G.R.

No.
185128
(Formerly UDK No. 13980)
RUBEN
DEL
CASTILLO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

January

BOY

CASTILLO,

30,

2012

Petitioner,

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of Ruben del Castillo
assailing the Decision2 dated July 31, 2006 and Resolution3 dated December 13, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision4 dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed by
SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner,
secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same
police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to immediately disembark from the jeep they
were riding and went directly to petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence is
a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor. When they went upstairs, they met
petitioner's wife and informed her that they will implement the search warrant. But before they can search the
area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his
house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and
exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the subject ran for
cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men
returned with two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del
Castillo, searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His
men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to
confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance. Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. The contents of the four (4) heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory
examination, the result of which proved positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation of Section 16,
Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. The Information5 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have in his
possession and control four (4) packs of white crystalline powder, having a total weight of 0.31 gram, locally
known as "shabu," all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or
prescription from any competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty. 7 Subsequently, trial on the
merits ensued.
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO3 Bienvenido
Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas.

The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner, Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del Castillo
and Herbert Aclan, which can be summarized as follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was installing the electrical wirings and
airconditioning units of the Four Seasons Canteen and Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He
was able to finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was engaged by the owner of the establishment
in a conversation. He was able to go home around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned
from his wife that police operatives searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the small
structure, 20 meters away from his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned by his older
brother and was used as a storage place by his father.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the Information. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Ruben del Castillo "alyas Boy Castillo,"
GUILTY of violating Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. There being no mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances proven before this Court, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1) Day as Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2)
Months as Maximum of Prision Correccional.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.31 gram, positive for
the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated and shall be destroyed in accordance
with the law.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is DISMISSED, with costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.9
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA, petitioner filed with this Court the
present petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the following arguments raised:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF COURT AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS
VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-1197-24;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE
CRYSTALLINE POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF THE NIPA HUT OR
STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, NOT ONLY
BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT IT WAS USED BY THE PETITIONER
OR THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING TEAM
ARRIVED AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT OR
STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY THE PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF
WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS
OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF
"POSSESSION" AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. HAD THE SAID COURT PROPERLY
APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE SAME
HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN.10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February 10, 2009, enumerated the following
counter-arguments:
I

SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge Priscilla S. Agana of Branch 24,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are admissible in evidence against him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs.11
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo
Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs
during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same search warrant. The OSG, however,
maintains that the petitioner, aside from failing to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant
to Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and convincing
evidence to show that Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his house is
no longer within the "permissible area" that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and that
the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be searched. The OSG, on the other
hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only
against government authorities and not to private individuals such as the barangay tanod who found the folded
paper containing packs of shabu inside the nipa hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the
same just because they were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the argument of the
petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to
and occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in
violation of law, and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause
must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.12 According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable cause for a search
warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.13 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands
more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.14 The judge, in
determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a
fixed and rigid formula,15 and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard.16 The existence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court,
therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search
warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. 17 Substantial basis
means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.18 A review of the records
shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered that the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A
designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. 19 In the present
case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-2420 specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as
the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away
from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one

described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of
which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the
search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was
a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked the
assistance of the barangay tanods, thus, in the testimony of SPO3 Masnayon:
Fiscal Centino:
Q For how long did the chase take place?
A Just a very few moments.
Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to reach him?
A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a barangay tanod.
Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?
A Nelson Gonzalado.
Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did] your driver get?
A Two.
Q What happened after that?
A We searched the house, but we found negative.
Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?
A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and found nothing.
Q What about you, where were you?
A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano.
Q What about the barangay tanod?
A Together with Milo and Pogoso.
Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded negative what did you do?
A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his shop because he ran from his shop, so we
searched his shop.
Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?
A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo named Dolly del Castillo.
Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, Barangay Tanod Nilo Gonzalado and the
elder sister of Ruben del Castillo were together in the shop?
A Yes.

Q What happened at the shop?

A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white folded paper.
Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?
A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.
Q Was that the only item?
A There are others like the foil, scissor.
Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil and others inside the electric shop?
A Yes.21
The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that the items that were actually seized were
found in another structure by a barangay tanod, was corroborated by PO2 Arriola, thus:
FISCAL:
Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you still recall what took place?
A We cordoned the area.
Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen?

A We waited for the barangay tanod.

Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?
A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of Ruben del Castillo's wife.
Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo?
A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her] face.
Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you] conducted the search?

A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team mate Bienvenido Masnayon saw that Ruben ran
away from his adjacent electronic shop near his house, in front of his house.
Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The house was clean.
Q What did you do afterwards, if any?
A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his electronic shop.
Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his electronic shop?
A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic) Ruben run from that store and furthermore
the door was open.
Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.
xxxx
Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop?

A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon.

Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean to say that there were other persons or other person
that followed after Masnayon?
A Then we followed suit.
Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed suit?
A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.
Q What about you?
A I also followed suit.
Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del Castillo?
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and I saw him open the folded paper which
contained four shabu deck.
Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the tanod open the folded paper?
A We were side by side because the shop was very small.22
SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?
A At his residence, the two-storey house.
Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in conducting the search at the residence of the accused?
A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A Negative, no shabu.
Q And what happened afterwards, if any?
A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.
Q And who among the team went inside?

A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.23

Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who
effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority.
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and
a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged
with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio
councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an
agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang
barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in
authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law
or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and
property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who
comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a
person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the
confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the barangay tanod who
found the confiscated items is considered a private individual, thus, making the same items admissible in
evidence, petitioner's third argument that the prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of the
regulated drugs seized, would still be meritorious.
Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter has the unique
opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying,24 unless attended with arbitrariness or plain disregard of pertinent facts or
circumstances, the factual findings are accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal25 as in the present case.
It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every
prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the
accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted
authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.26
In People v. Tira,27 this Court explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution
must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law,
includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is
in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession
exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The
accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the
contraband is located, is shared with another.28
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom
the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants control or
possession.29 The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a
constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused
or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.30 The records are
void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the
said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure
due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession. The CA, in its
Decision, noted a resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:

x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by occupation. As such, conclusion could
be arrived at that the structure, which housed the electrical equipments is actually used by the respondent. Being
the case, he has control of the things found in said structure.31
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also provide proof as to the ownership of
the structure where the seized articles were found. During their direct testimonies, they just said, without stating
their basis, that the same structure was the shop of petitioner.32 During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he
even outrightly concluded that the electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.33

However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there was an electrical shop but denied
what he said in his earlier testimony that it was owned by petitioner, thus:
ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:
Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical shop, is that correct?
A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he owns the shop.
Q Now, this shop is within a structure?
A Yes.
Q How big is the structure?
A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a mahjong den and at the other side is a structure rented
by a couple.34
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the
place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs.35 With the prosecution's failure to prove
that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In
considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the
accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt.36 Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a
moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.371wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 27819, which
affirmed the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case
No. CBU-46291 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del Castillo is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172035

July 4, 2012

FERNANDO
Q.
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

MIGUEL,

Petitioner,

DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 651 filed by Fernando Q. Miguel (petitioner), assailing
the January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the
petitioners suspension from public office and (ii) denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
suspension order.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials3 of Koronadal City, South
Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman)4 charging the
petitioner, among others,5 with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy
services for the architectural aspect, the engineering design, and the construction supervision and management
of the proposed Koronadal City public market (project).6
In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among others, to submit his counter-affidavit.
On October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit.7 In its July 29,
1999 resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner and some private individuals for
violation of R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for Falsification of Public Document under Article
171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.8

On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan.9 The
information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the [petitioner], a high ranking public
officer in his capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such while in the
performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his
official position, conspiring and confederating with the private [individuals] xxx acting with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and
advantages to said [accused], by inviting them to participate in the prequalification of consultants to provide the
Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and Management of the proposed
Koronadal Public Market, without causing the publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general
circulation, thereby excluding other consultants from participating in said prequalification.10 (Emphases and
underscoring added)
On motions separately filed by two of the petitioners co-accused,11 the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of
the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On August 21, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel,
followed suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The
Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP.12
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner asked13 the Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day extension
to submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly before the expiry of the extension requested, the petitioner asked14 the
OSP for an additional thirty-day period to file his counter-affidavit. Despite the two extensions asked and
granted, the petitioner asked the OSP anew for a twenty-day extension period.15

Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit, prompting
Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived his right to submit countervailing
evidence (April 25, 2001 resolution). On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the
resolution.16
On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the petitioner and
of the other accused private individuals.17
On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or
Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. On February 18, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied the

petitioners motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation this, despite the OSPs earlier termination of
the reinvestigation for the petitioners continuous failure to submit his counter-affidavit.18 The petitioner did not
question the denial of his motion.
On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases.19
On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June 27, 2005, the
petitioner filed his "Vigorous Opposition" based on the "obvious and fatal defect of the [i]nformation" in failing
to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.20
On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution 21 suspending the petitioner
pendente lite
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecutions Motion is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Court
hereby orders the suspension of [the petitioner] from his position as City Mayor, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato, and from any other public position he now holds. His suspension shall be for a period of ninety (90)
days only.22
On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded for a presuspension hearing.23 The Sandiganbayan denied his motion,24 prompting him to file this certiorari petition to
challenge the validity of his suspension order.
THE PETITION
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his suspension despite
the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner
was made through "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence." He alleges that the
phrases "evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality" actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused,25
rendering the information fatally defective.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his suspension order. Citing Luciano, et al. v.
Hon. Mariano, etc., et al.,26 he claims that "[n]owhere in the records of the [case] can [one] see any order or
resolution requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended."27 For the petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension hearing can only be satisfied if the
Sandiganbayan ordered an actual hearing to settle the "defect" in the information.
THE OSPS COMMENT

The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since all the elements of the offense under Section 3(b) of
R.A. No. 3019 are specifically pleaded by way of ultimate facts. These elements are:
1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato at the time material to the acts
complained of;
2. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith when he invited only his coaccused private individuals to participate in the prequalification of consultants for the project instead of
publishing it in a newspaper of general circulation; and
3. The petitioners actions, performed in relation to his office, gave unwarranted benefits and advantages
to his co-accused.28

The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead the Court on the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information, by conveniently failing to cite the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality"
when the petitioner quoted the "relevant" portions of the information in his petition.
Citing Juan v. People,29 the OSP argues that while no actual pre-suspension hearing was conducted, the events
preceding the issuance of the suspension order already satisfied the purpose of conducting a pre-suspension
hearing i.e., basically, to determine the validity of the information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his right
to preliminary investigation both by the Ombudsman and by the OSP (when the petitioner moved for a
reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner was charged constitute a violation of
R.A. No. 3019 and Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and the petitioner already moved to quash the

information, although unsuccessfully, after he had been declared to have waived his right to submit
countervailing evidence in the reinvestigation by the OSP.30
ISSUES
There are only two issues presented for our resolution:
1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is
valid; and
2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension
order against the petitioner.
THE COURTS RULING
We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed
resolutions.
The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is valid
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him,31 Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules)32 requires,
inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or
omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or
omissions and its attendant circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and concise language" and "in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x and for the
court to pronounce judgment."33
The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular,
whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the
complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The
raison detre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.34
In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a "person
of common understanding" in appreciating the import of the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality." A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he
ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to
his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the information would
yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this elemental phrase was actually omitted in
the information35 when, in his reaction to the OSPs comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is simply
the clarity of the phrases position, in relation with the other averments in the information. Given the supposed
ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,"
the remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an
information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.36
The pre-suspension order is valid
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory,37 the suspension requires a prior
hearing to determine "the validity of the information"38 filed against him, "taking into account the serious and

far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction."39 The
accused public officials right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be
issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an
information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not
constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.40
In Luciano v. Mariano41 that the petitioner relied upon, the Court required, "by way of broad guidelines for the
lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension," that
(c) upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the
accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office
pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion
for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the
validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is
that the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and
thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of
the information or withholding such suspension in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused
should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against
him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery
provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section
13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117
of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by the Sandiganbayan before his
suspension in office was ordered. As clear as the day, however, Luciano considered it unnecessary for the trial
court to issue a show cause order when the motion, seeking the suspension of the accused pendente lite, has
been submitted by the prosecution, as in the present case.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information so
that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the
case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its
validity.1wphi1 That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to
quash.42
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge
the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings against him,43 Luciano likewise emphasizes
that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct.44 With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in
mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the prosecutions motion
to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecutions motion for
hearing. The same conclusion was reached in Juan v. People,46 where the Court ruled:
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the Informations
that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and against them have
achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the
filing and the consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given
an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No.
3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted.47 It is well
settled that "to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of
procedural due process exists.48
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSPs Motion to Suspend Accused
Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of
the suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSPs Opposition to his plea for
reconsideration.49 Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioners continued demand for the conduct of an

actual pre-suspension hearing based on the same alleged "defect in the information,"50 which we have found
wanting has legally nothing to anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the petitioners position relates to the nature of Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal interpretation in favor of the accused public official
and a strict construction against the State.51 The suspension required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is
not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during his suspension.52
Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere preventive measure53 that arises from the
legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts
of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused.54
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in no case exceed
ninety (90) days,55 the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the information and of the
proceedings that preceded its filing vis--vis the merits of the defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone
by the absence or presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity to be heard on ones defenses, however
unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension mandated by law equally and sufficiently serves both the due
process right of the accused and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.
Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces the principle enshrined in the Constitution that a
public office is a public trust.56 In light of the constitutional principle underlying the imposition of preventive
suspension of a public officer charged under a valid information and the nature of this suspension, the
petitioners demand for a trial-type hearing in the present case would only overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than
promote, the orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207950

September 22, 2014

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
vs.
MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR alias "NOY", Accused-appellant.

Plaintiff-appellee,

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Every conviction for any crime must be accompanied by the required moral certainty that the accused has
committed the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must prove "the offender's intent to
take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide [was] actually carried out"1
!n order to convict for the crime of robbery with homicide. The accused may nevertheless be convicted of the
separate crime of homicide once the prosecution establishes beyond reasonable doubt the accused's culpability
for the victim's death.
In the information dated November 8, 2006, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor (Chavez) was charged with the
crime of robbery with homicide:

That on or about October 28, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and means of force, violence and intimidation upon the
person of ELMER DUQUE y OROS, by then and there, with intent to kill, stabbing the latter repeatedly with a
kitchen knife, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter, and on the saidoccasion or by reason thereof, accused took, robbed and carried away the
following:
One (1) Unit Nokia Cellphone
One (1) Unit Motorola Cellphone

Six (6) pcs. Ladies Ring

Two (2) pcs. Necklace

One (1) pc. Bracelet All of undetermined value and undetermined amount of money, all belonging to said
ELMER DUQUE y OROS @ BARBIE to the damage and prejudice of the said owner/or his heirs, in the said
undetermined amount in Philippines currency.
Contrary to law.2
Chavez pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on December 4, 2006. The court proceeded to trial. The
prosecution presented Angelo Peamante (Peamante), P/Chief Inspector Sonia Cayrel (PCI Cayrel), SPO3
Steve Casimiro (SPO3 Casimiro), Dr. Romeo T. Salen (Dr. Salen), and Raymund Senofa as witnesses. On the
other hand, the defense presented Chavez as its sole witness.3
The facts as found by the lower court are as follows.
On October 28, 2006, Peamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m., coming from work as a janitor in Eastwood
City.4 When he was about to go inside his house at 1326 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a person
wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt and black pants and holding something while leaving the house/parlor of
Elmer Duque (Barbie) at 1325 Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, just six meters across Peamantes house.5
There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so Peamante stated that
he was able to see the face of Chavez and the clothes he was wearing.6
Chavez could not close the door of Barbies house/parlor so he simply walked away. However, he dropped
something that he was holding and fell down when he stepped on it.7 He walked away after, and Peamante
was not able to determine what Chavez was holding.8 Peamante then entered his house and went to bed.9
Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office (SOCO) team arrived, led by PCI Cayrel. She was
joined by PO3 Rex Maglansi (photographer), PO1 Joel Pelayo (sketcher), and a fingerprint technician.10 They
conducted an initial survey of the crime scene after coordinating with SPO3 Casimiro of the Manila Police
District Homicide Section.11
The team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray, and they found Barbies dead body inside.12
They took photographs and collected fingerprints and other pieces of evidence such as the 155 pieces of hair
strands found clutched in Barbies left hand.13 They documented the evidence then turned them over to the
Western Police District Chemistry Division. Dr. Salen was called to conduct an autopsy on the body.14

