THE PROSECUTOR IS NOT MANDATED TO REQUIRE THE RES PONDENT TO

SUBMIT HIS COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS TO OPPOSE THE COMPLAINT:

While probable cause should first be determined before an information may be filed in
court, the prosecutor is not mandated to require the respondent to submit his counteraffidavits to oppose the complaint. In the determination of probable cause,
the prosecutor may solely rely on the complaint, affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant. If he does not find probable cause, the
prosecutor may dismiss outright the complaint or if he finds probable cause or sufficient
reason to proceed with the case, he shall issue a resolution and file the corresponding
information (TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR. ET AL. VS. MAGDALENO M. PEA, ET AL. G.R.
NO. 143591, MAY 5, 2010, SECOND DIVISION, PEREZ, J.).
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or
not
the
Court
of
Appeals,
in
its Decision[1] dated 20 June 2000 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 49666, is correct when it dismissed
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners
Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa,
Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P.
Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Eric L.
Lee and Ben Yu Lim, Jr., and ruled that the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago
City, did not gravely abuse its discretion in
denying the motion for reinvestigation and
recall of the warrants of arrest in Criminal
Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686.
The factual antecedents of the case are as
follows:
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea (Atty.
Pea) instituted a civil case for recovery of
agents
compensation
and
expenses,
damages, and attorneys fees[2] against
Urban Bank and herein petitioners, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Occidental, Bago City. The case was raffled
to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil Case
No. 754. Atty. Pea anchored his claim for
compensation
on
the
Contract
of
Agency[3] allegedly entered into with the
petitioners, wherein the former undertook to
perform such acts necessary to prevent any
intruder and squatter from unlawfully
occupying Urban Banks property located
along Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners
filed
a
Motion to Dismiss[4]arguing that they never
appointed the respondent as agent or
counsel. Attached to the motion were the
following documents: 1) a Letter[5] dated 19
December 1994 signed by Herman Ponce
and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar
Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of
the subject property; 2) an unsigned
Letter[6] dated 7 December 1994 addressed
to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a
Letter[7] dated 9 December 1994 addressed
to Teodoro Borlongan, Jr. and signed by
Marilyn
G.
Ong;
and
4)
a
Memorandum[8] dated 20 November 1994
from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents
were presented in an attempt to show that
the respondent was appointed as agent by

ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the

petitioners.
In view of the introduction of the abovementioned documents, Atty. Pea filed his
Complaint-Affidavit[9] with the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Bago City.[10] He claimed
that said documents were falsified because
the alleged signatories did not actually affix
their signatures, and the signatories were
neither stockholders nor officers and
employees of ISCI.[11] Worse, petitioners
introduced said documents as evidence
before the RTC knowing that they were
falsified.
In a Resolution[12] dated 24 September
1998, the City Prosecutor found probable
cause for the indictment of petitioners for
four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing
Falsified Documents, penalized by the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code. The City Prosecutor
concluded that the documents were falsified
because the alleged signatories untruthfully
stated that ISCI was the principal of the
respondent; that petitioners knew that the
documents were falsified considering that
the signatories were mere dummies; and
that the documents formed part of the record
of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used
by petitioners as evidence in support of their
motion to dismiss, and then adopted in their
answer
and
in
their
Pre-Trial
Brief.
[13] Subsequently,
the
corresponding
Informations[14] were
filed
with
the
MTCC, Bago City. The cases were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and
6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca
issued the warrants[15] for the arrest of the
petitioners.
On 1 October 1998, petitioners filed an
Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of
Arrest
and/or
For
Reinvestigation.
[16] Petitioners insisted that they were
denied due process because of the nonobservance of the proper procedure on
preliminary investigation prescribed in the
Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that
they were not afforded the right to submit
their counter-affidavit. Then they argued that
since
no
such
counter-affidavit
and
supporting documents were submitted by
the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied
on the complaint-affidavit and attachments

of the respondent in issuing the warrants of

arrest, also in contravention with the Rules of
Court. Petitioners further prayed that the
information be quashed for lack of probable
cause. Moreover,
one
of
the
accused, i.e., Ben Lim, Jr., is not even a
director of Urban Bank, contrary to what
complainant
stated. Lastly,
petitioners
posited that the criminal cases should have
been suspended on the ground that the issue
being threshed out in the civil case is a
prejudicial question.
In an Order[17] dated 13 November 1998,
the MTCC denied the omnibus motion
primarily on the ground that preliminary
investigation was not available in the instant
case which fell within the jurisdiction of the
first-level court. The court, likewise, upheld
the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying
that it was issued in accordance with the
Rules of Court. Besides, the court added,
petitioners could no longer question the
validity of the warrant since they already
posted bail. The court also believed that the
issue involved in the civil case was not a
prejudicial question, and, thus, denied the
prayer for suspension of the criminal
proceedings. Lastly, the court was convinced
that the Informations contained all the facts
necessary to constitute an offense.
Petitioners immediately instituted a special
civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before
the Court of Appeals, ascribing grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing
and not recalling the warrants of arrest,
reiterating the arguments in their omnibus
motion.[18] They, likewise, questioned the
courts conclusion that by posting bail,
petitioners already waived their right to
assail the validity of the warrants of arrest.
On 20 June 2000, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition.[19] Thus, petitioners
filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, raising the following issues:
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal
complaint is not cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, is the finding of
probable cause required for the filing of an
Information in court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do
not establish probable cause, should not the
investigating
prosecutor
dismiss
the
complaint, or at the very least, require the
respondent to submit his counter-affidavit?
B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters
which are not within the personal knowledge

of the complainant be sufficient basis for the

finding of probable cause?
C.
Where there is offense charged in a criminal
complaint is not cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, and the record of the
preliminary investigation does not show the
existence of probable cause, should not the
judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and
dismiss the criminal case, or at the very
least, require the accused to submit his
counter-affidavit in order to aid the judge in
determining the existence of probable
cause?
D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the
existence of probable cause?[20]
On the other hand, respondent contends that
the issues raised by the petitioners had
already become moot and academic when
the latter posted bail and were already
arraigned.
On 2 August 2000, this Court issued a
TRO[21] enjoining the judge of the MTCC
from proceeding in any manner with Criminal
Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, effective during the
entire period that the case is pending before,
or until further orders of, this Court.
We will first discuss the issue of mootness.
The issues raised by the petitioners have not
been mooted by the fact that they had
posted bail and were already arraigned.
It appears from the records that upon the
issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners
immediately posted bail as they wanted to
avoid embarrassment, being then the
officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled
date for the arraignment, despite the
petitioners refusal to enter a plea, the
court a quo entered a plea of Not Guilty for
them.
The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that
posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any
irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, that has already been superseded by
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of
Criminal Procedure. The principle that the
accused is precluded from questioning the
legality of the arrest after arraignment is true
only if he voluntarily enters his plea and
participates during trial, without previously
invoking his objections thereto.[22]
As held in Okabe v. Hon. Gutierrez:[23]
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is
a new one, intended to modify previous
rulings of this Court that an application for

