Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO
LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No.
68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per Curiam Resolution of this
Court promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding him guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending
him indefinitely from the practice of law; and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration of the
same Resolution holding her in contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing violated his right to life and
due process of law and by reason thereof the Order is null and void; that the acts of misconduct imputed to
him are without basis; that the charge against him that it was he who had circulated to the press copies of
the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan is unfounded such that, even in this Court's Resolution, his
having distributed copies to the press is not stated positively; that the banner headline which appeared In
the Daily Express is regrettable but that he was not responsible for such "misleading headline;" that he "did
nothing of the sort" being fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law practitioner and officer of the Court;
that as a former newspaperman, he would not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of the
Complaint to the press in envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would have written stories about
the case in a manner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicy articles perhaps, something that would
have further subjected the respondent justices to far worse publicity;" that, on the contrary, the press
conference scheduled by Ilustre was cancelled through his efforts in order to prevent any further adverse
publicity resulting from the filing of the complaint before the Tanodbayan; that, as a matter of fact, it was this
Court's Resolution that was serialized in the Bulletin Today, which newspaper also made him the subject of
a scathing editorial but that he "understands the cooperation because after all, the Court rendered a
favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year;" that he considered it "below his dignity to plead for
the chance to present his side" with the Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez, "a long-time personal friend" since he
"can afford to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the Honorable Court uphold its integrity;" that he was
called by a reporter of DZRH and was asked to comment on the case filed before the Tanodbayan but that
his remarks were confined to the filing of the case by Ilustre herself, and that the judgment of the trial Court
had attained its finality long ago; that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and did not prepare
the complaint filed before it, his professional services having been terminated upon the final dismissal of
Ilustre's case before this Court; that similarities in the language and phraseology used in the Ilustre letters,
in pleadings before this Court and before the Tanodbayan do not prove his authorship since other lawyers
"even of a mediocre caliber" could very easily have reproduced them; that the discussions on the merits in
the Per Curiam Resolution are "more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M. Gonzales
being competent to deal with the case before him;" that he takes exception to the accusation that he has
manifested lack of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the two highest Courts of the land, all he did
having been to call attention to errors or injustice committed in the promulgation of judgments or orders;
that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or abetted and could not have prevented the contemptuous
statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of Eva Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer his client when
these alleged acts were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the reminder on the first duty of a lawyer

which is to the Court and not to his client, a duty that he has always impressed upon his law students;" and
finally, that "for the record, he is sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the complaint
against the Justices before the Tanodbayan."
In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her main ground the alleged
deprivation of her constitutional right to due process. She maintains that as contempt proceedings are
commonly treated as criminal in nature, the mode of procedure and rules of evidence in criminal
prosecution should be assimilated, as far as practicable, in this proceeding, and that she should be given
every opportunity to present her side. Additionally, she states that, with some sympathetic lawyers, they
made an "investigation" and learned that the Resolution of the First Division was arrived at without any
deliberation by its members; that Court personnel were "tight-lipped about the matter, which is shrouded
mystery" thereby prompting her to pursue a course which she thought was legal and peaceful; that there is
nothing wrong in making public the manner of voting by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she
addressed Identical letters to Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani Cruz and
Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of my opponents were not a Solicitor General, and member of the
Supreme Court and a Division Chairman, respectively, the resolution of May 14, 1986 would not have
aroused my suspicion;" that instead of taking the law into her own hands or joining any violent movement,
she took the legitimate step of making a peaceful investigation into how her case was decided, and brought
her grievance to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against those whom she felt had committed injustice
against her "in an underhanded manner."
We deny reconsideration in both instances.
The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit. What due process
abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438 [1981]).
The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of
this Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the
reasons why he should not be subjected to dispose action. His Answer, wherein he prayed that the action
against him be dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also
given a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or the
official actions of the Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the contempt
proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced. Both were afforded
ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having authored the letters written by Ilustre, his
being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed
before said body, and his having committed acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court believed
otherwise and found that those letters and the charges levelled against the Justices concerned, of
themselves and by themselves, betray not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but also the
lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete obliviousness to the fundamental principle
of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the cardinal doctrine of independence of the
Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to have been said or proven. The necessity to conduct
any further evidentially hearing was obviated (See People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April
19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and Ilustre were given ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in
fact, heard.
(1)
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his Answer to the show-cause
Resolution that his professional services were terminated by Ilustre after the dismissal of the main petition
by this Court; that he had nothing to do with the contemptuous letters to the individual Justices; and that he
is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan.
Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre's Complaint was
furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the complainant" at his address of record. Of note, too, is the fact

that it was he who was following up the Complaint before the Tanodbayan and, after its dismissal, the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.
Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this Court, that after having failed
to serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at her
address of record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City," having been informed that she is 6 not a
resident of the place," he proceeded to the residence of Atty. Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily
received the two copies of decision for her husband and for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. 11).
That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs. Laureta is shown by the
fact that she filed, as of March 27, 1987, a "Petition for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration"
and subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the
Resolution on March 12, 1987, the very same date Mrs. Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the
lawyer-client relationship between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedly completely severed, all Mrs.
Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copy intended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on
Atty. Laureta proved to be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie- up between the corespondents is
heightened by the fact that three process servers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per
Curiam Resolution on Ilustre personally.
Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a "reporter" of
DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the
complaint, he would not have been pinpointed at all. And if his disclaimer were the truth, the logical step for
him to have taken was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of
elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did nothing of the sort. " He gave his comment with alacrity.
The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces when he asserts in his
Motion for Reconsideration that he "understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the
serialized publication of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing
editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin
union case last year." The malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming of an officer of the Court
and is an added reason for denying reconsideration.
Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court's Per Curiam
Resolution are more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, forgetting, however, his own discourse on the
merits in his Answer to this Court's Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He thus incorrigibly insists on
subordinating the Judiciary to the executive notwithstanding the categorical pronouncement in the Per
Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code has no application to the
members of a collegiate Court; that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the
ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended dissertation in the
same Per Curiam Resolution on the fundamental principle of separation of powers and of checks and
balances, pursuant to which it is this Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with
finality all justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its
judgments or declare them 'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound
practice."
Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of this Court are
belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance for the "adverse publicity"
generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned before the Tanodbayan rings with
insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that very purpose. The threat to bring the case
to "another forum of justice" was implemented to the fun. Besides, he misses the heart of the matter.
Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupational hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary
sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to destroy
the "authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme

Court as the final arbiter of all justifiable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the
Courts and the Justices concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice.
In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that would call for a modification,
much less a reversal, of our finding that he is guilty of grave professional misconduct that renders him unfit
to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to an attorney and officer of the
Court.
(2)
Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned deaf ears to any reason or
clarification. She and her counsel have refused to accept the untenability of their case and the inevitability
of losing in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone to blind their actions and in so doing degraded the
administration of justice. "Investigation" was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court,
be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation. The fact that no dissent was indicated
in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986 showed that the members of the Division voted
unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case because all deliberations
are held behind closed doors without any one of them being present. No malicious inferences should have
been drawn from their inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired The personality of
the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It was Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who
was Chairman of the First Division when the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was
rendered. Thereafter Justice Yap inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en
banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the First Division emphasizes the irrespective of Ilustre's case
irrespective of the personalities involved.
Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process servers the run-around.
Three of them failed to serve on her personally her copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution of March 12,
1987 at her address of record. Mrs. Laureta informed process server Lorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre was
residing at 17-D, Quezon St., Tondo, Manila. Romeo C. Regala, another process server, went to that
address to serve copy of the Resolution but he reported:
4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of ms.Eva Maravilla-Ilustre, said
address could not be located;
5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17 Quezon Street, Tondo,
Manila, and they informed that there is no such Ms. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre in the
neighborhood and/or in the vicinity; ... (p. 672, Rollo, Vol. 11).
The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy of this Court's Resolution on
Ilustre. He reported:
2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house in the address furnished at;
the notice of judgment (101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City), and was received by an
elderly woman who admitted to be the owner of the house but vehemently refused to be
Identified, and told me that she does not know the addressee Maravilla, and told me further
that she always meets different persons looking for Miss Maravilla because the latter always
gives the address of her house;
3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in the same place trying to
serve a resolution to Miss Maravilla which was returned unserved because she is not known
in the place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).