At around 11:00 a.m., Peamantes landlady woke him up and told him that Barbie was found dead at 9:00 a.m.
He then informed his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving Barbies house at 2:45 a.m.15
At around 1:00 p.m., Dr. Salen conducted an autopsy on the body and found that the time of death was
approximately 12 hours prior to examination.16 There were 22 injuries on Barbies body 21 were stab
wounds in various parts of the body caused by a sharp bladed instrument, and one incised wound was caused by
a sharp object.17 Four (4) of the stab wounds were considered fatal.18
The next day, the police invited Peamante to the Manila Police Station to give a statement. Peamante
described to SPO3 Casimiro the physical appearance of the person he saw leaving Barbies parlor.19
Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 to SPO3 Casimiro at the
police station.20 Chavez was then 22 years old.21 His mother told the police that she wanted to help her son
who might be involved in Barbies death.22
SPO3 Casimiro informed them ofthe consequences in executing a written statement without the assistance of a
lawyer. However, Chavezs mother still gave her statement, subscribed by Administrative Officer Alex
Francisco.23 She also surrendered two cellular phones owned by Barbie and a baseball cap owned by
Chavez.24
The next day, Peamante was again summoned by SPO3 Casimiro to identify from a line-up the person he saw
leaving Barbies house/parlor that early morning of October 28, 2006.25 Peamante immediately pointed to and

identified Chavez and thereafter executed his written statement.26 There were no issues raised in relation to the
line-up.
On the other hand, Chavez explained that he was athome on October 27, 2006, exchanging text messages
withBarbie on whether they could talk regarding their misunderstanding.27 According to Chavez, Barbie
suspected that he was having a relationship with Barbies boyfriend, Maki.28 When Barbie did not reply to his
text message, Chavez decided to go to Barbies house at around 1:00 a.m. of October 28, 2006.29 Barbie
allowed him to enter the house, and he went home after.30
On August 19, 2011, the trial court31 found Chavez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with homicide:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR @
NOY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicideand hereby sentences him to
suffer the penaltyof reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Further, he is ordered to pay tothe heirs of the victim, Elmer Duque y Oros the sum of 75,000.00 as death
indemnity and another P75,000 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.32
On February 27, 2013, the Court of Appeals33 affirmed the trial courts decision.34 Chavez then filed a notice
of appeal pursuant to Rule 124, Section 13(c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
elevating the case with this court.35
This court notified the parties tosimultaneously submit supplemental briefs if they so desire. Both parties filed
manifestationsthat they would merely adopt their briefs before the Court of Appeals.36
In his brief, Chavez raised presumption of innocence, considering that the trial court "overlooked and
misapplied some facts of substance that could have altered its verdict."37 He argued that since the prosecution
relied on purely circumstantial evidence, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt on the part of
Chavez.38 In this case, even if Peamante saw him leaving Barbies house, Peamante did not specify whether
Chavez was acting suspiciously at that time.39
As regards his mothers statement,Chavez argued its inadmissibility as evidence since his mother was not
presented before the court to give the defense an opportunity for cross-examination.40 He added that affidavits
are generally rejected as hearsay unless the affiant appears before the court and testifies on it.41
Chavez argued that based on Dr. Salens findings, Barbies wounds were caused by two sharp bladed
instruments, thus, it was possible that there were two assailants.42 It was also possible that the assailants
committed the crime after Chavez had left Barbies house.43 Given that many possible explanations fit the
facts,that which is consistent with the innocence of Chavez should be favored.44
On the other hand, plaintiff-appellee argued that direct evidence is not indispensable when the prosecution
isestablishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Chavez.45 The circumstantial evidence presented before the
trial court laid down an unbroken chain of events leading to no other conclusion than Chavezs acts of killing
and robbing Barbie.46
On the argument made by Chavez that his mothers statement was inadmissible as hearsay, plaintiff-appellee
explained that the trial court did not rely on, and did not even refer to, any of the statements made by Chavezs
mother.47

Finally, insofar as Chavezs submission that Dr. Salen testified on the possibility that there weretwo assailants,
Dr. Salen equally testified on the possibility that there was only one.48 The sole issue now before us iswhether
Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
We reverse the decisions of the lower courts, but find Chavez guilty of the crime of homicide.
I
Chavez was found guilty of the specialcomplex crime of robbery with homicide under the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any person guilty of
robberywith the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed. . . .49
Chavez invokes his constitutional right to be presumed innocent, especially since the prosecutions evidence is
purely circumstantial and a conviction must stand on a moral certainty of guilt.50
The Rules of Court expressly provides that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the conviction of an accused:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.51
The lower courts found that the circumstantial evidence laid down by the prosecution led to no other conclusion
than the commission by Chavez of the crime charged:
In the instant case, while there is no direct evidence showing that the accused robbed and fatally stabbed the
victim to death, nonetheless, the Court believes that the following circumstances form a solid and unbroken
chain of events that leads to the conclusion, beyond reasonable doubt, that accused Mark Jason Chavez y
Bitancor @ Noy committed the crime charged, vi[z]: first, it has been duly established, as the accused himself
admits, that he went to the parlor of the victim at around 1:00 oclock in the morning of 28 October 2006 and
the accused was allowed by the victim to get inside his parlor as it serves as his residence too; second, the
victims two (2) units of cellular phones (one red Nokia with model 3310 and the other one is a black Motorola)
without sim cards and batteries, which were declared as partof the missing personal belongings of the victim,
were handled to SPO3 Steve Casimiro by the mother of the accused, Anjanette C. Tobias on 05 November 2006
when the accused voluntarily surrendered, accompanied by his mother, at the police station: third, on 28
October 2006 at about 2:45 oclock in the morning, witness Angelo Peamante, who arrived from his work, saw
a person holding and/or carrying something and about toget out of the door of the house of the victim located at
1325 G. Tuazon Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and trying to close the door but the said person was not able to
successfully do so. He later positively identified the said person at the police station as MARK JASON
CHAVEZ y BITANCOR @ NOY, the accused herein; and finally, the time when the accused decided on 27
October 2006 to patch up things with the victim and the circumstances (Dr. Salens testimony that the body of
the victim was dead for more or less twelve (12) hours) when the latter was discovered fatally killed on 28
October 2006 is not a co-incidence.
The prosecution has equally established, based on the same circumstantial evidence, that the accused had indeed
killed the victim.52
Factual findings by the trial court on its appreciation of evidence presented by the parties, and even its
conclusions derived from the findings, are generally given great respect and conclusive effect by this court,
more so when these factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.53
Nevertheless, this court has held that "[w]hat is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of
robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offenders intent to take personal property before
the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried out."54 In cases when the prosecution
failed to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can
be convicted of robbery with homicide.55
The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts, as quoted previously, do not satisfactorily establish
an original criminal design by Chavez to commit robbery.
At most, the intent to take personal property was mentioned by Chavezs mother in her statement as follows:

Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni Barbie at kasabay
ang pagbigay sa akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari [sic] ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha
pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.
Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin sabahay ay
inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos ang insidente.
At ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon
City.
Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang nakasugat
sa kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.
Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan lamang.56
(Emphasis supplied)
However, this statement is considered as hearsay, with no evidentiary value, since Chavezs mother was never
presented as a witness during trial to testify on her statement.57
An original criminal design to take personal property is also inconsistent with the infliction of no less than 21
stab wounds in various parts of Barbies body.58
The number of stab wounds inflicted on a victim has been used by this court in its determination of the nature
and circumstances of the crime committed.
This may show an intention to ensure the death of the victim. In a case where the victim sustained a total of 36
stab wounds in his front and back, this court noted that "this number of stab wounds inflicted on the victim is a
strong indication that appellants made sure of the success of their effort to kill the victim without risk to
themselves."59
This court has also looked into the number and gravity of the wounds sustained by the victim as indicative ofthe
accuseds intention to kill the victim and not merely to defend himself or others.60
In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, homicide is committed in order "(a) to facilitate the
robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime."61 21
stab wounds would be overkill for these purposes. The sheer number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie makes
it difficult to conclude an original criminal intent of merely taking Barbies personal property.

In People v. Sanchez,62 this court found accused-appellant liable for the separate crimes of homicide and theft
for failure of the prosecution to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the
victim:
But from the record of this case, we find that the prosecution palpably failed to substantiate its allegations of the
presence of criminal design to commit robbery, independent ofthe intent to commit homicide. There is no
evidence showing that the death of the victim occurred by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The
prosecution was silent on accused-appellants primary criminal intent. Did he intend to kill the victim in order
to steal the cash and the necklace? Or did he intend only to kill the victim, the taking of the latters personal
property being merely an afterthought? Where the homicide is notconclusively shown to have been committed
for the purpose of robbing the victim, or where the robbery was not proven at all, there can be no conviction for
robo con homicidio.63