bail or the admission to bail by the accused

shall be considered as a waiver of his right to
assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the
legalities or irregularities thereon. The new
rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court
in People v. Red. The new rule is curative in
nature because precisely, it was designed to
supply defects and curb evils in procedural
rules. Hence, the rules governing curative
statutes are applicable. Curative statutes are
by their essence retroactive in application.
Besides, procedural rules as a general rule
operate retroactively, even without express
provisions to that effect, to cases pending at
the time of their effectivity, in other words to
actions yet undetermined at the time of their
effectivity. Before the appellate court
rendered its decision on January 31, 2001,
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was
already in effect. It behoved the appellate
court to have applied the same in resolving
the petitioners petition for certiorari and her
motion for partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the
petitioner after posting her personal bail
bond, it cannot be argued that she waived
her right to question the finding of probable
cause and to assail the warrant of arrest
issued against her by the respondent judge.
There must be clear and convincing proof
that the petitioner had an actual intention to
relinquish her right to question the existence
of probable cause. When the only proof of
intention rests on what a party does, his act
should be so manifestly consistent with, and
indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally relinquish the particular right
that no other explanation of his conduct is
possible. x x x.
Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion
to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or
For Reinvestigation on the same day that
they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise
expressly contained a stipulation that they
were not waiving their right to question the
validity of their arrest.[24] On the date of
their arraignment, petitioners refused to
enter their plea due to the fact that the issue
on the legality of their arrest is still pending
with the Court. Thus, when the court a
quo entered a plea of not guilty for them,
there was no valid waiver of their right to
preclude them from raising the same with
the Court of Appeals or this Court. The
posting of bail bond was a matter of
imperative
necessity
to
avert
their
incarceration; it should not be deemed as a
waiver of their right to assail their arrest. The
ruling to which we have returned in People v.
Red[25] stated:
x x x The present defendants were arrested
towards the end of January, 1929, on the
Island and Province of Marinduque by order

of the judge of the Court of First Instance of

Lucena, Tayabas, at a time when there were
no court sessions being held in Marinduque.
In view of these circumstances and the
number of the accused, it may properly be
held that the furnishing of the bond was
prompted by the sheer necessity of not
remaining in detention, and in no way
implied their waiver of any right, such as the
summary examination of the case before
their detention. That they had no intention of
waiving this right is clear from their motion
of January 23, 1929, the same day on which
they furnished a bond, and the fact that they
renewed this petition on February 23, 1929,
praying for the stay of their arrest for lack of
the summary examination; the first motion
being denied by the court on January 24,
1929 (G.R. No. 33708, page 8), and the
second remaining undecided, but with an
order to have it presented in Boac,
Marinduque.
Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be
said to have waived the right granted to
them by section 13, General Order No. 58, as
amended by Act No. 3042.
The rest of the issues raised by the
petitioners may be grouped into two, which
are: (1) the procedural aspect, i.e., whether
the prosecution and the court a quo properly
observed the required procedure in the
instant case, and, (2) the substantive aspect,
which is whether there was probable cause
to pursue the criminal cases to trial.
THE PROCEDURAL ASPECT:
Petitioners contend that they were denied
due process as they were unable to submit
their counter-affidavits and were not
accorded the right to a preliminary
investigation.Considering that the complaint
of Atty. Pea was filed in September 1998, the
rule then applicable was the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
The provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure relevant to the issue are Sections
1, 3(a) and 9(a) of Rule 112, to wit:
Section
1.
Definition.
Preliminary
investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for
the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well founded
belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.
Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in
Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information
for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted in
the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known

address
of
the
respondent
and
be
accompanied
by
affidavits
of
the
complainant and his witnesses as well as
other supporting documents, in such number
of copies as there are respondents, plus two
(2) copies for the official file. The said
affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal,
state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public,
who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that
they
voluntarily
executed
and
understood their affidavits.
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
(a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the
complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or
state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in
Section 3(a) of this Rule shall be observed.
The fiscal shall take appropriate action based
on the affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant.
(underscoring supplied)
The crime to which petitioners were charged
was defined and penalized under second
paragraph of Article 172 in relation to Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual
and use of falsified documents. The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more
than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit
any of the falsifications enumerated in the
next preceding article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any other
kind of commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third
party, or with the intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private document
commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in
evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the
damage of another or who, with the intent to
cause such damage, shall use any of the
false documents embraced in the next
preceding article or in any of the foregoing
subdivisions of this article, shall be punished
by the penalty next lower in degree.
Prision correccional in its medium and
maximum
periods
translates
to
imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1

day.[26] The next lower in degree to prision

correccionalis arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum
period which translates to 4 months and 1
day to 2 years and 4 months[27] of
imprisonment.Since the crime committed is
not covered by the Rules of Summary
Procedure,[28] the case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts
but applying the ordinary rules. In such
instance, preliminary investigation as defined
in Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable since
such section covers only crimes cognizable
by the RTC. That which is stated in Section
9(a) is the applicable rule.
Under this Rule, while probable cause should
first be determined before an information
may be filed in court, the prosecutor is not
mandated to require the respondent to
submit his counter-affidavits to oppose the
complaint. In the determination of probable
cause, the prosecutor may solely rely on the
complaint, affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant. If
he does not find probable cause, the
prosecutor may
dismiss outright the
complaint or if he finds probable cause or
sufficient reason to proceed with the case, he
shall issue a resolution and file the
corresponding information.
The complaint of respondent, verbatim, is as
follows:
COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT
I, MAGDALENO M. PEA, Filipino, of legal age,
with address at Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental, after having been sworn
in accordance with law hereby depose and
state:
1.
I am the Plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 754 pending with the Regional Trial Court
of Bago City entitled Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea
v. Urban Bank, et al Impleaded therein as
defendants of the board of the bank, namely,
Teodoro Borlongan, Delfin Gonzales, Jr.,
Benjamin De Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee,
Ben Lim Jr., Corazon Bejasa and Arturo
Manuel.(underlining ours)
2.
I filed the said case to collect
my fees as agent of Urban Bank, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as the bank) in
ridding a certain parcel of land in Pasay City
of squatters and intruders. A certified true
copy of the Complaint in the said case is
hereto attached as Annex A.
3.
In the Motion to Dismiss dated
12 March 1996 (a certified true copy of which
is attached as Annex B), Answer dated 28
October 1996 (Annex C), and Pre-Trial Brief
dated 28 January 1997 (Annex D) filed by the

bank and the respondent members of the

board, the said respondents used as
evidence the following documents:

Ong on behalf of ISC, a copy of which is

hereto attached as annex F, which states:
December 7, 1994

a. Letter
dated
19
December
1994
supposedly signed by a certain Herman
Ponce and Julie Abad for Isabela Sugar
Company (ISC) (a copy of which is attached
as Annex E), which states:
December 19, 1994
Urban Bank
Urban Avenue, Makati
Metro Manila

To: ATTY. CORA BEJASA

From: MARILYN G. ONG
RE: ISABELA SUGAR CO., INC.
Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea, who has been
assigned by Isabela Sugar Company inc. to
take charge of inspecting the tenants would
like to request an authority similar to this
from the Bank to new owners. Can you
please issue something like this today as he
(unreadable) this.

Gentlemen:
This has reference to your property located
among Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City which
you purchased from Isabela Sugar Company
under a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on
December 1, 1994.

b.
Letter dated 9 December 1994
supposedly executed by the same Marilyn
Ong, a copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex G, which states:
December 9, 1994

In line with our warranties as the Seller of the

said property and our undertaking to deliver
to you the full and actual possession and
control of said property, free from tenants,
occupants or squatters and from any
obstruction or impediment to the free use
and occupancy of the property and to
prevent the former tenants or occupants
from entering or returning to the premises. In
view of the transfer of ownership of the
property to Urban Bank, it may be necessary
for Urban Bank to appoint Atty. Pea likewise
as its authorized representative for purposes
of holding/maintaining continued possession
of the said property and to represent Urban
Bank in any court action that may be
instituted for the abovementioned purposes.
It is understood that any attorneys fees, cost
of litigation and any other charges or
expenses that may be incurred relative to
the
exercise
by
Atty.
Pea
of
his
abovementioned duties shall be for the
account of Isabela Sugar Company and any
loss or damage that may be incurred to third
parties shall be answerable by Isabela Sugar
Company.

