THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

CELESTINO
BONOAN y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 45130 Vol. 64, Phil 87 February 17, 1937
Ponente: J. Laurel
FACTS:
Celestino Bonoan met Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a
barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the
time in the barbershop, heard Bonoan say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech
turned around and saw Bonoan withdrawing his right hand, which held a
knife, from the side of Guison who said, "I will pay you," but Bonoan simply
replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed Guison 3 times on the
left side. The incident was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco. Bonoan
was arrested on the day itself. Bonoan admitted to stabbing Guison. Guison
was taken to PGH where he died 2 days later. Prosecuting attorney of Manila
filed an information charging Celestino Bonoan with the crime of murder.
Bonoan's defense counsel objected to the arraignment on the ground
that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in
the psychopathic hospital. The court issued and order requiring the Director
of the hospital to report on Bonoan's mental condition. A report was rendered
by Dr. Toribio Joson. The case was called for arraignment again, the defense
objected and again the court filed another order requiring the doctor who
examined Bonoan to appear in court to report on Bonoan's mental condition.
Dr. Toribio appeared before the court for the inquiry. The court issued
another order asking to summon other doctors from the hospital and to put
Bonoan under another doctor, Dr. Jose Fernandez, for closer observation. Dr.
Fernandez filed his report on 11 June 1935. Dr. Fernandez showed up in court
and reported that Bonoan was still not in a condition to defend himself.
Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that Bonoan could be discharged
from the hospital and appears for trial as he was "considered a recovered
case." Bonoan was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" and the trial was held.
To prove motive and mental normalcy of Bonoan the prosecution called on
Damaso Arnoco who testified that the reason for Bonoan's attack was that
Guison owed him P55 and would not pay him back. Bonoan had bought the
knife with which he stabbed Guison for 50 centavos and had been waiting 2
days to kill him. He acquired this information when he arrested and
questioned Bonoan. Bonoan was charged with the murder of Carlos Guison,
and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay P1K to indemnify the
heirs of Guison.
The defendant appealed the case and his counsel cited that the lower
court had erred in finding that Bonoan had dementia intermittently and not
immediately prior to the commission of the offense, in finding that the
accused did not show any abnormality either in behavior, action, language,
appearance, or action that he was mentally deranged, in finding that the
1

burden of proof lay in the defendant to prove that he was mentally deranged
at the time of the crime, and in not acquitting Bonoan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Celestino Bonoan was insane at the time of the
commission of the crime.
HELD:
Yes. Celestino Bonoan was insane at the time of the commission of the
crime. The judgment of the lower court reversed. Defendant appellant
acquitted but to be kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or any
other hospital for the insane.
Insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof of insanity at the time of
committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit
the accused on the ground of insanity. An affirmative verdict of insanity is to
be governed by preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is not
to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Prosecution must prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt. When a defendant in a criminal case interposes
the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing the fact rests
upon the defendant. To prove insanity the evidence must be clear and
convincing. The courts need to distinguish insanity in law from passion or
eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical
ailment.
In this case, the separate reports given by Dr. Toribio Joson and Dr.
Fernandez they both diagnosed Bonoan to be unstable, stating that "he will
always have troubles and difficulties with this world of realities." Bonoan was
diagnosed with dementia praecox which is a mental disease that disqualifies
a person from legal responsibility for his actions. In these people homicidal
attacks are common because of the delusions that they are being interfered
with or that their property is being taken. The court was of the opinion that
Bonoan was demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense charge
with and that consequently he is exempt from criminal liability.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO

PUNO y FILOMENO, accused whose death sentence is under review.
G.R. No. L-33211 Vol. 105 SCRA 151 June 29, 1981
Ponente: J. Aquino
FACTS:
Ernesto Puno entered the bedroom of 72 years old Francisca Col also
known as Aling Kikay, in Little Bagio, barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, Rizal. Aling
Kikay was on the bed, when Puno entered & insulted her by saying
"Mangkukulam ka, mambabarang, mayroon kang bubuyog." Then, he
repeatedly slapped her and struck her on the head several times with a
hammer until she was dead. The assault was witnessed by Hilaria dela Cruz
who was present in the room during the attack, and by Lina Pajes, a tenant in
the next room. After killing the old lady Puno went into the next room, where
the girls had taken refuge & made the following confession & threat "Huag
kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng
bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or according
to Lina "pinatay ko na ang iyong matanda. Huag kayong tumawag ng pulis.
Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang pahihigantihan ko." After Puno left,
Lina called the police. Puno fled to his parents' house then later on to his
second cousin, Teotimos house.
Puno's father surrendered him to the police. He was brought to the
National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal. He was charged with murder
in the municipal court. Puno's wife, his sister in law and his 2nd cousin all
testified in court describing his appearance and his behavior immediately
before and after them murder, boxing the dog, having an imaginary bumble
bee flying around him, singing, etc.
The defense presented 3 doctors to prove insanity but the doctors
instead proved that Puno had acted with discernment when he killed Aling
Kikay. Dr. Araceli Maravilla of Dr. Jose Reyes Memorial hospital said Puno was
an outpatient who could very well live with society even if he was afflicted
with schizophrenic reaction. Dr. Reynaldo Robles stated that Puno had
schizophrenic reaction but that this condition was "not socially
incapacitating." Dr. Carlso Vicente of the National Mental Hospital testified
that Puno acted w/ discernment & could distinguish right from wrong.
Puno was indicted for the murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig,
Rizal. Alleged in the information as aggravating circumstances were evident
premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard for sex. Puno was
sentenced to death and ordered to pay P22K to the heirs of the victim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ernesto Puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay.
3

HELD:
No. Puno was not insane when he killed Aling Kikay. In this case,
medium penalty for murder imposed. Death penalty is set aside. The accused
is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Record from Puno's stay at the National Mental Hospital stated that he
had been an outpatient for schizophrenia in 1962, recovered, had a relapse in
1964, improved and in 1966 his sickness remained UNIMPROVED. Treatment
continued in San Lazaro Compound up to 1970 where he was relieved of
symptoms and did not come back for medication. It cited that he was quiet
and as usual manageable. The report stated that he "is presently free from
any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms", but persons suffering from
schizophrenia may retain some of the residual symptoms but it wouldn't
affect their discernment of right and wrong. The court says: "in the light of
the strict rule just stated and the circumstance surrounding the killing, we are
led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed, the
victim'' The court cited that had he been a homicidal maniac he would have
killed Lina and Hilaria too. The evidence should prove clearly that he was
insane at the time of the commission of the crime.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, and he acts
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the
power to discern, or total deprivation of freedom of will. Mere abnormality of
the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. Two aggravating
circumstances, dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the age of the
victim are offset by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
the offender's mental illness (mild schizophrenic reaction) which diminished
him of his will power but did not deprive him of consciousness of his acts.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

DONATO BASCOS, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 19605 Vol. 44, Phil 204 December 19, 1922
Ponente: J. Malcolm
FACTS:
The accused Donato Bascos was charged with the murder of Victoriano
Romero filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. On arraignment, he
entered a plea of not guilty. The proof for the prosecution established that the
accused was the one who had killed Victoriano Romero, while the latter was
sleeping. The defense was that of insanity. Following the conclusion of the
trial, the presiding judge rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the
crime of homicide, however, the execution of the sentence should be
suspended in accordance with article 100 of the Penal Code, and the accused
placed in a hospital for the insane, there to remain until such time as his
mental condition shall be determined.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plea of inanity is sustainable under Article 8,
paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, or the case falls under Article 100 of the
Code and exempts him from criminal liability.
HELD:
Yes. The accused Donato Bascos was exempted from criminal liability.
In this case, Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code, applied to the facts,
the judgment reversed and the defendant acquitted and ordered confined in
an insane asylum.
The wife of the accused and his cousin testified that Donato Bascos
had been more or less continuously out of his mind for many years. Dr.
Gonzalo Montemayor, examined the accused and conducted an investigation,
found that the accused is a violent maniac, and that from the information he
had received from the neighbors of the accused, the latter had been insane
for some time. The physician expressed the opinion that the accused was
probably insane when Victoriano Romero was killed. The total lack of motive
of Bascos to kill Romero bears out the assumption that the former was
insane.
Therefore, the trial found the accused lunatic when he committed the
grave felony described in the record and that consequently he is exempt from
criminal liability and confined in an insane asylum.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO

MANALANG y OCON, accused.
G.R. No. L-47136-39 Vol. 123, SCRA 583 July 25, 1983
Ponente: Per Curiam
FACTS:
Four (4) persons were found dead by police investigators in the at
Mandaluyong City. The body of Maria Lourdes Shih was in her bedroom, naked
from the waist down. The bodies of Rosita Shih and Joy Angelique Shih, a five
year old child, were found in the adjoining room; while that of Hilda Pomida,
housemaid, was found in her quarters. All four were victims of stabbing.
Romeo Manalang was 23 years old and residing with his mother in
Caloocan when he committed the crimes. He had long planned to kill Rosita
Shih (first cousin of his father but whom he called lola) and Maria Lourdes
Shih, whom he called Marilou, and he went to their house precisely for that
purpose. Previously, in 1970, he was brought by his mother to the Shih
household so that the family could have a male companion and he had
deeply resented the fact that during the three years that he stayed with
them, he was treated like a mere houseboy and not as a relative.
Romeo went to the Shih residence and went straight to the kitchen and
took some coffee. Lola saw him and asked him why he was there. When Lola
turned her back, Romeo drew near, got a kitchen knife and stabbed the old
woman. Lola ran to her room but Romeo followed and further stabbed her.
When Romeo went out of the room, the maid suddenly appeared shouting
saklolo. Romeo stabbed her to keep her silent. The maid ran towards her
quarters but Romeo overtook her and continued to stab her. Romeo went
back to Lolas room still holding the knife when he found the child crying, he
also stabbed the girl to death. Thereafter, he waited for Marilou, who was
then out of the house. When Marilou arrived, she went straight to the house.
When Marilou reached the house, Romeo following behind and he
continuously stabbed her. After Marilou fell, Romeo dragged her into her
bedroom. Thereat, he removed Marilous pants and panty, and having
stripped her naked from the waist down.
Romeo, after getting Marilous wallet and key holder from her bag,
went to the intersection of Boni Ave., and the Hi-way (EDSA), boarded a bus
and went to the construction site where he was apprehended by the police.
The incident was witnessed by Teresita Estonatoc, resident of a house
6

adjacent to the Shihs house, who saw Romeo Manalang at about the time the
four (4) murders were committed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Romeo Manalang while maintaining his
plea of guilty, committed the crime of murder on his alleged insanity.
HELD:
No. Romeo Manalang was not insane when he committed the crime of
murders of Rosita, Maria Lourdes, Shih, child Joy Angelique Shih, and
housemaid Hilda Pomida. Wherefore, the trial court affirms the decision
sentencing appellant Manalang to death for each of the murders of Rosita
and Marilou Shih. Guilty of murder, with dwelling as an aggravating
circumstance offset by his plea of guilty for the killing of Joy Angelique Shih,
sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. And guilty of
homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling which is
offset by his plea of guilty, sentence him to prison mayor as minimum and
reclusion temporal as maximum for killing Hilda Pomida.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, insanity, as an exempting
circumstance, means that the accused must have been deprived completely
of reason and freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime.
The execution of the crimes perpetrated by appellant Manalang, as well as
his acts subsequent thereto, including his narration of the events and his reenactment thereof, clearly indicate that he was in full possession of his
faculties. It is quite true that mass killing will not be done by a normal person,
but the abnormality inherent in the taking of human life is not the kind of
abnormality that will exclude imputability.
In this case, in the four information charging the accused of murder,
treachery, evident premeditation and dwelling were present. They were all
found by the trial court to have been established beyond doubt. The
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was present in the killing
of Rosita and Maria Lourdes Shih as admitted by the accused that he went to
the Shih house precisely to kill them.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL

