HIDALGO ENTERPRISES V.

BALANDAN
91 PHIL 488
FACTS: Hidalgo Enterprises, an owner of an ice plant factory, kept on their premises 2 uncovered water tanks,
which were unguarded. On April 16, 1948, children entered the factory premises and swam in one of the water
tanks. Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, was drowned and sank in the tank. The lower court decided in
favor of the boys parents saying that Hidalgo Enterprises is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive
nuisance.
ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?
HELD: A swimming pool or water tank isnt an attractive nuisance for while it is attractive, it cannot be a
nuisance being merely an imitation of a work of nature. Hence, if small children are drowned in an attractive
water tank of another, the owner is not liable even if there be no guards in the premises.
ACAP VS CA 251 SCRA 30
FACTS: In 1975, Felixberto Oruma sold his inherited land to Cosme Pido, which land is rented by Teodoro
Acap, a tenant since 1960. When Cosme died intestate, his heirs executed a Declaration of Heirship and Waiver
of Rights in favor of Edy delos Reyes. Edy informed Acap of his claim over the land, and Acap paid the rental
to him in 1982, but refused to pay in subsequent years, which prompted him to file a complaint for the recovery
of possession and damages. Acap denied having entered in an oral lease agreement with delos Reyes and
averred that he continues to recognize Pido as the owner of the land, and that he will pay the accumulated
rentals to Pidos widow upon her return from abroad. Delos Reyes filed a suit of recovery of possession against
Acap and for the payment of rentals accruing to him as owner of the said lot where the lower court ruled in
favor of him.
ISSUE: Whether the subject declaration of heirship and waiver of rights is a recognized mode of acquiring
ownership over the lot in question.
HELD: No. The execution of the heirs of Pido the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights was held to be
not tantamount to sale. Such declaration is only one whereby heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the
decedent among themselves as they see fit. The Court further noted that waiver of hereditary rights is different
from sale of hereditary rights. Sale of hereditary rights presupposes an existence of a contract of sale whereas
waiver of hereditary rights is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with a knowledge of
its existence and intention to relinquish it in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. As delos
Reyes is a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, he cannot claim ownership over the lot on the sole basis of
the document executed.

De Luna vs Abrigo 181 SCRA 150

FACTS: On January 24, 1965, Prudencio de Luna donated property for the construction of buildings for a
school. Since the conditions were not met, the donation was revoked but was later on revived on April 9, 1971,
setting conditions for the construction of nursery, kindergarten and chapel within 5 years. On September 23,
1980, the children and only heirs of the late De Luna filed a complaint for the cancellation of the donation on
the ground that the terms were violated. The Foundation said it had partially and substantially complied with the
conditions and that the donor granted it an indefinite extension of time to complete construction. The RTC
dismissed the petition on the ground of the four-year prescription .

ISSUE: Whether the action prescribes in 4 years.

HELD: It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation must be
brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, said article
does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous
donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The rules on prescription and not the rules on donation applies
in the case at bar.

GONZALES VS COURT OF APPEALS 358 SCRA 393

FACTS: On May 7, 1969, Marina Gonzales (wife) died intestate and appointed as administratrix of her estate
was Lilia Gonzales. Prior to the partition of said estate, Ignacio Gonzales (husband) executed a Deed of
Donation on July 12, 1972 conveying his share of the property, in favor of his 14 grandchildren. The said
donation was not registered. Thus, when P.D. No. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972, the landholdings of the
spouses Gonzales were placed under Operation Land Transfer by virtue of said decree, and the farmers and
tenants of the spouses were accordingly issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer and
Emancipation Patents. On March 5, 1974, Lilia Gonzales filed an application for retention, requesting that their
property be excluded from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. On September 3, 1991, DAR issued an
order declaring that the subject landholdings covered by the deed of donation are exempted.
ISSUE: Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered when P.D. No. 27 took
effect, should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer.
HELD: It is undisputed in this case that the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales in favor of his
grandchildren, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance with law. For this
reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not participate in said deed or had no actual
knowledge thereof. Hence, while the deed of donation is valid between the donor and the donees, such deed,
however, did not bind the tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation. As previously enunciated by
this Court, non-registration of a deed of donation does not bind other parties ignorant of a previous
transaction (Sales vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 858 [1992]). So it is of no moment that the right of the
tenants-farmers in this case was created by virtue of a decree or law. They are still considered "third persons"
contemplated in our laws on registration, for the fact remains that these tenants-farmers had no actual
knowledge of the deed of donation.