G.R. No.

118712 | October 6, 1995 | LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
The nature of the case is the consolidation of two separate petitions for review
filed by Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, assailing the
Court of Appeals decision, which granted private respondents' petition for Certiorar and
Mandamus.
Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, Agricultural Management and
Development Corporation or AMADCOR (private respondents) are landowners whose
landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). Aggrieved by
the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Land bank with respect to the valuation and
payment of compensation for their land, private respondents filed with the Supreme
Court a petition questioning the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6 (1992) and
No. 9 (1990), and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary
administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties,
and the Land bank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked",
"reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them
to withdraw the same. The Supreme Court referred the petition to CA for proper
determination and disposition.
The CA found the following facts undisputed:
Respondents argued that Admin. Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in grave abuse
of discretion amounting excess in jurisdiction because it permits the opening of trust
accounts by the Land bank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank
designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles
are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. DAR and the Land bank
merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names
as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property,
the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds.
On the other hand, petitioner DAR contended that Admin Order No. 9 is a valid
exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. The issuance of
the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Land bank was a substantial compliance with Section
16(e) of RA 6657.Landbank averred that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits is
in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority
where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used.

ISSUES:
1. WON CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR Admin Order No. 9 (1990)
insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in
bonds
2. WON CA erred in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of
right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending
the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.
RULING:
1. NO. Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides:
Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of
the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the land
owner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall
take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is explicit that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds".
Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other
form. There is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded
construction of the term "deposit".
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there
is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only
for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of
administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect.
Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a
legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the
basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
2. YES. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already
deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they
rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived
of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain. It is unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under
Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the
landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the
same; the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he
should be fairly and immediately compensated.

Wherefore, petition is denied for lack of merit. Appealed decision is affirmed.

SONGCO V. NLRC 183 SCRA 610 MEDIALDEA, J:

FACTS:
1. Petitioners were members of the sales force of respondent Zuellig. Zuellig filed
with the DOLE an application seeking clearance to terminate the services of petitioners
allegedly on the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses. Petitioners opposed
said application alleging that the company is not suffering from losses and that they are
being dismissed because of their membership in the union.
2. During the last day of hearing of the case, the petitioners manifested that they are
no longer contesting their dismissal. The parties agreed that the sole issue to be
resolved is the basis of the separation pay due to petitioners.
3. Petitioners, as members of the sales force of Zuellig, received monthly salaries of
at least P400 plus commissions for every sale they made.
4. The Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into by Zuellig and Zuellig
Employees Association of which the petitioners are members, contains: Any employee,
who is separated from employment due to XXX permanent lay-off not due to the fault of
said employee shall receive from the company a retirement gratuity in an amount
equivalent to 1 months salary per year of service. One month of salary as used in this
paragraph shall be deemed equivalent to the salary date of retirement, years of service
shall be deemed equivalent to total service credits, a fraction of at least 6 months being
considered 1 year, including probationary employment.
5. Article 284 of the Labor Code then prevailing likewise provides: The termination
of employment of any employee due to XXX retrenchment to prevent losses XXX shall
entitle the employee affected thereby to separation pay. XXX The separation pay shall
be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least 1 month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher.
6. Petitioners argue that their sales commissions and allowances should be included
in the monthly salary for the purpose of computing their separation pay.
7. Zuellig contends that if it really were the intention of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules to include commissions in the computation of separation pay, it
could have explicitly said so in clear and equivocal terms. In addition, in the definition of
the term wage (Article 97), commission is used only as one of the features or
designations attached to the word remuneration or earnings
8. The labor arbiter rendered a decision ordering private respondent to pay the
petitioners separation pay equivalent to their 1 month salary (exclusive of commissions
allowances, etc) for every year of service. The labor arbiter ruled wage as defined in
Article 97(f) of the Code is not synonymous with salary as provided in the CBA and
Article 284.

