M. H.

, RAKES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
1. M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were working
in the companys yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars; each car carrying the opposite ends of
the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were
no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars move
were also weakened by a previous typhoon.
2. It was alleged that Atlantics foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired.
While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was
beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be
amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500).
3. Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be walking
only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them in
case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to
have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he
continued to work.
ISSUE: 1. What effect is to be given such an act of contributory negligence?
2. Whether or not Atlantic is liable.
Held:
1.While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were
expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that
there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the
foreman swears that he repeated the On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the
defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience
of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its
primary cause. This conclusion presents sharply the question, What effect is to be given such an act of contributory
negligence? Does it defeat a recovery, according to the American rule, or is it to be taken only in reduction of
damages?prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes
of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself,
without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it,
but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced the
event giving occasion for damages that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event,

the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage
which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of duty, the
last would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been
responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.
2. YES
In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of duty on its part in failing either
to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles transporting it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in
proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect and repair the roadway as soon as the depression in it became visible. It is
upon the failure of the defendant to repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the judge below based
his judgment.
Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another employee who swore
he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross nature
as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from
the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from
standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though; the
Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.
In this case, the SC also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are:
1.

Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between
two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also considered as a real source of an

2.

independent obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).

Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist without the
other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation (contractual or culpa
contractual).

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have
been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was
the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages
that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.
I.

CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to his
employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his
representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the

II.

civil action may proceed to judgment.

LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. The responsibility of an employer to his employee of a
fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.

III.

FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant
rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellowservant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.