MORALES y ALAS, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-44096 Vol. 121, SCRA 426 April 20, 1983
Ponente: Per Curiam
FACTS:
The accused Manuel Morales was charged with the rape of his own
daughter in Criminal Case No. 905 and infanticide in Criminal Case No. 904.
That sometime in the month of December, 1974, the accused-appellant
Manuel Morales, through force and intimidation, was able to have carnal
knowledge of his unmarried daughter Maria Morales. Thereafter, the
appellant repeated his misdeeds several times. Consequently, Maria Morales
got pregnant and on 19 March 1976, with the help of the appellant, she gave
birth to a live baby girl named Mary Morales inside their house in Barrio
Maluanluan. About an hour later, the appellant took the baby from the
mother, brought her out of the house, and buried her alive near their house.
To cover the place where he buried the baby, the appellant built a fire over it.
A neighbor of the appellant, Delfin Dris, reported to Lara, the Station
Commander that in the night of 19 March 1976, he heard the crying of a baby
but that later it stopped. With the help of Dris, Lara found the baby buried a
foot deep in a place about 15 meters from the appellants house. Lara
summoned the help of Dra. Alamar who conducted an autopsy on the body of
the baby. He also ordered a sergeant to fetch the appellant so that he could
identify the body of the baby. Appellant arrived and then identified the body
of the baby as his daughter by Maria Morales, his own daughter, whom he
buried alive to cover the shame of his family because of what he did to the
latter. Thereafter, the accused, Manuel Morales, in his extrajudicial confession
admitted that he buried his baby daughter alive.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manuel Morales was insane at the time of the
commission of the crime.
8

HELD:
No. The accused, Manuel Morales was not insane at the time of the
commission of the crime. With two aggravating circumstances and only one
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the imposition of capital
punishment is inescapable for this heinous, outrageous and cruel crime
without parallel in Philippine jurisprudence. Wherefore, the judgment in
Criminal Case No. P-904 is hereby affirmed.
The act of the accused in building a fire over the grave where he
buried his infant daughter in order to camouflage it and to deflect it from
suspicion belies his protestation that he had suffered a mental blackout at the
time. On the contrary, they show deliberateness and full possession of his
mental faculties to prevent discovery of a dastardly crime.
It is more likely that the accused was wavering between remorse of
conscience and a lurking desire to disown the crime and go scot-free if it
could be proven that the child had been born dead and lifeless. Besides, the
law presumes every man to be sane. When a defendant in a criminal case
interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that
fact rests upon him.
RAMON B. FELIPE, SR., as Chairman, Board of Judges, petitioner, vs.
HON. JOSE N. LEUTERIO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, EMMA IMPERIAL, represented by her guardian-ad-litem JUSTO V.
IMPERIAL, and SOUTHERN LUZON COLLEGE, respondents.
G.R. No. L-4606 Vol. 91, Phil 482 May 30, 1952
Ponente: J. Bengzon
FACTS:
March 12, 1950 a benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in
Naga with 8 contestants and 5 judges, (Ramon B. Felipe being the
chairman) where 1st prize was awarded to Nestor Nosce and 2 nd to Emma
Imperial. Days after the contest has been conducted and the winners
announced, one of the judges confesses he made a mistake that the ratings
he gave the second placer should have been as would entitle her to first
place. Four days after, Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges
protesting the verdict, and alleging that one of the Judges had committed a
mathematical mistake in the final score. Upon refusal of the Board to alter
their verdict, she filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance. The grades
given by judges were tallied and the contestant receiving the lowest number
(1 was highest) got 1 st prize. Nosce and Imperial both got the lowest number
of 10. The chairman, with the consent of the board, broke the tie awarding 1 st
prize to Nosce and 2nd to Imperial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of
the board of judges of an oratorical competition.
HELD:

No. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of
judges of an oratorical competition. Wherefore the order in controversy is
hereby set aside. No costs.
Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the
Word apply the highest tenets of sportsmanship: finally of the referees
verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are supposed to
join the competition to contribute to its success by striving their utmost: the
prizes are secondary. No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the
contestants, because theirs was merely the privilege to compete for the
prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and
until they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed
arbiters or referees or judges.
The Court has no jurisdiction. Error is contemplated by law as a
misapplication of a statute or provision. There could be error in the
computation of final scores, but it is not error in context of law. The Court
would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contest, and similar contests.
The decision of the board in such contests, although only implied, is final and
unappealable.

PHILIPPINE SOAP BOX DERBY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and JOSE ELSTON YABUT, represented by his father,
GEMINIANO E. YABUT, JR., and ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC.,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-108115 Vol. 249, SCRA 593 October 27, 1995
Ponente: J. Kapunan
FACTS:
On July 3, 1983, the defendant Philippine Soap Box Derby, Inc., a duly
organized non-stock corporation, held a soap box derby. Jose Elston Yabut, a
ten-year old student and son of Geminiano Yabut, Jr., joined the contest.
Elston Yabut won first place on the 1st race and was qualified for the 2nd race.
The derby rules provide that the maximum combined weight of car and driver
should not exceed 206 pounds. The boy lost in the second race. Thereafter,
the father returned the weight to the boy in order that it could be screwed
back to where it was originally attached. In the third race his father instructed
him to put back the half-pound weight at the back of the derby car. The boy
did not screw the weight; instead he placed it inside his back pocket. While
he was about to climb the ramp to ride the soap box car, a derby official
tapped his back pocket and discovered the half-pound weight inside the
pocket. When confronted, the boy admitted that he did not screw the lead
weight. The boy was not allowed to participate in the third race despite of the
efforts of the father to talk the derby officials. As a result of his son's
disqualification private respondent Geminiano Yabut, Jr. filed a complaint for
actual, moral and exemplary damages with the Regional Trial Court of
10

Caloocan City alleging that the arbitrary disqualification of his son "became a
nightmare, resulting in his son's embarrassment and humiliation, "not only
to relatives, classmates and friends but (also) to the public in general,
resulting in "mental anguish, serious anxiety, social humiliation and sleepless
nights."
ISSUE:
Whether or not in a private sports competition a court may substitute
its judgement made by the competitions officials in the interpretation and
enforcement of competition rules.
HELD:
No. The court may not be allowed to substitute its judgment made by
the competitions officials in the interpretation and enforcement of the rules
in a private sports competition. Wherefore, the Court of Appeals Amended
Decision is hereby reversed and the trial court's decision reinstated.
The soap box derby race has rules which must be strictly followed and
it has officials duly selected and authorized to enforce the rules. Anyone who
joins the derby, does so with the clear cut understanding that he shall abide
strictly by the rules. Decisions may not be pleasant to participants, like the
plaintiffs, but the latter may not be allowed to substitute their own judgments
over those authorized by the sponsoring body, to conduct the race.
The case at bar has taken through our courts would have been
unnecessary had private respondents observed ordinary rules of
sportsmanship and sporting play following John Elston Yabut's disqualification.
The maxim that "the judges decision is final" simplifies sports adjudication to
a degree which the larger arena of life does not ordinarily mirror.
Nonetheless, it is simplicity in procedure which we of the courts ought to
altogether idealize or sometimes aim for.
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFONSO PE,
defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-17396 Vol. 5, SCRA 200 May 30, 1962
Ponente: J. Angelo Bautista
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried
woman 24 years of age. Defendant was a married man, and an adopted son
of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolitas father. Because
of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close
to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. He frequently
visited Lolitas house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray
the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the
parents of Lolita learned about this, they prohibited defendant from going to
their house. The affair continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita
disappeared from her brothers house where she was living. A note in
handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolitas closet. The
disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but
up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts. The present
11

action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court
dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant committed injury to Lolitas family in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated
in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Yes. The defendant committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article
21 of the New Civil Code. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed.
Defendant is herby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as
damages and P2,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigation and
costs.
In this case, Article 21 of the New Civil Code as the legal basis which
provides: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage. The circumstances under which
defendant tried to win Lolitas affection cannot lead to any other conclusion
than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the
latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him.
Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events
than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having
illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-14628 Vol. 103, PHIL 629 September 30, 1960
Ponente: J. Concepcion
FACTS:
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas a teacher, hereinafter referred to
as complaint, filed with the said Court of First Instance a complaint for the
acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said
petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged
breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and
expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised
to marry the complainant. The complainant was 10 years older than the
petitioner (Francisco Hermosisima) but they had a very intimate relationship
12

thats why they are regarded as engaged then they had a child. However, the
petitioner breaches his promise to marry the complainant and married a
woman named Romanita Perez. This served as the cause of action of the
complainant to file a complaint against the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for
breach of promise to marry.
HELD:
No. However, when the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently
delivers. Although she cannot recover moral damages for the breach,
nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical and
hospitalization expenses as wells as attorneys fees. Wherefore, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, in all other respects, without
special pronouncement as to cost in this instance.
In this case, Article 2219, paragraph 3 of the New Civil Code as the
legal basis which provides: Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases: (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other
lascivious acts.
Because of petitioners seduction power, the complainant,
overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite
of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said
defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages
may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3,
of the New Civil Code.

APOLINARIO TANJANCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-18630 Vol. 18, SCRA 994 December 17, 1966
Ponente: J. J.B.L. Reyes
FACTS:
On December 1957, Apolinario Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos. They
were both of legal age then. After some time, they became a couple and in
consideration of Tanjancos promise of marriage, Santos acceded to his pleas
of carnal knowledge. This happened regularly for about one year until
December 1959. Santos conceived a child and as a result of her pregnancy,
she was forced to resign from her job as a secretary in IBM Philippines where
13

she received a salary of P230.00 monthly. Tanjanco refused to marry her

causing her mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock and social humiliation. She sued Tanjanco for damages. Court of First
Instance dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action but was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and the latter decided that there was cause
of action for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Tanjaco appeals to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the woman can sue for damages on the ground of
breach of promise to marry.
HELD:
No. The woman cannot sue for damages because breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. It is not permissible in this jurisdiction.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the
Court of First Instance is affirmed. Petition dismissed.
The purpose behind Article 21 of the Civil Code any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages. Fully countless gaps in statute which leave so many victims or
moral wrongs helpless, some even suffering material and moral injury.
Example is Seduction. There was no seduction involved. The man neither
used deceit, enticement or superior power to force the woman to have sex.
Sexual intercourse on a regular basis does not constitute seduction but,
rather, a voluntary and mutual passion between the parties.
In the case at bar, Santos entered into carnal act voluntarily with
mutual passion. Had she been seduced then she could have gotten out of the
relationship as soon as she can and not wait until after one year without him
fulfilling his promise to marry her. Thus not covered by Article 21 of the Civil
Code.