Atty. Ted Borlongan

URBAN BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
MAKATI, METRO MANILA
Attention: Mr. Ted Borlongan
Dear Mr. Borlongan
I would like to request for an authority from
Urban Bank per attached immediately as the
tenants are questioning authority of the
people who are helping us to take possession
of the property.
Marilyn Ong
c.
Memorandum dated 20 November
1994, copy of which is attached as annex H,
which states:
MEMORANDUM
To: Atty. Magadaleno M. Pea
Director

Very truly yours,

From: Enrique C. Montilla III

President

Isabela Sugar Company

Date: 20 November 1994

By:

You are hereby directed to recover and take

possession of the property of the corporation
situated at Roxas Boulevard covered by TCT
No. 5382 of the Registry of Deeds
for Pasay City,
immediately
upon
the
expiration of the contract of lease over the
said property on 29 November 1994. For this
purpose, you are authorized to engage the
services of security guards to protect the

HERMAN PONCE
JULIE ABAD
b. Memorandum dated 7 December 1994
supposedly executed by a certain Marilyn

property against intruders. You may also

engage the services of a lawyer in case there
is a need to go to court to protect the said
property of the corporation. In addition, you
may take whatever steps or measures are
necessary
to
ensure
our
continued
possession of the property.

10. I am likewise executing this affidavit for

whatever legal purpose it may serve.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Sgd. MAGDALENO M. PEA

ENRIQUE C. MONTILLA III

President
4.
The respondent member of the board
of the bank used and introduced the
aforestated documents as evidence in the
civil case knowing that the same are
falsified. They used thae said documents to
justify their refusal to pay my agents fees, to
my damage and prejudice.
5.
The 19 December 1994 letter (Annex E)
is a falsified document, in that the person
who supposedly executed the letter on
behalf of ISC, a certain Herman Ponce and
Julie Abad did not actually affix their
signatures on the document. The execution
of the letter was merely simulated by making
it appear that Ponce and Abad executed the
letter on behalf of ISC when they did not in
fact do so.
6.
No persons by the name of Herman
Ponce and Julie Abad were ever stockholders,
officers, employees or representatives of ISC.
In the letter, Herman Ponce was represented
to be the President of ISC and Julie Abad, the
Corporate Secretary. However, as of 19
December 1994, the real President of
plaintiff was Enrique Montilla, III and Cristina
Montilla was the Corporate Secretary. A copy
of the Minutes of the Regular Meeting of ISC
for the year 1994, during which Montilla, et
al. Were elected is hereto attached as Annex
I. On the otherhand, a list of the stockholders
of ISC on or about the time of the transaction
is attached as Annex J.
7.
The same holds true with respect to the
Memorandum dated 7 December 1994 and
athe letter dated 9 December 1994 allegedly
written by a ceratin Marilyn Ong. Nobody by
the said name was ever a stockholder of ISC.
8.
Lastly, with respect to the supposed
Memorandum issued by Enrique Montilla, III
his signature thereon was merely forged by
respondents. Enrique Montilla III, did not affix
his signature on any such document.
9.
I am executing this affidavit for the
purpose of charging Teodoro C. Borlongan,
Corazon M. Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel,
Delfin C. Gonzales Jr., Benjamin L. De Leon, P.
Siervo H. Dizon and Eric Lee, with the crime
of use of falsified documents under Artilce
172, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.
(underlining ours)

It is evident that in the affidavit-complaint,

specifically in paragraph 1, respondent
merely introduced and identified the board of
the bank, namely, Teodoro Borlongan, Jr.,
Delfin Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin De Leon, P.
Siervo Dizon, Eric Lee, Ben Lim, Jr., Corazon
Bejasa and Arturo Manuel, Sr. However, in
the accusatory portion of the complaint
which is paragraph number 9, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr.
was not included among those charged with
the crime of use of falsified documents under
Article 172, paragraph 2, of the Revised
Penal Code. The omission indicates that
respondent did not intend to criminally
implicate Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., even as he was
acknowledged to be a member of the
board.And there was no explanation in the
Resolution and Information by the City
Prosecutor why Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was included.
Moreover, as can be gleaned from the body
of the complaint and the specific averments
therein, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was never
mentioned.
The City Prosecutor should have cautiously
reviewed the complaint to determine
whether there were inconsistencies which
ought to have been brought to the attention
of the respondent or, on his own, considered
for due evaluation. It is a big mistake to bring
a man to trial for a crime he did not commit.
Prosecutors are endowed with ample powers
in order that they may properly fulfill their
assigned role in the administration of
justice. It should be realized, however, that
when a man is hailed to court on a criminal
charge, it brings in its wake problems not
only for the accused but for his family as
well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to
weigh the evidence carefully and to
deliberate
thereon
to
determine
the
existence of a prima facie case before filing
the information in court. Anything less would
be a dereliction of duty.[29]
Atty.
Pea,
in
his
Second
Manifestation[30] dated
16
June
1999,
averred that petitioners, including Mr. Ben
Lim, Jr., were already estopped from raising
the fact that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. was not a
member of the board of directors of Urban
Bank, as the latter participated and appeared
through counsel in Civil Case No. 754 without
raising any opposition. However, this does
not detract from the fact that the City
Prosecutor, as previously discussed, did not

carefully scrutinize the complaint of Atty.

Pea, which did not charge Mr. Ben Lim, Jr. of
any crime.
What tainted the procedure further was that
the Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of
the petitioners, including, Mr. Ben Lim, Jr.
despite the filing of the Omnibus Motion to
Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation raising among others the
issue that Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., was not even a
member of the board of directors.With the
filing of the motion, the judge is put on alert
that an innocent person may have been
included
in
the
complaint. In
the
Order[31] dated 13 November 1998, in
denying the motion to quash, Judge Primitivo
Blanca ruled that:
Courts in resolving a motion to quash cannot
consider facts contrary to those alleged in
the information or which do not appear on
the face of the information because said
motion is hypothethical admission of the
facts alleged in the information x x x.
(citations omitted.)
We cannot accept as mere oversight the
mistake of respondent judge since it was at
the expense of liberty. This cannot be
condoned.
In the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
mandate of the Constitution is for the judge
to personally determine the existence of
probable cause:
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Corollary thereto, Section 9(b) of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 9. Cases not falling under the original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

this Rule shall likewise be observed. If the

judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the
respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the
complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest after personally
examining in writing and under oath the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that
[n]o x x x warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing x x x the persons x x x
to be seized.[32] Interpreting the words
personal determination, we said in Soliven v.
Makasiar[33] that it does not thereby mean
that judges are obliged to conduct the
personal examination of the complainant and
his witnesses themselves. To require thus
would be to unduly laden them with
preliminary examinations and investigations
of
criminal
complaints
instead
of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases
filed
before
them. Rather,
what
is
emphasized merely is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself as to the existence of
probable cause. To this end, he may: (a)
personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause,
disregard the prosecutor's report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence. What he is never allowed to do is
to follow blindly the prosecutor's bare
certification as to the existence of probable
cause. Much more is required by the
constitutional provision. Judges have to go
over the report, the affidavits, the transcript
of stenographic notes if any, and other
documents supporting the prosecutor's
certification. Although the extent of the
judge's personal examination depends on the
circumstances of each case, to be sure,
he cannot just rely on the bare certification
alone but must go beyond it. This is because
the warrant of arrest issues not on the
strength of the certification standing alone
but because of the records which sustain it.
[34] He should even call for the complainant
and the witnesses to answer the court's
probing questions when the circumstances
warrant.[35]

