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FIRST DIVISION

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,


INC.,
Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 164532


Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:

LEON M. MAGTIBAY, JR. and


PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
July 24, 2007
EMPLOYEES UNION (PDIEU),
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:

By this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) seeks the reversal and setting aside
of the decision[1] dated May 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP
No. 78963, affirming the resolution dated September 23, 2002 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 00-03-01945-96. The
affirmed NLRC resolution reversed an earlier decision dated July 29, 1996 of the
Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 011800-96, which dismissed the complaint for
illegal dismissal filed by the herein respondent Leon Magtibay, Jr. against the
petitioner.
The factual antecedents are undisputed:

On February 7, 1995, PDI hired Magtibay, on contractual basis, to assist, for a


period of five months from February 17, 1995, the regular phone operator. Before
the expiration of Magtibays contractual employment, he and PDI agreed to a
fifteen-day contract extension, or from July 17, 1995 up to July 31, 1995, under the
same conditions as the existing contract.
After the expiration of Magtibays contractual employment, as extended, PDI
announced the creation and availability of a new position for a second telephone
operator who would undergo probationary employment. Apparently, it was PDIs
policy to accord regular employees preference for new vacancies in the company.
Thus, Ms. Regina M. Layague, a PDI employee and member of respondent PDI
Employees Union (PDIEU), filed her application for the new position. However,
she later withdrew her application, paving the way for outsiders or non-PDI
employees, like Magtibay in this case, to apply.
After the usual interview for the second telephone operator slot, PDI chose to hire
Magtibay on a probationary basis for a period of six (6) months. The signing of a
written contract of employment followed.
On March 13, 1996, or a week before the end the agreed 6-month probationary
period, PDI officer Benita del Rosario handed Magtibay his termination paper,
grounded on his alleged failure to meet company standards. Aggrieved, Magtibay
immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages before the Labor
Arbiter. PDIEU later joined the fray by filing a supplemental complaint for unfair
labor practice.
Magtibay anchored his case principally on the postulate that he had become a
regular employee by operation of law, considering that he had been employed by
and had worked for PDI for a total period of ten months, i.e., four months more
than the maximum six-month period provided for by law on probationary
employment. He also claimed that he was not apprised at the beginning of his
employment of the performance standards of the company, hence, there was no

basis for his dismissal. Finally, he described his dismissal as tainted with bad faith
and effected without due process.
PDI, for its part, denied all the factual allegations of Magtibay, adding that his
previous contractual employment was validly terminated upon the expiration of the
period stated therein. Pressing the point, PDI alleged that the period covered by the
contractual employment cannot be counted with or tacked to the period for
probation, inasmuch as there is no basis to consider Magtibay a regular employee.
PDI additionally claimed that Magtibay was dismissed for violation of company
rules and policies, such as allowing his lover to enter and linger inside the
telephone operators booth and for failure to meet prescribed company standards
which were allegedly made known to him at the start through an orientation
seminar conducted by the company.
After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter found for PDI and accordingly dismissed
Magtibays complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter premised his holding
on the validity of the previous contractual employment of Magtibay as an
independent contract. He also declared as binding the stipulation in the contract
specifying a fixed period of employment. According to the Labor Arbiter, upon
termination of the period stated therein, the contractual employment was also
effectively terminated, implying that Magtibay was merely on a probationary status
when his services were terminated inasmuch as the reckoning period for probation
should be from September 21, 1995 up to March 31, 1996as expressly provided in
their probationary employment contract. In fine, it was the Labor Arbiters position
that Magtibays previous contractual employment, as later extended by 15 days,
cannot be considered as part of his subsequent probationary employment.
Apart from the foregoing consideration, the Labor Arbiter further ruled that
Magtibays dismissal from his probationary employment was for a valid reason.
Albeit the basis for termination was couched in the abstract, i.e., you did not meet
the standards of the company, there were three specific reasons for Magtibays
termination, to wit: (1) he repeatedly violated the company rule prohibiting