And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for Reconsideration she persists in giving
that address at 101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers were told that she
was not a resident of and that she was unknown thereat. If for her contumacious elusiveness and lack of
candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further standing before this Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G. Laureta for the setting
aside of the order suspending him from the practice of law, and of Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the lifting of the
penalty for contempt are DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustre shall pay the fine of
P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10) days from notice, or, suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days upon
failure to pay said fine within the stipulated period.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., * took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P.,
HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F.
SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P.,
EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S.
ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR
MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of
the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform
Decree of 1977."
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National
Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest
common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the
outcome of the reliefs prayed for" 1 listed the grounds relied upon in this petition as follows:

A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE

FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC
MONEYS.
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE
CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR
WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO
OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE
CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE.
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT
AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. 2
Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated September 19, 1985, the
Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were
allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy fit for
resolution or determination. He further contended that the provision under consideration was enacted
pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie
from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the
latter's sphere of responsibility.
On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. This, they did,
stating, among others, that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold the
resolution of the present case in abeyance "until developments arise to enable the parties to concretize
their respective stands." 3
Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder. The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a
motion to dismiss, setting forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly rendered the instant
petition moot and academic. He likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) 4 as basis for the petition's dismissal.
In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R. Nos. 6837981, September 22, 1986, We stated that:
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondents both of whom have gone their
separate ways could be a convenient justification for dismissing the case. But there are
larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal
ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible
terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and
tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience
of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice.
The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because

the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there
are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless
cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the
outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well as to avoid great disservice to national
interest that We take cognizance of this petition and thus deny public respondents' motion to dismiss.
Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new Constitution, ratified by the Filipino people in the plebiscite held
on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution under Section
24[5], Article VI. And while Congress has not officially reconvened, We see no cogent reason for further
delaying the resolution of the case at bar.
The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant consideration. The case of Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of petitioners' locus standi. Thus:
Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds,
upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose
of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds which may
be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Although there are some decisions to the contrary,
the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite
standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not
only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may
therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys. [ 11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied. ]
Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said that as
regards taxpayers' suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of
Section 44 provides:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are
included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment.
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of constitutional commis ions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the
1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of

the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the
constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting
an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body
concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be
transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such
transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government
branch or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section
16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or
not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or
whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It
does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an
undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public
funds, provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was
foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the
appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions
on the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an
item to another [See. 16(5) and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all
safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts
all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority
bestowed upon the President, "... Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of
unfunded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for
budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic]
public money not on the basis of development priorities but on political and personal expediency." 5 The
contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to
Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch of the
government against a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of
responsibility.
Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little, Brown
and Company, Boston, explained:
... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of equal
dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or
indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or
supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of power which,
by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of
government, but it does not make any one of the three departments subordinate to another,
when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may declare legislative enactments
unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in
degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the cases
which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law,
whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or
revise the legislative action, but to enforce the legislative will, and it is only where they find

that the legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to
disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every private citizen may do in
respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges assumed to act and to render
judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority, the judges claim
no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will. If an act of the
legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative
power, but because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of the
people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives expressed in
any law." [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v.
Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary
cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the
scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of
the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the
Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII,
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as
part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power this
Court has exercised in many instances. *
Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law which We have earlier
mentioned to be constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot therefore accord them the
protection sought as they are not acting within their "sphere of responsibility" but without it.
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution brought about by the
plundering of the Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision which allows even the
slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad experience cannot remain written in our statute books.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is
hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDER RED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
4 The relevant portions read as follows:
The Court developed, for its own governance in the case confessedly within its jurisdiction, a
series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional
questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary
proceeding, declining because to decide such questions "is legitimate only in the last resort,
and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
individuals. It never was the thought tht, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the
legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative
act." Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345.
2. The Court will not "anticipate question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it." Liverpool. N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33, 39 ... "It

is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case. 'Burton v. United States. 196 U.S. 283, 295.
3. The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied." Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration
Commissioners, supra.
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.
This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538. Appeals from the
highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution
are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state
ground. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation. Tyler v. The Judges, 179 U.S. 405; Hendrick v.
Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 621. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking
than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus,
the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not
be entertained..... In Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a
suit brought by a citizenwho sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, the challenge of the federal
Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its
citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who
has availed himself of its benefits. Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, 124, U.S.
581 . . .
7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.' Cromwell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62." [pp. 176-177, Rollo].
INS v. CHADHA
462 U.S. 919 (1983)
Decided June 23, 1983
Solicitor General Lee reargued the cause for the Immigration and Naturalization Service in all cases. Alan B.
Morrison reargued the cause for Jagdish Rai Chadha in all cases. Antonin Scalia, Richard B. Smith, and David Ryrie
Brink filed a brief for the American Bar Association as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN,
STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171.... Each presents a challenge to the constitutionality of the
provision in 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 216, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1254(c) (2),
authorizing one House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to

authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a particular deportable alien to
remain in the United States.
I
Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds a British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the United
States in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa. His visa expired on June 30, 1972. On October 11, 1973, the District
Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered Chadha to show cause why he should not be deported
for having "remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted." Pursuant to 242(b) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C. 1252(b), a deportation hearing was held before an Immigration Judge on January
11, 1974. Chadha conceded that he was deportable for overstaying his visa and the hearing was adjourned to enable
him to file an application for suspension of deportation under 244(a)(1) of the Act. Section 244(a)(1), at the time in
question, provided:
"As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and
adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who
applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and "(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this
subsection; has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven
years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and
is a person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney
General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence."
After Chadha submitted his application for suspension of deportation, the deportation hearing was resumed on
February 7, 1974. On the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affidavits submitted with the application, and the
results of a character investigation conducted by the INS, the Immigration Judge, on June 25, 1974, ordered that
Chadha's deportation be suspended. The Immigration Judge found that Chadha met the requirements of 244(a)(1): he
had resided continuously in the United States for over seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer
"extreme hardship" if deported.
Pursuant to 244(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(1), the Immigration Judge suspended Chadha's deportation and a
report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress....
Once the Attorney General's recommendation for suspension of Chadha's deportation was conveyed to Congress,
Congress had the power under 244(c)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(c) (2), to veto the Attorney General's determination
that Chadha should not be deported. Section 244(c)(2) provides: "(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1)
of subsection (a) of this subsection -"if during the session of the Congress at which a case is reported, or prior to the
close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, either the Senate or the
House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such
deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his
own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither
the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation
proceedings."
The June 25, 1974, order of the Immigration Judge suspending Chadha's deportation remained outstanding as a valid
order for a year and a half. For reasons not disclosed by the record, Congress did not exercise the veto authority
reserved to it under 244(c)(2) until the first session of the 94th Congress. This was the final session in which
Congress, pursuant to 244(c)(2), could act to veto the Attorney General's determination that Chadha should not be
deported. The session ended on December 19, 1975. Absent congressional action, Chadha's deportation proceedings
would have been canceled after this date and his status adjusted to that of a permanent resident alien.
On December 12, 1975, Representative Eilberg, Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration,
Citizenship, and International Law, introduced a resolution opposing "the granting of permanent residence in the
United States to [six] aliens," including Chadha. The resolution was referred to the House Committee on the
Judiciary. On December 16, 1975, the resolution was discharged from further consideration by the House Committee
on the Judiciary and submitted to the House of Representatives for a vote. The resolution had not been printed and was
not made available to other Members of the House prior to or at the time it was voted on. So far as the record before
us shows, the House consideration of the resolution was based on Representative Eilberg's statement from the floor
that