(a) x x x.
(b) Where filed directly with the Municipal
Trial Court. If the complaint or information is
filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court,
the procedure provided for in Section 3(a) of

An arrest without a probable cause is an

unreasonable seizure of a person, and
violates the privacy of persons which ought
not to be intruded by the State.[36]

Measured against the constitutional mandate

and established rulings, there was here
a clear abdication of the judicial function and
a clear indication that the judge blindly
followed the certification of a city prosecutor
as to the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest with respect
to all of the petitioners. The careless
inclusion of Mr. Ben Lim, Jr., in the warrant of
arrest gives flesh to the bone of contention
of petitioners that the instant case is a
matter
of
persecution
rather
than
prosecution.[37] On this ground, this Court
may enjoin the criminal cases against
petitioners. As a general rule, criminal
prosecutions cannot be enjoined. However,
there are recognized exceptions which, as
summarized in Brocka v. Enrile,[38] are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused;[39]

The falsity of the document and the

defendants knowledge of its falsity are
essential elements of the offense. The Office
of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations
against the petitioners on the basis of the
Complaint-Affidavit of respondent Atty. Pea,
attached to which were the documents
contained in the Motion to Dismiss filed by
the petitioners in Civil Case No. 754. Also
included as attachments to the complaint
were the Answers, Pre-Trial Brief, the alleged
falsified documents, copy of the regular
meetings of ISCI during the election of the
Board of Directors and the list of ISCI
Stockholders.[50] Based on these documents
and the complaint-affidavit of Atty. Pea, the
City Prosecutor concluded that probable
cause for the prosecution of the charges
existed. On the strength of the same
documents, the trial court issued the
warrants of arrest.

b. When necessary for the orderly

administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions;[40]

This Court, however, cannot find these

documents
sufficient
to
support
the
existence of probable cause.

c. When there is a prejudicial question which

is sub judice;[41]

Probable cause is such set of facts and

circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that the
offense charged in the Information or any
offense included therein has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested. In
determining probable cause, the average
man weighs the facts and circumstances
without restoring to the calibrations of the
rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He relies on common
sense. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed
and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than
suspicion; it requires less than evidence that
would justify conviction.[51]

d. When the acts of the officer are without or

in excess of authority;[42]
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid
law, ordinance or regulation;[43]
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
[44]
g. Where the court had no jurisdiction over
the offense;[45]
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather
than prosecution;[46]
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance;[47] and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash
on that ground has been denied.[48]
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT:
Petitioners were charged with violation of
par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
or Introduction of Falsified Document in a
judicial proceeding. The elements of the
offense are as follows:
1.
That the offender knew that a
document was falsified by another person.
2.
That the false document is
embraced in Article 171 or in any
subdivisions Nos. 1 or 2 of Article 172.
3.
That
he
introduced
said
document in evidence in any judicial
proceeding.[49]

As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,[52] the

task of the presiding judge when the
Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or nonexistence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused.
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to
first determine probable cause for the arrest
of the accused is to insulate from the very
start those falsely charged with crimes from
the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a
public trial.[53]
We do not see how it can be concluded that
the documents mentioned by respondent in
his complaint-affidavit were falsified. In his
complaint, Atty. Pea stated that Herman
Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn Ong, the
alleged signatories of the questioned letters,
did not actually affix their signatures therein;
and that they were not actually officers or
stockholders of ISCI.[54] He further claimed

that Enrique Montillas signature appearing in

another
memorandum
addressed
to
respondent was forged.[55] These averments
are mere assertions which are insufficient to
warrant the filing of the complaint or worse
the issuance of warrants of arrest. These
averments
cannot
be
considered
as
proceeding from the personal knowledge of
herein respondent who failed to, basically,
allege that he was present at the time of the
execution of the documents. Neither was
there any mention in the complaint-affidavit
that herein respondent was familiar with the
signatures of the mentioned signatories to be
able to conclude that they were forged. What
Atty. Pea actually stated were but sweeping
assertions that the signatories are mere
dummies of ISCI and that they are not in fact
officers, stockholders or representatives of
the corporation. Again, there is no indication
that the assertion was based on the personal
knowledge of the affiant.
The reason for the requirement that
affidavits must be based on personal
knowledge is to guard against hearsay
evidence. A witness, therefore, may not
testify as what he merely learned from
others either because he was told or read or
heard
the
same. Such
testimony
is
considered hearsay and may not be received
as proof of the truth of what he has learned.
[56] Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony
or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as
well as oral statements.[57]
The requirement of personal knowledge
should have been strictly applied considering
that herein petitioners were not given the
opportunity to rebut the complainants
allegation through counter-affidavits.
Quite noticeable is the fact that in the letter
dated 19 December 1994 of Herman Ponce
and Julie Abad, neither of the two made the
representation that they were the president
or secretary of ISCI. It was only Atty. Pea who
asserted
that
the
two
made
such
representation. He alleged that Marilyn Ong
was never a stockholder of ISCI but he did
not present the stock and transfer book of
ISCI. And, there was neither allegation nor
proof that Marilyn Ong was not connected to
ISCI in any other way. Moreover, even if
Marilyn Ong was not a stockholder of ISCI,
such would not prove that the documents
she signed were falsified.

public prosecutors function without any

showing of grave abuse of discretion or
manifest
error
in
his
findings.
[58] Considering,
however,
that
the
prosecution and the court a quo committed
manifest errors in their findings of probable
cause, this Court therefore annuls their
findings.
Our
pronouncement
in Jimenez
Jimenez[59] as reiterated in Baltazar
People is apropos:

It is x x x imperative upon the fiscal or the

judge as the case may be, to relieve the
accused from the pain of going through a
trial once it is ascertained that the evidence
is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or
that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the
accused. Although there is no general
formula or fixed rule for the determination of
probable cause since the same must be
decided in the light of the conditions
obtaining in given situations and its
existence depends to a large degree upon
the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination, such a finding
should not disregard the facts before the
judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of
reasons. The judge or fiscal, therefore,
should not go on with the prosecution in the
hope that some credible evidence might
later turn up during trial for this would be a
flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold. It bears
repeating that the judiciary lives up to its
mission by visualizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It
should continue to be so.
On the foregoing discussion, we find that the
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
findings of the prosecutor as well as the
court a quo as to the existence of probable
cause.The criminal complaint against the
petitioners should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 20 June 2000, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 49666, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated 2 August
2000
is
hereby
made
permanent. Accordingly, the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Negros Occidental, Bago City,
is
hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal
Case Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685 and 6686.
SO ORDERED.

The Court may not be compelled to pass

upon the correctness of the exercise of the

v.
v.