DOMINADOR R. AYTONA, petitioner, vs. ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL.,

respondents.
G.R. No. L-19313 Vol. 4, SCRA 1 January 19, 1962
Ponente: J. Bengzon
FACTS:
Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing
president Garcia during the last minute of his term. On December 29, 1961,
14

Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank. When
Macapagal took his office as the next president he issued Order No. 2 which
recalled Aytonas position and at the same time he appointed Castillo as the
new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo warranto
proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank
governor and that he was validly appointed by the ex-president. Macapagal
averred that the ex-presidents appointments were scandalous, irregular,
hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt
to subvert the incoming presidency or administration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dominador Aytona should remain in his post.
HELD:
No. Aytona should not remain in his post. Wherefore, the Court
exercising its judgment and discretion in the matter, hereby DISMISS the
action, without costs.
The Supreme Court held that although President Carlos P. Garcia was
still President up to noon December 30, 1961 (his successor, President
Diosdado Macapagal was scheduled to assume the Presidency on said date)
he should not have issued mass midnight appointments on December 26,
1961. Such an act may be regarded by the successor as an abuse of
Presidential prerogatives, the appointments detracted from that degree of
good faith, morality, and propriety which form the basic foundation of claims
to equitable relief. Needless to say there are instances wherein not only strict
legality, but also fairness, justice, and righteousness should be taken into
account.
Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would
have the right to continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to
remain in his post as he is competent enough, his appointment can
nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcias appointments are hurried
maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the
policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his
appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his
appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety.
In public service, it is not only legality that is considered but also justice,
fairness and righteousness.

SOCORRO A. GILLERA, petitioner, vs. CORAZON FERNANDEZ and

ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Executive Officer the Board of Examiners,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-20741 Vol. 10, SCRA 233 January 31, 1964
15

Ponente: J. Barrera
FACTS:
On December 26, 1961, Socorro A. Gillera was extended an ad
interim appointment as Member of the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners by
then President Carlos P. Garcia, for a fix term of three years to fill the position
being vacated by Board Examiner Dr. Federico Cruz, whose term was expiring
December 28, 1961. Gillera accepted the appointment, took the oath of office
on December 28, 1961, assumed and discharged the functions appertaining
thereto preparing the questions on the subjects assigned to her for the
examinations which actually were given on January 2, 3, 4, and 7, 1962. In
the meantime or under date of December 31, 1961, she received a
communication from the Executive Secretary informing her of the
"withdrawal" or recall of her ad interim appointment in view of the President's
Administrative Order No. 2. On January 11, 1962, the President designated
Gillera as Acting Member of the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners, effective
January 2, 1962, "to continue only until after the results of the
Pharmaceutical examinations now being given by the Board has been
approved by this Office and released." It was therein stated that said
designation was made "as a matter of emergency in order not to disrupt
public service and not to prejudice the candidates in the current pharmacist
examination." Allegedly in view of the fact that the session of Congress
terminated without the examination results having been released, the
President issued to Gillera another designation on May 18, 1962, also until
the results of the examination were approved and released. On the other
hand, her ad interim appointment of December 28, 1961 was confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments on May 9, 1962.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners ad interim appointment of December
28, 1961 was validly recalled or withdrawn by the Presidents Administrative
Order No. 2, in the light of the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of
Aytona vs. Castillo.
HELD:
Yes. The petitioners ad interim appointment was valid. Wherefore,
petitioner's appointment which was duly confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments is hereby declared valid and she is entitled to the position of
Member of the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners. Respondent Corazon C.
Fernandez is directed to vacate the position and deliver the same to
petitioner.
The Supreme Court held that appointments made by an outgoing
President to fill up vacancies in important positions, if few and so spaced as
to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the
need for the appointment and the appointees qualification, are valid.
In the case at bar, even the new President recognized the need for the
immediate filling of the position of Member of the Board of Pharmaceutical
Examiners, in view of the examinations that were given on January 2, 3, 4,
16

and 7, 1962, that he (the President) saw it fit, as a matter of emergency in

order not to disrupt public service to designate petitioner herself to the
same position to which she was previously appointed and had qualified.
There is also no allegation that petitioner is not qualified to the said office, or
that her appointment was one of those attended by the mad scramble in
Malacaang in the evening of December 29, 1961. On the contrary, it is not
controverted by respondents that petitioners appointment was extended on
December 26, 1961 or even before the actual expiry of the term of Examiner
Cruz, which was a few days before the examinations would take place,
although said appointment was to take effect only on December 28, 1961,
and in fact petitioner took her oath of office only on the latter date. Clearly, it
cannot be said that in the instant case, petitioners appointment was not the
result of the Presidents deliberate action, considering her qualification and
the exigency of the service.

17

ALBETZ INVESTMENTS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

JOSE N. LEUTERIO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch II, and SPS. RICARDO CALMA and VICENTA D. CALMA, and
SPS. FRANCISCO UMENGAN and MARIA R. UMENGAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32570 Vol. 75, SCRA 311 February 28, 1977
Ponente: J. Antonio
FACTS:
The Calma spouses were the lessees of that lot no. 27 pt., Block No.
BP-52 of a subdivision located at 816 Prudencio Street, Sampaloc, Manila. The
defendant Albetz Investments, Inc., the lessor, needing the premises in order
to construct a new building, demanded delivery of the lot to it and upon
refusal of the Calma Spouses, Albetz Investments, Inc. brought an action of
unlawful detainer against Vicenta Calma. Judgment by default was rendered
by the Municipal Court on March 30, 1964, ordering Vicenta Calma and all
persons claiming under her to vacate the premises and to pay the
corresponding rentals. The judgment having become final, Atty. Macario S.
Meneses, director and lawyer of Albetz Investments, Inc., filed a motion for
execution. The motion was granted and the Municipal Court issued the writ of
execution on July 1, 1964, commanding the Sheriff to remove the defendants
in the premises and to collect the damages. Vicenta Calma and others filed a
petition for certiorari on the principal grounds that the order of demolition
was no longer in force, having been issued eight (8) months before its
enforcement, and that the said spouses were not notified of the order of
demolition, and they demolished the house indiscrimately and the personal
properties were carelessly placed, resulting in their being damaged, the Court
of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant, awarding them damages in specified amounts, as well as
attorney's fees and costs of suit. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not are the said occupants entitled to damages.
HELD:
Yes. Since no reasonable time was given, and the belongings were
damaged, the demolition of the house may be said to have been carried out
in a manner not consistent with justice and good faith, as required by Article
19 of the Civil Code. Damages may therefore be awarded in view of this
abuse of a right. Wherefore, with the foregoing modifications, the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
While it is true that Albetz Investments, Inc. had the legal right to the
surrender to them of the parcel of land leased by the Calma spouses, which
could only be achieved thru the demolition of the house standing thereon,
nevertheless, such right should not have been exercised in such a manner as
to unduly prejudice its owners. Urged by the lawyer of petitioner, the Sheriff,
aided with petitioner's laborers, wantonly, maliciously and indiscriminately
demolished the house, destroying in the process many of the personal
properties therein which belonged to the spouses Calma and Umengan.
18

The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Civil Code on Human
Relations are applicable, specifically Article 19 which provides, thus:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
In the case at bar the demolition complained was not carried out in a
manner consistent with justice and good faith. At the instance of petitioner, it
was done in a swift, unconscionable manner, giving the occupants of the
house no time at all to remove their belongings therefrom. No damage worth
mentioning would have been sustained by petitioner Albetz Investments, Inc.
if their men, led by the Sheriff, had been instructed to allow said occupants to
remove their personal properties, considering that this would not have taken
a considerable length of time.

19

SPS. CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPS. LITO and MARIA
CRISTINA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF
PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, M.M.,
BRANCH 181, respondents.
G.R. No. 116100 Vol. 253, SCRA 483 February 9, 1996
Ponente: J. Regalado
FACTS:
Perusing the record, the RTC of Pasig finds that the original plaintiff
Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by
Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse (and children). The plaintiff owns a parcel
of land with a two door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P.
Burgos, Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. Said properties may be
described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendant
herein. Taking P. Burgos as a point of reference, or the left side going to the
plaintiffs property, the row of houses will be as follows: that of defendants
Cristino and Brigido Custodio and that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and
then that of Ofelia Mabasa. There are two possible passageways. When said
property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the
premises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants.
However, sometime in February 1982, one of the said tenants vacated the
apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that
there had been built an adobe fence in the 1st passageway was making it
narrower in width. Said adobe fence was 1st constructed by defendant Santos
along their property which is along the 1 st passageway. Defendant M. Santos
testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when
her daughter was dragged by a bicycle predated by a son of one of the
tenants. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having at the
front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk
and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear was even
lost. Accordingly, the judgment given did not satisfy the plaintiff, herein
private respondents went to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents
is proper.
Whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their
favor.
HELD:
With respect to the 1st issue, herein petitioners are already barred
from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from adjudication therein.
With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue
of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
However, with respect to the 2nd issue, the award of damages has no
substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals
will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the
original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized
20

rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the
closure of the passageway. However, the mere fact that plaintiff suffered
losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant recovery
of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by
the defendant and damage resulting to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage,
or damage without wrong does not constitute a cause of action, since
damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a
breach of wrong. In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was
no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could
not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO CAGOCO y RAMONES, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 38511 Vol. 58, Phil 524 February 9, 1933
Ponente: J. Vickers
FACTS:
On July 24, 1932, Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on
the sidewalk. While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu
Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee was about to leave his father, the man
that had been passing back and forth (Francisco Cagoco) approached Yu Lon
from behind and suddenly and without warning struck Yu Lon with his fist on
the back part of the head. Cagoco immediately ran away. Yu Yee and two
other witnesses pursued him and then lost sight of him. The blow caused Yu
Lon to fall on the ground. As a consequence of which he suffered a lacerated
wound on the scalp and a fissured fracture on the left occipital region which
were necessarily mortal and caused his immediate death. The next day, Yu
Yee promptly reported the incident to the police. Cagoco was later
apprehended and identified by Yu Yee as his fathers assailant.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the crime committed with treachery.
Whether or not the accused liable for murder or slight physical injuries.
HELD:
Yes. The accused committed the crime with treachery and liable for
murder. Yu Yee had the exceptional opportunities for observing his fathers
assailant, because while that person was walking back and forth behind Yu
Lon, Yu Yee was facing the assailant. Further, the testimonies of the three
Chinese (Yu Yee and the other two Chinese witnesses who pursued the
accused) was corroborated by the testimony of a 15-year old boy, Dominador
Sales. As to the contention that the deceased would have fallen on his face if
he had been struck on the back of the head, the expert testimony shows that
in such a case, a person instinctively makes an effort to regain his balance.
As a result, the deceased may have fallen downwards. Further, the sidewalks
almost invariably slop towards the pavement so that when the deceased
straightened up, he naturally tended to fall backwards. The accused struck
the deceased on the back of the head because it would have been necessary
for him to go between the deceased and Yu Yee who were then conversing.
There is treachery when the offender commits a crime employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tends directly to insure its
21

execution without risk to him arising from the defense which the offended
part might make.
In order that a person may be criminally liable for felony different from
that which he proposed to commit, these two requisites should be present:
(1) that a felony was committed and (2) that the wrongful act done to the
aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
offender.
In the case at bar, there is nothing to indicate that Yu Lons death was
due to some extraneous case. It was clearly the direct consequence of the
accused felonious act and the fact that he did not intend to cause so great an
injury does not relieve him from the consequence of his unlawful act, but is
merely a mitigating circumstance. Since the accused committed the felony
with treachery, he is guilty of murder.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO Z.
OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 47722 Vol. 74, Phil 257 July 27, 1943
Ponente: J. Moran
FACTS:
Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and his co-accused Corporal Alberto
Galant were under instruction to arrest one Anselmo Balagtas, a notorious
criminal and escaped convict, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
Proceeding to the suspected house, they went into a room and on seeing a
man sleeping with his back toward the door, simultaneously fired at him with
their revolvers, without first making any reasonable inquiry as to his identity.
The victim turned out to be an innocent man, Serapio Tecson, and not the
wanted criminal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are criminal liable and the crime
committed is murder.
HELD:
Yes. The accused are criminally liable. As the deceased was killed while
asleep, the crime committed is murder. Wherefore, the judgment is modified
and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating
circumstance and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from
five (5) years of prison correccional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of the law, and with costs.
Even if it were true that the victim was the notorious criminal, the
accused would not be justified in killing him while the latter was sleeping. In
apprehending even the most notorious criminal, the law does not permit the
captor to kill him. It is only when the fugitive from justice is determined to
fight the officers of law who are trying to capture him that killing him would
be justified. No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an
arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint
than is necessary for his detention. And a peace officer cannot claim
22

exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in

making an arrest.
Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if
resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have
exceeded in the fulfilment of such duty by killing the person whom they
believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making
any previous inquiry as to his identity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUDY MOSENDE,

accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 97170 Vol. 228, SCRA 341 December 10, 1993
Ponente: C.J. Narvasa
FACTS:
The murder victim in this case was a fifteen year old boy named Carlo
Alipao, who was living in the town of Mainit, Surigao del Norte with his
mother, Gloria Alipao. He was last seen alive by his mother in the late
afternoon of September 18, 1986, when he left his home with two friends,
Jinky Mozol and Marlon Escuyos, to visit another friend, Rudy Mosende. Carlo,
or Lelot, as he was more familiarly called, was then wearing a T-shirt and
dark-colored short trousers with stripes. On entering Mosendes shack he shut
the door and told Benceslao and Fedelino to dig a hole in the ground. When
the hole was knee-deep, Mosende told them to go to the shacks toilet.
Benceslao and Fedelino were aghast to find in the toilet the dead body of a
male person, whose hands and feet were bound with rope, and whose head
and upper torso were encased in a sack. Mosende now told them to burry the
cadaver in the hole they had just dug. Exhumed from the residential lot in
Mainit of the Mosende family were the remains of a human body wearing a Tshirt. The body was identified by Mrs. Gloria Alipao to be that of her missing
son Carlo Alipao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Rudy Mosende is guilty of the crime of
murder.
HELD:
Yes. The Trial Court found Mosende guilty of the murder of Carlo Alipao,
on the basis of circumstantial evidence, refusing to believe his alibi. Appealed
judgment affirmed.
23

The law is that circumstantial evidence support and justify the verdict
of conviction if there be more than one circumstance, if the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The defense of alibi cannot overcome the dying declaration of the
victim and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Rudy Mosendes
proffered alibi was rejected in line with familiar jurisprudence. It cannot stand
in the face of the positive declarations of disinterested witnesses having no
reasonable motive to give false evidence that he was at the scene of the
crime on the day of its commission and consummation and in fact sought to
conceal it.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANICETO MARTIN,

defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-3002, SCRA May 23, 1951
Ponente: J. JUGO
FACTS:
Aniceto Martin was accused of the complex crime of parricide with
abortion before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. After trial he was
acquitted of abortion, but found guilty of parricide. The defendant, 28 yrs.
old, a farmer, was living in the barrio No. 12 of the municipality of Laoag,
Ilocos Norte. He courted the girl Laura Liz of the same barrio for several
months and was accepted. They had sexual intercourse before marriage and
she became pregnant. In an advanced stage of pregnancy, she came to live
with the family of the family of the defendant and demanded marriage, which
was duly solemnized on June 7, 1948, and they continued to live as husband
and wife. Between four and five o clock in the morning of August 1, 1948,
the corpse of Laura was found inside the family toilet, which was at a certain
distance from their home, with a maguey rope, 6m long and 1cm in diameter,
around her neck, leaving a circular mark around it with the exception of the
nape which was unmarked undoubtedly due to her long and thick hair
covering it. The corpse was first seen by Anselma Martin, sister of the
accused, who was living in the same house, and Saturnino Tumaneng,
brother-in-law of Laura, who happened to be passing by. The defendant was
absent from home. The barrio lieutenant immediately reported the matter to
the chief of police who, accompanied by a policeman, came to the barrio that
same morning to make an investigation. The police took possession of the
rope and put the defendant in a jeep bound for the municipal building. There
24

the defendant made a confession in the Ilocano language, which he signed

and swore to at about noon before the provincial fiscal at the latters house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Aniceto Martin committed the crime of
parricide and criminally liable.
HELD:
Yes. A person is responsible for the consequences of his criminal act
and even if the deceased had been shown to be suffering from a diseased
heart, appellants assault being the proximate cause of the death, he would
be responsible.
The appellant contends that the death of Laura was not due to the
strangling, but to her heart disease. It should be noted, however that the
heart failure was due to the fright or shock caused by the strangling, and
consequently, the defendant was responsible for the death, notwithstanding
the fact that the victim was already sick. Had not the defendant strangled the
deceased, the latter, notwithstanding her illness, would not have died. In
other words, the defendant directly caused her death.
The trial court considered two mitigating circumstances in favor of the
defendant: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased without any
sufficient provocation on the part of the defendant which in this case is
equivalent to incomplete self-defense on the part of the defendant, he should
not have wound it around her neck and tightened it and (2) lack of
instruction, without any aggravating circumstances to offset them, the
penalty next lower in the degree should be imposed, which is that of
reclusion temporal.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN
QUIANZON, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 42607 Vol. 62, PHIL 162 September 28, 1935
Ponente: J. Recto
FACTS:
On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of a
deceased person was being held in the house of Victorina Cacpal in a barrio,
near poblacion, of the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos norte, with the usual
attendance of relatives and friends. Andres Aribuabo, one of the persons
present, went to ask for food of Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all
appearances, had the victuals in his care. Aribuabo was a sexagenarian and
so was Quianzon. It was the second or third time that Aribuabo approached
Quianzon with the same purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took
hold of a firebrand and applied it to the neck of the man who so pestered
him. Aribuabo ran to the place where the people were gathered exclaiming
that he was wounded and was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those
present a wound in his abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of
this wound on the tenth day after the incident.
ISSUE:
25

Whether or not the accused Juan Quianzon is criminally liable for crime
of homicide.
HELD:
Yes. The Trial Court found Mosende guilty of homicide for killing Andres
Aribuabo. One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be
guilty of homicide if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the
death of such other. The fact that other causes contribute to the death does
not relieve the actor of responsibility. Judgment modified.
Appellants criminal liability for the death of Andres Aribuabo, briefly
consists, first, in the victims statement immediately after receiving the
wound, naming the accused as the author of the aggression, and the
admission forthwith made by the accused that he had applied a firebrand to
Aribuabos neck and had wounded him, besides, with a bamboo spit. Both
statements are competent evidence in law, admissible as a part of the res
gestae. Second, in the extrajudicial confession of the accused to the barrio
lieutenant, Dumlao, and later to the chief of police Llaguno, in the same
afternoon of the crime, that he was the author of Aribuabos wound and that
he had inflicted it by means of a bamboo spit.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FILOMENO MARASIGAN,

defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 9426 Vol. 27, Phil 504 August 15, 1914
Ponente: J. Moreland
FACTS:
Francisco Mendoza, while engaged in examining his sugar crop growing
upon his lands in the barrio of Irucan, now called Calayan, in the municipality
of Taal, Batangas Province, was asked by the accused and his wife to
approach them. They had an argument in indicating the division line between
the lands of the two. On attempting to ward off the blow Mendoza was cut in
the left hand. The accused continue the attack, whereupon Mendoza seized
the accused by the neck and the body and threw him down. While both were
lying upon the ground the accused still sought to strike Mendoza with his
dagger. While they were thus fighting for the possession of the knife, the wife
of the accused came forward and took the dagger from her husbands hand,
throwing it to one side. She then seized Mendoza by the neck and threw him
from her husband, who after various maneuvers, struck Mendoza a blow
26

which knocked him senseless. As a result of the fight Mendoza received three
wounds, two in the chest and one in the left hand, the latter being the most
serious, the extensor tendon in one of the fingers having been severed. The
wounds were cured in seven days at a cost of about Php45.00, but the middle
finger of the left hand was rendered useless.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is criminally liable.
HELD:
Yes. The accused are criminally liable. The judgment appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
A person injured in an assault is not obliged to submit to a surgical
operation to relieve the person who assaulted him from the results of his
crime. Where it appears from the evidence in the case that the appellant
inflicted a wound upon the complaining witness which destroyed the use of
one of the fingers of the left hand, a motion for a new trial was denied based
upon the allegation that appellant would be able to prove, if opportunity were
given, that the finger, although useless at present, could be restored to
substantially its normal condition by a surgical operation.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AH CHONG, defendantappellant.

G.R. No. 5272 Vol. 15, Phil 488 March 19, 1910
Ponente: J. Carson
FACTS:
Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements.
One evening, before going to bed, he locked himself in his room by placing a
chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by
someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, Who is there, but
received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from
his bed and called out again, If you enter the room I will kill you. But at that
precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed against the
door, and believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife and
struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate.
27

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ah Chong by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does
an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability.
HELD:
No. Ah Chong must be acquitted because of mistake of fact.
Wherefore, the judgment reversed; defendant acquitted.
Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have
been justified in killing the intruder under Article 11, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, which requires, to justify the act, that there be:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed;
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it, and
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
If the intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah
Chong, there would have been unlawful aggression on the part of the
intruder. There would have been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to
defend himself and /or his home. The knife would have been a reasonable
means to prevent or repel such aggression. And Ah Chong gave no
provocation at all. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, there is
nothing unlawful in the intention as well as in the act of the person making
the defense.

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-72964 Vol. 157, SCRA 1 January 7, 1988
Ponente: J. Gutierrez, Jr.
FACTS:
October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at
Brgy. Anonang, San Fabian Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the
tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his
palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had
overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what
happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He
asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and
28

Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded
that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
hacked Javier with a bolo but they had amicable settlement later on. 22 days
after the incident, Javier died due to tetanus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time
Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any
liability for Javiers death.
HELD:
No. Urbano is not criminally liable instead, only civil liabilities. Death
was not directly due to the hacking. Proximate cause is that which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces injury and without which the result would not have occurred.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wound inflicted upon him by the accused to be
proven beyond reasonable doubt because this is a criminal conviction.
Infection of wound was efficient intervening cause between wounding and
hacking which was distinct and foreign to the crime.
The petitioner at the very least is guilty of slight physical injury. But
because Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect
a compromise agreement, the criminal liability is wiped out by virtue of P.D.
No. 1508, Sec. 2(3) which allows settlement of minor offenses.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 43530 Vol. 61, PHIL 703 August 3, 1935
Ponente: J. Recto
FACTS:
On March 2, 1935 at early down, policeman Jose Tomambing who was
patrolling on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes Streets caught the accused Aurelio
Lamahang in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a
store of cheap goods located on the last named street. At that time the owner
of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused
had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from
29

the wall when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and
placed him under custody. Before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
defendant-appellant Aurelio Lamahang, found him guilty of attempted
robbery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be convicted of the crime
attempted robbery.
HELD:
No. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the intention of the
accused to enter Tan Yus store by means of violence, passing through the
opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to commit an
offense which due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing did not
develop beyond the first steps of its execution. It is not sufficient for the
purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed
constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its
unavoidable connection with the deed which upon its consummation will
develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the code.
Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by
means of force or violence another persons dwelling may be considered n
attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly
intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal
property belonging to another. In this case, there is no evidence in the record
from which the accused may reasonably be inferred.
Therefore, judgment revoked and the defendant found guilty of
attempted trespass to dwelling committed by means of force.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHARLIE

VILLORENTE and TERESITA VILLORENTE, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 100198 Vol. 210, SCRA 647 July 1, 1992
Ponente: J. Paras
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo,
Aklan convicting accused-appellants Charlie Villorente and Teresita Villorente
of the complex crime of abduction with rape. On March 25, 1986, in the
30

