EUGENIO vs.

CSC et al
FACTS: . Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied
for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility
and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying
on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its
organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:
Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career
Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget,
properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office
for Career Executive Service.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to
annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB
HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and
set aside
NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be
disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the
legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public
offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commissions power to reorganize
is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..
2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively
attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee the
CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower
in the government with a broad and positive outlook.
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent
Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent
Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally
inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy and program coordination. This is
clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination.
The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing
board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without

voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply
with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and
having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the
board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or
agency.
NOTES:
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source
of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director
with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary independent
constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need arises.
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The Commission shall have the following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2) members
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs
(4) The Office of Planning and Management
(5) The Central Administrative Office.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records
(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs
(14) The Office of Retirement
(15) The Regional and Field Offices.

ATTY. NERIO G. ZAMORA vs. TOMAS A. JUMAMOY

In a sworn letter-complaint dated 19 January 1993 and addressed to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, the complainant charged the respondents, who are deputy
sheriffs in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tagbilaran City, with gross inefficiency,
incompetence, and malpractice prejudicial to the government service, committed thus:
for more than two (2) years from now, the above-named Tomas Jumamoy and Domingo Brunidor,
both Deputy Sheriff of the City Courts of Tagbilaran, who reports [sic] for work at their whims and
caprices, deliberately failed and continue to fail implementing and/or enforcing writs of execution
on the following several cases to wit: Civil Case Nos. 1334, 1388, 1389, 1309, 1308, and Criminal
Case No. 3658, to the damage and prejudice to the undersigned and his clients.
. . . without authority of the court, said respondents accepts [sic] compromise payments from the
losing party and appropriate for their own benefit said compromise payments to the further
damage and prejudice to the undersigned counsel and his clients.
. . . despite repeated warnings, said respondents failed and continue to fail performing their sworn
duties and functions.
In a 1st Indorsement dated 21 January 1993, then Acting Executive Judge Antonio H. Bautista of
the RTC of Bohol forwarded the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator.
Acting on the memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator
of 1 February 1993, this Court required the respondents to comment on the letter-complaint. 1
In his Comment/Manifestation dated 24 March 1993, 2 respondent Tomas Jumamoy denied the
charges, alleged that the complaint is a pure harassment suit, and claimed that he had already
returned the writs of execution in Civil Cases Nos. 1334 (GLY Lending vs. Juvita Jumamil), 1388
(GLY Lending vs. Trinidad Solis), and 1389 (GLY Lending vs. Virginio Cuadra) on 16 January 1991,
21 December 1990, and 20 March 1991, respectively. In the said
returns, 3 he stated that Jumamil had asked for ample time to look for the necessary amount to
satisfy the judgment debt, but she failed to pay it; that Trinidad Solis made a partial payment of
P500.00 and promised to pay the balance before the end of December 1990; and that Cuadra
promised to pay the judgment debt before the end of March 1991 but failed to comply with his
promise. He stated in the first two returns that they were made "without prejudice for the plaintiff
to move [sic] for the issuance of alias writ in order to satisfy the judgment," and in the third, that
the return is "without prejudice for the sheriff to follow-up the promise made by defendant
Cuadra."
In his comment dated 29 March 1993, 4 respondent Domingo Brunidor alleged that partial
payments were made by the defendants in Civil Case No. 1308 and Civil Case No. 1309, and that
the accused in Criminal Case No. 3658, Serapio Marapao, Jr., paid the clerk of court, by way of
consignation, the sum of P1,200.00. He further claimed that the herein complainant did not file
motions for the issuance of alias writs of execution in the civil cases and that he received the alias
writ of execution in Criminal Case No. 3658 only on 26 February 1993.
On 11 September 1993, the Court referred this case to Executive Judge Antonio H. Bautista of the
RTC of Bohol for evaluation, report, and recommendation. 5
In his Report and Recommendation dated 2 December 1993, 6 Judge Bautista informed the Court
that at the scheduled hearing of this case on the same date, the complainant manifested that if
the respondents would "apologize and promise to perform their duties as Deputy City Sheriffs
faithfully, religiously and diligently he would withdraw the administrative complaint" and that the
respondents "in open court, on December 2, 1993 apologized to the complainant in the instant
case Atty. Nerio Zamora and promised to perform their duties as Deputy City Sheriffs faithfully,