unauthorized persons from entering the telephone operators room; (2) he


intentionally omitted to indicate in his application form his having a dependent
child; and (3) he exhibited lack of sense of responsibility by locking the door of the
telephone operators room on March 10, 1996 without switching the proper lines to
the company guards so that incoming calls may be answered by them.
The Labor Arbiter likewise dismissed allegations of denial of due process and the
commission by PDI of unfair labor practice.
PDIEU and Magtibay appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. As
stated earlier, the NLRC reversed and set aside said decision, effectively ruling that
Magtibay was illegally dismissed. According to the NLRC, Magtibays
probationary employment had ripened into a regular one.
With the NLRCs denial of its motion for reconsideration, PDI went to the CA on a
petition for certiorari. Eventually, the CA denied due course to PDIs petition on the
strength of the following observations:
We agree with the findings of respondent NLRC.
Petitioner PDI failed to prove that such rules and regulations were
included in or form part of the standards that were supposed to be made known to
respondent Magtibay at the time of his engagement as telephone
operator. Particularly, as regards the first stated infraction xxx petitioner PDI,
contrary to its assertion, stated in its position paper, motion for reconsideration
and in this petition that respondent Magtibay failed to abide by the rules and
regulations of the company issued by Ms. Benita del Rosario regarding the entry
of persons in the operators booth when respondent was already working for
petitioner PDI. Further, nowhere can it be found in the list of Basic Responsibility
and Specific Duties and Responsibilities (Annex D of the petition) of respondent
Magtibay that he has to abide by the duties, rules and regulations that he has
allegedly violated. The infractions considered by petitioner PDI as grounds for the
dismissal of respondent Magtibay may at most be classified as just causes for the
termination of the latters employment. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
Finally, the three questionable grounds also relied upon by petitioner PDI
in dismissing respondent Magtibay may be considered as just causes. However,
petitioner PDI did not raise the same as an issue in the present petition because

the procedure it adopted in dismissing respondent Magtibay fell short of the


minimum requirements provided by law.

PDI filed a motion for reconsideration but to no avail.


Hence, this recourse by PDI on the following submissions:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING
THAT A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEES FAILURE TO FOLLOW AN
EMPLOYERS RULES AND REGULATIONS CANNOT BE DEEMED
FAILURE BY SAID EMPLOYEE TO MEET THE STANDARDS OF HIS
EMPLOYER THUS EMASCULATING PETITIONERS RIGHT TO CHOOSE
ITS EMPLOYEES.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN REFUSING
TO FIND THAT PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AS LAID DOWN IN
SECTION 2, RULE XXIII OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES OF THE
LABOR CODE HAD BEEN OBSERVED BY THE PETITIONER.

We GRANT the petition.


This Court, to be sure, has for a reason, consistently tended to be partial in
favor of workers or employees in labor cases whenever social legislations are
involved. However, in its quest to strike a balance between the employers
prerogative to choose his employees and the employees right to security of tenure,
the Court remains guided by the gem of a holding in an old but still applicable case
of Pampanga Bus, Co. v. Pambusco Employees Union, Inc.[2] In it, the Court said:
The right of a laborer to sell his labor to such persons as he may choose is,
in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any
person whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of
right guaranteed by the Constitution. If the employer can compel the employee to
work against the latters will, this is servitude. If the employee can compel the
employer to give him work against the employers will, this is oppression.

Management and labor, or the employer and the employee are more often
not situated on the same level playing field, so to speak. Recognizing this reality,
the State has seen fit to adopt measures envisaged to give those who have less in
life more in law. Article 279 of the Labor Code which gives employees the security
of tenure is one playing field leveling measure:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause
or when authorized by this Title. x x x.

But hand in hand with the restraining effect of Section 279, the same Labor
Code also gives the employer a period within which to determine whether a
particular employee is fit to work for him or not. This employers prerogative is
spelled out in the following provision:
Art. 281. Probationary employment. Probationary employment shall
not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is
covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services
of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated
for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance
with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the
time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary
period shall be considered a regular employee.

In International Catholic Migration Commission v. NLRC, [3] we have


elucidated what probationary employment entails:
x x x. A probationary employee, as understood under Article 282 (now
Article 281) of the Labor Code, is one who is on trial by an employer during
which the employer determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent
employment. A probationary appointment is made to afford the employer an
opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationer while at work, and to ascertain
whether he will become a proper and efficient employee. The word probationary,
as used to describe the period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or
period but not its length.
Being in the nature of a trial period the essence of a probationary period of
employment
fundamentally
lies
in
the
purpose
or
objective

sought to be attained by both the employer and the employee during said period.
The length of time is immaterial in determining the correlative rights of
both in dealing with each other during said period. While the employer, as stated
earlier, observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationer to ascertain
whether he is qualified for permanent employment, the probationer, on the other,
seeks to prove to the employer, that he has the qualifications to meet the
reasonable standards for permanent employment.
It is well settled that the employer has the right or is at liberty to choose
who will be hired and who will be denied employment. In that sense, it is within
the exercise of the right to select his employees that the employer may set or fix a
probationary period within which the latter may test and observe the conduct of
the former before hiring him permanently. x x x.