"[i]t was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340 cases, that the aliens contained in the resolution
[Chadha and five others] did not meet these statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and it
is the opinion of the committee that their deportation should not be suspended."
The resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote.Since the House action was pursuant to 244(c)(2), the
resolution was not treated as an Art. I legislative act; it was not submitted to the Senate or presented to the President
for his action.
After the House veto of the Attorney General's decision to allow Chadha to remain in the United States, the
Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House order deporting Chadha. Chadha
moved to terminate the proceedings on the ground that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Immigration Judge held that
he had no authority to rule on the constitutional validity of 244(c)(2). On November 8, 1976, Chadha was ordered
deported pursuant to the House action.
Chadha appealed the deportation order to the Board of Immigration Appeals, again contending that 244(c)(2) is
unconstitutional. The Board held that it had "no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress" and Chadha's
appeal was dismissed.
Pursuant to 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a), Chadha filed a petition for review of the deportation order in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and Naturalization Service agreed with
Chadha's position before the Court of Appeals and joined him in arguing that 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional.
After full briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals held that the House was without constitutional authority to
order Chadha's deportation; accordingly it directed the Attorney General "to cease and desist from taking any steps to
deport this alien based upon the resolution enacted by the House of Representatives." The essence of its holding was
that 244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
We granted certiorari and we now affirm....
II
The contentions on standing and justiciability have been fully examined, and we are satisfied the parties are properly
before us. The important issues have been fully briefed and twice argued. The Court's duty in these cases, as Chief
Justice Marshall declared, is clear: "Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All
we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty."
III
A
We turn now to the question whether action of one House of Congress under 244(c)(2) violates strictures of the
Constitution. We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the
concern of the courts; if a challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained....By the same
token, the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.... Convenience and efficiency are not
the primary objectives - or the hallmarks - of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted
by the fact that congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate
authority to executive and independent agencies: Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law, 295
congressional veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196 different statutes...
JUSTICE WHITE undertakes to make a case for the proposition that the one-House veto is a useful "political
invention," and we need not challenge that assertion. We can even concede this utilitarian argument although the
longrange political wisdom of this "invention" is arguable....
Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress
and of the Executive in the legislative process. Since the precise terms of those familiar provisions are critical to the
resolution of these cases, we set them out verbatim. Article I provides:
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist
of a Senate and House of Representatives." Art. I, 1.

"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a
law, be presented to the President of the United States . . . ." Art. I, 7, cl. 2.
"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may
be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States;
and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be
repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations
prescribed in the Case of a Bill." Art. I, 7, cl. 3.
These provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers. We have recently
noted that "[t]he principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the
Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787." [W]e see that the
purposes underlying the Presentment Clauses, Art. I, 7, cls. 2, 3, and the bicameral requirement of Art. I, 1, and 7, cl.
2, guide our resolution of the important question presented in these cases. The very structure of the Articles delegating
and separating powers under Arts. I, II, and III exemplifies the concept of separation of powers, and we now turn to
Art. I.
B The Presentment Clauses
The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that the requirement that all legislation be presented to the
President before becoming law was uniformly accepted by the Framers. Presentment to the President and the
Presidential veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure that these requirements
could not be circumvented. During the final debate on Art. I, 7, cl. 2, James Madison expressed concern that it might
easily be evaded by the simple expedient of calling a proposed law a "resolution" or "vote" rather than a "bill." As a
consequence, Art. I, 7, cl. 3, was added.
The decision to provide the President with a limited and qualified power to nullify proposed legislation by veto was
based on the profound conviction of the Framers that the powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be most
carefully circumscribed. It is beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both Houses and the
President....
The President's role in the lawmaking process also reflects the Framers' careful efforts to check whatever propensity a
particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered measures....
C Bicameralism
The bicameral requirement of Art. I, 1, 7, was of scarcely less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto
and indeed the two concepts are interdependent. By providing that no law could take effect without the concurrence of
the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the Framers reemphasized their belief, already remarked upon
in connection with the Presentment Clauses, that legislation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and
fully considered by the Nation's elected officials. In the Constitutional Convention debates on the need for a bicameral
legislature, James Wilson, later to become a Justice of this Court, commented:
"Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes. sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a military, one.
Is there danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be
not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within
itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single house there is no check, but the inadequate one, of
the virtue & good sense of those who compose it."
Hamilton argued that a Congress comprised of a single House was antithetical to the very purposes of the
Constitution. Were the Nation to adopt a Constitution providing for only one legislative organ, he warned:
"[W]e shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus
entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever
contrived. Thus we should create in reality that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution
either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert." T
This view was rooted in a general skepticism regarding the fallibility of human nature later commented on by Joseph
Story:
"Public bodies, like private persons, are occasionally under the dominion of strong passions and excitements;
impatient, irritable, and impetuous. . . . If [a legislature] feels no check but its own will, it rarely has the
firmness to insist upon holding a question long enough under its own view, to see and mark it in all its
bearings and relations on society."
These observations are consistent with what many of the Framers expressed, none more cogently than Madison in
pointing up the need to divide and disperse power in order to protect liberty:

"In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this
inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of
election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common
functions and their common dependence on the society will admit."
....We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the Presentment
Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions....It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in
Art. I, 1, 7, represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.
IV
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories,
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would confine
itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the
outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.
Although not "hermetically" sealed from one another, the powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally
identifiable. When any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it....
Beginning with this presumption, we must nevertheless establish that the challenged action under 244(c)(2) is of the
kind to which the procedural requirements of Art. I, 7, apply. Not every action taken by either House is subject to the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I. Whether actions taken by either House are, in law and fact, an
exercise of legislative power depends not on their form but upon "whether they contain matter which is properly to be
regarded as legislative in its character and effect."
Examination of the action taken here by one House pursuant to 244(c)(2) reveals that it was essentially legislative in
purpose and effect. In purporting to exercise power defined in Art. I, 8, cl. 4, to "establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization," the House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations
of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the Legislative Branch.
Section 244(c)(2) purports to authorize one House of Congress to require the Attorney General to deport an individual
alien whose deportation otherwise would be canceled under 244. The one-House veto operated in these cases to
overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation; absent the House action, Chadha would remain in
the United States. Congress has acted and its action has altered Chadha's status.
The legislative character of the one-House veto in these cases is confirmed by the character of the congressional action
it supplants. Neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate contends that, absent the veto provision in 244(c)(2),
either of them, or both of them acting together, could effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once
the Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively delegated authority, had determined the alien should remain in the
United States. Without the challenged provision in 244(c)(2), this could have been achieved, if at all, only by
legislation requiring deportation. Similarly, a veto by one House of Congress under 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an
attempt at amending the standards set out in 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of 244 as applied to Chadha. Amendment and
repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I.
The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House veto in these cases further manifests its legislative
character. After long experience with the clumsy, time-consuming private bill procedure, Congress made a deliberate
choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable
aliens to remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice to delegate
authority is precisely the kind of decision that can be implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in
Art. I. Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's deportation - that is, Congress' decision to
deport Chadha - no less than Congress' original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that
decision, involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed
by presentment to the President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively
altered or revoked....
Clearly, when the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one House, independent of the other House, or of the
President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms. These carefully defined exceptions from presentment and
bicameralism underscore the difference between the legislative functions of Congress and other unilateral but
important and binding one-House acts provided for in the Constitution. These exceptions are narrow, explicit, and
separately justified; none of them authorize the action challenged here. On the contrary, they provide further support