WHITE VS. BUGTAS

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a verified letter-complaint dated August 10, 2001,
filed by Atty. Juliana Adalim-White against Judge Arnulfo O.
Bugtas, Presiding Judge, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, for ignorance of the law
relative to Criminal Case No. 10772 entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Manuel Bagaporo, Jr.
The full text of the letter-complaint is as follows:
I bring to the attention of your
Honors the act of Honorable Judge Arnulfo
O. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, Branches I and
II, Regional Trial Court, Borongan, Eastern
Samar for ordering the Release on
Recognizance [of] Mr. Manuel Bagaporo,
Jr., a convict of frustrated murder before
terminating service of the minimum penalty,
and pending the approval of the prisoners
application for parole.
Thank you.[1]
In an Indorsement dated August 28, 2001, the Office
of the Court Administrator directed respondent to file his
comment to the complaint.[2]
On October 29, 2001, respondent filed his Comment
admitting that he issued an order allowing Manuel Bagaporo,
Jr. (Bagaporo) to be released upon recognizance of the
Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, Alexandrino R.
Apelado, Sr. Respondent avers that: Bagaporo was convicted
by the trial court of the crime of frustrated murder and meted
the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four years and two
months to eight years and one day; Bagaporo served sentence;
subsequently, he filed an application for release on
recognizance; in support of his application, Provincial Jail
Warden Apelado issued a certification to the effect that
Bagaporo has been confined at the Provincial Jail since
February 9, 1996 and is already entitled to parole; another
certification was issued by Supervising Probation and Parole
Officer Eulalia R. Columbretis showing that Bagaporo had
applied for parole in line with the Department of
Justices Maagang Paglaya Program. Respondent contends
that on the basis of these certifications and on the rule that bail
being discretionary upon conviction by the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court granted Bagaporos application for
bail upon recognizance of Apelado.[3]
In our Resolution of November 25, 2002, we directed
the parties to manifest to this Court if they are willing to
submit this case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
filed.[4]
In his Manifestation dated January 27, 2003,
respondent requested that a formal investigation be conducted
to enable him to face his accuser.[5] On the other hand, despite
due notice, complainant failed to comply with the November
25, 2002 Resolution of this Court.

On November 16, 2004, respondent filed a Motion to

Dismiss on the ground of lack of evidence and that
complainant is not interested in prosecuting her complaint.[6]
In our Resolution of February 7, 2005, we referred
the instant case to Justice Lucas P. Bersamin of the Court of
Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation
on grounds that desistance of a complainant is not a basis for
dismissing an administrative case and because there is a need
to establish certain facts surrounding the complained acts
allegedly committed by respondent.[7] Thereafter, the
Investigating Justice set the case for hearing on various dates.
On April 15, 2005, respondent again filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that complainant failed to appear
during the hearings set by the
Investigating Justice on March 30 and 31, 2005.[8]
On April 29, 2005, the Investigating Justice issued a
Resolution denying respondents Motion to Dismiss and
resetting the hearing for the last time on May 31, 2005, with
warning that the case shall be deemed submitted for study,
report and recommendation should the parties fail to appear at
the date set for hearing.[9]
In a Manifestation dated May 13, 2005, complainant
indicated her desire to submit the case for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings and annexes filed.[10] On the other hand,
respondent sent a telegraphic communication dated May 31,
2005 manifesting that the CA may consider the case submitted
for resolution; and praying that he be allowed to submit a
memorandum.[11] The
Investigating
Justice
granted
respondents motion.[12] On June 30, 2005, respondent filed his
Memorandum through registered mail.[13]
On August 18, 2005, the Investigating Justice
submitted his Report and Recommendation to this Court with
the following findings:
The undersigned Investigating
Justice concludes that Judge Bugtas was
guilty
of gross
ignorance
of
the
law and gross
neglect
of
duty for
committing the following acts and omissions
in relation to the case of convict Bagaporo,
Jr., to wit:
1. Due to the penalty imposed on
him, Bagaporo, Jr. should have been
committed to the National Penitentiary upon
his conviction (whether or not he appealed).
The failure of Judge Bugtas, if he was the
trial judge, to issue forthwith the mittimus to
commit Bagaporo, Jr. as a national prisoner
under Presidential Decree No. 29 to the New
Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City was a
serious disobedience to Circular No. 4-93-A
dated April 20, 1992.
2. In acting on Bagaporo, Jr.s
application for release, Judge Bugtas
supposedly relied on the recognizance of
Provincial Jail Warden Apelado, Sr. and on
the other documents submitted in support of

the convicts application for release on

recognizance. Judge Bugtas contends that
his act did not constitute a violation since
bail was discretionary upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.
The undersigned Investigating Justice does not
accept Judge Bugtas good faith because Judge Bugtas was
apparently lacking in sincerity. He was not unaware that
Bagaporo, Jr. was serving final sentence for which his
indeterminate penalty had a minimum of 4 years and 2
months. When Judge Bugtas ordered the release,
Bagaporo, Jr. had not yet served even the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence, a fact that Judge Bugtas should
have known through a simple process of computation.
Even if he was informed of Bagaporo, Jr.s pending
application for parole, Judge Bugtas had no legal basis to
anticipate the approval of the application and to cause the
convicts premature release. He was thus fully aware that
Bagaporo, Jr. could not be released even upon the
recognizance of the Provincial Jail Warden.
3. Judge Bugtas act of prematurely releasing the
convict in effect altered the final sentence of Bagaporo,
Jr. The undersigned Investigating Justice submits that
Judge Bugtas thereby violated Art. 86, Revised Penal
Code which provides:
Art. 86. Reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision
mayor, prision correcional and arresto mayor. The
penalties
of reclusion
perpetua, reclusion
temporal, prision
mayor,prision
correccional and arresto mayor shall be executed and
served in the places and penal establishments provided
by the Administrative Code in force or which may be
provided by law in the future.
Judge Bugtas could give no acceptable
explanation for his act. A convicts release from prison
before he serves the full term of his sentence is due
either to good conduct allowances or to the approval of
his application for parole. The former is granted to him
by the Director of Prisons (now Director of the Bureau
of Corrections), pursuant to Art. 99, Revised Penal
Code; the latter, by the Board of Pardons and Parole
that was created and constituted pursuant to Act No.
4103, as amended. Obviously, the grant is not a judicial
prerogative.
Consequently, Judge Bugtas arrogated unto
himself authority that pertained under the law to an
administrative official or agency.
4. Judge Bugtas contends that his order of
release on recognizance was correct considering that
the convict had already been in custody for a period
equal to the minimum imprisonment meted out by the
trial court. To support his contention, he cites Sec. 16,
Rule 114, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail
or recognizance. No bail shall be required when the law
or these Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period
equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged, he
shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If
the maximum penalty to which the accused may be
sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty
(30) days of preventive imprisonment.