Within the limited legal six-month probationary period, probationary


employees are still entitled to security of tenure. It is expressly provided in the
afore-quoted Article 281 that a probationary employee may be terminated only on
two grounds: (a) for just cause, or (b) when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to
the employee at the time of his engagement.[4]
PDI invokes the second ground under the premises. In claiming that it had
adequately apprised Magtibay of the reasonable standards against which his
performance will be gauged for purposes of permanent employment, PDI cited the
one-on-one seminar between Magtibay and its Personnel Assistant, Ms. Rachel
Isip-Cuzio. PDI also pointed to Magtibays direct superior, Benita del Rosario, who
diligently briefed him about his responsibilities in PDI. These factual assertions
were never denied nor controverted by Magtibay. Neither did he belie the existence
of a specific rule prohibiting unauthorized persons from entering the telephone
operators booth and that he violated that prohibition. This notwithstanding, the
NLRC and the CA proceeded nonetheless to rule that the records of the case are
bereft of any evidence showing that these rules and regulations form part of the socalled company standards.
We do not agree with the appellate court when it cleared the NLRC of
commission of grave abuse of discretion despite the latters disregard of clear and

convincing evidence that there were reasonable standards made known by PDI to
Magtibay during his probationary employment. It is on record that Magtibay
committed obstinate infractions of company rules and regulations, which in turn
constitute sufficient manifestations of his inadequacy to meet reasonable
employment norms. The suggestion that Magtibay ought to have been made to
understand during his briefing and orientation that he is expected to obey and
comply with company rules and regulations strains credulity for acceptance. The
CAs observation that nowhere can it be found in the list of Basic Responsibility
and Specific Duties and Responsibilities of respondent Magtibay that he has to
abide by the duties, rules and regulations that he has allegedly violated is a strained
rationalization of an unacceptable conduct of an employee. Common industry
practice and ordinary human experience do not support the CAs posture.
All employees, be they regular or probationary, are expected to comply with
company-imposed rules and regulations, else why establish them in the first place.
Probationary employees unwilling to abide by such rules have no right to expect,
much less demand, permanent employment. We, therefore find sufficient factual
and legal basis, duly established by substantial evidence, for PDI to legally
terminate Magtibays probationary employment effective upon the end of the 6month probationary period.
It is undisputed that PDI apprised Magtibay of the ground of his
termination, i.e., he failed to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards made known to him at the time of engagement, only a week
before the expiration of the six-month probationary period. Given this perspective,
does this make his termination unlawful for being violative of his right to due
process of law?
It does not.
Unlike under the first ground for the valid termination of probationary
employment which is for just cause, the second ground does not require notice and
hearing. Due process of law for this second ground consists of making the

reasonable standards expected of the employee during his probationary period


known to him at the time of his probationary employment. By the very nature of a
probationary employment, the employee knows from the very start that he will be
under close observation and his performance of his assigned duties and functions
would be under continuous scrutiny by his superiors. It is in apprising him of the
standards against which his performance shall be continuously assessed where due
process regarding the second ground lies, and not in notice and hearing as in the
case of the first ground.
Even if perhaps he wanted to, Magtibay cannot deny as he has not denied
PDIs assertion that he was duly apprised of the employment standards expected of
him at the time of his probationary employment when he underwent a one-on-one
orientation with PDIs personnel assistant, Ms. Rachel Isip-Cuzio. Neither has he
denied nor rebutted PDIsfurther claim that his direct superior, Benita del Rosario,
briefed him regarding his responsibilities in PDI.
Lest it be overlooked, Magtibay had previously worked for PDI as telephone
operator from February 7, 1995 to July 31, 1995 as a contractual employee. Thus,
the Court entertains no doubt that when PDI took him in on September 21, 1995,
Magtibay was already very much aware of the level of competency and
professionalism PDI wanted out of him for the entire duration of his probationary
employment.
PDI was only exercising its statutory hiring prerogative when it refused to
hire Magtibay on a permanent basis upon the expiration of the six-month
probationary period. This was established during the proceedings before the labor
arbiter and borne out by the records and the pleadings before the Court. When the
NLRC disregarded the substantial evidence establishing the legal termination of
Magtibays probationary employment and rendered judgment grossly and directly
contradicting such clear evidence, the NLRCcommits grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It was, therefore, reversible error on