II
This court finds that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Chavez for the separate crime
of homicide.
First, the alibi of Chavez still placeshim at the scene of the crime that early morning of October 28, 2006.
The victim, Elmer Duque, went by the nickname, Barbie, and he had a boyfriend named Maki. Nevertheless,
Chavez described his friendship with Barbie to be "[w]ere like brothers."64 He testified during cross-

examination that he was a frequent visitor at Barbies parlor that he cannot recall how many times he had been
there.65 This speaks of a close relationship between Chavez and Barbie.
Chavez testified that he went to Barbies house at 1:00 in the morning of October 28, 2006 to settle his
misunderstanding with Barbie who suspected him of having a relationship with Barbies boyfriend:
MARK JASON CHAVEZ was a friend to the victim, Barbie, for almost three (3) years and the two (2) treated
each other like brothers. The latter, however, suspected Mark Jason of having a relationship with Maki Aover,
Barbies boyfriend for six (6) months, which resulted in a misunderstanding between them. Mark Jason tried to
patch things up with Barbie so thru a text message he sent on the evening of 27 October 2006, he asked if they
could talk. When Barbie did not reply, he decided to visit him at his parlor at around 1:00 oclock in the
morning. Barbie let him in and they tried to talk about the situation between them. Their rift, however, was not
fixed so he decided to gohome. Later on, he learned that Barbie was already dead.66
This court has considered motive as one of the factors in determining the presence of an intent to kill,67 and a
confrontation with the victim immediately prior to the victimsdeath has been considered as circumstantial
evidence for homicide.68
Second, the number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie strengthens an intention to kill and ensures his
death.The prosecution proved that there was a total of 22 stab wounds found indifferent parts of Barbies body
and that a kitchen knife was found in a manhole near Chavezs house at No. 536, 5th Street, San Beda, San
Miguel, Manila.69
The Court of Appeals recitation of facts quoted the statement of Chavezs mother. This provides, among
others, her sons confession for stabbing Barbie and throwing the knife used in a manhole near their house:
Na si Noy na aking anak ay nagtapat sa akin tungkol sa kanyang kinalaman sa pagkamatay ni Barbie at kasabay
ang pagbigay sa akin ng dalawang (2) piraso ng cellular phones na pag/aari [sic] ni Barbie na kanyang kinuha
pagka/tapos [sic] ng insidente.
Na ipinagtapat din sa akin ni Noy na ang ginamit na panaksak na isang kutsilyo na gamit namin sa bahay ay
inihulog niya sa manhole sa tapat ng aming bahay matapos ang insidente.
At ang isang piraso ng kwintas nakinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon
City.
Na ang suot niyang tsinelas ay nag/iwan [sic] ng bakas sa pinangyarihan ng insidente. At sya rin ang nakasugat
sa kanyang sariling kamay ng [sic] maganap ang insidente.

Na sinabi niya sa akin na wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan lamang.70
(Emphasis supplied)
Even if this statement was not taken into account for being hearsay, further investigation conducted still led
tothe unearthing of the kitchen knife with a hair strand from a manhole near Chavezs house.71
Third, no reason exists to disturb the lower courts factual findings giving credence to 1) Peamantes positive
identification of Chavez as the person leaving Barbies house that early morning of October 28, 200672 and 2)
the medico-legals testimony establishing Barbies time of death as 12 hours prior to autopsy at 1:00 p.m., thus,
narrowing the time of death to approximately 1:00 a.m. of the same day, October 28, 2006.73
All these circumstances taken together establish Chavezs guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
homicide.
III
There is a disputable presumption that "a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, thatthing which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him."74 Thus, when a person has possession of a stolen
property, hecan be disputably presumed as the author of the theft.75
Barbies missing cellular phones were turned over to the police by Chavezs mother, and this was never denied
by the defense.76 Chavez failed to explain his possession of these cellular phones.77 The Court of Appeals

discussed that "a cellular phone has become a necessary accessory, no person would part with the same for a
long period of time, especially in this case as it involves an expensive cellular phone unit, as testified by
Barbies kababayan, witness Raymond Seno[f]a."78
However, with Chavez and Barbies close relationship having been established, there is still a possibilitythat
these cellphones were lent to Chavez by Barbie.
The integrity of these cellphones was also compromised when SPO3 Casimiro testified during crossexamination that the police made no markings on the cellphones, and their SIM cards were removed.
Q: But you did not place any marking on the cellphone, Mr. witness?
A: No, sir.
Atty. Villanueva: No further questions, Your Honor.
Court: When you received the items,there were no markings also?
Witness: No, Your Honor.
Court: The cellular phones, were they complete with the sim cards and the batteries?
A: Theres no sim card, Your Honor.
Q; No sim card and batteries?
A; Yes, Your Honor.
Q: No markings when you receivedand you did not place markings when these were turned over to the Public
Prosecutor, no markings?
A: No markings, Your Honor.79
The other missing items were no longer found, and no evidence was presented to conclude that these weretaken
by Chavez. The statement of Chavezs mother mentioned that her son pawned one of Barbies necklaces ["At
ang isang piraso ng kwintas na kinuha rin nya mula kay Barbie ay naisanla niya sa isang sanglaan sa Quezon
City"80 ], but, as earlier discussed, this statement is mere hearsay.
In any case, the penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value of the stolen items.81 The lower court made
no factual findings on the value of the missing items enumerated in the information one Nokia cellphone
unit, one Motorola cellphone unit, six pieces ladies ring, two pieces necklace, and one bracelet.
At most, prosecution witness Raymund Senofa, a town mate of Barbie, testified that he could not remember the
model of the Motorola fliptype cellphone he saw used by Barbie but that he knew it was worth 19,000.00 more
or less.82 This amounts to hearsay as he has no personal knowledge on how Barbie acquired the cellphone or
for how much.
These circumstances create reasonable doubt on the allegation that Chavez stole the missing personal properties
of Barbie.
It is contrary to human nature for a mother to voluntarily surrender her own son and confess that her son
committed a heinous crime.
Chavez was 22 years old, no longer a minor, when he voluntarily went to the police station on November 5,
2006 for investigation,83 and his mother accompanied him. SPO3 Casimiro testified that the reason she
surrendered Chavez was because "she wanted to help her son"84 and "perhaps the accused felt that [the
investigating police] are getting nearer to him."85 Nevertheless, during cross-examination, SPO3 Casimiro
testified:
Q: Regarding the mother, Mr. witness, did I get you right that when the mother brought her son, according to
you she tried to help her son, is that correct?

A: That is the word I remember, sir.

Q: Of course, said help you do notknow exactly what she meant by that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: It could mean that she is trying to help her son to be cleared from this alleged crime, Mr. witness?
A: Maybe, sir.86
Chavezs mother "turned-over (2) units of Cellular-phones and averred that her son Mark Jason told her that
said cellphones belong[ed] to victim Barbie. . . [that] NOY was wounded in the incident and that the fatal
weapon was put in a manhole infront[sic] of their residence."87 The records are silent on whether Chavez
objected to his mothers statements. The records also do not show why the police proceeded to get his mothers
testimony as opposed to getting Chavezs testimony on his voluntary surrender.
At most, the lower court found thatChavezs mother was informed by the investigating officer at the police
station of the consequences in executing a written statement withoutthe assistance of a lawyer.88 She proceeded
to give her statement dated November 7, 2006 on her sons confession of the crime despite the warning.89
SPO3 Casimiro testified during his cross-examination:
Q: Do you remember if anybody assisted this Anjanette Tobias when she executed this Affidavit you
mentioned?
A: She was with some neighbors.
Atty. Villanueva
Q: How about a lawyer, Mr. Witness?
A: None, sir.
Q: So, in other words, no lawyer informed her of the consequence of her act of executing an Affidavit?
A: We somehow informed her of what will be the consequences of that statement, sir.
Q: So, you and your police officer colleague at the time?
A: Yes, sir.90
The booking sheet and arrest report states that "when [the accused was] appraised [sic] of his constitutional
rights and nature of charges imputed against him, accused opted to remain silent."91 This booking sheet and
arrest report is also dated November 7, 2006, or two days after Chavez, accompanied by his mother, had
voluntarily gone to the police station.
The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda rights, which
require that:
. . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will
be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right totalk to an attorney before being questioned and to
have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided
before any questioning if he so desires.92
The Miranda rightswere incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the statement thatany
waiver of the right to counsel must be made "in writing and in the presence of counsel."93
The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins "when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun tofocus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements."94

It may appear that the Miranda rightsonly apply when one is "taken into custody by the police," such as during
an arrest. These rights are intended to protect ordinary citizens from the pressures of a custodial setting:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive
suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting
itself," "which work to undermine the individuals will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from
the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were
voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanours as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.95 (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 743896 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to "include the practice ofissuing an
invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law."97
This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their
Miranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being
questioned by an investigating officer ina police station. As an additional pressure, he may have been compelled
to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station.
This court, thus, finds that the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves beyond reasonable doubt that Chavez
is guilty of the crime of homicide, and not the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
On the service of Chavezs sentence, the trial court issued the order dated November 14, 2006 in that "as prayed
for, the said police officer is hereby ordered to immediately commit accused, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor @
Noy to the Manila City Jail and shall be detained thereat pending trial of this case and/or untilfurther orders
from this court."98 The order of commitment dated September 28, 2011 was issued after his trial court
conviction in the decision dated August 19, 2011.
Chavez has been under preventive detention since November 14, 2006, during the pendency of the trial.1wphi1
This period may be credited in the service of his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. Offenders or accused who
have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the
detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the
assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the
following cases:

