Cabili v.

Badelles Digest
Facts:
1. Elections of November 10, 1959, Respondent Badelles and
Petitioner Cabili were rival candidates for the office of city mayor of
Iligan City. Cabili was proclaimed elected and thereafter assumed
office, succeeding Badelles the incumbent.
2. Thereafter, Badelles filed a case for quo warranto, questioning
Cabili's right to hold the office on the ground that the latter was not a
resident of the City for at least one year prior to his election. The
petition was filed by the law firm of San Juan, Africa and Benedicto,
as counsel for Badelles. Badelles was also represented by several
other lawyers but the senior counsel was Atty. Africa, who, in the
initial hearing, explained that he is the one in charge of the case, and
therefore, requested that all pleadings, notices, orders and other
papers be served at his office at 480 Padre Faura St., Manila. In order
to avoid any confusion in the service of pleadings and orders, he
made of record that only service at the given address will be
considered as service on petitioner Badelles and counsel. The Court
took note of said request of Attorney Africa.
3. The lower court dismissed the petition with copy of the decision
sent to the office address of Atty. Africa and was received the same
day. It appears however, that, in the interim, i.e. on December 28,
1959, Badelles, who was then in Iligan City, requested the judge for
a copy of the decision. Badelles, was given a copy but refused to sign
a receipt therefor. The judge ordered his court interpreter to record
the fact of said delivery of a copy to Badelles. This order was
complied with. The judge also telegraphed the law office of Atty.
Africa in Manila that copy of the decision was sent to them on
December 1959 and that petitioner Badelles personally was
furnished a copy also on that same day. The telegram was received
by Atty. Africa on December 29, 1959.

4. Upon receipt of the decision on January 4, 1960, the Africa Law

Office, counsel for Badelles, sent a notified appeal by registered mail
on the same date. On January 5, 1960, Badelles filed his own notice
of appeal to with a corresponding cash appeal bond of sixty pesos.
The Counsel for Cabili objected to the appeal on the ground that it
was filed beyond the period.
5. On February 15 and 19, 1960, respectively, the court dismissed the
appeals filed by Badelles and his counsel on the ground that the same
were filed beyond the five-day statutory period for appeal, as
provided in Section 178 of the improvised Election Code. A motion
for reconsideration filed by counsel for Badelles was denied for lack
of
merit,
so
Badelles
filed
the
petition
for certiorari and mandamus in CA to annul said orders. CA granted.
Issue: Whether or not the service to the client was valid
NO.
1. In accordance with the provisions of Rule 27, Section 2, service of
decisions should be made to the lawyers on record and not to parties.
In a long line of decisions, the Court have held that when a party
appears by an attorney who makes of record his appearance, service
of pleadings is required to be made upon said attorney and not upon
the party
2. A notice given to the client and not to his attorney is not a notice in
law and that service upon a party who has an attorney of record is
not a compliance with Rule 27, Sec. 2, which makes service upon
counsel mandatory; and that personal information by a party of the
rendition of a decision does not satisfy the right of counsel to receive
a copy of the decision rendered.

Venturanza v. CA Digest
Service of Summons
Facts:
1. Plaintiff Nieves Y. Senoran (now private respondent) filed a
complaint against spouses Violeta S. Venturanza and Romy
Venturanza (now petitioners) with MTC for collection of sums of
money for loans evidenced by promissory notes and due to nonpayment became demandable.
2. The summons was served on the petitioners through the father
who refused to sign the receipt. Due to petitioners failure to file an
Answer, the court rendered a decision ordering petitioners to pay.
However, the said decision could not be served to petitioners address
since they were no longer residing there, hence it was served in the
Office of Violeta at ADB.
3. The petitioners filed a "Motion to Set Aside Decision and to
Declare Past Proceedings Null and Void for Lack of Jurisdiction,"
alleging that there was no proper and valid service of summons upon
them in accordance with either Section 7 or Section 8 of Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court and that the court a quonever acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioners, since the address where the
summons was served is the residence of Violeta S. Venturanza's
father, and not on her address. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court validly
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners when the
summons was served upon Augusto Soans address which is not
the residence of petitioners
NO.
1. There is no question that the case at bar which is an action for
collection of sum of money, an action in personam thereby requiring

personal service of summons on the defendants. It is only when a

defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a
reasonable time that a substituted service may be availed of. For a
substituted service to be valid, summons served at the defendant's
residence must be served at his residence at the time of such service
and not at his former place of residence.
2. It is further required by law that an effort or attempt should first be
made to personally serve the summons and after this has failed, a
substituted service may be caused upon the defendant, and the same
must be reflected in the proof of service. Upon examination of the
sheriff 's Return in this case, no statement was made that an effort or
attempt was exerted to personally serve the summons on the
defendants and that the same had failed. In fact, said Return did not
indicate the address of the defendants to whom summons was
supposed to have been served. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in
this case where it is patent that the sheriff's return is defective. CA
decision reversed and set aside.

1.

2.

3.

4.

