Sustainable Development

Sust. Dev. 6, 9298 (1998)

ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

J. M. Buchdahl* and D. Raper

The Manchester Metropolitan University, UK

This paper presents a critical analysis of

the anthropocentric nonanthropocentric
ethical debate in the context of
sustainable development. Traditionally,
anthropocentrics are regarded as those
who value the environment
instrumentally, for the usefulness which
certain features of nature have for
humans. By contrast, nonanthropocentrics
value nature intrinsically, in its own right.
In this paper, such a simple bi-modal
representation of ethical value is criticized
for being too vague. Instead, by
examining five dimensions of ethical
value, the object of environmental value,
the nature of value, the source of value,
the theory of value and the attribution of
value, it is possible to construct a
logically coherent set of environmental
ethics which can fully address the
concept and implementation of
sustainable development.  1998 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
Received 4th February 1998
Accepted 25th February 1998
*Correspondence to: Joe Buchdahl, ARIC, Department of Environmental and Geographical Sciences, Manchester Metropolitan
University, Chester Street, Manchester M1 5GD
CCC 0968-0802/98/02009207 $17.50
 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

INTRODUCTION

t the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, 179 states

adopted a declaration committing themselves to making future development sustainable. Agenda 21 did not turn its back on
growth, but strove to ensure that the price of
growth did not become an intolerable bill for
future generations (DoE, 1994). Most societies
want to achieve higher standards of living, both
now and for future generations. Equally, they also
seek to protect and enhance their environment.
Sustainable development tries to reconcile these two
objectives. The problems for implementing sustainable development arise when we attempt to
balance social and economic progress with natural
harmony.
Consequently, sustainable development means
different things to different people. To some, the
essence of sustainable development is sustained
economic growth, where cycles of monetary
boom and bust are avoided. So long as technological advances keep pace with consumption of
natural resources, we may feel assured that future
generations will be able to experience an equal or
improved standard of living compared to our
own. To others, a sustainable society must turn to
renewable resources to enhance growth, whilst
protecting those aspects of the environment that
cannot be replaced. Growth should continue, as a
basic need of life, but not at the expense of future
generations and the environment they inhabit.
More radical environmentalists, however, would
wish us to go further. Human society, they claim,
is part of the global environment, not parasitic

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ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

upon it, and thus we should view our behaviour

(social and economic) as a subset of nature.
Human needs, therefore, are secondary to the
natural order of things, where equilibrium exists
between life and death, growth and decay. Rather,
we should strive for a sustainable harmony of nature.
Such a plurality of opinion is seen to arise out
of the varying attitudinal, ethical and metaphysical positions which people adopt regarding the
environment. Those that place more emphasis on
social and economic needs tend to adopt humancentred (anthropocentric) and instrumental value
systems. Others who prefer environmental protection at the expense of human growth are
proponents of nonanthropocentrism and intrinsicalism, where Nature is valued for her own sake.
If sustainable development is to succeed, in whatever form, it is crucial to examine more critically
the different ethical rationales from which the
varying concepts of sustainability are constructed.
This paper is about the environmental ethics of
sustainable development.

CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS
Within our post-modern culture, a branch of
ethics which deals with the rights and values
of nature has begun to challenge some of the
philosophical arguments which support more
traditional theories of morality (Pepper, 1996).
Nonanthropocentric or non-human-centred ethics
is now questioning the basis of existing anthropocentric (human-centred) value systems, which
regard human beings as the sole agents of moral
considerability. Differences between these two
ethical positions are found in their contrasting
treatment of the concepts of value, valuer and
valuing.
There are several dimensions of value ethics.
These include the object of value, the nature of
value, the source of value, the theory of value and
the attribution of value. Every ethical doctrine
subscribes to a specific subset of dimensional
positions, some of them common to each other.
Orthodox anthropocentrism, which treats only
human beings and their characteristics as worthy
of moral consideration (A1), dictates that nonhuman value is instrumental with respect to
human needs and interests (B1), that value is
generated by either human beings (C1) or divine
decree (C3) and that usually value is attributed
hierarchically (E2). Which theory of value anthro-

pocentrics subscribe to will often depend on their

position on dimension C1. Intuitionists will often
defend an objectivist value theory, whilst prescriptivists favour subjectivism. Those basing the
source of value on human reason may endorse
either.
Dimensions of Value Ethics

(A) Object of value

humans (anthropocentric)
sentient organisms (sentientric)
animals (zoocentric)
life (biocentric)
nature (ecocentric)
(B) nature of value
instrumental
inherent
intrinsic
(C) source of value
anthropogenic
intuition
reason
social prescription (convention)
ecogenic
divine decree
(D) theory of value
objectivist
subjectivist
(E) attribution of value
equal
hierarchical
In contrast, most nonanthropocentrics (A2)
(A5) value nonhuman nature intrinsically, independently of human values (B3). Radical
nonanthropocentrics, furthermore, often consider
the source of value in nonhuman nature to be
independent of human consciousness (C2), therefore favouring an objectivist theory of value (D1).
Although there are some who are willing to
accept the priorities of humans when making
moral valuations, fanatical nonanthropocentrics
commonly attribute moral value equally throughout nature.