1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender
voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does notagree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his
sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30)
years.
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall
be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if
the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under
this paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however,
That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order
the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons
charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which
the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment.99

Finally, this court laments thatobject evidence retrieved from the scene of the crime were not properly handled,
and no results coming from the forensic examinations were presented to the court. There was no examination of
the fingerprints found on the kitchen knife retrieved from the manhole near the house of Chavez.100 There were
no results of the DNA examination done on the hair strands found with the knife and those in the clutches of the
victim. Neither was there a comparison made between these strands of hair and Chavezs. There was no report
regarding any finding of traces of blood on the kitchen knife recovered, and no matching with the blood of the
victim or Chavezs. The results of this case would have been rendered with more confidence at the trial court
level had all these been done. In many cases, eyewitness testimony may not be as reliable or would have
been belied had object evidence been properly handled and presented.
We deal with the life of a personhere. Everyones life whether it be the victims or the accuseds is
valuable. The Constitution and our laws hold these lives in high esteem. Therefore, investigations such as these
should have been attended with greaterprofessionalism and more dedicated attention to detail by our law
enforcers. The quality of every conviction depends on the evidence gathered, analyzed, and presented before the
courts. The publics confidence on our criminal justice system depends on the quality of the convictions we
promulgate against the accused. All those who participate in our criminal justice system should realize this and
take this to heart.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Mark Jason Chavez y
Bitancor alias "Noy" is hereby declared GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt of the separate and distinct crime of
HOMICIDE. Inasmuch as the commission of the crime was not attended by any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, accused-appellant Chavez is hereby SENTENCEDto suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Accused-appellant Chavez's period of detention shall be deducted if consistent with Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128287 February 2, 1999
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
RIZAL ESPIRITU y KINAO, accused-appellant.

PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee,

PANGANIBAN, J.:
A counsel-assisted, voluntary confession of guilt is evidence of strong persuasive weight. It becomes
overwhelming when it is corroborated by independent prosecution evidence pointing to appellant as the
perpetrator of a killing.
The Case
Rizal Espiritu y Kinao appeals the Decision
him of murder.

of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, convicting

Before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City on May 3, 1996, Prosecutor II Romeo N. Carbonell filed against
Rizal Espiritu, along with two others Gerald Alicoy and Fred Malicdan an Information which reads: 2
The undersigned accuses GERALD ALICOY Y SIANO as principal by inducement and FRED
MALICDAN Y MILLER and RIZAL ESPIRITU Y KINAO as principal by direct participation
[in] the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of September, 1995, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident prem[e]ditation, after the accused GERALD ALICOY Y SIANO offered
the sum of P20,000.00 to the accused FRED MALICDAN Y MILLER and RIZAL ESPIRITU Y

KINAO for them to kill SATO SANAD 3 Y DOGA-ONG, the accused Fred Malicdan and Rizal
Espiritu, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Sato
Sanad with a sharp pointed instrument several times on his back inflicting on said Sato Sanad
several stab wounds at his back as a result of which said Sato Sanad died.
The commission of the offense is qualified by evident premeditation in that the three (3) accused
planned the killing where the accused Gerald Alicoy offered to the accused Fred Malicdan and
Rizal Espiritu the sum of P20,000.00 for them to kill Sato Sanad and the accused Fred Malicdan
and Rizal Espiritu carried out the plan and killed Sato Sanad.
The commission of the offense is likewise qualified by treachery in that the accused Rizal
Espiritu suddenly held and locked the neck of Sato Sanad with his hands and thereafter the
accused Fred Malicdan stabbed Sato Sanad several times on his back and the accused adopted
that mode of attack to ensure that the deceased could not put up a defense. 4
When arraigned on May 14, 1996, 5 Espiritu 6 and his co-accused 7 entered a plea of not guilty. After the
prosecution presented its evidence, a joint Motion to Dismiss 8 was filed by the counsels of Alicoy and
Malicdan; namely, Jose M. Molintas and Fred Bagbagen. On August 20, 1996, the trial court issued an Order 9
acquitting the two accused for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial
of Appellant Espiritu, however, continued.
On October 30, 1996, the court a quo rendered its Decision and the dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court [f]inds accused Rizal Espiritu y Kinao guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 7659 as charged in the information, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of Sato
Sannad the sum of P50,000.00 for his death; P200,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, all indemnifications are without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, accused Rizal Espiritu is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his
preventive imprisonment in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. 10
Hence, this appeal direct to this Court. 11
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In the 35-page Brief for the Appellee,
follows:

12

the solicitor general narrated the prosecution's version of the facts as

Between 7:30 and 8:00 o'clock in the evening of September 8, 1995, Henry Saclangan saw Sato
Sanad conversing with appellant Rizal Espiritu in front of Starlight Bakery located at Sunflower
Street, Navy Base Subdivision, Baguio City. Later, he saw Sato Sanad and appellant, who placed
his arm around the former's shoulder, walk.
At about 9:00 o'clock in that evening, Jeffrey Bernabe was in his house at Sunflower St., Navy
Base Subdivision, Baguio City conversing with friends. Momentarily, he heard someone outside
shouting for help. When he went out, Jeffrey Bernabe saw a man, who turned out to be Sato
Sanad, wounded and bleeding. Other people came out of their houses but no one dared to
prostrate on the ground. Jeffrey Bernabe went back to his house and boarded his truck.
Accompanied by his friends and helpers, Jeffrey Bernabe brought Sato Sanad to the Baguio
General Hospital where he died on arrival.
At about 9:00 o'clock that same evening, Police Officer Johnson Ayagen of the Pacdal Police
Substation, Baguio City, received a report from the base operator of a fight that occurred in
Sunflower Street. He was ordered to immediately proceed to the place. Along the way, PO
Ayagen met an Isuzu Elf Truck whose driver flagged him down. He was informed by Jeffrey
Bernabe that he and his companions were bringing a wounded person to the hospital. PO Ayagen
told the driver, Jeffrey Bernabe, to proceed to the hospital and to wait for him there as he would

first proceed to the crime scene. The police met nobody at the crime scene. What they found
were bloodstains on the ground; also, a bloodied, perforated maong jacket and false dentures.
When they arrived at the hospital, Jeffrey Bernabe informed them that the victim was already
dead.
Dr. Vladimir Villaseor of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Camp Bado Dangwa, Benguet,
conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Sato Sanad. Per Medico-Legal Report issued by Dr.
Villaseor, 13 the victim sustained the following injuries, to wit:
Trunk and Extremities:
1. Stab wound, right suprascapular region, measuring 1.5 x 0.5cm, 5cm from the
posterior midline, directed anteriorwards, downwards, and medialwards,
lacerating the underlying soft tissues and muscles.
2. Stab wound, right scapular region, measuring 1.2 x 0.4cm, 6cms from the
posterior midline, directed anteriorwards, downwards and medialwards, lacerating
soft tissues and muscles.
3. Stab wound, right scapular region, measuring 1.5 x 0.6cm, 7cms from the
posterior midline, directed anteriorwards, downwards and medialwards, lacerating
soft tissues and muscles.
4. Stab wound, right infrascapular region, measuring 1.8 x 0.9cm, 14cms from the
posterior midline 10cms deep, directed anteriorwards, slightly downwards and
medialwards, passing through the 9th right intercostal space, lacerating the lower
lobe of the right lung.
5. Stab wound, right lumbar region, measuring 1.8 x 0.8cm, 12cms from the
posterior midline.
6. Stab wound, right para-vertebral region, measuring 1.6 x 0.6cm, 2cms from the
posterior midline.
7. Stab wound, right para-vertebral region, measuring 1.8 x 1cm, 19cms from the
posterior midline, 10cms deep, directed anteriorwards, slightly upwards and
medialwards, passing through the 8th right intercostal space, lacerating the lower
lobe of the right lung.

8. Stab wound, left suprascapular region, measuring 1.5 x 0.5cm, 9cms from the
posterior midline, 8cms deep, directed anteriorwards, downwards and
medialwards, passing through the 2nd left intercostal space, lacerating the upper
lobe of the left lung.
9. Stab wound, left suprascapular region, measuring 1.5 x 0.5cm, 8cms from the
posterior midline, 9cms deep, directed anteriorwards, downwards and
medialwards, passing through the 6th left intercostal space, lacerating the lower
lobe of the left lung.
10. Stab wound, left intrascapular region, measuring 0.5 x 0.3cm, 14cms from the
posterior midline.

11. Stab wound, left infrascapular region, measuring 1.7 x 0.6cm, 6cms from the
posterior midline, 8cms deep, directed anteriorwards, slightly upwards and
medialwards, fracturing the 9th left thoracic rib, lacerating the left lower lobe of
the left lung.
12. Stab wound, left para-vertebral region, measuring 1.5 x 0.5cm, 2cms from the
posterior midlin[e], 8.5cms deep, directed posteriorwards, slightly upwards and
medialwards, passing through the 9th left intercostal space, lacerating the lower
lobe of the left lung.