the part of the appellate court not to annul and set aside such void judgment of the
NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated May 25, 2004 of the CA in CA
G.R. SP No. 78963 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the earlier
resolution dated September 23, 2002 of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. 00-0301945-96 is declared NULL and VOID. The earlier decision dated July 29,
1996 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 011800-96, dismissing respondent
Leon Magtibay, Jr.s complaint for alleged illegal dismissal, is REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Magdangal M.
de Leon, concurring; rollo, pp. 58-69.

[2]

68 Phil. 541 (1939).

[3]

G.R. No. 72222, January 30, 1989, 169 SCRA 606.


Agoy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 112096, January 30, 1996, 252 SCRA 588.

[4]

PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT
By: Atty.Fred | September 4, 2006 in HR and Labor
52 Replies | Related posts at the bottom of article
Who is a probationary employee?
A probationary employee is one who, for a given period of time, is being observed and
evaluated to determine whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. A
probationary appointment affords the employer an opportunity to observe the skill,
competence and attitude of a probationer. The word probationary, as used to describe the
period of employment, implies the purpose of the term or period. While the employer
observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a probationer to ascertain whether he is

qualified for permanent employment, the probationer at the same time, seeks to prove to the
employer that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent
employment. (Escorpizo vs. University of Baguio Faculty Education Workers Union, G.R.
No. 121962 [1999])
What is the governing law?
Probationary employment is governed by Article 281 of the Labor Code, which reads:
ART. 281. Probationary Employment. Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6)
months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has
been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails
to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by
the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to
work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.
What are the grounds for terminating a probationary employee?
Article 281 states that a probationary employee can be legally terminated: (1) for a just
cause; or (2) when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
the reasonable standards made known to him by the employer at the start of the
employment. The limitations in dismissing a probationary employee are:
First, this power must be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the
contract.
Second, the dissatisfaction on the part of the employer must be real and in good faith, not
feigned so as to circumvent the contract or the law;
Third, there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal.
New Case
In the recent case of Dusit Hotel Nikko vs. Gatbonton (G.R. No. 161654, 5 May 2006), the
Supreme Court found that the employer failed to present proof that the employee was
evaluated or that his probationary employment was validly extended.
In this case, the employee was hired for a 3-month probationary period (the period provided
by law is six months, but this may be shortened or, in appropriate cases, extended by
agreement between the employer and the employee). For its defense, the employer claimed

that the 3-month probationary employment was extended for another 2 months because the
employee was not yet ready for regular employment. The employer presented, as proof, a
Personnel Action Form containing the recommendation.
However, the Supreme Court noted that the Personnel Action Form: (1) was prepared on
only in the fourth month, well after the 3-month period provided under the contract of
employment; (2) the recommended action was actually termination of probationary
employment, and not extension of probation period; (3) the action form did not contain the
results of the respondents evaluation; (4) the action form spoke of an attached memo that
allegedly contains the recommendation for extension, but the memo was not presented; (5)
the action form did not bear the respondents signature.
Therefore, in the absence of any evaluation or valid extension, there is no basis to show if
the employee indeed failed to meet the standards of performance previously set.
Effect of validly terminating a probationary employment
At the expiration of the probationary period, the status of the employee becomes regular.
Since the employee in the Dusit Hotel Nikko case was not dismissed for a just or authorized
cause, his dismissal was illegal, and he is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights, and other privileges as well as to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
May a probationary employment be extended?
In Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Leogardo (G.R. No 74246, 26 January 1989), the
Supreme Court stated that the extension of the probationary period was ex gratia, an act of
liberality on the part of the employer affording the employee a second chance to make good
after having initially failed to prove his worth as an employee. Such an act cannot unjustly
be turned against said employers account to compel it to keep on its payroll one who could
not perform according to its work standards. By voluntarily agreeing to an extension of the
probationary period, the employee in effect waived any benefit attaching to the completion
of said period if he still failed to make the grade during the period of extension.

Dismissal of probationary employee


- G.R. No. 177937
see - G.R. No. 177937
"x x x.