for the conclusion that congressional authority is not to be implied and for the conclusion that the veto provided for in
244(c)(2) is not authorized by the constitutional design of the powers of the Legislative Branch.
Since it is clear that the action by the House under 244(c)(2) was not within any of the express constitutional
exceptions authorizing one House to act alone, and equally clear that it was an exercise of legislative power, that
action was subject to the standards prescribed in Art. I. The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the
President's veto, and Congress' power to override a veto were intended to erect enduring checks on each Branch and to
protect the people from the improvident exercise of power by mandating certain prescribed steps. To preserve those
checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be
eroded. To accomplish what has been attempted by one House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity
with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both
Houses and presentment to the President.
The veto authorized by 244(c)(2) doubtless has been in many respects a convenient shortcut; the "sharing" with the
Executive by Congress of its authority over aliens in this manner is, on its face, an appealing compromise. In purely
practical terms, it is obviously easier for action to be taken by one House without submission to the President; but it is
crystal clear from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the Framers ranked other
values higher than efficiency....
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental
processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men
who had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked. There is no
support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often
encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the
President. With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way
to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution.
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
Today the Court not only invalidates 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell
for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a "legislative veto." For this reason, the
Court's decision is of surpassing importance. And it is for this reason that the Court would have been well advised to
decide the cases, if possible, on the narrower grounds of separation of powers, leaving for full consideration the
constitutionality of other congressional review statutes operating on such varied matters as war powers and agency
rulemaking, some of which concern the independent regulatory agencies.
The prominence of the legislative veto mechanism in our contemporary political system and its importance to
Congress can hardly be overstated. It has become a central means by which Congress secures the accountability of
executive and independent agencies. Without the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson's choice: either to
refrain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite
specificity to cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate
its law-making function to the Executive Branch and independent agencies. To choose the former leaves major
national problems unresolved; to opt for the latter risks unaccountable policymaking by those not elected to fill that
role. Accordingly, over the past five decades, the legislative veto has been placed in nearly 200 statutes. The device is
known in every field of governmental concern: reorganization, budgets, foreign affairs, war powers, and regulation of
trade, safety, energy, the environment, and the economy....
The history of the legislative veto also makes clear that it has not been a sword with which Congress has struck out to
aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches - the concerns of Madison and Hamilton. Rather, the veto has
been a means of defense, a reservation of ultimate authority necessary if Congress is to fulfill its designated role under
Art. I as the Nation's lawmaker. While the President has often objected to particular legislative vetoes, generally those
left in the hands of congressional Committees, the Executive has more often agreed to legislative review as the price
for a broad delegation of authority. To be sure, the President may have preferred unrestricted power, but that could be
precisely why Congress thought it essential to retain a check on the exercise of delegated authority.
For all these reasons, the apparent sweep of the Court's decision today is regretable....

United States Supreme Court

GOLDWATER v. CARTER, (1979)
No. 79-856
Argued:

Decided: December 13, 1979

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
ORDER
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case
is remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint.
Mr. Justice POWELL, concurring.
Although I agree with the result reached by the Court, I would dismiss the complaint as not ripe for judicial
review.
I
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 113-114 (1976) (per curiam ). Prudential considerations persuade me that a dispute
between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken
action asserting its constitutional authority. Differences between the President and the Congress are
commonplace under our system. The differences should, and almost invariably do, turn on political rather
than legal considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power
between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse. Otherwise,
we would encourage small groups or even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of
issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to resolve the conflict.
Mr. Justice MARSHALL concurs in the result.
Mr. Justice POWELL concurs in the judgment [444 U.S. 996 , 997] and has filed a statement.
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST concurs in the judgment and has filed a statement in which Mr. Chief Justice
BURGER, Mr. Justice STEWART, and Mr. Justice STEVENS join.
Mr. Justice WHITE and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN join in the grant of the petition for a writ of certiorari but
would set the case for argument and give it plenary consideration. Mr. Justice BLACKMUN has filed a
statement in which Mr. Justice WHITE joins.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN would grant the petition for certiorari and affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and has filed a statement.
In this case, a few Members of Congress claim that the President's action in terminating the treaty with
Taiwan has deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to [444 U.S. 996 , 998] a change in the
supreme law of the land. Congress has taken no official action. In the present posture of this case, we do not
know whether there ever will be an actual confrontation between the Legislative and Executive Branches.
Although the Senate has considered a resolution declaring that Senate approval is necessary for the
termination of any mutual defense treaty, see 125 Cong.Rec. S7015, S7038-S7039 (June 6, 1979), no final

vote has been taken on the resolution. See id., at S16683-S16692 (Nov. 15, 1979). Moreover, it is unclear
whether the resolution would have retroactive effect. See id., at S7054-S7064 (June 6, 1979); id., at S7862
(June 18, 1979). It cannot be said that either the Senate or the House has rejected the President's claim. If
the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do so. I therefore concur in the
dismissal of this case.
II
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST suggests, however, that the issue presented by this case is a nonjusticiable
political question which can never be considered by this Court. I cannot agree. In my view, reliance upon
the political-question doctrine is inconsistent with our precedents. As set forth in the seminal case of Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the doctrine incorporates three inquiries: (i) Does the issue involve
resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government?
(ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do
prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention? In my opinion the answer to each of these
inquiries would require us to decide this case if it were ready for review.
First, the existence of "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department," ibid., turns on an examination of the constitutional provisions governing the exercise
of the power in question. [444 U.S. 996 , 999] Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 ( 1969). No
constitutional provision explicitly confers upon the President the power to terminate treaties. Further, Art.
II, 2, of the Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with the advice and consent of the
Senate. Article VI provides that treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land. These provisions add
support to the view that the text of the Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to
terminate treaties to the President alone. Cf. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 (1973); Luther v. Borden, 7
How. 1, 42 (1849).
Second, there is no "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" this case; nor is
a decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."
Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S., at 217 . We are asked to decide whether the President may terminate a treaty
under the Constitution without congressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be easy, but it
only requires us to apply normal principles of interpretation to the constitutional provisions at issue. See
Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395 U.S., at 548 -549. The present case involves neither review of the
President's activities as Commander in Chief nor impermissible interference in the field of foreign affairs.
Such a case would arise if we were asked to decide, for example, whether a treaty required the President to
order troops into a foreign country. But " it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S., at 211 . This case "touches"
foreign relations, but the question presented to us concerns only the constitutional division of power
between Congress and the President.
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I find inherent in Mr. Justice REHNQUIST's
opinion concurring in the judgment. Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty with a
foreign country and announced that it [444 U.S. 996 , 1000] would go into effect despite its rejection by
the Senate. Under Mr. Justice REHNQUIST's analysis that situation would present a political question even
though Art. II, 2, clearly would resolve the dispute. Although the answer to the hypothetical case seems selfevident because it demands textual rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue presented is
no different from the issue presented in the case before us. In both cases, the Court would interpret the
Constitution to decide whether congressional approval is necessary to give a Presidential decision on the
validity of a treaty the force of law. Such an inquiry demands no special competence or information beyond
the reach of the Judiciary. Cf. Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111 (1948).1