Municipality of Kalibo, Aklan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the above-named accused, with deceit and abuse of confidence, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct Jona Neron, a
woman tended age from the house of Claire Tioco at New Buswang, Kalibo
Aklan where said Jona Neron was working a domestic servant, to Ogsiip
Libaco, Aklan and once there in the house of the accused, Charlie Villorente,
in conspiracy with the other accused Teresita Villorente, by force and
intimidation employed upon the person of the offended party, have sexually
intercourse with Jona Neron against her will.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants, Charlie Villorente nd Teresita
Villorente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Abduction with
Rape.
HELD:
Yes. Charlie and his mother are equally liable for the crime in view of
the conspiracy between them which was alleged in the information and duly
proven at the trial. Since as Jona was only fifteen years old when she agreed
to leave her employers house to go with Charlie and his mother Teresita, the
crime committed was forcible abduction under Art. 342 of the Revised Penal
Code. Jonas virginity may be presumed from the fact tht she was an
unmarried barrio girl when the crime was committed. She was raped two
times a night for three nights by the accused Charlie Villorente.
Premises considered, the decision appealed from is affirmed subject to
the modification that executive clemency is recommended with respect to
appellant Teresita Villorente.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENIO

OLAES, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. L-11166 Vol. 105 PHIL 502 April 17, 1959
Ponente: J. Montemayor
FACTS:
31

On Novembr 9, 1954, a provincial bus owned and operated by Laguna

Transportation Company driven by Feliciano Limosnero bound for Manila,
when the bus reached the curve in Bo. Almanza Las Pias, a man identified
by passenger Inobio as Cosme Isip holding a rifle or carbine, signalled the bus
to stop. But before the vehicle could come to a complete stop, seven other
men also carrying guns, emerged from the left side of the road. Limosnero
having doubts with the appearance of these armed men, he started the
engine and sped away from the place despite the shouts of the men on both
sides of the road for him to stop, having the thoughts that the eight men
were not passengers but were bent on holding-up the bus and robbing the
passengers. Those men immediately commenced firing at the bus which was
riddled with bullets. Limosnero was shot grazed the head. Among the
passengers, Maria Argame shot on the back penetrating the abdominal wall
and entering the abdominal cavity, Elena Loyola shot on the shoulder
fracturing her right clavicle. In the trial, star witness Inobio one of the
passengers, clearly indentified Cosme Isip and defendant-appellant Eugenio
Olaes. Before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, defendant-appellant Eugenio
Olaes, together with Cosme Isip and Bienvenido Dayuta, who where then at
large and five other men, unidentified and also at large, were accused of the
crime of attempted robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be convicted of the crime
attempted robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide.
HELD:
No. In this case, where the crime charged was for attempted robbery
with homicide and frustrated homicide, the defendant may not be convicted
of consummated robbery with homicide. Moreover, there were no overt acts
pointing to robbery or even an attempt thereof have been established, the
killing of one passenger and the wounding of two others should be considered
as plain murder, frustrated murder, and physical injuries respectively.
Wherefore, as to the courts duty to interpret and apply the laws as
they find them on the statute books, regardless of the manner their
judgments are executed and implemented by the executive department,
have complied with their solemn duty to administer justice. Until the
legislature sees fit to repeal or modify the imposition of the extreme penalty,
the courts will continue to impose the same when the facts and
circumstances in a case so warrant. The judgement affirmed with
modifications.

32

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

BASILIO BORINAGA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 33463 December 18, 1930
Ponente: J. Malcolm
FACTS:
Harry H. Mooney, an American resident of Calubian, Leyte, entered into
a contact with Juan Lawaan for the construction of a fish cage. Basilio
Borinaga is associated with Lawaan in the said project. On the morning of
March 4, 1929, Lawaan, with some of his men, went to Mooneys shop and
tried to collect from him the whole amount fixed for the entire project,
regardless of the fact that only about two-thirds of the fish corral had been
finished Mooney refused to pay and Lawaan warned him that if he did not
pay, something would happen to him. Borinaga had earlier been heard to
tell a companion that he will stab Mooney. On the evening of the same day,
Mooney was in the company of his neighbour, perpetua Najarro. He was
seated on a chair with his back towards the window of Najarros store. Najarro
saw Borinaga approaching the store window and Borinaga struck at Mooney
with a knife, but his knife landed on the back of Mooneys chair. Mooney fell,
but was not injured. Borinaga returned to the store with his knife in his hand,
but was unable to strike at Mooney since the latter and Najarro shone a
flashlight in his direction; Borinaga ran away. Later, Borinaga was overheard
stating that he had missed his chance to stab Mooney and even apologized to
his friends regarding the matter. Borinaga was charged in the Court of First of
Instance of Leyte for the crime of frustrated murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused, Basilio Borinaga constitute frustrated
murder.
HELD:
Yes. In this case, the crime committed was that of frustrated murder.
As an essential condition of a frustrated crime, Borinaga performed all the
acts of execution, attending the attack. There was nothing left that he could
do further to accomplish the work. The cause resulting in the failure of the
attack arose by reason of forces independent of hi will. Borinaga also
voluntarily desisted from further acts. The subjective phase of the criminal
act was passed.

33

EVELYN SUAREZ-DE LEON, complainant, vs. JUDGE SANTIAGO G.

ESTRELLA, Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Pasig City,
respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1935 July 29, 2005
Ponente: J. Austria-Martinez
FACTS:
The case concerns the sworn letter-complaint dated June 17, 2000 filed
with the Office of the Court of Administrator (OCA) of this Court by Evelyn
Suarez-De Leon charging respondent Judge Santiago Estrella of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 67, with serious misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law. Complainant is one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
51203, entitled, Danilo Suarez, et al., vs. Valente Raymundo, et al., filed
with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 155, for annulment of judicial sale of several
parcels of land. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 51203
for failure of the plaintiffs to prosecute. Complainant then moved for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal. The trial court grants the motion
and lifted the order of dismissal. In its report dated November 7, 2001, the
OCA found no evidence to prove that respondent Judge dismissed Civil Case
No. 51203 because of corrupt and improper motive. However, it found that
respondent erred in setting aside the final and executory judgement of this
court in G.R. No. 94918.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge Santiago Estrella, guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
HELD:
No. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of
must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but were also
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Gross ignorance of
the law is a serious accusation, and a person who accuses a judge of this very
serious offense must be sure of the grounds for the accusation. In this case,
the OCA agreed with the findings that there is no evidence to prove that
respondent judge dismissed Civil Case No. 51203 because of any improper or
corrupt motives. Hence, he cannot be held guilty of gross ignorance of the
law. Nonetheless, the respondent judge committed an honest mistake and
should be admonished in dismissing Civil Case No. 51203.
The instant administrative complaint against Judge Santiago Estrella is
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. However, respondent Judge is
admonished to be more careful in complying with the directives of this Court
and to exercise more diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge.

34

EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
G.R. No. 141066 Vol. 451 SCRA 673 February 17, 2005
Ponente: J. Austria-Martinez
FACTS:
The petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision,
dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 20443,
affirming the decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Cas Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070
convicting her of violation of B.P. Bldg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law. The RTC, convicted both Evangeline Ladonga and her spouse
Adronico, both are regular customers in the pawnshop business of Mr. Oculam
in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by
Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of
May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990
issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a third loan in the amount ofP8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check
No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks
bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT"; when the
Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he
filed a criminal complaint against them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner, Evangeline Ladonga who was not the
drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced but her co-accused
husband under the latters account could be held liable for violations of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 as co-conspirator.
HELD:
No. In this case, the petitioner should not be held liable for being a coconspirator on the basis that (1) in determining if she is liable for the same
crime it must be proven that there was conspiracy; (2) it was not proven by
direct evidence even by the witness testimony that Evangeline Ladonga was
merely present at the time of the issuance of the checks; (3) a conspiracy
must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence; (4) criminal liability cannot incurred based on general allegation of
conspiracy. In criminal cases, moral certainty not mere possibility determines
the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for the
defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has
35

not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal
cases.
Petitioner Evageline Ladonga is acquitted of the charges against her
under B.P. Bld. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

LADISLAO ESPINOSA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
G.R. No. 181071 Vol. 615 SCRA 446 March 15, 2010
Ponente: J. Perez
FACTS:
This case comes before this Court as a appeal, by way of a Petition for
review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
conviction of herein petitioner, Ladislao Espinosa, for the crime of Serious
Physical Injuries. On August 6, 2000, private complainant Andy Merto,
bearing a grudge against the petitioner, went to the house of the latter in the
Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. While standing outside the house,
private complainant Merto shouted violent threats, challenging the petitioner
to face him outside. Sensing the private complainants agitated state and
fearing for the safety of his family, petitioner went out of his house to reason
with and pacify Merto. However, as soon as he drew near the private
complainant, the latter hurled a stone at the petitioner. The petitioner was
able to duck just in time to avoid getting hit and instinctively retaliated by
hitting the left leg of the private complainant with a bolo scabbard. The
private complainant fell to the ground. Petitioner then continuously mauled
the private complainant with a bolo scabbard, until the latters cousin,
Rodolfo Muya, restrained him. As a consequence of the incident, private
complainant Merto sustained two (2) bone fractures, one in his left leg and
another in his left wrist. It took about six (6) months for these injuries to
completely heal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not under the set of facts given in this case, complete selfdefense may be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.
HELD:
The Court rules in the negative. In their decisions, both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals found that the first and third elements of selfdefense are present in the case at bar. Nonetheless, to dispel any doubts, the
Court hereby affirms the existence of the first and third elements of selfdefense, based on the following reasons: (1) unlawful aggression on the part
of private complainant Merto was manifested by his attack upon the person
of the petitioner in throwing a stone at the latter. This sudden and
36

unexpected assault posed actual danger on the life or limb of the petitioner,
prompting the latter to take steps in his defense. To the mind of the Court,
this is an offensive positively strong enough to be the basis for a defensive
action; (2) there is lack of sufficient, if not total absence of, provocation on
the part of the petitioner. The facts are clear that it is private
complainant Merto who invited the confrontation with petitionerby shouting
violent threats at the latter.
The argumentation is on the existence of the second
element, i.e., reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression. The trial court and the Court of Appeals were
in agreement that the means employed by the petitioner in conducting his
defense is disproportionate to what was necessary to prevent or deter the
attack of private complainant Merto.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CUNIGUNDA

BOHOLST-CABALLERO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. L-23249 Vol. 61 SCRA 180 November 25, 1974
Ponente: J. Muoz Palma
FACTS:
Cunigunda Boholst Caballero seeks reversal of the judgment of the CFI
of Ormoc City finding her guilty of parricideshe allegedly killed her
husband, Francisco Caballero, using a hunting knife. The couple was married
in 1956 and had a daughter. They had frequent quarrels due to the husband's
gambling and drinking and there were times when he maltreated and abused
his wife. After more than a year, Francisco abandoned his family. In 1958,
Cunigunda went carolling with her friends and when she was on her way
home she met her husband who suddenly held her by the collar and accused
her of going out for prostitution. Then he said he would kill her, held her by
the hair, slapped her until her nose bled then pushed her towards the ground.
She fell to the ground; he knelt on her and proceeded to choke her.
Cunigunda, having earlier felt a knife tucked in Francisco's belt line while
holding unto his waist so she wouldn't fall to the ground, grabbed the hunting
knife and thrust it into her husband's left side, near the belt line just above
the thigh. He died 2 days after the incident due to the stab wound. Then she
ran home and threw the knife away. The next day, she surrendered herself to
the police along with the torn dress that she wore the night before.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cunigunda, in stabbing her husband, acted in
legitimate self-defense.
HELD:
Yes, she Cunigunda acted in legitimate self-defense. In this case,
elements of self-defense, based on the following reasons: (1) burden of proof
of self-defense rests on the accused. The location and nature of the stab
wound confirms that the said victim, the husband, was the aggressor. With
37

her husband kneeling over her and choking her, accused had no other choice
but to pull the knife tucked in his belt line and thrust it into his side. The fact
that the blow landed in the vicinity where the knife was drawn from is a
strong indication of the truth of the testimony of the accused. Based on the
re-enactment of the incident, it was natural for her to use her right hand to
lunge the knife into husband's left side; (2) three requisites of legitimate selfdefense are present: (1) Unlawful aggression. The husband resorting to
pushing her to the ground then choking her just because she was out
carolling at night constitutes unlawful aggression. There was imminent
danger of injury. (2) Reasonable necessity of means employed. While
being choked, Cunigunda had no other recourse but to take hold of the knife
and plunge it into husband's side in order to protect herself. Reasonable
necessity does not depend upon the harm done but on the imminent danger
of such injury. (3) Lack of sufficient provocation. Provocation is sufficient
when proportionate to the aggression. In this case, there was no sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused to warrant the attack of her husband.
All that she did to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind
of her husband was to be out carolling at night.

