CONCHITA CARPIO - MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE

OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR

ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 217126-27
November 10, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which granted private respondent Jejomar Binay, Jrs request for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the Ombudsmans Joint Order
(preventive suspension order for 6 months without pay) preventively suspending Binay and several other
public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati; and (b) the Resolution ordering the
Ombudsman to comment on private respondents petition for contempt.
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.
and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing
them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the
Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a factfinding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted.
Subsequently, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay,
Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases and six (6) criminal cases.
As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the
following procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during
his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati.
During Binay Jr.s term, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phase III, Phase IV, and Phase V of the
Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently,
executed the corresponding contract on without the required publication and the lack of architectural
design, and approved the release of funds therefor.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition before the CA seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and
praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued
that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5)
phases of the Makati Parking Building project since Phases I and II were undertaken before he was
elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his reelection as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability.
Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive suspension order through the DILG
National Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion) and Makati City
Vice Mayor Romulo V. Pea, Jr. (Pea, Jr.) thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor.
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution, granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO. Further
arguing the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior

term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be
administratively charged.
The Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court arguing: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to
grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay,
Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable
officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings. However, Binay, Jr. argues that
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial power to review acts of
any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this
case.
ISSUE/s:
1.

Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, was the Ombudsmans plain, speedy, and adequate remedy

2.

Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) has subject matter jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition

3.

Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension issued by Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.
HELD:
1. YES
As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be
considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, certain
exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of
a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition and one of these
exceptions is when and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key government
institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence,
involves an issue of transcendental public importance that demands no less than a careful but expeditious
resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous application of the
condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative liability.
As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding
her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances before the CA, is justified.
2.
YES, the CA has jurisdiction on the subject matter.

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition,
and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act1.
Upon an assiduous scrutiny of the legislative intent (the reasoning behind the law), the Court is, however,
unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section 14, RA 6770, as the Ombudsman invokes.
In Fabian v. Desiertoni, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as
unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its
advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, this
provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure
which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by
law;" and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a
Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals
The second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 - and thus
attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and
concurrence. It is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce,
invalid. Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court,
consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition.
3.
YES.
The CA's certiorari jurisdiction is not only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts
(under Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma, the doctrine
was explained as follows:
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs
an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should
also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court
may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power.

1 Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme
Court, on pure question of law.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue
the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against
Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the
CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and
which it had already acquired over the main case.
DUNCANO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.3 On March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for
violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, 5 allegedly
committed willful, unlawful, and criminal failure to disclose in his statement of
assets and liabilities and net worth (SALN) of his financial and business
interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of
which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan
Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO
which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Petitioner Duncano, at the time, a
regional director of the BIR with salary grade 26.
Held
No.
The respondent court erred in ruling that a Regional Director is one of the
exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not
salary grade 27 or higher. Those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or
higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g),
regardless of their salary grades.31 While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only
officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary
Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Hence, the petition is granted

DOMINADOR P. BURBE
v .
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002

FACTS:

Atty. Magulta, respondent, has agreed to legally represent Dominador Burbe, petitioner and
help him recover a claim of money against a creditor. Respondent Magulta prepared the
demand letters sent to the creditor but to no avail. Hence, Respondent Magulta has advised
the petitioner that they should already file a case against the creditor. For such services he
required a filing fee and was accordingly paid and an amount of Php 25,000. Atty. Magulata
informed the petitioner that he already filed a complaint in court and that they should just
wait for a notice from the court.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any notice of the
complaints progress. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyers office but to no
avail. To prove that the case has already been filed, the respondent lawyer invited the
petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. The lawyer
went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day.

Being already suspicious, the petitioner decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court to
personally verify the progress of the case. Upon inquiry, he was informed that there was no
record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on his behalf.

Consequently, petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the
excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown a
certification did he admit that he really did not file the complaint reasoning that he had
spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose. As compensation, he offered to
reimburse the money paid to him by issuing two checks.

Respondent claims that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and

Burbe(petitioner) for the reason that Burbe never paid him for services rendered.

Respondent also claims that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for one
of his partners kumpadre

ISSUE:
1.) WON there is a lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and the petitioner
2.) WON the respondent lawyer should be disbarred.

HELD:

Yes. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant
asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formers business. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any
previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer/fee be paid, promised, or charged.
It slso not material that the attorney consulted did not afterwards handle the case for which
his service had been sought. If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any
kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional
employment is established.

Furthermore, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal

relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the formers
fee.

2.) No. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and the member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. The
Court deems that a one-year suspension is a the proper penalty to be imposed.