Finally, the political-question doctrine rests in part on prudential concerns calling for mutual respect
among the three branches of Government . Thus, the Judicial Branch should avoid "the potentiality of
embarrassment [that would result] from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question." Similarly, the doctrine restrains judicial action where there is an "unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made." Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S., at 217 .
If this case were ripe for judicial review, see Part I supra, none of these prudential considerations would be
present. [444 U.S. 996 , 1001] Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of respect for a
coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395 U.S., at 548 . If the President and the Congress had
reached irreconcilable positions, final disposition of the question presented by this case would eliminate,
rather than create, multiple constitutional interpretations. The specter of the Federal Government brought
to a halt because of the mutual intransigence of the President and the Congress would require this Court to
provide a resolution pursuant to our duty " 'to say what the law is.' " United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
703 d 1039 (1974), quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 ( 1803).
III
In my view, the suggestion that this case presents a political question is incompatible with this Court's
willingness on previous occasions to decide whether one branch of our Government has impinged upon the
power of another. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 138 ; United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U.S., at 707 ;
The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 676 -678 (1929 ); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 2 Under
the [444 U.S. 996 , 1002] criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, we have the responsibility to decide whether
both the Executive and Legislative Branches have constitutional roles to play in termination of a treaty. If
the Congress, by appropriate formal action, had challenged the President's authority to terminate the treaty
with Taiwan, the resulting uncertainty could have serious consequences for our country. In that situation, it
would be the duty of this Court to resolve the issue.
Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice STEWART, and Mr. Justice
STEVENS join, concurring in the judgment.
I am of the view that the basic question presented by the petitioners in this case is "political" and therefore
nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country's foreign
relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the
President. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), a case in which members of the Kansas Legislature
brought an action attacking a vote of the State Senate in favor of the ratification of the Child Labor
Amendment, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes wrote in what is referred to as the "Opinion of the Court":
"We think that . . . the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of previous
rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political
departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation
of the adoption of the Amendment.
"The precise question as now raised is whether, when the legislature of the State, as we have found, has
actually ratified the proposed amendment, the Court should [444 U.S. 996 , 1003] restrain the state
officers from certifying the ratification to the Secretary of State, because of an earlier rejection, and thus
prevent the question from coming before the political departments. We find no basis in either Constitution
or statute for such judicial action. Article V, speaking solely of ratification, contains no provision as to
rejection. . . ." Id., at 450.

Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion concluded that "Congress in controlling the promulgation of the
adoption of a constitutional amendment has the final determination of the question whether by lapse of
time its proposal of the amendment had lost its vitality prior to the required ratifications." Id., at 456.
I believe it follows a fortiori from Coleman that the controversy in the instant case is a nonjusticiable
political dispute that should be left for resolution by the Executive and Legislative Branches of the
Government . Here, while the Constitution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall participate
in the ratification of a treaty, it is silent as to that body's participation in the abrogation of a treaty. In this
respect the case is directly analogous to Coleman, supra. As stated in Dyer v. Blair, 390 F.Supp. 1291, 1302
(N.D.Ill.1975) (three-judge court):
"A question that might be answered in different ways for different amendments must surely be controlled
by political standards rather than standards easily characterized as judicially manageable."
In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty, and the fact
that different termination procedures may be appropriate for different treaties (see, e. g., n. 1, infra ), the
instant case in my view also "must surely be controlled by political standards."
I think that the justifications for concluding that the question here is political in nature are even more
compelling than in Coleman because it involves foreign relations-specifically [444 U.S. 996 , 1004] a treaty
commitment to use military force in the defense of a foreign government if attacked. In United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), this Court said:
"Whether, if the Joint Resolution had related solely to internal affairs it would be open to the challenge that
it constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the Executive, we find it unnecessary to
determine. The whole aim of the resolution is to affect a situation entirely external to the United States, and
falling within the category of foreign affairs. . . ." Id., at 315.
The present case differs in several important respects from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952), cited by petitioners as authority both for reaching the merits of this dispute and for
reversing the Court of Appeals. In Youngstown, private litigants brought a suit contesting the President's
authority under his war powers to seize the Nation's steel industry, an action of profound and demonstrable
domestic impact. Here, by contrast, we are asked to settle a dispute between coequal branches of our
Government, each of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests, resources not
available to private litigants outside the judicial forum. 1 Moreover, as in Curtiss-Wright, the [444 U.S. 996 ,
1005] effect of this action, as far as we can tell, is "entirely external to the United States, and [falls] within
the category of foreign affairs." Finally, as already noted, the situation presented here is closely akin to that
presented in Coleman, where the Constitution spoke only to the procedure for ratification of an
amendment, not to its rejection.
Having decided that the question presented in this action is nonjusticiable, I believe that the appropriate
disposition is for this Court to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions for
the District Court to dismiss the complaint. This procedure derives support from our practice in disposing
of moot actions in federal courts. 2 For more than 30 years, we have instructed lower courts to vacate any
decision on the merits of an action that has become moot prior to a resolution of the case in this Court.
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). The Court has required such decisions to be
vacated in order to "prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal
consequences." Id., at 41. It is even more imperative that this Court invoke this procedure to ensure that
resolution of a "political question," which should not have been decided by a lower court, does not " spawn
any legal consequences." An Art. III court's resolution of a question that is "political" in character can create
far more dis- [444 U.S. 996 , 1006] ruption among the three coequal branches of Government than the

resolution of a question presented in a moot controversy. Since the political nature of the questions
presented should have precluded the lower courts from considering or deciding the merits of the
controversy, the prior proceedings in the federal courts must be vacated, and the complaint dismissed.
Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Mr. Justice WHITE joins, dissenting in part.
In my view, the time factor and its importance are illusory; if the President does not have the power to
terminate the treaty (a substantial issue that we should address only after briefing and oral argument), the
notice of intention to terminate surely has no legal effect. It is also indefensible, without further study, to
pass on the issue of justiciability or on the issues of standing or ripeness. While I therefore join in the grant
of the petition for certiorari, I would set the case for oral argument and give it the plenary consideration it
so obviously deserves.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the order directing the District Court to dismiss this case, and would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it rests upon the President's well-established authority to
recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign governments. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27A-29A.
In stating that this case presents a nonjusticiable "political question," Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in my view,
profoundly misapprehends the political-question principle as it applies to matters of foreign relations .
Properly understood, the political-question doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an exercise of foreign
policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been "
constitutional[ly] commit[ted]." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. [444 U.S. 996 , 1007] 186, 211-213, 217 (1962). But
the doctrine does not pertain when a court is faced with the antecedent question whether a particular
branch has been constitutionally designated as the repository of political decisionmaking power. Cf. Powell
v. McCormack,395 U.S. 486 , 519-521 (1969). The issue of decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a
matter of constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it falls within the competence of the
courts.
The constitutional question raised here is prudently answered in narrow terms. Abrogation of the defense
treaty with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking Government, because
the defense treaty was predicated upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan Government was the only
legitimate political authority in China . Our cases firmly establish that the Constitution commits to the
President alone the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes. See Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964); Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S., at 212 ; United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 , 228-230, 62 S. Ct. 552 (1942). That mandate being clear, our judicial inquiry
into the treaty rupture can go no further. See Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S., at 212 ; United States v. Pink,
supra, 315 U.S., at 229

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101273 July 3, 1992
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner,
vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC

AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, THE TARIFF COMMISSION, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and
THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 27 November 1990, the President issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any
other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional
duty of five percent (5%) ad valorem. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported
articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. This additional duty was
subsequently increased from five percent (5%) ad valorem to nine percent (9%) ad valorem by the
promulgation of Executive Order No. 443, dated 3 January 1991.
On 24 July 1991, the Department of Finance requested the Tariff Commission to initiate the process
required by the Tariff and Customs Code for the imposition of a specific levy on crude oil and other
petroleum products, covered by HS Heading Nos. 27.09, 27.10 and 27.11 of Section 104 of the Tariff and
Customs Code as amended. Accordingly, the Tariff Commission, following the procedure set forth in
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, scheduled a public hearing to give interested parties an
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of their respective positions.
Meantime, Executive Order No. 475 was issued by the President, on 15 August 1991 reducing the rate of
additional duty on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem, except in
the cases of crude oil and other oil products which continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine
percent (9%) ad valorem.
Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission submitted to the President a "Report on
Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil Products" dated 16 August 1991, for consideration and appropriate
action. Seven (7) days later, the President issued Executive Order No. 478, dated 23 August 1991, which
levied (in addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem and all other
existing ad valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and
P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
In the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, petitioner assails the validity of Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows:
Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the
President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in
the nature of revenue-generating measures.
Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders No. 475 and 478 contravene Section 401 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, which Section authorizes the President, according to petitioner, to increase, reduce or
remove tariff duties or to impose additional duties only when necessary to protect local industries or
products but not for the purpose of raising additional revenue for the government.
Thus, petitioner questions first the constitutionality and second the legality of Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478, and asks us to restrain the implementation of those Executive Orders. We will examine these
questions in that order.