RUJJERIC Z. PALAGANAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
G.R. No. 165483 Vol. 501 SCRA 533 September 12, 2006
Ponente: J. Chico-Nazario
FACTS:
Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their
drinking spree at their house but later decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke
Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. Thereafter, Jaime Palaganas
arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas (nephew) and Virgilio Bautista.
When Jaime Palaganas was singing, Melton Ferrer sang with him. Jaime
Palaganas got irritated and insulted. He felt that he was being mocked by
Melton Ferrer that caused him to go to the Ferrers table and uttered
statements which began the fight. Ferdinand sought help to Rujjeric
Palaganas. They went to the Bar and upon seeing the Ferrers outside;
Ferdinand pointing at the Ferrers instructed Rujjeric to shoot them. Rujjeric
Palaganas shot Servillano, Melton and Michael with the use of unlicensed
firearm. As a result, Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded and
Michael was shot in his right shoulder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating
circumstance which should be appreciated by the court at the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. It has been held by the Supreme Court from the precedents before
the case that the use of unlicensed firearm is now considered as a special
aggravating circumstance.
38

The Court states that: Aside from the aggravating circumstances

abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance provided for
under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,
which is a special law.
Its pertinent provision states: If homicide or murder is committed with
the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Therefore, the decision was affirmed with certain modifications
appreciating the special aggravating circumstance in the case at bar.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICARTE

MACARIOLA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-40757 Vol. 120 SCRA 92 January 24, 1983
Ponente: J. Melencio-Herrera
FACTS:
The accused Ricarte Macariola, a prisoner confined at the New Bilibid
Prisons, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, guilty of the crime of MURDER for the
death of Romeo de la Pea, a prisoner in the, same Penal institution, and
sentencing the accused to suffer the capital penalty of death.
That on or about the 21st day of September, 1971, in the New Bilibid
Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused while then confined at the said
institution, with treachery and evident premeditation, and armed with
improvised deadly weapon did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault and wound therewith one Romeo de la Pea No. 29820-P,
a sentenced prisoner in the same institution, inflicting upon him multiple stab
wounds, while then unarmed and unable to defend himself from the attack
launched by the accused, as a result of which the said Romeo de la Pea died
instantly. The defense does not dispute that the deceased prisoner was
stabbed and killed by the accused. It maintains, however, that the accused
stabbed the deceased in self-defense.
ISSUE:
39

Whether or not the acts of the victim of kicking the accused and trying
to get back the money accused won in their gambling game do not constitute
such aggression as would justify stabbing of victim.
HELD:
The evidence for the defense falls short of that requirement. The
accused claims that the victim was the unlawful aggressor in that prior to the
stabbing, while he was trying to retrieve the money won from the victim, the
latter kicked him on the chest causing to fall. That act, however, does not
constitute such unlawful aggression as would justify the killing of the victim.
It was not of such a nature that posed actual or imminent and real danger to
the accuseds life. Defense witness Antonio Vivero testified that upon being
kicked by the victim, the accused stood up and both protagonists positioned
themselves against each other (nag pormahan) as if they were getting
ready before the accused stabbed the victim with a matalas. This
circumstance clearly shows that the accused and the victim were getting
ready for a fight and that the act of the accused was more out of retaliation
than of self-defense.
Aggression, if not continuous, does not justify accused in running after
victim and stabbing him. Besides, even granting that there was unlawful
aggression on the victims part, it was not continuous. As prosecution witness
Romeo Sato testified, the victim fled to a kubol after he was initially
wounded and was pursued by the accused.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BARTOLOME

POGOSA, CARLOS POGOSA and MARINO POGOSA, accusedappellants.
G.R. No. L-40297 Vol. 127 SCRA 574 February 20, 1984
Ponente: J. Abad Santos
FACTS:
That on or about the 11 th day of December, 1973, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Bartolome
Pogosa, Carlos Pogosa and Marino Pagosa, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping and aiding one another, with treachery and intent
to kill, did and then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, strike and stab the person of Expedito Encabo, inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds which caused his death.
Expedito Encabo together with his common-law wife Pacita Cuesta de
Leon while taking supper, they heard sounds of falling pieces of iron. Encabo
went out to investigate the noise while his wife continued eating. Encabo
caught Bartolome in the act of stealing iron scraps belonging to the Ormoc
Sugar Company. After a brief heated discussion between the two, Bartolome
pulled out a hunting knife from his waist and stabbed Encabo in the stomach
with it, despite efforts on the part of the latter to parry the thrust and wrest
the weapon away from his assailant. Suddenly two persons appeared behind
40

Encabo, Carlos Pogosa stabbed Encabo with a sharp pointed instrument,

while Marino Pogosa struck the victim at his feet and back with an iron bar.
Before the assailants left, Bartolome told Pacita not to bother helping Encabo
because he will surely die. Encabo was rushed to the hospital. Five hours
later, he died. A post-mortem examination of Encabos body and found the
cause of death to be hemorrhage secondary to multiple stabbed wounds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim of self-defense by appellant Bartolome is not
meritorious and the use of bolo is not justified even if the victim slapped and
kicked appellant who was caught stealing.
HELD:
Bartolomes claim that he acted in self-defense is too crude to be
convincing. The testimony of Pacita Encabo and Olegario Paredes clearly
shows that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.
Indeed under the circumstances he could not have been the aggressor. As
Security Inspector for the OSCO whose scrap iron had been repeatedly stolen,
he was in effect the aggrieved party so that in the confrontation with
Bartolome he was performing a lawful act not an act of aggression.
Moreover, he was not even armed for he was eating his evening meal when
he left his house to investigate suspicious noises. Upon the other hand, it was
Bartolome who was armed with a small bolo. Accordingly, even if it be
assumed for the sake of argument, that the deceased had kicked and slapped
Bartolome, the use of a bolo under the circumstances was not justified for
there was no reasonable necessity for its use.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUNG), defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. 18924 Vol. 46 Phil 729 October 19, 1922
Ponente: J. Romualdez
FACTS:
The Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant
to the information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is
accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel
Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay
two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court,
which so held and dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over the
crime committed by Wong Cheng aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdictional waters.
41

HELD:
Yes. The crime on the case at bar was committed in our internal waters
thus having our court the right of jurisdiction over the offense committed. The
court said Having the opium smoked within our territorial limits, even though
aboard a foreign merchant ship, is a breach of the public order, because it
causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory.
Therefore, the demurrer is revoked and court ordered further proceedings.
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in
connection with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which
crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel should not be
prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction
they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security
of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and
followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under
such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within
whose territory they were committed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROMANA SILVESTRE and MARTIN ATIENZA, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 35748 Vol. 56 Phil 353 December 14, 1931
Ponente: J. Villa-Real
FACTS:
Martin Atienza was convicted as principal by direct participation and
Romana Silvestre as accomplice of the crime of arson by the Court of First
Instance. On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas de la Cruz and his
wife, Antonia de la Cruz, were gathered together with the appellants herein
after supper, Martin Atienza told the couple to take their future out of the
house for he was going to set a fire to it to avenge the people of Masocol,
who he said had instigated a charge against him and Romana Silvestre, who
was also with them during that night after supper. Since Atienza was with was
armed with a pistol, no one dared anything to him, even Silvestre. She was
there listening to her co-defendant's threat without protest. On their way to
report the threat caused by Atienza, the de la Cruz couple realized that the
fire had already started when they saw their home in flames. The fire
destroyed about forty-eight houses.
42

ISSUE:
Whether or not Martin Atienza be guilty of arson, even when he
thought that besides himself and his co-defendant, there was nobody in Dela
Cruzs house at the moment of the setting the fire.
Whether or not mere passive presence in anothers crime, silence, and
failure to give alarm, constitute the crime of conspiracy and accomplice to
the crime.
HELD:
In the first issue, the court found Martin Atienza guilty of Arson, defined
and penalized in Article 550, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 550. The penalty of cadena temporal shall be imposed upon:
...2. Any person who shall set fire to any inhabited house or any building in
which people are accustomed to meet together, without knowing whether or
no such building or house was occupied at the time, any freight train in
motion, if the damage cause in such cases shall exceed six thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas.
In the second issue, mere passive presence at the scene of anothers
crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of
agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by
article 14 of the Revised Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the
crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent.
Hence, the courts judgment to Romana Silvestre was reversed. She was
acquitted.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GERONIMA

SINDIONG DE PASTOR and SANTOS T. PASTOR, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-335 Vol. 77 Phil 1000 February 12, 1947
Ponente: J. Hilado
FACTS:
The accused Geronima Sindiong de Pastor and Santos T. Pastor were,
on June 4, 1941, charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Oriental Negros in an
information filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Dumaguete, capital of
the province, with a violation of sections 1458 and 1459 of the Revised
Administrative Code, in relation with Act No. 3243, and section 2723 of the
same Code. The accused waived their right to a preliminary investigation,
whereupon the proper information was lodged against them with the Court of
First Instance of the province on July 11, 1941. Probably as a consequence of
the Pacific war having supervened, no further proceedings were taken until
January 27, 1946, when the accused filed a motion to quash. The motion was
upheld by the trial court in its order dated February 12, 1946. The business of
43

the accused in connection with which they are thus being prosecuted was
that of owners, managers or administrators of the "Magazine Center", an
establishment devoted to the selling of newspapers, magazines and
stationery, according to the information.
The information alleges that these defendants during the period
comprised between January, 1936, and March 31, 1938, being such owners,
managers and administrators of said "Magazine Center", with the deliberate
purpose to evade the payment of the percentage tax upon their receipts,
voluntarily, illegally, and criminally neglected to make a return of their sales
within the time prescribed by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in view of the express repeal of sections 1458 and
1459, in relation with section 2723, of the Revised Administrative Code, and
of Act No. 3243, by section 369 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise
known as the National Internal Revenue Code, and in view of the later
enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503, violations of the provisions of the
repealed acts, while they were in force, could be legally prosecuted after the
repeal but also after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 503.
HELD:
Where the repealing law wholly fails to penalize the acts which
constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repeal
carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and
sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to the repeal.
This is our case, since, as already seen, the National Internal Revenue Code,
and for that matter even Commonwealth Act No. 503, wholly fails to penalize
the acts imputed upon the herein defendants.
The judgement of this Court that the order appealed from be, as it is
hereby, affirmed with cost de officio.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EL CHINO CUNA (alias SY