religiously and diligently." Forthwith, the complainant withdrew the complaint and did not any
more adduce evidence.
Judge Bautista then recommended that this case be dismissed.
In the resolution of 1 June 1994, 7 the Court referred back this case to Judge Bautista for
investigation, report, and recommendation, inviting his attention to the ruling in Sy vs. Academia 8
that a complaint for misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance against a public officer or employee
cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the complainant simply because he has lost interest in
the prosecution of the case and that public interest and the need to maintain the faith and
confidence of our people in the Government and its agencies and instrumentalities demand that
proceedings in administrative cases against public officers and employees should not be made to
depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses;
hence, regardless of their motion to dismiss or to withdraw the complaint, the proceedings therein
may continue.
Judge Bautista then conducted an investigation in this case. The complainant and the respondents
testified.
In his Report and Recommendation dated 27 June 1994, 9 Judge Bautista explicitly states:
The charges preferred by the complainant Atty. Nerio Zamora were admitted, under oath, in open
court, on the testifical chair by the respondents Domingo Brunidor and Tomas Jumamoy who have
shown remorse and repentance of what they have done as observed by the Court in their
deportment and behavior on the testifical chair.
The charges, as admitted by the respondents, under oath, and in open court, are conclusively
serious.
He then recommends "the suspension of the respondents Tomas Jumamoy and Domingo Brunidor
from office for two months without pay."
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends the approval of the recommendation of Judge
Bautista considering that the "respondents' plea for forgiveness appears sincere and proceeds
from a voluntary admission of the charges from a repentant heart, and considering further that
this is the first time that they had been administratively charged."
The Court finds the above recommendation to be well-taken. The respondents having thus
admitted the charges in open court and while they were under oath, no further evidence was
necessary for holding the respondents liable for gross inefficiency, incompetence, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Their own comments readily show that they withheld
the due implementation of the writs of execution on the mere pleas of the judgment debtors for
time to raise funds or to pay them on installments, and that they then returned the writs
unsatisfied or partially satisfied, hoping, nevertheless, that the prevailing party would ask for alias
writs of execution. In short, they deliberately failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of
their duty to obtain satisfaction of the judgments. There is no proof that the judgment debtors had
no property exempt from execution; accordingly, the respondents should have complied with
Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. They should not have simply folded their arms and
waited for the fulfillment of the promises of the judgment-debtors. A delay in the execution of a
judgment may prejudice the judgment creditor, for such delay may provide an opportunity for
scheming judgment debtors to bring their property beyond the reach of the writs. It may be that
the respondents were moved by compassion and sympathy, but such personal feelings must never
be allowed to compromise the public-trust character of their office which binds them to a
continuing accountability to the people. The respondents should not have forgotten the rule that
the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. 10
The Court does not look with favor upon the actuation of the complainant in offering to withdraw
the complaint provided that the respondents would apologize to him and promise to be more

diligent in the performance of their duties. His grievances against the respondents relate to their
public duty and not to a purely personal matter and, therefore, transcend the complainant's
personal pique or pride. After this Court had taken cognizance of this case, the complaint can no
longer be withdrawn just because the respondents have apologized or repented. Such a
withdrawal by the complainant could only invite suspicion that he was not really sincere in
bringing the complaint. In any event, this Court cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a
complainant in a matter which may involve its disciplinary authority.
WHEREFORE, for gross inefficiency, incompetence, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, respondents TOMAS JUMAMOY and DOMINGO BRUNIDOR are each SUSPENDED from
office for TWO (2) MONTHS, without pay. The suspension shall take effect upon notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.

Abeja vs. Tanada

236 SCRA 60 Law on Public Officers Public Office is Personal to the Incumbent
In 1992, Rosauro Radovan was declared the winner of the mayoralty elections in Pagbilao, Quezon.
His rival, Evelyn Abeja, filed an election protest where she questioned the results in 22 precincts.
Radovan filed a counter protest where he questioned the results in 36 precincts with counterclaim
for damages. Abeja then caused the revision of the ballots covering the 22 precincts and paid the
expenses therefor. Abeja then urged Radovan to cause the revision of the 36 precincts he is
questioning. Radovan however refused and so Abeja filed a motion that a judgment be rendered
based on the results from the 22 precincts. The original judge did not rule on the motion before he
was transferred. Before the judge could be replaced, Radovan died. Radovan was then substituted
by the vice mayor (Conrado de Rama) and Radovans wife, Ediltrudes. Ediltrudes substituted his
deceased husband insofar as the latters counterclaim for damages is concerned.
In 1993, the new judge, Federico Taada ruled that Abejas motion is premature because the 36
precincts are not yet revised. Taada agreed with Radovan that the 36 precincts may only be
revised if Abeja can show that she (Abeja) leads by at least one point vote over Radovan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge is correct.
HELD: No. There is no rule in election protests cases which states that a protestant (Abeja) must
first show that she won in the precincts she is contesting before evidence on the protestees
(Radovan) counter-protest can be had. This will render the protestants case to be at the mercy of
the protestee who can just prolong the case until his term is over.
Also, the Supreme Court ruled that the substitution of Ediltrudes for her deceased husband is
erroneous. This is notwithstanding the counter-claim for damages in the counter protest. Public
office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs. The heirs may
no longer prosecute the deceased protestees counter-claim for damages against the protestant
for that was extinguished when death terminated his right to occupy the contested office.