ANTHROPOCENTRISM,
NONANTHROPOCENTRISM AND
SUSTAINABILITY
Anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism offer
their own rationale and framework for sustainable development. The former has usually been
associated with shallow green, or mainstream,

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J. M. BUCHDAHL AND D. RAPER

environmental thinking, whilst the latter forms

the basis of deep green ecology. Orthodox
anthropocentrism regards humans, both present
and future, as the sole entities worthy of moral
consideration. Where nonhuman entities are
found to have moral value, this is purely instrumental with respect to the needs and interests
of human beings (Routley and Routley, 1995).
Hence, social and economic interests, which have
dominated Western cultural thinking for 200
years, are considered primary, whilst the idea of
natures economy is reduced to resource consumption and conservation. Since growth is the
only evidence of life, development should continue, but in a manner that conserves natures
resources for the benefit of future generations.
Radical nonanthropocentrics, however, regard
such an ethical doctrine as a form of human
chauvinism and speciesism. Rather, it is argued,
evolution informs us that values do exist within
nature independent of humans, and as such these
values are considered intrinsic (Elliot, 1995).
Nature should thus be valuable for its own sake,
not just for the benefits it can bring to mankind.
Such value is therefore ecogenic, being derived
from outside the sphere of human existence. The
real meaning of sustainability would stress that
natures economy is primary, and the social and
market economies of human beings are parasitic
on it. Social and economic development should
be dependent upon natures constraints. In the
extreme, growth would be balanced by decay, as
life complements death, and sustainable development reduces to sustainable harmony in nature.
As we shall see, aspects of both anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism may be recommended for an ethical rationalization of
sustainable development. Nevertheless, each contains logical inconsistencies which must be identified before a coherent ethical theory can be
formulated. Although numerous philosophical
texts have been written which discuss in greater
detail these issues (e.g. Steverson, 1996; Elliot,
1996; Scoville, 1995; Morito, 1995; Sterba, 1994;
Paden, 1994; Ferre, 1993; Weston, 1992; Callicott,
1992; Harlow, 1992), here we will provide only a
selective review of some of the more relevant
problems associated with traditional anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric value ethics.

ISSUES FOR ANTHROPOCENTRISM

Orthodox anthropocentrism has formed the basis
of moral theory since biblical times. The notion of

man as steward of his environment (Passmore,

1974) is inherent within ethical arguments discussing the relationship of society and nature.
Nevertheless, logical inconsistencies exist regarding both its treatment of the object of value
(dimension A) and the nature of value (dimension
B).
Object of value and membership of the
Moral Club
A major difficulty for human-centred value systems arises because a set of morally relevant
characteristics must be found to exist that is
unique to the human beings, whilst being absent
from other species (Routley and Routley, 1995).
Intelligence, the ability to learn, consciousness,
sociality and emotions may all be considered here.
Evidently, however, several, if not all of these
characteristics are found to exist in many nonhuman species, in particular the nonhuman
primates. Furthermore, if the moral value of such
characteristics is taken as instrumental with
respect to the advancement of some other goal,
for example pleasure or welfare, it can be
observed that other species engage in such
motivations as well.
Conversely, we may note that several subsets
of human beings are partly devoid of such morally worthy characteristics as listed, including
infants, the illiterate, the mentally infirm, the
vegetative and, as some would suggest, the
unborn. Consequently, we are faced with two
alternatives: either remove sections of society
from the Moral Club (as the national-socialist
party of 1930s Germany advocated), or admit
that some nonhuman species should be ascribed
moral value of some form.
The nature of moral value
Ethical theories which consider all moral value to
be instrumental with respect to human needs,
interests and motivations (B1) have been criticized
according to the logical inconsistencies that
instrumentalism creates. Typically such theories
take the goal to be the furtherance of welfare
or pleasure. In order for instrumentalism to
work logically, however, the goal itself must be
implicitly treated within the theory as valuable.
Thus, we are left with two choices. In the first, the
goal is taken as itself instrumentally valuable with
respect to some further goal, thus creating an
infinite series of instrumental values. Alternatively, the goal is not taken to be instrumentally

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ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

valuable but is assumed to be valuable in some

other way. Such an assumption leads, of course, to
the consideration of the goal as having intrinsic
value, or value in itself. Kant sought, unconvincingly, to side-step this paradox by proposing that
ones behaviour should accord with universalizable maxims which respect persons, and their
duties, as ends in themselves (Paton, 1967).
Orthodox anthropocentrism, then, faces
charges of speciesism and the logical inconsistency of instrumentalism. By contrast, nonanthropocentrism advocates a theory of intrinsicalism
with respect to the nature of moral value, and is
willing to include not only all other forms of life
within the Moral Club (biocentrism) but inanimate
entities such as rocks, landscapes and oceans as
well (ecocentrism). Despite its mystic appeal,
however, more radical nonanthropocentric doctrines face their own logical inconsistencies in
support of intrinsicalism (B3) and the objectivist
theory of value (D1) that it presupposes.

ISSUES FOR
NONANTHROPOCENTRISM
Many proponents of deep ecology have hailed
certain aspects of nonanthropocentrism as offering a radically new system of ethics, a global
ethics based upon the theory of evolution, ecology and the new physics (Callicott, 1994). Yet the
assertion that moral value is considered intrinsic
in nature, requiring no need for humans to engage
in valuing experiences, must surely be questioned.
If such a premise is rejected, then one must
concede that what remains is fundamentally an
anthropogenic ethic (C1). To suggest otherwise
requires the acceptance of an objectivist, and
essentially false, meta-ethical theory (D1).
Problems with objective value
Two arguments traditionally employed by moral
sceptics in the rejection of objective value include
appeals to relativity and metaphysical peculiarity
or queerness. The argument from relativity has as
its premise the implied spatial and temporal variations in ethical codes that exist between different
social groups, cultures and generations. Whilst
such an observation is merely a descriptive truth,
it nonetheless weakens the case for objective
morality: radical differences between ethical
judgements, and perhaps more significantly ways
of life with which such judgements are coupled,

make it difficult to treat such judgements as

apprehensions of objective truths (Mackie, 1977).
The argument from queerness lends further
support to the criticism of objective value.
Appeals to intuition (C1a) are often used to
support such value theories. Some traditional
human-centred ethical positions falsely claim that
moral truths are discoverable by intuition, inferring that they exist objectively in the universe.
Nonanthropocentrics avoid charges of intuitionism by favouring an ecogenic source (C2) of
intrinsic value. However, a subject-dependent sensory perception mechanism that is capable of
recognizing objective values must surely be of a
very peculiar sort. To suggest, for example, that
unsustainable development is objectively morally wrong requires us to see the consequential
link between unsustainable development and its
wrongness.
The naturalistic fallacy
The argument from queerness, or the peculiarity
of perceiving objective values, highlights a
wider and more fundamental mistake that radical
nonanthropocentrics make. Since the age of
Darwinism, it has become widely accepted that
moral has nothing to do with natural (Rolston,
1992). Nature simply is what it is, and it is only
humans which generate what ought to be. When
one attempts to link what is with what ought to be
one commits the naturalistic fallacy.
This is not to say that values do not exist in
nature. On the contrary, Darwinism informs us
that organic evolution depends upon values, inasmuch as there is a constant struggle between the
weaker and the stronger for perpetuation or
survival (Glass, 1966), but such values refer to the
mechanistic importance of natural processes for
individual organisms, species or species systems.
Such mechanistic or natural values do not inform
the organism that it ought to survive, but merely
how to. The mechanistic value of a natural object
(or process), alone, does not entitle that object (or
process) to be evaluated morally. To define the
moral worth of nature in terms of observations or
facts is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. Facts, by
themselves, do not provide us with reasons for
action, but only offer guidance as to how we
ought to act (Singer, 1981).
No doubt, many advocates of nonanthropocentric environmentalism will remain unimpressed
by such criticism of intrinsic or objective value,
but even for them a challenge remains. Many of
the alleged value-adding properties of natural

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J. M. BUCHDAHL AND D. RAPER

systems, such as beauty, complexity and harmony, seem to be primarily aesthetic properties
and human projections on the natural world
(Elliot, 1995). Furthermore, it can be argued that
contemporary perceptions of what is natural are
themselves constructions tainted with moral overtones, inexorably intertwined with the aesthetic
properties used to describe them.

REJECTING THE CLASSICAL

ANTHROPOCENTRIC
NONANTHROPOCENTRIC
DICHOTOMY
It seems, then, that neither orthodox anthropocentrism nor radical nonanthropocentrism, as
ethical doctrines, can offer a fully comprehensive
framework for the moral justification of sustainability. On the one hand, anthropocentric ethics
fails to account adequately for the moral value of
nonhuman nature, other than in a purely instrumental sense for the usefulness it serves for
human beings. Thus, conservation of natural
resources and maintenance of the environmental
status quo can only be justified by appeals to
human preferences. Frequently, we are informed
that contemporary (Western) human needs are
detrimental to the natural order of things. In
addition, identification of such instrumental values
depends upon knowledge of the ecological
functions or other utilities of nonhuman entities
(Lemons and Saboski, 1994). Yet if moral prescriptions are defined by scientific research, we run the
risk of committing the naturalistic fallacy, identifying what is understood about nature with what
is morally valuable in nature.
On the other hand, more radical versions of
nonanthropocentric ethics presuppose the acceptance of an objectivist theory of value, and of
intrinsic value in nature. Sustainability is then
justified in terms of the rights of existence of
nonhuman entities, rather than in terms of the
commercial or scientific potential of such entities.
This may seem to be mystically appealing to
individuals disillusioned with Western cultures
and ideologies. Yet we are still left with a feeling
of who decides?, or rather, how such absolute
value in nature is authorized. It seems that no
matter how hard we try to conceptualize an
objectivist set of ethics, we are reminded that it is
human beings, endowed with a unique ethical
consciousness, who project ethical judgements
onto the natural world. Nevertheless, whilst both

anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism contain flaws in their philosophical arguments, they

nonetheless offer valuable contributions to the
theory of moral value in nature, and more specifically the ethical justification of sustainability.

RECONCILING ANTHROPOCENTRISM
AND NONANTHROPOCENTRISM
If charges of logical inconsistency associated with
objectivist value perspectives are to be avoided, it
is necessary to turn to a more subjectivist analysis
of the environmental ethics of sustainability. One
way of achieving reconciliation between orthodox anthropocentric and radical nonanthropocentric doctrines is to emphasize the distinction
between the object of value (dimension A) and
the source of value (dimension C). A moral or
ethical statement in this context offers a judgement as to whether a certain action (or inaction) is
right or wrong, and whether an object is ethically
valuable or valueless. All such statements concerning the object of ethical value express first
order (normative) ethical judgements. By contrast,
second order (meta-ethical) statements attempt to
define the nature of moral valuing, or in other
words the source of ethical valuing. Such first and
second order views are not merely distinct but
completely independent. Much of the criticism
levelled earlier at classical anthropocentrism and
nonanthropocentrism may be explained by the
fact the neither doctrine adequately recognizes
such a distinction.
Having rejected anthropocentric perspectives
of the object of ethical value, and an objectivist
source of ethical value, we are left to consider the
role of nonanthropocentric subjectivism as an
alternative ethical doctrine for justifying sustainability. Although the business of prescribing a
moral judgement involves a subjective experience,
one restricted to human consciousness, we need
not preclude the possibility that nonhuman
entities, themselves incapable of moral evaluation,
may be accommodated into an expanded Moral
Club. Since the object and the source of ethical
value are independent, moral value need not be
restricted only to entities capable of moral valuing. Thus, valuing an object for its own sake need
not require the existence of an objectivist ethics,
but can be achieved simply by the subjective
construction or prescription of an ethical concept.
The ethical dimensions of nonanthropocentric subjectivism are thus A5 (ecocentric), B2

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ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

(inherentist), C1c (anthropogenic prescriptivist),

D2 (subjectivist) and E2 (hierarchical). The doctrine presupposes ecocentrism, because nonhuman
entities, including inanimate objects, can be logically included within the Moral Club, inherentism
(rather than instrumentalism or intrinsicalism),
because whilst value in nonhuman nature is
dependent upon human consciousness, some of
this value does not derive from traditional human
values, anthropogenic prescriptivism, because the
source of the ethical valuing experience is unique
to humans, who engage in such behaviour
through convention, therefore, subjectivism and
finally, hierarchical attribution of value, since most
people would presumably wish to rank the ethical
status of themselves above other living species
and inanimate objects.

one hand, technocentrics cannot disregard the

strong cases for expanding the Moral Club to
include all aspects of nonhuman nature. Neither
can it be assumed that human ingenuity will
continue to offer a level of environmental protection above that of degradation. On the other
hand, the development needs of present and
future generations cannot be dismissed as aspects
alien to the ways of nature. Agenda 21 is right to
recognize the competing demands of natural harmony and human welfare (Keating, 1993). Where
it founders is with regards to the overriding
ideology of man as shepherd and nature as
resources. Nature does indeed provide instrumental value with respect to social and economic
needs, but nature has an inherent value outside
these demands as well, a value for itself.

WHAT FORM OF SUSTAINABILITY?

CONCLUSION

Nonanthropocentric subjectivism accepts that

some value in nature does not derive from human
needs and interests. Whilst value recognition (or
prescription) is anthropogenic, the value object in
question need not be anthropocentric. Equally,
however, the needs of humans, both present and
future, cannot be dismissed as secondary to the
needs of nonhuman nature. Both the chauvinism
of orthodox anthropocentrism and the value
theory inconsistencies of radical nonanthropocentrism demand the acceptance of a man nature
dichotomy in direct contravention to contemporary Darwinian ecology. Mankind is neither separate from nor master of nature, but embodied
within it. The development needs of mankind,
therefore, are neither subsidiary nor superior to
the needs1 of nature, but form part of them.
To a certain extent, then, nonanthropocentric
subjectivism allows us the freedom to choose
between a number of possible sustainability
scenarios. Whilst objectivist moral arguments,
whether human centred or nonhuman centred,
may allow an easier choice in this respect, one
should not allow the practical difficulties associated with subjectivism to sway us from its more
logically constructive content. On the contrary, it
is crucial to recognize the subjective validity of
competing ideologies for sustainability. On the
1

Needs here expresses the idea of nature striving towards

harmony or equilibrium, as determined by thermodynamic principles. Whilst some contemporary science has begun to challenge
this static view of nature as fallacious, the metaphor is nonetheless
a useful one, in the sense that nature tends, albeit without
teleological purpose, towards physically determined states.

In this paper we have critically reviewed current

ethical thinking within the environmental debate.
In recent years. a plethora of practical scenarios
for sustainability have been proposed, some
emphasizing social and economic development,
others concentrating more on environmental protection. Many of these scenarios are, however,
founded on incomplete or logically inconsistent
ethical and meta-ethical theories. It was our purpose, then, to review these inconsistencies and
to propose a well structured doctrine for environmental ethics. This is the ethics of nonanthropocentric subjectivism.
Environmentalists have traditionally been
divided into two distinct groups according to
how each views the object, nature and source of
moral value. Orthodox anthropocentrism is based
upon instrumentalist and anthropogenic value
theories, which consider humans and human
characteristics as the sole members of the Moral
Club. Alternatively, radical nonanthropocentrism
emphasizes intrinsicalism, and ecogenic or objectivist sources of value, with value attributed to all
of nature, animate and inanimate. This simple
bi-modal representation of environmental ethics
fails to distinguish adequately between, and therefore identify, the independent dimensions of
moral value and moral valuing. By recognising
logical inconsistencies of objectivist value theories
and the chauvinism of orthodox anthropocentrism, it is possible to construct a set of environmental ethics which can address the concept and
implementation of sustainable development.

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J. M. BUCHDAHL AND D. RAPER

Nonanthropocentric subjectivism offers the

only logically coherent ethical foundation on
which to build a programme of sustainable development. Whilst inherent value can theoretically
be ascribed to nonhuman entities, the construction
of moral values is nonetheless a uniquely human
experience dependent upon human consciousness.
By implication, whilst choices of what is considered morally valuable must remain within
the human sphere, such choices, in the context
of environmental protection, should no longer
regard human preferences (e.g. social and economic) as the only manifestations of moral significance. Rather, by understanding and appreciating
the natural value of our global environment, we
can be guided as to what would make a morally
acceptable course of action to achieve sustainable
development.

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BIOGRAPHY
Joe Buchdahl is a research fellow working for the
Atmospheric Research and Information Centre at
the Manchester Metropolitan University. He
co-ordinates the Global Climate Change and Air
Quality Information Programmes, and is currently
researching for a PhD in public attitudes towards
environmentalism.
David Raper is the Director of the Atmospheric Research and Information Centre at the
Manchester Metropolitan University. He conducts both pure and applied research on air
quality management and emissions modelling,
and is a leading expert in the field of the
environmental impacts of aviation.
The authors can be contacted at the Atmospheric Research and Information Centre, Department of Environmental and Geographical
Sciences, The Manchester Metropolitan University, Chester Street, Manchester, M1 5GD, UK.
Tel: 0161 247 1593.
Fax: 0161 247 6332.
E-mail: j.buchdahl@mmu.ac.uk

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