

Detachment Noury Bey was made up

of three field artillery batteries, four
Redif infantry battalions, and a machine gun company of unknown origin.
The four Redif infantry battalions were
formed into a regiment which was entitled the Mretebb (combined) Regi-

Sources: Das Heerwesen der Trkei.

1912, Loebells Jahresberichte fr 1912,
pp. 221-242; Das Heerwesen der Trkei.
1913, Loebells Jahresberichte fr 1913,
pp. 232-234: Hans Rohde, Die Operationen
an den Dardanallen im Balkankriege 1912/
1913, (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1914), pp.
132-134

D etached Div is ion M endres

F ebrua ry , 1 913
Redif Regiment M ersina

The Tscharnak-Kale Division was further distinguished by a total lack of

machine guns. As partial compensation, it had a battery of pom-pom guns.
One of the Redif divisions had but one
machine gun company. All other divisions had two.

ment. (Colonel Noury Bey was an

officer of extraordinary energy who
had spent a tour of duty with a German
regiment in Cologne.)

Redif Reg iment M ustafaz

Cavalry Machine Gun

Detachment 27

27 th Cavalry Reg iment

Mretebb Cavalry Regiment

Mretebb Cavalry Regiment

M retebb Field Artillery Regiment

Readers wishing to make, in excess of "fair use", copies of articles appearing in Tactical Notebook, should
send 5 per copy per page (two sides) to the Institute of Tactical Education, PO Box 125, Quantico, VA 22134.
Instructors, librarians, schools and institutions should write to inquire about blanket permission to copy.

AUGUST 1993