Serana vs Sandiganbayan
(Public Officer, Student Regent)
Facts: Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student
regent of the University of the Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance of her
official functions, she represented to former President Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons
Hall of the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and for
which purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00.
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP
student regent, she was not a public officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a member
in representation of the student body since she merely represented her peers; 2.) that she was a
simple student and did not receive any salary as a UP student regent; and 3.) she does not fall
under Salary Grade 27.
The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she
had the general powers of administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP. Compensation
is not an essential part of public office.
Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to
which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and
corporate powers in the university. It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can
act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations.
Issue: WON a government scholar and UP student regent is a public officer.
Held: Yes.
First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for
the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. (Laurel vs Desierto)
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public makes one a public officer.
Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Hence, it is not only the salary grade
that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Third, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most,
it is merely incidental to the public office.
Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

Preclaro vs Sandiganbayan
(Public Officers, Non-Career Service)
Facts: Accused is a project manager/consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division, Industrial
Technology Development Institute, Department of Science and Technology, a component of the
Industrial Development Institute which is an agency of the DOST.
He is to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD building, while the Jaime Sta. Maria
Construction undertook the construction. The structure is jointly funded by the Philippine and
Japanese Governments.
While the said construction has not yet been completed, accused either directly requested and/or
demanded for himself the sum of P200,000.00, claimed as part of the expected profit of the
contractor.
Petitioner was charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for committing said
offense in relation to the performance of his official duties.
Petitioner asserts in a petition for review that he is not a public officer because he was neither
elected nor appointed to a public office, but merely a private individual hired by the ITDI on
contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified period. Hence the Sandiganbayan
erred in taking cognizance of the case.
Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 defines a public officer to include elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption
service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government
Issue: WON a private individual hired on a contractual basis by the government is a public officer.
Held: Yes. The word includes used in defining a public officer indicates that the definition is not
restrictive. The terms classified, unclassified or exemption service were the old categories of
position in the civil service which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career
Service by PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
A private individual hired on a contractual basis as Project Manager for a government undertaking
falls under the non-career service category of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as
defined by Sec 2(b) of RA 3019.

Under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec 6(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, noncareer service in particular is characterized by 1) entrance other than those of the usual test of
merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and 2) tenure which is limited to a period specified
by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.
Section 9(4) of the same provides that Non-Career Service It shall include Contractual personnel or
those employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a
specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to
be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction
and supervision from the hiring agency.

Farinas vs Executive Secretary

Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011
(Public Officer, Difference between appointive officials and elective officials)
Facts: Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals
Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact
Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66.Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers
and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Respondents contends that there is no violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A
substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their
office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not
elected by popular will. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Issue: WON the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials
gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones.
Held: No. Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.
The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an

appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter
8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are
strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding
political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.
Moreover, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification. Hence, equal protection is not infringed.

BINAMIRA vs. GARRUCHO, JR.

FACTS: A memorandum designating Ramon Binamira as General Manager of Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA) was addressed and signed by the then Minister of Tourism and the Ex-officio
Chairman of PTA. The Minister sought the approval of the delegation to the president and the same
was granted. Concomitantly, Binamira assumed office as general manager on the same date that
the memorandum was sent.
Allegedly, Binamira discharged duties as the PTA general manager and ex-officio vice
chairman. Said discharged is even purported to have been acknowledge by the president.
However, after sometime, Peter Garrucho, as the newly appointed secretary of tourism
demanded for Binamira's resignation which was pursuant to a memorandum that then Pres.
Aquino sent to the former advising him of the invalidity of the delegation of the position to
Binamira as he was not appointed by the president which was what was required under PD 564.
PD 564 is the law that created the Ministry of Tourism. Under section 23-A of the decree, the
General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term
of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause.
When Binamira was ousted, Garrucho took over his place as general manager, still in
pursuance with the memorandum sent by Pres. Aquino.
On account of the foregoing events, Binamira filed a petition for quo warranto question
Garrucho's post and prayed for reinstatement claiming unjust dismissal. Pending said case, he
filed a supplemental petition impleading Jose Capistrano who was the appointed general manager.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Binamira is proper and thus does not warrant his recall.
HELD: Petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by the
Minister of Tourism.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only
designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and
designation that the petitioner has failed to consider.

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in
the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme
Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House
of Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is
legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that
he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment,
which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.
Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner cannot sustain
his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that
the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the
President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of
discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible
for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President.
The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act
that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a
member of the Cabinet.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being
that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and
discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he
cannot delegate his duties to another.
In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the
exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was
deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to
substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
Even on the assumption that the power conferred on the President could be validly exercised by
the Secretary, we still cannot accept that the act of the latter, as an extension or "projection" of
the personality of the President, made irreversible the petitioner's title to the position in question.
The petitioner's conclusion that Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the act of President Aquino is
based only on half the doctrine he vigorously invokes. Justice Laurel stated that doctrine clearly in
the landmark case of Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, where he described the relationship of the
President of the Philippines and the members of the Cabinet as follows:
. . . all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the
Philippines when "performed and promulgated in the regular course of business," which was true
of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds that such
acts shall be considered valid only if not "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," as
also happened in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.