9. Petitioners appeal to the NLRC was dismissed for lack of merit. Hence, the
present petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances be included in the
monthly salary of the petitioners for the purpose of computing their separation pay.
HELD:
YES. Anent the inclusion of allowances, the Court ruled in Santos v. NLRC that in
the computation of back wages and separation pay, account must be taken not only of
the basis salary of the petitioner but also her transportation and emergency living
allowances.
Anent the inclusion of commissions, Art 97(f) by itself is explicit that commission
is included in the definition of the term wage. Where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation or construction; there is only
room for application. The ambiguity between Art 97(f), which defines the term wage
and Article 284 and the CBA, which mention the words pay and salary is more
apparent than real. The word salary means a recompense or consideration made to a
person for his pains and industry in another mans business. There is eminent authority
for holding that the words wages (Middle English: wagen) and salary (Latin:
salarium) are essentially synonymous. Both words are interchangeably used and refer
to one and the same meaning: a reward or recompense for services performed.
Likewise, pay is synonymous with wage and salary. Inasmuch as the three words
have the same meaning and commission is included in the definition of wage the
logical conclusion is, in the computation of the separation pay of the petitioners, their
salary base should also include their earned sales commissions.
Granting, for the sake of argument that the commissions were in the form of
incentives or encouragement, so that the petitioners would be inspired to put little more
industry on the jobs assigned to them, these commissions are still direct remunerations
for services rendered which increased the income of Zuellig.
Commission is the recompense, compensation, or reward of an agent, salesman,
executor, trustee, receiver, when the same is calculated as a percentage on the amount
of his transactions or on the profit of the principal. The nature of the work of a salesman
and the reason for such type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly
that commissions are part of petitioners wage or salary. The Court takes judicial notice
that some salesmen do not receive basic salary but depend on commissions and
allowances alone, although an employer-employee relationship exists. If the opposite
view is taken that commissions do not form part of salary or wage, the Court will be
saying that such salesmen will not be entitled to separation pay, which is absurd. The
workingmans welfare should be the primordial concern in interpreting the Labor Code

and its implementing rules and regulations. All doubts should be resolved in favor of
labor.

Nos. 24116-17 August 22, 1968

Cebu Portland Cement Company, vs. Mun. of Naga, Cebu, et. al.
plaintiff-appellant
defendants-appellees
Facts:
1. The Treasurer of the Mun. of Naga, Cebu collected from Cebu Portland Cement
Company (CPCC) municipal license tax imposed by the Amended Ordinance No.
21 on cement factories located in the same municipality.
2. The demands made by the Treasurer were not entirely successful and resulted to
the remedies provided under Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The Treasurer gave CPCC 10 days to settle the account.
3. The Treasurer also notified the Plant Manager of CPCC that he was distraining
100,000 bags of Apo cement in satisfaction of their municipal license tax in the
total amount of Php 204,300.00. At first the Plant Manager did not agree with the
letter but acknowledged the distraint in the afternoon of the same day he was
notified.
4. The Treasurer signed the receipt of the goods under the authority of 2304 of the
Revised Administrative Code & shall sell the same at a public auction to the
highest bidder. The proceeds thereof shall be utilized in part of the satisfaction of
the municipal license tax & penalties CPCC owes to the municipality of Naga,
Cebu.
5. The Notice of Sale was posted by the Treasurer & stated that the public sale
shall be on July 27, 1962. However, no sale was held on the date specified & in
the appealed decision, that there was a stipulation by the parties where the
auction took place on January 30, 1962.
WHO
Cebu Portland
Cement Company

Cebu Portland
Cement Company

WHAT
Petition (2 separate
actions: Validity of
the distraint & the
sale at a public
auction of the bags
of cement)
Motion for
Reconsideration

Issue
1. Whether the distraint was valid.
2. Whether the auction sale was valid

WHERE
RTC

DECISION
Denied

Supreme Court

Denied

Decision
Decision of the lower court was affirmed in toto. With costs against the plaintiffappellant.
1. CPCC alleged that the 10-day grace period in the letter of the Municipal
Treasurer did not lapse and therefore, the distrain is invalid. This is not true.
According to the Revised Administrative Code, the municipal treasurer may
seize & distrain any personal property belonging to such person or any
property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or
charge in question xxx. With this, the law gives an authority to the municipal
treasurer to seize & distrain properties regardless of the provisions or
conditions stated in the letter. There is only room for application and not for
interpretation and what is stated in the letter cannot amend the law.
2. The auction sale is also valid. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the
sale cannot take place less than 20 days after notice to the owner or
possessor of the property xxx. Since the first notification for distrait was in
July 6, 1961 & the sale was on January 30, 1962, the requisite for the
notification was more than complied with. The sale was only delayed due to
the deferment made by the CPCC. Even if the sale was made only in January
1962, the Treasurer informed the CPCCs acting officer that he would again
advertise for the public sale of the said bags of cement. With this, the validity
of the date of the said auction sale cannot be contested.

Landbank vs CA
249 SCRA 149 (1995)
FACTS: Private respondents are landowners whose holdings were acquired by DAR
and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under RA 6657. Aggrieved
by the alleged lapses by DAR and LBP with respect to the valuation and payment of
compensation for their land, private respondents filed a petition questioning the validity
of DAR AO Nos. 6 and 9. They sought to compel DAR to deposit in cash and bonds the
amounts respectively, carmarked, reserved and deposited in trust accounts for
private respondents and allow them to withdraw the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not DAR overstepped the limits of its power when it issue AO No. 9
HELD: Yes, DAR overstepped the limits of its power when it issue AO No. 9. There is no
basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowners as
compensation for his property because Sec 16 (c) of RA 6657 is specific that the
deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds. In the same vein, petitioners cannot
invoke LRA Circular No 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations
cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. The respondent court there, did not
commit ay error in striking down AO No. 9 for being null and void.