13 Stab wound, left lumber region, measuring 2.5 x 0.8cm, .2cm from the
posterior midline, directed anteriorwards, slightly downwards and medialwards,
lacerating the underlying soft tissues and muscles.
CONCLUSION:
Cause of Death: Hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds on the body.
At the wake of Sato Sanad, Reyvo Sanad, his son, was informed by his cousin, Nestor Kinao,
that appellant Rizal Espiritu, a cousin of Nestor mentioned something about the killing of his
father. Together, they sought out appellant. They found him in the company of his uncle, Alfredo
Kinao, who was also related to the wife of Sato Sanad. When confronted, appellant was
persuaded to relate his participation in the killing of Sato Sanad. Appellant eventually confessed
to being one of the assailants of Sato Sanad. Then, all those present agreed to meet the following
day at the Baguio City Police where appellant would surrender.
The following day, or on September 20, 1995, appellant, accompanied by Alfredo Kinao, met
with the victim's relatives at the Baguio City Police Station. However, the day before their
meeting, Alfredo Kinao had talked to Atty. Daniel Mangallay in his office and asked him to be
appellant's counsel. Atty. Mangallay thus went to the Baguio City Police Station where he met
the others. Atty. Mangallay conferred with appellant regarding the case and agreed to represent
him.
Prior to the investigation, Atty. Mangallay informed the police that appellant would voluntarily
give his statement. Police Officer Wilfredo Cabanayan, who was assigned to take appellant's
statements, apprised the latter, in the presence of his lawyer, of his constitutional rights to remain
silent, to have competent and independent counsel of his choice and his right against selfincrimination. After Atty. Mangallay, himself, had explained to appellant his constitutional
rights, the latter signified his willingness and readiness to give his statement. Police Officer
Cabanayan propounded his questions in Ilocano to which appellant replied in the same dialect.
The questions and answers were then translated into English.
Thereafter, appellant and Atty. Mangallay affixed their respective signatures on the sworn
statement. During the proceeding, Atty. Mangallay was at all times assisting appellant. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, appellant, accompanied by Atty. Mangallay and Police Officer Cabanayan, was
presented before Prosecutor Dizon for personal examination. Appellant declared that he
understood his statement as explained to him by Prosecutor Dizon. Thereafter, appellant again
signed his sworn statement.
At the preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell, appellant was
likewise assisted by Atty. Mangallay. Accused Gerald Alicoy and Fred Malicdan were present
with their respective counsel. During the clarificatory questions, appellants, appellant repeated
the contents of his sworn statement given before the police which was recorded in the transcript
of stenographic notes. Further, Prosecutor Carbonell conducted an ocular inspection of the scene
of the crime with all the accused and their counsel present. 14
Version of the Defense
Denying participation in the killing of Sanad, Appellant Espiritu assails the admissibility of his extrajudicial
confession. In the 23-page Appellant's Brief, 15 the defense submitted its version of the facts in this wise:
AFREDO KINAO, the uncle of the accused, stated that on September 17, 1995, he was at a vigil
in Quirino Hill, when his son arrived and told him that they had to see the accused who was at
the police station. He asked the police if they could bring out the accused. They were able to do
so when they signed a promissory note. The police told him that Espiritu was a suspect in the
killing of Sato Sannad and they had to return him on September 20, 1995. Upon their return,
Espiritu told the police, that he [would] tell them what happened since his conscience was
bothering him. The police advised them to get a lawyer to assist the accused.

He added that on September 19, 1995, he went to Atty. Mangallay's house, but was advised to
see the latter in his office on September 20, 1995. When informed by the police that a lawyer
[was] needed, he went to Atty. Mangallay's office, and they proceeded to the police stattion.
Upon their arrival, the statement of the accused was taken. Then they proceeded to the
prosecutor's office for the subscription of the statement.
RIZAL ESPIRITU stated that the victim's relatives asked him to give a statement to the effect
that he together with Alicoy and Malicdan killed Sato Sannad. They offered him P50,000.00 and
said that the two [would] be put in jail. He did not participate in the killing of Sannad. He went to
the police station accompanied by Alfredo Kinao and the relatives of the victim on September
20, 1995. He was advised by the police to get a lawyer and Alfredo Kinao, left to get a lawyer
but he did not authorize him to do so. The police started to take and prepare his statement at
around 8:00 AM and the lawyer arrived at around 10:00 AM, when his statement was already
being taken. Lawyer Mangallay did not give him any advice and did not explain in detail the
contents of the statement. He was not advised nor informed that by giving the statement he could
be imprisoned and even sentenced to death.
On sur-rebuttal, he declared that it was only after he had related the incident that the police told
him to get a lawyer. He was at the investigation room when the lawyer arrived together with
Alfredo Kinao and at that time, his statement had already been taken by the police. 16
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court convicted Espiritu on the basis of his confession and corroborating evidence of corpus delicti.
The confession was admitted in evidence, because the Court believed that the appellant voluntarily executed it
while being assisted by a competent and independent counsel. Further, during the investigation conducted by
Assistant Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell, Espiritu affirmed that he had voluntarily executed the extrajudicial
confession before the police, and he even reenacted how Sanad was killed.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant assigns the following errors to the court a quo:
I. The court a quo gravely erred in admitting in evidence the uncounselled extra-judicial
confession (Exhibit "B") of the accused-appellant.
II. The court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder. 17

In resolving this appeal, the Court will address two main issues: (1) the admissibility of the extrajudicial
confession and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence of guilt.
This Court's Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue:
Admissibility of Extrajudicial
Confession

In assailing the admissibility of his extrajudicial confession, appellant invokes paragraphs 1 and 3 of Section 12,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He insists that his confession was obtained in violation of his rights (1) to
have an independent and competent counsel and (2) to be informed of such right. Further, he argues that he was
not advised by Atty. Mangallay of the consequences of the execution of a confession.
We disagree. We are convinced that the confession of Appellant Espiritu is admissible in evidence, as it was
satisfactorily shown that it was (1) voluntary and (2) made with the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel. 18

With respect to the first requisite, we find that Espiritu readily admitted killing Sanad when he was confronted
by the relatives of the deceased. 19 Thereafter, without being "invited" by the investigating officers, he went to
the police station and voluntarily gave his statement to SPO1 Wilfredo P. Cabanayan. 20 Later, appellant
affirmed before Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell the fact that he, with Atty. Mangallay, had gone to the police
station to surrender and that the said counsel had assisted him when the police started taking his statement. 21 In
his confession, appellant admitted that he and Malicdan killed Sanad, after being hired by Alicoy to do so for
the sum of P20,000. Aside from describing the details of how he and his cohort killed Sanad, Espiritu, during an
ocular inspection, even pointed out the place where the killing had been committed.
These acts of the appellant are clear manifestations that, contrary to his protestations, no "torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation or any other means" was used against him to force him to confess.
Competent and
Independent Counsel
The defense contends that Atty. Mangallay was retained by Alfredo Kinao and not by appellant. It is also
argued that the said lawyer was unable to advise or to explain the contents of the extrajudicial confession to the
appellant before the latter signed it.
We are not persuaded. At the outset, we must clarify that the right to counsel does not mean that the accused
must personally hire his own counsel. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel in (1) engaged
by anyone acting on behalf of the person under investigation or (2) appointed by the court upon petition of the
said person or by someone on his behalf. 22 Thus, that Atty. Mangallay was retained not by the appellant
personally but by his uncle, Alfredo Kinao, is not proof of counsel deprivation. The fact remains that Kinao, in
hiring the counsel, acted on behalf of Appellant Espiritu. Besides, Espiritu did not object when Atty. Mangallay
represented him during the investigations before the police and the city prosecutor. In fact, he expressly
acknowledged Atty. Mangallay as his counsel. 23
The
meaning
of
Deniega 24 as follows:

"competent

counsel"

was

explained

in

People

v.

. . . [T]he lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as reasonably
possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in
the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who
would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's
constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, 25 this Court stressed that an accused's right to be
informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel "contemplates the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle."
Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter
could not afford one) "should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or
person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the
accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition." Lawyers engaged by the
police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are
generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement
authorities can be symbiotic.
xxx xxx xxx

. . . The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to
end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of
the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
Undoubted is the competence of Atty. Mangallay who was himself presented by the prosecution as witness.
Without violating the rule on privileged communication, he testified:

Q So all the while the provisions of this preliminary questions from A, B and C
were asked, it was only the police who [h]as all the time been talking to the
accused?
A Of course, before the Police Officer propounded those questions, we agreed
that it be propounded in Ilocano dialect so that the accused can understand, sir.
Q Who agreed, you?
A The accused, me and the Police Officer, sir.
Q And do you know if it was reduced first in Ilocano version before it was
translated in English version?
A It was propounded in English dialect and then into the Ilocano dialect and after
that, the accused was asked if he understood the same, sir.
Q What do you mean, if he understood the same?
A Of course, if he got the meaning of what was propounded to him, sir.
Q What, for example?
A That he had the right to counsel.
Q And what did the accused say?