CONCO), defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. 4504 Vol. 12 Phil 241 December 15, 1908
Ponente: J. Carson
FACTS:
On the 12th of August, 1907, the provincial fiscal filed in the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Isabela, an information charging the
defendant Chinaman Cuna (alias Sy Conco), with a violation of section 5 of
Act No. 1461 of the Philippine Commission, committed as follows:
That the said Chinaman Cuna (alias Sy Conco), on or about the 30th
day of June, 1907, in the municipality of Echague, in the Province of Isabela,
in the Philippine Islands, sold for ten cents, Philippine currency, a small
quantity of opium, to Apolinaria Gumpal, a Filipino woman, who was neither a
44

doctor, pharmacist, vender of opium with license, nor an inveterate user of

opium duly registered; all contrary to the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an act is punishable or not at the time of its
commission, there was a law in force which penalized it.
HELD:
The Court expressly reserves its opinion as to whether in such cases
the provisions of Article 22 of the Penal Code are applicable to Acts of the
Commission or of the Philippine Legislature, so as to require the imposition of
the penalty provided in the repealing Act, if such penalty be more favorable
to the accused than that prescribed in the former Act.
The doctrine of English and American common law relied upon by
counsel for defendant is not and has not been the accepted doctrine in this
jurisdiction, and that, in accordance with the accepted doctrine, the courts in
these Islands are not deprived of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence
offenders who have violated the provisions of Act No. 1461 prior to the date
when Act No. 1761 went into effect, notwithstanding the provision of the
latter Act repealing Act No. 1461; and that the penalty prescribed by the
repealing Act for violation charged in the information not being more
favorable to the accused than that prescribed in the old law, the penalty to
be imposed is that prescribed by the old law. But we expressly reserve our
opinion as to which penalty would properly be imposed in case wherein a
later Act of the Commission of the Philippine Legislature imposed more
favorable penalty than that prescribed in a repealed Act.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 37673 Vol. 58 Phil 255 March 31, 1933
Ponente: J. C. Avancea
FACTS:
Potenciano Taneo and his wife lived in his parent's house in Dolores,
Ormoc. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio
and guests were entertained in the house, among them were Fred Tanner and
Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano went to sleep and while
sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting
his wife who tried to stop him, wounded her in the abdomen. He also
attacked Fred and Luis and tried to attack his father, after which, he wounded
himself. Potenciano's wife, who was 7 months pregnant at that time, died five
45

days later as a result of the wound. The trial court found Potenciano guilty of
parricide and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. It appears from the
evidence that the day before the commission of the crime, the defendant had
a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Collantes and Abadilla, who invited him
to come down and fight.
When he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his
mother. On the day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the
defendant was sad and weak, had a severe stomach ache thats why he went
to bed in the early afternoon. The defendant stated that when he fell asleep,
he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadila
held his feet. That's why he got up and it seemed to him that his enemies
were inviting him to come down; he armed himself with a bolo and left the
room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was
wounded. Then, he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation
wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked
everybody that came his way.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant acted while in a dream.
HELD:
Yes. The defendant acted while in a dream & his acts, therefore,
werent voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability. The apparent lack
of motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there
are none, but that simply they are not known to us. Although an extreme
moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without a real motive
but just for the sake of committing it. In the case at hand, the court found not
only lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts
complained of, but also motives for not committing the acts. Dr. Serafica, an
expert witness in the case, stated that considering the circumstances of the
case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of a
hallucination and not in his right mind. The wife's wound may have been
inflicted accidentally. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his
wife, but that he was defending himself from his enemies.
The defendant is not criminally liable for the offense. It was also
ordered that he be confined in the government insane asylum and will not be
released until the director thereof finds that his liberty would no longer
constitute a menace.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. QUE PO LAY,
defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 37673 Vol. 94 Phil 640 March 29, 1954
Ponente: J. Montemayor
FACTS:
The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US
dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed
to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.
46

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official
Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of Republic
Act No. 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of
P1,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is
needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding
penalties.
HELD:
Po Lay is correct for the circular has the force of law, and should have
been published. It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision,
that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question
prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective. This is based on the general principle and theory that before the
public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law,
regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and
specifically informed of such contents including its penalties. Thus, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquits the
appellant, with costs de oficio.

RICARDO ESCARDA, complainant, vs. Judge JACINTO MANALO of

Coron, Palawan, respondent.
Adm. Matter No. 2268-MJ Vol. 94 Phil 640 November 7, 1980
Ponente: J. C. Fernando
FACTS:
47

This administrative complaint for improper conduct by complainant

Ricardo Escarda against respondent Municipal Judge Jacinto Manalo of Coron,
Palawan affords this Court an opportunity to set forth the guiding principle as
to when the Lupon Tagapayapa under the Katarungan Pambarangay Decree
should take cognizance of a case. Respondent Judge refused the referral of a
complaint for slight physical injuries to the Lupon Tagapayapa. That was the
basis of this charge against him. As the Decree was intended to remedy the
clogged state of the dockets through the amicable settlement of minor
disputes relying on what was aptly referred to by President Marcos as "the
good sense and civic spirit of our citizenry and our community leaders,"
respondent Judge should be held accountable, if, as alleged, he did not
comply with its provisions. His refusal, however, finds support in Circular No.
12 of the late Chief Justice Castro, as amended by Circular No. 22. It reads as
follows, "Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of
Local Government and Community Development that an the barangays
within your respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for
in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of settlement
of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints,
petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said
Lupons. Circular No. 12 dated October 30, 1978, issued by the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro is to that extent modified."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent need to refer the case to the barangay
captain or the Lupon.
HELD:
In the case at bar, Criminal Case No. 2041 was filed before any such
certification. Therefore, respondent need not refer the case to the barangay
captain or the Lupon.
Prior to such certification of the organization of the Lupon Tagapayapa
then, a municipal judge must comply with the Rules of Court applicable to
any complaint or judicial proceeding properly cognizable by him. That is his
bounden duty. Since there is no question as to the particular case of physical
injuries falling within the jurisdiction of respondent Judge, he acted in
accordance with law.
The complaint for improper judicial conduct is therefore without merit.
Accordingly, it should be dismissed. As mentioned at the outset of this
opinion, this resolution is intended to provide guidance for the actuation of
the judges concerned, more specifically as to the date when in accordance
with Presidential Decree No. 1508 the system of conciliation provided for
therein should be followed before the judiciary could act on the matter.

48

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,

vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the DOLE, and JOSE N.
SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the POEA, respondents.
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
Ponente: J. Grio-Aquino
FACTS:
Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc. (PASEI) is the largest
national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly
licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engage in the business of obtaining
overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers, including domestic
helpers. On June 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses
suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary
Ruben Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through the POEA
took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. Pursuant
to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30,
Series of 1991, providing guidelines on the Government processing and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation
of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic
helpers. Pursuant to the previous issuances, the POEA Administrator also
issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of
employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion
and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circular.
Whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are
unconstitutional, unreasonable, unfair and oppressive.
HELD:
They are in accordance but legally invalid, defective and unenforceable
for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Register as required in Art 2 of CC, Art 5 of the Labor Code and
Sec 3(1) and 4, Chap 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to
restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. On the other hand,
the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by
Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the
Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and
the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is
broad and far-ranging as provided by Articles 15, 17 and 20 of the Labor
Code. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in
administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It
has been necessitated by the growing complexity of the modern society. More
and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of
society's ramified activities. It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not
prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of
Filipino land based workers for overseas employment. The power to restrict
49

and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of

police power. The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the
police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.
MANUEL LARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PETRONILO DEL
ROSARIO, JR., defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-6339 Vol. 94 Phil 778 April 20, 1954
Ponente: J. Montemayor
FACTS:
In 1950 defendant Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi
cabs or cars, operated a taxi business under the name of "Waval Taxi." He
employed among others three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the
latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37 months. On September
4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance
notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation
company, as a result of which, according to the mechanics and chauffeurs
above-mentioned they lost their jobs because the La Mallorca failed to
continue them in their employment. They brought this action against Del
Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight
hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and one month salary (mesada)
provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce because the failure of
their former employer to give them one month notice. Subsequently, the
three mechanics unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers
remained as plaintiffs. The defendant filed a motion for dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action and the trial court
for the time being denied the motion saying that it will be considered when
the case was heard on the merits. After trial the complaint was dismissed.
Plaintiffs appealed from the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals which
Tribunal after finding only questions of law are involved.
As to the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of
Commerce, article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to
have repealed said Article 302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code of
Commerce governing Agency. This repeal took place on August 30, 1950,
when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its
publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of services of the
plaintiffs by the defendant took place according to the complaint on
September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal of Article 302 which they
invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, assuming that it
were still in force speaks of "salary corresponding to said month." commonly
known as "mesada." If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the
day, week or month, then computation of the month's salary payable would
be impossible. Article 302 refers to employees receiving a fixed salary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1949.
HELD:
In this case, the Supreme Court in an obiter dictum held that the new
Civil Code of the Philippines took effect on August 30, 1950. This date is
50

exactly one year after the Official Gazette publishing the Code was released
for circulation, the said release having been made on August 30, 1949. The
plaintiffs then are not entitled to any compensation, the New Civil Code
having repealed the Code of Commerce.
PHILIPPINE COMMERICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of
the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, petitioner, vs. THE
HON. VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 Vol. 56 SCRA 266 April 20, 1954
Ponente: J. Montemayor
FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was
a domiciliary of the Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to
the validity of certain testamentary provisions she had made in favor of her
husband, a question arose as to what exactly where the laws of Texas on the
matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group contended
that the Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no
renvoi was possible).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is
a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in
the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at any
other time).
The court must resolve the matter by asking for proof on what the
Texas law on the matter is. This proof must be presented before the trial court
(the Supreme Court thus remanded the case to the trial court so that the
latter might receive evidence re the law of Texas). Be it noted that the foreign
law must be proved as a fact unless the court already actually knows what it
is, either because it is already generally known, or because it has been so
ruled in other cases before it, and there is no claim to the contrary.

51

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased. MORA

ADONG, petitioner-appellant, vs. CHEONG SENG GEE, opponentappellant.
G.R. No. 18081 March 3, 1922
Ponente: J. Malcolm
FACTS:
Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands
on August 5, 1919 and left property worth nearly P100,000 which is now
being claimed by two parties - (1) Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was
a legitimate child by marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China
in 1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married
to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two daughters
with the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia. The conflicting claims to
Cheong Boos estate were ventilated in the lower court that ruled that
Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage
through a mere letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit married each
other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine
Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural
child. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, the
trial court reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and
Cheong Boo had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the
Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage and thus the
daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The lower
court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the
Philippine Islands laws this as an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under
Quaranic laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit
is valid Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and
Mora Adong is valid RULING: The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese
marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a
natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and
to be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate children
Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them under the law.
HELD:
Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that all marriages contracted
outside the islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which
the same were contracted, are valid in these islands. To establish a valid
foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to
prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence. A Philippine marriage followed by 23 years
52

of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after

the death of the husband through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, save
upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction
of the existence of such impediment. A marriage alleged to have been
contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-called matrimonial letter held
not to be valid in the Philippines.