A person in custody for a period equal to or

more than the minimum of the principal penalty
prescribed for the offense charged, without
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or
any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a
reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the
discretion of the court.
The undersigned Investigating
Justice opines that Judge Bugtas contention
compounds his already dire situation. He
seems to believe that the quoted rule applies
to a convict like Bagaporo, Jr. He has no
realization at all (or, if he has, he conceals it)
that the rule applies only to an accused
undergoing preventive imprisonment during
trial or on appeal; and that the rule has
absolutely no application to one already
serving final sentence. Such ignorance,
whether pretended or not, is terrifying to see
in a judicial officer like Judge Bugtas, a
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court.
5. Judge Bugtas labors under a
mistaken notion about the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, that once the convict has
been in custody for the duration of the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence, he
may be released even if his application for
parole is still pending. He thereby ignores
that the benefit under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is accorded to the convict
only after the Board of Pardon and Parole
has determined his application favorably
after
considering
all
the
cogent
circumstances.
It is crucial that Judge Bugtas be
reminded that the convict must remain in
prison pending the consideration of the
convicts application for parole by the Board
of Pardons and Parole, for there is no
assurance of the grant of his application.
6. In any case, Judge Bugtas should
have outrightly denied the application of the
convict for release on recognizance not only
because the convict had yet to complete
even the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence but also because the convict must
serve his sentence even beyond the
minimum unless in the meantime the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections
granted him the allowances for good
conduct that offset the unserved portion
pursuant to Art. 97 and Art. 99, Revised
Penal Code; or unless the Board of Pardons
and Parole approved the convicts application
for parole.[14]
Accordingly, the Investigating Justice recommended that
respondent be fined in the amount of P25,000.00.[15]
We agree with the Investigating Justice that
respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law but not as to
the recommended penalty.
Respondent is being charged with ignorance of the
law for having ordered the release of Bagaporo pending
approval of the latters application for parole and before his
completion of the minimum period of the sentence imposed
upon him.
Respondent contends that his order allowing the
release on recognizance of Bagaporo is in consonance with the

provisions of Section 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court

which provides as follows:

the penalty and the offense are within the purview of the
Probation Law.

Sec. 16. Bail when not required; reduced bail or

recognizance. No bail shall be required when the law or
these Rules so provide.

In the instant case, there is no showing that Bagaporo

applied for probation. In fact at the time of his application for
release on recognizance, he was already serving sentence.
When he was about to complete service of the minimum of his
sentence, he filed an application for parole. However, there is
no evidence to show that the Board of Pardons and Parole
approved his application. We agree with the Investigating
Justice in holding that a convicts release from prison before he
serves the full term of his sentence is either due to good
conduct allowances, as provided under Act No. 1533[20] and
Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, or through the approval
of the convicts application for parole. A good conduct
allowance under Act No. 1533 and Article 97 of the Revised
Penal Code may be granted by the Director of Prisons (now
Director of the Bureau of Corrections), while the approval of
an application for parole is sanctioned by the Board of
Pardons and Parole. In addition, a convict may be released
from prison in cases where he is granted pardon by the
President pursuant to the latters pardoning power under
Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution. [21] In the present
case, aside from the fact that there is no evidence to prove that
Bagaporos application for parole was approved by the Board
of Pardons and Parole, there is neither any showing that he
was extended good conduct allowances by the Director of
Prisons, nor was he granted pardon by the President. Hence,
there is no basis for respondent in allowing Bagaporo to be
released on recognizance.

When a person has been in custody for a period

equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced, he shall be released immediately, without
prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the
proceedings on appeal. In case the maximum penalty to
which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall
be released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more
than the minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for
the offense charged, without application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his
own recognizance, at the discretion of the court.[16]
Based on the above-quoted Rule, respondent argues that since
Bagaporo had already been in prison for a period which is
equal to the minimum of his sentence, his release on
recognizance is in order. Respondent also contends that he
simply exercised his discretion in allowing Bagaporo to be
released on bail on the strength of the provisions of the first
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which
provides that upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.[17]
We are not persuaded.
At the outset, it must be noted that Bagaporo was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
four years and two months to eight years and one day. It is not
disputed that he began to serve sentence on February 9, 1996.
Counting four years and two months from said date the
minimum period of Bagaporos sentence should have been
completed on April 9, 2000. Hence, we agree with the
observation of the Investigating Justice that it is wrong for
respondent to claim that Bagaporo had already served the
minimum of his sentence at the time that he was granted bail
on recognizance, that is, on February 16, 2000.[18]
Furthermore, it is patently erroneous for respondent
to release a convict on recognizance.
Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain
and clear in prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction by
final judgment and after the convict has started to serve
sentence. It provides:
SEC. 24. No bail after final judgment;
exception. An accused shall not be allowed bail after the
judgment has become final, unless he has applied for
probation before commencing to serve sentence, the
penalty and the offense being within the purview of the
Probation Law. In case the accused has applied for
probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under
his bail, but if no bail was filed or the accused is
incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release
on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member
of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed after
the accused has commenced to serve sentence.[19]
The only exception to the above-cited provision of
the Rules of Court is when the convict has applied for
probation before he commences to serve sentence, provided

Moreover, respondent should know that the

provisions of Sections 5 and 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court apply only to an accused undergoing preventive
imprisonment during trial or on appeal. They do not apply to a
person convicted by final judgment and already serving
sentence.
We have held time and again that a judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules.[22] It is imperative that he be
conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of wellsettled authoritative doctrines.[23] He should strive for
excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end
that he be the personification of justice and the rule of law.
[24]
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his
office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be
gross ignorance of the law.[25] In the present case, we find
respondents ignorance or utter disregard of the import of the
provisions of Sections 5, 16 and 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court as tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and
procedure.
As to the imposable penalty, Section 8(9), Rule 140
of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies gross ignorance
of the law or procedure as a serious charge. Under Section
11(A) of the same Rule, the imposable penalty, in case the
respondent is found culpable of a serious charge, ranges from
a fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not more
than P40,000.00 to dismissal from the service.
This is not the first time that respondent judge was
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
In Docena-Caspe
vs.
Bugtas,[26] respondent
was
finedP20,000.00 for having granted bail to an accused in a
murder case without conducting hearing for the purpose of
determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong. He was
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely. Hence, we deem it proper to impose
the penalty of P40,000.00.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas
is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is ordered to
pay a FINE in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos

(P40,000.00) and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of

the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

complainants bail, but the personnel said that there was no

bail indicated. The personnel was said to be reluctant in
giving any information and asked, "Nadampot ninyo na ba,
nadampot nyo na ba siya."
5

ESTHER
P.
MAGLEO, Complainant,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN
and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT ATTY. ADONIS
LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, PASIG CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a sworn ComplaintAffidavit, dated July 12, 2011, filed by Esther P. Magleo
(complainant) charging respondents Judge Rowena De
Juan-Quinagoran (respondent judge) and Atty. Adonis A.
Laure, Clerk of Court V (respondent CoC), both of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 166, Pasig City (RTC), with
Gross Misconduct, Gross Partiality, Acts Unbecoming a
Member of the Judiciciary, Violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, and Conduct Unbecoming a Court Personnel
relative to Criminal Case No. 137860-PSG, entitled People
of the Philippines v. Esther Magleo y Pampolina, for Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code.
1

Complainant is the accused in the aforementioned criminal

case. She averred that in an Order, dated May 13, 2010,
Judge Nicanor Manalo, Jr. (Judge Manalo)granted her
demurrer to evidence and acquitted her of the charge of
estafa. Thereafter, the prosecutor filed a motion to inhibit
Judge Manalo from the case which was later re-raffled to
Branch 166, RTC, Pasig City, presided over by respondent
judge.
Complainant avers that, instead of motu proprio dismissing
the case on ground of double jeopardy, respondent judge
through her Order, dated November 4, 2010, overturned the
order of acquittal and set the case for reception of defense
evidence on February 23, 2011. Complainant filed a motion
for reconsideration, but it was denied by respondent judge
in her February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order.
2

On February 11, 2011, complainant filed a petition for

certiorari (With Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order)
before the Court of Appeals (CA)questioning the propriety
of the Omnibus Order. Complainant asserts that the
November 4, 2010 and February2, 2011 orders of
respondent judge were indicative of her gross partiality and
lack of knowledge of the existing laws and jurisprudence,
violating complainants right against double jeopardy.
3