Before doing so, however, the Court notes that the recent promulgation of Executive Order No. 507 did not
render the instant Petition moot and academic. Executive Order No. 517 which is dated 30 April 1992
provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Lifting of the Additional Duty. The additional duty in the nature of ad
valorem imposed on all imported articles prescribed by the provisions of Executive Order No.
443, as amended, is hereby lifted;Provided, however, that the selected articles covered by
HS Heading Nos. 27.09 and 27.10 of Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as
amended, subject of Annex "A" hereof, shall continue to be subject to the additional duty of
nine (9%) percent ad valorem.
Under the above quoted provision, crude oil and other oil products continue to be subject to the
additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem under Executive Order No. 475 and to the special
duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products under
Executive Order No. 478.
Turning first to the question of constitutionality, under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the
enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the
Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the
President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI
of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
There is thus explicit constitutional permission 1 to Congress to authorize the President "subject to such
limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose" to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other
duties or imposts . . ."
The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, and Sections 104 and
401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are the provisions which the President explicitly invoked in
promulgating Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in
relevant part:
Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings and the rates of import
duty under Section 104 of Presidential Decree No. 34 and all subsequent amendments
issued under Executive Orders and Presidential Decrees are hereby adopted and form part
of this Code.
There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the rates of duty
indicated in the Section under this section except as otherwise specifically provided for in
this Code: Provided, that, the maximum rate shall not exceed one hundred per cent ad
valorem.
The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to Section Four Hundred
One of this Code shall be subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff Commission and may
be revised by the Presidentupon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority.
xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)
Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full:
Sec. 401. Flexible Clause.
a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, and subject
to the limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon recommendation of the National
Economic and Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby
empowered: (1) to increase, reduce or remove existing protective rates of import
duty (including any necessary change in classification). The existing rates may be increased
or decreased but in no case shall the reduced rate of import duty be lower than the basic
rate of ten (10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the increased rate of import duty be higher
than a maximum of one hundred (100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to establish import quota or
to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; and (3) to impose an additional duty
on all imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, whenever necessary; Provided,
That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the
NEDA, the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels granted in Section
One hundred and four of this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to this
section.
b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA pursuant to the
provisions of this section, except in the imposition of an additional duty not exceeding ten
(10) per cent ad valorem, the Commission shall conduct an investigation in the course of
which they shall hold public hearings wherein interested parties shall be afforded reasonable
opportunity to be present, produce evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also
hear the views and recommendations of any government office, agency or instrumentality
concerned. The Commission shall submit their findings and recommendations to the NEDA
within thirty (30) days after the termination of the public hearings.
c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of import duty within the limits
fixed in subsection "a" shall include the authority to modify the form of duty. In modifying the
form of duty, the corresponding ad valorem or specific equivalents of the duty with respect to
imports from the principal competing foreign country for the most recent representative
period shall be used as bases.
d. The Commissioner of Customs shall regularly furnish the Commission a copy of all
customs import entries as filed in the Bureau of Customs. The Commission or its duly
authorized representatives shall have access to, and the right to copy all liquidated customs
import entries and other documents appended thereto as finally filed in the Commission on
Audit.
e. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of
this section.
f. Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the provisions of this section shall take
effect thirty (30) days after promulgation, except in the imposition of additional duty not
exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem which shall take effect at the discretion of the
President. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, however, seeks to avoid the thrust of the delegated authorizations found in Sections 104 and
401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, by contending that the President is authorized to act under the Tariff

and Customs Codeonly "to protect local industries and products for the sake of the national economy,
general welfare and/or national security." 2 He goes on to claim that:
E.O. Nos. 478 and 475 having nothing to do whatsoever with the protection of local
industries and products for the sake of national economy, general welfare and/or national
security. On the contrary, they work in reverse, especially as to crude oil, an essential
product which we do not have to protect, since we produce only minimal quantities and have
to import the rest of what we need.
These Executive Orders are avowedly solely to enable the government to raise government
finances, contrary to Sections 24 and 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution, as well as to
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. 3 (Emphasis in the original)
The Court is not persuaded. In the first place, there is nothing in the language of either Section 104 or of
401 of the Tariff and Customs Code that suggest such a sharp and absolute limitation of authority. The
entire contention of petitioner is anchored on just two (2) words, one found in Section 401 (a)(1):
"existing protective rates of import duty," and the second in the proviso found at the end of Section 401
(a): "protection levels granted in Section 104 of this Code . . . . " We believe that the words "protective" and
''protection" are simply not enough to support the very broad and encompassing limitation which petitioner
seeks to rest on those two (2) words.
In the second place, petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of which this Court may
take judicial notice that the Bureau of Customs which administers the Tariff and Customs Code, is one of
the two (2) principal traditional generators or producers of governmental revenue, the other being the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. (There is a third agency, non-traditional in character, that generates lower but
still comparable levels of revenue for the government The Philippine Amusement and Games
Corporation [PAGCOR].)
In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very much like taxes
which are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and for regulatory purposes. 4 Thus, it has been held
that "customs duties" is "the name given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the
tariff or tax assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a foreign country." 5 The levying of
customs duties on imported goods may have in some measure the effect of protecting local industries
where such local industries actually exist and are producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however,
the very same customs duties inevitably have the effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs
duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy objective only. Most
commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the sense of exactions the proceeds of which become
public funds 6 have either or both the generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or social
activity as their moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to say which, in a particular instance, is
the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to
fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a special
duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products may be seen to have some "protective" impact upon
indigenous oil production. For the effective, price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At the
same time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the government are raised by the imposition
of such increased tariff rates or special duty.
In the fourth place, petitioner's concept which he urges us to build into our constitutional and customs law,
is a stiflingly narrow one. Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code establishes general standards with
which the exercise of the authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that
authority must be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security."
Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can
be secured by the exercise of that delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local industries" is
the sum total or the alpha and the omega of "the national economy, general welfare and/or national

security." We find it extremely difficult to take seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative
standards and policies summed up in Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of
consumers, who after all constitute the very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as important a
dimension of "the national economy, general welfare and national security" as the protection of local
industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even removed precisely for the purpose of protecting
consumers from the high prices and shoddy quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and
subsidized local manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community.
It seems also important to note that tariff rates are commonly established and the corresponding customs
duties levied and collected upon articles and goods which are not found at all and not produced in the
Philippines. The Tariff and Customs Code is replete with such articles and commodities: among the more
interesting examples are ivory (Chapter 5, 5.10); castoreum or musk taken from the beaver (Chapter 5,
5.14); Olives (Chapter 7, Notes); trufflesor European fungi growing under the soil on tree roots (Chapter 7,
Notes); dates (Chapter 8, 8.01); figs (Chapter 8, 8.03); caviar (Chapter 16, 16.01); aircraft (Chapter 88,
88.0l); special diagnostic instruments and apparatus for human medicine and surgery (Chapter 90,
Notes); X-ray generators; X-ray tubes;
X-ray screens, etc. (Chapter 90, 90.20); etc. In such cases, customs duties may be seen to be imposed
either for revenue purposes purely or perhaps, in certain cases, to discourage any importation of the items
involved. In either case, it is clear that customs duties are levied and imposed entirely apart from whether
or not there are any competing local industries to protect.
Accordingly, we believe and so hold that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which may be conceded to be
substantially moved by the desire to generate additional public revenues, are not, for that reason alone,
either constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner
has not successfully overcome the presumptions of constitutionality and legality to which those Executive
Orders are entitled. 7
The conclusion we have reached above renders it unnecessary to deal with petitioner's additional
contention that, should Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 be declared unconstitutional and illegal, there
should be a roll back of prices of petroleum products equivalent to the "resulting excess money not be
needed to adequately maintain the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF)." 8
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosilo, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 144463. January 14, 2004]
SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORSKI, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION and SPORTS AND GAMES ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to nullify the
Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, executed by
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) in favor of
respondent Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (also referred to as SAGE).
The facts may be summarized as follows:
PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation existing under Presidential Decree No.
1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos. Pertinent provisions of said enabling
law read:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all
games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following
objectives:
xxxxxxxxx
b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports, gaming pools
(basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance,
which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: x x x (3) minimize,
if not totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent in the conduct and operation
of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement.
xxxxxxxxx
TITLE IV GRANT OF FRANCHISE
Sec.10. Nature and term of franchise. Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the Corporation
is hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights,
privileges and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places,
sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football, lotteries, etc. whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Republic of the Philippines.
On March 31, 1998, PAGCORs board of directors approved an instrument denominated as Grant of
Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, which granted SAGE the
authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet Gaming
facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate
safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games.
On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia Ll. Reyes, and SAGE,
represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the
above-named document.
Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by conducting
gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available
at various Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games,
Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of
SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that
PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for
the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the