A The accused clearly stated that he understood the same.

Q No more?
A No more, sir.
Q And, [were] those the only questions being propounded during the preliminary
questions?
A Of course there were several questions.
Q What [were] those questions?
A That the accused ha[d] the right to remain silent.
Q And what did the accused say?
A Of course, he said that he [was] willing to give his statement.
Q And what else, no more? [Those were] all the questions that were asked by the
police?
A There were other questions, sir.
Q What [were] those other questions?
A Likewise, he was apprised of his right to self-incrimination, sir.
Q What else, how did the Police apprise the right of the accused to self
incrimination?
A The Police Officer informed the accused [of his] being a person entitled to
counsel of his own; that he ha[d] the right to remain silent; that he may refuse to
give any and that whatever statement he may give [could] be used against him,
sir.

Q And what did the accused say?

A The accused said, he [was] willing to give his statement and [to have] me as his
counsel, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Under what instance did you assist the accused?
A Of course under all the circumstances surrounding the taking of the sworn
statement, sir.
Q [In what particular] circumstance can you remember that you assisted actually
the accused?
A From the time he was asked or apprised of his rights up to the time he ended his
sworn statement, I was assisting him, sir.
Q And it was only the accused who had been answering the preliminary questions
asked by the police, is that correct?
A Of course, it was [he] who was being asked.
Q So it was [he] who was giving the answer?
A After being explained, sir.

Q Who explained, the police?

A Both of us, sir.
Q Was your explanation put into writing?
A Of course not, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said that before Rizal Espiritu gave his statement, the only thing you
[did] was to confirm what was told you by Alfredo Kinao, [was] that correct?
A Aside from that, I also asked him if he [was] willing to give his statement to the
police, sir.
Q Is that all?
A Of course, I explained the consequence of such statement, sir.
Q Like what [was] the consequence of giving the statement?
A As what had been repeatedly asked . . . him or propounded to him, any
statement [could] be used against him, sir.
Q [Was] that all that you asked . . . the client, sir?
A Of course, I also informed him that the crime he was charged of [was] a
heinous crime, sir.
Q Is that all?
A I also explained to him that being a heinous crime, the penalty there[for was]
death, sir.

Q Is that all?

A I also asked him if he [was] willing to suffer any consequence of giving his
statement, sir.
Q And did you tell him in particular the consequences [of] giving his statement?
A Yes, sir, even before I was officially engaged by them.
Q What did you tell him as a consequence?
A As a consequence, he [could] be charged [with] a crime of murder, sir.
Q [Was] that all that you told him?
A That of course, if found guilty, he [could] be punished, sir.
Q [With] death?
A Yes, sir.
Q [Was] that all that you advised your client before he gave his statement?
A Among other things, I really asked him if he was really voluntarily and freely
giving his statement despite all the explanation that I made, sir.
Q And when he said yes, you were convinced and that was it, you advised him
nothing more, nothing less tha[n] was stated, is that correct?
A It was of his own voluntary decision, sir. 26
The assistance rendered to appellant by Atty. Mangallay met the standards that had been set in Deniega for the
purpose of safeguarding the right of the accused against involuntary confession. In the present case, the counsel
was vigilant in informing Espiritu of his rights. He was clear in explaining to his client every question
propounded by the investigating officer. And he was not negligent in relating to the appellant the legal
consequences of the latter's extrajudicial confession.
Verily, a review of the record reveals no infirmity in the manner in which appellant's extrajudicial confession
was taken. Witness Cabanayan testified that Atty. Mangallay assisted Espiritu throughout the time that the latter
gave his statement. 27 Even the aforementioned uncle of the appellant, Defense Witness Alfredo Kinao, attested
to such facts. 28
Second Issue:
Guilt Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt
We hold that appellant's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt by his counsel-assisted and voluntary
confession, which was corroborated on material points by the prosecution witnesses. The defense has not given
this Court any reason why we should reverse or modify the trial court's assessment of the credibility of said
witnesses and their testimonies. 29 Indeed, appellant does not question the prosecution's evidence which
established the corpus delicti. 30
Pertinent portions of appellant's confession are quoted hereunder:
Q: Sometime on September 7, 1995, at about 6:00 PM, where were you?
A: I was then at San Carlos Heights, Baguio City.
Q: What were you doing at the said place?
A: I visited my cousins who [were] residents [of] the said place.

Q: Were you able to visit your cousins?

A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Because while walking on my way along the San Carlos Heights [R]oad, I was
met by a young boy [who] asked me if I kn[e]w a certain "RIZAL".
Q: What [was your] answer if there [was] any?
A: I replied that I was the one whom he was asking [about] and then he told me to
look for "GERALD".
Q: Do you know this Gerald whom the boy was referring to?
A: Upon learning that the young boy was referring to [my] barcada (friend),
named Gerald Alicoy who resides at Lamag Village, San Carlos Heights, Baguio
City, I then proceeded to their house.
Q: Were you able to go to the house of Gerald Alicoy?
A: No, because I saw Gerald Alicoy standing with a male person [in] a basketball
court along the road before reaching their house.
Q: What did you do upon seeing Gerald Alicoy?

A: I went near and he uttered "NAIMBAG TA NADANUNAN NAKA DIAY

UBING"[;] I then replied "WEN TA NASABAT KO DIAY PAGNAAN".
Q: What else did Gerald Alicoy tell you if there were any?
A: He asked me "KAYAT YO TI AGKACUARTA?"
Q: What did you answer?
A: I answered him "KAYAT KO A".
Q: What else did Gerald Alicoy tell you?
A: He told me and his companion whom I came to know as FRED MALICDAN
the following[:] "NO CASTA GARUD INKAYO TIRAEN NI SATO TAKNO
MATAY ITED KO TI B[EI]NTE MIL (P20,000.00) KANIAYO", "KET
DAYTOY TI CADUAM NI FRED, SAAN KA NGA AGDANAG".
Q: Did you ask Gerald Alicoy who [was] this Sato he was referring to?
A: I kn[e]w that he was referring to SATO SANNAD who [was] an old
acquaintance [in] Manila and [a] resident of Navy Base, Baguio City.
Q: Did Gerald Alicoy tell you if he kn[e]w Sato Sannad.
A: On the same day that Mr. Alicoy asked [us] to kill Mr. Sannad, he told us that
he knew such person because the latter [was] a co worker of his in Tagaytay.
Q: Did you ask Gerald Alicoy why he ordered you to kill Sato Sannad?
A: No, sir and he ha[s] told us why.
Q: After Gerald Alicoy promised to pay you P20,000.00 [for] killing Sannad,
what did you do?

A: Both Fred Malicdan and I agreed as to the time and the meeting place in the
presence of Alicoy.
Q: Did Fred Malicdan tell you your meeting place and its time?
A: He told me that we [would] me[e]t at about 5:00 PM to 5:30 PM at the parking
space for jeepneys bound for San Carlos Heights, Baguio City at Kayang St.,
Baguio City, o[n] September 8, 1995.
Q: What else ha[d] you agreed [to] if there were any?
A: Nothing more and we parted ways and I went home.
Q: As agreed upon, were you able to see or me[e]t Fred Malicdan?
A: Yes, at about 5:00 PM of September 8, 1995, we both met at the parking space
of jeepneys bound for San Carlos Heights at Kayang St., Baguio City.
Q: After you both met, what happened?
A: He told me that we [would] then proceed to Navy Base, Baguio City [to]
which I agreed and while walking I told Malicdan to verify first [if] Sannad [was]
present inside the restaurant. As I entered the restaurant I saw Sannad so I went
back immediately and informed Fred Malicdan that Mr. Sato [was] inside the
restaurant drinking.
Q: What did Malicdan tell you if there were any?
A: He told me that we [would] wait [for] Sannad to go out [of] the restaurant
where he was drinking.
Q: [Did] you [wait]?
A: Yes, we both waited about ten (10) minutes until Sato Sannad went out
towards the Hilltop Hotel.
Q: What did you do next?
A: Fred Malicdan and I followed him without [his] knowing that he [was being]
followed by us until he rode in a moving jeepney bound for Pacdal, Baguio City
at the side of Plaza Theater.
Q: What did you do next?
A: We hailed and boarded a taxi and ordered the driver to bring us to Navy Base,
Baguio City.
Q: Were you and Malicdan [able to reach] Navy Base?
A: No, we stopped right after the bridge at Leonard Wood Road, Baguio City.
Q: Why did you stop there?
A: Because Fred was assuming that Sannad would take that road in going to their
residence.
Q: Were you about to wait [for] Sannad?
A: After 10 minutes of waiting [for] the jeepney where Sannad was tiding [it]
passed by us and stopped at the crossing going towards the residence of Sannad.
Q: Did Sannad alight from the jeep?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do when Sannad alighted?