The Issue
The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent was
illegally terminated from employment by petitioners.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative.
There is probationary employment when the employee
upon his engagement is made to undergo a trial period during
which the employer determines his fitness to qualify for regular
employment based on reasonable standards made known to him
at the time of engagement.[21]
A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys
security of tenure.[22] However, in cases of probationary
employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination,
an additional ground is provided under Article 281 of the Labor
Code, i.e., the probationary employee may also be terminated for
failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of the engagement. Thus, the services of
an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may
be terminated for any of the following: (1) a just or (2) an
authorized cause; and (3) when he fails to qualify as a regular

employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by


the employer.[23]
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that subject to
the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their
right to be protected against dismissal, except for just and
authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of
notice under Article 283 of the same Code, the employer shall
furnish the worker, whose employment is sought to be
terminated, a written notice containing a statement of the causes
of termination, and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a
representative if he so desires, in accordance with company rules
and regulations pursuant to the guidelines set by the Department
of Labor and Employment.
In the instant case, based on the facts on record,
petitioners failed to accord respondent substantive and
procedural due process. The haphazard manner in the
investigation of the missing cash, which was left to the
determination of the police authorities and the Prosecutors
Office,
left
respondent
with
no
choice
but
to
cry
foul. Administrative investigation was not conducted by petitioner
Supermarket. On the same day that the missing money was
reported by respondent to her immediate superior, the company
already pre-judged her guilt without proper investigation, and
instantly reported her to the police as the suspected thief, which
resulted in her languishing in jail for two weeks.
As correctly pointed out by the NLRC, the due process
requirements under the Labor Code are mandatory and may not
be supplanted by police investigation or court proceedings. The

criminal aspect of the case is considered independent of the


administrative aspect. Thus, employers should not rely solely on
the findings of the Prosecutors Office. They are mandated to
conduct their own separate investigation, and to accord the
employee every opportunity to defend himself. Furthermore,
respondent was not represented by counsel when she was stripsearched inside the company premises or during the police
investigation, and in the preliminary investigation before the
Prosecutors Office.
Respondent was constructively dismissed by petitioner
Supermarket effective October 30, 1997. It was unreasonable for
petitioners to charge her with abandonment for not reporting for
work upon her release in jail. It would be the height of callousness
to expect her to return to work after suffering in jail for two
weeks. Work had been rendered unreasonable, unlikely, and
definitely impossible, considering the treatment that was
accorded respondent by petitioners.
As to respondents monetary claims, Article 279 of the
Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges, to full backwages, inclusive
of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him
up to the time of his actual reinstatement. However, due to the
strained relations of the parties, the payment of separation pay
has been considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement,
when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On the
one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could
be a highly oppressive work environment. On the other, the
payment releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable

obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer


trust.[24]
Thus, as an illegally or constructively dismissed employee,
respondent is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or
separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2)
backwages. These two reliefs are separate and distinct from each
other and are awarded conjunctively.[25]
In this case, since respondent was a probationary employee
at the time she was constructively dismissed by petitioners, she is
entitled to separation pay and backwages. Reinstatement of
respondent is no longer viable considering the circumstances.
However, the backwages that should be awarded to
respondent shall be reckoned from the time of her constructive
dismissal until the date of the termination of her
employment, i.e., from October 30, 1997 to March 14, 1998. The
computation should not cover the entire period from the time her
compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual
reinstatement. This is because respondent was a probationary
employee, and the lapse of her probationary employment without
her appointment as a regular employee of petitioner Supermarket
effectively severed the employer-employee relationship between
the parties.
In all cases involving employees engaged on probationary
basis, the employer shall make known to its employees the
standards under which they will qualify as regular employees at
the time of their engagement. Where no standards are made
known to an employee at the time, he shall be deemed a regular
employee,[26] unless the job is self-descriptive, like maid, cook,
driver, or messenger. However, the constitutional policy of

providing full protection to labor is not intended to oppress or


destroy management.[27] Naturally, petitioner Supermarket cannot
be expected to retain respondent as a regular employee
considering that she lost P20,299.00 while acting as a cashier
during the probationary period. The rules on probationary
employment should not be used to exculpate a probationary
employee who acts in a manner contrary to basic knowledge and
common sense, in regard to which, there is no need to spell out a
policy or standard to be met.[28]

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