time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined
exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the internet, being an international network of computers,
necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to
operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation in PAGCORs franchise, under Section 14 of P.D. No.
1869 which provides:
Place. The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or games of chance on land or water within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x
Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of the
authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the
right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or
amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.
[1]
He contends that internet gambling could not have been included within the commonly accepted
definition of gambling casinos, clubs or other recreation or amusement places as these terms refer to a
physical structure in real-space where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance
authorized by law.
The issues raised by petitioner are as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT PAGCOR IS AUTHORIZED UNDER P.D. NO. 1869 TO
OPERATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES ON THE INTERNET;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION, OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT AUTHORIZED RESPONDENT SAGE TO OPERATE INTERNET
GAMBLING ON THE BASIS OF ITS RIGHT TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN GAMBLING
CASINOS, CLUBS AND OTHER AMUSEMENT PLACES UNDER SECTION 10 OF P.D. 1869;
III. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED AUTHORITY TO SAGE TO OPERATE
GAMBLING ACTIVITIES IN THE INTERNET.
The above-mentioned issues may be summarized into a single pivotal question: Does PAGCORs
legislative franchise include the right to vest another entity, SAGE in this case, with the authority to operate
Internet gambling? Otherwise put, does Presidential Decree No. 1869 authorize PAGCOR to contract any
part of its franchise to SAGE by authorizing the latter to operate Internet gambling?
Before proceeding with our main discussion, let us first try to hurdle a number of important procedural
matters raised by the respondents.
In their separate Comments, respondents PAGCOR and SAGE insist that petitioner has no legal
standing to file the instant petition as a concerned citizen or as a member of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that he is not a real party-in-interest entitled to the avails of the suit. In this light, they argue that
petitioner does not have the requisite personal and substantial interest to impugn the validity of PAGCORs
grant of authority to SAGE.
Objections to the legal standing of a member of the Senate or House of Representative to maintain a
suit and assail the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various
government agencies or instrumentalities are not without precedent. Ordinarily, before a member of
Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the government there
must be an unmistakable showing that the challenged official act affects or impairs his rights and

prerogatives as legislator.[2] However in a number of cases,[3] we clarified that where a case involves an
issue of utmost importance, or one of overreaching significance to society, the Court, in its discretion, can
brush aside procedural technicalities and take cognizance of the petition. Considering that the instant
petition involves legal questions that may have serious implications on public interests, we rule that
petitioner has the requisite legal standing to file this petition.
Respondents likewise urge the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition because under
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, these remedies should be directed to any tribunal,
board, officer or person whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. They maintain
that in exercising its legally-mandated franchise to grant authority to certain entities to operate a gambling
or gaming activity, PAGCOR is not performing a judicial or quasi-judicial act. Neither should the act of
granting licenses or authority to operate be construed as a purely ministerial act. According to them, in the
event that this Court takes cognizance of the instant petition, the same should be dismissed for failure of
petitioner to observe the hierarchy of courts.
Practically the same procedural infirmities were raised in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation where an almost identical factual setting obtained. Petitioners therein filed a petition
for injunction directly before the Court which sought to enjoin respondent from operating the jai-alai games
by itself or in joint venture with another corporate entity allegedly in violation of law and the Constitution.
Respondents contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to take original cognizance of a petition for
injunction because it was not one of the actions specifically mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 56 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondents likewise took exception to the alleged failure of petitioners to
observe the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. In brushing aside the apparent procedural lapse, we held that x
x x this Court has the discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition at bar if compelling reasons, or
the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.[4]
In the case at bar, we are not inclined to rule differently. The petition at bar seeks to nullify, via a
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed directly before this Court, the Grant of Authority and Agreement for
the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming by virtue of which SAGE was vested by PAGCOR with
the authority to operate on-line Internet gambling. It is well settled that averments in the complaint, and not
the nomenclature given by the parties, determine the nature of the action. [5] Although the petition alleges
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent PAGCOR, what it primarily seeks to accomplish is to
prevent the enforcement of the Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and
Internet Gaming. Thus, the action may properly be characterized as one for Prohibition under Section 2 of
Rule 65, which incidentally, is another remedy resorted to by petitioner.
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth;
hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the wellentrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.[6]
Having disposed of these procedural issues, we now come to the substance of the action.
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of
public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control
and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and
regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that
prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting
the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality

of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost
always defined in clear and unequivocal language.[7]
After a circumspect consideration of the foregoing discussion and the contending positions of the
parties, we hold that PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on or shared its
franchise to SAGE.
In the Del Mar case where a similar issue was raised when PAGCOR entered into a joint venture
agreement with two other entities in the operation and management of jai alai games, the Court, [8] in an En
Banc Resolution dated 24 August 2001, partially granted the motions for clarification filed by respondents
therein insofar as it prayed that PAGCOR has a valid franchise, but only by itself (i.e. not in association with
any other person or entity), to operate, maintain and/or manage the game of jai-alai.
In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the former grants the latter
the authority to operate and maintain sports betting stations and Internet gaming operations. In essence,
the grant of authority gives SAGE the privilege to actively participate, partake and share PAGCORs
franchise to operate a gambling activity. The grant of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right
and a duty to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily and
whimsically but must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and
conditionalities. A corporation as a creature of the State is presumed to exist for the common good. Hence,
the special privileges and franchises it receives are subject to the laws of the State and the limitations of its
charter. There is therefore a reserved right of the State to inquire how these privileges had been employed,
and whether they have been abused.[9]
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or management contracts, it is
not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable
franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle
of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has
been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v. Pacquing,[10] the Court clarified that since ADC has no
franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from
the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila. By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a
separate legislative franchise and not ride on PAGCORs franchise if it were to legally operate on-line
Internet gambling.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Grant of Authority
and Agreement to Operate Sports Betting and Internet Gaming executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is
declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17122

February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
Williams & Ferrier for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
JOHNS, J.:
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the
monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating
the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State,
to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material
provisions of which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the
consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose
of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.
(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the commodities referred
to or have such distribution or sale made by the Government itself.
(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or individual may acquire,
and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.
(d) . . .
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct the production or
milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices thereof; to corner or hoard said products
as defined in section three of this Act; . . .
Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this
Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.
SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders and decrees
promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousands pesos,
or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That in
the case of companies or corporations the manager or administrator shall be criminally liable.
SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall consider
that the public interest requires the application of the provisions of this Act, he shall so declare by
proclamation, and any provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporarily
suspended.
Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the Governor-General, with
the consent of the Council of State, shall declare the application of this Act to have likewise terminated,
and all laws temporarily suspended by virtue of the same shall again take effect, but such termination
shall not prevent the prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such termination, nor the
filing of any proceedings for an offense committed during the period covered by the Governor-General's
proclamation.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at
an excessive price as follows:

The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General
of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of
Act No. 2868, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang
Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty
centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the GovernorGeneral of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No.
2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53
of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the
sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that
the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published
on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the GovernorGeneral to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to
the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued
"for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General.
The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn." The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion
of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of
State," is authorized to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how
long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take
effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but
has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause,"
and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an
emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and
the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer
who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and
the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the GovernorGeneral found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the
seller commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in the
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute
the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law,
the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute
the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is
for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without
deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that
power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act
delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the
Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the GovernorGeneral, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868
is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make
rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no
delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a
law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the
Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183-187; 24 L. ed.,
94), first laid down the rule:

Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest and, under the
decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight
unless protected by their charters.
The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges for the
transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads of the State is not void as being
repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to that of the State.
It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being a public utility,
the State had power to establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger rates. This was followed by the
State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law, providing for, and empowering, a railroad commission to hear and
determine what was a just and reasonable rate. The constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of
State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held:
Regulations of railway tariffs Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. Under Laws 1887, c. 10, sec.
8, the determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as to what are equal and reasonable
fares and rates for the transportation of persons and property by a railway company is conclusive, and,
in proceedings by mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and published
by them, no issue can be raised or inquiry had on that question.
Same constitution Delegation of power to commission. The authority thus given to the
commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and judgement, what are equal and
reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power.
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides
That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and property shall be equal
and reasonable.
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate all the facts, to
hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not make the violation of the
order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is a civil proceeding. It was there held
That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well settled to require
either argument or citation of authority.
The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt rules and
regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into effect a law already passed, is
apparent. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law.
The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and reasonable. It had
the undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it deemed equal and reasonable.
They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the law shall be,
which would not be allowable, but have merely conferred upon it an authority and discretion, to be
exercised in the execution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The
legislature itself has passed upon the expediency of the law, and what is shall be. The commission is
intrusted with no authority or discretion upon these questions. It can neither make nor unmake a single
provision of law. It is merely charged with the administration of the law, and with no other power.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Dowling vs. Lancoshire Ins.
Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made."

The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so
that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of
the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not
be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire
insurance policies were required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it
leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or
other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed
fact or event.
The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United States vs. Grimaud (220 U.S., 506;
55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a trespass
on government land in a forest reserve were valid constitutional. The Act there provided that the Secretary of
Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure the object of such
reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from
destruction;and any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."
The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:
In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon stated terms or in stated
ways, the Secretary of Agriculture merely assert and enforces the proprietary right of the United States
over land which it owns. The regulation of the Secretary, therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or
even of administrative, power; but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized
agent to allow person having no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of proprietary control is
altogether different from governmental authority.
The opinion says:
From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring upon executive
officers power to make rules and regulations, not for the government of their departments, but for
administering the laws which did govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But when
Congress had legislated power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to
those who were to act under such general provisions "power to fill up the details" by the establishment of
administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment
fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed by Congress, or measured by the injury done.
That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recognized as vital to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."
If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove and grazed their
sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were making an unlawful use of the
government's property. In doing so they thereby made themselves liable to the penalty imposed by
Congress.
The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a forest reserve. He
is required to make provisions to protect them from depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized 'to
regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules
regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."
The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating legislative power. It will be noted
that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a public corporation, and that a railroad
was a public utility, and that, for such reasons, the legislature had the power to fix and determine just and
reasonable rates for freight and passengers.
The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the legislature could delegate the
power to ascertain the facts and determine from the facts what were just and reasonable rates,. and that in
vesting the commission with such power was not a delegation of legislative power.

The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of fire insurance," and the
court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain,
so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination
of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could
not be delegated."
The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.
These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority.
The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly
defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:
That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the
government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the
integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution.
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that
it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall
be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to
depend.
The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:
All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain closed until 5 o'clock on
the following morning, unless by special permission of the president.
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the Supreme Court of that State says:
We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to confer arbitrary power
upon an executive officer, and allows him, in executing the ordinance, to make unjust and groundless
discriminations among persons similarly situated; second, because the power to regulate saloons is a
law-making power vested in the village board, which cannot be delegated. A legislative body cannot
delegate to a mere administrative officer power to make a law, but it can make a law with provisions that
it shall go into effect or be suspended in its operations upon the ascertainment of a fact or state of facts
by an administrative officer or board. In the present case the ordinance by its terms gives power to the
president to decide arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when a saloon shall close. This is
an attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be sustained.
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and
that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any
price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any
price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and
without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.
The Executive order2 provides:
(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time being as follows:
In Manila
Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57 kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.

Rice at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.

Corn at P8 per sack of 57 kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.
In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the Manila price less the
cost of transportation from the source of supply and necessary handling expenses to the place of sale, to
be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the maximum price shall
be the authorized price at the place of supply or the Manila price as the case may be, plus the
transportation cost, from the place of supply and the necessary handling expenses, to the place of sale,
to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all
instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper
enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may
demand." The law is a general law and not a local or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and
different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices
to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the
Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are
hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and
Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities."
The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated
power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the Governor-General to fix one
price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize him to fix the price of rice in the
Philippine Islands under a law, which is General and uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the
law, the price of rice fixed in the proclamation must be the same all over the Islands. There cannot be one price
at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it is a mater of common knowledge, and of which this court will take
judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice with different and corresponding market values, and that there is
a wide range in the price, which varies with the grade and quality. Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in price for
the grade or quality of the rice, and the proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and convicted, fixes
the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of 57 kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to
all grades of rice, and says nothing about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law is confined to palay,
rice and corn. They are products of the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many
other things are also products. Any law which single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous other products of
the Islands is not general or uniform, but is a local or special law. If such a law is valid, then by the same
principle, the Governor-General could be authorized by proclamation to fix the price of meat, eggs, chickens,
coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the Islands. In the very nature of things, all of that class of
laws should be general and uniform. Otherwise, there would be an unjust discrimination of property rights,
which, under the law, must be equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the
discretion and by a proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in
excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes
the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left
it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the
act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain
undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say
whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long
it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what
was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn," Neither did it specify or
define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no
crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and
the defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a
price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the GovernorGeneral in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation
of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and
void.
It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering, which worked a severe
hardship on the poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the question here presented is the
constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an argument for, or against, its
constitutionality.
The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and property
rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought not to change with the wind or any emergency
condition. The fundamental question involved in this case is the right of the people of the Philippine Islands to be
and live under a republican form of government. We make the broad statement that no state or nation, living
under republican form of government, under the terms and conditions specified in Act No. 2868, has ever
enacted a law delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can
never be delegated under a republican form of government.
In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing with government
property. It was dealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. If this
law should be sustained, upon the same principle and for the same reason, the Legislature could authorize the
Governor-General to fix the price of every product or commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower him to
make it a crime to sell any product at any other or different price.
It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of the Constitution should be
suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial power was in full force and effect, and that
while that power was in force and effect, such a provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not,
suspended even in times of war. It may be claimed that during the war, the United States Government undertook
to, and did, fix the price at which wheat and flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United
States had declared war, and at the time was at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is also
true that in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United States commandeered all the wheat and flour,
and took possession of it, either actual or constructive, and the government itself became the owner of the wheat
and flour, and fixed the price to be paid for it. That is not this case. Here the rice sold was the personal and
private property of the defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. The government had not bought and did
not claim to own the rice, or have any interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal,
private property of the defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but the
members of this court have taken on solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be
construed to meet the changing winds or emergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or nation under a
republican form of government ever enacted a law authorizing any executive, under the conditions states, to fix
the price at which a price person would sell his own rice, and make the broad statement that no decision of any
court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be found which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of
Act No. 2868 here in question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the
power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the
people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the
maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law.
This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of the Governor-General, upon
the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher price,
and which holds that portions of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the
constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of the Act.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.