She further stated that she did not receive a notice of

hearing for June 8, 2011. Despite such omission,
respondent judge still issued a warrant of arrest on June 9,
2011. She was surprised when agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) forcibly arrested her on June
15, 2011. She added that while on her way to the NBI
office, a lady agent called the personnel of Branch 166,
RTC, Pasig City, to inquire on the amount of the
4

According to complainant, she examined the order of arrest

and it appeared that the amount of bail recommended was
erased to bar her from posting the bond for her temporary
liberty. She claimed that on the same day, she instructed
her bondsman to proceed to Branch 166 to inquire about
the proper amount of bail. Respondent CoC and the staff,
however, treated the bondsman with hostility, annoyance
and indifference.
6

The next day, on June 16, 2011, complainants son and her
lawyer talked to respondent judge and the latter agreed to
fix the amount of bail at P40,000.00. Respondent judge,
however, initially refused to sign the order and advised
them to file a motion to lift the warrant of arrest.
Complainant averred that when her son inquired why the
same was not signed, the court secretary arrogantly said,
"Huwag mo na ako tanungin, yun ang order ni Judge
makikipagtalo ka pa e sumunod ka na lang, wala ka
namang magagawa." Thereafter, upon filing of an ex-parte
Motion to Lift Warrant of Arrest, respondent judge granted
the same and complainant was released from NBI custody
around 5:30 oclock in the afternoon of the same day. To
aggravate her ordeal, police officers proceeded to
complainants house on June 27, 2011 to enforce anew the
warrantof arrest, but her counsel sent an e-mail to the
arresting officer, furnishing him a copy of the order lifting the
order of arrest.
7

Complainant avers that these acts show how cruel,ignorant

and unorganized respondent judge is in running her office.
It would also show that respondent clerk of court and the
court staff exhibited hostility, partiality and wanton disregard
of respect.
In their Joint Comment, dated August 10, 2011, the
respondents stated that when the case was re-raffled to
Branch 166, RTC, Pasig City, in view of the inhibition of
Judge Manalo, there was a pending motion for
reconsideration of the May 13, 2010 Order granting
complainants Demurrer to Evidence. In her February 2,
2011 Omnibus Order, respondent judge emphasized the
reasons for overturning the order granting the demurrer to
evidence. In its pertinent parts, the Omnibus Order reads:
9

Clearly, when the accused filed the demurrer to evidence,

the prosecution has not rested its case yet. Thus, the
granting of the demurrer to evidence is not proper
considering that it was filed prematurely.
The reason why the defense is not allowed to file a
demurrer to evidence before the prosecution rests its case
is best articulated in the case of Valencia vs.
Sandiganbayan. The Supreme Court discussed that:
[a] demurrer to evidence tests the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence. As such, a
demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same
must be filed after the prosecution rests its case. But before
an evidence may be admitted, the rules require that the
same be formally offered, otherwise, it cannot be
considered by the court. A prior formal offer of evidence
concludes the case for the prosecution and determines the
timeliness of the filing of a demurrer to evidence.

As held in Aquino v. Sison [G.R. No. 86025, November 28,

1989, 179 SCRA 648, 651,-652], the motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence filed by the accused after the
conclusion of the cross examination of the witness for the
prosecution, is premature because the latter is still in the
process of presenting evidence. The chemistry report relied
upon by the court in granting the motion to dismiss was
disregarded because it was not properly identified or
formally offered as evidence. Verily, until such time that the
prosecution closed its evidence, the defense cannot be
considered to have seasonably filed a demurrer to evidence
or a motion for leave to file the same.
Thus, the filing of the demurrer to evidence before the
prosecution could rest its case and the subsequent granting
thereof effectively denied the prosecutions right to due
process. [Emphases supplied]

2011, the OCA received complainants Comment on the

Joint Rejoinder withthe attached affidavit of Ronald P.
Magleo, her son, narrating the 15th and 16th June 2011
incidents. On September 23, 2011, the OCA received the
Joint Reply to the Comment (on the Joint Rejoinder filed
by the respondents). Finally, on October 4, 2011,
complainants Comment on Respondent Judge Joint
Rejoinder was filed with the OCA.
22

23

24

The OCA then recommended that the administrative case

be referred to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals,
who shall cause the same to be raffled among the Justices
of the said Court, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
25

The Court's Ruling

10

The complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the Court

of Appeals (CA) questioning the November 4,2010 and
February 2, 2011 Orders, but it was dismissed by said
appellate court on August 15, 2011 for lack of merit.
11

The respondents further stated that contrary to the

allegations of complainant, the latter and her counsel were
duly notified of the hearing on June 8, 2011, as evidenced
by: (1) the February 23, 2011 Constancia with return
card showing that the notice was duly received by
complainant and her counsel; (2) the court calendar for
June 8, 2011; and (3) the certification issued by the post
office.
12

13

14

15

The respondents also averred that complainant failed to

identify the court personnel who allegedly said "Nadampot
ninyo na ba, nadampot nyo na ba siya." Moreover, they
claimed that there was nothing wrong even if the court
personnel indeed asked the same. With respect to the
allegation that the court personnel treated the bondsman
with hostility, they claimed that no bondsman went to their
branch that day. Even assuming that the bondsman indeed
went to their branch, the court personnel were justified in
not divulging any information due to the confidentiality of
the court records.
16

17

The respondents likewise stressed that the order of arrest

did not state a bond for complainants temporary liberty
because she jumped bail by failing to appear in court for the
June 8, 2011 hearing. Thus, the original bail bond in the
amount of P40,000.00 was forfeited and an order of arrest
was issued.
18

Respondent judge explained that she did not immediately

sign the draft order granting bail because she could not
motu proprio lift the warrant of arrest as there was no
motion filed by the complainants lawyer. When
complainants lawyer, however, filed the proper motion to lift
the order of arrest, she promptly acted on the motion and
complainant was released immediately from NBI custody.
She alsostated that it was already beyond the control of the
court if the PNP officers attempted to serve the warrant of
arrest despite the order lifting the same.
19

In her 31 August 2011 Reply, complainant reiterates the

allegations she made in her complaint, claiming she did not
receive any copy of the notice of the hearing for 08 June
2011.
In
their
07
September
2011
Joint
Rejoinder, respondents counters that complainant was duly
informed of the 08 June 2011 hearing. On September 16,
20

21

The issue in this case is whether the respondents

committed transgressions in the performance of their duties
warranting the imposition of disciplinary penalties.
The Court rules in the negative.
At the outset, this Court finds that there is no need to refer
the administrative case to the CA as the facts and
arguments stated in the pleadings are sufficient for
properadjudication of this case. Claim of Gross Partiality for
reversing an Order Granting the Demurrer to Evidence
Complainant asserts that respondent judge committed
gross ignorance of the law and evident partiality when she
overturned the order granting the demurrer to evidence
because it would constitute as a violation to her
constitutional right against double jeopardy. Complainant
argues that a dismissal due to such order is considered as
acquittal which bars a subsequent opening of the criminal
case.
This Court is convinced that respondent judge acted in
accordance with the law and jurisprudence. It was the
February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order which elucidated the
clear legal basis why respondent judge continued the
criminal casedespite the earlier order granting the demurrer
to evidence. Generally, if the trial court finds that the
prosecution evidence is not sufficient and grants the
accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an
adjudication on the merits of the casewhich is tantamount to
an acquittal and may no longer be appealed.
26