Samartino v. Raon, CA Digest

Facts:
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo
are the surviving sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena
Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among
the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel
of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under in the name of coowners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo.
2. In 1996, respondents instituted a complaint for ejectment against
petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment alleging
that during the lifetime of Filomena, she leased her share to
petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said
lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner
refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor.
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of
petitioner. At the time of service, he was not at home as he was then
confined at the NBI rehab center since January 19, 1996, where he
was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency.
Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC
appeared before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will
be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint
within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months
for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be
recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee. ]
The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC,
declared petitioner in default and ordered them to present
evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of respondents. Counsel of respondent filed a
motion to set aside judgement at the RTC, RTC affirmed lower court
decision. This decision became final, the property was sold in an
auction to the respondents, Petitioner filed petition for relief from
judgement alleging that the parcel of land from which he was being
evicted had been sold to him by Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as
evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988.
Petition was dismissed by RTC. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari

before CA which was also dismissed, including his MR, hence this
petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the court (MTC & RTC) acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner

1.
2.

3.

4.

NO. The summon was ineffective. There being no valid substituted

service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner. In actions in personam, summons on the
defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant
in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If
efforts to serve the summons personally to defendant is impossible,
service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendants dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal
service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served
in person will substituted service be availed of.
The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of
substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why
efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts
and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be
stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, the
substituted service cannot be upheld.
It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances
warranting substituted service of summons may be proved by
evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of summons,
especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a
substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would
invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds
Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of
this case is it shown that petitioners brother, on whom substituted
service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and
discretion residing at petitioners residence.

Valmonte v. CA Digest
Service of Summons
1.
Facts:
1.
Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners
Lourdes and Alfredo are husband and wife both residents of 90222 Carkeek
Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte,
who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in
the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the
state of Washington and Manila, where he holds office at S-304 Gedisco
Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila.
2.
Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of
petitioner filed an action for partition against former and her husband. She
alleged that, the plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at present a resident
of 14823 Conway Road, Chesterfield, Missouri, U.S.A., while the
defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this complaint may be served
with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita,
Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola
Valmontes spouse holds office and where he can be found.He husband was
also her counsel, who has a law office in the Philippines. The summons
were served on her husband.
3.
Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondents counsel to her
husband as the party to whom all communications intended for her should
be sent. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo at his
office in Manila. Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the
one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the
process on her behalf. Accordingly the process server left without leaving a
copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
4.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with
Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her
Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her in default.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf of his
wife and opposed the private respondents motion. RTC denied the MR of
respondents. CA declared petitioner Lourdes in default. Said decision was
received by Alfredo hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served
with summons.

2.

3.

4.

NO.
There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes.
The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action
is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendants interest in a
specific property and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines,
service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such
service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by
personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in
such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy
of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which
the court may deem sufficient.
In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes. This mode
of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as
through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant
resides. The service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not
made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, 17 and certainly
was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to
consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.
Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made
upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, 17. As
provided in 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing,
supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and
setting forth the grounds for the application.
Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such
leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer
which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after
notice.

ASIAVEST v CA

FACTS:
In 1984, a Hong Kong court ordered Antonio Heras to pay US$1.8
million or its equivalent, with interest, to Asiavest Ltd. Apparently,
Heras guaranteed a certain loan in Hong Kong and the debtor in said
loan defaulted hence, the creditor, Asiavest, ran after Heras. But
before said judgment was issued and even during trial, Heras already
left for good Hong Kong and he returned to the Philippines. So when
in 1987, when Asiavest filed a complaint in court seeking to enforce
the foreign judgment against Heras, the latter claim that he never
received any summons, not in Hong Kong and not in the Philippines.
He also claimed that he never received a copy of the foreign
judgment. Asiavest however contends that Heras was actually given
service of summons when a messenger from the Sycip Salazar Law
Firm served said summons by leaving a copy to one Dionisio Lopez
who was Heras son in law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment can be enforced
against Heras in the Philippines.
HELD: No. Although the foreign judgment was duly authenticated
(Asiavest was able to adduce evidence in support thereto) and Heras
was never able to overcome the validity of it, it cannot be enforced
against Heras here in the Philippines because Heras was not properly
served summons. Hence, as far as Philippine law is concerned, the
Hong Kong court has never acquired jurisdiction over Heras. This
means then that Philippine courts cannot act to enforce the said
foreign judgment.
The action against Heras is an action in personam and as far as Hong
Kong is concerned, Heras is a non resident. He is a non resident
because prior to the judgment, he already abandoned Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong law on service of summons in in personam cases
against non residents was never presented in court hence processual
presumption is applied where it is now presumed that Hong Kong
law in as far as this case is concerned is the same as Philippine laws.

And under our laws, in an action in personam wherein the defendant

is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state
is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This
method of service is possible if such defendant is physically present
in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and
decide the case against him. Without a personal service of
summons, the Hong Kong court never acquired jurisdiction.
Needless to say, the summons tendered to Lopez was an invalid
service because the same does not satisfy the requirement of personal
service.

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE

COMPANY V BREVA 2004