Vicente D.

Ching, the legitimate son of a Chinese citizen, Tat Ching, and a

Filipino, Prescila Dulay, was born in La Union and has resided in the
Philippines since April 11, 1964.
Ching filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examination and was
allowed subject to the condition that proof of his Philippine citizenship be
submitted. In compliance, he submitted his certification as a certified public
accountant, his certification as a registered voter and a certification of
election as a member of Sangguniang Bayan during the 1992 elections.
On April 5, 1999, Ching passed the Bar Examinations and was scheduled to
take oath on May 5, 1999. The court required Ching to submit further proof
of his citizenship but failed to do, thus, he was not allowed to take his oath.
It was only on July 15, 1999 that Ching filed his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance to comply with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared
by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen.
Ching, being a child of a Chinese and a Filipino mother born under the 1935
Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship. The proper
period of election should be construed as made within a reasonable time
after attaining the age of majority. Such period is not indefinite subject to
extension under circumstances when the person concerned has always
considered himself as a Filipino. The Office of the Solicitor General
recommends to allow Ching to take oath and be subject to the relaxation of
the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and
the provisions of C.A. No. 625.
W/N Ching has complied with the citizenship requirement and thus may be
allowed to take his oath as a member of the Bar.
No. Chings petition to take oath is denied on the ground that Ching failed to
validly elect Philippine citizenship. It was only on 1999 that he complied with
the requirements of C.A. No. 625 when he was already 35 years old or over
14 years after he had reached the age of majority. The 14-year lapse of
time is clearly beyond the contemplation of the requirement of election as
upon reaching the age of majority and to exercise the given privilege.
There was no valid reason for Chings delay of election of citizenship.
Moreover, his contention of his residency in the Philippines and other

special circumstances cannot be given merit as the law specially provided

the requirement for the acquisition of the Philippine citizenship by election.
One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate
right to such citizenship and thus, he should avail of the right with fervor,
enthusiasm and promptitude. With this, Ching was not be permitted to take
his oath.

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother
and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years
after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be
resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the
Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese
citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao,
La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the
Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course
at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the
1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September
1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition
that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November
1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of
Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission
showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by

Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released
and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the
successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However,
because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20
April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the
same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to
file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the
"legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the
1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in
strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled
"An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino
Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an
inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon
reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2)
conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship
may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election
must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made
upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of
the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been
construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age
of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of
Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p.
51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27,
1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos.
355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But
in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over
seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the
"reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the
peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends
the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
"reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his
Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance,
both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared
myself as one in my school records and other official
documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant)
reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was
eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and
sworn to by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with
the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of
allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing

fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the
question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a
"reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election
retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that
"(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not
be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the
citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it
remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the
1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order
to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof,
legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship
by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and
shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany
the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time
period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made.
The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon
reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice

on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this

dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this
Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a
"reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase
"reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the
three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and
that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is
the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period
may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the
person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect
Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on
February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16,
1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15,
1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or
over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of
majority. It is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already
thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A.
No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached
the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the
privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay
in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered
voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition
of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching

erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a
refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of
which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic)
legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established
that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14,
1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22
years old), Esteban was already participating in the
elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These
acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances
obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus,
negating its applicability. First, EstebanMallare was born before the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625.
Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not
be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare
to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a
natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is
therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be
necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29
Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12,
1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953;
Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither
could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a
non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which
he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co
vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18 where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a

formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]),
the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and
the participation in election exercises constitute a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage
when he came of age constitutes a positive
act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52:
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.
He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who
cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship
as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare
rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For
those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up,
there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less
binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving
in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting
during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the
person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because
he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this
case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned
twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the
part of the private respondent would not only have been

superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity.

How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However,
even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his
having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is
a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree
with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching
failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years
that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond
the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of
majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All
that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election
cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be
claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect
Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away
from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D.
Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.

away so that they are in no position to submit their

respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in
allowing respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial from
the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December
1986, certifying that respondent was "acting with morality
and has been careful in his actuations in the community."
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized
practice of law filed against respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied
the latter's petition to be allowed to take the oath as member of the
Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either denied or "Noted without
action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after considering his
plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the several
testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness,
reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the
lawyer's oath "with the Court binding him to his assurance that he shall
strictly abide by and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the
Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Ta n
v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking,
complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed separate motions for
reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989. These were acted
upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for ready
reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No.
616, and Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing
respondent to take his oath. They alleged that respondent
had deliberately and maliciously excluded them in his
Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without merit
considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent
had discussed said cases quite lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that
Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and
Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed

Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was

signed only by the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga
del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without
authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter; and
that Atty. Angeles was respondent's own counsel as well as
the lawyer of respondent's parents-in-law in CAR Case No.
347, Ozamiz City. Attached to Complainant's Motion for
Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24 February
1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter
President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the present
Board of Officers with the undersigned as President had not
issued any testimonial attesting to the good moral character
and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989,
respondent states that the IBP testimonial referred to by
Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the former
IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen
O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29
December 1986, and that he himself had not submitted to
the Court any certification from the IBP Zamboanga del
Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to
require the present Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga
del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing
to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral
character as to entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if
not, the reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte is likewise
required to submit a COMMENT on respondent's moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar.

Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from

notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his
Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25 August 1989,
pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with
the respondent, is not aware of any acts committed by him
as would disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might
be relevant to mention, however, that there is Civil Case No.
3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines, Represented by
the Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal,
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank
of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for Cancellation of
Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said
respondent, per complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a
certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon
investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not
susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he
later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The
mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at public
auction and respondent has not redeemed the land until the
present. (Emphasis Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated
2 February 1990, signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its
President Gil L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by
the Office of the Clerk of CourtMunicipal Trial Court in the
City of Dipolog; Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City Prosecutors,
Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of any
crime, nor is there any pending derogatory criminal case
against him. Based on the above findings, the Board does
not find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify
him from admission to the Philippine Bar.

We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP

Certification and to reply to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in
our Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections
of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the
Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August 1989, that there is
a pending case before his Court involving respondent Sabandal, this Court
resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking of respondent
Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of
the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before
his "Sala" as soon as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment,
dated 13 March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609,
vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and
describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and
surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990,
complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed the Court that her relationship
with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had asked forgiveness
for what has been done to her and that she finds no necessity in pursuing
her case against him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no
further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere
repentance and reformation which she believes make him morally fit to
become a member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the
letter stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to the legal
profession and request this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at
a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2
October 1990, which also required a comment on Tan's letter from
complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment,
dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private
personal disposition which raises the question whether
personal forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and
obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and maintain
the importance and finality of the Honorable Supreme
Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .

It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and

discretion of any party to change or amend said final
resolutions which are already res judicata. Viewed in the
light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions, these
cases therefore should not in the least be considered as
anything which is subject and subservient to the changing
moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any
permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming change in
tactics and strategy could not improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M.
Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who
apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having availed of
optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this Court, on 17
December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in
Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et
al" for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was
already considered closed and terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990,
had been reached between the principal parties, approved by the Trial
Court, and conformed to by the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of
Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage
thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan; provided for the surrender of the
certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to
the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of'
Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts of possession
or ownership over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay
defendant Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and
interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against
defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were
NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the same Resolution,
complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to comment on the
same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was
sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del

Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case with his Court and that
he has no cause to object to his admission to the Philippine Bar. This was
"Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August
1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion pending compliance by
the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991 requiring them to
comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by
submitting a Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating that the termination
of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his
repentance with restitution of the rights of complainants he violated," and
that "there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the Bar." This was
"Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to
be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the
oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from the time he took and passed the
1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration of his show of contrition
and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of were the several
testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness.
At that time, we had not received the objections from complainant Tan to
Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the civil
case against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by the Government in 1985 and was
brought about because of respondent's procurement of a certificate of free
patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public domain and its use as
security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was
an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any defense and
was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The
controversy was eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent
surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the government and paying-off
the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further expenses of litigation
incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The
Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval of the

said amicable settlement and prayed that judgment be rendered in

accordance therewith, "as the amicable settlement may amount to a
confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in
1985, at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the
lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was
then submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good
moral character without, however, mentioning the pendency of that civil
case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its
termination, the Court now entertains second thoughts about respondent's
fitness to become a member of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the
Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free
patent title over property which he could not but have known was public
land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his
moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public
service, which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed by the
Republic against him where no determination of his guilt or innocence was
made because the suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor
General had pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a
confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of the
intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a
bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure
of the mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a
finger to redeem the same until the civil case filed against him was
eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and
fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case
for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting
several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor
and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these
were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case
against him and were obviously made without awareness of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case instituted by the Government against
him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of
dishonesty and lack of good moral character.

That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and
Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not submitted any opposition to his motion
to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already expressed their
objections in their earlier comments. That complainant Tan has withdrawn
her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor,
the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of
right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
the law but who are also known to possess good moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always
tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession,
both in academic preparation and legal training as well as in
honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed
lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this
high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is
to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
persons who are known to be honest and to possess good
moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it
has been defined as "including at least common honesty" (Royong v.
Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario,
52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar
Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a
member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is
RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath is hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED.