Reliability Engineering and System Safety 157 (2017) 1322

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Reliability Engineering and System Safety

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ress

Modeling reliability of power systems substations by using stochastic

automata networks
Mindaugas nipas a,n, Virginijus Radziukynas b, Eimutis Valakeviius a
a
b

Kaunas University of Technology, Department of Mathematical Modeling, Lithuania

Lithuanian Energy Institute, Laboratory of Systems Control and Automation, Lithuania

art ic l e i nf o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:
Received 30 September 2015
Received in revised form
22 April 2016
Accepted 12 August 2016
Available online 18 August 2016

In this paper, stochastic automata networks (SANs) formalism to model reliability of power systems
substations is applied. The proposed strategy allows reducing the size of state space of Markov chain
model and simplifying system specication. Two case studies of standard congurations of substations
are considered in detail. SAN models with different assumptions were created. SAN approach is compared with exact reliability calculation by using a minimal path set method. Modeling results showed
that total independence of automata can be assumed for relatively small power systems substations with
reliable equipment. In this case, the implementation of Markov chain model by a using SAN method is a
relatively easy task.
& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:
Reliability modeling
Markov chain
Stochastic automata network
Power system
Substation

1. Introduction
Markov chain modeling has been applied in power system reliability modeling for a long time [1,2]. It has a well-developed
mathematical apparatus and can describe complex behavior of a
system [3]. Two alternatives to Markov models are common in
power system reliability modeling: methods based on the independence of system components (e.g., fault tree analysis, reliability block diagrams, etc.) and Monte Carlo simulation.
Methods which assumes total independence of system components are simpler, but even these techniques can be cumbersome, and classical methods, such as fault tree analysis [4] or
generation of minimal set paths [5], require computer assistance
and use of special algorithms. These methods can also be combined in modeling of Markov chains [6,7].
A Monte Carlo simulation method is often applied in reliability
modeling and has been used to simulate various types of objects,
such as substations [8], power plants [9] or standard and composite generation and transmission systems [10,11]. However, simulation of rare events (which is common in reliability modeling)
requires special attention [12,13], and Markov chain models tend
to be more efcient if a system is not too large and highly reliable
[14]. Moreover, since by nature Monte Carlo method is based on
n

Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: minsnip@ktu.lt (M. nipas),
Virginijus.Radziukynas@lei.lt (V. Radziukynas), eimval@ktu.lt (E. Valakeviius).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2016.08.006
0951-8320/& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

random experiments, it is benecial to be able to compare its results to other methods, for which Markov chain modeling can be
used [15,16].
Markov chain modeling allows evaluating complex system
behavior [17,18]; however, the main drawback is rapid growth of
system states and, consequentially, rising complexity. Therefore,
most examples in Markov chain reliability modeling deal with
relatively small state space [17,19]. For a more complex system,
special software can be applied [20,21], but there is still a need for
systematic approach, which would allow for simplied description
of complex systems. Some proposed strategies are based on system decomposition into smaller independent subsystems [22,23],
but the problems might arise if subsystems are interdependent.
One of the methods suitable for complex Markov chain model
creation is stochastic automata networks (SANs) formalism [24].
SAN formalism applies Kronecker algebra operations, which enables to store innitesimal generator matrix in compact format;
therefore, it is especially suitable for solving the problem of dimensionality. It also allows for systematic description of interaction between smaller subsystems which provides an exact solution. The SAN method was applied to different areas of research.
For example, SAN formalism was used to evaluate availability of
large-scale computer networks [25], in system theory, SANs were
applied in creating the inuence model [26]; in cell biology, SANs
can be used to model ion channels [27], etc.
Kronecker algebra approach is not new in system reliability, but
most examples deal with systems of independent components

14

M. nipas et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 157 (2017) 1322

[28]. A more sophisticated use of Kronecker algebra with functional transitions in respect to system reliability is considered in
[29], though it uses different terminologies than that of SAN
formalism. In [30], theoretical k out of n system was specied by
using SAN formalism. However, practical application of SANs in
solving real-world reliability problems is still uncommon.
In [31], SAN formalism is used to specify reliability of cogeneration power plant substation. In this paper, it has been elaborated on these ideas to propose a methodology to model system
reliability of power systems substations. System division into different automata and the use of arrowhead matrices are addressed
in detail. We also consider the use of SANs together with classic
reliability modeling techniques like minimal path sets, failure
modes and effect analysis (FMEA) and structure functions. Reliability models of two standard congurations of substation under
different model assumptions are created using the proposed
methodology. The calculation of system measures and evaluation
of independence of individual automata are also considered.
The main principles of Markov chain numerical modeling and
SANs are introduced in Section 2, while the theoretical background
on SAN formalism is presented in Section 3.
In Section 4, the application of SANs of real world power systems is addressed. In this chapter, the formation of individual
automaton is considered due to preventative circuit breaker actions of power system. The proposed technique leads to automata,
whose innitesimal generators are arrowhead matrices. We demonstrated that arrowhead matrices and SAN formalism allow
specifying various scenarios, which are common in reliability
modeling.
This methodology is applied in two case studies. In Section 5
we present the model of sectionalized bus and in Section 6 a ring
bus substation conguration. Both reliability models are considered in detail under different assumptions, which can be easily
implemented by the use of functional transition rates. Functional
transition rates are used to specify preventative circuit breaker
operation, shared load and repair capacity.
In Section 7, it is shown how SAN reliability modeling can be
combined with minimal path set methods and structure functions
for estimation of system availability.
In Section 8, the modeling results are presented. In Section 9,
we discuss the implication of modeling results and the conditions,
under which the independence of automata can be assumed. In
this case, the implementation of SAN modeling becomes a much
easier task.

2. Development of Markov chain model

In this paper we assume stationary analysis of homogenous
irreducible continuous time Markov chain reliability models, with
nite number of system states. Development of Markov chain
model can be divided into three main stages:
1) Dening the set of states of the system and possible transitions
amongst them.
2) Computation of steady-state probabilities.
3) Computation of necessary probabilistic characteristics of the
system, using steady-state probabilities.
The rst step is model specication. For reliability model this
could mean dening failure and repair rates, describing possible
system reconguration after failure, etc. Memoryless property is
satised under assumption that transition rates among system
states are those of exponential distribution. Basically, system
specication results to an innitesimal generator Q of continuous
time Markov chain.

The row vector of steady-state probabilities is the solution of

the system of linear equations

Q = 0.

(1)

If Markov chain is irreducible, Q is singular its rank is equal to

if n is the number of system states. Thus, an additional
condition is used

( n 1),

(2)

e = 1;

where e denotes a column vector (of size n) consisting of 1.

Necessary system measures can be calculated from steady-state
probabilities. E.g., suppose that S is the set of all possible states s( i)
of a system reliability model, while SF S is a subset of states in
which the system is failed. Then probability that the system is
failed Pr( F ) can be estimated as follows

Pr( F ) =

s ( i ) SF

( )

s ( i) ;
(3)

( ) is a steady-state probability that the system is in the

where s

( i)

state s( i).
One of the main problems in Markov chain modeling is a rapid
growth of the number of system states. E.g., Markov chain model
of a system consisting of k different items (each of them can be at
fault or operating) has a state-space of size 2k. Thus a twenty-item
system would have more than one million states. Moreover, the
number of states doubles if the number of items is increased by
one. This phenomenon the number of states of the Markov chain
grows exponentially when the number of system components
grows linearly is called a state space explosion.
The state space explosion makes the practical application of
Markov chains a difcult task. If the number of system states is
large, the model creation and solution of (2) might be challenging.
Therefore, the use of efcient Markov chain modeling techniques
and numerical methods is crucial.

3. Stochastic automata networks

One of the methods which allow creating large Markov chain
models is stochastic automata networks (SANs) formalism. SANs
allows storing innitesimal generator Q in a compact form by
using tensor (Kronecker) algebra operations.
Using SAN formalism the system is described as a few different
automata which can interact among themselves. Each automaton
is represented by a Markov chain, i.e., a set of states and possible
transitions among them. If two automata interact, transition in one
automaton may depend on the state in another. The state of the
system (global state) is compositional state of all automata. For
more information about SANs we refer to [24].
Innitesimal generator matrix of the whole system (global
generator matrix) can be expressed by innitesimal generators of
individual automata, using tensor algebra operations. We recall
basic denitions of tensor algebra.
Tensor (Kronecker) product A B of two matrices A Rm n
and B Rp q is given by

a11B a1nB

A B = R mp nq.

a m1B a mnB

(4)

Tensor (Kronecker) sum A B of two squared matrices

A Rm m and B Rn n is given by

A B = A In + Im B R mn mn.

(5)

More about Kronecker product with regard to SANs can be

M. nipas et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 157 (2017) 1322

found in [32].
If the network consists of k independent stochastic automata
A( i) with innitesimal generators Q( i) , i = 1... k , when an innitesimal generator of the whole system (so called global innitesimal generator) Q can be expressed as a tensor sum
k

Q = Q ( i).
i=1

(6)

Expression (6) is called SAN descriptor of the system. If all

automata are completely independent, steady-state probability
vector of the whole system is given by
k

= ( i).
i=1

(7)

Here ( i) is steady-state probability vector of an individual

automaton.
The more difcult task is dealing with interaction among automata, if the system cannot be divided into completely independent modules. Plateau and Atif [24] expressed two different
ways to describe the interaction among automata:
1) Functional transition rates a transition rate in a single automaton may depend on the state of the other automata. Transition rates which are independent on the state of other automata
are called constant transition rates.
2) Synchronizing events transition in one automaton can cause a
transition in other automata. Transition rates are called local, if
they are not transition rates of synchronizing events. Synchronizing transitions may also be functional.
The main problem the steady-state solution cannot be expressed as a simple product form (7). This means that much larger
linear system of equations must be solved, in order to nd .
However, system descriptor can still be expressed using tensor
products and extended tensor algebra concepts for functional
transition rates [33]. Special software can also be used for specication of SAN models [34].
Steady-state probabilities can be found either from solving (1)
after Q is built from SAN descriptor, or explicitly from SAN descriptor. I.e., building and storing of Q is not necessary, if special
numerical methods are applied. These problems are considered in
detail in [35].

4. Power system reliability modeling by the use of SANs

The reliability models are created under the following three
assumptions: 1) each item can be in one of two possible states
operating or failed; 2) a failed item is detected and repair is initiated immediately; 3) the repaired item is as good as new.
4.1. System division into distinct automata
Application of SAN formalism requires choosing a proper system division into distinct automata. E.g., consider substation with
a sectionalized bus (see Fig. 1):
Even if one assumes absolutely reliable line segments, it still
consists of 17 different items. Modeling each item as an individual
automaton with 2 possible states would result in Markov chain
with 217 states. Moreover, specication of all possible interactions
among different automata would require a lot of functional transition rates and/or synchronizing events. Therefore derivation of
SAN descriptor would be a very complicated task in this case.
We propose the following strategy for division into different
automata which is more convenient for power system reliability

15

modeling all items, which are disconnected together in case any

of them is at fault, must be modeled by the same individual
automaton.
In order to choose this division at rst we perform FMEA
analysis i.e., we assume preventative circuit breaker action,
which is described in Tables 1 and 2. The rst column of Table 1 is
very important, because it presents items which are disconnected
together under repair. Therefore it is benecial to model them by
the same individual automaton.
The effect of circuit breaker failure is assumed to be as presented in Table 2.
The proposed model specication technique leads to a network
consisting of 6 automata. We enumerate them according to Table 1, i.e. L1 and S1 are modeled by the rst automaton A( 1) , L2 and
S2 are modeled by A( 2) etc.
Assigning a circuit breaker to the automaton is somewhat arbitrary e.g., C1 could be assigned either to A( 1) (together with L1,
S1) or to A( 3), which also includes S3, S5, B1 and S7.
4.2. The use of arrowhead matrices
The main advantage of proposed strategy it allows reducing
the size of system state space and also the number of interactions
among different automata. This follows from the simple assumption that an item cannot fail if it is disconnected under repair.
Therefore multiple failures are impossible in a single automaton.
In this case an automaton modeling ni different items has innitesimal generator which is given by
T1

S9

C4

S7
B1

S3

C1

S4

C2

S1

L1

S5
C3
S6

T2

S10

C5

S8

B2

S2

Fig. 1. Sectionalized bus conguration of the substation.

Table 1
Preventative disconnection due to
the failure of other items.
Failed

Disconnected

L1, S1
L2, S2
B1, S3, S5, S7
B2, S4, S6, S8
T1, S9
T2, S10

C1-S3
C2-S4
C1-S1, C3-S6, C4-S9
C2-S2, C3-S5, C5-S10
C4-S7
C5-S8

Table 2
Preventative disconnection due to
the failure of circuit breakers.
Failed Disconnected
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5

C3-S6, C4-S9
C3-S5, C5-S10
C1-S1,C2-S2,C4-S9,C5-S10
C1-S1, C3-S6
C2-S2, C3-S5

L2

M. nipas et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 157 (2017) 1322

16

Q ( i) = 1

ni

1 n i

* 0 0
.
0 * 0
0 0 *

(8)

The rst line in (8) denotes an operating state, while the rest
denotes a failure of items number 1, 2, , ni respectively. Eq. (8)
can also be written in the block form as follows

d
1, ni
1,1
;
Q ( i) =

ni,1 Dni

(9)

where 1, ni a row-vector consisting of failure rates; ni,1 a

column-vector consisting of repair rates;

Dni = diag (Mni,1);

d1,1 = 1, nieni,1.
The structure of non-zero entries in matrices (8)(9) has a
distinct shape, which is known as arrowhead matrix [36]. In this
paper we want to demonstrate that the use of arrowhead matrices
and SAN formalism allows describing variety of events common in
system reliability.
1) Repairable item I.e. an item which can be in two possible
states: operating and failed. If and denotes a failure and
repair rates respectively, its' Markov chain has an innitesimal
generator

Q=

(10)

It is obvious that (10) is a particular case of (8).

2) Planned maintenance Suppose that a repairable item can be
repaired not only because of a failure, but also to ensure its
long-run availability. If p and p denotes planned failure and
repair rates, an item has an innitesimal generator

Q=
p

p
p
0

0 .

(11)

3) System with shared load and repair capacity Consider a twoitem system with a shared load. I.e. failure and repair rates can
vary due to the failure of another item (because of increased
load, limited repair capabilities, etc.). Each item can be described by the innitesimal generator with functional transition
rates:

f
f2 1
1
; Q ( 2) =
Q ( 1) = 2
g21 g21

f
f12
.
1 2
g12 g12

(12)

Suppose that failure rate increases 50% due to the shared load,
and repair rate decreases 20% due to the shared repair capabilities. In that case functional transition rates in (12) can be
dened as

1,
1,
s ( j) = O ;
s ( j) = O ;
; gi =
fi =
.

j
1.5, s ( ) = F;
0.8, s ( j) = F;

(13)

where s( j) denotes a state of automaton A( j); i, j = 1, 2, i j .

SAN descriptor of the two-item system is given by

Q = Q ( 1) Q ( 2);

systems with shared load. The main difference functional

transition rates are dened as indicators of failure. E.g., imagine
a two-item system and suppose that the failure of the second
item prevents the rst item of failure, while the failure of the
rst item does not have an effect on the second item. This can
be modeled by changing (13) into

2
0, s ( ) = F ;
f1 =
f2 = g1 = g2 = 1.

(
1, s 2) = O;

(15)

5) Generalized arrowhead matrix Putting together all aforementioned reliability scenarios one can dene an arrowhead matrix
with functional transition rates (in respect to generalized tensor
algebra we call it generalized arrowhead matrix):
i
fn n(i )
i

0
0
.
0
*

0
*

i
f11( )
*

g ( i)
*
Q ( i) = 1 1
0

( i)
0
gni ni

(16)

Matrix (16) can also be written in a block form (9), if 1, ni , ni,1

and Dni include functional transition rates.
SAN consisting of k automata, each of them having innitesimal
generator (16), can be written as
k

Q = Q ( i).
i=1
g

(17)

In the next chapter we present reliability models of standard

substation congurations described by SAN with (17) type of
descriptor.

5. Reliability modeling of sectionalized bus conguration

In this chapter we present the reliability model of substation
with sectionalized bus, presented in Fig. 1. We use the proposed
methodology for system division into different automata, when
each automaton is described by an arrowhead matrix. Three different models were considered: one with independent automata
and two models with preventative failures and shared load. In
both later cases functional transition rates will be used.
5.1. SAN descriptor of sectionalized bus conguration
The repair and failure rates of an incoming line, a disconnector,
a circuit breaker, a bus bar and transformer are denoted as l and
l , s and s , c and c , b and b , t and t respectively.
We assume that the rst automaton A( 1) describes items L1, S1
and circuit breaker C , while the second automaton A( 2) represents
1

items L2, S2 and circuit breaker C2. Since both of these parts consist
of identical items, its innitesimal generators are given by:

* f f f
Li l
Si s
Ci c

*
0
0
, i = 1, 2.
Q ( i) = l
s 0
*
0

*
0
c 0

(18)

(14)

In (18) fL , fS and fC denotes the functions which model pre-

where g denotes generalized Kronecker sum, which is used

when dealing with functional transition rates [33].
4) System where failure of one item prevents other from failure
These systems can be described in a similar manner as the

ventative disconnection under the repair. These and other functional transition rates are considered in detail in Sections 5.25.4.
For the rest of innitesimal generators Q( i) we use block form
(9). In that case Q( i) is dened by vectors ( i) and ( i) . E.g., the

M. nipas et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 157 (2017) 1322

third automaton A( 3), which models behavior of the items S3, S5, S7,
B1 and C3, is given by

( 3) =

fB b fS s fS s fS s fC c
1

(
= (s
= (s
= (s

fS
fS

( 3) = ( b s s s c ) .

(19)

fS

The fourth automaton A( 4) includes B2, S4, S6 and S8. It is the

only automaton in this SAN model, which does not contain a circuit breaker. Its innitesimal generator is dened by

( 4) =

(f

B2 b

(20)

Similarly, innitesimal generators of A( 5) and A( 6) may be dened by

)
);

T1 t

fS s fC c ;
9
4

T2 t

fS s fC
10

(5)

(i )
(1)

i = 1, 2, 5, 6;

(27)

Functional transition rates associated with A( 4) are

(
) (
) (
)
= ( s ( ) = 0 ) ( s ( ) 5 ) ( s ( ) 3) ;
= ( s ( ) = 0 ) ( s ( ) 3 ) ( s ( ) 3) ;
= ( s ( ) 3) ( s ( ) 5) ( s ( ) 3) .

fS

fS

fS

(28)

Functional transition rates associated with A( 5) are

) (

fT = s ( 3) = 0 s ( 1) 3 ; fS = fC = fT .

5 c

T
( i) = ( t s c ) ; i = 5, 6.

(21)

SAN descriptor of the system may be written as

(29)

And nally, functional transition rates associated with automaton A( 6) are as follows:

) (

) (

fT = s ( 4) = 0 s ( 3) 5 s ( 2) 3 ;

Q = Q ( i).
i=1
g

(22)

State space, generated by (22) is a set of 6-tuples

s=

(4)

(5)

fC = fS .

T
( 4) = ( b s s s ) .

(f
( ) = ( f

(1)

fB = s ( 2) 3 s ( 3) 5 s ( 6) 3 ;

fS s fS s fS s ;
4
6
8

( 5) =

)
3) ;
3) ;
3) ;

fB = s (1) 3 s (5) 3 ;
3

) (
= 0 ) (s
= 0) (s
= 0 ) (s

17

{ ( s )}; i = 1, 6; s = 0, 3; s = 0, 5; s
( i)

= 0, 4.

fS

10

= fC = fT .
5

(30)

5.3. SAN of independent automata

(23)

E.g., 6-tuple (0;0;0;0;1;0) denotes a state which means failed

transformer T1, while other items are operating. It is easy to see
from (23), that the size of global system state space is equal to
426542 = 7680.

5.2. Preventative failure rates

The implementation of SAN with independent automata is

straightforward it sufces to change all functional transition
rates into constants. In this case it can be achieved by replacing all
functions in (18)(21) by 1.
Assuming the independence of automata would also allow representing the entire branch as a single component. For example,
it is easy to verify that the matrix of type (9) can be replaced by
that of type (10), if respective failure and repair rates are chosen as
follows:
ni

In this chapter we dene functions used in (18)(21). These

functions model preventative circuit breaker operation under
failure. All functions have values 0 or 1; therefore they can be
dened by the use of logical predicates.
At rst we dene functional transition rates of the rst automaton A( 1) . Let us assume that L is disconnected and cannot fail, if

i,
i=1

i =i 1 i

.
(31)

This transformation allows for a signicant reduction of statespace and could be useful if Markov chain reliability model had a
large number (millions or more) of states.

any of S3, S5, S7, B1, C3 (all belong to A( 3)) or C4 (denoted by state
3 of A( 5)) is under repair. These conditions can be expressed by
dening fL as
1

) (

fL = s ( 3) = 0 s ( 5) 3
1

(24)

The same conditions apply to S1 and C1, therefore:

fS = fC = fL .
1

(25)

Similarly, functional transition rates associated with the second

automaton A( 2) can be dened as

) (

) (

fL = s ( 4) = 0 s ( 3) 5 s ( 6) 3 ; fS = fC = fL .
2

(26)

Functional transition rates associated with A( 3) can be written

as

5.4. Including shared load and repair capacity

SAN model described in the previous chapter can be easily
modied in order to include shared load and repair capacity.
Suppose that failure rate of transformer increases 50%, if another
transformer is out (we must emphasize that it is a theoretical
example and we do not have statistical data to support these
numbers). This may be modeled by multiplying t in (21) by the
function

1,
if s ( j) = 0 ;
fT s =
( i; j) = ( 1; 6), ( 2; 5).
i

1.5, otherwise ;

(32)

Suppose that the repair capacity is also limited repair rate of

an item decreases 50% if any other item is under repair. This
condition can be included in SAN model by multiplying each repair rate of innitesimal generators (18)(21) by the following
function:

M. nipas et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 157 (2017) 1322

18

if s ( j) = 0 = 1 ;
1,
ji
gi =
i = 1, 6.

0.5, otherwise ;

(33)

Table 3
Preventative disconnections due to the failure of the items of ring bus
conguration.
Failed
L1, S2, S3, B2
L2, S4, S8, B3
T1, S1, S5, B1
T2, S6, S7, B4

6. Reliability modeling of ring bus substation conguration

Disconnected

Failed

Disconnected

C1-S1,
C2-S3,
C1-S2,
C3-S5,

C1
C2
C3
C4

C2-S4,
C1-S1,
C1-S2,
C2-S3,

C2-S4
C4-S7
C3-S6
C4-S8

C3-S6
C4-S7
C4-S8
C3-S5

In this chapter we consider a reliability model of the ring bus

conguration (see Fig. 2). We use the same approach to create SAN
reliability model system division into individual automata is
performed according to failure modes and effect analysis, while
each automaton is described by an arrowhead matrix with functional transition rates.
The circuit breaker operation under the repair is presented in
Table 3.

System state space S consists of 4-tuples, and is dened as

follows

6.1. SAN descriptor of the system

S = s ( i) ; i = 1, 4; si = 0, 5.

Table 3 suggests the use a SAN of 4 stochastic automata to

model reliability of ring bus conguration. We choose a rst automaton A( 1) to model items L , B , S , S and C . Its local in-

E.g., a 4-tuple (3;0;0;0) denotes a system state with failed

disconnector S2, while other items of the substation are operating.

given by

(34)

fB b fS s fS s fC c ;
3
4
8
2
(35)

The third automaton A( 3) models items T1, B1, S1, S5 and C3. Its
local innitesimal generator Q( 3) is dened by vectors

(36)

( 4)

Finally, automaton A which models the part consisting of T2,

B4, S6, S7 and C4, is dened by:

T2 t

fS

L1
C1

S2

(
)
= f = ( s ( ) = 0 ) ( s ( ) 5) ;
= ( s ( ) = 0 ) ( s ( ) 5) .

(40)

( 2)

and

fS

C2

fS

(41)

S3

C2

S4

fT = fB = s ( 1) 5 ;
1

) (

fS = s ( 1) = 0 s ( 2) 5 ;
1

fS = fC = s
3

( 4)

) (

=0 s

( 1)

5 .

(42)

Finally, the functions presented in (37) are dened as follows:

fT = fB = s ( 3) 5 ;
2

L2
B2

fL = fB = s ( 4) 5 ;

(37)

S1

C1

fB b fS s fS s fC c ;
4
6
7
4

( 4) = ( 3) .

B1

Functions presented in (36) are

( 3) = ( t b s s c ) .

(f

fS

( 4) =

fB b fS s fS s fC c ;
1
1
5
3

T1 t

(
)
= f = ( s ( ) = 0 ) ( s ( ) 5) ;
= ( s ( ) = 0 ) ( s ( ) 5) .

fL = fB = s ( 2) 5 ;

Functions associated with the second automaton

presented in (35) may be written as

T
( 2) = ( l b s s c ) .

(f

(39)

Functional transition rates of ring bus substation model are

dened in the same way, as described in the previous chapter. At
rst, functional rates associated with the rst automaton A( 1) are

models L2, B2, S4, S8 and C8, is described by vectors

( 3) =

(38)

6.2. Preventative failure rates

Similarly to (34) the rest of automata are described by arrowhead innitesimal generators, therefore it is possible to write them
in block matrix form (9). E.g., innitesimal generator Q( 2) , which

L2 l

i=1
g

* f f f f f
L1 l
B2 b
S2 s
S3 s
C1 c

*
0
0
0
0
l

b 0
*
0
0
0
1)
(
Q =
.
*
0
0
0
s 0

*
0
0
0
s 0

*
0
0
0
c 0

(f

Q = Q ( i).

( )

nitesimal generator is given by

( 2) =

SAN descriptor of the system may be written as

B3

fS

) (

fS = fC = s
7

= s ( 3) = 0 s ( 1) 5 ;
4

( 2)

) (

=0 s

( 3)

5 .

(43)

B4
S5
T1

C3

S6
T2

S7

C4

S8

Fig. 2. Ring bus conguration of the substation.

6.3. SAN of independent automata

If independence of different automata is assumed, it can be
modeled in the same way as in previous chapter i.e., all functional transition rates in (40)(43) must be constants equal to 1.

M. nipas et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 157 (2017) 1322

19

In this case probability of the event A1 is given by

6.4. Including shared load and repair capacity

We assume the same effect of shared load of the transformer

and shared repair capacity of the items at fault as in the previous
chapter. In case of ring bus substation conguration, we multiply
t in (36) and (37) by the following function:

1, if s ( j) = 0 ;
fT s =
( i; j) = ( 1; 4), ( 2; 3).
i

1.5, otherwise ;

(44)

Shared repair capacity can be modeled by using the functions

dened in (33), if i = 1, 6 is replaced by i = 1, 4 . E.g., vector ( 3)
may be written as
T

( 3) = ( g3t g3b g3s g3s g3c ) .

(45)

7. Estimating system measures of SAN reliability models

Stochastic automata networks approach can be easily implemented together with classical reliability methods such as
minimal set paths and structure functions.

Pr( A1) = Pr( Pi ).

Exact calculation of (48) by using general addition theorem

requires estimating 28 1 = 63 terms.
Calculation of Pr( A2 ) would be even more cumbersome task, because it consists of 216 1 = 255 different terms. Estimation of these
components requires a thorough analysis and it is not a trivial task.
7.2. SAN representation of minimal path sets
It is easy to associate a structure function to a minimal path set
by using state variables s( i) of SAN descriptor. E.g., P1 of sectionalized bus conguration is successful if automata A( 1), A( 3) and A( 5)
are in the operating state. Thus, the following binary function,
whose arguments are system state vector s (23) of SAN model, can
represent minimal path set P1 of sectionalized bus:

1( s) =

( s ( j ) = 0) ;

j = 1, 3, 5.
(49)

The rest of minimal path sets of sectionalized bus conguration

can be represented by the following binary functions:

2( s) =

7.1. Minimal path sets

(48)

i=1

( s ( i) = 0) ( s ( 3) 5);

i = 1, 3, 5;

( s ( i ) = 0 ) ( s ( j ) 3) ;

i 2, 5; j = 2, 5;

( s ( i ) = 0 ) ( s ( j ) 3) ;

i 1, 6; j = 1, 6.

We assume that transformers are connected to power lines. It is

easy to see from Fig. 1, that 4 different minimal path sets exists for
sectionalized bus conguration:

i, j

4( s) =

(50)

i, j

P1 {L1,S1,C1,S3,B1,S7,C4,S9,T1} {S5,C3};
P2 {L2,S2,C2,S4,B2,S8,C5,S10,T2} {C3,S6};
P3 {L1,S1,C1,S3,B1,S5,C3,S6,B2,S8,C5,S10,T2} {C4,S7,S4,C2};
P4 {L2,S2,C2,S4,B2,S6,C3,S5,B1,S7,C4,S9,T1} {C1,S3,S5,S8}.

Similarly we dene the structure functions i i = 1, 8 associated to the minimal path sets Pi of the ring bus conguration. The
argument of these functions is state space vector (39).

If a fault occurs on S5 or C3, we assume that breakers C1 and C3

will operate thus breaking the continuity of P1. Therefore P1 contains S5, C3. For similar reasons P2 contains S5 and C3; P3 contains
C4, S7, S4 and C2; P4 contains C1, S3, C5 and S8.
We denote as Ai an event that at least i ( i = 1, 2) transmission
lines are connected to a transformer. Thus, probability of the event
A1 may be written as

4
Pr( A1) = Pr Pi.
i=1

3( s) =

1( s) =

( s ( i) = 0) ( s ( 2) 5);

i = 1, 3;

2( s) =

( s ( i ) = 0) ;

i = 1, 2, 3, 4;

3( s) =

( s ( i) = 0) ( s ( 4) 5);

i = 1, 2, 3;

( s ( i) = 0) ( s ( 1) 5);

i = 2, 3, 4;

( s ( i) = 0) ( s ( 2) 5);

i = 1, 3, 4;

( s ( i) = 0) ( s ( 3) 5);

i = 1, 2, 4;

4( s) =

(46)

5( s) =

An exact calculation of (46) by using the general addition

theorem requires estimating the probability of 24 1 = 15 different terms.
Probability of the event A2 can be expressed as

Pr( A2 ) = Pr( P1 P2 P1 P3 P2 P4 P3 P4 ).

(47)

Similarly, it is easy to see from Fig. 2, that 8 different minimal

path sets exists in the ring bus conguration. They can be written
as follows:
P1 {L1,B2,S2,C1,S1,B1,T1} {S3,C2,S5,C3};
P2 {L1,B2,S3,C2,S4,B3,S8,C4,S7,B4,S6,C3,S5,B1,T1}
{L2,S1,C1,S2,T2};
P3 {L2,B3,S4,C2,S3,B2,S2,C1,S1,B1,T1} { L1,S5,C3};
P4 {L2,B3,S8,C4,S7,B4,S6,C3,S5,B1,T1} {S4,C2,C1,S1,T2};
P5 {L1,B2,S2,C1,S1,B1,S5,C3,S6,B4,T2} {S3,C2, S7,C4};
P6 {L1,B2,S3,C2,S4,B3,S8,C4,S7,B4,T2} {L2,S2,C1, S6,C3};
P7 {L2,B3,S4,C2,S3,B2,S2,C1,S1,B1,S5,C3,S6,B4,T2}
{L1,S7,C4 S8, T1};
P8 {L2,B3,S8,C4,S7,B4,T2} {S4,C2,S6,C3}.

6( s) =

7( s) =

( s ( j ) = 0) ;

i = 1, 2, 3, 4;

8( s) =

( s ( j) = 0) ( s ( 3) 5);

i = 2, 4.

(51)

7.3. Implementation of system reliability measures estimation

It is easy to estimate the values of structure functions, associated with each minimal path set, once steady-state probabilities
are calculated.
Below we present a pseudocode for estimation of Pr(A1) for a
sectionalized bus conguration, assuming the independence of
automata.
for i1 0:3
for i2 0:3

M. nipas et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 157 (2017) 1322

20

for i3 0:5
for i4 0:4
for i5 0:3
for i6 0:3
f1: (i1 0)*(i3 0)*(i5 0);
f2: (i2 0)*(i4 0)*(i6 0)*(i35);
f3: (i1 0)*(i3 0)*(i4 0)*(i6 0)*(i33)*(i33);
f4: (i2 0)*(i3 0)*(i4 0)*(i5 0)*(i13)*(i63);
if (f1) or (f2) or (f3) or (f4)
pr ps p(ind)
end if
end for i6
end for i5
end for i4
end for i3
end for i2
end for i1

Table 5
Sectionalized bus conguration reliability modeling results.
1 Set of parameters
Reliability model

Event

Minimal path sets

A1
A2
A1
A2
A1
A2
A1
A2
A1
A2

SAN (independent)
SAN (f, prev.)
SAN (f, shar.)
SAN (f, prev. shar.)
2 Set of parameters
Reliability model
Minimal path sets
SAN (independent)

The meaning of variables used in pseudocode: ij denotes the

state of automaton A( j), j = 1, 6 ; fi denotes the value of structure
function, associated to path Pi is successful; pr denotes the probability Pr(A1); p(ind) denotes a steady-state probability of a
system.
Number ind denotes an array index, which can be calculated
from ij and the number of states of each automaton ni. In this case,
ind could be estimated from

ind = i j nk .

j=1 k=j+1
6

(52)

The main advantage over the use of general addition theorem is

that it checks all system states, using only standard functions
which can easily be implemented in most of programming languages. It does not require any special algorithms based on graph
theory [37].

8. Modeling results
We calculated probabilities Pr( A1) and Pr( A2 ) for sectionalized
bus and ring bus substation congurations with two different sets
of failure and repair rates. The rst set of estimated model parameters (see Table 4) is statistical data collected by Lithuanian
Energy Institute. The second set of parameters was chosen from
[38]. In this case we chose higher failure rates and average repair
times, in order to get more visible difference between different
reliability modeling methods.
Probabilities of events A1 and A2 for the sectionalized bus
conguration was estimated by using two different modeling approaches: probability calculation of standard minimal set paths
method and Markov chain modeling.
First, we used minimal set paths and the general addition
theorem for exact calculation of Pr( A1) and Pr( A2 ). The probabilities
that an item j is operating was calculated from pj = j8760/t j .
Table 4
Failure and repair rates.
Set 1

l
s
c
b
t

Set 2
0.0816
0.0002
0.0067
0.0002
0.0114

tl
ts
tc
tb
tt

70
8
48
2
48

l
s
c
b
t

0.15
0.001
0.08
0.01
0.02

tl
ts
tc
tb
tt

100
15
160
6
200

SAN (f, prev.)

SAN (f, shar.)
SAN (f, prev. shar.)

Event
A1
A2
A1
A2
A1
A2
A1
A2
A1
A2

Average time per year

h
min
0
19
3
11
0
19
3
11
0
19
3
11
0
20
3
12
0
19
3
11

s
30
4
30
2
29
1
35
20
30
1

Average time per year

h
min
13
0
72
1
12
59
71
54
12
55
71
44
13
37
72
46
12
55
71
44

s
49
0
38
54
9
21
15
41
53
37

The rest of reliability models are SANs, whose descriptors are

built with different model assumptions. The rst model is the SAN
of independent automata, while the rest of three models include
functional transition rates, dened in previous chapters. Two separate models include:
1) preventative circuit breaker operation;
2) shared load and repair capacity.
The last SAN model was built by putting all functional transition rates together (both preventative failures and shared load/
repair capacity).
Modeling results are presented in Table 5 (probabilities are
interpreted as an average time per year).
Two conclusions can be derived from Table 5. First, the difference between the modeling results of minimal set path method
and SAN of independent automata seems to be very small. The
difference of about 1 and 5 min per year for events A1 and A2 respectively (relative error is 0.0015 in both cases) can be seen
only in case of the modes with less reliable equipment.
The difference among the SAN models is also not very big. As
expected, the probabilities of the model with preventative failure
rates are lower than those of SAN with independent automata, but
the difference seems to be almost invisible, especially with the
rst set of model parameters.
The effect of shared load and repair capacity is slightly more
visible. A relative difference between this and independent automata model is higher than 5% modeling event A1, though absolute
difference is only about 1 min per year.
Assuming both preventative failure rates and shared load/capacity seems to cancel each other out.
Modeling results of the ring bus conguration are presented in
Table 6. We did not estimate the probabilities by using general
addition theorem for this substation conguration.
Modeling results of ring bus substation brings similar conclusions as the sectionalized bus conguration. The effect of functional transition rates in SAN model basically can be seen only in
case of higher failure rates and repair time.

M. nipas et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 157 (2017) 1322
Table 6
Ring bus conguration reliability modeling results.
1 Set of parameters
Reliability model

Event

SAN (independent)

A1
A2
A1
A2
A1
A2
A1
A2

SAN (f, prev.)

SAN (f, shar.)
SAN (f,prev. shar.)
2 Set of parameters
Reliability model
SAN (independent)
SAN (f, prev.)
SAN (f, shar.)
SAN (f,prev. shar.)

Event
A1
A2
A1
A2
A1
A2
A1
A2

Average time per year

h
min
0
39
2
51
0
39
2
51
0
39
2
51
0
39
2
51

s
5
28
4
28
17
43
16
41

Average time per year

h
min
25
39
59
8
25
33
59
0
25
57
59
28
25
45
59
13

s
42
24
34
39
34
49
11
4

9. Evaluating independence of automata

Modeling results showed a relatively small difference between SANs
of independent automata and SANs with functional transition rates.
It is obvious that modeling system as a SAN of independent
automata is a much easier task than SAN with functional transition
rates. Assuming automata independence means not only an easier
model solution by (7). System specication is also much easier,
because in this case the denition of functional transition rates can
be discarded. Therefore it would be benecial to know a priori if
the difference between two model assumptions leads to the signicantly different modeling results.
It is easy to see that functional transition rate has an effect only
when failure occurs. Therefore, probabilities that 2 items are failed
might indicate the difference between the models. Suppose that
Pri( 2) denotes a probability that two items are failed if the system
is modeled by SAN of independent automata, while Prf ( 2) denotes
the same probability of SAN with functional transition rates. If the
only functional transition rates are those of preventative failures, it
is easy to see that Pri( 2) Prf ( 2). Therefore, if Pri( 2) is too small to
have an impact on system reliability measures, there would be no
point to consider the functional transition rates. In that case one
could just assume independence of automata, which would simplify system specication and solution signicantly.
An exact estimation of Pri( 2) requires to solve SAN model of
independent automata, however, a simpler criterion might be
used. We propose a crude estimate of an upper bound for Pri( 2)
which may be written as

Pri( 2) nf 2 2 ,

(53)

where nf2 denotes a number of states with 2 failed items,

= max /min i.e., it is a ratio of the highest failure rate and the
lowest repair rate.
Number nf2 depends on the SAN model. If SAN consists of automata,
those innitesimal generators are given by (16), it can be found from
k1 k2

nf2 =

ni nj ;
i=1 j=i

(54)

where k denotes the number of automata; ni and nj denotes the

number of items which are being modeled by automata A( i) and A( j).

21

Let us consider SAN model of ring bus conguration presented

in Section 6. The model is a SAN of 4 automata whose sizes are 6.
Thus from (54) we get that nf 2 = 150. If we use the rst set of
parameters presented in Table 4, from (53) follows
Pri( 2) 0.0000638, which means about 33 min per year on average. However, if one assumes 10 times shorter incoming line (thus
10 lower value of l ), from (53) to (54) we get Pri( 2) 0.0000012,
which means only about 37 s per year on average. The average
time would be even lower if more reliable equipment is used. In
that case functional transition rates of preventative disconnection
might be discarded with higher certainty.
In general Pri( 2) Prf ( 2) does not hold if shared load and repair
capacity is considered. However it is still possible to apply (53) if
the values of max and min are changed accordingly to the functional transition rates. I.e. one must take the highest possible value
of max and the lowest possible values of min from the denition of
functions, which models the shared load and repair capacity.

10. Discussion
The paper presents the use of SAN formalism in system reliability modeling. The proposed strategy of system division into individual automata allows for simplication of model specication.
The use of decomposition techniques in Markov chain reliability
modeling is not new and is probably unavoidable for a large system.
The applications differ in types of modeled systems (e.g., nuclear
power plants [23] or electrical bus networks [22]) and used methodology (Markov models can be specied using together with faulttree analysis [39], Petri nets formalism [40], etc.). The decomposition is natural if subsystems are independent, but it is much more
complicated if they interact in any way. SAN formalism allows to
describe the behavior of a system in a systematic way as we have
demonstrated by the proposed technique in this paper.
In general, it is intended that this research serves as an encouragement for a more widespread use of Markov chains and
SAN formalism in reliability modeling. However, we have to note
that the proposed methodology has some drawbacks. Specication
of functional dependencies among different automata can be
cumbersome even for a relatively small object, such as standard
substation congurations presented in this paper. In the future
research, it might be very advantageous to automate the process of
system description based on graph theory algorithms, as it was
done in [22,39]. Graph theory methods can also be applied for
generation of minimal path sets, which, as has been shown in this
study, can be merged with SAN formalism and structure functions
for estimation of system measures. This could be achieved by
adding some labeling schemes of each item with respect to different automata. We also believe that SAN application together
with minimal cut sets could be implemented in a similar way.
Modeling results showed that the difference between the
model of independent automata and the models with functional
transition rates is relatively small, especially in models with very
reliable equipment. This means that probably the most cumbersome part, i.e. specication of functional transition rates, could be
avoided altogether. In this case, assumption of independence is
justied quantitatively, and modeling by SAN becomes a relatively
easy task.
One of the advantages of the proposed methodology is that it
leads to a distinct structure, that is, the innitesimal generator of
each individual automaton is an arrowhead matrix. Although this
property was not utilized in this study, it might be benecial for
application of efcient numerical methods. This property would be
very important for lowering computation time for large models,
when the storage of global system matrix and efcient calculation
of steady-state probabilities requires special attention.

22

M. nipas et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 157 (2017) 1322

At the moment, we cannot state that the proposed methodology is the most efcient way for the system description. Other
techniques might yield a lower number of system states or, alternatively, to simplify specication of functional dependencies
between different automata. This study was opted for a trade-off
between the size of state space and ability to describe interaction
between different automata.
In general, two main factors restrict the applicability of any
Markov chain based methodology in reliability modeling. First, it is a
rapid growth of the number of states in Markov model, which is
often referred to as state space explosion. Although SAN formalism is
suitable for simplifying this problem, it is not a complete solution.
Depending on computational resources even the compact representation of transition matrix is not sufcient when the size of
probability vector exceeds RAM capacity. To the best of our knowledge, a general compact form for a probability vector is not yet
known; therefore, it remains the bottleneck in Markov chain modeling for large systems. In this case, state space reduction could be
applied as it is common in reliability problems [41]. This study did
not concentrate on these problems, and the presented examples
were intended merely to demonstrate the proposed methodology.
However, we believe that the advanced techniques, such as SAN
formalism, allow for specication and solution of much larger Markov chain models in reliability problems than is commonly assumed.
Second limitation to the application of Markov processes is its
inapplicability to non-Markovian systems. In Markovian system, the
time after which the system leaves any particular state does not
depend on the time already spent in that state. This memoryless
property is satised only when the time-spans between different
events have an exponential distribution. Non-exponential distribution can be approximated by phase type distribution, which is
also applicable to SAN formalism [42]. In such a way a non-Markovian system is replaced by a Markovian one, although it would
further increase the size of state-space. In addition, this, most likely,
would not be suitable in some situations, e.g., to model planned
repairs in regular time intervals. In such cases, other approaches,
such as the Monte Carlo method, should be applied.

[11]

[12]
[13]
[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]
[20]
[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]
[25]
[26]

[27]

[28]

Acknowledgments
[29]

This work was supported by Grant (ATE-no. 04/2012) from the

Research Council of Lithuania.

[30]

[31]

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