A: We followed him and that [was] already past seven o'clock in the evening.
Q: What happened next?
A: We continued following him until he stopped and bought [a] cigarette at a
store.
Q: What happened next?
A: While paying [for] the cigarette, he saw me and invited me to have a drink.
Q: How far were you when he was inviting you to drink?
A: I was about five meters away from him.
Q: What happened next when he invited you to drink?
A: I told him that we need not drink.
Q: What happened next?
A: He then [came] near me and as he was approaching he saw Fred Malicdan who
was about 15 meters behind me so he likewise approached him.
Q: What happened when he approached Fred Malicdan?
A: As Sannad was walking towards Malicdan, I immediately followed him and
held his neck with my left hand and locked [it] with my right hand.
Q: What else did you do if there were any?
A: I dragged hi[m] towards a garbage [box] beside the road near a store.
Q: What else did you do?

A: I shoved his body and he slumped on the garbage on his stomach.

Q: Where was Fred Malicdan at that time?
A: He was right behind Sannad while I was on his (Sannad) [right side] still
holding his neck.
Q: What happened next?
A: Fred Malicdan repeatedly stabbed him and thereafter I tried to hold him up
while Malicdan opened the garbage box.
Q: What did you do next?
A: We were about to drop him into the garbage box but in the process I [loosend]
my grip on him so he immediately shouted "ARAYATEN DAK" for three times.
Q: When he shouted what did you do?
A: I freed him and we ran away.
Q: Should you see again the weapon used by Malicdan in stabbing Sannad, can
you identify the same?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Are you willing to suffer the consequences of your wrongful act?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you also willing to testify against Gerald Alicoy and Fred Malicdan?
A: Yes, sir. 31
As a consequence of the confession of the appellant, his conviction becomes inevitable. 32 Such confession is
evidence of a high order, "since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience." 33
As mentioned earlier, the confession of Espiritu was corroborated by the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. The latter affirmed the appellant's statement as to the time and the place of the incident, the weapon
used and the location of the stab wounds on the victim's body.
First, Dr. Vladimir Villaseor 34 autopsied the body and testified that, based on the injuries inflicted, the
weapon used was a pointed instrument and that the assailant was positioned behind the victim. Second, Police
Officer Johnson Ayagen testified that he saw a garbage box near the crime scene, a detail specifically
mentioned by Espiritu in his extrajudicial confession. 35 Third, Witness Jeffrey Bernabe, upon hearing the cries
for help, proceeded to the place of the incident, where he found the victim lying on the ground at about the same
time as that which Espiritu mentioned in his confession. 36 Lastly, the prosecution witnesses and Espiritu point
to the same locus criminis.
Treachery
The court a quo correctly qualified the killing to murder. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected
attack of the malefactors on their unarmed prey without the latter giving the slightest provocation. 37 Appellant
and his cohort executed their plan in a manner that rendered their victim surprised and unable to defend himself.
We agree with the observation of the trial court that the great number of wounds inflicted on the back of Sato
Sanad manifests the treacherous nature of the attack.
On the other hand, we cannot appreciate evident premeditation which was alleged in the Information. The
records of this case do not show any evidence whatsoever to prove this aggravating circumstance.
Proper Penalty

and Damages
Aside from the absence of an aggravating circumstance, the trial court had one other reason for imposing
reclusion perpetua and not death: the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. This mitigating
circumstance is appreciated when the following requisites concur: "(1) the offender had not been actually
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary." 38
The foregoing requisites are borne by the records, which show that Espiritu surrendered to the police even in the
absence of a warrant for his arrest. 39
Likewise, we affirm the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, consonant with prevailing jurisprudence. 40
However, we cannot sustain the award of moral 41 and exemplary damages, 42 as the Court finds nothing in the
records to support the same. 43

WHEREFORE, the ASSAILED DECISION is hereby AFFIRMED, but the award of moral and exemplary
damages is deleted. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
THE
vs.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES,

petitioner,

HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
Baguio City, and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents.
Nelson Lidua for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge of the right of an
individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III of the
Constitution, with the right of any person "under investigation for the commission of an offense . . . to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right," granted by the same provision. The relevant facts are
not disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its
Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane
tickets, 1 the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9,
1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to
which Ramos pertained. 2
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten notes 3 reading
as follows:
2-8-86

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE
IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000
(APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE
1700/9 FEB 86.
(s)
Felipe
Ramos
(Printe
d) F.
Ramos
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City, Edgardo R.
Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA
Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter,
his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect
inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the
proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been
prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a
"compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he
desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein
by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards
did). 4 How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would seem that no compromise
agreement was reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of
estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that
place and during that time, according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos)
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully ... defraud the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner, to wit: said accused ...
having been entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of passengers for one-way trip and

round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the express obligation to remit all the proceeds
of the sale, account for it and/or to return those unsold, ... once in possession thereof and instead
of complying with his obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate,
misapply and convert the value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated
demands, ... failed and refused to make good his obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party .. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. The
prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and supervision of the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6
which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL
Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x
given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s Evidence." 7 Particularly as regards the
peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken without
the accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons interposed under
Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the
witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A and K,
which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement
of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an investigation
conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of this
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his
statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the
handwritten admission made by accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason
stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when he
made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was denied, by Order dated September 14, 1988.
10
In justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce
Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v.
Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial investigations the right to counsel may
be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept
in the present Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was
one "for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to him' and therefore clearly
fell "within the coverage of the constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time,
or the investigation was administrative in character could not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the
constitutional provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition for certiorari and
prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the People of the Philippines. By
Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on the
petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents
from proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe
Ramos), including the issuance of any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case or on any matter in
relation to the same case, now pending before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial
Region." The Court also subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The comments
of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The Solicitor General has made
common cause with the petitioner and prays "that the petition be given due course and thereafter judgment be
rendered setting aside respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the
prosecution." The Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever impropriety might have attended the
institution of the instant action in the name of the People of the Philippines by lawyers de parte of the offended
party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue of whether or not it was grave abuse of
discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve
it.

At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, 11 to which respondent Judge
has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of
Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment of the American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these
rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in
Section 12 of the same Article III. 13
Right Against Self-Incrimination

The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is
accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any
civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party
or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give
a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to
refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be
sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may
incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other
officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right
against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well known
axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in
the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the character or
effect of a question to be put to the latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not
claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be
waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights.
These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under
investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first
sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying
in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.

This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the 1935
Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a
decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police
custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against
the suspect. 24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to
exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been
given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere,
resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody interrogation of
accused persons." 26 And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." 27 The situation contemplated has also been more precisely described
by this Court." 28
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation arises which
at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters
and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings,
and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and
seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study have
taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating
and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into
silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the
constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to a police
precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself up for the
killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that
such a statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation not
being exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that against self-incrimination and
(2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in
court for a crime.

It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial
interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time
of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant
in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of
his right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor),
in common with all other persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set out in the first sentence of
Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory
question at the time that it is put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of giving testimony or
refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the
Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf; but if he
offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be
a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself' signifies that
he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of
the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He
cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In other
words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena,
having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the
defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn,
answer any question. 34 And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in
any manner prejudice or be used against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right. But if he does testify,
then he "may be cross- examined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters stated in
his direct examination, or connected therewith . 36 He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any
question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the evidence he will produce, would have a tendency
to incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might
incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of
which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against selfincrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of
the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should testify in his behalf,
he may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he might be implicated in
that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular question which might implicate him for a
different and distinct offense, say, estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court,
has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in
some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in
violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT 37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;

d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to

incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of
the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying
to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His
Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was however
so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal principles involved as to make
application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious
exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are
hereby, annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a
person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore
come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered
questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the
proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he
sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in
the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the
ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the violation of the right of any person
against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the complaining parties, complaining
companies, or complaining employers because being interested parties, unlike the police agencies who have no
propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their
hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue
ascendancy and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the
law that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the
employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses
ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the
making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under such administrative investigation in his defense,
with opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of
course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in
his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the
administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not been
accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be
informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident
that the employee's statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely
so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or
mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's expressed apprehensions may
be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be brought to bear on an employee under
investigation or for that matter, on a person being interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended.
In such an event, any admission or confession wrung from the person under interrogation would be inadmissible
in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced
statements may not in justice be received against the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any
evidentiary value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of the respondent Judge
in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit
in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed
with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become
functus officio, is now declared of no further force and effect.