A. RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN, JR. vs.

CA
FACTS:
Before this Court is a Petition for New Trial and,
in the alternative, for the Reopening of the Case1 on the
ground of newly discovered evidence filed by A. Rafael
C. Dinglasan, Jr. (Dinglasan) who was found guilty2 of
violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as
The Bouncing Checks Law, by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case No.
21238.
The alleged newly discovered evidence claimed
by Dinglasan are the affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan,
in her capacity as Executive Vice-President and
Treasurer of Elmyra, and Ma. Encarnacion Vda. De
Dinglasan, the wife of Mariano Dinglasan, who, during
his lifetime, was the Cashier and Liaison Officer of the
same company. These affidavits, together with the
transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 attached to
Solidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3
October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom,
tends to prove that Dinglasan made good of the check
within five banking days from notice of dishonor. He
could not, therefore, be validly convicted of violating
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for one of the essential
elements of the offense, that is, the drawer failed and
refused to make good the said check within five banking
days from the notice of dishonor, is absent.
ISSUE: Whether or not a new trial or reopening of the
case based on newly discovered evidence should be
allowed.
HELD: Explicit from the above stated rule that a Motion
for New Trial should be filed before the judgment of the
appellate court convicting the accused becomes final.
To rule that finality of judgment shall be
reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or order
denying the second motion for reconsideration would
result to an absurd situation whereby courts will be
obliged to issue orders or resolutions denying what is a
prohibited motion in the first place, in order that the
period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby,
prolonging the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a
ruling would allow a party to forestall the running of the
period of finality of judgments by virtue of filing a
prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical
but also unjust to the winning party.
It should be emphasized that the applicant for
new trial has the burden of showing that the new
evidence he seeks to present has complied with the
requisites to justify the holding of a new trial.28
The threshold question in resolving a motion for
new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether
the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered

evidence which could not have been discovered by due

diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly
discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when
was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e.,
when should or could it have been discovered.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.

Neypes vs. CA
FACTS:Petitioners filed an action for the annulment of
judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or
reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC
against private respondents. In May 16, 1997 order, RTC
denied respondents complaint based on prescription.
Respondent filed MR. In an order received by the
Petitioner on March 3, 1998, RTC dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. On the 15th day thereafter, (March 18)
Petitioner filed MR which was later dismissed by the
RTC. On July 27, 1998, Petitioner filed notice of appeal
and paid appeal fees on August 8, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the
notice of appeal holding that it was filed 8 days late. This
was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners
filed MR but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998. Via petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the
dismissal of notice of appeal before the CA.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that
they have seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They
argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
started to run only on July 22 since this was the last day
they receive the final order of the trial court denying
their MR. When they filed their appeal on July 27, 1998,
only 5 days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999
CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period
for appeal should have reckoned from March 3, 1998 or
the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. Accordingly, the order was
the final order appealable under the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed their notice of
appeal on time.
RULING: First and foremost, the right to appeal is
neither a natural right nor part of due process. It is
merely statutory privilege and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal
must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failure

to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The right

to appeal was fixed by both statute and procedural rules.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be
taken within 15 days from the notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. A final order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing for the court to do
with respect to it.
To standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh start of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from the
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial of
motion for reconsideration. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from the receipt of order denying the motion for
new trial, MR or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed
their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
denying their MR). This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41 Sec 3, of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use
of the disjunctive or signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should as a
rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of the or in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15
days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from
notice of the final order
Petitioner here filed their notice of appeal July
27, 1998 or five days from the receipt of the order
denying their MR on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of
appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15
days.

SAN LORENZO BUILDERS vs BAYANG

ThFacts: On February 16, 2004, the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board decided in favour of Ma. Cristina
(Bayang), in her case filed against San Lorenzo Builders
Inc., (San Lorenzo), for specific performance and
damages. San Lorenzos appeal and motion for
reconsideration to the HLURB Board of Commissioners,
were also denied. Hence, San Lorenzo elevated its
appeal to the Office of the President (OP). By
Resolution of November 17, 2006, the OP denied San
Lorenzos appeal, stating that San Lorenzo received the
order of the Board of Commissioners affirming that of the
Arbiter decision on July 27, 2005. When they filed their
Motion for Reconsideration of the order on August 10,
2005, fourteen (14) days have elapsed. Upon their
receipt of the order denying the Motion for

Reconsideration on April 17, 2006, they had only one

day, or on April 18, 2006 to file their notice of appeal
before the OP. They filed it only on April 27, 2006 or
nine days late, hence the appeal was filed out of time.
San Lorenzo moved to reconsider, citing the fresh
period rule enunciated in the case of Neypes vs. CA,
but the OP denied it, ruling that the fresh period rule
applies only in judicial appeals, not administrative
appeals. Their petition for review with the Court of
Appeals was also denied, hence they elevated their case
to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the fresh period rule also apply
to administrative appeals.
Ruling: We DENY the petition. It is settled that the fresh
period rule in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals
and not to administrative appeals.
In Panolino v. Tajala,1 the Court was confronted with a
similar issue of whether the fresh period rule applies to
an appeal filed from the decision or order of the DENR
regional office to the DENR Secretary, an appeal which
is administrative in nature. We held in Panolino that the
fresh period rule only covers judicial proceedings under
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
The fresh period rule in Neypes declares:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in
the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also
apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals;
Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
to the Court of Appeals; and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.
xxxx
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision
in Neypes, the fresh period rule shall apply to Rule
40_(appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional

Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals

from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals);
and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court). Obviously,these Rules cover judicial proceedings
under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioners present case is administrative in nature
involving an appeal from the decision or order of the
DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such
appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative
Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section
1 clearly provides that if the motion for reconsideration
is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal during
the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from
receipt of the resolution of denial; whereas if the
decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15day period to perfect his appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a
decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the
OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the
fresh period rule in Neypes does not apply.
As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations
governing appeals from decisions of the HLURB Board
of Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of
HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, in relation to
Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18,
series of 1987:
Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No. 765,
series of 2004, prescribing the rules and regulations
governing appeals from decisions of the Board of
Commissioners to the Office of the President, pertinently
reads:
Section 2. Appeal. Any party may, upon notice to the
Board and the other party, appeal a decision rendered
by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the
President within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in
accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series
of 1987.
The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall
suspend the running of the period of appeal to the Office
of the President.

Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of

Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, provides
that in case the aggrieved party files a motion for
reconsideration from an adverse decision of any
agency/office, the said party has the only remaining
balance of the prescriptive period within which to appeal,
reckoned from receipt of notice of the decision denying
his/her
motion
for
reconsideration.2 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, in applying the above-mentioned rules to the
present case, we find that the CA correctly affirmed the
OP in dismissing the petitioners appeal for having been
filed out of time.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the present petition for review
on certiorari andAFFIRM the decision dated July 23,
2010 and resolution dated December 2, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100332.