SY JOC LIENG, SY YOC CHAY, SY JUI NIU and SY CHUA NIU, plaintiffs,
appellees-appellants, vs. GREGORIO SY QUIA, PEDRO SY QUIA, JUAN
SY QUIA and GENEROSO MENDOZA SY QUIA, defendants, appellantsappellees.
G.R. No. L-4718 Vol. 16 Phil 137 March 19, 1920
Ponente: J. Torres
FACTS:
The facts, which involve conflicting claims to the estate of a Chinese
merchant domiciled in the Philippine Islands and of the validity of his
marriage, there known as Vicente Romero Sy Quia, who died intestate at
Manila in 1894. The appellants, who were plaintiffs in the court of first
instance, claim as descendants of a marriage between the intestate and Yap
Puan Niu, a Chinese woman, said to have been contracted in 1847 at Am
Thau, in the Province of Amoy, China. The appellees claim as the descendants
of a marriage with Petronila Encarnacion, a Filipino woman celebrated in 1853
at Vigan, in the Philippines. The principal question here, as in the insular
courts, is whether the proof sufficiently established the Chinese marriage. On
this, the insular courts differed, the court of first instance finding the
marriage adequately proved and the Supreme Court, one justice dissenting,
holding the other way.
Sy Quia was born at Am Thau, China, in 1822, and went to the
Philippines at the age of twelve. At first, he was located in Manila, but at
some time before 1852 went to Vigan and entered the service of a merchant
at an annual salary of 200 pesos. During that year, he was converted to the
Catholic faith, and was baptized in the parish church. The next year, he
married Petronila, the banns being regularly published and the marriage
publicly solemnized according to the rites of the church, as a preliminary to
which he affirmed under oath, and the civil and ecclesiastical authorities
certified, after inquiry, that he was then unmarried. Shortly after the
marriage, he and Petronila took up their permanent home in Manila. They
were then without any particular property other than 5,000 pesos which she
received from her mother and brought into the conjugal society. He became a
merchant, and, through their united efforts, they accumulated real and
personal property amounting at the time of his death to upwards of 600,000
pesos. They lived in a manner becoming the marital state, and were
universally recognized as husband and wife. Three sons and two daughters
were born of the marriage. One of the daughters married and predeceased
her father, leaving a son surviving. The other died after the father, leaving
the mother as her only heir. Following Sy Quia's death, the widow
53

administered the estate, with the aid of the sons until 1900, when, through
appropriate judicial proceedings, the property was distributed among the
widow, sons, and grandson as the persons rightly entitled thereto. The
present suit was brought in 1905, more than half a century after the
marriage, and then for the first time was its validity or its good faith as to
either spouse brought in question -- a fact which is of particular significance
first, because Yap Puan Niu, the alleged Chinese wife, visited in Manila at the
home of a brother of Sy Quia twice during the life of the latter, and second,
because two of the plaintiffs were adults living in Manila at the time of Sy
Quia's death and during the eleven years intervening before the suit was
brought.
There was testimony, taken by way of depositions in China, tending to
show that Sy Quia returned from the Philippines to Am Thau in 1847, when he
was twenty-five years old; that, during that year, he married Yap Puan Niu,
the marriage being properly arranged and celebrated; that he remained at
Am Thau three or four years, during which two sons were born of this
marriage; that he then returned to the Philippines, and Yap Puan Niu
continued to reside at Am Thau, dying there in 1891; that the four plaintiffs
are the only living descendants of this marriage, two being grandsons, one a
granddaughter, and one a great-grandson. Six of the witnesses in China
testified directly to the marriage, and their testimony, if standing alone,
would be quite persuasive of its occurrence, notwithstanding some
discrepancies in their statements. But this testimony did not stand alone. It
was met and contradicted by that of several Philippino witnesses, taken
mostly by deposition, to the effect that they had known Sy Quia in Vigan for
some years before his marriage to Petronila in 1853, and that he was living
there during the period when, according to the opposing testimony, he
married Yap Puan Niu and remained in China. One of these witnesses was an
aged man who testified with certainty that he was a student at Manila
between 1839 and 1845 and knew Sy Quia there; that he, the witness, was
married at Vigan in 1847, and that Sy Quia was living there then. Others of
these witnesses give kindred reasons for their ability to speak with precision
concerning Sy Quia's presence at Vigan during the period in question. Still
other witnesses gave testimony more or less corroborative of these opposing
theories, but it was less direct and was also contradictory.
In addition to this conflicting testimony, there was this situation, as
before indicated: the Philippine marriage and the forty years of uninterrupted
marital life following it were not only established, but conceded. While Sy
Quia lived, the validity of that marriage passed unchallenged, and no right
was asserted under the one alleged to have occurred in China. More than
this, the right of the widow and children of the Philippine marriage to the
property acquired during its existence went unquestioned for eleven years
after his death and for five years after the judicial distribution of the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proof sufficiently established the Chinese marriage.
HELD:
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In these circumstances, every presumption was in favor of the validity

and good faith of the Philippine marriage, and sound reason required that it
be not impugned and discredited through the alleged prior marriage save
upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction
of the existence of that impediment. The conflicting testimony, isolatedly
considered, did not measure up to this standard, and clearly it did not do so if
proper regard was hard for the probative force of the conduct of all the
parties concerned during the many intervening years. Then too, the lips of Sy
Quia and Yap Puan Niu had been sealed by death, and this, with the long
interval of time, gave unusual opportunity for the use of fabricated testimony
the untruth of which it would be difficult to expose.
Giving due effect to these considerations, we cannot say that the
Supreme Court of the Philippines erred in holding that the Chinese marriage
was not adequately proved. Indeed, we regard the evidence as not producing
a moral conviction of the existence of that marriage, but as leaving the issue
in serious doubt.
When in a litigation the application of a foreign law, for example the
law of China, is sought, it is necessary to prove before the courts of the
Islands, in a satisfactory manner, the existence of such a law as a question of
fact; and when proof of such a law is lacking, it is improper to apply unknown
laws to suits pending before the courts of the Islands.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIONISIO ENRIQUEZ,
defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-10533 November 11, 1915
Ponente: J. Araullo
FACTS:
The defendant, Dionisio Enriquez, contracted a canonical marriage with
Juliana Marcelo in the parish of Binondo, Manila, on July 21, 1886. He left his
wife and children in the barrio of Bataan, municipality of Orion, Province of
Bataan, in the year 1895, going to the Province of Laguna as a postal
employee; and, after experiencing various vicissitudes during the revolution
of `96 and `98, on returning to the said pueblo of Orion in 1901 he did not
find his wife, nor could be obtain the slightest information of her or her
whereabouts, notwithstanding his persistent and diligent search. Therefore,
believing her dead, he determined to contract a canonical marriage with
Joaquina Trajano, in the parish of Orion, Bataan, on February 1, 1905. In
December, 1913, his first wife, Juliana Marcelo, made her appearance in the
pueblo of Orion. In her testimony she stated that she was actually absent and
in Manila, Tarlac and Victoria, from 1895 to 1913, when she returned to the
pueblo of Orion, and that during this period she had had no news of her
husband.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Dionisio Enriquez can be deemed guilty of
the crime of bigamy.
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HELD:
While ignorance of the law is no excuse, i.e., no excuse for not
complying with the law, ignorance of the fact eliminates criminal intent as
long as there is no negligence. Thus, a man who marries a second wife upon
the reasonable belief after due search that his wife, missing for 10 years, is
dead, does not incur criminal responsibility even if it turns out that the first
wife is still alive. This is merely ignorance of the fact.
The trial court recognized that the defendant, when he contracted his
second marriage with Joaquina Trajano, acted on the reasonable and well
founded belief that his first wife, Juliana Marcelo, was dead, in view of the fact
that for 19 years he had had no news whatever of her whereabouts and in
view of the fruitless result of his endeavors to find her. In other words, he
believed in good faith that his marriage with his first wife, Juliana Marcelo,
had been dissolved by her death, consequently fraudulent intent, which
constitutes one of the essential elements of the crime of illegal marriage,
cannot be charged to the defendant and he cannot, therefore, be considered
guilty of the said crime.

MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner, vs. RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO

ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 46623 Vol. 69 Phil 217 December 7, 1939
Ponente: J. Imperial
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision
of the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Bataan. The said court held: that the contract is entirely null and
void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are
the owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common
ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to
the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession
of the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from
any alienation. The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an
accompanying accessory contract of mortgage. The executed accessory
contract involved the improvements on a piece land, the land having been
acquired by means of homestead. Petitioner for his part accepted the
contract of mortgage. Believing that there are no violations to the
56

prohibitions in the alienation of lands petitioner, acting in good faith took

possession of the land. To wit, the petitioner has no knowledge that the
enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of
Antichresis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is deemed to be a possessor in good faith of
the land, based upon Article 3 of the New Civil Code as states Ignorance of
the law excuses no one from compliance therewith, the Ps lack of
knowledge of the contract of antichresis.
HELD:
The accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements of on the
land is valid. The verbal contract of antichresis agreed upon is deemed null
and void.
Sec 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides Every person who
is unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which
it is invalidated shall be deemed a possessor of good faith. And in this case,
the petitioner acted in good faith. Good faith maybe a basis of excusable
ignorance of the law, the petitioner acted in good faith in his enjoyment of
the fruits of the land to which was done through his apparent acquisition
thereof.

MARCELO B. ASUNCION, LUCITA ASUNCION, JOSEFINA DEL ROSARIO,

MIRIAM ASUNCION, and MARILOU ASUNCION, complainants, vs. HON.
K. CASIANO P. ANUNCIANCION, JR., Presiding Judge, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch XI, Manila, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-90-496 August 18, 1992
Ponente: Per Curiam
FACTS:
Respondent, Metropolitan Trial Court Judge K. Casiano P. Anunciacion,
Jr. of Manila was being charged with (1) ignorance of the law and judicial
incompetence, (2) oppression and arbitrary exercise of power, and (3)
violation of human rights in line with his exercise of judicial decision-making
in a previous ejectment case which involved the complainants (as
respondents) and a Herminio Samson (who filed the ejectment case and
stood as the complainant). During the said ejectment case hearing, the said
respondent judge allegedly hastily adjourned the proceedings after the
complainant Marcelo Asuncion gave his statement, which the respondent
57

judge saw as an admission of the contempt being charged against the

respondents of the said ejectment case, and issued an order. Furthermore,
during the said ejectment case, Asuncion requested a postponement because
his lawyer was not available at that time. However, it was denied by the
respondent judge and, in a loud voice, declared that he would put Asuncions
wife and daughters in jail, where he indeed called a branch sheriff to enforce
his order to put Asuncions wife and daughters in jail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent, Judge K. Casiano P. Anunciancion,
displayed and is guilty of serious misconduct, oppression and ignorance of
the law, which further resulted to a violation of the complainants human
rights.
HELD:
The case was raffled to the RTC of Manila, Branch 27 for investigation,
report and recommendation. On June 8, 1992, Judge Edgardo P. Cruz
submitted an Investigation Report recommending that respondent Judge be
fined and given an appropriate warning. After reviewing the records of the
proceedings before respondent Judge Anunciacion acted arbitrarily,
despotically and with complete disregard for the complainants rights, when
he ordered them to be jailed without even informing them of the charge
against them, either by furnishing them with a copy of the contempt motion
or reading it to them. Respondent Judge did not inform the complainants of
the nature and course of the accusation against them contrary to the
directive in Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Neither did he give the
complainants a chance to explain their side. Moreover, respondent Judge
denied them the right to be assisted by counsel and their right to defend
themselves, even as their father, Marcelo Asuncion, pleaded for
postponement of the proceedings because his lawyer was not available at the
time. By his oppressive and precipitate action, respondent Judge displayed
arrogance and gross ignorance of the law and violated the complainants'
human rights.
The Court finds respondent Judge K. Casiano Anunciacion, Jr., guilty of
serious misconduct, oppression and ignorance of the law.

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