27

The current scenario, however, is an exception to the

general rule. The demurrer to evidence was premature
because it was filed before the prosecution rested its case.
The RTC had not yet ruled on the admissibility of the formal
offer of evidence of the prosecution when complainant filed
her demurrer to evidence. Hence, respondent judge had
legal basis to overturn the order granting the demurrer to
evidence as there was no proper acquittal. The complainant
elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certioraribut
it sustained her ruling. The CA decision reads:
28

29

Indubitably, an order granting an accuseds demurrer to

evidence is a resolution of the caseon the merits, and it
amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution
of the accused after an acquittal would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this
general rule, however, the Court has previously made some
exceptions.
30

People v. Tan eruditely instructs that double jeopardy will

not attach when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such
as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a sham. In addition,
in People v. Bocar, this Court rule that there is no double
jeopardy when the prosecution was not allowed to complete
its presentation of evidence by the trial court.
31

provisional liberty could be taken away if she would violate

any of the undertakings stated therein. One of the
conditions for bail is that the accused shall appear before
the proper court whenever required by the court or the
Rules of Court.
35

32

As a consequence of failing to attend the trial when so

required, a bench warrant was issued against
complainant. A bench warrant is defined as a writ issued
directly by a judge toa law-enforcement officer, especially
for the arrest of a person who has beenheld in contempt,
has disobeyed a subpoena, or has to appearfor a hearing
or trial. The provision on bench warrant is expressed under
Section 9, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which states that
"[w]hen a respondent released on bail fails to appear on the
day fixed for the hearing, the court may issue another order
of arrest or may order the bond for his appearance to be
forfeited and confiscated, or both." (Underscoring supplied)
1wphi1

The circumstances obtaining in this controversy placed it

within the realm of the exception.
The records demonstrate that the prosecution, with
respondent Oilink International Corporation as private
complainant, had not yet rested its case when the Demurrer
to Evidence was filed and eventually granted by the RTC
Branch 161.

36

xxxx
The RTC Branch 161 should have ruled on the
prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence before acting on
petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. Having failed to do so,
there is nary a doubt that no double jeopardy attached.
Petitioners blind insistence that she is made to face trial
after having been acquitted carries no conviction.
33

Though the CA decision has not reached finality, it only

goes to show that the respondent judge acted in good faith
as she merely followed precedents.
Claim of Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for not
serving the Notice of Hearing
In the February 2, 2011 Omnibus Order of respondent
judge, it was stated that the next scheduledhearing was on
February 23, 2011. On the said date, however, respondent
judge was on leave of absence due to an illness. The
Constancia, dated February 23, 2011, stated that the trial
was to resume on June 8, 2011.
34

Complainant asserts that she did not receive the February

23, 2011 Constancia and, for said reason, she was not able
to attend the June 8, 2011 hearing. The respondents,
however, were able to submit numerous documentary
proofs stating that complainant indeed received the notice
of hearing, to wit: (1) Certified true copy of the subject
Constancia, dated February 23, 2011; together with the two
return cards pasted on the back thereof; (3) the certified
true copy of the court calendar for June 8, 2011; and (4) the
Post Office Certification that complainant and her counsel
were notified about the said hearing date.
Between the bare allegations of complainant that she did
not receive the Constancia and the substantiated claim of
the respondents that the notices were served, the Court
tends tobelieve the latter.Thus, complainant has no
acceptable excuse to be absent on the June 8, 2011
hearing. Her failure to attend now seems to be a deliberate
attempt to ignore such important trial date and the
consequences of her absence are attributable to her alone.
Claim of Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for
issuing a Bench Warrant
It must be noted that complainant was only granted
provisional liberty when she applied for bail. Such

Jurisprudence dictates that the primary requisite before a

bench warrant shall be issued is that the absent-party was
duly informed of the hearing date but unjustifiably failed to
attend so. As stated above, complainant was undeniably
notified of the June 8, 2011 hearing but she failed to attend.
37

Complainant also averred that respondent judge committed

erroneous conduct (1) when she issued a bench warrant
without specifically stating the amount of bail bond and (2)
for not motu proprio lifting the bail bond when complainants
son and lawyer showed their willingness to apply for bail.
According to respondent judge, the June 9, 2011 order of
arrest failed to state a bail bond because complainant
jumped bail by failing to appear in court for hearing on June
8, 2011. The Court finds this acceptable because when an
accused fails toappear in person as required, the bond shall
be declared forfeited. Also, it is not required by the Rules
of Court that the amount of new bail bond be stated in the
bench warrant. The Court cannot chastise respondent
judge for an act notrequired by the Rules. Absent any
abuse of discretion, it is sufficient that the bail bond was
fixed after complainant was arrested. Such would bethe
proper time for the judge to consider whether to increase,
decrease or retain the amount of bail based on the
guidelines.
38

39

Moreover, there is nothing in the Rules which mandates a

judge to motu proprio lift the bench warrant once the
accused expresses his intent to be released on bail.
Without any provision to the contrary, Section 1, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court governs such that a motion must be
filed to seek affirmative relief. In the present case,
respondent judge acted within the scope of her authority
when she required complainants son and lawyer to file an
ex parte motion to lift the order of arrest. When the motion
was filed and the prosecutor did not express any objection,
respondent judge deemed it fit to impose the same amount
ofbail at P40,000.00. Respondent judge immediately
entertained complainants son and lawyer when they came
to her branch despite her scheduled hearing and as a
result, complainant was released on that same day.
40

In the absence of a showing that the acts complained of

were done with malice or intention to violate the law or
disregard the Rules of Court or for some corrupt motive,
they would, at best, constitute errors of judgment which do
not amount to serious misconduct.
41

Claim of Performing Acts Unbecoming of a Judge and Court

Personnel due to the court personnels discourtesy
Complainant claims that respondent CoC and some court
personnel were disrespectful in conversing with her
bondsman, her son, and her lawyer. During her arrest, one
of the court personnel said "Nadampot ninyo na ba,
nadampot nyo na ba siya." When the bondsman visited the
branch, he claimed to have been snubbed by the
personnel. Also, complainants son received an arrogant
remark from the court secretary stating "Huwag mo na ako
tanungin, yun ang order ni Judge makikipagtalo ka pa e
sumunod ka na lang, wala ka namang magagawa." On the
other hand, the respondents denied that their court
personnel made those rude remarks, and claimed that even
assuming that those remarks wereindeed made, these were
justified remarks under the circumstances of the situation.
42

While the allegations of complainant were not fully

substantiated, the Court disagrees with the respondents
that disrespectful remarks made by court personnel should
be tolerated and even considered "justified remarks." The
respondents, and all court personnel for that matter, should
be reminded that the image of the Judiciary is mirrored in

the kind of conduct, official or otherwise, which the

personnel within its employ display, from the judge to the
lowliest clerk. Impolite language and improper tone should
be avoided. Professionalism, respect for the rights of
others, good manners and right conduct are expected of all
judicial officers and employees. Thus, all employees are
required to preserve the Judiciary's good name and
standing as a true temple of justice. For such improper
remarks, the respondents and their court personnel are
admonished.
43

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondents Judge

Rowena De Juan-Quinagoran and Branch Clerk of Court
Atty. Adonis Laure is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Respondents and their court personnel, however, are
hereby ADMONISHED to be always courteous in dealing
with litigants and the public in the performance of official
duties.
SO ORDERED.